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D E F E N C E .

D I P L O M A C Y.

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WHY NAVY NEEDS

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TOUGH TERRAIN Once the acme of high discipline and honour, the Indian defence structure is today battling scandals and scams, outdated armaments, social tensions in the barracks and bureaucratic inefficiency...

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GEOPOLITICS

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Publisher’s note

Silence of the Lambs

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NE OF the most outrageous razzmatazz of 24 hour news, breaking phrases used time and news and exclusive news, it gets triviagain during the American alised even further. Where is the ininvasion of Iraq was a ubiqdepth analysis, the perceptive debate uitous new form of and the informed discourse? reportage called “embedded journalism”.

GEOPOLITICS hopes to be the catalyst in sparking this debate. To look at foreign In effect, you travelled with the troops, policy, international security were one of them and reportand defence from the prism ed on the war from the of developments on the trenches so to say. grounds, the trends and the Chris Hedges, one of options and offer our readers America’s best known war an opportunity to make their correspondents made perown informed choices. For far haps what was one of the too long, national security most defining assessments of and foreign policy debate has the practice: “The embedbeen shrouded behind the ding of several hundred jourK Srinivasan veil of minimal debate and nalists in military units does disclosure in the national interest. In a not diminish the lie. These journalists different generation and a different condo not have access to their own transtext, Winston Churchill once remarked: portation. They depend on the military “I cannot forecast to you the action of for everything, from food to a place to Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a myssleep. They look to the soldiers around tery inside an enigma: but, perhaps, them for protection. When they feel the there is a key. That key is Russian nationfear of hostile fire, they identify and al interest.” It looks so strikingly similar seek to protect those who protect them. to what is happening in the Indian conThey become part of the team. It is a text 70 years later! natural reaction. I have felt it. But in That reminds us of the savage Dr that experience, these journalists Hannibal Lecter from the film classic become participants in the war effort.

Silence of the Lambs, who said, though They want to do their bit. And their bit in an unconnected situation: “As your is the dissemination of myth, the myth mother tells you, and my mother cerused to justify war and boost the morale tainly told me, it is important, she always of the soldiers and civilians.” used to say, always to try new things.”

Is there an Indian context to it? UnforIn GEOPOLITICS, we hope to try afresh tunately, yes. A large number of those and nail the Lecters and the Chiltons of who cover the country’s geopolitics the world. And, most important, try space — national security, foreign policy new things. and defence — have accepted a suo moto strategy of practicing embedded journalism in the belief that sanitised releases, informal briefings and an acceptance that there are areas that are off-bounds because of law and order and geo-strategic importance is furthering the cause of national interest! The establishment too, prefers it this way. There are a few uncomfortable questions and in the srini@newsline.in

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May 2010

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Reality Bites COVER STORY P40

All is not well with the Indian armed forces. GEOPOLITICS takes a close look at the ongoing mess in the military management of the country.

FOCUS (P14)

IN-DEPTH (P26)

DISPELLING MISGIVINGS

THE SEA HAWK

A fresh perspective on the much-criticised Nuclear Liability Bill. The legislation, in fact, seeks to position India as a responsible nuclear power.

The present and the former chief of Indian Navy make a strong case for the aircraft carrier to augment India’s maritime capability.

PERSPECTIVE (P32)

CYBERSPHERE (P70)

SCRUITINY (P20)

Rethinking The War Doctrine

Techno-Savvy Terrorists

Honour at stake

Isn't it the time to revisit India's military doctrine of "dissuasive deterrence "in tune with national interests as influenced by the regional and global strategic environment?

Terrorists have set up their own media labs, equipped with high-definition cameras, laptop computers and the software that permits images to be edited and manipulated.

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What is the truth behind the Rs 300 crore Sukhna land ‘scam’? GEOPOLITICS delves into the controversy which has dented the Army’s image...

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FRONTIER... (P36)

VIEWPOINT (P67)

SECURITY (P54)

DIPLOMACY (P60)

North East holds immense significance for India's geopolitics even as it has perennially defied integration into the national ethos.

