Geopolitics

CHALLENGES BEFORE THE NEW ARMY CHIEF

geopolitics VOL III, ISSUE II, JULY 2012 n `100

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D E F E N C E n D I P L O M A C Y n S E C U R I T Y

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HOW NOT TO GATHER INTELLIGENCE ATLAS ELEKTRONIK IN INDIA

SOUR

DREAM? GIVEN THE MONEY AND TIME IT HAS CONSUMED, TEJAS HAS TO PROVE THE CRITICS WRONG

COVER STORY (P44)

THE TEJAS SAGA DRDO

Although it has taken the country 30 years to build, the Light Combat Aircraft programme has bestowed the country with vast aircraft-building know-how.

PERSPECTIVE (P16)

MOD

ARMY PRO

ASSESSMENT (P12 )

CHALLENGES GALORE

INORDINATE DELAY

The new Army Chief, General Bikram Singh, will have to grapple with dual problem of restoring morale and putting an end to critical deficiencies.

The government must speed up the process of establishing a National Defence University in order to promote critical thinking among our senior service officers.

SPECIAL FEATURE (P34)

DEF BIZ (P39)

INTERNAL SECURITY (P54)

OPTIMISM GALORE

SUBMARINE EXPERTS

CHINKS IN THE ARMOUR

A look at the key prospects and opportunities at the Farnborough International Air Show 2012

Atlas Industries, specialists in a wide array of underwater technologies, look to further their relationship with the Indian Navy.

We analyse the gaping holes in the country’s intelligence apparatus.

www.geopolitics.in

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July 2012

US DEPARTMENT/FILICKR

VIRANDER SINGH

HEMANT RAWAT

NUCLEAR-REACTOR-GUIDES.BLOGSPOT

EXTENDING TACTICAL REACH (P19)

IN THE CROSSHAIRS (P28)

PROVIDING OVERWATCH (P30)

PERSIAN CONUNDRUM (P72)

The DRDO is planning an upgrade of the Pinaka multiple barrel rocket launcher to improve range.

The recent RFI for new sniper rifles takes the Army closer towards modernising its infantry.

Armed with unique capabilities, UAVs have become essential assets for the armed forces.

Iran’s nuclear status is bewildering the world and the international community is struggling to contain the crisis.

FOCUS (P58) STEPPING UP

MTCSP.ORG.UK

The involvement of the private sector is critical for the improvement of the internal security conditions in the country in the long term.

DIPLOMACY (65)

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EXPANDING TIES Editor-in-Chief

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INDIA AND THE US OVER A RANGE

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CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS BETWEEN

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CHALLENGES BEFORE THE NEW ARMY CHIEF

geopolitics VOL III, ISSUE II, JULY 2012 `100

ng Dealithe

D E F E N C E D I P L O M A C Y S E C U R I T Y

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HOW NOT TO GATHER INTELLIGENCE ATLAS ELEKTRONIK IN INDIA

SOUR

DREAM? GIVEN THE MONEY AND TIME IT HAS CONSUMED, TEJAS HAS TO PROVE THE CRITICS WRONG

Cover Design: Ruchi Sinha The total number of pages in this issue is 80 with cover

July 2012

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GEOPOLITICS

LETTERS

LETTERS TO EDITOR

www.geopolitics.in

T

he Special Feature (Towards Credible Deterrence, June 2012) was an interesting read. I was amazed to read about the details of the Chinese missile system. But I have my objection on a basic principle.

There is so much hidden and undisclosed information on the issue that are at the core of nuclear warfare and deterrence is hidden from public.

Therefore, all the analysis is based on information available in the public domain. I feel the article suggests India is not well prepared for nuclear deterrence.

The basic perception of the author is that nuclear silos can be attacked by the enemy and, therefore, nuclear missiles should be mobile. Fair enough, but once the nuclear missiles come out in the open, satellites will be able to catch them. In silos, the nuclear signature is at a minimum and the vulnerability is also little — unless, of course, the exact location of the silo is known. Every nation, including India disperses its nuclear weapons, as your article suggests. But there are many hidden truths, which are essential to analyse and understand the issue.

Regards Prakriti Agashe Mumbai POLITIC COVER2.qxd geo june cover11_GEO

5/26/2012

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INDIA N PL A AND VOL III, ISSUE

I, JUNE 2012

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C U R I T Y C Y S E P L O M A C E D I D E F E N

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ELUSIVE AIR-DEFENCE GUNS THE NCTC IMBROGLIO

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SURVIVOR HAS ENEMY, ARJUN TO FACE A REALIN ITS JOURNEY 1972 AND YET CONCEIVED IN MANY A NAY-SAYER AT HOME BATTLED

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t was not much of a surprise to read an ex-cavalry officer writing positive comments about the Arjun Tank (The Arjun Saga, June 2012). We have heard a lot about the superior performance of the Arjun compared to the T-90 tanks in recent times. The Arjun MKII, which is undergoing field trials, seems to have the potential to become a precursor to the Future Main Battle Tank.

The author does inform us about the MKII but doesn’t provide the details of this version. The article covers the history of the development of the tank in great detail but it would have been better if there had been more information about the new version. The article should have given more information about the ongoing Arjun MKII trials in Rajasthan. Having said that, I also would like to say that the article should have explained why, in spite of new improvements, the Army is reluctant to purchase more tanks. One argument that goes against the Arjun is that it is incompatible with the tank logistics systems of the Indian Army. Details about these issues would have made the article more balanced. Finally, I feel the knowledge of philosophy of operation of the Indian mechanised forces is important to know why certain tanks are preferred over others. Since the author is a cavalry officer, no one better than him could have done that. Although the article covers the philosophy of other main battle tanks like the Abrams, Merkava and T-90, it does not go into the details.

Overall, however, the article will educate a large number of enthusiasts like me.

Regards Sangharsh Patel Gujarat

PL DCNS AN ON S P IN IN ITS DIA

I

he cover of your June issue was eye-catching, to say the least. The issue carried a number of interesting articles. The interview of

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DCNS India head (“We have vast experience in building submarines for India, pg 34) gave much, required insight into the ongoing Scorpene submarine programme. It was pleasant to read about Rosoboron Terra (“We have had full support from the Army and the Ministry, pg-40) in Peter Punj’s interview. It is good that we are moving towards indigenisation with Indian firms making inroads into the maintenance and services sector. It is a good omen.

As far as I can tell, Geopolitics is the only magazine with so many regular features among defence magazines in the country. The latest feature, BizIntel, is going to set a new trend. I am sure others will try to follow the trend. The Pipavav-MDL deal is an eye-opener. It’s a serious matter if the company was in touch with MDL for investment seven years ago. There is so much insider-trading going on in the MoD. The blacklisting story proves that the MoD, that talks of transparency, is highly opaque and can jeopardise Indian security in the name of honesty. Keep the good work going. We hope to see some more new features.

Regards P K Arora New Delhi

All correspondence may be addressed to: Editor, Geopolitics, D-11 Basement, Nizamuddin (East), New Delhi-110013.

OR mail to geopolitics@newsline.in.

July 2012

{GOLDENEYE}

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Soldier-turned-Governor JJ does a

backhand return T

here is no doubt that men in uniform (and without) are creating ripples by writing about the armed forces. Last month it was R K Anand’s whiplash against the establishment and this month the riposte in favour of the establishment and the institutional strength of the system came from Joginder Jaswant Singh. In tennis parlance, it would be called a crosscourt backhand return! Sad as it may sound, the fact of the matter is that General JJ Singh, first made waves as the first Sikh to hold the top post.

It should have gone to another brilliant Sikh general (Harbaksh Singh) long back. But that didn’t happen and when JJ became the chief, there was naturally elation in Punjab that a pind da munda was now the head of the forces. There is nothing communal or parochial in this, it is simply a celebration of a unique event (just as much as many in the Alkali Dal too celebrated when Manmohan Singh became Prime Minister).

Now the Governor of Arunachal Pradesh, the former chief of army staff, was at his crackling best at his book launch (read review elsewhere in this issue). He ad- libbed with his wife, cracked jokes and even asked the Chief Minister to stand up so that people could see him.

But he better be careful. He said his wife had eyes that were ‘chinki’. Whatever that means. But if he was alluding to the North East where he happens to be a Governor now, he could be in trouble. For those who are not aware of the recent development, the Ministry of Home Affairs has created a law to prevent racial atrocities against North Eastern people. And under the gamut of it, falls the naming of someone as ‘chinki’ as well.

No surprise the media ignored the ‘closed to the media’ diktat from Harper Collins and turned up in full force. But they got their instructions from apparently the General who forgot all about it and spoke plenty to the media post the launch.

www.geopolitics.in

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July 2012

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{GOLDENEYE}

Natrajan calls

What happened on Siachen?

If track record is anything to go by, then BEML Chief Ò VRS Natarajan has plenty to be optimistic about. The last time a Public Sector Unit (PSU) CEO was suspended

The faujis are getting clever. They have now learnt Ò that that the art of getting the political and bureaucratic masters to fall in line requires not just large

happened when the Air India Chairman and Managing Director Michael Mascarenhas was suspended and a CBI case slapped on him. But Michael had formidable backers in Delhi including the then Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister Brajesh Mishra. The case was fast tracked (ever heard of a CBI case being put in the fast forward mode?), Michael was absolved and just days before his date of superannuation he was reinstated so that he could go with his head held high and in good grace. Michael decided that he had had enough of aviation and never returned to the business. These days he is the head of the multinational security company, Brinks Arya. But Natarajan’s case is different. Whereas Michael was smooth and suave and had a high number of friends and benefactors in the right places, the disgraced BEML chief — who had great dreams of making his firm a billion dollar enterprise-was a literal battering ram. In his decade-long stint at the top, whip-lashed everyone else into submission.

Sometimes when you are in power you fail to notice the straws in the wind. The first indication of acute negativity against him was when he was forced to withdraw the legal notice to the former chief. And then the icing on the cake was his sudden suspension. If people are to be believed, after the news of him being suspended by the ministry reached him, he called up the powersthat-be to confirm the news. After publication of a series of adversial news reports, it seems that he has lost faith in the media and wanted to confirm the bad news personally. Such is life.

doses of discipline but a dash of subterfuge as well! In a surprising move, India reiterated its old stand on Siachen during the visit of the Defence secretary Shashi Kant Sharma to Pakistan. With the Pakistan Army Chief making conciliatory noises, the fear was that maybe India goes soft at the political level. There was enough media hype on the possibility. To prevent any such possibility, the army approached the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) with a clear and unambiguous perspective on Siachen. In the meantime, they also approached the other CCS members and explained the position. The rest was done by aggressive writing of the ex-officers in newspapers. Good fellas, the army has learned the ways to manipulate the fractured polity.

China seminar Indo Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) is celebrating its Ò Golden jubilee with plenty of razzmatazz and pomp. And why not? A golden Jubilee is an occasion to celebrate, reflect and reenergise oneself for the journey ahead. As part of this exercise, the ITBP is organising a series of events to showcase its capability. The force has made serious attempts to show its pan-national character. In line with this, it also wanted to add some intellectual gloss to the exercise. A seminar on China it thought would be a good idea. It was a maiden attempt by the ITBP to showcase its importance and claim some ground in the strategic space. Indian central police organisations have been witnessing the dilution of their role and importance. They, in recent times, have been trying to regain the lost importance. The China seminar was touted as a key event and great plans were made and all the leading strategic minds were invited to grace the occasion. But under the austerity measures the twoday seminar was reduced to one day and subsequently cancelled citing administrative issues. When will we see the intellectual upliftment of our paramilitary forces?

No one knows why and who prompted the cancellation.

Only the babus will know and they are not talking.

That’s not English You have interpreters and you have interpreters, but how can you have an interpreter when both are Ò speaking the same language. Well, that's the off-the-record feedback from the Americans who find the peculiar brand of Malayali English that the Raksha Mantri speaks hard to decipher. No offence meant, but the fact of the matter is that both Bengalis and Malayalis (of course, there are exceptions) carry the fragrance of their matri basha across the spectrum to English. That's why you have a Pranab Mukherjee addressing Sonia as 'Shoniya'. Now, don't ask us about St Anthony. He hardly utters a word, so we wouldn’t know first-hand! www.geopolitics.in

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July 2012

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GEOPOLITICS

PANORAMA

T S O GH IN THE

GRAPHIC: RUCHI SINHA

E N I H C MA

T

here’s a quiet spectre spreading across the Middle East.

Unseen and unheard of until now, it is spreading its tentacles across computer networks across the region. Heeding its mysterious masters’ bidding, the cybernetic creature is striking without warning. Its target seems to the infrastructure of Iran, specifically the computers that control the country’s nuclear weapons programme. More of a cybernetic entity than a traditional computer virus, it has bewildered security experts across the world with its sophistication and prowess. Dubbed ‘Flame’ by the people who ‘discovered it in the wild’, it has been called one of the most complicated viruses ever found.

Kaspersky Lab is calling it “one of the most complex threats ever discovered”.

With unprecedented data-snatching capabilities, it has been described as an espionage toolkit that has been infecting targeted systems for at least two years.

So sophisticated and ground breaking is the new malware that it dwarfs Stuxnet, the virus that wreaked havoc with Iran’s nuclear programme, in size. It is alleged to be part of a well-coordinated, ongoing, state-run cyber espionage operation.

Alexander Gostev, Chief Security Expert at Kaspersky Lab said: “One of the most alarming facts is that the Flame cyberattack campaign is currently in its active phase, and its operator is consistently surveilling infected systems, collecting information and targeting new systems to accomplish its unknown goals.”

‘FLAMED’ SILENT AND DEADLY According to findings, the malware has been active since March 2010, but evaded discovery because of its “extreme complexity” and since only selected computers are being targeted.

In an effort to contain the virus, Iran resorted to severing Internet links to its Oil Ministry — the hub for nearly all the country’s crude exports.

NOVEL CREATURE

KEY FUNCTION

¡

ACCIDENTAL DISCOVERY

It has been described as a multitasking mole

¡

It can wipe data off hard drives

¡

Eavesdrop by activating audio systems to listen in on Skype calls or office chatter

¡ ¡ ¡

Take screenshots Log keystrokes Steal data from Bluetoothenabled mobile phones

Flame’s key function “appears to be cyber espionage, by stealing information from infected machines” and transferring it to servers across the world.

The malware was found during an inquiry driven by the International Te l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n Union (ITU), the United Nations’ specialised agency for information and communication technologies. The ITU kicked off research after a string of incidents with another destructive malware programme codenamed Wiper, which removed data on a number of computers in the Western Asia region. It was while investigating these incidents that Kaspersky Lab and ITU specialists came across the new type of malware.

GEOGRAPHICAL

SPREAD

Flame has been detected in the Palestinian territories, Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.Also

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found in Israel, Tel Aviv believes the virus could be traced to the US or other Western nations.

MODULAR DESIGN Flame consists of multiple modules — the section actually used to infect a machine is relatively small. After installation, the virus downloads further modules of its own code, depending on the explicit missions its makers want it to carry out. This makes the virus harder to follow and observe the virus, as different infected computers have diverse permutation of modules.

CYBER ARSENAL According to experts, Flame could be part of a project created by the same state-sponsored team that was behind Stuxnet and the related malware, DuQu. When asked about Flame, Israeli Vice Premier Moshe Yaalon did little to deflect speculation that it was the Jewish State’s handiwork: “Whoever sees the Iranian threat as a significant threat is likely to take various steps, including these, to hobble it. Israel is blessed with high technology, and we boast tools that open all sorts of opportunities for us.”

REPRODUCES

Flame has the capability to reproduce over a local network by means of several methods, including the same printer susceptibility and USB infection method used by Stuxnet.

July 2012

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GEOPOLITICS

ASSESSMENT

CHALLENGES BEFORE

THE ARMY

As the country now has a new Chief of the Army, urgent action is needed to restore moral health and make up critical deficiencies, says GURMEET KANWAL

G HEMANT RAWAT

ENERAL BIKRAM Singh has taken over the reins of the Indian Army at a time when this great army — often referred to as the ‘last man standing’ in a country riven by corruption, land and corporate scams, political expediency and much else — is passing through a rough patch in its history. The higher leadership of the Army has been facing criticism for putting ‘self’ before ‘service’, contrary to the Chetwood motto that is ingrained into an officer’s psyche from his training days at the Indian Military Academy (IMA), Dehradun: “The safety, honour and welfare of your country come first, always and every time. The honour, welfare and comfort of the men you command come next.

Your own ease, comfort and safety come last, always and every time.” (From a speech delivered by Field Marshal Sir Philip W Chetwood during the inauguration of IMA in 1932.)

When General V K Singh became the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) two years ago, there were huge expectations that he would restore the moral health of the Army as he came in with the reputation

TOUGH ASSIGNMENT: General Bikram Singh has taken over the reins of the Indian Army as it passes through a rough patch in its history

www.geopolitics.in

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July 2012

g ASSESSMENT of an officer with the highest integrity.

However, his tenure as COAS was marred by his own fight against the government on the issue of his date of birth and various other unseemly controversies that have not done the reputation of the Army any service as a first-class fighting force. These controversies are too well known and too recent to bear recounting. While individually, none of them have amounted to much, collectively these have severely dented the image of the Army in the eyes of the public that has constantly supported the Army, and even internationally.

A dispassionate SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis reveals that up to the level of combat units, i.e. infantry battalions, armoured and artillery regiments and other arms and services, the Army continues to remain a force to reckon with.

The combat-level Army is a cohesive fighting force and operationally its ethos is marked by professional excellence.

However, a number of officers comprising the Army’s leadership ranks from Brigadier onwards appear to have lost their moral compass and have strayed in their approach to moral uprightness.

These officers are increasingly taking chances with ventures that are shady and downright wrong (e.g. land and housing scams), hoping that they will get away with it without being discovered.

Perhaps, they have fallen victim to the ills that plague civil society, which spawns them.

Some of the senior officers have apparently forgotten the lines in the National Defence Academy (NDA), Khadakwasla, prayer that exhorts officers to ‘choose the harder right instead of the easier wrong’. This is a serious development with grave long-term consequences for the Army’s operational ethos. It needs to be immediately arrested and then corrected. The armed forces have always held their officers to higher moral standards than the civil society that they come from, and it is for this reason that they have remained untainted by the many ills that have plagued the nation for several decades. It is to be hoped that General Bikram Singh will immediately initiate remedial measures to arrest and correct the present downslide in the moral standards of the Army’s higher ranks. This issue merits his highest consideration in the months ahead. www.geopolitics.in

Preparedness for war Of course, the new COAS also has to simultaneously take stock of the Army’s preparedness for war and internal security challenges. Previous Army Chief General V K Singh’s leaked letter to the Prime Minister and the CAG’s recent report have revealed that the state of defence preparedness is a cause for serious concern. The Chief’s letter has brought into the public domain what has been known for long to Army officers in service and those who have retired from service.

The leakage of an ultra-sensitive top secret letter will certainly have an adverse impact on national security, as it has given undue advantage to India’s military adversaries by publicly disclosing sensitive information about the deficiencies in weapon systems, ammunition and equipment in service in the Army. However, now that these facts are

IT IS HOPED THAT GENERAL BIKRAM SINGH WILL INITIATE MEASURES TO ARREST THE DOWNSLIDE in the public domain, surely these will help focus the nation’s attention on the need to speedily make up the shortages and give the Army the wherewithal that it needs to fight and win future wars.

General V K Singh was not the first COAS to have apprised the PM about the poor state of preparedness; his predecessors had done so as well. General K M Cariappa had gone to Pandit Nehru to ask for additional funds for military modernisation and was reported to have been told, “India does not need an army; it needs a police force.” Well, the ignominy of 1962 followed.

The late General Bipin Joshi had written to PM Narasimha Rao to urge him to help the Army to make up the longstanding large-scale shortage of ammunition. While the shortage was worth over `10,000 crore, Army HQ had reportedly identified a “bottom line” figure without which the COAS said the Army

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would remain unprepared for war.

Perhaps the country’s precarious financial condition in the early-1990s did not allow PM Narasimha Rao to provide the necessary funds to immediately make up the shortage. A few years later the Kargil conflict took place and the whole nation heard the COAS General V P Malik making the chilling statement on national TV, “We will fight with what we have.”

It is well known that India had to scramble to import 50,000 rounds of 155mm ammunition for its Bofors guns, besides other weapons and equipment.

Stocks of tank ammunition and that for other artillery and air defence guns were also low and it was just as well that the fighting remained limited to the Kargil sector and did not spill over to the rest of the LoC or the plains.

Approximately 250,000 rounds of artillery ammunition were fired in that 50-day war. The government has authorised the stocking of sufficient ammunition to fight a large-scale war for 50 to 60 days. This is known as the ‘war reserve’.

As the Army Chief’s letter and the CAG report bring out, not enough new stocks were apparently procured to make up even the ammunition expended during the Kargil conflict. Stocks of several critical types of ammunition for tanks and artillery guns, have fallen to as low as less than 10 days war reserves. Also, ammunition has a shelf life of about 12 to 15 years, at the end of which it is no longer usable for combat but can still be used for training. Hence, the shortages continue to increase every year if action is not taken to constantly make up the deficiency.

The other major issue highlighted in the letter written by the COAS pertains to the continuation in service of obsolescent weapons and equipment and the stagnation in the process of military modernisation aimed at upgrading the Army’s war-fighting capabilities to prepare it to fight and win on the battlefields of the 21st century. While the COAS has pointed out several operational deficiencies, the most critical ones include the complete lack of artillery modernisation since the Bofors 155mm howitzer was purchased in the mid-1980s, “night blindness” of the Army’s infantry battalions and mechanised forces, and the fact that the air defence guns and missile systems are 97 per cent obsolescent. The inadequacy of the intelligence, surveillance July 2012

g ASSESSMENT

BRAVING THE ODDS The Indian Army faces a number of challenges at present, including:

Depletion of tank, artillery ammunition Stagnation in military modernisation process Continuation in service of obsolescent weapons and equipment Lack of artillery modernisation since Bofors gun was purchased in mid1980s “Night blindness” of the army’s infantry battalions and mechanised forces Obsolescence of 97 per cent of air defence guns and missile systems Inadequacy of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems

and reconnaissance systems, with an adverse impact on command and control during war, adds to the Army’s difficulties.

Lack of defence planning This sorry state of affairs has come about because of the flawed defence planning and defence acquisition processes in existence, a grossly inadequate defence budget and the inability to fully spend even the meagre funds that are allotted.

Funds are surrendered quite often due to bureaucratic red tape — civilian as well as military, scams in defence procurement and the frequent blacklisting of defence firms accused of adopting unfair means to win contracts.

Long-term defence planning is the charter of the apex body of the National Security Council, which meets very rarely due to the preoccupation of the PM and other members of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) with dayto-day crisis management. As such, the 15-year Long-term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP) and five-year Defence Plan do not receive the attention that these merit.

The 11th Defence Plan, which terminated on March 31, 2012, was not formally approved by the government and, hence, did not receive committed budgetary support that would have enabled the three Services to plan their acquisitions of www.geopolitics.in

weapons and equipment systematically, rather than being left to the vagaries of annual defence budgets.

Consequent to the leakage of the Chief’s letter and the major uproar in Parliament that resulted, the Defence Minister is reported to have approved the 12th Defence Plan 2012-17 and the LTIPP 2012-27 in early-April 2012. While this is undoubtedly commendable, it remains to be seen whether the Finance Ministry and, subsequently, the CCS will also show the same alacrity in according the financial approvals necessary to give practical effect to these plans.

The defence budget has dipped below 2 per cent of the country’s GDP, despite the fact that the Service Chiefs and Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence have repeatedly recommended that it should be raised to at least 3 per cent of the GDP if India is to build the defence capabilities that it will need to face the emerging threats and challenges and discharge its growing responsibilities as a regional power in Southern Asia.

