The Development of the Eurozone A neofunctional analysis of the integration processes Nick De Leu // Tartu University // 2010
Introduction On January 1st, 2011, Estonia became the latest country to join the eurozone, now bringing the total of EU Member states that use the euro as their currency to 17.1 This is arguably a milestone for the euro, as the Estonian accession to the zone is a genuine eastward expansion for the European currency. The Baltic State is the first former Soviet Union country to join the euro area, and the country is located so far East in the European Union that its inhabitants in fact call the Baltic Sea the “Western Sea”.2 Moreover, the accession comes at a remarkable moment in EU history. Since 2007, the global economic and financial crises have been wreaking severe havoc in the various national households of the European Union. This eventually led to the 2010 European sovereign debt crisis, which held – and, to some extent, still holds – no less than five eurozone countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) in a stranglehold as they struggled to avoid bankruptcy – leading many economists to fear the euro could collapse.3 Nonetheless, throughout the whole process of accession to the euro zone, Estonia proved to be a star pupil. Tallinn benefited from the “Nordic coolness” of its people to introduce some of the toughest austerity measures seen in Europe – thus staying steady on the euro track. No major protests, like in Greece or France, or even fellow Baltic States Latvia and Lithuania, occured.4 5 The Estonian entry led European Commission President Jose Barroso to state that now, “over 330 million Europeans carry euro notes and coins in their pockets” and that that “is a strong signal of the attraction and stability that the euro brings”.6 Indeed, even throughout the crisis that rocked the eurozone, Estonia remained determined to adopt the currency, and Iceland, which has always been reluctant to join the European Union (mostly on grounds of differing
“Map of euro area 1999-2011,” ECB, http://www.ecb.int/euro/intro/html/map.en.html (accessed 5 Jan. 2011). Jan Puhl, “Austerity pays off for Estonia: former Soviet republic could be next to adopt euro,” Der Spiegel, 6 Mar. 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,698299,00.html (accessed 5 Jan. 2011). 3 Stefan Schultz, “Europe’s Debt Crisis – Five Threats to the Common Currency,” Der Spiegel, 2 Nov. 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,677214,00.html (accessed 5 Jan. 2011). 4 Jan Puhl, “Austerity pays off for Estonia”. 5 Utt Ummelas, “Estonia’s entry expands euro into former Soviet Union,” Bloomberg, 31 Dec. 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201012-31/estonia-joins-euro-club-as-currency-expands-east-into-former-soviet-union.html (accessed 5 Jan. 2011). 6 Utt Ummelas, “Estonia’s entry expands euro into former Soviet Union”. 1 2
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opinions on fishery policies) pushed for EU accession – and entry to the eurozone – as a way out of the financial crisis.7 Nevertheless, Estonia is likely to be the last addition to the euro club for several years, as a lot of Member States continue to grapple with the first real financial crisis in the eurozone. For instance, Lithuania and Latvia, believed to be next in line for accession, are now aiming for 2014, and bigger eastern countries have shied away from setting target dates.8 The aforementioned expansion and the handling of the crisis are of course to be seen within the framework of the development of the eurozone. Both factors are new elements in the history of a single European currency, and, from a broader perspective, the history of a European common monetary policy – an idea that surfaced as early as 1962, in a memorandum issued by the European Commission (under the presidency of the German Walter Hallstein) and that has greatly influenced European integration.9 This paper will attempt to provide a theoretical framework for the influence the development of the eurozone has had on European integration so far. More specifically, it will be argued that neofunctional integration theory can help explain the processes at hand. In order to fit the development of the Eurozone into the neofunctionalist framework, a description of neofunctionalist theory should of course first be made. This paper will discuss the origins and key concepts of the theory, its development and the main objections against it. In the second part of this paper, several events in the development of the eurozone will be described and explained by means of neofunctionalist concepts. Finally, it will be argued that the development of the eurozone can be seen both as a result of neofunctional pressures, as it can be the source of them.
