Congress, Foreign Policy, and Trade by Neha Shah

Neha Shah Iaff 195 Congress, Foreign Policy, and Trade With the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan being poorly managed, many individuals are turning to Congress to play an active role in shaping our foreign policy. Traditionally, the president has crafted and implemented the nation’s foreign policy, whether as commander in chief of the country’s military forces or as the head American diplomat. For the most part Congress has stayed out of international issues, instead focusing on domestic problems. However, following World War I Congress began to flex its foreign policy muscle again1. For the most part, Congress’ foreign policy work had little repercussions. A strong executive branch resulted in congressional hearings or legislation with little substance. However, Congress has traditionally been able to exert considerable influence over one area of America’s foreign policy—trade policy and foreign economic policy. Though its constitutionally granted right to ratify treaties and hence trade agreements, its ability to impose economic sanctions, and it’s ability to shape the architecture of the Federal bureaucracy, Congress can and does help to shape America’s foreign policy, albeit with some limitations. In order to establish friendly relations with another country the United States will often enter into trade agreements with that country. The Constitution specifically 1

Lindsay, James M. Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1994. Shah, 1

delegates this power to Congress stating, “The Congress shall have the power…to regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes”2. While a President may negotiate the treaty, Congress must ultimately ratify the treaty. In addition to achieving economic objectives, this ability allows Congress to have a say in what countries garner the “favored-nation” label. Because of this ability the President must be mindful of the opinion of Congress when creating a treaty. If a President negotiates a treaty that has provisions members of Congress do not like, the ratification process can stall. While a majority of treaties are ratified, Congress has occasionally wielded its power against the executive branch. In 1794, Supreme Court Justice John Jay negotiated a treaty on behalf of George Washington with Great Britain. The John Jay treaty of 1794 not only resolved tensions between the United States and Great Britain but also required the United States to “promote a disposition favorable to friendship and good neighborhood”3. The Senate was quick to approve the treaty, yet the House stalled the ratification process by refusing to appropriate the money necessary for implementation4. Both President Washington and the Supreme Court argued that the House was required to appropriate the money since the treaty was already the “law of the land”5. Representative

The United States. United States Constitution. 21 July 1788. < http://www.archives.gov/national_archives_experience/charters/constitution.html>. 3 Jay, John. Great Britain and the United States. The Jay Treaty: Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation. <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/britain/jay.htm>. 4 Lindsay, James M. 5 Lindsay, James M. Shah, 2

James Madison argued that the House was well within its right to stall the process since representatives have a “clear constitutional right and duty…to deliberate on the on the expediency or inexpediency of carrying such Treaty into effect, and to determine and act thereon, as, in their judgment, may be most conducive to the public good”6. The House and the executive branch eventually compromised by adding language that affirmed Congress’ right to withhold funding in exchange for appropriating money for the Jay Treaty7. If a President wishes to extend a trade agreement, he must also seek approval from Congress. For example, in order to continue trade agreements with Colombia President George W. Bush needed the permission of the 110th Congress to extend the agreements through the upcoming fiscal year8. The United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act extended previous agreements, but also made changes and provisions to the original agreement. Knowing the bill would be controversial, the executive branch made extensive efforts to win over members of congress. Current Secretary of Commerce Carlos M. Gutierrez lobbied on behalf of the bill, making a point to visit with members on the House Foreign Affairs Committee multiple times. In addition, under the direction of Secretary Gutierrez, members of

Quoted in Smith, Constitution and Foreign Policy, p. 109. Lindsay, James M. 8 Hoyer, Steny H. United States. Cong. United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement Implementation Act. 110 Cong. <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/z?d110:h.r.05724:>. 7

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Congress were flown to BogotĂĄ to explore economic opportunities in Colombia9. The executive branch lobbied extensively because they needed as many members of congress as possible to support the bill. Because Congress ratifies treaties, the executive branch will work considerably to appease them in exchange for a vote. This power allows Congress to change a treaty to reflect the current times, as well as strike down a treaty a previous Congress enacted. In addition to rewarding a country, Congress can also use its power to punish country or a leader for negative behavior through economic sanctions. Congress cannot only establish trade agreements, but it also has the ability to break economic bonds. Because members of legislation propose the bill that creates sanctions, Congress is given the power to pick and choose which countries will essentially have bad economic relations with the US. In addition, this power gives them the ability to highlight which foreign policy issues are important to the United States and what types of behavior, or leaders, will be tolerated. Whether for human rights issues or perceived unfair practices members of Congress will propose a bill that cut off, or severely limit, economic ties between the United States and another country. As a country with a strong economy, trade with the United States is important to most countries. By punishing a country for its negative behavior with trade embargoes, the United States is cutting off a vital source