In real terms, the increase in the budget for 2012-13 from `1,64,415 crore in 201112 to `1,93,007 crore ($ 38.6 billion) is barely adequate to allow for inflation, which is ruling at about 7.5 to 8.0 per cent, and the consequent increase in pay and allowances. The rupee’s recent slide against the US dollar to below `55 to a

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dollar has further eroded its purchasing power. Annual inflation in the international prices of weapons, ammunition and defence equipment is generally between 12 and 15 per cent. Each year’s delay in the procurement of operationally critical items substantially increases the burden on the exchequer.

Giving his reaction to the Finance Minister’s budget speech, Defence Minister A K Antony said, “By and large we are very happy about the budget because apart from the allocation, the Finance Minister has said that if the defence needs more money, there won’t be any problem.” However, the armed forces are unlikely to be satisfied as their plans for modernisation have been stymied year after year by the lack of committed budgetary support. The ongoing RMA (revolution in military affairs) has passed the Indian Army by. It is still a first-rate fighting force, but one that is equipped mostly with obsolescent weapons and equipment.

The lack of progress in the replacement of the Army’s obsolescent weapons and equipment and its qualitative modernisation to meet future threats and challenges is worrisome as the Army continues to maintain large-scale deployments on border management and internal security duties. It needs to upgrade its rudimentary C4I2SR system and graduate quickly to network centricity to optimise the use of its combat potential. While the mechanised forces in the plains are still partly night blind, the capability to launch offensive operations in the mountains continues to remain inadequate to deter conflict. The capability to launch precision strikes from ground and air-delivered firepower, which will pave the way for the infantry to win future battles, is much short of the volumes that will be required. The MoD must immediately ask for additional funds to kickstart the Army’s stalled modernisation process.

While the new COAS has his work cut out for him, the government will do well to appoint a National Security Commission to take stock of the lack of preparedness of the country’s armed forces and to make pragmatic recommendations to redress the visible inadequacies that might lead to yet another military debacle.

(The author is a Delhi-based defence analyst) July 2012

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CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: The establishments of the Indian National Defence University is a pressing need

QUO VADIS, INDIAN NATIONAL

DEFENCE UNIVERSITY? In order to promote a critical thinking among our senior service officers, the government must speed up the process of establishing a National Defence University as per the recommendation in the 1999 Kargil Review Committee report, writes RAJ MEHTA

O King, thanks to the Mauryan Army standing vigil, day and night, in weather fair and foul, Pataliputra reposes in peaceful comfort; secure in the belief that the borders of Magadha are inviolate. The day the soldier has to demand his dues… you will have lost all moral sanction to be King.

— Extracted from Kautilya’s letter to Emperor Chandragupta Maurya

N

OTHING ILLUSTRATES the critical, desperate need for establishing the Indian National Defence University (INDU) more than the highvisibility-high-octane media and diplomatic hyped February 28, 2012 release of the document: Non-Alignment 2.0: a Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the

www.geopolitics.in

21st Century by a group of Indian foreign policy experts. The document purports to place into context the core values and methodology that will pitch India into the regional and world stage as a serious player. It is the end result of 14 months of labour by Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Sunil Khilnani, Rajiv Kumar, Shyam Saran, S Raghavan, Nandan Nilekeni, Siddharth Varadarajan and Lt Gen (Retd) Prakash Menon. National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon, Deputy NSA’s Alok Prasad and Latha Reddy attended and presumably contributed to some sessions. Criticism has been muted so far by people in the official loop, but former NSAs Brajesh Misra, M K Narayanan and even Shivshankar Menon himself, have questioned the approach, lack of depth and research orientation and conclusions

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of the report.

Widely read and respected scholar-soldier Professor Gautam Sen is an exGurkha Regiment officer who left the Army in 1974 after 12 years of service. He is a fellow of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) and lectures at the Pentagon, Harvard, Stanford, MIT, Georgetown, Illinois and Pittsburg Universities. Commenting on Nonalignment 2.0, he says: “I am refraining from commenting on the desirability and strategic values of the report which could have easily been made by any intelligent Ph.D. student from the Department of Political Science, International Relations or Public Administration of any Indian University.”

Clearly, this effort to fill the perceived “strategic culture” or “strategic thinking” void does not quite excite him. Reading July 2012

g

Bilaspurat that lie along NH 8. It is believed that it will be seven years before INDU is open for business, taking the overall waiting period for INDU realisation to over 20 years.

The CONDU, after due deliberation, has chosen the American NDU model for INDU, but with modifications to suit Indian needs. Let us examine what the US NDU has on offer before we see how the INDU will be structured to meet its security challenges. In passing, the Chinese and Pakistani models will also be examined.

GEOPOLITICS

PERSPECTIVE

Management College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Joint Forces Staff College and the College of International Security Affairs. It has six research centres that work on strategy formulation/learning; on the Chinese military; on WMD; on technology and on homeland security. It runs a variety of programmes for military, civil, strategic communications, diplomatic and corporate officials the world over. NDU research papers/journals command worldwide attention.

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the fine print of his remarks, one feels that the Nehruvian “Non Alignment” model in its updated 21st century 2.0 incarnation to put across Indian security approaches and concerns does not quite pass muster, especially when this 70-page document flags India’s national interest as “being National University of Defense Technolotoo complex” for elucidation. Sen says gy (NUDT), China that this “lack of consensus” between Attributes of the US NDU Established in 1955 by the Chinese these security experts is “specifically due Before World War II, American scholarDefence and Education ministries, the to the reason that the process of bridging ship manifested in its military services NUDT focuses on integrated learning/ the gap between the realm of ideas and more or less independently. The need for research on Engineering, Defence Scithe domain of public policy- makence and Technology, IT and Space ing has never been achieved nor programmes. Its 2000-strong faculty attempted in India”. handles 28,000 PG/UG students.

The critical reactions to this apex policy document, however NDU Pakistan muted, spell out the dismal state of Established in 1971, it has the Presithe Union so far as orientation dent of Pakistan as Chancellor, with towards the entire gamut of securia serving three-star General as its ty is concerned, internal as well as President. Its mission is “to impart external/global. It is high time, higher education in policy and strattherefore, the government stopped egy formulation at various tiers with “evading responsibility” and took a emphasis on national security and step towards developing a profesdefence, and act as a national thinksional, integrated approach to the tank”. Students take classes in security conundrum. advanced strategic methods, conA dozen years after the father of flict resolution, WMD, nuclear polimodern Indian strategic thinking, tics and diplomacy. The NDU is K Subrahmanyam, made his recmodelled on the US NDU. ommendation in his 1999 Kargil MARTIAL PROWESS: Officers Training Academy, Gaya is Review Committee (KRC) report, the third pre-commissioning military academy in the country Quo Vadis INDU? the government, taking into raised on July 18, 2011 Professor Gautam Sen is right in account this, the follow-up Task stating that the USA must be creditForce on Defence Reforms under Arun inter-Services synergy and need for closer ed with the unique ability of projecting “a Singh and the subsequent Group of Minties between diplomacy, industry and the singularity of education and national isters (GoM) recommendations, finally military led to the creation of the Army interest”. Perhaps, its NDU best reflects promulgated the INDU by an Act of ParIndustrial College in 1924 and, after World this synergy; something that the CONDU liament, on May 11, 2011. A 13-member War II, the formation of joint colleges of obviously found worth emulating for the expert committee (Committee on NDU or higher military learning.

INDU. The INDU founding principle is to CONDU) was also constituted. It was “ensure cross-pollination of ideas and authorised to visit the NDUs of USA and US NDU emblem strategic thinking between academia and China to formulate its suggestions for The NDU was established in 1976 to congovernment.” With this in mind, CONDU INDU structure, mandate and solidate the nation’s defense community recommended that INDU be established staffing/functioning details. Officials say intellectual resources. NDU functions as a multi-disciplinary centre of excelINDU’s charter will be to undertake longunder the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its mission lence with its President, a serving threeterm defence and strategic studies; create is to prepare military and civilian leaders star officer of the armed services, and the “synergy’’ between academicians and from the USA and other countries to betVice-President from the Indian Foreign government functionaries, and “educate ter address national and international Service. The faculty ratio was fixed at 50 national security leaders on all aspects of security challenges through multi-disciper cent each from the military and civil national strategy’’. In February 2011, the plinary educational programmes, services (total of 135). CONDU had recHaryana government started the process research, professional exchanges and ommended the establishment of a of land acquisition for 205 acres in Guroutreach. The NDU includes the National National Institute of Security Studies, a gaon district in two villages, Binola and War College, Information Resources College of National Security Policy; an www.geopolitics.in

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July 2012

g PERSPECTIVE

NEED OF THE HOUR: It is high time the government stopped “evading responsibility” and took a step towards developing a solution to the security conundrum

Institute of Advanced Technology Studies and an Institute of Defence Management (IDM) with the existing College of Defence Management (CDM) under it, along with a new Centre for Research and Policy and a College of Industrial Research and Management. It had also suggested a Corporate Fellowship Programme to be run by a Distance Learning Department. The views expressed have been criticised as the opinion suggests that existing military institutions with accretion can take on the INDU charter.

Colonel Harinder Singh, a Research Fellow writing in an IDSA Issue brief in November 2010, felt that tiered research at four broad levels: area studies, strategic studies; international relations and quantitative studies (war gaming/simulation) would be needed. Training on global perspectives in terms of India’s grand strategy and foreign policy should be covered through studies in the field of international relations and political economy.

Overall, he felt that a challenging course curriculum and well-researched deliverables could ensure institutional rigour. In this context, he felt that the American and British approaches — the former emphasises extensive course work while the latter is less reliant on theory — be studied for adopting. He also felt: “A well-crafted outreach programme with academic universities and policy-oriented research think-tanks within the country and abroad will contribute to the overall quality of INDU scholarship.” He also felt that a visionary Advisory Committee and a brilliant, time-sensitive Steering Committee were needed to deliver the INDU for brilliant exploitation. www.geopolitics.in

A sobering reality check Scouring the net or newspapers/journals has not helped this writer get worthwhile authentic details on what the current state of INDU preparations is for a timesensitive, long-awaited opening. The disagreements with the recommendations offered by CONDU, the lack of transparency about INDU progress/challenges/faculty hiring/tie-ups with foreign institutions of like nature/qualitative requirements for students; military, civil or foreign leave us to draw the obvious conclusions. Instead of progress that one could be proud of, it appears that fierce, unrelenting turf battles are afoot (the bane of Indian governance). Rumour mills suggest that there are differing perceptions about who should head the organisation; inter-ministry differences of perception with reference to running the institution and having a say in content; methodology and deliverables. The rapidly-expanding plethora of NCR-based think-tanks, most pandering to powerful lobbies, must surely want a share of the INDU pie. Since a stand has not been taken/publicly expressed on the overall structure that INDU intends to adopt, existing and new, as also content and faculty-related issues, the Indian defence establishment appears to be the key loser, even after Parliamentary approval. The choking fear is that the INDU may finally end up merely replacing the Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) by way of award of degrees to its affiliated military institutions, the National Defence Academy, Defence Services Staff College and the National Defence College, sending “scholars/ researchers” on junkets and

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muddling along as a “centre of excellence” in our by now well-patented, ambivalent manner.

The INDU of Our Dreams General Shammi Mehta (Retd), ex-Army Commander and DG CII and an officer who was part of the Arun Singh Task Force on Defence Reform way back in 2000, is, however, optimistic and hopeful. Hopeful that national interest will override all other considerations, he feels that INDU, though correctly modelled on the US model, must find its own path for creating an interdisciplinary approach through a fully integrated multi-disciplinary format.

This should allow us to examine issues of overwhelming concern to us such as, for instance, the Arab Spring; the validity and execution of out-of-area operations or the way we look at our relationship and problem resolution vis-à-vis China.

One would like to add that INDU should be capable of defining “sufficient” as opposed to “classic” victory for India — even under the threat of a nuclear overhang. The research done by INDU using its unique India-specific integrated model should allow INDU to suggest strategies using Indian military, soft as well as diplomatic/cultural/economic powers for national and international good. Such a critical thinking-led research approach attuned to Indian realities will ensure that documents like Non Aligned 2.0 invite professional respect not criticism. As the Gita says, when the wise see knowledge and action as one, they see truly. INDU can give us that chance.

(The author is a retired Major General) July 2012

TOP SHOT Sniper rifles to extend the reach of Indian marksmen

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SUBMARINE SPECIALISTS Atlas brings a wealth of underwater expertise to India

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B U S I N E S S

HEMANT RAWAT

AF.MIL

KELTRON BAGS DRDO ORDER

EXTENDING

TACTICAL REACH The Pinaka system is the only indigenous rocket system in operation with the Indian Army and one of the DRDO’s most successful programmes. But now, after a request by the enduser, the DRDO is developing an extended range version, reports ROHIT SRIVASTAVA www.geopolitics.in

P

INAKA IS one rocket system that both the Army and the Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) are proud of. The DRDOdeveloped Pinaka multi-barrel rocketlaunching system can provide massive artillery support to Army columns. With a range of around 40 km, it has the capability to strike deep within enemy territory and pulverize the enemy command and control centres, formation headquarters and formations deep in the battlefield.

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KERALA STATE Electronics Development Corporation (Keltron) has received an order of `six crore from Naval Physical and Oceanographic Laboratory (NPOL), Kochi. The contract is for the supply of sonar simulators. NPOL is DRDO’s leading laboratory, which works in the naval segment. The simulators will be manufactured by Keltron at its Aroor unit. Simulators are used in imparting training to the naval personnel on how to operate the sonars on the ships and submarines of the Indian Navy.

Keltron has won this competitive bid by defeating Bharat Electronics Limited. The simulator designed by the NPOl incorporates features of international standards. The Aroor plant is an exclusive unit for the Sonar Array Production, which can not only manufacture but also repair and test sonar systems.

July 2012

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GEOPOLITICS

DEFBIZ

DRDO

Under development during the Kargil War, the Pinaka was test-fired during the conflict to check its prowess in a real battle. At that time, the Indian Army made an extensive use of the Russian-origin Grad 21 (122mm) rocket system for salvo firing to dislodge intruders from the Himalayan heights.

The destructive impact of the multiple rocket system on the enemys’ fortified position strengthened the case for multiple-barrel rocket systems.

India subsequently purchased the 90-km-range Smerch rocket system from Russia in 2006.

Being an imported system with high-end specifications, the Smerch works out as a very costly proposition. And, since it has the capability to fire different types of warheads, it does not make sense to use the Smerch against targets at short range.

Across the world, the trend is to first create rocket systems with a low-range and once the viability of the design has been demonstrated, development of the extended range version, with the same support system, begins. This incremental upgradation is a common phenomenon for any weapons system and platform.

www.geopolitics.in

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July 2012

g DEFBIZ

Speaking on the Pinaka-upgrade programme, Dr S Sundaresh, Chief Controller Research & Development (Armament and Combat Engineering), DRDO, said: “This is one of our success stories. At present, two regiments of the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket system are operational in the western sector. The launcher is being manufactured by Tata SED (Strategic Electronics Division) and Larsen & Toubro. The command centre is made by Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) and Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML) makes the replenishment vehicles. It is thus a good mix between private and public players. At present, the missile has a range between 35 and 40 km depending on factors such as wind speed, elevation, hurdle and warhead etc.”

The complete Pinaka system comprises the launcher vehicle, command centre, repair vehicle and loader-cumreplenishment vehicle. The 214-mm

BOTH THE ARMY AND DRDO ARE PROUD OF THE PINAKA ROCKET SYSTEM rocket is being produced at the Ordnance Factory Board, at the rate of 1000 rockets per year.

Speaking on the future orders for the rocket system from the Indian Army, Dr Sundaresh said, “In the next 18 months the Indian Army is planning to raise three-four regiments of the rocket system. The Army has plans of having a large number of Pinaka regiments in the future. The production facility of the rocket is being upgraded.”

One regiment of the Pinaka is made up of 20 launchers. Generally, 36 rockets are kept in the replenishment vehicle for every launcher. Being an area weapon, the Pinaka does not have precision-strike capability and is, therefore, fired in salvo to neutralise targets over a large area.

Each Pinaka regiment has three batteries and each battery has six launchers while one launcher is used for practice and training, another is kept as reserve.

Every battery has a command vehicle

and a replenishment vehicle is allotted for two launchers. At present, the Indian Army has three rocket systems, namely Grad 21, Pinaka and Smerch, with a maximum range of 20 km, 40 km and 90 km, respectively.

There was a need for a rocket system with a range between that of the Smerch and that of the Pinaka. The Smerch can neutralise targets at the Pinaka’s range but it is a costly system and the Army is looking for a cost-effective solution to this requirement. (The DRDO’s Prahar is another rocket system which is under development and will fill the range between the Smerch and the Brahmos).

Dr Sundaresh added: “A year back, the Army asked us for a longer range Pinaka and it put a stipulation that the system should not change much. So we carried out a feasibility study.”

To increase the range while keeping other specifications intact was possible only by improving the propellant system.

In any rocket system, there are three components, the propulsion system, command and control and warhead.

Since the last two do not play a role in range, the only system that was needed to improve was the propulsion system.

According to Dr Sundaresh: “New propellant techniques have increased the range without any major modification. We did a feasibility study and told the Army that it can be done with improved propellant.

The range will be increased without much change in the launcher and support system. The same launcher with a SHOCK AND AWE: The Pinaka is capable of unleashing massive amount of firepower on the enemy

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July 2012

g DEFBIZ

SCOURGE OF THE ENEMY Technical Characteristics

Maximum range No of tubes per launcher Time of fire salvo of 12 rockets Time of coming into action Area neutralised by a battery of six launchers

: : : :

38 km 12 44 s 3 min

:

100 m by 800 m

: : : : : : :

214 mm 276 kg 100 kg 4950 mm Proximity / ET Composite 2700 kg

:

10 min

:

10 min

:

15 min

:

15 min

Rocket Characteristics

Calibre Total weight Warhead weight Length Fuze Propellant Loaded pod weight

Replenishment Characteristics

HEMANT RAWAT

Time required for loading two pods on a launcher vehicle Time required for loading two pods on a LCR vehicle Time required for loading two pods on a RV Time required for unloading of fired pods from a launcher and reloading from LCR

slight repositioning of some systems can accommodate new rockets.”

In order to pack more propellant in almost the same space, the DRDO has employed a new packing technique, which has increased the range substantially. “In the new rockets, a case-bonded propellant technique is being used wherein the same volume of 30 per cent www.geopolitics.in

more propellant is packed,” informed Dr Sundaresh. “We are also using a more powerful propellant in the new rockets.

The improved propellant, along with better packing has improved range up to 60 km.”

The length of rocket doesn’t remain exactly the same: it will increase by 30 cm while the weight of the launcher will

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increase by 40 kg. The warhead of the rocket, however, remains the same. So the system will be able to make use of the same support system and launchers.

The new rockets are undergoing trials.

Dr Sundaresh, who is spearheading the Mark-II project, informed, “We started the static test in January 2012. We did a couple of static trials and the complete trials will be completed by September.

The technical trials or DRDO validation will be completed by the end of this year.

As per schedule, by the middle of 2013, user-trials should be complete and the clearance for production is expected by the end of 2013. During the actual flighttest, fine-tuning of the aerodynamics of the rocket will be carried out.”

DRDO IS WORKING CLOSELY WITH INDUSTRY PARTNERS FOR PINAKA MARK II At present, the DRDO is further finetuning the propellant packing in the rockets and carrying out static trials.

According to Dr Sundaresh, “50-60 prototypes were developed for the trial purpose. The project would cost `40 crore and in three years we would be able to increase the range by 50 per cent. Our project management has improved. In any Mark-II of existing systems, we are able to improve in a short span of time.”

The DRDO is working very closely with the industry partners for the Mark-II version. Dr Sundaresh said, “For launcher system we are already in touch with the industry. By end of the next year, the support system of the rocket system will be ready to prove the total system. We are going to the same companies to carry out the change in the product.”

When operational, this new improved Pinaka will provide flexibility to Army commanders on the battlefield. The additional indigenous rocket system, which can be manufactured in large numbers, will provide the Army the capability to create firepower asymmetry in a much shorter time span.

July 2012

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DEF BIZ

g The Boeing- BEL connection

DRDO howitzers? Yes, says Army THE INDIAN Army has conveyed its assurance to the Ministry of Defence on the induction of DRDO’s underdevelopment artillery guns. Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE), one of the leading DRDO labs which develops the weapon system, has been working on a

155 mm 52 caliber artillery gun. The Indian Army has reportedly told DRDO that it would place orders for 140 guns if it passes the field trials.

Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) is producing the Bofors guns for the Indian Army. The contract for the Bofors gun also included the Technology Transfer and the the Indian Army has placed orders for 100 of these guns to be manufactured by the OFB.

www.geopolitics.in

HEMANT RAWAT

BOEING

Eight minesweepers from South Korea

KANGNAM

BOEING DELIVERED the first EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft with a cockpit subassembly produced by the Bengaluru-based Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) to the US Navy in early May. The subassembly provides cockpit floodlighting compatible with the aircraft’s Night Vision Imaging System (NVIS). The initial contract was awarded to BEL by Boeing in March 2011 for F/A-18 cockpit subassemblies. The initial contract had options to renew it for up to four years annually. Based on BEL’s performance, Boeing had renewed the contract for another year.

Dennis Swanson, Vice President of International Business Development for Boeing Defense, Space & Security in India, said: “BEL continues to demonstrate its capabilities and its position as a valued partner to Boeing.

BEL’s work on P-8I, Super Hornets and Growlers is another example of how Indian companies are becoming a part of the global supply chain while Boeing helps them expand their opportunities across the global aerospace industry.”

Some of the cockpit subassemblies to be installed on Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets includes complexmachined stowage panel for the Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System connector cable and an avionics cooling system fan test switch panel with an NVIS-compatible floodlight assembly.

In addition to these, BEL provides Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) interrogators and Data Link II communications systems for the Indian Navy’s fleet of P-8I maritime reconnaissance aircraft. Boeing and BEL are also partners in the Analysis & Experimentation Centre (AEC) in Bengaluru since 2009. AEC is a centre for collaboration, experimentation and discovery, where both firms work to help the Indian armed forces understand the potential operational impacts of new system concepts, innovative technologies, and emerging and evolving processes.

INDIA IS going to buy eight mine counter-measures vessels (MCMVs) from the South Korean Kangnam Corporation for `6000 cr. The contract will be executed in two parts. In the first part the Korean firm will build two of these vessels. The rest of the six vessels will be constructed at the MoD-owned Goa Shipyard after transfer of technology from the prime contractor. The final price negotiation is going on.

Modern MCMVs are built from composites and highgrade steel, which gives them a low level of magnetivity.

These vessels will be equipped with radars and acoustic sensors with the capability to detect and then destroy mines with underwater vehicles. Mines are easy to lay and a very cheap and effective way to destroy ships when they try to enter harbours.

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July 2012

g 95 UAVs for Navy and Air Force

HEMANT RAWAT

HINDUSTAN AERONAUTICS Limited (HAL) will invest `600 crore in a new unit at Chellaghatta to manufacture new fighter aircraft and for engine production. The new unit, spread over 40 acres, will be adjacent to HAL airport in Bengaluru. A Memorandum of Understanding in this regard was inked between the state of Karnataka and HAL in early June. The Karnataka government has said that it will support the expansion of HAL. The new facility will have two divisions, one for eircraft assembly and testing and another for engine assembly and testing for the new fighter aircraft programme.

