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N e w E a s t e r n E u r o p e i s a c o l l a b o r a t i v e p r o j e c t b e t w e e n t h r e e P o l i s h PARTNERS The City of Gdańsk www.gdansk.pl A city with over a thousand years of history, Gdańsk has been a melting pot of cultures and ethnic groups. The air of tolerance and wealth built on trade has enabled culture, science, and the arts to flourish in the city for centuries. Today, Gdańsk remains a key meeting place and major tourist attraction in Poland.

While the city boasts historic sites of enchanting beauty, it also has a major historic and social importance. In addition to its 1000-year history, the city is the place where the Second World War broke out as well as the birthplace of Solidarność, the Solidarity movement, which led to the fall of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe.

The European Solidarity Centre www.ecs.gda.pl The European Solidarity Centre is a multifunctional institution combining scientific, cultural and educational activities with a modern museum and archive, which documents freedom movements in the modern history of Poland and Europe.

The Centre was established in Gdańsk on November 8th 2007. Its new building was opened in 2014 on the anniversary of the August Accords signed in Gdańsk between the workers’ union “Solidarność” and communist authorities in 1980. The Centre is meant to be an agora, a space for people and ideas that build and develop a civic society, a meeting place for people who hold the world’s future dear. The mission of the Centre is to commemorate, maintain and popularise the heritage and message of the Solidarity movement and the anti-communist democratic opposition in Poland and throughout the world. Through its activities the Centre wants to inspire new cultural, civic, trade union, local government, national and European initiatives with a universal dimension.

The Jan Nowak-Jeziorański College of Eastern Europe www.kew.org.pl The College of Eastern Europe is a non-profit, non-governmental foundation founded on February 9th 2001 by Jan Nowak-Jeziorański, a former head of the Polish section of Radio Free Europe and a democratic activist.

The foundation deals with cooperation between the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. The aims if its charters are to carry out educational, cultural and publishing activities, and to develop programmes which enhance the transformation in the countries of Eastern Europe. The organisation has its headquarters in Wrocław, Poland, a city in western Poland, perfectly situated in the centre of Europe and with a deep understanding of both Western and Eastern Europe.

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ear Reader, If there is one phrase that is being repeated like a mantra in 2017, it is that “the world is upside down”. During public and private discussions from Warsaw to Prague, Berlin, Brussels, London and even Washington we see a growing sentiment that we can no longer make basic assumptions about the infallibility of liberal democracy. Of course, a lot of this sentiment is related to the rise of anti-liberal (or illiberal) populist forces in both the eastern and western parts of Europe (not to mention the United States) and the concerns that go along with this rise. There is no doubt that a real challenge to the current liberal democratic order is taking place, including in many countries of our region. Hence, the question that arises is – if the liberal democratic order is indeed no longer sound, what is the alternative?

This issue of New Eastern Europe debates the state of liberal democracy in Europe and specifically adds the voices from our region. We not only asked our authors to interpret the rise of populist, anti-liberal attitudes, but also present voices from those who do not think it is such a terrible thing. Agree with them or not, their arguments allow us to understand their perspective and force us to interpret why traditional, conservative politics are becoming more popular in Central and Eastern Europe. They also presents a certain reflection of similar processes taking place in the West, in such countries as France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands or the United States. Lastly, the role of outside influence, like Russian propaganda, is also one that needs to be taken into account in this context.

These developments will also likely have an effect on Ukraine – a country which has declared a pro-European path but still struggles with its post-Soviet heritage.

There is no question that Ukraine’s success directly depends upon how politics develops in the West. That is why this issue looks at the process, or lack thereof, of de-oligarchisation, the fight against corruption, the situation of the Crimean Tatars and the current state of Polish-Ukrainian relations.

These and other issues show that the debate on Europe’s East is nowhere near an end. Thus, as always, we invite you to stay in touch via our web site, Facebook and Twitter. You can also contact us via email editors@neweasterneurope.eu with your thoughts and reactions to these debates.

The Editors

Erratum: We would like to make a small correction to the previous issue. On page 160 Peter Brenkus was incorrectly quoted. The correct quote should read: “Only a very small minority of Muslims commits terrorist acts, but it happens.” We apologise for this error.

Contents Opinion & Analysis 7

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Politics and international relations are more than just a game of different interests. Taking emotions into account is as important as dry policy analyses, because what may seem as irrational at first glance, might appear reasonable if considered through a prism of passion and affect.