As the White House opts to prioritise relations with an ascendant China, GEOPOLITICS takes a critical look at the American Left’s growing unease with India.

A senior police officer empathises with the Indian police force which has to deal with both cultural conflict and fragmented social control in rural areas.

Encircling India remains a long term Chinese strategy, though Beijing has chosen to cozy up to New Delhi, for now.

NEIGHBOURS (P63)

On a new high A refreshingly objective and realistic analysis of the bilateral relations by Bangladesh High Commissioner to India, Tariq A Karim.

SPECIAL REPORT (P17)

g GEOPOLITICS

WATER POLITICS

Volume I No 1

It’s time to exercise constant vigil in the wake of recent Chinese activities aimed at exploiting the potential of the rivers emanating from Tibet into India.

Editor-in-Chief

K SRINIVASAN Editor

PRAKASH NANDA Consulting Editor

VISHAL DUGGAL Conceptualised and designed by Newsline Publications Pvt. Ltd., D-11 Basement, Nizamuddin (East), New Delhi -110 013, Tel: +91-11-41033381-82 Managing Editor: TIRTHANKAR GHOSH All information in GEOPOLITICS is derived from sources we consider reliable. It is passed on to our readers without any responsibility on our part. Opinions/views expressed by third parties in abstract or in interviews are not necessarily shared by us. Material appearing in the magazine cannot be reproduced in whole or in part(s) without prior permission. The publisher assumes no responsibility for material lost or damaged in transit. The publisher reserves the right to refuse, withdraw or otherwise deal with all advertisements without explanation. All advertisements must comply with the Indian Advertisements Code. The publisher will not be liable for any loss caused by any delay in publication, error or failure of advertisement to appear.

Owned and published by K Srinivasan, 4C Pocket-IV, Mayur Vihar, Phase-I, Delhi-91 and printed by him at Nutech Photolithographers, B-240, Okhla Industrial Area, Phase-I, New Delhi-110020.

Readers are welcome to send their feedback at geopolitics@newsline.in.

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E N G A G I N G . I L L U M I N AT I N G . I N V I G O R AT I N G

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TOUGH TERRAIN Once the acme of high discipline and honour, the Indian defence structure is today battling scandals and scams, outdated armaments, social tensions in the barracks and bureaucratic inefficiency...

Picture Ministry of Defence

May 2010

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FIREWALKERS INC

As fuel prices touch the stratosphere, airlines owners get edgy. It’s like walking on hot coals: they are cutting costs, dropping routes and wondering what to do next

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FIREWALKERS INC

As fuel prices touch the stratosphere, airlines owners get edgy. It’s like walking on hot coals: they are cutting costs, dropping routes and wondering what to do next

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TEJAS PROJECT TO COST OVER Rs13,000 CRORE THE OVERALL developmental cost of Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) has quietly zoomed past the Rs 13,000-crore mark, with the government sanctioning the extension of the fighter’s “full-scale engineering development’’ (FSED) till December 31, 2018.

Tejas developmental saga will now stretch across 35 years, sanctioned as the project was way back in 1983 at a cost of Rs 560 crore to replace the ageing MiG-21s.

The story of Tejas is quite similar to that of the Arjun main-battle tank, which has not been operationalised by the Indian Army yet, though the project was first approved 36 years ago.

The success of TEJAS will boost India’s indigenous defence production, given the fact that India still imports 70 per cent of its military hardware and software.

“This is a very sorry state of affairs.

Even after 27 years since LCA was sanctioned, it is yet to see light of the day,’’ says the latest report of the parliamentary standing committee on defence,

tabled in Parliament, recently.

The TEJA project includes singleseater IAF, twin-seater trainer and naval LCA variants. With Tejas prototypes clocking 1,350 flights till now, the “final operational clearance’’ for the IAF variant is now slated for December 2012.

So, IAF should have its first Tejas squadron of 20 fighters by 2014-15.

India is now going in for foreign engines to power even the Tejas Mark-II version after the indigenous Kaveri engine failed to pass muster after 20 years of development at a cost of Rs 2,839 crore.