According to R K Tyagi, Chairman, HAL: “The new unit requires access to a runway. It is a time-bound programme to establish the infrastructure, production facilities and supply of the aircraft.” The production facility has a potential to create direct employment for around 1,200 personnel. Another 3,600 jobs are expected to be created because of logistics, services and outsourcing activities.

The expert group on “Restructuring and Strengthening of HAL” under the leadership of B K Chaturvedi, former Cabinet Secretary and Member, Planning Commission, visited various facilities of HAL on June 11, 2012. They held discussions with R K Tyagi, Chairman, HAL and other senior officials.

The mandate of the group is to look into issues such as building up specific business groups and profit centres in HAL and suggesting measures to meet technological and HR challenges. It will also focus on how to enhance synergies between HAL, the private defence sector and civilian industry and suggest changes in the organisation and its production lines. The expert group will submit its report by end of July 2012.

LOCKHEED MARTIN

HAL to invest `600 crore in new unit

THE INDIAN Air Force and Indian Navy will buy 95 mini Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) jointly. The ministry is at present formulating the specifications for the tender document. The bidding process for this tender is expected to begin early part of the next year. Out of the 95 UAVs, IAF will get 60 of these birds and the rest will go to the Indian Navy. At present India is using Israeli UAVs, mostly Searchers and Heron. The main specification of the UAVs is that the weight should not exceed 33 pounds as they would be operated by individual soldiers. The Indian Army has also floated a similar tender for mini UAVs. The Indian armed forces are now striving to bring in assets that can give realtime long-range surveillance capability to even the lowest formations in the battlefield.

HAL inks contract for MTA THE INDIAN multi-role transport aircraft project has crossed another milestone with a tripartite agreement signed between Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL), United Aircraft Corporation Transport Aircraft (UAC-TA) and Multirole Transport Aircraft Ltd (MTAL). To work on the joint development of MTA, HAL Rosoboronexport www.geopolitics.in

and UAC-TA formed a joint venture firm MTAL. HAL has a 50 per cent share in the MTAL and the rest is equally divided between two of the Russian firms.

The aircraft is going to be

in the class of 15 to 20 tonnes. The MTA is going to replace the Dornier aircraft, which is in service with the Indian armed forces. The demand for this aircraft between the develop-

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ing partners is close to 145 aircraft; India is expected to buy 45 aircraft while over 60 aircraft are expected to be exported to other nations.

According to HAL: “The MTA project’s preliminary design will start immediately on signing the follow-up contract on preliminary design on which tripartite discussions have been concluded.”

July 2012

DEF BIZ

g Hai on Mahindra Naval JV with Rafael

MAHINDRA

NOVEL PARTNERSHIP: Brigadier (Retd) K A Hai Chief Executive, Mahindra Defence Systems, with Vice Admiral (Retd) Yedida Yaari, CEO, Rafael at the signing of the MoU. In the background are Anand Mahindra, Vice Chairman & MD, Mahindra & Mahindra and Major General (Retd) Ilan Biran Chairman, VP GM land & Naval Systems Sector, Rafael

DURING DEF EXPO 2012, Mahindra and Mahindra (M&M) announced the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Israeli military behemoth Rafael. The M&M statement said that the MoU would lead to the formation of a joint venture (JV) company in India. The JV will manufacture subsurface naval products such as Anti-Torpedo Defence System (ATDS), Electronic Warfare Systems, Advanced Armour Solutions and Remotely Operated Weapons Stations for Futuristic Infantry Combat vehicle (FICV).

Speaking to the Geopolitics, Brig Kutub Hai, Chief Executive, Mahindra Defence System (MDNS) said: “The MoU was signed to form a joint venture agency. MDNS is a fully-owned subsidiary of the M&M. As per our plan Rafael will buy 26 per cent of stakes in MDNS. This will form the JV. We looked www.geopolitics.in

around for a partner for two years in naval system. In Rafael we found the right partner for having a long-term strategic partnership. Rafael is a good fit in the underwater naval system.”

As part of the JV, Rafael will bring in the anti-torpedo defence system for which the Request for Proposal (RFP) is expected very soon from the Indian Navy. Naval electronic warfare systems and unmanned surface vehicles will be some of the technologically-advanced products that Rafael will bring to the table in the first phase of the JV. If Mahindra sticks to the FICV selection process, the JV will also make some products for the programme like active protection system for the vehicle and remote control weapon system.

At the Defexpo, Anand Mahindra, MD, M&M, had said: “Our joint venture with Rafael signals our strategic entry

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into a wide range of high-tech defence solutions, which will enable the Mahindra Group to become a leading defence systems integrator in India.”

On the question of how the tech transfer would take place in the JV, Brigadier Hai said, “The JV will also have people deputed from Israel. Transfer of Technology is very much part of the JV. They would be providing full support in anti-torpedo and Electronic Warfare (EW) systems. We will also be sending our people to Rafael to experience the high technology manufacturing process. We will be receiving background intellectual property (IP) from Rafael. Thereafter, we will also be customising the Rafael products and creating lot of foreground IP will come from JV. We will definitely have people absorbing technology from Rafael and customising for Indian requirement.

This is one of the prime reasons to get the technology.”

MNDS is Pune based and the company is in the process of acquiring 3-4 acres more and plans to build a floor space of around 40,000 sq ft in its new facility. The shareholder agreement is expected to be final by September 2012 and the plant is expected to be ready by next year. The production from the plant is expected to begin by early 2014.

Till now, MNDS has delivered triple torpedo launchers to the Navy, a contract which it won earlier. It responded to the global RFI for the ATDS. RFP for the same is expected very shortly. The MDNS will be doing around 30-40 per cent of the workshare of the ATDS. Indian Navy is purchasing ATDS for its surface ships but in the future they could also be deployed for its submarine fleet.

Brigadier Hai said that M&M was focusing on underwater systems as it was easy to acquire capability in any given niche area. He also said that the company would also be offering sonar systems in future. According to Brigadier Hai, the Mahindra-Telephonics JV would be providing technology for the ATDS and as well as unmanned surface vehicles.

July 2012

g DCNS and Pipavav team up big time

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Pipavav needs technology for warship and surface-vessel building. DCNS is interested in building ships in India under the ‘Make India’ programme and it was looking for a shipyard in India, which had all the required facilities to manufacture modern naval warships.

The Indian government is willing to buy ships from abroad but wants a slow and systematic movement of the technology and expertise to India. In effect, it wants these ships to be built in India.

DCNS is willing to share technology with India. The partnership between the two firms is that Pipavav will provide the infrastructure while DCNS will provide the technology. As per the agreement between the two companies, any DCNS contract from Indian government will be undertaken by the project to the Pipavav shipyard.

Pierre Legros, DCNS Head of the Surface Ships

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division, concluded: “DCNS’s pledge is to become a key technology and Know-How Provider (KHP) to Pipavav.

Our objective is to propose modern manufacturing processes together with state-of-the-art platforms. DCNS is committed to transfer the technologies needed to support India’s national security needs.”

DCNS

DCNS AND PIPAVAV have teamed up to establish a strategic partnership to bring DCNS technologies, methods and skills to Pipavav. The focus of the collaboration is to build the highest state-of-the-art strategic assets, including modern warships for the Indian Navy and Coast Guard.

Speaking on the partnership, Patrick Boissier, DCNS Chairman, said: “Through the P75 Scorpene submarines, the ongoing indigenisation programme and DCNS India, we are working to enlarge our footprint in India. This strategic partnership with Pipavav again demonstrates DCNS’ confidence in the growing capabilities and long-term development of the Indian defence industries.”

Nikhil Gandhi, Pipavav Chairman, in his statement, said: “DCNS is well known for its high-tech platforms such as Scorpene submarines, Mistral-Class LPDs, FREMM frigates and innovative Gowind vessels (Corvettes and Offshore Patrol Vessels) among others. DCNS and Pipavav will provide India with advanced expertise on naval ships. The synergies between India’s largest integrated shipyard and the proficiency of the largest European naval defence company will allow cost-effective and timely manufacturing of high-class vessels for the benefit of all customers.”

The partnership was cemented a year back but was kept under wraps, thanks to the controversy over Pipavav and other private sector players and the on-off permission status of the Pipavav-Mazagoan Dock collaboration. The partnership is preparing a roadmap to build warships.

July 2012

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GEOPOLITICS

DEBBIZ

VIRENDRA SINGH

ONE SHOT ONE KILL: Sniper rifles provide reach and lethality like no other infantry weapon

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July 2012

g DEFBIZ

MAKING INDIAN

SNIPERS ELITE The Indian Army has taken another step towards the modernisation of its most neglected branch, the infantry. Here is an analysis of the recent Indian Army RFI for new sniper rifles

S

NIPER RIFLES play a very crucial role for infantry units by providing reach, lethality and precision that no other small infantry weapon can provide on the battlefield. Sniper rifles are used to neutralise the enemy that is well entrenched and difficult to target, as well as enemy officers providing leadership to troops.

The elimination of a leader in any unit creates chaos and confusion among the soldiers. During any operation snipers are expected to target the enemy precisely without exposing themselves.

The Indian Army’s Directorate of Infantry and Additional Directorate General of Weapons and Equipment sent out an open Request for Information (RFI) to ‘identify probable vendors who can undertake the project’. The last date to respond to the RFI was June 15, 2012.

The Army’s document says: “The weapon should be modular and facilitate replacement of sub-assemblies.” This means that the Army is looking for weapons that are easy to maintain. Modular designs do not require the entire weapon to be opened or dismantled if a sub-system malfunctions. The malfunctioning system can be replaced without disturbing any other systems. This is cost effective and less time consuming.

The Army is interested in a weapon system that has an adjustable cheek rest for the operator, providing him comfort during target acquisition. The RFI also suggests that the Army would be interested in guns with different ‘butt options’ which is a rare quality among sniper rifles. The Indian Army also wants these guns to be capable of firing blank rounds.

The RFI also calls for a sniper rifle with ‘many sling attachment points’, and ‘detachable bipods’. The Army needs

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confirmation from the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) on the ‘demonstration of the weapon system in India on a No-Cost No-Commitment basis’ and also wants OEMs to ‘supply limited equipment for trials at No-Cost No-Commitment basis.’

The Indian Army has more than a thousand units that would require these guns. The final number involved would be in thousands, as the Army might give one or more of these sniper rifles to each battalion. Weapons such as grenade launchers, light machine guns and medium machine guns, etc. are bought

THE INDIAN ARMY IS PURCHASING 2,000 SNIPER RIFLES FOR 300 GHATAK BATTALIONS according to a plan of giving one per section or one per company in a unit. If these are bought at the rate of one per company, then every battalion will have at least five sniper rifles.

In its questionnaire, the Indian Army had asked for the production capacity of the manufacturers, indicating that the Army is interested in buying sniper rifles in large numbers, but in a short span of time. It does not want to compromise when it comes to acquisition. The RFI asks the OEM to ‘indicate the minimum quantity of weapons with which, they would be

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willing to offer transfer of technology’. The Indian Army also wants information about the countries which are operating these weapons and since when.

The Indian Army has also enquired about the ‘cost of one complete sniper rifle along with sighting system’. This probably suggests that the Army has not been able to figure out the total number of weapons it intends to buy. The recent procurement scandals have made the Army slightly wary, and in recent times it has started enquiring about sub-contractors and vendors.

At present, the Indian Army uses a number of sniper rifles from a wide range of countries with different specifications (see box). Recent reports in the media have suggested that the Army would be purchasing 2000 sniper rifles for 300 Ghatak battalions. The RFP for this was issued last year to augment the existing stocks. Last year, the Army also floated a tender for flame suppressors for existing sniper rifles. In the current RFI, the rifle is expected to have noise and flame suppressors to add stealth to the gun.

The Army has also started scouting for new sighting systems for its sniper rifles.

In this RFI, the Army has asked for daytime sighting systems and magnification systems with field of view, digital zoom and diopter settings. The Army is also looking for picatinny rails to mount various sighting systems. Existing small arms will be modernised with picatinny rails to enable them to mount sighting systems, target designators and thermal imagers.

This is just the beginning of the process. The track record of the Army is not very good when it comes to the speed of acquisition. But the infantry needs to be modernised urgently and India can’t afford to be slow in this regard.

July 2012

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GEOPOLITICS

DEFBIZ

EAGLE EYES FOR THE

INDIAN ARMY

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have become the need of the hour for all the armed forces with an expansion of systems capable of executing various tasks at a fraction of the cost of legacy systems, reports ROHIT SRIVASTAVA

T

HE INDIAN Army has been using UAVs of different sizes for some years now but now it is moving towards the next revolution in military affairs. On May 22, 2012, the Indian Army released a Request for Information (RFI) for mini UAVs through the Directorate General of Infantry. The RFI details the important specification that the Army would like to have in the UAV, such as ‘real-time, surveillance and reconnaissance, detection of enemy movement, target detection, recognition, identification and acquisition, post-strike damage assessment (PSDA)’. This covers the gamut of a mission that a UAV is capable of.

At present, the Indian Army uses the Israeli Heron and Searcher UAVs for reconnaissance missions. Of late, the Army has also been employing UAVs for a border management role extensively in Kashmir. The UAVs are flown to track

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and identify insurgents infiltrating from the other side of the Line of Control (LoC). This has improved the Indian Army’s efficiency in the high mountains of Kashmir. The UAVs have become an integral part of the Army’s operational plan, as evidenced in a recently-concluded military exercise. This is a deviation from the usual secrecy that surrounds the information about the UAVs and their operations. All the three Services have been buying UAVs secretively, but now the Army has lifted the veil with the intention to purchase these aircraft with an RFI. According to the RFI, the UAV should be able to use both Raster and Digital Terrain Elevation Data. The Indian Army wants the UAV system to have ‘Three Aerial Vehicles (AVs) or Platforms, one Man Portable Ground Control Station (MPGCS), three Launch and Recovery Systems.’

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The Army would like the system to have ‘a remote video terminal’, threecolour day video cameras; three monochromatic night thermal sensors and one radio relay (RR). The weight of the whole mini UAV system is restricted to 35 kg, which would include the ‘weight of one AV with its MPGCS, backpack(s) (where required), one launch and recovery system (where required) and one set of optical sensors’.

Other requirements include the ability of ‘launch and recover the AV within an area of 50 metres by 50 metres.’ And if the launch is from wheeled launcher ‘the AV should take off / land from an unpaved surface in a distance of not more than 50 metres’.

The Army wants two different variants of the UAVs, one for the plains and another for the mountains, with a mission range of over 10 kilometres with maximum payload. The mountain variant is July 2012

g DEFBIZ

AT PRESENT, THE INDIAN ARMY USES THE ISRAELI HERON AND SEARCHER UAVs FOR RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS The RFI wants the MPGCS to operate in ‘S Band (2 GHz to 4 GHz) with digital transmission’. It further expects the UAV system to ‘provide real-time video from the day sensor with a minimum resolution of 1280 by 720 pixels at not less than 20 frames per second’. Similarly, the infrared camera is expected to capture ‘real-time video at a minimum resolution of 640 by 480 pixels at not less than 20

frames per second’.

The UAV system should also have two-way radio relay within a radius of five kilometers to another UAV along with the ability to relay ‘live sensor feed and telemetry data to the MPGCS’. The Army also wants more than one of these aerial vehicles to transmit data within a five-square-kilometer range, without mutual interference.

One can expect numerous global firms to offer their UAVs to match these specifications. There has been an exponential rise in the mini and micro-UAV segment as they have the capability to enhance battlefield capability of the units that employ them. As has been the experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, where sections use mini and microUAVs in operation these will most probably be company-level assets. The Indian armed forces are going net-centric and this is another step towards achieving the net-centric capability. Incidentally, within a year, all the three Services will have their own satellites.

OBSERVE AND REPORT: The micro UAVs bestow a tactical advantage to infantry units by dispelling the fog of war

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July 2012

USAFRICOM/ FILCKR

expected to be ‘launched and recovered up to an elevation of 4 kilometres at sea level and ‘operate up to 1000 metres above ground level (AGL)’. The drone should also have ‘endurance of 90 minutes, with a minimum loiter time of 45 minutes with maximum payload at 1000 metres above takeoff altitude and ground-operating temperatures ranging from minus 100 C ± 5° C to plus 300 C ± 5° C.’ This suggests that these will be employed in the greater Himalayan range and also in the LoC region, where the average altitude is around 5,000 meters.

The flight envelop expected from the plain and hill version is that it would be capable of being ‘launched and recovered up to an elevation of three kilometres at sea level and operate up to 1000 metre above ground level (AGL) and have an endurance of 120 minutes with a loiter time of at least 60 minutes with maximum payload at 1000 metre above takeoff altitude and ground-operating temperatures of 0° (Zero degrees) C ± 5° C to plus 400 C ± 5°C.’

g BIZINTEL

THE RELIANCE BLUEPRINT

Reliance Industries to wire up Mumbai, their first step to get into the defence and internal security space. Here is the further update on the same. Reliance is setting up two companies to handle the internal security and defence genre. Internal Security will be handled by Defence Security Solutions Ltd and a defence segment — where Reliance is primarily focusing on aerospace — will be handled by Reliance Aero Space Technology Ltd. Almost every major global aviation company has been in discussion with Reliance for some sort of collaborative effort including Dassault, SAAB, Boeing, EADS, Lockheed and who have you. It seems Reliance is keen on moving forward in the aerospace segment/global assembly and sub-assembly rather than leapfrog into an ambitious manufacturing rigmarole straightway. It is in this context that almost all OEMs — both in the US and the Europe — have spoken to Reliance: “The logic is to when we should be part of a global supply chain is in fact a valuable cog into wheel, at least that is the perspective. That is the development model we are looking at,” said somebody who has been closely associated with their operations.

PALBA.CZ

MONTH we had reportÄ LAST ed on the big contract won by

MINISTRY Of Defence’s Ä THE Defence Acquisition Council, is

BLACKLISTING: UNENDING SAGA

slated to meet to discuss the Indian Army’s proposals for acquisition of different weapon systems in July. One of the proposals that will undergo scrutiny is the acquisition of Light- Armoured Vehicles for the infantry. The proposal is expected to go through the ‘Make India’ programme but both the industry and the Army do not seem very enthusiastic about that. One of the reasons is that the Army’s budget for internal security is being reduced. The internal security budget is being diverted towards paramilitary organisations from the Army. In the last few years, the paramilitary has begun buying a huge number of armoured vehicles and similarly the

INTERNATIONAL defence Ä THE industry has become wary of the Indian Defence Ministry after the blacklisting of five defence firms. But if the sources are to be believed, the Ministry has moved an internal memo-cum-advisory on the blacklisting. Basically, the idea is to blacklist the individual firms not the group, but the Ministry has decided to ignore the companies for the tender process. For the moment, at least. In future, it will change its stance as per the situation. What dynamism! It’s like saying: Show me the company and we will show you the law.

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HEMANT RAWAT

g BIZINTEL

RAVI Rishi hand in the BEML Ä THE business is getting deeper. A couple

of years ago, BEML did a contract with the Slovakian firm DMD, the owner of the Konstructa. The contract was for the manufacturing of the DMD’s Zuzana 2, 155/52 caliber howitzer in India. During the Defexpo, BEML displayed a model of the wheeled version of the gun.

The wheeled version of the gun is mounted on Tatra Trucks. Thus this makes the Tatra-Konstructa combination a must for the gun. What is significant in this story is that the same gun went into the wheeled gun trials for the Indian

Army’s tender. The barrel burst during the trials and Konstructa replaced the barrel and thereafter the gun performed well. But the gun performance was not up to the mark and with Rheinmetal being blacklisted, the tender went into a single-vendor situation.

Therefore, Ravi Rishi pushed the same gun which did not perform as per the Army’s requirements and BEML went on to do the contract. Since the DPSU (Defence Public Sector Undertaking) gets preferential contracts from the ministry, the Zuzana would have been pushed into the Indian Army under the name of indigenisation.

INDIAN

BOFORS BAESYSTEMS

RAVI RISHI FACTOR

BOFORS 155/39 caliber Ä THE gun, which is being made by J&K police is also buying armoured vehicles in large numbers. One of the main manufacturers of armoured vehicles in India is not at all excited about the proposal. The chances are very high that this proposal of `1500 cr might go the way the tender for light strike vehicles for the Special Forces went. The light strike vehicle proposal is starting again from scratch.

Both the Army and the Air force are looking to acquire a number of all

terrain light strike vehicles (ATLSVs) to function as “offensive weapon platforms in all terrain configurations to meet special operations requirements of a small team”. The requirements call for a vehicle in the 3,500-kg unladen weight class category with a payload capacity of 900-1200 kg. These will be high-mobility vehicles for reconnaissance and patrol roles to provide space and cross mobility in all terrains (including high altitude and deserts).

LAV MAY NOT GET DAC CLEARANCE

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the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) under Transfer of Technology (ToT), is about to cross an important threshold very soon.

The OFB is releasing tenders for the partners to make the famous howitzer gun. The OFB is planning to do the barrel and the upper carriage of the gun.

The undercarriage, that comprises the legs and body, will be manufactured by the private industry. The chances of the MDSBAE joint venture Defence Land System India, which is bidding for the undercarriage manufacturing tender, is very high. The undercarriage is a very crucial part of the gun and makes up around 40 per cent of the gun. Any upgradation of the caliber of the gun is only possible if the undercarriage is strong.

The OFB will manufacture the barrel, ordnance and recoil system of the gun and is also looking for vendors for various assembly and subassembly of the gun.

The ToT of the famed Bofors was done under the initial contract for this gun that was signed between the AB Bofors and the MoD in 1986. Since then, the technology was lying idle with the OFB and India continuously looked for importing guns from foreign manufacturers. In the second phase, the OFB is slated to manufacture the 45 caliber version of the Bofors gun.

July 2012

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GEOPOLITICS

SPECIALREPORT

DRDO

MUCH OPTIMISM, PLENTY OF HOPE A platform to demonstrate civilian and military aircraft to potential customers and investors, the Farnborough International Air Show has a legendary reputation among aircraft enthusiasts and industry bigwigs. A look at the key prospects and opportunities at this year’s show

I

N REAL terms, it’s the moolah that makes for any exhibit ion or air show. At the In 2010 Farnborough Air Show, $47 billion worth of orders were announced there were over 1.2 lakh (1,20,000) visitors and close to 1,500 exhibitors from 40 countries around the world. It’s a different ball game this year: the economy con-

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tinues to flounder, business is tough, spending cuts are huge and the industry is still sluggish and far from a recovery mode. The surprise is that nearly 30 per cent of the exhibitors at this year’s show are first timers.

While the defence market is undoubtedly depressed, it’s the commercial aerospace market that’s on the upswing.

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The big aircraft from the last edition — the 787 Dreamliners — has since entered service and Airbus promises that the A350XWB has long passed the stage of glitches and is now on course for development. That apart the red hot A320 Neo and the737 MAX will provide more excitement.

This year’s Farnborough Air Show, July 2012

g SPECIALREPORT

NOBLETEK.COM

BRITISH ICON: Once the mainstay of the Royal Air Forces’s stategic bomber fleet, the legendary Vulcan still draws in massive crowds at the air show

being staged less than a month before the London Olympic Games, is completely sold out and is set to accommodate some 1,455 exhibitors from around 70 countries. What remains to be seen is how close to the tally of 120,000 expected business visitors the 2012 show will attract and whether it will generate anything like the $47 billion worth of deals announced in July 2010.

Organizers have reported that the size of several national pavilions —including www.geopolitics.in

those of Italy, France, Russia, the US, Mexico, the Czech Republic, Germany and Switzerland — have increased in size. Overall, almost one fourth of the 2012 exhibitors have enhanced the amount of space they’ve booked against 2010. Also, 28 per cent of the 2012 exhibitors are exhibiting for the first time at Farnborough.

