Preview: Issue 1/2014 by New Eastern Europe

No 1(X)/2014 ISSN: 2083-7372 quarterly January-March

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B O O K S & R E V I E W S : A N D R Z E J WA J D A , LY U D M I L A U L I T S K AYA , ROMAN SZPORLUK, SL AVOJ ŽIŽEK & SREĆKO HORVAT

Victoria Narizhna Igor Lyubashenko

Mykola Riabchuk Taras Voznyak RUSSIA A Dress Rehearsal for Democracy? Ayder Muzhdabayev On learned helplessness Alexander Snegirev

ISSN 2083-7372

Dear Reader,

The beginning of every year, unavoidably, brings reflection over what has happened in the year before and what consequences it could have on the year to come. However, while we all tend to agree that history matters, we also know how impossible it is to foresee the course of the future based on the past. And indeed, we finished 2013 with an incomplete chapter in Ukraine along with some disappointment with the European Union’s limited success in integration with the East. Recent events show that when it comes to this region nothing can be taken for granted, including Russia and its geopolitical aspirations. As two Lithuanian analysts, Laurynas Kasčiūnas and Vytautas Keršanskas, write in a summary of the 2013 Eastern Partnership Summit: “decision makers in the EU should take into account that the Russia-led Eurasian Customs Union is qualitatively different from all previous integration initiatives in the post-Soviet space”. A painful truth, but also one that the EU should not disregard, especially in light of the arguments made by Dominik P. Jankowski and Paweł Świeżak, Polish security experts, who state that: “Eastern Europe has become an ‘unwanted child’ for some western countries, one they would prefer to forget about.” Considering the limited attention span on this issue, we want to present you with analyses of one of the countries which probably represents the biggest victim of western misconceptions. Belarus is often easily assigned the label of “Europe’s last dictatorship”, yet seen by many others as located in the heart of Europe. While explaining the complexities of its current situation, the authors of this issue, who don’t question Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s authoritarian rule, point to the EU policies that poorly address the Belarusian people who, as an intellectual and oppositionist Alyaksandr Milinkevich writes, are not only entrepreneurial but also pro-European. The articles aim to present Belarus from various viewpoints and allow us to ask a question why we overlook this key nation too often. This issue also includes an essay by Alexander Snegirev, a Russian writer, who tackles the problem of learned hopelessness in post-Soviet societies as well as and an insightful interview with Ayder Muzhdabayev, the deputy editorin-chief of Moskovsky Komsomolets. Lastly, in the review section, we point to the newest film directed by Andrzej Wajda presenting the story of the Polish communist fighter – Lech Wałęsa. As always, we encourage you to join us online and via our social networks (Twitter and Facebook). The Editors

Contents Opinion and Analysis 8

Lessons from Vilnius Laurynas Kasčiūnas and Vytautas Keršanskas

A New Kind of Revolution Victoria Narizhna

Euromaidan. Chronicles of networked revolt Igor Lyubashenko

The period between November 21st and December 1st 2013 marks the beginning of a new era in Ukrainian politics. It is now possible to say with confidence that one of the main things that took place is the political initiation of the new generation.

Europe with a View to the Future Adam Reichardt

The Eastern European Winter Dominik P. Jankowski and Paweł Świeżak

The Emergence of a New (Old) Eurasia Adam Balcer Despite Russia’s goal to create a Eurasian Union to reintegrate the countries of the former Soviet Union, this vision will most likely remain on paper. The rise of China’s role in the region clearly demonstrates that the Eurasian Union does not constitute a serious obstacle to economic and political cooperation between countries in the postSoviet space and other regional powers.

The Russian Orphanage Model Alexander Snegirev

After the Crash Mykola Riabchuk

Georgia’s Choice Nika Sikharulidze

What Gives Us Strength? Alyaksandr Milinkevich

The current times cannot be called favourable for Belarus, but it is on this anvil that the Belarusian identity is being tempered. The Belarusians are a people with a European past and capable of preserving their identity.

The Anatomy of Belarusian Numbness Dzmitry Hurnevich

Redefining Identity Jędrzej Czerep

Between Collaboration and Conflict Andrzej Poczobut

In Belarus, there is an economic crisis; there is social discontent; there are trade unions, but there are no worker protests. Why haven’t the trade unions become the main agent of the change and social resistance in Belarus?