Theoretical background As Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen argues in his award-winning essay Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC (1991), neofunctionalism is the most elaborate, ambitious and criticized theory of regional integration. It was developed Hannes Gamillscheg, “Mini-Mehrheit für Islands EU-Antrag,” Die Presse, 16 Jul. 2009, http://diepresse.com/home/politik/eu/495637/MiniMehrheit-fuer-Islands-EUAntrag (accessed 5 Jan. 2011). 8 Utt Ummelas, “Estonia’s entry expands euro into former Soviet Union”. 9 “Bulletin de la Communauté Économique Européenne,” European Economic Community, Dec. 1962, 10, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documentation/chapter1/19621231fr07commissionenvisage.pdf (accessed 5 Jan. 2011). 7
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in the late 1950s and early ‘60s by the American political scientists Ernst B. Haas (in The Uniting of Europe, 1958) and Leon Lindberg (in The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, 1963), and was partly based on the functionalist integration theory put forward by British political theorist David Mitrany. However, the European Community evolved in ways other than those the neofunctionalists expected, and the theory fell into disfavor, eventually leading to its abandonment by Haas himself. Nonetheless, Tranholm-Mikkelsen argues the debate on neofunctionalism has been reopened since the mid-‘80s, as he perceived a “new dynamism” in the European Community.10 Neofunctionalist integration theory tries to explain “the process whereby European integration proceeds from modest sectoral beginnings to something broader and more ambitious”.11 Both Haas and Lindberg emphasized the importance of central, supranational institutions, such as the European Commission or the European Court of Justice, in this process.12 This becomes clear from their respective definitions of integration, as Haas stresses the “shift of loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” and Lindberg refers to states “seeking to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs”.13 Before any integration can occur, however, Haas distinguishes three background conditions for it. He demands the presence of pluralistic social structures, which allow for diversity of political parties and interest groups (which could gradually become loyal to the new centre), argues for common ideological patterns and a substantial economic development – as economic integration is a prerequisite for political integration.14 15
Spillover However, the key concept in the neofunctionalist theory is the concept of spillover, which occurs when integration in one area results in demands for integration in others.16 TranholmMikkelsen distinguishes three aspects of the spillover snowball effect.
Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, “Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A reappraisal in the light of the New Dynamism of the EC,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 1991. Vol.20, No.1, 2-3. 11 Rachel Wang, “The Fate of the European Union,” Global Politics, http://www.globalpolitics.co.uk/Archive/The%20Fate%20of%20the%20EU.htm (accessed 4 Jan. 2011). 12 Jorge Juan Fernández García, Jess E. Clayton, Christopher Hobley, The Student’s Guide to European Integration, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 30, http://books.google.be/books?id=S1G5cNRZiwgC&pg (accessed 5 Jan. 2011). 13 Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, “Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete?,” 3-4. 14 Catherine MacMillan, “The application of Neofunctionalism to the enlargement process: the Case of Turkey,” Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 47 no. 1 (2009), 790. 15 Catherine MacMillan, “The Case of Turkey,” 795. 16 Jorge Juan Fernández García et al., The Student’s Guide to European Integration, 30. 10
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Functional spillover implies that some sectors within industrial economies are so interdependent that it is impossible to treat them in isolation. Attempts to integrate certain tasks will lead to problems which can only be solved by integrating yet more tasks. This was already obvious to the French politician Jean Monnet, arguably one of the fathers of the European Union, who thought that integration of basic industries such as coal and steel must lead to a need for integration of other energy sectors, and later of the whole economy.17 Therefore, institutions widen and deepen integration, through creation of new institutions or new policies.18 Political spillover comes forth from Haas’ demand for pluralistic societies. Various interest groups will discover that their interests may be better pursued through supranational institutions than through national ones, which will result in a shift of allegiance. Lindberg emphasized that these groups are represented by highly bureaucratized organizations, socalled “elites”, which go through a learning process described as engrenage: in the process of integration, they would interact more and more with supranational