“What this means is that over 50 per cent of our customer base is upwardly dynamic, which means that they are

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looking to do more business and win new business,” said Shaun Ormrod, Chief Executive of Farnborough International in a chat with journalists in May. ***** ****** ****** There is also huge excitement at the expansion of the UAV sector at Farnborough. Thanks to the devastating impact of the drones in Pakistan’s lawless tribal areas, most countries view it as critical to their defence preparedness. It’s now July 2012

g SPECIALREPORT

***** ****** ****** At the show, the US aerospace companies and the US military will be out in force — with F-16, F-18E/F, C-130Js and the V-22 all set to make an appearance.

The Osprey tiltrotor will also be there.

From 2013, the USAF Special Operations will be operating the Ospreys from RAF Mildenhall. The USAF will also perform

SPATIALENERGY.COM

mainstream and most manufacturers are likely to have a twin stream at the show — the defence spectacle of unmanned flights and the civil role that drones can play in fire fighting, law enforcement to search and rescue.

The Unmanned Systems Showcase at Farnborough International Air show 2012 is a platform for international manufacturers and operators to exhibit and demonstrate their products. Farnborough International Air show 2010 launched the first-ever UAS(Unmanned Aviation Systems) Indoor Flying area, at a UK aerospace exhibition which proved to be one of the most popular features of the show, widely attended by trade visitors and delegations. The Unmanned Systems Showcase returns in 2012.

Meanwhile, two companies on either side of the channel — Dassault Aviation and BAE Systems — are waiting for the British and French governments to decide whether to sign a Euro 40-million technology development contract for their long-awaited Medium-Altitude, Long Endurance (MALE) drone. Also, MBDA is expected to unveil its next ‘Future Concepts’ based on micromunitions for UAVs. Dassault is also waiting for the French government to decide whether to buy an interim MALE drone called Voltigeur that is a spin-off from Israel Aerospace Industries’ Heron TP. This drone was intended for deployment in Afghanistan but the requirement appears less urgent now that France has decided to withdraw its troops from that country. It could still be used, however, as France’s contribution to NATO’s Alliance Ground Surveillance programme, approved in May this year.

A separate contract, worth about Euro 10 million, is also expected soon to fund exploratory studies of an Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle also planned by the two countries.

AVIATION MECCA: The Farnborough Air Show reels in visitors from around the world

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July 2012

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July 2012

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BOEING The planning for Farnborough is being finalised and it will provide more specific information once the company has confirmed details. Boeing expects that its products and services highlighted at the show will attract the interest of many of its customers and stakeholders attending the show. On the defence side, Boeing has confirmed that the F/A-18 Super Hornet and the US Marine Corps V-22 are currently scheduled to appear.

SPECIALREPORT

Saab will have a number of its aeronautics products on static display, ranging from the Gripen NG Demo aircraft to the Saab 340 MSA, to flight displays by the Gripen C. The focus is on manned, unmanned and surveillance aeronautical technology.

Saab will be showcasing a number of platforms at the Farnborough Air Show.

These include the Gripen NG. Gripen NG is the most technologically-advanced fighter aircraft in the world. The first of the new generation, multi-role combat aircraft to enter service, Gripen NG will deliver strategic reach, true access to the battle arena, enhanced awareness and precise firepower.

The Saab 340 MSA is multi-role surveillance aircraft for detection, classification and identification of maritime contacts.

The Erieye AEW&C Mission System: The Erieye AEW&C Mission System includes sensors, C2 and communications. These are complemented by a comprehensive suite of training and support systems. Farnborough Air Show is extremely important to the Saab team.

This is testified by the fact that it will have a strong contingent present at Farnborough.

LOCKHEED MARTIN Fans of Lockheed Martin have a chance to win a ride on a historic Lockheed C121C Super Constellation at the show.

Five lucky winners will have a seat on the airplane, when it makes a celebratory flight from Farnborough Airport on the morning of July 10. To win a seat, one must write an essay of not more than 250 words that describes how aviation history influenced your path to becoming an aviation enthusiast and includes a photo.

You must also be a fan of Lockheed Martin on Facebook or follow the company on Twitter, which is easy enough to do before the entry is submitted.

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SPATIALENERGY.COM

SAAB

THE FLYING SOUK: $47 billion worth of orders were announced at the 2010 Farnborough Air Show

a flypast with the iconic B-52.

One important aircraft yet to appear at an international air show is, of course, the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. While there are regular updates on the test, the training fleet deliveries are still behind schedule. However, if Lockheed is able to persuade the Pentagon and manage a transatlantic flight with mid-air refuelling as well as possibly a back-up spare aircraft it would be a big boost not just to Lockheed but for Farnborough as well. For the European partners of the programme, it will be a shot in the arm: with the UK having recently returned to the F-35 STVOL variant.

It is more or less confirmed that Airbus Military is hoping to bring the A400M transporter to the show — it is now undergoing functionality and reliability tests ahead of its first delivery at the turn of the year. Last year, the A400 was in the static line Paris air show.

Other highlights include: A Irkut will be bringing its Yak-130 trainer (Yak) A There will be an appearance from two of the Russian Knights Su-27 (one in static, one in flying)

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A

Saab Gripen the KAI/Lockheed Martin T-50 advanced trainer.

There will also be a definite ‘new space’ feel as Virgin Galactic begins countdown to operations with its Spaceship Two sub-orbital space plane. There will be a full-size mock-up of Virgin Galactic’s Spaceship Two. Virgin boss Richard Branson will be there personally to outline his vision and a 400-seat pavilion has been allocated for the company.

The Breitling Jet Team, The Blades, RedHawks, Breitling Wingwalkers and the RAF Red Arrows will fly over the skies of Farnborough aerodrome performing stunts and tricks with speed and precision that visitors always enjoy.

The solo displays will also be enhanced by the first appearance of the South Korean Air Force T-50 jet trainer in the colours of the Black Eagles display.

On the ground, both the past and the future will be demonstrated in an impressive static collection including historical greats like the Breitling-sponsored Lockheed Super Constellation, appearing in commemoration of Lockheed Martin’s 100th anniversary, and the Catalina Flying Boat.

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GEOPOLITICS

INTERVIEW

“OUR PLAN IS TO CREATE A 100 PER CENT

SUBSIDIARY IN INDIA” Atlas Elektronik, the German submarine major with vast experience in submarine and naval technology, proposes to start an Indian subsidiary to focus on emerging opportunities.

ROHIT SRIVASTAVA spoke to KHALIL RAHMAN, Country Head, India, about Atlas Elektronik’s foray into India About Atlas Atlas is jointly owned by ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems and EADS. ThyssenKrupp also owns HDW (HowaldtswerkeDeutsche Werft GmbH), which manufactures submarines.

Atlas has three large divisions. Firstly, the submarine division — here we produce, if you like, the “brain” and the “ears” of the submarine. The submarine is blind effectively: it can only listen, it can’t see. And it listens through the sonar systems that it has. We produce the sonar arrays, the command system and we also produce the effector — which is the www.geopolitics.in

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July 2012

g INTERVIEW torpedo. Atlas has a complete range of torpedo technologies. In fact, we are the only company that has the full range of technologies — from the homing head at the tip to the casket — to the fibre optical wire-guiding system at the rear.

On the surface ships we have the same philosophy. Atlas provides the underwater sensors, (i.e. the sonar systems), the command system and we integrate missiles and other effectors into our command systems. Our UKbased subsidiary produces torpedo counter-measures or decoys. In the surface area, our business line is split into anti-submarine warfare, mine countermeasures and combat systems.

In addition, we have a service division, a hydrographic company called Atlas Hydrographic and we have a communications company called Hagenuk Marinekommunication.

On programmes in India India has a very ambitious programme of shipbuilding, both surface ships and submarines. As such, no major company can afford to ignore the Indian market.

Atlas has been present in India since the 1980s approximately. We supplied our equipment for the Shishumar-Class submarines, which were designed by HDW, like the combat systems, the torpedoes and the sonar systems.

The Indian Navy is currently upgrading the existing fleet of submarines: both the German-origin and the Russian-origin submarines. So, we are involved in upgrading the complete suite of equipment on the

German submarines. We’ve already upgraded two of the submarines. For the Russian-built Kilo class, we’re bidding for the towed-array sonar.

These are existing platforms, but of course what is interesting to a company like Atlas are the future-build programmes. There is a long-term plan to procure another 18 conventional submarines, the first six of which will be called Project 75 (India). We will be bidding with our shareholder HDW for Project 75 (India). When the tender will come out and what will happen — your guess is as good as mine — but it’s clearly an important programme for Atlas.

Similarly, the Navy has a large number of build programmes for the surface ships. So, frigates, destroyers, minehunting vessels and we have a long list of projects, some of the major ones that we are trying to work with are in the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) area.

Sometimes we bid directly to the Navy, sometimes to the shipyards that will build the ships; sometimes in partnership with the Indian industry. So, for example, we may partner with a public sector undertaking (PSU) like Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) to provide our technology, which will then integrate it into its own system.

We have domain expertise in sonar technology. We may provide building blocks that an Indian partner could stitch together with an existing combat system that they have developed in order to provide into a new platform or even upgrade an existing platform.

So, the future in India, as we see it, will be very much not just the question of us coming with a German-built product and delivering it to the Indian Navy, but building a coalition of partners here in India, that will include both the public sector and the private sector, the shipyards and even organisations like DRDO (Defence Research Development Organisation) to help the Indian industry develop localised solutions or solutions that are adapted to the needs of the Indian market.

So those are our interests in India.

The size of the market is no secret to anyone. Our plan is to create a 100 per cent Atlas subsidiary in India, and this will establish both commercial and technical footprints in the country. This is ongoing and should be operational within the next few months.

We also are in the process of negotiating or having discussions about memorandums of understanding (MoUs) and partnerships with key industry players.

We have already some ongoing partnerships. So, for example, on the portable diver detection sonar (PDDS) — we have partnered with Larsen & Toubro.

On the PDDS programme The Indian Navy has a large fleet, which may be at threat from divers when the ships are anchored. So they have a plan to equip the entire fleet with a diver detection sonar device. So you can hang it over the side of the ship and detect any movement that is going on around the ship when the ship is at anchor.

DPR

LONGSTANDING ASSOCIATION: Atlas supplied equipment for the Shishumar-Class submarines which were designed by HDW

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July 2012

g INTERVIEW It is a ‘Buy-and-Make’ India programme. That means that the Indian company would be the lead — in this case Larsen & Toubro. The Acquisition Wing has asked for the Capability Definition Document (CDD), which is the step just before the RFP (request for proposal). In addition to these, we are also interested in all other programmes where our technology has an application.

On upgrades for the Kilo-class submarines The Indian Navy has ten Kilo-class submarines and it has launched an RFP for towed sonars. We have already submitted our response.

I think another project that will be of

www.geopolitics.in

technological barrier for “buy global” projects to a level where you have two competitors. In Europe, a government will work with its local industry in the same way the Indian government will work with the DRDO or with BEL or with HAL (Hindustan Aeronautics Limitied).

Because we have subsidiaries in the UK for example, and in Germany, we will get orders from these governments that are ready to develop something completely new, something completely innovative.

And that’s very important and that’s what allows us to stay at the leading edge of technology.

So even if there aren’t any big shipbuilding programmes, like there are in India, there are still these kinds of development projects.

On the European market Europe is undergoing a period of slow growth economically. That does not mean to say that Europe has come to a complete standstill. We are based in Germany and the German Navy continues to represent about 30 per cent of our business. The other point is that European governments fund cuttingedge projects. The Indian DPP (Defence Procurement Procedure) requires there to be competition; so you have to set the

On the role in Project 75 I HDW are the platform manufacturers.

Whenever you have a big programme like that, the prime contractor will be the platform provider — in this case HDW.

ROHIT SRIVASTAVA

interest to India will be the torpedoes. Atlas, as I told you earlier, owns the intellectual property rights (IPR) on everything from the tip of the torpedo to the casket. We are in fact the only European manufacturer that has a complete range of technologies. I can say very confidently that our heavyweight torpedo is the best torpedo in the world. It’s not only sailing on German submarines, but has also been exported to various navies in Europe, Asia and elsewhere. The performance of this torpedo is clearly proven in terms of range, speed and reliability.

We are looking at developing partnerships with India in order to allow India to develop an indigenous torpedo that integrates aspects of our technology. We have a unique technology, for example in batteries that gives the range and speed, or in the fibre optic wire guidance systems. So we have some really unique technologies that we are willing to share with India and we are talking to various partners including the DRDaO. How we can transfer these technologies would need to be defined.

We recognise that a market and an economy the size of India needs to develop its indigenous industry and will do it. We are not looking to provide necessarily finished products. Where there are gaps, immediate gaps, we are happy to do that, if the products are the requirements of the Navy. But we are also interested in transferring those technologies and building the relationships that will allow us to be here for the long term. Selling products is a short-term opportunity. Of course, we are interested in it where possible, but we are more interested in being here for the long term.

ONE STOP SHOP: Atlas is one of the few companies in the world that makes all the critical components of submarines, like this Actas-towed array radar

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Other projects Well the Navy itself has a number of ASW projects. An RFI (Request for Information) came out last year for shallow water ASW craft, a small craft and I think it’s tendering to a number of Indian shipyards. We expect the tender shortly.

So we are obviously talking directly to the Navy and to the shipyards and to industry partners about how best to integrate our technologies onto these platforms. The torpedo defence system has great potential. And we are talking directly with the Navy and the partners again.

There is a tendency in the Indian Navy to define projects more and more either as ‘Buy-and-Make’ Indian programmes, or with technology transfer, or in some cases when we are talking about the platforms, to give the project to the Indian shipyards. So it might be that the Navy, for example, decides to specify our technology on a maker’s list, but gives the responsibility to the shipyard to procure. In the same way, the prime contractor would be HDW for the submarines and we will be a subsupplier to HDW. That might be the model that will work with Indian shipyards in the future. It seems to be a trend that we’re seeing increasingly, as it simplifies the procurement procedure for the Navy.

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MILITARYPHOTOS.NET

Rank of India on Global Peace Index

7

g

55

Gold sovereigns found by bomb disposal squad

GEOPOLITICS

NUMBERSGAME

THE COUNTRY’S rank in 2011 was 137 while Pakistan is now at 149 out of 158 countries that were ranked in the list. On top of the list is Iceland, once again ranked the most peaceful country in the world, followed by Denmark and New Zealand. At the bottom of the list is Somalia, ranked the least peaceful country at 158th position. For the first time since the GPI rankings began, the Middle-East and North Africa have displaced Sub-Saharan Africa as the least peaceful region in the world.

21 Landmines recovered

THE LANDMINES were recovered from the KurungGaneshpur path in Latehar district of Jharkhand in an anti-Maoist operation. The target of the landmine appeared to be security forces as they were planted on the route used by them. The mines ranged in size from one to ten kilos and the security forces found the first 10-kilo improvised explosive device in the vicinity of a well in the region.

THE REVELATION was made

by Maoist top-shot Sadanala Ramakrishna who was arrested in Kolkata earlier this year. According to the officials from the National Investigation Agency (NIA), material for the production of nearly 1,000-1,200 rockets was seized when Sadanala Ramakrishna was caught.

The Maoist has disclosed that the Naxals had manufacturing units in Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Bihar, Karnataka and West Bengal.

50

UDUMULASUDHAKARREDDY.BLOGSPOT.IN

Naxal armouries exist

Sadanala also said that the Maoists had formed Central Technical Committee (CTC) in 2001 and the fabrication of weapons on large scale was undertaken on subcontract basis to a number of lathe works companies.

CTC also conducts assembly of weapons parts and production of improvised rocket launchers, in addition to repair of arms and development of pipe guns amongst a host of other tasks.

IN AN unclaimed bag at Chennai airport. The bag caused panic at the airport car park after lying unattended for more than an hour. The airport manager

called the bomb squad after an alert head constable alerted the authorities to the presence of the unclaimed baggage. The airport manager also announced the presence of the bag over the public announcement system at the airport. After the police arrived with sniffer dogs and cordoned off the area the bomb disposal squad discovered the gold coins in the bag.

Ultras being trained in PoK

According to a report in the Deccan Herald, efforts are being made to push the militants undergoing training in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) over the Line of Control into the Kashmir Valley. According to media reports, the Krishna Ghati in the Poonch region has been identified as an “extremely vulnerable” neighbourhood for infiltration.

Consequently, security forces have been told to increase patrolling in the region. The militants' handlers across the border are said to be troubled by the fact that in spite of concerted efforts by them, they have not been able to sneak in militants into India

during the summer, traditionally the best time for infiltration. In a sign of normalcy returning to the Kashmir Valley, this summer has witnessed a very successful tourist season with a large number of visitors touring the state.

FLICKRHIVEMIND.NET

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g 3,000

NUMBERSGAME

Tribal youth turn up for recruitment

THE BASTAR youth braved a Maoist prohibitory order in Kanker district, 200 km south of Raipur, one of the worst-affected regions in south Chhattisgarh, to try and join the Indian Army.

Army officials were pleasantly surprised at the turnout in spite of the discovery of Maoist literature warning the locals against attending the six-day recruitment rally. The Maoists had warned people in seven districts to stay away from the recruitment camp and printed pamphlets asking people to boycott it. The Army has been recruiting up to 300 candidates from Chhattisgarh in every six-month cycle.

150

Crore approved for Service Headquarters

DEFENCE MINISTER A K Antony has given 'in principle' approval to the project that amounts to a threefold hike from the current `50 crore. The decision to hike the budget was taken at a meeting of the Defence Minister with the three service chiefs and Defence Secretary Shashikant Sharma. In the light of the present security scenario, the Defence Minister also reviewed the overall training and operational activities of the armed forces.

12,000 Acres encroached

ACCORDING TO a disclosure to the Parliament's Public Accounts Committee by the Defence Ministry, squatters have been on defence-owned land for the past 20 years. To shore up its case, the Ministry is recording, updating and microfilming documents relating to the land. Also under review are leases that have either run out or under dispute. Over 17 lakh acres of land are under the direct possession of the defence establishment.

2,000

Soldiers commit suicide

roads on India-China border 26 New WORK ON roads has started to provide better connectivity to regions on the sensitive eastern border. The new roads — 804 km in length — will cost `1,934 crore. The new roads will be critical to the operations of the IndoTibetan Border Police (ITBP) and so the MHA (Ministry of Home Affairs) has been pushing for their speedy construction. As these roads pass through ecologicallysensitive areas, the Ministry of Environment and Forests had some objections, but these have since been largely sorted out. The foundation work of 462 km-long roads has been completed and surfacing work on a 158-km-long stretch has also been accomplished. A twophase plan has been made by the Centre for the construction of roads on the India-Pakistan and IndiaChina borders for speedy movement of troops and associated equipment.

A RECENT research carried by Prof Bashir Ahmad Dabla, head of the Sociology department of Kashmir University, revealed a sharp rise in suicides in the Army and other para-military forces deployed in the state. According to the study, a majority of the soldiers who committed suicides were married and the preferred method was the use of the service weapon. The research revealed a slightly higher number of suicides by personnel from the southern states. While unofficial estimates put the total number of suicides in the region between 7,000 and 20,000 in 20 years, Professor Dabla’s research done from 2009 to 2011 revealed the armed forces share to be around 2,000 cases. Denial of leave, stress related to counter-insurgency and altercations among personnel were the leading causes of suicides. www.geopolitics.in

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GEOPOLITICS

COVERSTORY

A DREAM COME

TRUE?

Conceived 30 years ago, the Light Combat Aircraft programme, for which the country has spent about `10,000 crore, appears like a crawling and disappointing affair superficially, but on closer scrutiny, it is a great success story, writes VIJAINDER K THAKUR

T

HE LIGHT Combat Aircraft (LCA) project was proposed in 1983 by DRDO (Defence Research Development Organisation) as an F16-class lightweight fighter designed to replace the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) MiG-21 fighter variants.

It was an exciting and ambitious project that stirred pride amidst young IAF fighter pilots already buoyed by the recent induction of Jaguars, after years of operating the early 60s vintage fighters. The Jaguar deal, which included local assembly of the aircraft, was a landmark event because it ended India’s isolation from the West and heavy dependence on all equipment Soviet. The deal allowed India to catch up with western fighter technology and tactics.

No more were IAF fighter pilots confined to just reading about inertial navigation systems, moving map displays, head-up

SEA WARRIOR: LCA Navy is the second STOBAR (Ski Take Off But Arrested Recovery) carrier borne aircraft in the world, after the Russian deck-based aircraft

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displays and laser-guided weapons in crew room magazines; they could actually fly an aircraft that had them. Equally important was the opportunity to interact with RAF pilots and imbibe tactics suited for electronics-packed platforms like the Jaguar, thanks to the training programmes that were thoughtfully negotiated as part of the Jaguar deal.

Having assimilated Jaguar technology, it appeared logical for the IAF and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to forge ahead and build a local design and manufacturing capability. The LCA was the logical conclusion. In 1984, in order to fast-track the development of the LCA, the government set up the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) with the Scientific Adviser (SA) to the Defence Minister as its Director General. The SA also served as a Secretary to the Government of India (GoI) — that would give him clout to clear bureaucratic bottlenecks.

The ambitious goal was to deliver a fully-tested, production-ready version of the aircraft within 10 years — that is by 1994. The IAF went along with the

dream and firmed up its air staff requirements in 1985. The GoI sanctioned the project in 1986 and project definition started in 1987.

Project kickoff Bold and ambitious projects tend to be risky endeavours. The Jaguar deal gave us access to a lot of technology, but not all that would go into building the LCA. And these included fly-bywire, use of composites, multi-function displays and micro-processor-based monitoring and control of mechanical systems. Besides, there were sanctions on technology-transfer from the Western countries, even though the DRDO overstated capabilities and glossed over challenges. By 1990, the ADA came out with the design of the LCA and told MOD (Ministry of Defence) that it would take seven years to develop it!

The LCA was conceived and developed as a fourth-generation aircraft with ¾ Fly-by-wire flight control systems for increased redundancy and lighter weight ¾ Relaxed Static Stability for increased performance ¾ Glass cockpit incorporating the latest all-digital open architecture avionics systems with integrated head-up display, multi-function displays and helmet-mounted display ¾ Advanced composite materials

for the airframe ¾ Computer-based control of all electro-mechanical systems for safe handling through the entire envelope of the aircraft and engine.

As part of the LCA project, the government also sanctioned the indigenous development of the Kaveri engine to power the aircraft on March 30, 1989, with a Probable Date of Completion (PDC) of December 31, 1996. The PDC has since been revised several times and the Kaveri project has since been delinked from the LCA project.

The government cleared the Full Scale Engineering Development (FSED) of the LCA in two phases in 1990. In Phase 1, two technology demonstrator aircraft ( TD-1 and TD-2) were to be built and test flown as proof-of-concept. In Phase 2, additional prototype aircraft were to be built to speed up the flight-test programme leading to Initial Operational Clearance for use in the IAF. Phase 1 started in 1991 and the TD-1 rolled out on November 17, 1995, followed by TD-2 in 1998. However, the aircraft remained grounded due to technical problems in flight control systems and structural deficiencies. The programme faced a further setback after the US imposed sanctions following India’s May 1998 nuclear tests.

The tests immediately ended US help in developing the Fly-By-Wire (FBW )

DRDO

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July 2012

— — 2014 — — —

SAGA

Flight Control System (FCS) for the

— LCA. National Aeronautical Laborato-

ry Control Law (CLAW ) team, which

— was developing the FBW FCS in the US, was literally asked to pack its bags

— and return to India overnight. Also

impacted were ADA’s efforts to devel-

— op carbon brakes, flight control actuators, composite materials, DFCC (Digital Flight Control Computers).