In Search of One Voice Alena Zuikova

109

Challenging Cooperation on the Local Level Miroslav Kobasa

112

The Pitfalls of Eurasian Integration Anna Maria Dyner

People, Ideas, Inspiration 118

Rethinking EU Policy towards Belarus Andrei Liakhovich Relations with Belarus are not a high priority for the European Union. The majority of its policy is based on containing Russia’s influence. The EU could have a greater impact on Belarus relations, but only if it wants to. For now, it seems to be perfectly satisfied with the status quo.

125

So close, yet so far away Evgeny Treshchenkov

Interviews 131

Dress Rehearsal Democracy? A conversation with Ayder Muzhdabayev

“I do not believe that Navalny is a hope of Russian democracy and a European type politician on the whole. And this may also be in Putin’s interests, as he may demonstrate to the West: look here, in case of democratisation, I could be replaced by people who encourage Muscovites to join Nazi processions.”

137

The Ukrainian Window to Europe An interview with Taras Voznyak

161

The Russian city of Perm recently underwent a revolutionary change from a rusting industrial city to a cultural hot spot.

169

Human Trafficking in Romania Misha Hofland

History

The Evolution of the Central European City A Conversation with Jan Sucháček

Books and Reviews 175

Ryszard Jabłoński – A Different Wajda?

177

Filip Mazurczak – Beyond the Cold Warrior

180

Ida Orzechowska – Europe in the Time of Cholera

Wałęsa. Człowiek z nadziei (Wałęsa. Man of Hope). A film directed by Andrzej Wajda

On Zbig: The Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski. Edited by Charles Gati

On Slavoj Žižek and Srećko Horvat’s What Does Europe Want? The Union and its Discontents

183

Andrey Miroshkin – Letters on a Post-War Country On Lyudmila Ulitskaya’s Детство 45–53: а завтра будет счастье (Childhood 45-53: And Tomorrow There Will Be Happiness)

186

Anna Kotaleichuk – Reading Szporluk on Maidan On Roman Szporluk’s Формування модерних націй:Україна – Росія – Польща (The Formation of Modern Nations: Ukraine – Russia – Poland)

Reports 142

Happiness Is Near? Aleksandra Eriksson

189

Zośka Papużanka – Unravelling the Past On Wiesław Myśliwski’s Ostatnie rozdanie (The Last Deal)

148

Eastern Galicia Revisited Tadeusz Iwański

192

156

Surviving Totalitarian Regimes An oral history interview with Mimi Jiránkova and Nataša Lišková

194

Dorota Sieroń-Galusek – The Ethos of Bridge Builders On a Handbook of Dialogue. Trust and Identity.

Philip Palmer – Reframing the Debate On Magdalena Waligórska’s Klezmer’s Afterlife: An Ethnography of the Jewish Music Revival in Poland and Germany

198

Grzegorz Nurek – Around Polish Cinema On a series dedicated to Polish film directors published Krytyka Polityczna

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EDITOR AND PUBLISHER The Jan Nowak-Jeziorański College of Eastern Europe in Wrocław office@kew.org.pl www.kew.org.pl CO-EDITOR European Solidarity Centre ecs@ecs.gda.pl www.ecs.gda.pl EDITORIAL BOARD Leonidas Donskis, Yaroslav Hrytsak, Paweł Kowal, Ivan Krastev, Georges Mink, Zdzisław Najder, Cornelius Ochmann, Eugeniusz Smolar, Lilia Shevtsova, Roman Szporluk, Jan Zielonka EDITORIAL TEAM Adam Reichardt, Editor-in-Chief Iwona Reichardt, Deputy Editor, Lead Translator Giacomo Manca, Contributing Editor EDITORIAL INTERN Martina Cebecauerova COPYEDITING AND PROOFREADING Gina Kuhn, Filip Mazurczak CONTRIBUTING ARTIST Andrzej Zaręba ADVERTISING Wiesława Nowosad SUBSCRIPTION subscription@neweasterneurope.eu LAYOUT AND FORMATTING Agencja Reklamowa i Interaktywna SALON REKLAMY EDITORIAL OFFICES New Eastern Europe ul. Mazowiecka 25 p. 606 30-019 Kraków editors@neweasterneurope.eu European Solidarity Centre ul. Doki 1, 80-958 Gdańsk tel.: +48 58 767 79 71 ecs@ecs.gda.pl