No alternative to liberal democracy?

Samuel Abrahám The status and merit of liberal democracy is a hotly debated topic, especially in Central Europe.

The question remains whether Central and Eastern European states, which recently appear to be shifting more to the far right, will eventually embrace western liberalism or will populist and nationalist politics become more widespread.

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Illiberal winds from the East Bartosz Rydliński

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While democracy and liberalism offer a sense of relative political liberty, they do not guarantee economic freedom. This is the key problem that has been experienced in Central and Eastern Europe.

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Europe needs a return to its true values Boško Obradović

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The world is fundamentally changing Raivis Zeltīts Facts need to matter, no matter what Mateusz Mazzini and Miłosz Wiatrowski

Chaos or Stability Marcin Kaczmarski In terms of world politics, Russia and China share a similar view – rejecting the US claim to primacy and western domination in the world.

Yet with the changes now taking place in the West, Russia expects to thrive amidst the chaos, while China wishes to maintain some degree of international stability.

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A far right hijack of Intermarium Matthew Kott The appeal of Intermarium on the far right lies in how it can be portrayed as a political third way. This interpretation takes the ideas of the national conservatives further by positing Intermarium as the remaining heartland of the “true Europe”, a bulwark not only against Putinist “neo-Bolshevism” encroaching from Moscow, but also against the neoliberal, multicultural, secular and feminist “neoBolshevism” emanating from Brussels.

The five rings of the empire Paweł Kowal A quarter century ago the Soviet Union collapsed, but the Russian imperial system did not. It is currently being reconstructed

by President Vladimir Putin.

14 Illiberalism György Schöpflin 16

Homo politicus, Homo passionis Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska

The abandonment of Ukraine?

David R. Marples With Donald Trump in the White House, the question many are asking is how it will affect US foreign policy. Trump himself has called for a rethink of traditional foreign policy priorities, which puts the country’s relations with Ukraine and its support against Russiansponsored separatists also into question.

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The oligarchs strike back Tadeusz Iwański

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Crimean Tatars losing hope Ridvan Bari De Urcosta

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Celebrating diversity in Kyiv Anna Kotaleichuk

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Georgia’s unwavering or unravelling pro-European direction Eugene Kogan There is a sense of déjà vu in Georgia that despite the government’s success in reforming the nation, the European Union is slow to reward it.

Can the EU’s reaction lead to a backlash and unravelling of Georgia’s pro-European direction?

Such an option is no longer far-fetched.

Reports 98

Mariupol on the edge of war Wojciech Koźmic In Mariupol the conflict is assessed differently than in Kyiv. Here, the enemy is close and the war remains on the horizon. There are Ukrainian flags flying, but the frontline is only 20 kilometres away.

Interviews 109 I am personally very Euro-optimistic An interview with Andrii Deshchytsia

114 Poland fully supports the Ukrainian cause An interview with Jan Piekło

History 119 Russia between revolutions A conversation with Sylwia Frołow

127 Doroshenko’s third way Tomasz Targański The pendulum of history has repeatedly pushed Ukraine from the West to the East and back again.

Petro Doroshenko in the 17th century seemed to be the only one who seriously attempted to break this historical continuum by seeking a third way. Could his failure act as a warning sign for any future attempt at breaking the cycle?

People, Ideas, Inspiration 133 Integration starts at home Anna Fedas The Polish city of Gdańsk is well-known for the role it has played in history: the place where the Second World War broke out and the birthplace of Poland’s Solidarity movement. Lesser known, however, is the leading role the city is playing in Poland today in accepting and integrating immigrants.

140 The story of Poland’s multinational history Elżbieta Ciborska 147 Estonia faces challenges both old and new with integration efforts Michael Amundsen

Eastern Café 162 How Russia understands international law Przemysław Roguski 167 Caught in the storyline Kacper Dziekan 171 Through Crimea with Eldar Wojciech Siegień 174 Forgotten heroes of a forgotten war Andrzej Zaręba 179 A Ukrainian miracle Olena Pavlova

Editor and publisher The Jan Nowak-Jeziorański College of Eastern Europe in Wrocław office@kew.org.pl, www.kew.org.pl

Zamek Wojnowice ul. Zamkowa 2, 55-330 Wojnowice, Poland Co-editor European Solidarity Centre ecs@ecs.gda.pl, www.ecs.gda.pl