The delay caused by the US sanc— tions ultimately proved to be a bless-

—

— — — — — — — ing in disguise because it challenged

— DRDO scientists and gave a major fil— lip to indigenisation. The first Tech-

nology Demonstrator aircraft TD-1 — successfully flew in January 2001, followed by TD-2 in July 2002.

In the first week of May 2003, the —

— —

g

THE TEJAS

COVERSTORY

then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee witnessed both the technology demonstrators (TD1 and TD-2) flying together, after which he christened LCA as “Tejas”.

The LCA crossed the sound barrier for the first time on August 1, 2003. Digital fly-by-wire control system for the production versions of the aircraft was fully developed by 2003. The technology development phase for the aircraft was completed in March 2004.

Based on the successful first flight of the TD-1 in 2001, the government gave a go-ahead for Phase 2 of FSED in November 2001. The PDC for Phase 2 was set at December 31, 2008, with the Tejas expected to obtain Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) by the year 2005-2006. The PDC has since been revised to December 31, 2012.

Phase 2 involved building and flight-testing five Prototype Vehicles (PV1 to PV5), with PV4 being the Naval variant

1990

comes out with `ADA the LCA design and

1991

— gives MoD seven-year

time frame, Government — clears the Full Scale Engineering Development — (FSED) of LCA in two phases

—

— — — 1983 — —

www.geopolitics.in

1989

engine to power LCA `Kaveri sanctioned, with a Probable

Date of Completion (PDC) set at December 31, 1996

— —

1 starts and the TD-1 rolls out in `Phase 1995, followed by TD-2 in 1998

1986

sanctions `GoI project, project

and PV5 a two-seat trainer version. The PV series aircraft would join TD-1 and TD-2 in the flight testing programme. definition starts in All the aircraft earmarked for the flight 1987 test programme, except PV4, were flying by November 26, 2009, when the Light Combat Aircraft project LCA Trainer PV5 took to the skies.

To ensure a smooth, efficient and proposed as an F-16-class lightweight fighter and goal set timely transfer of technology from the design agency ADA to the production to deliver a production-ready agency, HAL, MoD placed an order for version aircraft by 1994

1983

`

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eight Limited Series Production (LSP) aircraft built to IOC standards on HAL. The LSP aircraft will eventually enter squadron service.

LSP-1 flew for the first time on April 25, 2007, and LSP-7 on March 9,

1998

faces set`Programme back after US imposes sanctions after Indian nuclear tests

2012. LSP-6 is yet to fly. It is being rigged up as a test vehicle for high angle of attack testing.

It may be noted that as the Tejas evolved, it put on nearly 1.5 tonne more weight than it was designed for.

In January 2009 ADA sought assistance from European defence major EADS to redesign the Tejas undercarriage and help reduces the weight of the fighter.

It also sought help for fuel distribution, uneven braking, flight controls, environmental controls and testing.

EADS is now helping ADA get final operational clearance for the LCA Tejas under a $20-million contract.

IAF involvement The IAF became actively involved in the LCA programme around 2007 when it stationed a team of experienced officers in Bengaluru to oversee the induction of the aircraft into the service. The team helped ADA in operationalising the aircraft, converting it from a test bed maintained by scientists, to an aircraft that could be maintained by less qualified personnel at July 2012

g COVERSTORY

2014 air bases. The team also coordinated the transfer of technology between the ADA and HAL. The presence of the IAF team also reiterated the IAF’s commitment to the programme, which had lost some momentum because of delays in its implementation on account of technological challenges.

Performance shortfalls By 2010, it became evident to the IAF that the aircraft was still short on certain key air staff requirements. These were: ¾ Power to Weight

that the aircraft delivered must be safe to fly but without the concession on performance.

Following IOC-1, the Tejas’s development and flight testing focused on eliminating IOC shortfalls, including expansion of the AOA range of the aircraft and clearance for release of more weapons. IOC-2 is now

2003

then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vaj`The payee christens LCA as “Tejas”, LCA

2001

Technology Demonstrator air`First craft TD-1 flies followed by TD-2 in July 2002

Ratio Sustained Turn Rate Maximum speeds at low altitudes Angle of Attack (AOA) range Weapon-delivery profiles Performance shortfall, like sustained turn rate and maximum low-level speed, can only be remedied through the use of a more powerful engine, and the IAF has reconciled to wait for LCA Mk2 powered by the GE F414 INS-6 engine.

However, the IAF considered the flight envelope (AOA and G-Limit) expansion and clearance of weapon delivery profiles essential for induction of the aircraft. Since increasing the AOA range and G-limit of the aircraft and clearing it for more weapon delivery profiles would require more development and testing, the IAF agreed to grant provisional IOC to the aircraft so that HAL could start manufacturing and delivery of the first lot of 20 production standard aircraft.

Tejas was granted provisional Initial Operation Clearance on January 10, 2011 at a ceremony at HAL Airport in Bengaluru during which Defence Minister AK Antony handed over the IOC certificate to Air Force Chief Air Chief Marshal PV Naik. “This is only the semifinal,” Antony cautioned ADA noting ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾

www.geopolitics.in

crosses sound barrier

expected to be attained in a month or two. In November 2011, DRDO said it had made progress in expanding the aircraft’s AOA range. Also, additional weapon trials were successfully completed in Jaisalmer and Goa. In May 2012, the DRDO chief expressed confidence that the IAF would be able to raise its first Tejas squadron by the end of the year.

`Expected FOC of Tejas Operational Clearance (IOC) configuration, along with support equipment.

While placing the initial order, IAF indicated that it would order an additional 20 aircraft once Final Operational Clearance was obtained for the aircraft in squadron service, bringing the total purchase to 40 aircraft. However, the IAF placed an order for an additional 20 Tejas Mk 1 aircraft in January 2011, shortly before the aircraft received the IOC. The initial 40 Tejas aircraft are planned to be powered by the GE 404.

LCA Tejas Mk-2 In September 2008, it was announced that the Kaveri would not be ready in time for the Tejas to give it a performance boost, and that an alternative power plant would have to be selected.

The re-engined LCA would be referred to as LCA Tejas Mk-2. Later, it was announced that the LCA Tejas Mk2 would be powered by the F414-GE-INS6 engine with a max thrust of 22,000 lbf, as compared to the 19,000 lbf max thrust of the F404-GE-IN20.

Airframe modifications Minor modifications are being made to the LCA Tejas Mk1 airframe to accommodate the slightly larger engine. The fuselage has been extended by 500mm.

The dimensions of Mk2 will be: Span: 8.20m Length: 13.70m Height: 4.52m

At the time of IOC-1, the Tejas was expected to get “Final Operational Clearance”(FOC) by December 2012, after which HAL was to start production at the rate of 10 aircraft a year.

The first squadron was to be delivered to the IAF by the end of 2014 and the second squadron by 2016. But the production has been now resheduled.

The Tejas is now expected to get its FOC in the middle of 2014.

Planned induction In March 2006, the IAF placed an order on HAL for supply of 20 Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) in Initial

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Upgrades Besides a more powerful engine, Tejas Mk-2 will feature additional improvements like: y Reduced Structural Weight y Improved Aerodynamics y Upgraded of Flight Control Computer y Improved Electronic Warfare Suite y Improved Avionics y In-flight Refuelling Retractable Probe y On-board Oxygen Generation System y Increased fuel capacity. y Fuel Dump System y Improved Maintainability July 2012

g COVERSTORY

The combination of increased thrust, weight reduction measures and improved aerodynamics is expected to give the Tejas Mk 2 an outstanding performance and close combat manoeuvrability, despite the weight gained as a result of fuselage extension to fit the engine. The Tejas Mk.2 is scheduled to make its first flight in 2014, with full-rate production to follow two years later.

LCA Navy The MoD sanctioned Full Scale Engineering Development (FSED) of a Naval variant of the Tejas, capable of operating from an aircraft carrier, on March 28, 2003, with a PDC of March 27, 2010.

The PDC has since been revised to December 27, 2014. The LCA-Navy is based on the Tejas Mk-1/Tejas Mk-2 being developed for the IAF. It is being developed to be compatible with the two INS Vikrant-class indigenous aircraft carriers being built in Cochin. It is required to be capable of: y Taking off using a 14-degree ski jump with 200 m deck run. y Landing in 90 m using an arrester hook. y Sustaining longitudinal deceleration of 4.5 g.

Once developed, LCA Navy will be the only carrier-borne aircraft in the

AS THE TEJAS EVOLVED, IT PUT ON NEARLY 1.5 TON MORE WEIGHT THAN IT WAS DESIGNED FOR light category in the world and the second STOBAR (Ski Take Off But Arrested Recovery) carrier-borne aircraft in the world, after the Russian deck-based aircraft.

LCA Navy features LCA Navy involves a 15 per cent redesign of the LCA. The new features include: y Arrestor hook y Drooped nose for better cockpit visibility y LEVCONS and fore plane to reduce landing speed y Auxiliary airintakes y Strengthened undercarriage

Tejas Mk-1 Features

and fuselage Auto throttle to reduce pilot load by maintaining constant angle of attack during the critical phase of a flare-less carrier landing y Fuel Dump System enables safe landing by reducing weight in event of an emergency landing immediately after launch from carrier.

Maximum T/O from a carrier will be restricted to 12.5 tonnes, with the max external load being reduced to 3.5 tonnes. The aircraft is required to perform a flareless landing and absorb a sink rate of up to 7.1 rn/sec, and on touchdown engage full throttle till arrested by deck cable. As a result, the main landing gear of the aircraft experiences a load that is five times the load experienced by the IAF version during landing. The rapid deceleration following arrestor cable engagement, imposes high axial load on the aircraft, necessitating re-certification of all Line Replacement Units (LRUs), components and associated systems to ensure repeated fail safe operation. y

Two-phased development The aircraft is being developed in two phases.

Phase 1: The LCA Navy aircraft will be developed from LCA Mk 1, which will be modified to take off using

External fuel capacity

2x1200 litre DT on inboard pylons 1x725 litre DT underbelly

Powerplant

1xF404-GE-IN20

Thrust (Dry)

54.9 kN (12,250 lbs)

Radar

ELTA EL/M 2032 Hybrid AESA radar

Thrust (Afterburner)

85 kN (19,000 lbs)

Weight (Empty)

6,560 kg

Internal fuel capacity

2458 kg

Weight (Max Take off)

13,300 kg

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July 2012

g COVERSTORY

a ski jump and perform an arrested landing. During this phase, ADA initially planned to develop one twin- seater trainer (NP1) and one fighter (NP2), along with Shore Based Test Facility (SBTF) at Goa. In May 2012, DRDO announced that a third aircraft would be built as part of Phase 1 development to speed up the process of certification. The third aircraft has been designated NP5, because the designations NP3 & NP4 are already earmarked for the two prototypes being built for Phase 2 development. ADA is yet to decide whether NP5 will be a trainer or fighter. The three Phase 1 prototypes would serve as Technology Demonstrators to prove Aircraft Carrier Compatibility.

Phase 2: The LCA Navy will be certified for carrier operations using two aircraft (NP3 & NP4) built in the Tejas Mk2 configuration, powered by F414-GE-INS6 engine with a maximum thrust of 22,000 lbs. Only Phase 2 aircraft will participate in carrier operation certification, with Phase 1 aircraft being reserved exclusively for SBTF operations.

Project progress The NP1 was rolled out by the Defence Minister AK Antony from Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) Aircraft Research in Bengaluru on July 6, 2010.

THE NEED FOR A LOW-COST, LIGHT-WEIGHT MANNED FIGHTER ISN'T LIKELY TO DISAPPEAR FOR AT LEAST 20-30 YEARS The NP1 made its maiden flight on April 27, 2012, flying for 20 minutes with its undercarriage extended.

Following its first flight, NP1 will undergo additional flight testing at Bengaluru for six to eight months before being flown to INS Hansa near Goa, for testing with the Shore Based Test Facility (SBTF), comprising a ski-jump and arresting gear, being constructed using equipment from Russia.

Carrier Compatibility Tests The SBTF at Goa simulates a carrier deck with a ski jump for take-off, arrestor cables for landing and the optical system for approach alignment and flareout. Before a full-arrested landing takes place, taxi-engagement and carri-

er-style approaches with the hook extended will take place. The LCA Navy prototypes are expected to complete their aircraft carrier compatibility trials by 2014 and achieve Initial Operational Clearance.

Limited Series Production (LSP) order In February 2012, the Defence Acquisition Council approved Limited Series Production (LSP) of eight LCA-Naval aircraft by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). The eight fighters will be a mix of single-seat fighters and twin-seat trainers. The LSP aircraft will be used for flight testing of the aircraft through its entire envelope and eventual final operational clearance (FOC).

Induction in Indian Navy The LCA-Navy inducted into service will be based on the re-engined LCA Mk 2 since the GE 404-IN20-powered Mk 1 does not have the reserve of power required for carrier deck operations. On induction into the Indian Navy, LCANavy is likely to be renamed.

LCA Navy development challenges At the roll-out of the first Naval LCA NP1 at Bengaluru on July 6, 2010, ADA Director, Dr P S Subrahmanyam said the aircraft still needed to shed 400 kg

Weight (Operational Clean)

9,800 kg

Wing Area

38.4 sq m

Length

13.2 m

Maximum Speed

1350 kph CAS

Wing Span

8.2 m

Service Ceiling

15000 m

Height

4.4 m

Air-to-Air Missiles

CCM/BVR

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g COVERSTORY

and the landing gear had to be perfected. The need for the LCA to be able to absorb sink rates of up to 7.1 m/s is a Military Specification (Mil Spec) requirement. During routine operations, typical touchdown vertical speeds would be 3 to 4 m/s. At one point ADA sought a concession on the stringent Mil Spec requirement from the Indian Navy to check the weight spiral of the aircraft, but the Navy stuck to the requirement in order to cater to situations such as pilot misjudgment under adverse visibility conditions while landing immediately after takeoff with full fuel and weapons load.

It is worth noting that the LCA Navy/ LCA Mk 2 will be able to jettison fuel in the air in case the aircraft has to land shortly after take off, to reduce touchdown weight. However, jettisoning fuel takes time; in some conceivable situations, there may not be enough time.

In May 2012, Aviation Week magazine reported that strengthening of the rear airframe and undercarriage for carrier operations, and addition of an arrestor hook, have made the aircraft about 1,000 pounds overweight. An Indian Navy official told the magazine, “The naval variant of the LCA will require the F414 Enhanced Performance Engine [EPE] providing up to 26,500 pounds of thrust, a 20-per cent boost.” The F414 is still under development.

The bottom line Nearly 30 years after it was proposed and 20 years after a project go-ahead, the LCA has still not been inducted into the IAF — a damning fact, but only when read out of context. In terms of technology development, the project is already an outstanding success. The country has mastered FBW FCS with unstable aerodynamics, use of composites for weight and RCS reduction, computer-based control of electro-mechanical systems, open architecture avionics with glass cockpit, head-up display and helmet-mounted sighting.

Equally important, the country now has the infrastructure to develop and test technologies that go into a modern fighter aircraft. And thanks to the LCA, www.geopolitics.in

the country will never need to build a fighter from scratch!

The LCA does have a lot of potential.

It is easy to handle. There is some difference of opinion amongst IAF fighter pilot as to which of its two fighters, Jaguar and Mirage 2000, is the easier one to fly. But there is unanimity that the Tejas handles better than both!

IN 2009, ADA SOUGHT ASSISTANCE FROM EADS TO REDESIGN THE TEJAS UNDERCARRIAGE Before the first Tejas trainer, PV5, took to the skies on November 26, 2009, LCA test pilots were required to fly four sorties on the Mirage-2000 before flying the LCA. “While the Mirage 2000 is a delight to fly, the LCA handles better,” a former LCA test pilot told Geopolitics.

LCA’s easy handling is “a big tribute to the CLAW (Control Law) team, probably the most professional of all the groups that work on the LCA programme,” he added.

Tejas’ avionics — MFDs, helmet mounted sight and laser Pod — complement its capable FBW system to make the fighter an absolute delight to fly.

The LCA Mk1 has a wing loading that is significantly lower than that of the MiG21 Bis / Bison which it would be replacing. It also has a better Thrust to Weight ( T/W ) ratio, even with the 19,000 lbf max thrust F404-GE-IN20.

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All else being equal, Tejas should perform better in “Fight within Visual” (WVR) combat than the MiG-21. Despite its somewhat larger size, LCA will likely have a lower RCS than the MiG, because of the extensive use of composites, shaping and use of radar absorbent paint. Add to that the better capability of the LCA’s ELTA EL/M 2032 Hybrid AESA and better weapon fit, and you end up with an aircraft that will likely be significantly better in Beyond Visual Range (BVR) combat.

Assuming AOA and G limitations will be overcome, HAL support will be world class and the aircraft lives up to its current flight safety record, the Mk 1 could well turn out to be an aircraft that the IAF drools over. The promise of the Mk2 with the 22,000 lbf F404-GE-INS6 engine may well be an incentive for the IAF to induct the LCA before shortfalls in LCA flight envelope are completely eliminated. It may be noted that LCA Mk2 is the fighter that the IAF really wants. The MK2 was proposed only after the Mk1 came short on Air Staff Requirements.

The importance of the Tejas also lies in the fact that the need for a low-cost, light-weight manned fighter isn’t likely to disappear for at least 20-30 years despite advances in Unmanned Air Systems. Since it’s a home-grown fighter, ADA will be able to continuously tweak and upgrade the LCA to keep it relevant over the next two to three decades, improving flight characteristics and electronics by leveraging technological advances.

The author was a young Jaguar pilot when the LCA was proposed and dreamt of flying it one day. The author’s dream didn’t come true, but the nation’s dream has come true. The LCA project is an unstoppable success. The challenge now is not to develop the technology, but to leverage it to the hilt with private sector involvement.

(The author is a former fighter pilot) July 2012

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SECURITY ALERT ON INDIA-NEPAL BORDER

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Dreaded Maoist Naveen Manjhi was arrested in Jharkhand recently.

Manjhi and his fiancé who is also a top-level Naxalite were picked up from the Gidhania forest in Vishnugarh. Manjhi, carried a `10lakh reward on his head.

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Ranvir Sena founder Brahmeshwar Singh was killed by motorcycleborne assailants in Bihar recently.

Ranvir Sena was the private militia allegedly responsible for killing more than 250 in clashes with the Naxalites of the region.

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The Home Ministry has nixed the 'one-nation-one-number' provision of the Telecom department for J&K and the North-East for security reasons. The 'one-nation-onenumber' provision exempts users from paying roaming charges under the National Telecom Policy.

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The national Crime and Criminal Tracking Network System (CCTNS) has missed the March 2012 deadline for a national network and has received an extension of three more years. It will permit real-time sharing of data between the 6,000 police headquarters and more than 14,000 police stations in India.

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The National Investigation Agency (NIA) has been ordered by a Delhi court to produce before it is the 26/11 mastermind PakistaniAmerican David Coleman Headley and others for allegedly carrying out terror strikes in India. The NIA has limited access to Headley who is in the custody of American authorities.

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SECURITY HAS BEEFED UP ALONG THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER WITH NEPAL FOLLOWING THE SPLIT IN THE MAOIST RANKS IN THE HIMALAYAN STATE. THE CENTRE HAS SENT OUT AN ALERT AND ASKED THE BORDERGUARDING FORCES IN THE STATES OF UTTARAKHAND, UTTAR PRADESH, BIHAR, WEST BENGAL AND SIKKIM TO INTENSIFY THEIR PATROLLING ALONG THE PERIMETER. AFTER THE SCHISM IN THE MAOIST RANKS THE SASHASTRA SEEMA BAL (SSB) HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO PREVENT VIOLENCE ALONG THE 1751-KM INTERNATIONAL BORDER AND STOP CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENT. THE SSB GUARDS 450 BORDER OUT POSTS (BOPS) ON THE INDIA-NEPAL BORDER AND 25 OF ITS BATTALIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN DEPLOYED AS A BULWARK AGAINST ANY SECURITY PROBLEM AND AS A CHECK AGAINST ANTI-NATIONAL ACTIVITIES.

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ACCORDING TO A REPORT IN THE TIMES OF INDIA, IN A BID TO THWART ANY POTENTIAL CYBER ATTACK AGAINST INDIAN ESTABLISHMENTS, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC) IS ALL SET TO ENDORSE A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN AND DESIGNATE THE DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA) AND NATIONAL TECHNICAL RESEARCH ORGANISATION (NTRO) AS THE SPEARHEADS OF INDIA’S CYBER ATTACK. ALTHOUGH PERMISSION WOULD BE GIVEN TO OTHER AGENCIES TO GATHER INFORMATION FROM ABROAD, ONLY THESE TWO WOULD HAVE THE MANDATE TO CARRY OUT OFFENSIVE ACTIVITIES. HEADED

BY PRIME MINISTER MANMOHAN SINGH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL IS LIKELY TO SANCTION THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN SOON.

July 2012

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THE UNION Cabinet has approved the allocation for the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) for seamless flow of information from a variety of sources. According to Home Minister P Chidambaram, the Cabinet Committee on Security, chaired by PM Manmohan Singh, gave its nod for the purchase of certain technological items mentioned in the Detailed Project Report. The rationale behind the NATGRID was to collate information from 21 organisations, including the banking and insurance sectors and railways to gather data that could point to security threats. The data can then be accessed by the Intelligence Bureau and income tax authorities among a total of 11 other agencies. Conceptualised after the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, it was conceived to make information sharing by security and law enforcement agencies.

SNOOPING DEVICES MISSING THE DEPARTMENT of Telecom (DoT) has been asked by the Ministry of Home Affairs to issue a fresh warning on reporting and return of “off-the-air” snooping devices.

Even a year after the previous warning there has been little compliance and some of the equipment is still reported missing. The reasons for the fresh directive is a disclosure by the Haryana police that two firms, Ericsson India and ZTE Telecom located in Gurgaon, were unaware of the location of two such devices. The Department of Revenue Intelligence has declared that since 2008, more than 1,100 GSM and CDMA snooping devices have been imported. All equipment importers — including law enforcement authorities — were issued the first notice by the DoT in December 2010 to report these passive interception devices “within 60 days” or face prosecution and imprisonment.

NAXALS’ ROCKET LAUNCHERS ACCORDING TO a report by the National Investigation Agency (NIA), the Naxals are in the concluding step of “finetuning and calibrating” technology to assemble rocket-launchers.

The Maoists have reportedly spent `40 crore over a dozen years to obtain expertise for manufacturing rocket launchers. The NIA says that the Naxals intend to use the rockets against the Army — that has planned to set up jungle warfare schools in the Naxal-dominated areas — as well as the paramilitary forces. Security forces speculate that the Naxals have hidden away the rocket launchers in Chhattisgarh and Karjat in Maharashtra.

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DESOLATE AIRFIELDS EASY TARGETS EVEN AS the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) warned airlines of human bombs, isolated airfields across the nation remain easy targets for terrorists. According to a report in The Times of India, pilots who operate in remote airfields have complained of slack security. Corporate clients and politicians use these airfields to reach remote areas of the country which may not even be fenced or even equipped with basic facilities like X-ray machines or navigational and technical support.

According to the report, policemen at these airstrips are neither duty-bound nor equipped to secure these facilities. A majority of these remote airstrips, with lengths ranging between 3,000 and 9,000 ft, were built during World War II to serve military needs, but are now owned by either private parties, the Airports Authority of India, or by the state governments. The danger lies not just in their lack of infrastructure but also the fact that there are no pre-or post-flight checks. Terrorists could use the airfields to transport arms and ammunition or even fake Indian currency notes to different parts of the country with impunity. www.geopolitics.in

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INTERNAL SECURITY

NE MILITANTS IN BANGLADESH, MYANMAR TVARAJ.FILES.WORDPRESS.COM

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IN SPITE of the crackdown by the Bangladesh government, reports indicate that militant groups, particularly the groups from Manipur, are active in camps along the border. The recent arrest of militants by the Border Security Force (BSF) established that the North-East ultras still have bases in the area.