officials, which allows them to develop new perspectives and loyalties.19 20 Lastly, there is cultivated spillover. As mentioned before, both Haas and Lindberg emphasized the role of central institutions: in the eyes of neofunctionalists, they are the embodiment of common interest. Haas has argued that classical diplomatic negotiations rarely move beyond the “lowest common denominator”, so the talks result in the position of the least cooperative partner. However, if there is an autonomous and institutionalized mediator – like the European Commission – the result may be based on an “upgrading of the common interest”.21 Catherine MacMillan argues the Commission can do this by encouraging co-operation in areas which it perceives to hold a common interest. The EC could then cultivate spillover by pushing through package deals, using its superior expertise or by using its close ties with national civil servants and interest groups. By doing so, the supranational institution simultaneously strengthens its own power base.22 MacMillan distinguishes two more forms of spillover. Ernst Haas himself recognized – even before the first enlargement round – that as integration proceeds, neighboring countries are Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, “Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete?,” 4-5. Jorge Juan Fernández García et al., The Student’s Guide to European Integration, 30 19 Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, “Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete?,” 5. 20 Catherine MacMillan, “The Case of Turkey,” 792. 21 Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, “Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete?,” 6. 22 Catherine MacMillan, “The Case of Turkey,” 792. 17 18
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increasingly affected and attracted by membership of the regional integration project, a phenomenon for which he coined the term “geographical spillover”.23 Lee Miles adds to this the concept of institutional spillover, which involves the revision of EU institutions after an increase in the number of members. Expansion complicates intergovernmental bargaining, so it is likely to pressure for more supranational policy making.24
Downfall and revival of the theory However, the concept of spillover seems to have its limits. As leading political theorist Andrew Moravcsik argues, integration has only intermittently spilled over to closely related sectors, and the influence of the supranational officials has only increased slowly.25 Moreover, Haas was forced to admit that he had underestimated nationalism as a factor of integration.26 As the aforementioned Hallstein-Commission played a highly visible role in the EEC and tried to link the completion of the Common Agricultural Policy with budgetary and institutional reforms, French President Charles de Gaulle was not amused. France boycotted the Community in what would later become known as the 1965-66 Empty Chair Crisis. Furthermore, de Gaulle opposed the scheduled transition to majority voting in the European Council, and the Luxembourg Compromise of 1966 allowed for a de facto national veto on all issues by European Member States. Needless to say, this greatly slowed down the process of integration.27 Neofunctionalist scholars had to part with the idea of “automatic” spillover. As TranholmMikkelsen puts it: the concept changed from being a matter of certainty to a mere matter of probability. Haas recognized that his theory had failed to explain why decision makers choose to integrate in some areas and not others – precisely the accusation he held against functionalism – and abandoned his brain-child.28 Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, however, has spotted a re-emergence of the neofunctionalist logic since the mid-‘80s, originating from the 1985 adoption by the European Council of the European Commission’s White Paper on Completing the Internal Market. The later adopted Single European Act involved a legal commitment to the achievement of the White Paper’s Catherine MacMillan, “The Case of Turkey,” 796. Catherine MacMillan, “The Case of Turkey,” 798-9. 25 Andrew Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: a Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31 No. 4 (1993), 476. 26 Catherine MacMillan, “The Case of Turkey,” 792. 27 Jorge Juan Fernández García et al., The Student’s Guide to European Integration, 30. 28 Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, “Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete?,” 9. 23 24
