CDR BRENNAN SWEENEY
f you had told me a year ago that my first combat mission as a squadron XO was going to be over Syria, I would’ve called you a liar. If you had added that the flight would include a 750-mile, single-engine transit over hostile territory, failing electrical systems and capped off with a no-HUD approach, I might have passed on the command bonus! It was the first combat mission of the deployment, and it started out optimistically enough, with good weather forecast and a high likelihood of employing weapons on day two of Carrier Air Wing Seventeen’s efforts to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIS. After transiting 750 miles from USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) and tanking once on the dreaded KC-135 Iron Maiden, we had completed our first on-station window or “vul.” While en route to our second tanker, still over Syria, my heart dropped a little when I heard the distinctive master-caution tone and saw a steady right AMAD pressure caution. In the F/A-18E Super Hornet, this caution indicates a loss of oil pressure in the right airframe mounted accessory drive (AMAD). In accordance with the pocket checklist (PCL) and after a short discussion with my experienced wingman, I secured the right engine. I didn’t plan to land any time soon and would rather not be on fire. With one generator secured, the other should be able to carry the robust electrical load of the Super Hornet, even with all combat systems operating. I was disappointed and a bit surprised when, shortly after 28
securing the right engine, my displays flashed, followed by loss of the right DDI, HUD and various other systems. The GEN TIE caution that was now illuminated pointed at a fault in the electrical circuitry. My electrical system showed just under 28 volts. I assumed that the voltage was actually 28 volts and that the gauge was just slightly off. I diagnosed the loss of displays as being a missioncomputer failure. To add insult to injury, my auxiliary radio was stuck in HAVEQUICK. The time sync had been lost, resulting in loss of communication with my wingman, who was still communicating with our JTAC on the PRI radio. I used my primary radio to communicate the emergency and my intentions to our assigned Battle Management Agency (BMA). I pumped my aircraft to signal my wingman to join and passed him the electrical HEFEO signal. After my wingman acknowledged the signal, I gave him the hand signal for ”fuel,” passed the lead and we proceeded to the tanker for some much-needed gas. The next problem wouldn’t come from a complex set of failures or compound emergencies: it was Approach