While factions of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) have camps in the Bangladesh-Myanmar border areas, Manipur, militants have camps in the Moulvi Bazar area.

The Chittagong Hill Tracts are also being used for transit by the other militants from the North-East. The Myanmarese government had set a June 10 deadline for closing down camps on its border with India and the Indian security forces, incuding the Army and the Assam Rifles, are bracing for an expected exodus of militants from these regions. Extra forces had been positioned along the ManipurMyanmar border to check the flight of militants into India.

July 2012

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OUR DAYS prior to the September 7, 2011 blast outside the Delhi High Court, the Intelligence Bureau (IB), India’s prime domestic intelligence agency, generated an input about a terror plot in the national capital. The input spoke about a plot involving four persons from Karachi, Srinagar, Jammu and Delhi that might result in “some violent activity” in the national capital. All that the ‘alert’ mentioned was four names and an atypical money trail that started from Srinagar and ended in Delhi. Bereft of any details, the input made little sense to the police establishment, who were tasked with preventing the “violent activity”. The blast claimed 14 lives and left at least 88 persons injured. Home Minister P Chidambaram rued in the Parliament that the Delhi Police could not prevent the attack in spite of an intelligence alert having been shared with it, thereby allowing the media to go berserk lampooning the police incapacity. The truth, however, was that the so-called ‘input’ was no way sufficient to enable any police action leading to the busting of the terror plot.

The above narrative is certainly not an isolated case. A common and recurrent complaint by the police officers on duty is that on most occasions, the inputs landing on their tables are generic and theoretical in nature. These one-page alerts generated almost on a daily basis by the multiplicity of agencies on the ground level may appear impressive to a record keeper, but in operational terms, it is plain unusable trash.

This leads us to find answers to critical

www.geopolitics.in

questions: What are the challenges for intelligence gathering in India? Is it a problem of capacity, systemic oversight or something else? As India adds bricks to its counter-terror architecture each passing day, what are the areas that need attention and what are the chances that the existing loopholes can be plugged with the ongoing projects?

This condition of a paralysis of intelligence collection is imposed on the country by a system shaped by a plethora of actors — located both in the official circles, and outside of it. The present state of affairs of the country struggling to generate adequate amounts of actionable intelligence is a result of both historical political anomalies and also of the continuing policies that believe in creating grand new structures at the expense of basic principles. In addition, the role of the non-state actors, i.e. the extremists/ militants and insurgents, in accentuating the problem by systematically targeting the intelligence-gathering apparatus also remains significant.

Question of numbers and quality: That there are about 20 different agencies — big and small — collecting ground-level intelligence in the country might sound impressive. But the reality is that each of these agencies is vastly understaffed. Consider for example, the case of the Intelligence Bureau. As per a 2008 estimate, it had a staff strength of about 25,000 including technical and cyber experts, against a recommended strength of 40,000. Worse still, even this beleaguered staff strength was marked by a vacancy rate of 20 per cent.

Strange and outright appalling it

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H C TIWARI

What is missing in the country’s domestic intelligence gathering is “the focus on the basics”, argues BIBHU PRASAD ROUTRAY

may sound, but divided into numerous subsidiary units, the IB today manages its operation for the entire country with a paltry strength of only 5,000 field-level officers. This miniscule number of officers for a population of 1.2 billion specifically to gather purely security-related information would still have been somewhat manageable with exceptionally qualified officers, had most of them not been tasked predominantly to collect political intelligence to be used by the ruling parties. It is no surprise that while the IB has excelled in becoming an effective tool at the hands of the ruling party, its contribution to preventing terror attacks is in a state of perennial decline.

At least for the past three years, the IB has been out on a mission to fill up the vacant posts. Regular recruitment is on for Assistant Central Intelligence Officer (ACIO) posts, the lower rank officers in the agency, equivalent to that of a police sub-inspector or an upper division clerk in a government department. However, it has not been a smooth ride. Media reports have detailed how only half of the short-listed candidates show up for the entrance examination. Meagre salary, poorly crafted professional progression schemes within the agency and a dodgy existence make the IB profession an unattractive career option. “We don’t get July 2012

INTELLIGENCE FAILURE: Days before the Delhi High Court blast, the IB had information about a terror plot in the national capital

as many applications as we should”: remains IB’s way of nitpicking.

A different problem marks the hunt for senior officers — that of an insufficiently deep-skilled human capital pool. The fact that the agencies do not use an open and direct recruitment channel and follow an opaque system of staffing of people who have been rejected for other services with low marks in the civil services examination, does not allow the IB to recruit the best available minds. In addition, only a handful of candidates from the science, technology, and engineering stream get into the agencies. A recent task force report “Reforming India’s Intelligence Structure” by the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), noted that the candidates appearing for such job interviews lack even basic general knowledge and awareness on current affairs.

External weakness: Given that India’s rather protracted experience with terror that has much to do with externally supported terror, it is natural that the operations of the domestic agencies need constantly to be supplemented by the efforts of the external internal agencies in the neighbouring countries. In this context, the Research & Analysis Wing (RAW ), www.geopolitics.in

India’s external intelligence agency, is also responsible for internal security. Its success in monitoring the activities of the anti-India terrorist groups and their sponsors in countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh is critical to stopping attacks that have an ‘external’ footprint.

Existing literature, however, points at a pathetic state of capacity among the RAW, especially in Pakistan.

While much of the blame for the state of affairs goes to two Prime Ministers — Morarji Desai and Inder Kumar Gujral — who dismantled the agency’s network within that country during their tenures, successive governments too have been lackadaisical in terms of pushing the agency to regain strength in that country.

It is not just that the government has neglected the critical aspect of RAW’s covert operations, the selection of some most undeserving chiefs for the organisation in recent years has also been its undoing.

A misplaced priority: What is missing in the country’s search for a counter-terrorism architecture is its focus on the basics. The debate over new institutions and new acts to deal with terrorism continues to ignore the need to revive and strengthen ground-level intelligence-

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generating capacity. Incidentally, none of the new structures set up since the 2008 Mumbai attacks focus on the quality of intelligence gathering.

One of the much-touted achievements of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in the post-26/11 period has been the setup of the subsidiary Multi-Agency Centres at the states level (SMACs), adding to the already existing MAC at the Centre, headed by a part-time additional director of the IB. Home Minister Chidambaram maintains that these subsidiary MACs facilitate seamless integration of all available intelligence collected by different agencies. While this might have been true, the new set-up has done little in terms of enhancing the quality of intelligence gathering, which continues to remain at an appallingly low level.

Neither the MAC nor the SMACs collect intelligence or carry out intelligence operations. Intelligence sharing within the MAC set-up is mostly informal and unstructured, often leaving gaping holes.

In effect, the integration of intelligence has merely meant integration of bad intelligence. One of the recent examples of limitations of the MAC set-up was the early May 2012 release of the photographs of the five Pakistani Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) July 2012

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INADEQUATE MEASURES: Unless the intelligence infrastructure across the country is strengthened quantitatively, the nation will remain open to terror attacks

terrorists who were subsequently found to be ordinary civilians unconnected to terrorism. IB had doubted the authenticity of the information collected by the RAW. But that did not stop the information being relayed to all concerned, leaving many red faces within the government on subsequent days.

Retreat of intelligence: No other conflict situation in the country has exposed the vulnerability in the intelligence collection mechanism than left-wing extremism. Both the state and the central forces have suffered tremendously due to a complete absence of ground-level intelligence in almost all the affected states.

Strangely enough, yet much in line with the current strategy of security sector reforms, such weakness among the existing agencies is paving the way for creation of new agencies. For example, the lack of confidence in and inadequacy of the intelligence passed on to the central forces has forced the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) to generate its own intelligence by developing an internal intelligence wing.

Interestingly, the challenges posed by the Naxal theatres in terms of intelligence collection have a lot in common with the American efforts in the Af-Pak region.

Inputs have indicated that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the lead agency in the hunt for the Al-Qaeda cadres in the Af-Pak region, faced with an acute shortage of local officers, continues to employ young and inexperienced www.geopolitics.in

Caucasian-looking men, who stand out because of their lack of knowledge on the region’s culture and issues. They have been easily identifiable not just by their appearance, but also, according to some reports, by their lack of merit to be intelligence agents. The IB and the intelligence units of the state police in the Naxal theatres face a similar dilemma of deploying less-qualified officers on the ground. Dwarfed by the absence of basic skills such as linguistic knowledge, IB agents struggle to understand the sociopolitical culture of the societies they operate within. Any intelligence they provide is thus based on very weak platforms and hardly accurate.

Just like the Af-Pak region, where the Al-Qaeda leaders are based in the remotest and most insular regions, making it almost impossible for the ‘foreign’ intelligence operatives to mingle with the local population while on their job, collecting information about the Naxals too has become problematic in the absence of the local population to do the job for the agencies. Similar to the Al Qaeda/ Taliban in the FATA region of Pakistan who kill locals for even talking to foreign-looking men, the Naxals too have run an extremely effective annihilation campaign against the tribal ‘police informers’.

MHA data indicates that between 2007 and 2011, as many as 920 civilians were killed by the Naxals after being termed ‘police informers’ in the affected states.

While bulk of these killed may actually

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not have been the sources for the agencies, such systemic annihilation allows the extremists to maintain a much superior human intelligence as well as counter-intelligence vis-a-vis the official agencies in the affected areas. It is of little surprise that intelligence collection has remained one of the most arduous challenges for the states in the Naxal belt today. The CIA manages to fill in the weakness by its reliance on Technical Intelligence (TECHINT) and the unrelenting use of drones against the Al-Qaeda. The Indian government’s options are quite limited on this front.

The way ahead: Comprehensive reforms are obviously a need of the hour, targeting all the existing loopholes. There is an urgent need to improve recruitment through deputation, promotions, training for new recruits and better quality supervision of operations in intelligence agencies. Time has also come to take a fresh look at the much-delayed project of separating the investigation and law and order functions of the police and have a system of preventive intelligence-gathering system in place. Way back in September 2006, the Supreme Court had asked the central government to initiate the project. Little has moved in that front in the last six years.

(The author, a Singapore-based Security Analyst, served as a Deputy Director in the National Security Council Secretariat, Government of India) July 2012

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SECURITY SOLUTIONS The best way to develop India’s “Homeland Security System” is to encourage the domestic industrial majors to devise homegrown technologies, writes SAURAV JHA

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HE 2008 Mumbai terror attack has spawned a major market for homeland security solutions in India, with various agencies scrambling to put in place security systems designed to both prevent and contain terrorist assaults on Indian soil.

India is looking to bring in more than $10 billion worth of cutting-edge homeland security products, solutions, and services for border protection, marine security, counter-insurgency, city surveillance, intelligence infrastructure, and other critical security infrastructure needs within the next year itself.

As such, homeland security has also emerged as an area where India’s private sector is being able to leverage its greater flexibility (say in sourcing technology from abroad) to offer solutions that India’s defence public sector units will find difficult to match. Naturally, a market that is set to reach $13 billion by 2014 is attracting serious global interest, although international majors seem to have decided that they are better off partnering with large Indian business houses for this segment.

Nonetheless, further down the road, Indian industry must innovate and offer truly homegrown solutions to secure the homeland. India currently accounts for about four per cent of worldwide expenditure on homeland security and, given current trends, the Indian market may well account for over six per cent of the total global expenditure in this arena by 2020.

But the chief attractiveness of the sector stems from the fact that homeland security involves relatively greater spending on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) tools than that on the procurement of weapons. This means that

CITY-WIDE SURVEILLANCE: Round-theclock inspection of public spaces is essential to ensure the safety of cities

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companies that have traditionally not been involved in the armaments business (such as many Indian majors) can enter the security market via this route since many of the technologies required in this field can evolve from solutions that may

g FOCUS already be available in the civilian domain such as ruggedised network security architecture and conventional off the shelf (COTS) hardware that can be used in security systems.

Indeed, the security business of today has moved far beyond the paradigm of simply having enough men with guns, so to speak. It is an area that has been deeply affected by the worldwide information and communications revolution with the need to both “see first” and “act fast” literally making the difference between safety and catastrophe. Homeland security, therefore, involves the induction of security surveillance gear, communications and software as much as the augmentation of weaponry, mine resistant trucks and body armour.

Take, for instance, the Mumbai CCTV project, which is also in some sense a flagship project for India Inc’s involvement in the Indian homeland security market. The project envisages the installation of more than 6,000 CCTV cameras across Mumbai to collect real-time videos from distant cameras and transmit the footage via an optical fibre network to a control room

fitted with workstation personal computers operating application software. Now a Reliance Industries Limited (RIL)-led consortium comprising Allied Digital Services, IBM, and Cisco may have emerged as the lowest bidder in this project conceived after the 26/11 terror attack. It seems that of the 10 original bidders for the project, seven were shortlisted, of which two consortia qualified and in late May 2012 there were reports that the RIL-backed consortium had won the project.

What is significant, however, is that none of the companies in the consortium will be immediately recognised as traditional players in the defence space. But as some RIL officials are fond of pointing out, the group has apparently designed and is now operating the “world’s largest integrated security automation system consisting of over 12,000 cameras apart from tens of thousands of other advanced security sensors, radars and video analytics” across its various assets and installations.

Indeed, the Mumbai CCTV project is much more than that mere positioning of cameras at vantage points and traffic

HFS-INFO.COM

junctions in the city. The lynchpin of the system is a sophisticated analysis software that can both sieve and store specific footage, thereby allowing the derivation of useful inputs from the surveillance net.

Then, there is also the question of setting up a wireless broadband network that allows the unhindered transmission of real-time footage at all times. In fact, this is probably an area where RIL feels it has an advantage going forward, given that it is a license holder for a pan-India wireless broadband 4G network and already has in place an alliance with Siemens, whose proprietary surveillance technology has been used in the past to secure locations such as the Dubai Police Headquarters and the Doha 2006 Asian Games. After all, the future of urban surveillance networks seems to be a video net riding on high speed wireless broadband networks. However, Siemens is not a member of the RIL consortia that has emerged as the lowest bidder for the Mumbai CCTV project.

RIL’s international partnerships, most notably with Siemens, is of course part of a wider trend in the Indian homeland security market wherein Indian corporates are looking to bring in technology via a global alliance to present customised solutions to the Indian market. For instance, Mahindra Defence Systems has a joint-venture partnership with US-based Telephonics Corporation to make surveillance and communication systems for Indian agencies, while Tata Advanced Systems has a venture with Zurich-based AGT International to tap opportunities in the homeland security market. The Tata-AGT joint venture, known as Avana Integrated Systems, avowedly aims to deliver homeland security solutions tailored for the Indian threat environment and leverage cutting-edge technology deployed globally by AGT to protect critical assets. Its key solutions apparently include integrated hardware managed by advanced data fusion techniques in keeping with the then Tata Sons Chairman Ratan Tata’s statement in 2010:“homeland security impacts the lives of every citizen and is an area where the Tata Group would like to make a meaningful contribution.”

However, a truly meaningful contribution will happen only when Indian majors actually start offering homegrown technology. In this respect, almost all private players within the country claim that they are indeed looking to incubate technology and will set up domestic research and development (R&D) units for homeland security soon enough. But the fact is, at the July 2012

BUY INDIAN: It is high time the tools of surveillance trade were manufactured in the country instead of being imported

moment, the front end of India’s emerging surveillance networks are also being sourced from overseas. Of course, this is a great news for companies such as Swedish video solutions player Axis Communications that sells security solutions ranging from network video cameras to video management software. It is also attracting a lot of interest from Israeli companies that have a considerable expertise in these areas as well. The basic idea at the moment, therefore, seems to be that an Indian major with a good dedicated communication network will partner with foreign companies specialising in surveillance systems and software in a consortium approach to bid for homeland security tenders in India.

While on paper, this seems like a good approach since the new communication systems being rolled out by Indian majors can certainly be used for sending immediate, uninterrupted alerts triggered by sensors sourced from abroad, it is ultimately a www.geopolitics.in

short-term prospect. India simply cannot continue to rely on imported sensors and software indefinitely as that can itself represent a security threat in the long run.

Perhaps, having realised this, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) recently inaugurated a separate department dedicated to researching technologies useful for internal security and gaining an advantage in low-intensity conflict. Of course, the DRDO is also looking at international collaboration for many projects in this area, but these are more akin to joint development than mere rebadging of imported systems. For instance, DRDO is currently involved in developing foliage-penetrating radar with Swedish major SAAB. Indian industry needs to operate on similar lines and put in place partnerships that actually result in technology absorption and co-development. Allowing DRDO to choose production agencies from within India’s private sector will also aid this prospect as the

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former can serve as a conduit to germinate world-class capabilities and technology practices in the latter. This will certainly help fructify the Indian defence ministry’s stated desire to acquire up to 70 per cent of its homeland security hardware from the domestic private sector.

In this context, it will also be important to explore just how much the United States will be willing to cooperate in the realm of developing technologies for homeland security, given the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia. If some quarters are to be believed, there is already a great degree of intelligence collaboration on homeland security between India and the United States through both the Strategic Dialogue and the Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism. Homeland security, therefore, also represents an area that is ripe to put in place US Defence Secretary Panetta’s recent assertion that the Indo-US relationship would move towards codevelopment and joint production.

July 2012

geopolitics

DIPLOMACY

THINKING ALIKE

SUFFERING FROM TRUST DEFICIT

PRESIDENT.IR

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India and the United States inch closer

IRAN’S NUCLEAR IMBROGLIO

DEALING WITH

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HE RELATIONSHIP between India and Pakistan during the last few years has been indifferent. Neither is there an animosity in the relationship, nor is there a peace process on any of the major issues that have been identified as a part of the composite dialogue. A section within India thinks that India should take this opportunity to move forward and make the peace process irreversible and effective. This section wants India to commit to few confidence-building measures visa-vis Pakistan. Another section is suspicious of any positive change in the IndoPak relations and wants India to remain cautious and not jump the gun.

Where do India’s relations with Pakistan stand today?

How far can India go? Will Pakistan deliver?

D SUBA CHANDRAN discusses these and other vexing issues

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The present state First, a stock taking of Indo-Pak relationship is essential before analysing where it is heading. In terms of the positives, the ceasefire across the Line of Control (LoC) and international border remains.

Despite minor skirmishes, the ceasefire has held for a long time, perhaps a record time, when compared to the border interactions between the two countries since early 1980s. Militancy and violence in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and the rest of India, with its base in Pakistan is low; there have not been any major incident of terrorism in the last few years. These two are significant positive stories in the bilateral relations.

On the other side, neither of them has been able to build further. There is no significant movement relating to Hafiz Saeed in the Mumbai terrorist attack case. There is unlikely to be any major development in this issue, as Pakistan insists on legal issues and proof, which would never be provided by the Indian security establishment. Even if India is able to provide any credible evidence, Pakistan is not likely to accept the same; the military and intelligence establishment is not likely to give MERCURIAL RELATIONS: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh with Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani at the Indo-Pak World Cup semi-final, at Mohali on March 30, 2011 July 2012

g DIPLOMACY up Hafiz Saeed. Hence any amount of pressure and evidence is unlikely to result in any positive development vis-a-vis the Lashkar-e-Toiba.

Neither is there any positive movement on the most favoured nation status (MFN) on trade; though, the status is not likely to transform the bilateral economic relationship between the two countries. India considers it a confidence-building measure, which can be considered a measure of Pakistan’s seriousness. Instead, Pakistan, especially the political leadership, expects India to take the first step to prove India’s sincerity. The perception within Pakistan is — now that there is a genuine change within Pakistan on how India is perceived, New Delhi should make use of this opportunity and take the next step in building confidence.

Especially after the recent disaster in Siachen region, where Pakistan had lost numerous lives of its soldiers, there was a larger expectation that India should move ahead and demilitarise Siachen.

While New Delhi expects Pakistan to do more, especially vis-a-vis the Lashkar-eTaiba, to prove its sincerity towards the peace process, Islamabad expects India to do more in J&K, especially in Siachen.

Since both countries want the other to take credible measures to prove their sincerity, the peace process is not going anywhere and is stuck.

Will Pakistan deliver?

What can India do to further, in terms of taking the peace process and the bilateral relationship? Much will depend on how much time and space the leadership in Pakistan has for improving the bilateral relationship. While India has its own internal problems and divides (remember the time we have spent in deciding the next President?), facing the election, the present government has also other priorities.

Improving Indo-Pak relations is neither a priority for Pakistan nor for India.

Before making concrete measures at the bilateral level, there should be a clear understanding of what is happening within Pakistan and whether Indo-Pak relations is a priority for Islamabad and Rawalpindi (The Army headquarters). Pakistan is caught today in a whirlwind, with multiple contests involving different actors. The first and foremost is the relationship with the US and Afghanistan. The debate and animosity towards the US in reopening the NATO supply line is only an expression of how unstable is Pakistan’s relationship with the US. More than the US, it is Pakistan’s www.geopolitics.in

stakes and interests as conceived by Rawalpindi in Afghanistan, that play a decisive role in Pakistan-US, PakistanAfghanistan, and perhaps Indo-Pak relationship as well.

Pakistan would like to have its own trump cards in Kabul after 2014, hence is relying on the Haqqani network. While the international community and the US, in particular, are upset with Pakistan’s negative contribution in Afghanistan, they have not been able to push Islamabad to do more. Pakistan also does not want India to play any major role in Afghanistan.

The following two questions seem to shape Pakistan’s defence against India playing a role on Kabul. India does not share

THE INDIAN MILITARY IS NOT KEEN ON RELINQUISHING THE STRATEGIC HIGH GROUND IN SIACHEN borders with Afghanistan; hence why should India try to be in Afghanistan in a major way? Second, is India using Afghanistan as its strategic depth against Pakistan and creating troubles in the Pashtun and Baloch regions? Pakistan’s reluctance and resistance to any Indian role will play a crucial role in how India perceives Pakistan and Indo-Pak relations. If Pakistan remains suspicious of New Delhi’s contribution to Kabul and resists India’s role in Afghanistan, but expects Indo-Pak relationship to improve, there is a serious imbalance.

However, more than Pak-US relationship and Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan, what is likely to shape IndoPak relationship in the immediate future is the internal situation within Pakistan.

Despite Gilani becoming the longest-serving Prime Minister in the history of Pakistan, the government he is heading today is perhaps the weakest ever since it took over in 2008. There is a deadly tussle between the government and the judiciary; the Prime Minister has been already implicated by the apex court. Zardari, the President, is waging a behind-the-scenes war with Iftikhar Chaudhry, the Chief

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Justice of Pakistan. Besides the government, the judiciary is also engaged in an indirect duel with the military and intelligence agencies over the human right violations and disappearances especially in Baluchistan. There is a suspicion, that the ongoing accusation against the Chief Justice over the question of his son Arsalan being bribed by a business tycoon, is seen as a part of intelligence agencies (and perhaps the government) trying to corner the judiciary and force it to back off.

Worse, the TTP (The Pakistani Taliban) offensive is continuing unabated. Despite the military operations in Khyber Paktunkwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA), there is no semblance of TTP being placed under check.

It seems to be striking at will, not only in the tribal regions, but also elsewhere. Outside the TTP-led violence, Karachi, the economic capital of Pakistan, has been burning continuously for the last few years and is paralysed.