Consequently, while the first 20 Tejas will be powered by the American GE-404 engines, the hunt is on for new more powerful engines for the next six Tejas Mark-II squadrons (16-18 jets in each).

The Rs 13,000-crore mark for the LCA project is breached even if the Kaveri fiasco is kept aside. For one, the FSED PhaseI, which finished in March 2004, cost Rs 2,188 crore.

The Phase-II, which was to be completed by December 2008 at a cost of Rs 3,301 crore, will now get over in December 2012, with additional funds of Rs 2,475 crore.

Moreover, in November last year, the government “accorded’’ sanction for “continuing FSED of LCA till December 2018, with an estimated additional cost of Rs 5,302 crore’’.

Amid all this, IAF is keeping its fingers crossed, grappling as it is with a free-fall in the number of its fighter squadrons, down to just 32 from a sanctioned strength of 39.5.

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Army to buy missile systems THE INDIAN army has issued a global Request for Information (RFI) about medium-range loitering missile systems, seeking details about their day and night camera payloads, ground control stations, data links, launchers and the like.

The RFI has been sent to Israeli firm - IAI Malat and US-based Raytheon, as these are one of the few companies that can manufacture such sophisticated and hi-tech systems.

The loitering missile is basically a UAV which can transmit data after hovering over a target undetected for about half-an-hour and then hit a selected target. The Indian armed forces have inducted over 100 Israeli Searcher-II, Heron and other UAVs as `force-multipliers' in reconnaissance missions as well as for precision-strike operations.

The RFI states that the Army is interested in a system with capabilities that include topattack and the ability to abort an attack after target lock (and re-designate). The Army wants a system where the launcher can be mounted on a Tatra truck. The RFI has sought details on the missile's cruising speed, maximum range at which it can engage a target, its loitering time, data link's range and the like.

It is understood that these missiles cost about $10 million a piece and hence these will be used very selectively. Industry sources say that this will be the second purchase of such systems by India and offset contracts are already underway for the first purchase.

ICGS Vishwast commissioned A NEW generation offshore patrolling vessel (OPV), ICGS Vishwast, has been commisioned into the Coast Guard in mid-March.

“Vishwast, meaning 'Trustworthy', is a projection of the Indian Coast Guard's will and commitment to maritime order and security,” a defence ministry statement said. The first of its class ship has been indigenously developed

by Goa Shipyard Limited. Special features of the ship include an integrated bridge system, an integrated machinery control system, a high-power external fire fighting system and May 2010

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g an indigenously built gun mount. The ship can carry one helicopter and five high-speed boats for search and rescue, maritime law enforcement, exclusive economic zone surveillance, high speed interdiction and marine pollution response missions.

The 90-metre-long OPV displaces 2,400 tonnes, and is propelled by 9,100 KW twin diesel engines to a maximum speed of 26 knots. At an economical speed, she has an endurance of 4,500 nautical miles, and can stay at sea for 17 days without refill.

The commissioning of ICGS Vishwast is part of the plan to manufacture three new series vessels to replace the ageing Offshore Patrol Vessels inducted in 1980s. The first of the three OPVs was inducted in 2008.

It is envisaged that in the times to come the Indian Coast Guard will raise its cadre by an additional 3,000 personnel, procure 20 fast patrol vehicles (Fops), 41 interceptor boats, 12 coastal surveillance aircraft (Dornier's), seven OPVs and commission 14 new stations to address the security gap along the coastline which came into highlight post 26/11.

BRAHMOS TEST-FIRED SUCCESSFULLY THE VERTICAL-launch version of supersonic BrahMos cruise missile was successfully test-fired by the navy from a warship in the Bay of Bengal off the coast of Orissa on March 21. The missile was launched from Indian Navy ship INS Ranvir and it manoeuvred successfully hitting the target ship.

After this test, India has become the first and only country in the world to have a "manoeuvrable supersonic cruise missile in its inventory.