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New Eastern Europe is co-financed by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education

The project is co-financed by the Department of Public and Cultural Diplomacy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs within the framework of the grant programme – Cooperation in the Area of Public Diplomacy 2013 All works published with grant funded from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are published under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license (CC by 3.0). Any republication of materials funded under this grant must be attributed in the manner specified by the author or licensor. Circulating texts without the Editors’ permit is strictly forbidden. The Editors bear no responsibility for the content of advertisements. Copyright © by the Jan Nowak-Jeziorański College of Eastern Europe in Wrocław (Kolegium Europy Wschodniej im. Jana Nowaka-Jeziorańskiego we Wrocławiu), 2014 Circulation: 6000 Printing: Drukarnia Kolejowa Kraków Sp. z o.o. International Distribution: www.pineapple-media.com Printed in Poland

Lessons from Vilnius L A UR YN A S KA SČIŪN A S A ND VYTA U TA S K E R Š A N S K A S

The Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius must be seen as an opportunity to review the goals of Europe’s policy in the region. Thus far, the policy has been understood as the spread of European values and norms in the neighbourhood. But, the cases of Ukraine and Armenia show that competing integration projects could further reduce the EU’s abilities to tie the neighbouring states to Europe. The Vilnius Summit was neither a victory nor a failure for the European Union’s Eastern Partnership policy. It is an important milestone because the original mission to give a European perspective to the region has been accomplished. On the other hand, however, no agreement with Ukraine that we could call the “point of no return” was reached during the summit. The biggest achievement of the summit is not very inspiring – the initialling of the Association Agreements with Moldova and Georgia, and, to some extent, a “green light” for the visa-free regime with Moldova. Of course the big disappointment of Ukraine’s slap in the face to EU made these achievements look even better. Ukraine’s signing of the Association Agreement with EU would have meant that the Ukrainian multi-dimensional foreign policy would be practically over, ending the country’s possibility to enter into the Customs Union. However, this round was lost and the competition between the integration spaces continues. Winners and losers Decision makers in the EU should take into account that the Russia-led Eurasian Customs Union is qualitatively diﬀerent from all previous integration initiatives in the post-Soviet space. The Eurasian Customs Union means deeper integration,

Laurynas Kasčiūnas and Vytautas Keršanskas, Lessons from Vilnius

Opinion and Analysis

because, apart from a free trade area, it also includes a single imports taxation system, a uniform external customs tariff and other harmonised standards. Once a country joins the Eurasian Union, it loses its independence in the area of external trade policy. Members of the Eurasian Customs Union have to both agree on the common customs tariff and jointly develop a common trade regime with third countries. Should EU partner countries join the Eurasian Union, this would mean that Russia would gain leverage in the external trade policy of the other countries in the Eurasian Union and will be able to affect their relations with the EU. For instance, it could foreclose their negotiations with the EU on enhanced free trade agreements. Thus, the current situation in Ukraine becomes a zero-sum game: for Russia it is a win or lose question in the context of the possibility to dominate in the biggest and economically strongest post-Soviet state. At the same time, the EU may win or lose momentum, after which the political and civil will to integrate may decrease dramatically (the lessons of the NATO Bucharest Summit in 2008 must be considered). So, why didn’t the EU and Ukraine sign the Association Agreement? Who are the winners and losers of this political challenge? The dominant interpretation states that the EU has lost this round, not only diplomatically but also geopolitically, while it is the third victory in a row for Russia if we consider Syria and Edward Snowden to be the first two. It is quite obvious that the EU was trapped by its normative policy – playing the Tymoshenko card and not recognising early enough that the EU is not the only player in town. The overly high requirements in the fields of selective justice and democratic reforms for Ukraine were not flexible enough to react to the changing situation. Thus, this normativity only pushed Ukraine into Russia’s field of interest and, automatically, created a greater dependence on anti-democratic internal and external political powers. Viktor Yanukovych’s decision was also determined by the enormous economic and political pressure from Russia, which the EU did not manage to react to. However, there is an alternative view that states that Yanukovych, not Russia, is the winner of this geopolitical game. Given that Yanukovych did not even plan to sign the Association Agreement, his bargaining to the EU was only intended to “raise his price” and use the perspective of the Association Agreement as leverage in the relations with Russia, especially in the fields of gas prices and credit rates. So, it was not the traditional question of Ukraine’s participation in the Russialed Customs Union, but the question of (not) signing the Association Agreement

An alternative view states that Yanukovych, not Russia, is the winner of this geopolitical game.