For the government, led by the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), the immediate priority is to face the elections. With Benazir gone, there is unlikely to be any sympathy for the party in the forthcoming election; there is only disappointment and hopelessness among the people in terms of how the PPP managed governance and the economy. Though the Finance Minister created a record during early June 2012, when he presented the budget, (for the first time, in a row for five years by the same government), there was nothing to cheer about. Pakistan has missed all the targets of growth during 2011-12, and the budget deficit for 2012-13 is substantial.

With the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) declining by more than 50 per cent this year and the current account deficit widening, one is not sure, how Pakistan will manage its budget deficit during the current financial year.

What has further complicated the government inside is the ongoing energy crisis. Load-shedding has created a situation which is witnessing people rioting in cities in Punjab and Sindh. The PML-N Chief Minister of Punjab has even equated loadshedding with a form of terrorism.

With all the above problems within Pakistan in an election-year, how far can India go? Is the present government in Pakistan likely to make any major decision vis-a-vis India? Can Zardari afford to take any substantial step, keeping in mind the vertical divide in the polity and the pressure from the religious right?

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g DIPLOMACY Equally importantly, the Establishment (Army-controlled) in Pakistan has not made any major statement on improving Indo-Pak relations. Given the fact that Pakistan’s policy towards Afghanistan is led by the Establishment, it is safe to conclude that it is neither keen nor under any pressure to take the Indo-Pak relations to the next level. Given its pre-occupation with the TTP and Afghanistan, the Establishment is not likely to take on India and open another front. At the same time, the Establishment is not likely to improve the Indo-Pak peace process and make bold measures.

So, why not do something on Siachen?

Finally, a postscript is essential on the recently-concluded Secretary-level talks, especially on Siachen. There is a greater expectation in Pakistan, and also amongst a section within India, to bring an end to the militarisation of Siachen. Irrespective of the military or strategic significance of the region, those who argue that Siachen should be demilitarised consider this a confidence-building measure.

Undoubtedly, demilitarisation of Siachen would be a great confidencebuilding measure. But confidence building aimed at what? What does the resolution of Siachen lead to? Is that an objective, or a strategy to achieve larger normalisation? If it is seen as an independent objective, then it is a non-starter. If it is a part of larger plan, what is that plan or end game, towards which demilitarisation of Siachen is one of the first steps?

Any cursory look at the recent debate COVETED WASTELAND: Often celebrated as the world's highest battlefield the Siachen glacier is of critical strategic importance

within Pakistan over the Siachen conflict would make it clear that the writings and articulation have been high on moral grounds, after failing in all their initiative to militarily remove the Indian presence from Siachen. Invariably, every account on the Pakistani side would argue India as the aggressor in Siachen, with no understanding of Indian sensitivities. Why did India decide to do what it finally did in 1984?

What circumstances had forced India to make that move? If the Indian political and military leadership is convinced that the situation today is different and the concerns of the mid-1980s no more exist, they should move ahead and demilitarise.

But asking or pressurizing for demilitarisation as a political confidence-building measure may not be the right way to consolidate the peace process. Especially when the militarisation of Siachen occurred owing to lack of confidence, expecting India to demilitarise as a sign of confidence building does not make sense.

If demilitarisation is seen as a CBM, then why stop with Siachen? Let both countries move ahead and demilitarise from the rest of J&K as well. In fact, it would be a bigger CBM, or as the media would like to dramatise, the mother of all Indo-Pak CBMs. Why stop with Siachen alone?

The road ahead: The Fabian dictum Given the internal situation within Pakistan, India will have to wait till the coming

elections in Pakistan, before strategising the Indo-Pak peace process. Nor would New Delhi have the time and energy, when the country itself has already started the countdown for the next elections. A CBM, for the sake of it, will not take the peace process anywhere. India should make efforts to maintain the ceasefire and hold on till the next government is formed across the border. So should Pakistan.

Meanwhile, India should initiate a debate within, between the State and civil society, and more importantly between the various departments on how far should India go? While the civil society will be willing to take the extra step, are all departments/ministries of the government on the same page? For example, the Indian military may have nothing objectionable in improving the trade between two countries, but may have a strong position on Siachen. While the Foreign Ministry may like to move forward on cross-LoC interactions, the Home Ministry may have serious reservations.

In any case, the political situation within the two countries will not allow both countries to move forward, fearing failure.

A half-hearted effort will end up half baked, increasing the frustration. The time is not ripe, either for India or for Pakistan.

Waging peace is tougher than waging war.

So let India and Pakistan wait for the opportune moment, as the legendary Roman General Fabius Maximus did, but to wage peace.

(The author is Director, The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi) ARMY PRO

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INDO-US BONHOMIE US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has just described the Indo-US relations as an “affair of the heart” with the usual ups and downs. We carry two views on the subject, particularly the security dimensions, one from India and another from the US...

DPR

STRATEGIC PARTNERS: US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta at the South Block with Defence Minister AK Antony and Defence Secretary Shashikant Sharma (left)

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A view from INDIA…

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CHANGING THE

MINDSET The Indian policy-making and strategic community needs to read the newness in the American approach towards India, writes CHINTAMANI MAHAPATRA

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S DEFENCE Secretary Leon Panetta’s recent trip to India was not a standalone trip. It was part of his nine-day visit to Asia and that explains why its significance should be measured in the larger context of the changing balance of power in Asia.

This visit came close on the heels of US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s India visit, and soon after President Barrack Obama announced his new Asia-Pacific strategy.

The relative decline of US influence around the globe, marked by serious economic downturn at home, and failure of US strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan abroad, coupled with the rapid rise of China, has induced the Obama Administration to devise a new strategy for the Asia-Pacific region.

The prevailing crisis in the European Union, particularly in the Eurozone, gives less hope to the US to engage this region for bolstering American economy. The absence of a credible military threat to Europe in the post-Soviet era has made the NATO alliance an increasingly expensive security project. Simultaneously, the economic stakes of the US in the Asia Pacific have been steadily rising over the decades, requiring more US attention and engagements. In addition, the growth of the Chinese military capabilities, along with the economic miracle of China’s growth story, poses a potential

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challenge to present and future US interests in the region.

The new Obama strategy has sought to address this shifting centre of gravity of global political economy and military balance. The Obama Administration clearly wants to strengthen alliances with Japan, South Korea and Australia; renew defence ties with erstwhile allies, such as the Philippines and Thailand, turn former enemies, such as Vietnam into new friends and continue to build security ties with new strategic partners, such as India.

Indo-US defence cooperation has been improving since the Bush Presidency and President Obama has sought to carry it forward further. Leon Panetta’s visit to India came against the backdrop of unprecedented level of Indo-US military exercises. India has conducted more military exercises with the US than with any other country in the world. India has also opened its attractive and lucrative defence market to US defence industryperhaps striking more defence deals with the US than any other single country in last ten years.

Unlike India, China and Pakistan — two countries that draw the most attention of the Indian security establishment — pose a potential security threat to US interests. The trust deficit between Washington and Islamabad has widened to an extent where Pakistan no longer enjoys the benefits that it acquired after being elevated to the position of a major nonNATO ally of the US in the recent past.

The US neither transfers defence equipment to China, nor holds military exercises worth the salt, with that country. India Continued on Page 68 ` July 2012

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A view from the US…

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AN UPWARD

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Of late, there may have been more ups than downs in the US-India security relationship, but some pepping up is still required, argues AMIT GUPTA

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RTICLES HAVE recently, appeared about the India-US security relationship running out of steam — the issues cited are the disagreement over Iran and the fact that the US did not win the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) fighter competition despite considerable lobbying by President Obama and the US Embassy in New Delhi. At the same time, the USIndia relationship, the importance of which has achieved a bipartisan consensus in Washington DC, remains constrained by India’s internal politics thus, it required significant horse-trading for the first Manmohan Singh government to pass the Indo-US nuclear bill through the Indian Parliament. And the current Congress government is increasingly becoming hostage to the demands of its regional coalition partners. Mamata Banerjee was able to temporarily, at least, scuttle the Teesta River agreement with Bangladesh while the DMK got India to vote against Sri Lanka in the United Nations. More importantly, perhaps, is the feeling in Washington that the Indian government talks a good talk but is far less effective on delivery: be it opening up the Indian market to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) or to see India take a leadership position in Asia. Critics point out that India remains trapped in an internal debate on what role the country should assume on the global stage and to what extent it should cozy up to the United States in the pursuit of its foreign policy. I would argue that India-US relations have been transformed in the last decade to the point where they cannot be negatively www.geopolitics.in

reversed, especially in the security arena. There are several reasons for this.

First, the United States and India, since the Clinton Administration, have moved towards a general convergence of interests where Washington has become increasingly sensitive to, and accommodative of, Indian national interests. The old IndiaPakistan coupling in US foreign policy has gone and the nuclear deal laid the basis for giving India de jure nuclear weapons power status.

Second, the arms relationship has been mutually beneficial, despite the loss of the MMRCA contract to the French Rafale. India has agreed to buy C-17 Globemaster III strategic-lift aircraft (becoming the second largest operator of the type after the United States), as well as C-130 Hercules tactical transporter, and the P-8 Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft, and will most likely purchase an American attack helicopter. Further, if India were to purchase the Global Hawk surveillance unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV ), it would substantially improve the maritime and internal security. Had there been 24-hour coverage of the maritime space around Mumbai, the terrorists Continued on Page 69 `

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is thus seen by the US policy-makers as a more suitable strategic partner than either China or Pakistan.

At a time when the budgetary problems in the US make it difficult for the administration to sustain the same level of defence expenditure and compel it to set new priorities, the Obama Administration’s decision to expand its military presence in Asia and reduce its deployments in Europe is the logical culmination. Japan, the traditional pivot of America’s Asia Pacific strategy, itself is in deep economic trouble. Relatively smaller Asian allies of the US are supportive of the US strategy, but are not adequate to take up the expanding challenges posed

by China. India is looked at by American analysts as an old civilization, large and populous country, a rising economic and military power and potentially a robust alternative to balance the rise of China.

Nonetheless, the United States finds many roadblocks on the way to realise its intended goal of making India a new alliance partner to tackle the challenges of the 21st century. Defense Secretary Panetta visited India to, among other things, dismantle the roadblocks — not at one go but to take an incremental step towards the goal. And what are the roadblocks?

The first obstacle, of course, is India’s allergy to the word “alliance”. Indian foreign policy community and strategic analysts have been so enchanted with the term “non-alignment” that the term “alliance” almost generates an allergic reaction. The non-aligned India forged no defence ties with the US during the Cold War; did not endorse US naval presence in the Indian Ocean; opposed the US-led alliance in Asia, such as SEATO and CENTO; and viewed with suspicion Washington’s arms supply to Pakistan.

In the post-Cold War era, India buys weapons and other defence equipment from the US; holds naval exercises with the US in the Indian Ocean; does not criticise US arms supply to Pakistan; maintains cordial security ties with a host of US alliance partners, such as Japan, Australia and South Korea; and uphold “strategic partnership” with the United States. There has also been on-going counter-terrorism cooperation between the two countries. Significantly, the Bush Administration once requested India to send troops to Iraq and the Indian government led by the National Democratic www.geopolitics.in

AN ALLIANCE WITH INDIA WILL HAVE TO BE BASED ON MUTUALITY OF INTERESTS AND RESPECT Alliance instead of outrightly rejecting it contemplated for some time to do so. The Indian response to such a request during Cold War would have been straight “no”.

More significantly, India participated in the Afghan reconstruction activities in the midst of US and NATO forces battling Taliban and other insurgents and terrorist groups. Would it have been possible during the days of serious “non-alignment”?

India was allowed by Washington to enhance its soft power in Afghanistan much to the annoyance of Pakistan — the so-called major non-NATO ally.

In other words, in the new context of the post-Cold War era and against the backdrop of spreading terrorist activities, India and the US practically acted like alliance partners, although both the sides refrained from using the term “alliance” for domestic political reasons and possible adverse regional implications. IndoUS cooperation in tackling mutual threats was sometimes more intense than what the US could expect from alliance partners like Japan and South Korea.

Votaries of nonalignment in India often argue that signing of agreements like Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), and End-Use Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) would make India an alliance partner of the US. What is noteworthy is the fact that even close alliance partners like Britain and Australia sometimes stay away from buying US weapons on similar grounds! Many American NATO partners refused to support US military action against Iraq in 2003!

How does one define an alliance then?

The US had concluded defence agreements with Pakistan during the Cold War, turning it into a junior alliance partner, but did not come to the rescue of Pakistan during the latter’s war against India.

The Philippines was another US alliance

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partner in the Pacific, but Washington stayed away from the former’s conflict with Malaysia over the disputed Sabah province.

Nonetheless, the Obama Administration has been keen to sign such agreements with India in order to facilitate interoperability of forces during complex military operations in the future. Some Indian officials and defence analysts do not favour such agreements on the ground that it would make India an alliance partner of the United States.

Some have gone to the extent of announcing a new foreign policy doctrine called “Non-alignment 2.0”.

The fear of getting sucked into an alliance relationship with the US has the roots in India’s colonial past, philosophy of the nationalist struggle; and the US Cold War policies and past behaviour.

Washington had little regard for India’s non-alignment, its Cold War strategies made India’s adversaries, Pakistan and China, favourites of US strategists at various phases of Cold War history.

India has watched the US sanction policies even towards its allies and Indians are aware of the highhanded behaviour of the sole superpower and the deep American desire to see every other country as a junior partner. Thus India is apprehensive about getting too close to Washington on defence and security matters. In fact, China today has much larger economic ties with the US than India, and Pakistan remains a military ally despite widening trust deficit. Washington cannot abandon either. What then is the meaning of “strategic partnership” or the goal of democratic alliance between the largest and the strongest democracies of the globe? Defence Secretary Panetta’s visit to India was actually aimed at allaying Indian fears, strengthening existing partnerships, tackling certain immediate security issues and shaping an appropriate relationship with India in the light of Obama’s new Asia Pacific strategy.

To allay Indian fears over foundational agreements like CISMOA and EUMA, Panetta thought it better not to pressure India too much on these issues and allow the country to have its own debates.

The US has realised that alliances of the future are not going to be a replica of the past alliances whether NATO or CENTO. New alliances with special powers like India will have to be based on mutuality of interests and respect for strategic Continued on Page 70 ` July 2012

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who attacked on 26/11 might have been deterred before they landed near the Taj Mahal Hotel in Mumbai.

Those in the United States who bemoan the loss of the fighter contract fail to understand that in the era of the Obama pivot to Asia what the United States requires are partners who can “plug and play” with the United States for joint operations. Transport and surveillance aircraft bring the kind of interoperability that would enhance US missions in the region. The C-17 provides heavy lift across Asia while an F16/F-18 would not have gone much further than India’s Exclusive Economic Zone. The Australians, for instance, have bought transport and surveillance aircraft precisely with such joint operations in mind.

Additionally, in an era when every major foreign arms procurement by India becomes the subject of a corruption witch-hunt, the government-togovernment Foreign Military Sales from the United States have worked to India’s advantage by ensuring the integrity of such deals.

Third, the United States has become a close partner of India in the fight against terrorism since the various national security bureaucracies in Washington recognise that groups in Pakistan, with the support of elements from the Pakistani establishment, have carried out acts of terrorism in the South Asian region. This was particularly the case after the Mumbai attacks when the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) provided vital forensic assistance to the Indian authorities in making the link between the terrorists and their handlers in Pakistan. Counterterrorism will remain an important, if understated, part of the security relationship, as the United States helps India counter groups that serve as a long-term threat to both countries.

This brings up the fourth point which is the breakdown of the US-Pakistan relationship. Since the last year of the George W Bush Administration, there has been recognition in Washington that Islamabad plays the regional game in ways that are detrimental to US interests. Bruce Riedel, David Sanger and Bob Woodward have all documented the lack of trust between the United States and Pakistan as it became clear that Islamabad had www.geopolitics.in

THE KEY ISSUE WILL BE HOW INDIA VIEWS ITSELF AS WORKING WITH THE US PIVOT TO ASIA supported terrorist organisations that hurt US efforts at nation-building in Afghanistan. Woodward gives details of the “Retribution Plan” to counter a 9/11-style attack by terrorists based in Pakistan. Should such an attack on America take place, the US would retaliate by attacking every known al-Qaeda base and camp in Pakistan (regardless of how outdated the information would be) and by hitting 150 associated camps. A clearer warning could not have been issued to Islamabad that it would face unacceptable damage if it worked intentionally (or was an unintentional bystander) to permit an attack on the American homeland from Pakistani soil.

From a Pakistani perspective, the relationship has hit rock bottom since the view in Islamabad is that the United States does not respect Pakistani sovereignty, is favouring India over Pakistan and, most importantly, will abandon Pakistan once the Afghan War is over.

Pakistani analysts, therefore, talk of a “reset” of the US-Pakistan relationship, although Islamabad’s options are far more limited than what is believed by the Pakistani elite. So where do these sets of constraints and opportunities leave the US-India security relationship?

US-India: The future The best way to view the relationship is that it is one where both countries are investing in the future. This will be reflected in arms sales as well as in any possible future US effort to get India to participate in joint operations in Asia.

Arms sales are likely to be most promising where support systems are concerned, since India has yet to feel confident about the United States as a guaranteed supplier of weaponry while residual concerns remain in Washington about India’s reliability and how

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secure it is as a possessor of advanced American weapons technologies. What will continue, therefore, are weapons purchases, technology purchases, cooperation to deal with terrorism and ongoing military exercises between the two countries. The latter have been particularly useful in getting the two militaries to know and respect each other and, more importantly, to build trust that can be leveraged in the future.

Afghanistan The key point that emerged from Defense Secretary Panetta’s June 2012 visit to New Delhi was that Washington wanted India to play a greater role in Afghanistan. This is a change from the past, when an Indian presence in Afghanistan was viewed as upsetting Pakistan and thereby throwing a spanner in any potential Afghan settlement.

With NATO exhausted from the nationbuilding effort in Afghanistan and the decline of relations with Pakistan, India remains the one regional player whose objectives in Afghanistan are parallel to those of Washington. Moreover, it is the one country that has good relations with Iran and Russia — two of the other countries that would play a role in the post-US stabilisation of Afghanistan.

India, America, and the Indo-Pacific The key security issue will be how India views itself as working with the American pivot to Asia. Before addressing how India may do this, it is necessary to discuss whether the pivot to Asia is a long-term US strategy or one likely to die if the Obama Administration does not get a second term? The answer lies in the fact that economically, politically and militarily, China remains front and centre in American priorities and a Romney Administration is just as likely to continue to enlarge American political and military commitments in the region. The Obama Administration is starting to put teeth to the policy by talking in terms of the Indo-Pacific — a region that redefines international security by creating a geographical area that encompasses half the world’s population. Further, the air-sea battle doctrine of the Pentagon is a clear shift away from counter-insurgency — which was necessitated by the two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq — to one which Continued on Page 71 ` July 2012

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autonomy. The US seems to be looking for a new language and vocabulary to explain US-India ties and work towards a relationship where Indian can share defence burden in the Indo-Pacific region, Indian Ocean and be a strong pillar in the emerging balance of power.

The Indian policy-making community and strategic community need to read the newness in the American approach in the light of the post-Iraq developments, Arab Spring, end game in Afghanistan, shifting centre of gravity from the West to the East, the uncertain evolution of China as a political heavyweight in years to come and even the probable failure of nuclear Pakistan to sustain itself as a viable state. Panetta said in his speech: “America is at a turning point. After a decade of war, we are developing a new defence strategy — a central feature of which is a “re-balancing” toward the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, we will expand our military relationships and our presence in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia. Defence cooperation with India is a linchpin in this....”

While this is the larger picture, Washington expects India to be an

ABSENCE OF A CREDIBLE THREAT TO EUROPE HAS MADE NATO AN EXPENSIVE PROJECT important player in addressing issues in the West Asian region in the post-US withdrawal from Iraq and forthcoming withdrawal from Afghanistan in the near future. Religious extremism, terrorism, instability in the heart of the world’s hydrocarbon resources, piracy, and violent crimes on the cyberspace, land and sea are issues that cannot be addressed singularly by any country. India and the US would have to forge partnership with each other and with others to address these challenges.

The real big question is how to manage the relationship with China — the new superpower in the neighbourhood. Cold War thinking dominates the Indian debate and discourses. Analysts are afraid

that the US has been trying to put in place a containment strategy to contain China and India should not be part of this strategy. Nothing is farther from the truth.

The US-China web of economic ties is so complex and interdependent that old Cold War strategies would simply not work. The forces of globalisation and complex interdependence of international political economy have made structural realism irrelevant to understand the great power dynamics. The current mix of economic and military developments defies any categorisation of the US-China relationship on the basis of traditional international relations theories. Most of the things are in a state of fast flux. The US, China and other major powers are in a race to build hedges against uncertainties and India needs to do so. Neither neo-non-alignment nor Cold War-based “containment” theories can help India shape a desirable relationship with the US. Our allergy to the term “alliance” should be treated with a search for a new definition of the term and avoidance of critical ties with the US on issues on grounds of fear of getting sucked into an alliance!

(The author is Professor, Centre for American Studies, SIS, JNU, New Delhi)

BOEING

TANK BUSTER: The AH-64 Apache gunship is widely tipped to be picked by India for its attack helicopter programme

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focuses on American technological strengths and global reach.

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has recently given a series of speeches outlining how the Obama Administration is reconfiguring its forces to make its presence in the Indo-Pacific have more credibility, particularly by increasing the number of naval vessels in the region by cutting the size of America’s Atlantic fleet — thus creating a 60:40 ratio of naval vessels between the two oceans.

So how does India fit into the American strategy? Secretary Clinton listed India as one of the partners to “…to join us in shaping and participating in a rules-based regional and global order”.

Further, she spoke of “enhancing coordination and engagement among the three giants of the Asia-Pacific: China, India, and the United States”. Yet it is not clear how New Delhi wants to operationalise its role in this process. The Old Nehruvian consensus on foreign policy no longer exists in New Delhi, as national and regional parties have different foreign policy perspectives and on how to deal with the United States.

On the other hand, the objective of the United States and a number of

THE VIEW IN ISLAMABAD IS THAT THE US DOES NOT RESPECT PAKISTANI SOVEREIGNTY other countries in Asia is to make China accept the regional order that has existed in the Asia-Pacific since the Nixon visit to China in the 1970s — and this consequently led to four decades of regional peace and prosperity. A China that accepts order and does not seek hegemony — one that continues its impressive economic growth and restrains its bellicose nationalism and military forays — is the end game that the most nations of the Indo-Pacific seek. Part of achieving this order is to make China realise that hegemony would be expensive and would be contested, as Hugh White argues, by Russia, Japan, the United States and India. New Delhi is cautiously starting to make

China aware of its strategic significance: the launching of the Agni 5 missile and the Indian forays into South East and East Asia are examples of India not sitting by passively and letting China dictate how the game of power politics is played in Asia. In that sense India is working to broaden the political space in Asia, something that fits into Washington’s own vision for Asia.

What needs to be done, however, is for India to start addressing how to work with Japan, China, and the United States to firm up the Asian order. This will require moving away from the emotional border issue to discuss issues like setting up an India-China free trade agreement. In order to succeed it cannot solely be dictated from Washington or Beijing. The other influential nations of Asia will have to participate.

(The author is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Security Studies at the United States Air Force Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. The views expressed in this article are his and do not necessarily reflect those of either the United States Department of Defense or the United States Air Force)

THE GAME CHANGER: India is set to become the biggest operator of the Boeing C-17 Globemaster III after the US AF.MIL

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RAN’S NUCLEAR status is bewildering the world and the international community is struggling to try and put an end to the crisis. International organisations and the academic communities are probing the nature and extent of the predicament, emphasising and reporting on the status of the nuclear programme of Iran.