The test-firing was part of the preinduction tests by the Navy as moves are afoot to deploy the vertical-launch ver-

sion of the missile in ships. The weapon system has been designed and developed by the Indo-Russian joint venture company.

In separate messages, President Pratibha Patil and defence minister AK Antony congratulated the BrahMos scientists and the navy for the successful test-launch.

The missile is already in service with the Navy and its Shivalik class frigates have been equipped with it.

BrahMos has also been inducted into the Army and preparations are on to develop its air-launched and the submarine-launched versions.

India developing sub-sonic ‘Nirbhay’ cruise missile INDIA IS developing a sub-sonic 1,000-km range cruise missile “Nirbhay” which can be used for a cvariety of applications”, says Dr V K Saraswat, Scientific Advisor to Defence Minister and Chief of Defence Research and Development Organisation.

The 1000-kg “missile is getting into some shape”, he said. He further added that the flight-trial of air-to-air missile ‘Astra’, having a range of 45 to 100 km, is on the cards.

Saraswat was delivering the keynote address at a national convention on ‘The Frontiers of Aeronautical Technologies’, organised by the Aeronautical Society of India in Delhi on April 18, 2010 He said India’s armed forces are looking for long duration loitering missiles which can enter “enemy territory”, search targets such as radars, concentration of assets and

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“a variety of movements of enemy”, “home-on” the targets and “bang” them.

Saraswat made a strong push for deploying space-based sensors to keep a tab on “adversaries” and gather intelligence vis-a-vis defence surveillance.

He said space-based sensors are a must for tracking and detecting the movements of enemies. Unless it has space-based sensors, India would not be able to make its ballistic missile defence system a “potent weapon”, the scientist said.

India is launching a major programme for surveillance, particularly space-based, in terms of electro-optical payload and synthetic aperture radar. “So, unless we prepare ourselves for future space-based systems, security is going to be a major issue,” he said May 2010

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g IAF’s transport aircraft arrive in Ukraine

India to purchase 40 Su-30MKI warplanes RUSSIA AND India will sign a contract of the supply of 40 newest multi-purpose fighters Su30MKI for the Indian Air Force later this year.

“We’re conducting negotiations over this contract; we’re expecting it to be signed this year,” director of the Sukhoi corporation Mikhail Pogosyan underlined on Friday.

Su-30MKI (modernized, commercial, Indian) is a modification of SU-30MK, designed specially for India. Its top speed is 2,200 kilometers per hour. It has a range of 3,500 kilometers. Armaments: a 30-mm gun, with missiles or bombs on 12 suspension points.

HIGH SPEED BOATS FOR COAST GUARD

INDIA-RUSSIA RENEGOTIATE CARRIER PRICE

LARSEN & TOUBRO (L&T) will design and construct 36 high speed interceptor boats worth Rs 970 crore for the Indian Coast Guard.

The boats shall be designed in-house at the L&T’s Ship Design Centre, a part of its heavy engineering division, and shall be constructed at its existing shipyard at Hazira (Gujarat) and the new shipyard coming up at Katupalli near Ennore (Tamil Nadu).

RUSSIA AND India signed a new contract on the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov with the delivery date in 2012; the contract cost is not disclosed.

“A new contract on the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov was signed, the price is agreed upon,” Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said. “The price was coordinated, but I cannot call it a mutual agreement,” the vice-premier said. “The delivery date is the end of 2012,” he added.

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ON MARCH 4, 2010, the first batch of five military transport aircraft of Indian Air Force arrived at the “Kyiv” airport. They will be overhauled and modernised at facilities of 410 Plant of civil aviation State Enterprise (Kyiv).

The representative office of India has been established at the Plant 410.

On June 15, 2009, the contract on modernisation of 105 AN-32s fleet of Indian Air Force was signed. According to this agreement, the first 40 airplanes will be upgraded in Ukraine, the other 65 ones at BRD-1 aviation plant of Indian Air Force in Kanpur (Northern India).