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objective, and entailed among others a (limited) extension of the formal scope of the EC, a move towards majority voting in the European Council and a codification of the existing practices on foreign policy cooperation.29 The pace of European integration increased significantly, and neofunctionalist pressures seemed to be as prominent as in the early years of the EC.30 Since then, the debate in neofunctionalist theory has been reopened. One of the flaws of neofunctionalism was that it didn’t provide a proper theory of disintegration: it only explained why countries coordinate their efforts, but not why they defect from such arrangements. Thus, contemporary neofunctionalists have discussed the alternatives to spillover. One of the most remarkable notions to emerge from this is spillback, or “a retreat of integration at sectoral or institutional level, or both”. Arne Niemann suggests that spillback may result from three factors. First, there is the reluctance of leaders such as de Gaulle or former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to hand over sovereignty to supranational institutions. Second is the effect that anti-integration domestic groups may have on national governments: they can prevent the government from rising above a certain common denominator, even if it is itself pro-integration.31 In this respect, Tranholm-Mikkelsen also argues that there should at least be a “permissive consensus”: neofunctionalism may focus on “elites”, but popular attitudes should not be ignored.32 Lastly, diversity between Member States should not be underestimated as a factor which can negatively influence integration. Philippe C. Schmitter, on the other hand, challenges the traditional neofunctionalist notion that a crisis in integration is likely to spur spillover. In his opinion, such a crisis is more likely to result in what he calls encapsulation, or an intergovernmental solution – although the chances of spillover increase according to the previous level of integration of the organization. Schmitter includes several other possible outcomes of integrational crisis, such as “muddleabout”, which implies that actors try to maintain the integration, but without institutional changes; “spill-around”, meaning the proliferation of “functionally specialized, independent, but strictly intergovernmental bodies”; and “build-up”, which occurs when Member States grant greater authority to a regional organization without expanding its mandate.33
Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, “Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete?,” 10-11. Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, “Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete?,” 16. 31 Catherine MacMillan, “The Case of Turkey,” 793. 32 Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, “Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete?,” 17. 33 Catherine MacMillan, “The Case of Turkey,” 793. 29 30
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Schmitter has also proposed a system of polycentric and multi-level governance, as opposed to the traditional neofunctionalist view that the end shape of the EU would be a federal state. Such a system, which entails the possibility of opt-outs for Member States that do not wish to integrate fully in certain sectors, would increase the organizations absorption capacity.34
Application to the development of the Eurozone As mentioned before, neofunctionalists see a very important role for supranational institutions in the process of European integration. Therefore it is not surprisingly that it was the European Commission that issued a memorandum stating that it wanted Europe to move towards a veritable monetary union as early as 1962.35 However, it was exactly this kind of idealism that sparked the upsurge in nationalism, illustrated by the Empty Chair Crisis, which all but paralyzed neofunctionalist theory. A new proposal for a gradual realization of a European Monetary Union surfaced in the 1970 Werner Report. However, these plans went off track as the Bretton Woods system broke down and the 1973 oil crisis proved that the EC was having trouble finding a common policy.36 In 1979, the European Monetary System was launched, as European leaders agreed to create a “currency snake” by tying European currencies together.37 The initial achievements of the EMS encouraged efforts to complete the common market for goods, capital and services as envisaged in the 1986 SEA, but doubts soon emerged about whether the EMS could meet the challenges brought on by further integration.38 For instance, it was expected that the abolition of restriction on movement of capital inherent to the project would increase exchange volatility, and it was argued that the EMS would be unable to survive this pressure. Thus the economic rationale for the EMU was created: without it, it would not be possible to reap the full benefits of the internal market.39 The “triangle of incompatibility” was presented as the official technocratic justification for the EMU: a state cannot have monetary autonomy, free capital flows and fixed exchange rates at the same time: one of them must be sacrificed to further
Catherine MacMillan, “The Case of Turkey,” 793-4. de la Communauté Économique Européenne,” European Economic Community, 10. 36 Horst Ungerer, A Concise history of European Monetary Integration – From EPU to EMU, (Westport: Quorum Books, 1997), 3, http://books.google.com/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=I9ugHSjIGLIC (accessed 6 Jan. 2011). 37 “History of the Euro,” BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/business/2001/euro_cash/history/1.stm (accessed 7 Jan. 2011). 38 Horst Ungerer, A Concise history of European Monetary Integration, 4. 39 Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, “Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete?,” 13. 34