On its part, Teheran has been asserting that it has an inalienable right to enrich and reprocess uranium. It has even claimed that it had crossed the threshold and enriched to the level marked for Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). It just jumped out of the LowEnriched Uranium (LEU) bracket.

However, there is no indication to suggest that it has achieved the ability to create Weapon Grade Uranium (WGU).

All the international players concerned are monitoring Iran’s status continuously: the United Nations Security Council ((UNSC), the International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Union, Israel and the United States (US).

The P-5 group of the UNSC, along with Germany, is struggling to find ways to resolve the crisis. But the P-5 itself looks like a divided house. Except on certain fundamental issues raised in the UN Resolutions, the P-5 is sending mixed signals and the effectiveness of sanctions imposed by the UNSC is under scrutiny.

Other international and supranational bodies have also not contributed much to try and end the crisis.

On May 25, 2012, the IAEA submitted yet another report numbered GOV/ 2012/23, and entitled, “Implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement

IRANIAN PARADOX

There is no easy solution to the nuclearisation of Iran, writes RAJIV NAYAN

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July 2012

g DIPLOMACY and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran”. As a signatory of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which has been operational since May 1974. But since then, the international community has witnessed phases of the Iranian anger against the IAEA inspection. Iran was often accused of not complying with the obligations of the NPT and the safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The IAEA Board of Governors submitted a number of reports regarding the Iranian non-cooperation, which in turn, prompted the UNSC to pass a few resolutions urging Iran to take corrective measures. In 2010, the UNSC Resolution 1929 asked Iran to abide by the safeguards agreement and other subsidiary arrangements it had signed with the IAEA. It also asked Iran to ratify the Additional Protocol and follow its provisions immediately.

However, the most significant part of the UNSCR 1929 was the instruction given to Iran to “cooperate fully with the IAEA on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear programme…” The IAEA has been submitting its reports on the implementation of binding obligations by Iran. This year, the IAEA submitted its report in February as well, after Iran projected its new NUCLEAR IMBROGLIO: Iran has invited IAEA officials to visit the Bushehr nuclear power plant

UTILITIES-ME.COM

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enrichment technology and released clips of scientists working in nuclear reactors.

The May and February reports are more or less identical.

After the November 2011 IAEA Board of Governors resolution, IAEA officials and Iranian authorities held three rounds of dialogue this year. The third round of dialogue was conducted in May 2012.

About the earlier meetings in 2012, the IAEA report noted: “Iran and the Agency [IAEA] were unable to reach an agreement on a structured approach to the clarification of all outstanding issues related to Iran”s nuclear programme; Iran provided an initial declaration in which it dismissed the Agency”s concerns; the Agency presented Iran with initial questions on Parchin and the foreign expert, 9 to which the Agency has yet to receive answers; and Iran stated that it was not able to grant access to the Parchin site.”

After the May 2012 dialogue, the IAEA report observed: “During the talks, a number of issues of mutual interest were discussed, in particular the clarification of issues relating to possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.

During the meeting with Mr Jalili (Saeed Jalili, the Iranian chief negotiator with P5+1), it was decided to agree on a structured approach.” The report acknowledged the continued difference between Iran and the IAEA Under the Iran-IAEA safeguards agreement, Iran declared 16 nuclear facilities and 9 facilities outside the declared facilities known as LoFs (Locations outside Facilities). These LoFs are located in hospitals. The May 2012 IAEA report informed that since the February 2012 report, Iran had notified an additional facility — the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP). As per the report, “This was the result of an administrative restructuring of ongoing activities that involved no physical changes to Iran’s facilities.” The May report recorded that Iran had not executed the instructions of the UNSC Resolutions or the IAEA Board of Governors regarding halting enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water production.

The report mentioned that Iran continued to enrich uranium in the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) and Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at the Natanz site. The report found that Iran had been increasing activities in the FEP. Increased activities include setting up cascades and the FEP produces LEU. The IAEA report complained that Iranian authorities had

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not provided all the details of the plant.

The May 2012 IAEA report also noted: “During the period April 9 to April 14, 2012, the operator at PFEP blended approximately 1.6 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20 per cent U-235 with approximately 7.5 kg of natural UF6.” The moment the enrichment level is increased to 20 per cent it is called HEU. However, the IAEA report concluded that the PFEP had not undertaken any activity which it had not declared.

The report also maintained that Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) had begun the production of both HEU and LEU since 2011. FFEP is located in a defence complex. Iran has promised to provide more information about ongoing activities at FFEP later. The IAEA also observed that Iran had not provided details about the announcement of constructing ten more uranium enrichment facilities. Iran had also announced that it had begun work on five of them. The IAEA also does not have any information about the Iranian announcement made on February 7, 2010, in which it claimed to have laser enrichment technology. It maintains that Iran has not supplied any information about it in its declaration.

However, the May 2012 IAEA report gave an estimate about the amount of enriched uranium: “According to the latest figures available to the Agency, Iran has produced 6197 kg of UF6 enriched up to 5 per cent U-235 and 145.6 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20 per cent U-235, since it began production of such material.”

The May 2012 IAEA report confirmed the Iranian claim that it had not taken any reprocessing activities. The Iranian Heavy Water Production plants, which are supposed to be closed down as per the UNSC resolution, are still functioning. IAEA officials visited a Heavy Water Production facility on August 17, 2011.

Since then, its repeated requests to visit the Heavy Water Production sites had not been accepted.

The May report also discussed Uranium Conversion Facility, Fuel Manufacturing Plant, Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant, design information, Additional Protocol and so on, in the context of the Iranian nuclear programme, and in general, expressed unhappiness because of the Iranian opaque approach.

The report has a section on the “possible military dimension”. The report remarked that this dimension had been viewed with concern in the international July 2012

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DIGITAL GLOBE-ISIS

THE SMOKING GUN: This 2006 image shows Iranian facilities at Esfahan including the tunnel entrance near the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF).

community and in the IAEA. It wanted Iran to come clean on it. Though only for the Parchin site, it talked about satellite imagery, which had observed some activities. There were reports, which maintained that Iran had tested a nuclear device. Some newspapers published a few pictures to corroborate it. The IAEA report did not mention the test explicitly but wanted the Iranian government to provide information. The Iranian government, quite obviously, denied any such move. Similarly, the news that Iran would develop a nuclear-fueled submarine is disturbing the US, Israel and other countries as they suspect that Teheran will now claim the right to enrich uranium up to 90 per cent uranium under this new excuse.

The report commented on undisclosed nuclear-related activities, including development of nuclear warhead and ballistic missiles. The IAEA view is that these are unresolved issues, which can be solved only in cooperation with Iran. However, the IAEA blames Iran for not cooperating with it. Iran and others maintain that the IAEA findings on the ‘possible military dimension’ is based on ‘a wide variety of independent sources’ which are nothing but dubious sources of misinformation launched by anti-Iran forces. Already www.geopolitics.in

Saeed Jalili, the Iranian chief negotiator with P-5+1, accused IAEA inspectors of conducting espionage in Iran.

Thus, the ambiguity about the Iranian nuclear weapon is continuing. Even the IAEA report did not provide an authoritative data on the weaponisation of nuclear capability of Iran. It found Iran not complying with the UNSC resolutions as well as the decisions of the Board of Governors of the IAEA. It also accused Iran of not providing sufficient information on its nuclear activities. For the military perspective, it has to rely on independent sources, which may not be accepted by many.

As a result, the resolve of the international community regarding sanctions imposed on Iran appears to be weakening. A strong section of the international community feels that Iran may be given some space so that it is manoeuvred. The thinking that the Iranian situation is not as alarming as portrayed, along with the energy need of the countries overwhelmingly dependent on Iranian oil, is making the international community have a relook at the policy of sanctions on Iran.

Even the US adopted a lenient approach towards some countries. Its famous “sanctions reprieve” announce-

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ment assured a few countries that their oil import from Iran would not face sanctions from the US because they had substantially reduced their dependence on Iranian oil. The countries, which were given the reprieve are India, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Turkey and Taiwan. Earlier, Japan and the European Union countries had been extended relaxation. However, issues such as transportation of oil and insurance are still unresolved. On the other hand, the Iranian government maintains that the continued oil embargo on Iran would make the global market unstable. It got a big boost from the head of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Abdullah El-Badri when he opposed hundred per cent embargoes against Iran.

So, should the world now completely rule out the possibility of a war or a preemptive strike? No doubt, in the current US administration, war is a remote possibility. Israel”s security agencies, of late, too, demonstrated skepticism about a war and a pre-emptive strike. One of the former heads of Mossad completely ruled out the military option. Even a top-level serving Israeli official publicly stated that pre-emptive strikes against Iran would not be so easy. He said that the Iranian military capability should not be underestimated. However, in an opinion poll survey in the US, it was found that a majority of US citizens seriously believed that Iran was developing nuclear weapons. This may lead to some pressure on the US administration for toughening its policy vis-à-vis Iran. The toughening of the policy may lead to the closure of the window of opportunity to resolve the conundrum.

What ought to be done? The international community should work for a reasonable solution. This reasonable solution includes no nuclear weapon for Iran.

As it has signed the NPT and safeguards agreement, it should provide information to the IAEA about its nuclear facilities. It will be a solid confidence-building measure. The element of rhetoric should be cut down substantially. The best option would be its disappearance from official or unofficial briefings of the parties concerned . And most importantly, pending nuclear issues like nuclear disarmament should be pushed seriously. Nuclear reduction is not an answer.

(The author is Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi) July 2012

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GEOPOLITICS

EXCERPTS

A SENSE OF DÉJÀ VU…

OVERTAKES YOU There have been memoirs written in the past by some senior Indian officers, such as Lt Gens SPP Thorat, SD Verma, Harbaksh Singh, SK Sinha and JFR Jacob. Ex-Army Chief Gen VP Malik has written, but about the Kargil War. General JJ Singh is thus, ironically, only the third Indian Army Chief after Generals JN Choudhuri and Krishna Rao to write his memoir says General RAJ MEHTA in his review of the former Chief of Army Staff ’s autobiography A Soldier’s General

A Soldier’s General Author: General J J Singh Publisher: Harper Collins Pages: 400 Price: `799

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SOLDIER’S General is loaded with an interesting mix of intense personal awareness, an engaging wonderment, symbolism, drama, patches of good writing, avoidable repetition and a persistent feeling of déjà vu. The General in a recent interview candidly stated: “There is always a dilemma in writing an autobiography — are you trying to praise yourself more than you should?” The reader gets to know as the book progresses.

Divided chronologically into six parts, the book traces JJ’s truly enviable ancestry; joining the NDA; rising in ranks from Cadet to Colonel; thereafter holding various ‘star ranks’ till he becomes Chief in Part 4. Part 5 covers his current gubernatorial assignment and Part 6 his concluding “Reflections”. An early feeling that stays www.geopolitics.in

with you is that JJ, a self-declared “maverick”, is sometimes ungenerous. Thus General JFR Jacob, who has recently suggested that he was the brain behind the Bangladesh victory, draws his, perhaps not fully deserved, ire. In securing a rare ‘competitive’ vacancy in the Staff College exams, JJ shows early on that he is superbly professional and obsessively competitive. His remarks, that being junior, he was disadvantaged because “many senior guys on the course” were armed with (unethical) Previous Course Knowledge (PCK) leave insiders bemused.

That he has a most impressive ‘field profile’, serving in hardship, often highaltitude areas becomes very clear in the book and is laudable. His unit command at Tezu, starts “with single-minded resolve” to be the best. Selected to test an emerging warfighting concept (Mobile Defence; whose ignorance by us led to disastrous consequences in 1962) after disagreement on its practicability vitiates the atmosphere, he describes how his placing of troop safety over exercise conduct leads to postponement and subsequent no-victor-no-vanquished conclusions. Absence of an explanatory sketch/map here leaves the reader bemused. Awarded Vishist Seva Medal (VSM) — a rare award for a CO in command — he is detailed for the elite Higher Command course. He proudly

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notes that he was the first from his batch to do the course. Post a logistics posting, he is hand-picked for another unit command and thereafter as Defence Attaché to Algeria. In “perform or perish” command of a brigade in North Kashmir, JJ writes that he had to commence with sacking a CO for command dereliction. With change of role to LoC guarding, JJ explains “how I saved my goose from being cooked”. JJ found the area flush with terrorists, contrary to his predecessor’s claims, and eliminated most. Branded as “the thorn in their flesh”, he was seriously wounded by terrorists but courageously and speedily returned to command.

Chapter 13 describes in pulsating Robert Ludlum fashion how JJ, branded as Brigadier ‘Shaitan Singh’ was ambushed in Baramula town. The anecdote is unfortunately backed by incorrect graphics/text (the Chowk shown in Sketch 13.1 is Tehsil, not Tashkent Chowk; the terrorists names in Sketch 13.2 are indecipherable; Shera is actually Sheeri village. With 20 terrorists firing rockets, machine guns, AKs and throwing grenades, it sounds Rambo-like that there were no fatalities during this day ambush. Awarded the Army Chief’s Commendation Card, JJ proceeded to the prestigious NDC course. Posted as Additional Director General Military Operations (ADGMO ‘A’) after command of a Division, July 2012

g EXCERPTS Gen JJ’s charter was to handle ongoing about ‘dirty tricks’, he chooses to ‘guard operations as well as border management. one’s flanks…and leave the rest to destiny’.

His counterpart, ADGMO ‘B’ handed operThe General candidly accepts being ational planning and a host of other oper- overcome by emotion on his appointment ational charters. The text does not unfor- as Jangi Laat (Chief ). He cried. His goal tunately radiate this clarity. was that the Army be ‘optimally trained, JJ reiterates how the Siachen ‘losers’ tag equipped and structured; operate successled to the Pakistani misadventure at Kargil. fully in a joint service environment… in JJ chooses to blame “forward troops and short; Fight to Win’. A version of his intent commanders” for the early snafus. Com- was made available publicly; another first. pare this interpretation with that of his His views on ‘The Security Perspective’, his Chief, Gen VP Malik, in his book: “Kargil — panning of the Cold Start strategy, his From Surprise to Victory” and you get a views on Internal Security and Countering totally different perspective. General Malik Terror invite a sense of déjà vu. “Iron-Fistdetails grave Army, Intelligence, Political, and-Velvet-Glove” is a born-again British Bureaucratic, Procurement and Planning strategy forged in Malaya during 1948-60 failures, ending by his “We shall fight with to combat insurgency. Kashmir is where it whatever we have” take-away. Awarded an all began, during the enlightened rule of AVSM, JJ mistakenly does not mention the Bud Shah (Zain-ul-Abidin) in the 15th cencontribution of the then Colonel (now tury. His people-centric rule combined Chief) Bikram Singh, his focused and capa- strictness with tolerance, promotion of ble Director MO-2, who was the credible media face of the Army.

Command of the battle-tested 1 Corps, was JJ’s next “feather in the cap”.

Pitched into ‘Exercise Mayhem’ (piquantly named because it so accurately describes Clausewitz’ interpretation of the nature of war), JJ says he took umbrage and had it renamed as Ex Poorna Vijay. JJ lashes out at un-named ‘higher commanders’ who fail to give clear directions/trash an exercise during conduct. It appears he took over a dysfunctional Strike Corps given the blank looks he received from his staff/advisers during his first staff/adviser conference. He expresses DISTINGUISHED SERVICE : Defence Minister wonderment at being able (after pilot- AK Antony bidding farewell General JJ Singh in led navigational glitches) to finally show September 2007 an armour regiment kicking up dust to the Defence Minister and Army Chief. public health, education, arts and crafts.

He is correctly critical of Operation Where Gen JJ can claim credit is that he Parakram and its questionable ‘coercive made people-friendly operations central diplomacy’ gains; listing ‘fuzziness and to his vision. That it has been refined/taklack of clarity’ in the overall national strate- en several notches up by the charismatic gy as the culprits. Incidentally, JJ writes that Gen Ata Hasnain, finds no mention. he created a war memorial at his HeadOn the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) quarters; displaying the Vijayanta tank of conundrum, the General finds the current the 1971 war hero, 2/Lt Arun Khetarpal, situation manageable. The CDS appointPVC (Posthumous). The Poona Horse will ment he feels, should be contingent to crehopefully ignore this typo because it ation of an integrated military hierarchy. fought the war with Centurions and retains The nuclear dimension draws praise for its the tank in which Khetarpal died. Promot- current status. Readers would have loved to ed as Army Commander ARTRAC, the hear his pragmatic take on today’s realpoliauthor says he authored the Army’s tik practices and constraints in India Shinwarfighting doctrine. As the Western Army ing; the SAARC/ SE/East Asian region but Commander thereafter, he takes credit for all they read is the existing party line. The the creation of the South Western Com- disadvantages of holding a Constitutional mand and 9 Corps. With media buzz iden- office are apparent as there is little introtifying him as the next Chief, he sees him- spection on India’s abysmal policy paralyself as ‘the natural successor’. Cautioned sis and state of operational readiness. www.geopolitics.in

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In terms of command and leadership experience, the author identifies serious HR issues such as clever, time-pass officers who try and hoodwink the system.

He correctly brings out the importance of field service over ticket punching; writes about out-of-the-box thinking; using the directive style of command ‘esprit-decorps’ and its optimum exploitation led to his ‘consistently over performing’, he opines. He also emphasises ethics and probity. One is, however, left wondering how much of this ‘loud thinking’ led to improvements within the system and whether that should not have been quantified. General JJ Singh clinically dismisses the allegations of having crafted a line of succession resulting in marginalisation of General VK Singh’s tenure. His farewell as ‘Jangi Laat’ is a ‘Balle Balle’ affair, with a buggy, cavalry escort and fine dining — Effective symbolism.

Quixotically comparing himself with Musharraf, he quotes Murtaza Razvi: “The tragedy is not that Musharraf ran a banana republic but that by the time he left…it had run out of bananas.” JJ writes that he sees himself as ‘a maverick, the architect of the Indian Army’s doctrine…a General…who shoots from the hip and the lip’ (this review could easily be titled ‘Have Gun, Will Travel! The author’s final ‘reflections’ reinforce his mindsets. In a sequencing glitch, JJ pans Stephen Cohen under ‘Force Restructuring’. Memoir writing in the West, unlike in India, is taken seriously.

Julius Caesar’s insightful “Caesar’s Commentaries” are must-reads. General Bill Slim’s Defeat into Victory is widely regarded. His lack of ego, consistent references to errors in planning/ judgment, and his deficiencies as a military commander vastly educate the reader. By comparison, the India has lagged behind. General SK Sinha’s A Soldier Recalls stands out in this genre. This raises the question; How does A Soldier’s General rate? The reviewer objectively leaves the reader to decide; with the caveat that its production values need an upgrade. Crammed with photos and graphics, it has clarity problems in some and several typos/inadvertent errors, some already highlighted.

(Gen Raj Mehta, has commanded a Sector [Brigade] at Anantnag, and the Baramula Division. He was Chief of Staff of 9 Corps during the tenure of Gen JJ Singh) July 2012

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Right Angle

A WRONG MOVE

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ANY STRATEGIC pundits have overlooked $ 50 million in exploration there. Now, there may have the geopolitical significance of the recent been sound commercial reasons behind the decision but decision of the overseas arm of the statethe timing of the decision, particularly in the context of owned Oil and Natural Gas Commission the Chinese opposition, raises many questions that my (ONGC), known as the ONGC Videsh Ltd. sources in the ministry of external affairs (MEA) have (OVL), to pull out of an offshore oil block in Vietnam in failed to explain to me. In fact, I get a distinct impression the disputed South China Sea (SCS) at a time when China that they are not happy with the OVL decision either. was raising sovereignty concerns over India’s oil exploThey concur that the timing of the OVL has dented India’s ration in the region. rising international stature and weakened India’s marNot long ago, Sun Weidong, Deputy Director General itime doctrine that says that developments in the SCS of Asian Department in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign have a bearing on the Indian Ocean region. All told, about Affairs, had said; “The region is a disputed area. There55 per cent of India’s trade with the Asia-Pacific transits fore, we don’t think to do so (to prospect for oil) is good through the SCS. for India,” adding that “the sovereignty of the There is a school of thought that every islands in the region is a huge issue, and India major power should be granted unchalshould not carry out oil exploration activities lenged geopolitical dominance in its surthere before the issue is resolved”. rounding region for the bigger cause of globChina, Taiwan and five Southeast Asian al peace and stability. After all, so the argucountries (Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, the ments run, the United States had its Monroe Philippines, and Vietnam) have conflicting doctrine, enunciated in 1823 by President claims over islands and maritime zones in the James Monroe. It said that the United States SCS. Southeast Asian countries defend their was entitled to “indisputable sovereignty” Prakash Nanda claims in terms of international laws, in parover the islands and waters within a line on ticular the 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the the map that enclosed the vast majority of the Caribbean Sea (1982 UNCLOS) that allows coastal countries excluSea and the Gulf of Mexico and that these claims constisive economic zones extending from the edge of the territuted a “core interest” of the United States - an interest for torial sea out to 200 nautical miles. Besides, in 2002, the which it was prepared to fight. So why should others deny Southeast Asian states had negotiated a modus vivendi China its own Monroe doctrine of similar dominance in with China in the form of a Declaration on Conduct of its areas of “core interests”?

Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) to settle their disThere is a serious fallacy in the above argument. Othputes peacefully and not to upset the status quo. er than being an affront on the concept of “sovereign On the contrary, China says that the entire SCS equality of States”, the Monroe doctrine, incidentally, was belongs to it and is a region of “core national interest”, accepted - and this may sound a great irony - by all the similar to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang province. It even neighbours of the United States, many of them resisting demands that though other nations are allowed to navitheir colonial masters in Europe - Spain and Portugal. In gate in the SCS, the movement of their military vessels that sense, the Monroe doctrine promoted and strengthneeds its prior clearance, something countries such as ened the cause of independence of many Latin American the United States and India refuse to accept on the sound countries. In a way, the doctrine also dissuaded the then international principles of “freedom of navigation”, “open superpower, Great Britain, from going to South America access to maritime commons” and “respect for internafor new colonies. In contrast, none of the Chinese neightional law of the Sea (UNCLOS)”. bours in Southeast Asia, not to speak of Japan, South India so far had argued that its OVL was exploring oil Korea, Russia and Mongolia, is prepared to tolerate a Chiand gas in Vietnamese-controlled territory, allowed under na, which expands the scope and range of its “core interboth the UNCLOS and DOC. In 2006, OVL signed a conests” every passing year. tract with Petro Vietnam to jointly explore sectors 127 and On the other hand, will China ever allow India to 128 in the Phu Khanh Basin in the SCS. In September develop its Monroe doctrine in South Asia and the Indian 2011, the OVL signed three additional deals to jointly Ocean region? As it is, China does not even care about explore oil and natural gas in these blocks. But these two India when it builds the strategic projects in Pakistan blocks have been at the centre of a diplomatic uproar occupied Kashmir (PoK), a “disputed territory” like the between India and China. Of course, there are some othSCS. Viewed thus, why should we legitimise two contraer blocks such as block 06.1 and Nam Con Son basin dictory yardsticks of China - one in SCS and another in where OVL has stakes, but these areas have not come Kashmir? But that is exactly what has happened after under Chinese objections as yet.

OVL’s withdrawal.

OVL relinquished block 127 last year after it encountered dry wells and paid Vietnam $15 million as exit-fees.

And in April, it decided to quit block 128, ostensibly under similar pleas, even though last year it had invested prakashnanda@newsline.in

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July 2012

Reg No.DL(E)-01/5363/2011-2013 RNI No. DELENG/2010/35319 Posting Date. 8-9/07/2012