The airplanes will be fitted with upto-date equipment providing higher level of flight safety, including air collision avoidance system, ground proximity warning system, satellite navigation system, distance measuring equipment, upgraded radio altimeters, new radar with two multifunctional indicators, new oxygen system and improves seats for crew members. 25 positions of new equipment will be installed.

After modification the trials with the installed equipment will be carried out. On the results of the tests, the airplanes will be shown to the Indian customer.

It was decided to modernise AN-32 because at present it cannot be replaced with the other one. This airplane was especially designed on the order of Indian government to be operated from/to the elevated airfields (up to 4,500 m above sea level) and under hot climate conditions. Often AN-32s are the only aircraft able to provide connection between mountain settlements and big cities. In India AN-32 was called “Silver Hourse” for its high maneuverability and reliability.

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g INDIA, FRANCE TO SIGN MIRAGE UPGRADE DEAL

Rs 3,726cr DEAL FOR 12 VVIP HELICOPTERS VVIPS LIKE to travel in plush and secure comfort. After getting three desi versions of US President’s ‘Air Force One’, the Indian President and PM will now also get 12 swanky helicopters for VVIP travel on the lines of ‘Marine One’.

The defence ministry has quietly inked a Rs 3,726-crore deal to acquire 12 three-engined AW-101 helicopters from AgustaWestland, a unit of Italian major Finmeccanica, for IAF’s elite Communication Squadron, which ferries around the President, PM and other VVIPs. All the 12 helicopters will be delivered in three years or so. The Cabinet Committee on Security apparently gave the nod for the exorbitant helicopter deal, despite objections from the finance ministry, due to ‘security concerns’ raised by the Special Protection Group as

well as IAF. The government’s VVIP helicopter contract comes after the Rs 727-crore deal for five mid-size Embraer 135BJ Legacy jets in September 2003 and the Rs 937-crore contract for three Boeing Business Jets (BBJs) in October 2005, with advanced self-protection suites to guard against missiles and other threats.

The AW-101 helicopters were pitted against the American Sikorsky’s S-92 Superhawks during extensive field trials held in 2008, which the US firm later claimed were unfairly biased against it.

Giuseppe Orsi, CEO, AgustaWestland said, “This significant order by the Indian Air Force to meet its government transport helicopter requirement confirms the correct vision and strategy of AgustaWestland in India.”

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AHEAD OF an expected visit by President Nicolas Sarkozy later this year India is set to sign a $2.2-billion deal with France to upgrade its fleet of Mirage 2000 fighters.

The upgrade would give the aircraft the new radar systems, a new weapon suite, missiles, electronic warfare system and modern electronic warfare. It is crucial for the India Air Force, as it would also give its most potent fighter an extension in service life. The deal is to upgrade 51 of the fighters in the IAF’s inventory.

France had initially quoted a price close to $3 billion for the upgrade. This was coming to about $58 million per aircraft, which, the IAF believed was almost the price of a brand new fighter jet.

As per the revised estimate, the cost per aircraft is coming to $43 million, which, according to experts, is still high.

The deal will also strengthen IndoFrench military ties, given the recent bad blood over the cancellation of the $2-billion mid-air tanker deal in which the European Airbus 330 MRTT had been short listed. This was preceded by the cancellation of the $600 million deal to have 197 light helicopters for the Army.

France is also interested that India approves the Maitri air-to-surface LowLevel Quick Reaction Missile (LLQRM), jointly developed by the DRDO and France’s MBDA. May 2010

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RUSSIA-INDIA MILITARY TRANSPORT PLANE A NEW Russian-Indian military transport plane could make its maiden flight by 2018.

Russia and India had signed an intergovernmental agreement on the joint development of a multi-role transport aircraft (MTA) in 2007. The cost of the $600-mln project is being equally shared by the two countries.

The MTA project will be implemented by a Russian-Indian joint venture, cofounded by Russia’s arms exporter Rosoboronexport and United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) and India’s HAL. Moscow and New Delhi will have an equal share in the development and production of the aircraft. The aircraft is expected to be assembled in both Russia and India.

Initially it is expected that about 205 aircraft will be prodused of which 30% will go on the world market.

