Waking up from hibernation Russia retaliates: agitation or malevolence? Nick De Leu // Russian Foreign Policy // Tartu University // 2010 To many news media, political cartoons are a convenient way of addressing complicated matters in a thorough fashion, without taking up too much printing space. Whereas the political commentator is often limited by the insufficiency of words, and is subject to extensive nuances, the cartoonist can utilize visual symbols and textual witticisms, which help convey an intricate message quicker than elaborate opinion articles. Moreover, cartoonists particularly make use of irony and leave open ends so as to incite thought and wonder in their readership. It is exactly this trait that makes political cartoons interesting to analyze. And that is what will be attempted over the course of the next few pages. Subject of analysis will be one cartoon, published in the Russian journal Russia in Global Affairs. It will be examined through an enquiry into the symbols and events portrayed in the cartoon, which will then be discussed in relation to the ideological background assumptions behind the cartoon. In conclusion, a reconstruction of the artist’s statement will be attempted. The cartoon depicts the traditional bear as a symbol of Russia. The bear is facing East, when suddenly, an arrow strikes him in the rear. The cartoonist refers to this event with the caption “Kosovo”, hinting that the Kosovo crisis was a first slight provocation from the West towards Russia. The bear, however, does not react until a second arrow, symbolizing the eastward enlargement of NATO, hits him. He turns his head in amazement, and sees a third arrow coming his way, in the form of the presence of the US military in the Caucasus region. The ursine then faces east again, staring shyly at his feet, until he is hit by a fourth Western provocation: the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles in Eastern Europe. At this point, the bear turns his head westward, only to shout a loud “enough!” – to which the cartoonist refers as “a completely disproportionate reaction”. In pursuit of a better understanding of the symbols the author uses in this cartoon, a brief venture into historical facts should be made, before we can examine the ideological background to which it refers. In 1999, during the Balkan crisis accompanying the disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) launched Operation Allied Force into the FRY, in order to “put an end to massive human rights violations by the Serb forces against the Albanian population of Kosovo”.1 Russia objected to this operation on the grounds that NATO, a mutual defense structure, was not pursuing self-defense in this case, since the FRY was not a member of NATO. Russia had also used its status as permanent member of the United Nations Security Council to veto the operation, forcing NATO to act unilaterally, without the support of the UN. Subsequently, Russia deemed the operation in violation of international law, as article 53 of the UN Charter states that “no enforcement action shall be taken […] by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council”. This marked the beginning of a new decade of deteriorating relations between the Russian Federation and NATO.
Derek Averre, “From Pristina to Tskhinvali: the legacy of Operation Allied Force in Russia’s relations with the West”, International Affairs 85:3 (2009): 1. 1
Waking up from hibernation // Nick De Leu // Tartu University // 2010 In early 2008, the Kosovo conflict was revived when the Kosovo government declared independence from Serbia, and the state was recognized by, among others, 86% of NATO member states. Again, Russia objected, with President Vladimir Putin calling the recognition “a terrible precedent”2 at a Commonwealth of Independent States summit in Moscow, and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov linking the recognition of Kosovo to violent outbreaks of separatism in Tibet.3 Russia also referred to UNSC Resolution 1244, which, however calling for meaningful autonomy and self-administration for Kosovo, reaffirmed the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the FRY.4 Concerning the second “provocative arrow” from the West – NATO enlargement – the first thing that may come to mind is the phrase famously coined by the first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, about the goal of the organization: “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”. Throughout the years, the focus may have moved entirely to the perception of a “Russian threat” – the USSR during the Cold War period, and to lesser extent, the Russian Federation nowadays. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact – the USSR’s bloc response to NATO – it became clear that the former SSR’s were particularly worried about this “threat”, and sought access to NATO. In 1999, for the first time in 17 years, three new countries joined the alliance: Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. Russia was not amused by this, but the accession was nonetheless largely overshadowed by the Kosovo crisis. In 2004, however, NATO enlargement reached a new milestone, with the accession of six former Warsaw Pact members, dubbed the “Vilnius Group” effectively leading to the expansion of NATO up to the borders of the Russian Federation. Suffice to say, Russia saw this as a direct provocation, and is now fiercely opposing moves to include Ukraine and Georgia into the NATO structure, mostly accusing the United States of pursuing a uni-polar world5, based on the premise of article 10 of the NATO Treaty, specifying that states should apply for NATO membership with the USA. The third alleged sting to the Russian bear – the deployment of US military personnel in the Caucasus, most likely refers to Georgia, the US’s main partner in the region. Even after the war, Lavrov has accused NATO of “encouraging Georgia” to stir up the conflict in South Ossetia and has criticized “the destabilizing impacts of foreign military aid to Georgia”, possibly alluding to a US-Georgian joint military exercise in July 2008.6 According to the author, the fourth and final blow to Russia are the talks about Anti-Ballistic Missile systems (ABM) in Eastern Europe. In 2002, the US unilaterally withdrew from the ABMTreaty (which limited ABM’s) drawn up with the USSR in 1972. This gave the Bush administration the opportunity to strike up talks with the Czech and Polish governments, about the installation of a radar tracking system and interceptor missiles respectively – the latter
“Putin: Recognition of Kosovo’s independence ‘terrible precedent’”, People’s Daily, February 23, 2008, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90853/6359363.html 3 “Russia links Tibet violence to Kosovo precedent”, Rianovosti, March 18, 2008, http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080318/101564953.html 4 “Moscow on Kosovo: no means no”, Russia Today, February 20, 2009, http://rt.com/Politics/2009-02-20/Moscow_on_Kosovo__no_means_no_.html 5 “Putin’s speech: Back to cold war?”, BBC News, February 10, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6350847.stm 6 “War in the Caucasus: Towards a Broader Russia-US Military Confrontation?”, Global Research, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=9788 2
Waking up from hibernation // Nick De Leu // Tartu University // 2010 agreement being sped up by Polish concern about the war in Georgia and bolstered with Patriot missiles to protect Poland from neighbors – such as Russia. While the Russian reaction to the American withdrawal from the Treaty was rather mild, Moscow was infuriated by the concrete plans. However the US stresses that the systems are a way of defending the US and Europe against Iran, Moscow seems convinced that the plans are aimed at weakening Russia. These suspicions are not softened by the Washington Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation – which stated that the interceptors are technologically unproven7 – and by a BBC publication suggesting the system would in fact be more effective against Russian missiles8. Putin reacted that the missile defense system “could trigger a new spiral of the arms race” 9, while top Russian general Anatoly Nogovitsyn warned that “Poland is risking attack, and possibly a nuclear one”, in addition to other Russian fierce language stating the Russian response to the system would “go beyond diplomacy”. 10 President Dmitry Medvedev even threatened to deploy Iskander missiles in the enclave of Kaliningrad, to “neutralize” the defense shield plans.11 These vituperations could be seen as the “completely disproportionate reaction” to which the cartoon refers. In the spirit of the cartoon, however, the reaction remains confined to mere words. And then there’s the Georgian crisis. Several months before the Georgian conflict, Russia began encouraging the independence of the breakaway Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, following Moscow’s outrage over the recognition by Western democracies of Kosovo in February 2008. At the April Bucharest summit, NATO issued a communiqué saying that it welcomes Ukraine and Georgia into the organization, to which Putin reacted by vowing support to the Georgian breakaways.12 The bear was further aggravated by the American presence in the Caucasus during July, before effectively invading Georgia in August – an operation NATO literally called “disproportionate”.13 A reaction definitely fiercer than those mentioned above – possibly due to the rapid succession of facts. The question the cartoonist might try to incite in his readership, is why the Russians respond so harshly to the arrows shot at them from the West. To answer this question, an assessment through the major ideological themes of Russian foreign policy seems in place. In the case of Kosovo, Russia argues that the unilateral