35“Bulletin
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integration.40 In other words, functional spillover into further integration was needed to complete the SEA goal. The project was launched in the 1989 Delors Report which proposed a EMU in which the exchange rates would be irrevocably locked, there would be a European System of Central Banks, common monetary policies and binding rules for budgetary policies.41 In the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, the European Council officially adopted a single European currency – the euro – as a goal for at the latest 1999. The project was overshadowed by severe crises of the EMS in 1992 and 1993, triggered by speculative international capital movements, but the will to move on with the realization of EMU persisted.42 This can be seen as in illustration of the notion that spillover is more likely to occur when there is already a certain degree of integration. Furthermore, the European Commission has been able to gain some ground in the institutional balance. The additional leverage is won by linking new proposals to the European Council’s commitment to the internal market objective. Basically, the Commission tells the Council that “if it really wants the internal market, like it says it does, then it should also adopt the policies suggested by the Commission”.43 This shows that the European Commission indeed cultivated its own spillover while pushing for the eurozone. In the meanwhile, the euro project had seen yet another upsurge of nationalism, as Margaret Thatcher was heavily opposed to the EMS system. However, the British Treasury Department and the Bank of England did see advantages in the EMS, and the standoff eventually resulted in the resignation of Mrs. Thatcher and the British accession to the EMS in 1990. A similar case could be observed in Denmark, where the Social Democratic Party gradually changed its policy on the EMU, which allowed the centre-right minority to take a more positive stance as well.44 These facts can be seen as cases of political spillover, where the elites of a country shift their allegiance to the European project. Nevertheless, Denmark and the UK have maintained their opt-out of the eurozone – an illustration of what Schmitter means when he says the EU shouldn’t be too strict in the
David Howarth, EMU, “Integration Theories and the annoying complexities of French policy-making” in The €uro – European Integration Theory and Economic and Monetary Union, ed. Amy Verdun, (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 182, http://books.google.com/books?id=j8jItybMHC4C (accessed 6 Jan. 2011). 41 Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, “Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete?,” 12. 42 Horst Ungerer, A Concise history of European Monetary Integration, 4. 43 Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, “Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete?,” 15. 44 Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, “Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete?,” 14. 40
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application of its rules. In the case of Denmark, the opt-out was the result of a failed referendum: which underlines Niemann’s remark that a shift in “elite” allegiance is not enough if the public doesn’t agree. Perhaps the most striking feat of neofunctionalist strategy in the development of the eurozone is the package deal made with Germany in the early nineties. French President François Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl both seized their chance to achieve their goals: Mitterrand agreed to Kohl’s desired German reunification, but in exchange Germany had to commit its strong economy to a European currency – which the French saw as a guarantee for peace. Meanwhile, Kohl made sure the newly founded European Central Bank was to be modeled after the Bundesbank.45 That bank replaced the European Monetary Institute in 1999, and has been an important player in European integration and the development of the eurozone ever since. From its creation, the ECB was already one of the most supranational organizations of the EU. Like the European Court of Justice, it is highly independent and thus not subject to Member State government oversight. The ECB can even make legally binding regulations and decisions itself.46
Recent developments As recently as 2010, the ECB has been subject of controversy. The bank is essentially bound by a “no bail-out”-clause, which means it cannot bail-out a country in need – this was intended to be a guarantee for the independent policy of stability the ECB is supposed to maintain. 47 Nevertheless, in May 2010, the bank purchased parts of the government debt of its most vulnerable members: Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal, which sparked great protests, particularly in Germany.