The MTA will be most likely developed on the basis of the Il-214 twin-engine military transport aircraft designed by the Ilyushin Design Bureau.

The new aircraft will feature a takeoff weight of around 55 tons, flight range of 2,500 kilometers (1,550 miles) and a payload of up to 20 tons.

INDIA TO PROCURE BASIC TRAINER PLANES

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NDER ITS Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with South Korea, India is likely to acquire Korean basic trainer aircraft to train fresh IAF pilots. The Indian Air Force needs basic trainers. The request for proposal is already out and the concerned South Korean company is reported to have offered the very basic trainer KT-1.

India has already requested to procure 75 basic trainer aircraft on multi-vendor basis and 106 aircraft are supposed to be built by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited The manufacturers to whom requests have been sent

JOINT INDO-RUSSIAN 5G FIGHTER BY 2016 A RUSSIAN-Indian fifth-generation fighter jet may be expected to be developed by 2015-2016.

Moscow and New Delhi are likely to sign a contract on a joint venture very soon focusing on the design concept and technical requirements forwarded by the Indian side.

The new aircraft is most likely to be based on Russia’s T-50 prototype fifthgeneration fighter, which has already made two test flights and is expected to join the

Russian Air Force in 2015.

The Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) of India is reported to have have sought a 25% share in design and development of the project.

The new fighter for the Indian Air Force is likely to feature two-seat cockpit, advanced electronics and may also be armed with BrahMos supersonic missiles.

It is being interpreted as “a unique warplane” that combines the capabilities of an air superiority fighter and attack aircraft.

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include global names such as Embraer’s Tucano, Pilatus (PC-7 or PC-/9), Raytheon (T-6 Texan), Finmeccanica (M-311), Grob Aircraft Company (G-120TP), EADS PZL (PZL-130-TC-11 Orik) and Korea Aerospace Industries (KT-1).

The IAF is procuring these aircraft for replacing the fleet of HPT-32.

As per the understanding, the first 12 aircraft will be delivered within 24 months of the contract. The remaining trainers will be acquired in batches. The 75 aircraft are part of the government’s go-ahead to the IAF for the acquisition of 181 basic trainers.

India to buy Russian fighter jets INDIA AND Russia are negotiating for a new contract on the delivery of 42 Su30MKI to the Indian Air Force. This will cost the country $3 billion.

The new air-superiority fighters will come on top of the 230 already contracted from Russia in three deals worth a total of $8.5 billion. Originally India ordered for 50 Su-30MKI aircraft from Russia in 199698 and an additional 40 planes in 2007.

Under a licensed production agreement between 2003 and 2017, The Hindustani Aeronautics Ltd was also contracted to build 140 such aircraft in India.

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PROFILING THE NEW ARMY CHIEF GEN V K Singh took over as the new Chief of Indian Army on March 31, 2010. Gen Singh has vast experience in counterinsurgency operations and till lately was the GOC-in-C of Kolkata-based Eastern Command.

Gen Singh is the first trained commando to take over as the Army chief. He became the 26th chief of the Indian Army and will stay at the helm of the 1.13 million personnel-strong Army for over two years.

The new chief belongs to the Rajput Regiment, same as Field Marshal K M Cariappa, the first Indian to become the Army chief in 1949. He was commissioned in the Rajput Regiment in June 1970 and

HUMAN ERROR BEHIND IAF AIR CRASHES

commanded the same unit when it was positioned along the Line of Control with Pakistan. He participated in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War as a young captain. Gen Singh is a graduate of the Wellington-based Defence Services Staff College as well as the US Army War College at Carlisle. He also did a Rangers Course, a prestigious commando training, at Fort Benning in the US. Experienced in counter-insurgency, Line of Control and high altitude operations, Singh was awarded the Yudh Sena Medal for his distinguished service during ‘Operation Pawan’ against the LTTE in Sri Lanka.