Fernandez, Gerald. "Colombiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s President Tacitly Supports Union Murders." The Hill's Congress Blog. 21 Feb. 2008. <http://blog.thehill.com/2008/02/21/colombias-presidenttacitly-supports-union-murders/>. Shah, 4

of income. Enough economic pressure, and subsequent pressure from angry citizens, is thought to convince a country or leader to make changes. In most cases the executive branch and the legislative branch are in agreement when it comes to economic sanctions. Yet, there are instances when the President and Congress do not see eye. Congressâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; control over trade agreements can give it the upper hand. Idi Amin became President of Uganda as a result of a 1971 coup. During his time in power thousands of foreigners were expelled from the country, and over one hundred thousand individuals were murdered, including two high profiled murders of American citizens10. Congressional investigations revealed that American coffee companies accounted for a majority of Aminâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s foreign capital. By 1977 coffee accounted for over ninety percent of Ugandan foreign export earnings11. This resulted in a substantial tie to the United States, especially since American companies alone purchased approximately fifty-eight thousand (metric) tons of coffee12. US coffee purchases alone provided over one-third of its total export earnings13. Despite the human rights atrocities and US influence on the Ugandan economy the Carter administration was hesitant to pursue economic consequences against Amin. The administration asserted that economic sanctions violated American free trade and sovereignty principles. In December of 1977 a resolution was introduced that called on the president to prohibit Ugandan imports from 10

Nurnberger, Ralph D. "The United States and Idi Amin: Congress to the Rescue." African Studies Review 25 (1982). Apr. 2008 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/view/523992?seq=12>. 11 Nurnberger, Ralph D. 12 Nurnberger, Ralph D. 13 Nurnberger, Ralph D. Shah, 5

entering the United States, American exports to ship to Uganda, Ugandan citizens from receiving any form training that had a potential military application, any aircraft owned by the Ugandan government from having American landing rights14. In addition, American representatives to international financial groups, such as the World Bank and the African Development Fund, would vote against loans to Uganda. Furthermore, Uganda was to be excluded from US trade promotion initiatives, and President Carter was urged to cease diplomatic relations with Amin15. Despite President Carter’s lobbying efforts the bill passed. Within three days of its passing coffee companies, including Folger Coffee Company, suspended Ugandan coffee purchases16. The harsh consequences in the bill sent a signal to the world that one of the most influential countries in the world was not tolerating Amin’s actions. The 1977 bill would go on to inspire economic sanctions against South Africa due to apartheid, including garnering enough support to override a veto by President Regan. Congress also has the ability to pass procedural legislation, which influences who creates foreign policy and how it is created. While substantial legislation affects the actual economic agreements, procedural legislation also shapes foreign trade policy.17. While such legislation does not create economic policies, it does comment on who creates such policy and how such policy is created. Concerned with the State Department’s and the White House’s treatment of foreign trade policy, members created 14

Nurnberger, Ralph D. Lindsay, James M. 16 Nurnberger, Ralph D. 17 Lindsay, James M. 15

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the Office of US Trade Representative in 197418. The USTR was created so that the executive branch had a department that dealt solely with trade policy. The Trade Act of 1974 curbed presidential power and sought to give Congress more control over trade processes. The act specifically stipulates that five members from the Senate Finance Committee and five members from the House Ways and Means Committee be labeled official advisors to government trade negotiators. In addition to consulting with the negotiators, the members are allowed to participate in trade talks. The trade act also created an advisory committee of individuals from various consumer, industry, and labor organizations to advise the President about trade agreements. The executive branch is required to update both the Congressional and Private-Sector advisory committees. The two committees allow Congress to inject themselves into the executive branch processes. In addition to regular updates, Congress has the opportunity to voice their opinion and directly influence the trade talks. Congress can also alter the decision-making process by reorganizing responsibilities. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 shifted the responsibility of deciding whether the US should protest unfair trading practices from the president to the USTR. Although USTR is a part of the executive branch, Congress felt that shifting the responsibility to the USTR would make it more difficult for a president to refuse retaliation19. As a compromise the Act also created the fast tracking process. This process allows the president to go before Congress and seeking fast tracking 18 19

Lindsay, James M. Lindsay, James M.