Editorial board Yaroslav Hrytsak, Paweł Kowal, Ivan Krastev, Georges Mink, Zdzisław Najder, Cornelius Ochmann, Mykola Riabchuk, Eugeniusz Smolar, Lilia Shevtsova, Roman Szporluk, Jan Zielonka Editorial team Adam Reichardt, Editor-in-Chief Iwona Reichardt, Deputy Editor, Lead Translator Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, Editor Viktoria Chaban, Editorial Intern Copyediting Martin O’Reilly Illustrations and cover Andrzej Zaręba Cover layout Do Lasu s.c Subscription dystrybucja@kew.org.pl Layout and formatting Mariusz Warchoł Editorial offices New Eastern Europe ul. Mazowiecka 25 p. 808, 30-019 Kraków editors@neweasterneurope.eu European Solidarity Centre Plac Solidarności 1, 80-863 Gdańsk tel.: +48 58 767 79 71 ecs@ecs.gda.pl

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Circulating texts without the Editors’ permit is strictly forbidden. The Editors bear no responsibility for the content of advertisements.

Copyright © by the Jan Nowak-Jeziorański College of Eastern Europe in Wrocław (Kolegium Europy Wschodniej im. Jana Nowaka-Jeziorańskiego we Wrocławiu), 2017

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Opinion & Analysis

No alternative to liberal democracy?

S a m ue l A b r a h á m

The status and merit of liberal democracy is a hotly debated topic, especially in Central Europe. The question remains whether Central and Eastern European states, which recently appear to be shifting more to the far right, will eventually embrace western liberalism or will populist and nationalist politics become more widespread.

The spectre of illiberalism is haunting Western Europe. Traditional parties seem unable to respond to the real (and invented) problems that Europe is now facing.

What is more, illiberalism in recent years has grown and become more widely accepted in some Central European countries. The Hungarian prime minister, for instance, infamously boasted that his country is an “illiberal democracy”. And surely, after some prodding and flattery, Jarosław Kaczyński, the éminence grise of Polish politics, would probably agree that such a description would apply to the status quo in Poland today. Such a description in the past was reserved as stark criticism for modern autocratic regimes with partially-free elections, but now it is being legitimised as a viable alternative to liberal democracy. How and why has this unexpected development taken place?

Blame the bureaucrat Perhaps the most significant factor in all of this is that the European Union has gradually plunged into political crisis. The first crisis began in 2004, just after its great expansion. It was followed by the 2008 economic crisis and accelerated, as

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Opinion & Analysis

No alternative to liberal democracy?, Samuel Abrahám

a result of the massive influx of refugees from Syria and elsewhere and the Brexit vote last summer. What was perceived as a disturbing and marginal phenomenon a decade ago is gradually haunting Europe in the form of authoritarian politics and a defiance of a cornerstone of liberal democracy – the rule of law. The question remains, though, whether the states of Central and Eastern Europe – some of which have already shifted towards the far right – will eventually embrace western liberalism (the core ideology of the EU) or will populist and nationalist politics become more widespread.

It seems that the two trends feed off each other.

The far right re-emerged immediately after the fall We are not witnessing of communism; they reconnected with pre-war and a Manichean struggle Second World War political parties and movements, of good and evil, but but gradually added the modern characteristics of a struggle between their far right counterparts in Western Europe. all the ultra-nationalistic and ethnic xenotraditional and Besides phobic elements, it now also included a criticism modern values. of socially progressive causes – such as gay rights and women’s rights – as well as blaming the EU as the main promoters of these causes. Despite the huge political, social and economic benefits stemming from EU membership, as well as the widespread public support, the far right has somehow successfully managed to dump all the blame on imaginary bureaucrats in Brussels, who promote gay rights, impose refugee quotas on member states and, in a most conspiratorial fashion, try to deprive Central European states of their sovereignty. Not surprisingly, populists have always used crude stereotypes and sweeping statements in their rhetoric.

Paradoxically, even if they deal with problems that are real, they seldom solve them or even wish to, for they only seek political gain.

It is still unclear whether Central Europe could initiate yet another global or European political crisis or whether this is just a temporary anomaly in this region. What is certain, however, is that we are not witnessing a Manichean struggle of good and evil, but a struggle between traditional and modern values. In fact, what we witness today is a 21st century rendition of the struggle between liberal democracy and its enemies.

Indeed, a recurring tension has emerged, which has defined and shaped Europe since the 19th century – between enlightenment and reactionary, counter-enlightenment forces. The former fosters liberal values such as individual freedom, protection and universal human rights while the latter conveys conservative values, such as community, religion, tradition and in some cases ethnic unity and superiority.