declaration of independence did not respect international law and UN resolutions – both of which are very important to Russia, as specified in its most recent Foreign Policy Concept (FPC). Moscow might also be covertly worried about a rebellious region of its own: Chechnya – but these motives for objection are essentially the same as, for instance, Spain’s. “Russia threatens military response if US, Poland follow through with missile defense deal”, Foxnews, August 20, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,407262,00.html 8 “Q&A: US missile defence”, BBC News, September 20, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6720153.stm 9 “Wrap: Russia’s Putin talks US missile defense, NATO, Iran in Munich”, en.rian.ru, October 2, 2007, http://en.rian.ru/world/20070210/60519251.html 10 “Russia warns of response to US missile shield”, Breitbart, August 20, 2008, http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D92M5GM81 11 “The Kaliningrad Missile Crisis”, Acus, November 13, 2008, http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/russian-missile-kaliningraddefense-crisis 12 “Putin vows support for NATO hopeful Georgia’s rebels”, Alertnet, April 3, 2008, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L03283037.htm 13 “Russia’s envoy to meet with NATO ambassadors in Brussels”, Natomission.ru, January 26, 2009, http://www.natomission.ru/en/cooperation/current/show/68/ 7
Waking up from hibernation // Nick De Leu // Tartu University // 2010 Furthermore, Russia sees Serbia as a key partner in Southeast Europe, possibly in relation to the South Stream gas pipeline project which should transport Russian gas to Italy and Austria, through Serbia, bypassing Ukraine. NATO’s eastward enlargement concerns Russia so thoroughly that it is defined as the main external military danger to the nation in the new Russian Military Doctrine. It is important to note, however, that Russia does not perceive NATO “as such” as a threat – only the shift in balance that accompanies the enlargement. It’s also perceived as a challenge to the privileged interests Russia has in certain regions, and the right of the Federation to shape its own security environment. Moscow accuses America of pursuing a uni-polar world through NATO14, whereas Medvedev likes to advocate a multi-polar system, based not on solely Western, but on shared terms, as he expressed in his June 2008 Berlin speech. This move stems from the notion of “great power” that Russia cherishes: rather than comply to NATO demands, Moscow would like to create a new coalition. The sentiment of great power probably also played a great part in the Georgian conflict, which was preceded by skyrocketing energy prices, making the bear feel more confident. Russia also tried to deter US ambitions in the region, on the basis of its claim for a sphere of influence in the neighborhood. Moreover, Moscow justified its intervention in South Ossetia by the “danger” the Georgian operations imposed on Russians in the region, as it considers the protection of compatriots a priority. Moscow has voiced serious concerns about ABM systems in Eastern Europe, mostly stemming from its own national security concerns. It fears the system might be small to start with, but could expand. Russia also accuses the US of “overstepping its natural borders” yet again. The events the author showcases in this political cartoon can be seen as a long-stretched cycle between March 1999 (Kosovo crisis) and November 2008 (Iskander threat), or as a rapid escalation of events between February (Kosovo independence) and August 2008 (Georgian conflict). Either way, they are manifestations of the same process: a decade of disappointments for Russia in the West. The artist obviously advocates the idea of the West illegitimately pushing Russia to its wit’s end, only to react shocked and indignant when Russia eventually responds – treating a loud bark like a bite. Although, by not specifying what he meant by “a completely disproportionate response”, the cartoonist leaves room for interpretation, which brings up the Georgian question – hardly a “mere bark”. In this cartoon, the author is trying to convey the blurry state of international law and relations. The West perceives the arrows it shoots as slight stings which should not aggravate a huge bear, whereas Russia sees the events as horrific provocations, compared to which its reaction is rather mild. However, with the “reset button” pressed by US President Barack Obama and the strong call of NATO Secretary General Rasmussen for NATO-Russian relations, there seems to be a change in climate. Whether this initiates an era of better Western understanding of Russian grievances, remains to be seen. In that regard, the November NATO-Russian summit in Lisbon promises to become highly interesting. 14
“Putin’s speech: Back to cold war?”, BBC News, February 10, 2007
Waking up from hibernation // Nick De Leu // Tartu University // 2010