Singh was awarded the Ati Vishisht

A WHOPPING 45 per cent of IAF air crashes in the last six years have taken place due to human error. The IAF has informed the parliamentary committee on defence that it had recorded a total of 74 air mishaps between April 2004 and March 2010, of which a high of 42 per cent was due to technical faults in the aircraft and a mere 6 per cent due to bird-hit.

The figures in percentage would mean the IAF has suffered 33 crashes out of 74 due to human errors, 31 due to technical errors in the aircraft and another 4 due to bird hit. Reasons for the remaining six crashes have not been given to the committee. The committee, in its latest report submitted to Parliament, noted with concern that these mishaps were taking place

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Seva Medal (AVSM) for distinguished service while commanding a counterinsurgency force. The General has an illustrious record in the Army for standing first in the Young Officers Course of Infantry and again being awarded the Commando Dagger for standing first in the Commando Course. Singh will be the 24th Indian to be the Army chief, as the first two Indian Army chiefs were British officers General Sir Robert Lockhart and General Sir Roy Bucher. Singh was in the news recently when he recommended action against four General-ranked officers indicted by a probe in the Sukna land scam in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal.

against the backdrop of the IAF facing a crisis due to shortage of trainer aircraft and obsolescence of simulators for its pilot trainees. It pointed out with concern that the IAF’s Hindustan Piston Trainer-32, a basic trainer aircraft, had remained grounded for over a year now following a mishap early last year and the Kiran Mk-II HJT-16 simulators were in disuse.

The IAF has faced problems with HPT-32’s engine and airframe, even as it spared all its Kiran trainers (usually used for secondary flying training) to enable rookie pilots to learn flying skills. It also had a gap in its training syllabus due to the lack of an Advanced Jet Trainer (AJT) when pilots moved on from Kiran aircraft to MiG-21 supersonic fighter jets.

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g inaccessible locations of various Central Police Forces, at an approximate cost of Rs 5.94 crore. In addition to it, 288 number of DSPTs have also been sanctioned to BSF and ITBP. The government has also announced ex-gratia amount for the next kin of CRPF personnel killed in Dantewada. As part of the package, the government will give a hefty compensation totalling Rs 38,60,000 and the last pay drawn, under the Liberalized Pensionary Award (LPA) under EOFP Rules. In addition to monetary benefits, the government has also announced a job for the family member of all 76 deceased.

AIR-TO-AIR EXERCISES WITH FRANCE, UK

LCA TEJAS TO BE INDUCTED INTO IAF 20 TEJAS LIGHT Combat Aircraft (LCA) are likely to be inducted into the Indian Air Force (IAF) by March 2011. A contract with Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd for procurement of these aircraft had been signed on March 31, 2006.

Apart from the above contract for 20 LCA, a proposal for acquiring an additional 20 LCA in Final Operational Clearance configuration is being assessed. The specifications of the LCA are as per the Air Service Requirements finalised by the IAF.

CHINA-CENTRIC ARMY DIVISIONS IN ORDER to counter the growing threats from China, the Indian Government has decided to raise two mountain divisions (20,000 troops) to be deployed on the India-China border. The Government has lifted a 37-year-old freeze on making fresh recruitment for the China-centric mountain division. The two mountain divisions would be trained to fight a twofront war simultaneously with China and Pakistan as the Army was now capable of rapidly transferring troops from one theatre to another at a very short notice.

The Army was raising new units in the last 25 years from within its existing sanctioned troop strength. One division has about 10,000 men.

At present, the Army has two divisions and the sanction for two more divisions will help the Army plug all operational gaps and help it defend its eastern and

IN ORDER to further expand its ties with global air powers, the Indian Air Force will carry out air-to-air exercises with France and United Kingdom in 2010. To begin with, the ‘Garud’ series exercise with the French would be held in France in June and the ‘Indradhanush’ series with the British Royal Air Force would be held at the Kalaikunda air base in West Bengal in October this year.

At the fourth edition of the ‘Garud’, IAF will be represented by its air superiority Sukhoi-30 fighter jets and the Il-76 heavy-lift transport aircraft in the aerial war games with France. The Il-78 mid-air refuelling aircraft, which have helped in expanding the strategic reach of the IAF, are also likely to

western borders and wage two-front war if need be.