No alternative to liberal democracy?, Samuel Abrahám

Opinion & Analysis

Liberal democracy and its discontents Thus, rather than review the nature of illiberalism in Central Europe, let us look at the basic precepts of liberal democracy and its multiple rivals in the past. This will allow us to bring some context to current developments in the region.

The status and merit of liberal democracy is, of course, a hotly debated topic. And, moreover, it is often misconstrued and deliberately so. Its critics usually pair it with liberalism which is considered to be a hyper-tolerant and relativistic ideology, responsible for all the social problems of the modern era. In the former communist states, a large section of the elite blames liberal democracy for all the ills of the post-communist transformation: that it opened the doors to corruption, cynicism, greed and mass privatisation. Others argue that it has weakened the state and its public institutions, thus allowing crass politicians and economic oligarchs to exploit the state and to siphon away funds that could have been used to support social welfare and education.

The critics of liberal democracy span from the right and left of the political spectrum. From the Liberal democracy is the right, liberal democracy is denigrated for undermining moral values, religious beliefs and the spirit culmination of liberalism, of patriotism. Some right wing ideologues blame both in structure and liberals for weakening the state’s centralising power in the manifestation while others maintain that liberal democratic states of its core practices, are too strong and intrusive. The religious right often views liberals as outright immoral for allowing norms and values. abortion and favouring same sex marriage. Liberal democracy is dismissed by some on the political left as a cynical cover up for prevailing and growing economic disparity. It is seen as an imperialist system that only pretends to care about individual freedom and well-being. In addition, some on the left view liberal democratic states as weak because they are unable to confront large corporations that are largely responsible for greenhouse gas emissions and exploiting workers in developing countries.

It is a paradox to witness so much criticism of liberal democracy today considering that its structure is so widespread. Nearly every country in the world uses the separation of powers model, where the state is divided into three different branches of power – legislative, executive and judiciary – and holds general and periodic elections.

The constitution in most countries guarantees the independence of the three branches of power and thus legitimises the authority of those powers. However, the written constitution and political reality differs from country to country and often legislative and judiciary powers are subservient to a powerful executive. The existence of the three branches provides legitimacy to the state but it does not guarantee the spirit of

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No alternative to liberal democracy?, Samuel Abrahám

Opinion & Analysis

liberal democracy. Indeed, good constitutions are a precondition but not a guarantee of a fair distribution of power, where no one branch dominates over the other two.

What does liberal democracy stand for?

A liberal democratic form of government is the culmination of liberalism, both in structure and in the manifestation of its core practices, norms and values. As an ideology, liberalism went through a major transformation and its various strands have helped shape the political spectrum of many present-day liberal democracies.

The reason for its evolution is due to the constant adjustments made when political environments change. Liberal democracies, by their very nature, are always in a competitive mode and are more used to confronting enemies and rivals. As philosopher Ernest Gellner remarked with some satisfaction, 20th century liberal democracies defeated its enemies with their own weapons – fascism militarily and communism economically.

There are basic tenets of modern liberalism that distinguish it from other ideologies: it must be present to secure justice and freedom for its citizens; it must guarantee constitutional democratic governance, free elections, religious tolerance, freedom of speech, a free press and the free movement of people. According to political theorist Stephen Holmes, it must also contain the power of police and, at the same time, foster a free market. For individuals, the regime must provide personal security so that they can have the impartiality of the judiciary. The state must also be a guarantor of individual freedom both from outside interference (negative freedom) and to guarantee citizens the right to participate in the political process (positive freedom). Finally, the democratically-elected majority must respect its political opposition and grant equal rights to members of minority groups. One can truly speak about liberal democracy only after all these conditions are met – one that is not only democratic but also fulfils the norms of a just and free society.

Part of the confusion is that in the early 19th century liberals dwelled on the Lockean perception that favours protection of private property and individual liberty and Adam Smith’s preference for a weak state in order to foster laissez faire capitalism. Curiously, these principles are also held by many present day conservatives. The late liberals, whose views are poignantly expressed in the writings of T.G. Green and John Dewey, realised that free markets must be regulated and progressive taxes introduced by governments in order to protect the welfare of their citizens. As a result the role of the state increased during the 20th century and the task was, once again, to achieve checks and balances among the executive, legislative and judiciary powers. Late liberals were also responding to pressures

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