48
It also seems to point out that the ECB is reinterpreting its own
powers – an event Niemann had warned for in 2006, by stating that “supranational institutions tend over time to develop a life of their own and escape the control of Member States”.49 The European Commission has also seized the opportunity of the crisis to demand more power. For instance, it suggested the introduction of a “European Half Year”, which would “De totstandkoming van de Euro”, Mens en Samenleving, http://mens-en-samenleving.infonu.nl/politiek/22471-de-totstandkoming-van-deeuro.html (accessed 6 Jan. 2011). 46 Amy Richmond and Dorothee Helsenberg, Supranational Institution Building in the European Union – A comparison of the European Court of Justice and the European Central Bank, (New Haven: Yale University, 1999), 2. 47 “’No-bail out clause’ the dilemma for EU,” The Irish Times, 13 Feb. 2010, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/finance/2010/0213/1224264351860.html (accessed 6 Jan. 2011). 48 Brian Blackstone, “After debt crisis, new tension between ECB, Germany,” Wall Street Journal, 29 May 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703957604575272463950198700.html (accessed 6 Jan. 2011). 49 Catherine MacMillan, “The Case of Turkey,” 792. 45
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require EU Member States to present their budgets to the Commission six months before presenting them to the national parliament.50 It has also proposed to strengthen its own hand at punishing countries that sport large budget deficits by reducing their Agriculture funding. The innovation would be that the accused country would have to prove its neighbors that it does not deserve to be punished.51 Lastly, the accession of Estonia to the eurozone can be perceived as an illustration of neofunctionalism aswell. As MacMillan points out, enlargement is viable if the prerequisite conditions, postulated by Haas, are not likely to be disturbed by the expansion. 52 Through the fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria and the Euro Convergence Criteria, Estonia passed this test. On top of that, Schmitter argues that a successfully integration geographical union is prone to enlarge, as neighboring countries are likely to push for membership in order to avoid the negative consequences of regional discrimination.53 In other words, when two countries trade heavily, and one of them adopts the euro, it would be interesting if the other joins the eurozone as well. This is arguably the case between Estonia and Finland, as Finland is Estonia’s largest trade partner.54 On the other hand, this process entails the risk that countries join not because they share political goals, but out of fear of being left out – an evolution that is slightly visible in the Icelandic case.55
Conclusion In this paper, it has become quite clear that the start of European development towards a eurozone coincided with the revival of neofunctionalism. Essentially, the eurozone is the consequence of Europe’s desire for an internal market – it is a way to deal with the increasing pressures that the integration towards that market brought on. Simultaneously, the eurozone has spawned a supranational institution, the European Central Bank, and it has let the European Commission increase its competences. In the development of the eurozone, one can find elements that illustrate early neofunctionalist theory, such as the concept of spillover in, for instance, the transition from EMS to EMU; but also examples of more contemporary notions, like the British and Danish opt-outs which “EU-Kommission greift in nationale Etatplanung ein – Das Europäische Semester,” Euractiv, 12 May 2010, http://www.euractiv.de/finanzplatz-europa/artikel/das-europaische-semester-003101 (accessed 6 Jan. 2011). 51 “EZB stützt Vertragsänderung für wirtschaftliche Führung der EU,” Euractiv, 6 Jul. 2010, http://www.euractiv.com/de/euro/ezb-stuetztvertragsaenderung-fuer-wirtschaftliche-fuehrung-der-eu-news-496030 (accessed 6 Jan. 2011). 52 Catherine MacMillan, “The Case of Turkey,” 794. 53 Catherine MacMillan, “The Case of Turkey,” 796. 54 “Estonia and Finland,” Välisministeerium, 11 Nov. 2010, http://www.vm.ee/?q=en/node/69 (accessed 7 Jan. 2011). 55 Catherine MacMillan, “The Case of Turkey,” 796. 50
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illustrate Schmitter’s system of polycentric and multi-level governance. The same flaws that marred the theory of neofunctionalism could also be found in the development of the eurozone, like the underestimation of nationalist tendencies. Overall, neofunctionalism has proven to be a theory of integration which is very suitable for describing and analyzing processes within Europe. But above all, it seems like the theory has become more of a strategy for supranational institutions like the European Commission and the European Central Bank to push for an increase in competences.
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