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approval. Once the president has this approval, members of Congress must vote either for or against proposal without amendments. During the 93rd session of Congress over twenty-five thousand bills were introduced in both the House and Senate20. Yet less than six hundred and fifty, or approximately two and a half percent, of these made it through the legislative process and became law21. Such slim chances make getting a bill through the legislative process difficult and subsequently it is harder for Congress to play a role in ever-changing foreign affair issues. The first step in getting a foreign trade bill passed is pushing it through committee. A close majority, like the current one in the 110th Congress, means many controversial trade bills will not make it past committee. In some cases, changes must be made in order to ensure that certain individuals will vote in favor of a bill. This can result in a bill becoming so watered down that it looses its original purpose. Often, a bill will make it past committee but will not get enough votes in the House or Congress. Trade related bills are usually introduced through the House. Sometimes a bill passed in the House doesnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t make it through the Senate. Occasionally, a bill will pass both chambers but will fail to pass after conferencing. The uncertainty and time consuming process makes it difficult for Congress to play a role. Even if certain members are interested in a particular issue it is highly unlikely they will be able to survive the legislative process in order to have any substantive impact. 20

Nathanson, Iric. "Getting a Bill Through Congress." The American Journal of Nursing, 75 (1975): 1179-1181. May 2008 <http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002936X(197507)75%3A7%3C1179%3AGABTC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C>. 21 Nathanson, Iric. Shah, 8

In some cases Congress manages to draw up a bill that is suitable to the majority, yet cannot get the bill through the legislative process in time to deal with the issue. In the 1970s reports of human rights abuses in the then Central African Empire caught the attention of numerous government officials. In an attempt to punish Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa for his poor human rights record, the House Foreign Operations Subcommittee proposed language that cut most US trade and foreign aid to the CAE22. However, Emperor Bokassa was overthrown before the bill could make it through the Appropriations committee23. Foreign-relations are complex issues that are constantly changing. In the case of Emperor Bokassa Congress couldnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t respond fast enough, and the proposed bill essentially became obsolete. While trade provides an outlet for Congress to strongly impact US foreign policy, the limitations imposed by the legislative process severely curtail the influence and role of Congress. Given the partisanship of many Congresses and the slow nature of the legislative process it is often difficult to quickly enact trade restrictions or economic sanctions. While Congress is rather protective of its trade powers at time it has released this power back to the executive branch. This allows the president to quickly respond to a situation without having to wait for Congress to get its act together. During the 1930s Bolivia and Paraguay were at war with each other, and Congress gave President Roosevelt to enact

The Associated Press. "African Emperor to Lose U.S. Aid." The Washington Post 6 Dec. 1977. Historical Newspapers: the Washington Post. Proquest. Gelman Library, Washington D.C. May 2008. 23 Lindsay, James M. Shah, 9

trade restrictions related to the Chaco War24. This negatively impacted the Curtis-Wright Corporation, which had a large business selling bombers to Bolivia25. In United States v. Wright-Wright, the corporation challenged the ability of the President to make such trade restrictions. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the government, claiming that although the Constitution gave Congress the power to regulate foreign trade, the restriction was valid since Congress had previously allowed President Roosevelt to enact such restrictions26. Congress has largely left foreign policy issues to the president. Following, World War I however representatives and senators became interested in foreign policy issues. Congress has been most successful through foreign economic initiatives. Whether ratifying trade agreements, imposing sanctions, or reorganizing the executive branch, trade allows Congress to play an integral role in shaping Americaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s foreign policy. However, the nature of the legislative process and partisan bickering can hinder this ability. With a current incompetent executive branch, Congress is being charged with the responsibility of fixing the damage caused by the Bush administration. Congress now faces the challenge of taking their success with trade and shifting it to other areas in foreign policy.

Colton, Campbell C., Nicol C. Rae, and John F. Stack, Jr. Congress and the Politics of Foreign Policy. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2003. 25 Colton, Campbell C., Nicol C. Rae, and John F. Stack, Jr. 26 Colton, Campbell C., Nicol C. Rae, and John F. Stack, Jr. Shah, 10