Opinion and Analysis

Laurynas Kasčiūnas and Vytautas Keršanskas, Lessons from Vilnius

that was on the table during the negotiations with Russia. According to this view, Yanukovych is the absolute winner of this game exactly because of this achievement. This situation is a perfect example of Kyiv’s well-known West-or-East balancing, supplemented with the Ukrainian belief that it is possible to fool both sides. However, this time it looks that Yanukovych came to a deadlock when hundreds of thousands protesters came to the streets. There were some presumptions which stated that Ukraine is inevitably dependant on Russia. According to this position, the oligarchic economic model that is anchored in Ukraine along with the adhesion of business and politics and the domination of informal rules in respect to the principle of supremacy of law are the invisible leashes that tie these two countries together. Trying to escape this situation has been programmed for failure since the beginning, and the unsuccessful agreement with the EU only proves this once again. Different views Regardless of one’s point of view, the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius must be seen as an opportunity to review the goals and implementation of this policy and shape its future. What lessons should be learnt? So far, the EaP policy has been understood as the spread of European values and norms in the neighbourhood. But the cases of Ukraine and Armenia show that the alternative integration projects competing with the EU do not rely on the principle of formal conditionality, offering a stimulus package which could further reduce the EU’s abilities to “tie” neighbouring states to European rules. This means that the strategic planning for the Eastern Partnership policy should more deeply assume the geopolitical situation. This is necessary, as the EU Eastern Partnership policy is not the only player in town. In Vilnius, it became clear that the six partner countries had different views and capacities for adopting the European rules of the game and choosing the EU as their main geopolitical direction. It is therefore possible to distinguish two blocks of EaP countries in regards to their different progress in implementing the programme’s provisions. The “advanced” or simply potential associated partners are Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Meanwhile Azerbaijan “does not want”, Armenia “cannot”, and Belarus “does not want and cannot” choose rapprochement with the EU as offered by the Eastern Partnership programme. It has become clear that the common Eastern Partnership model does not satisfy the interests of all six countries and, although the de facto implementation of the

The common Eastern Partnership model does not satisfy the interests of all six countries.

Laurynas Kasčiūnas and Vytautas Keršanskas, Lessons from Vilnius

Opinion and Analysis 11

Photo: Giacomo Manca

Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, was greeted at the Vilnius Summit by Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso. Ukraine’s decision not to sign the Association Agreement has led to much speculation as to what is next in this geopolitical game.

programme continued at a different pace, the adaptation of the programme of multispeed integration into the EU is a reality. It is important to provide conditions for the three guiding principles – individual progress, catching up and differentiation – to further serve as driving motives behind the Eastern Partnership. In this case, the dilemma is what the EU can offer to the “advanced” partnership countries so that they will continue to seek adoption of European rules and move closer to the EU. Another important question is the type of relationship model that the EU should apply to the rest of the EaP countries, for those who cannot (Belarus) or those who do not (Azerbaijan and Armenia) seek to sign an Association Agreement with the EU. Obviously, differentiation trends in modelling the future of the Eastern Partnership makes us think of applying more flexible, thus, dissimilar instruments to the countries that have made progress. The current EaP content consists of two main pillars: 1) the Association Agreement and integration into the EU domestic market through an enhanced free trade agreement and 2) a gradual movement towards a visa-free regime as well as various facilities. Visa liberalisation is considered the most urgent issue for ordinary citizens. In order to retain less advanced countries in the field of EU interests, the prospect of visa-free travel should not be denied despite the reluctance of these countries to sign the Association Agreement. Although visa liberalisation is still a future issue, its advocates believe that visa-free travel would create opportunities for