REDUCED CALL CHARGES FOR PARAMILITARY THE MINISTRY of Home Affairs (MHA) has asked national telephone services provider, BSNL, to reduce the call charges to rupee one per minute for the Jawans of CPMFs posted in forward areas. BSNL has now reduced the call charges of these 400 numbers of DSPTs from Rs 5 to Re 1 per minute.

This will go a long way in boosting the morale of the Jawans of CPMFs posted in remote and inaccessible areas.

The matter was taken up with Department of Telecommunication to suggest a cheaper mode of communication so that the CPFs personnel posted in the remote / inaccessible areas of the country are able to talk to their families. At the request of MHA, BSNL has installed 400 numbers of Digital Satellite Phone Terminal’s (DSPT) at the

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g join the Indian contingent there. The French side is expected to field its latest Rafale fighters and various versions of the Mirage200 fighters.

INS ARIHANT GOES ON TRIAL ‘INS ARIHANT’, India’s first nuclear submarine, has reportedly gone to the high-seas for an extended trial. To be inducted by the Navy by 2011, ‘INS Arihant’ is one of India’s top secret defence projects for over three decades. With an 80 Mwe nuclear reactor at its core, it was launched in the water in last July. The sea trial will be carried out for more than a year in different conditions to test the endurance and performance of the nuclear submarine, which is capable of staying under water for months.

‘INS Arihant’ will be the third leg of the nuclear triad, enabling India to have retaliatory second strike capability from the sea.

COUNTERING CYBER ATTACKS FACING INCREASING cyber attacks, Indian Defence Minister, A K Antony, has asked the top brass of the Armed Forces to coordinate closely with various national cyber agencies and prepare crisis management action plan to counter cyber attacks and cyber terrorism. Addressing the Unified Commanders’

Conference in New Delhi last fortnight, Antony said cyber-space has emerged as an important medium for information sharing but at the same time the existing technology is susceptible to misuse by anti-social and anti-national elements.

Debating cyber security at such high profile conferences is a good sign of the government’s willingness to tackle the growing threat, especially from China, which recently hacked into the Indian computers at various missions and important ministries, according to a report titled ‘Shadows in the Cloud’ by Canadian scholars. The Chi-

30,000 BSF PERSONNEL TO BE INDUCTED THE CONTINUING troubles at different border regions of the country have probably forced the government to approve induction of additional personnel in the BSF. The Centre has approved raising of 29 battalions, comprising around 30,000 personnel, for the country’s frontier guarding force.

Out of the 29 battalions, 16 are reportedly intended to be deployed in riverine areas along Indo-Bangladesh border while 13 would serve as additional reserve battalions to be deployed on a rotational basis to ensure sufficient training, rest and recuperation for the personnel. The exercise began late last year. Two battalions have already been raised and seven are to be raised during 2010-2011.

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Catamarans for Indian navy THE GUJARAT government-owned PSU Alcock Ashdown, has built the ‘hull form’ of two catamarans for the Indian Navy, the first catamarans for hydrographic survey to be inducted by the navy.

So far two ships have been launched. The first ship christened, INS Makar, was launched in early February and the second, INS Meen, has been launched recently at the shipyard in Bhavnagar.

The main role of the vessels, to be stationed at Vishakhapatanam, will be to conduct coastal hydrographic survey of major and minor ports and harbours, their approaches and limited oceanographic survey. nese cyber attack had resulted in the theft of sensitive information from Indian ministries and the offices of Dalai Lama and the United Nations. Since hacked computers are used in these attacks, it is near impossible to prove the involvement of groups or countries but researchers have pointed fingers at China, based not only on the origin of the attacks but also on the nature of organisations that were targeted and the documents that were of interest to the hackers.

Meanwhile, the US has appointed a 3star general, Lt General Keith Alexander to head the Pentagon’s new cyber command division. Gen Alexander has revealed that the US is already defending itself from these attacks and is of a strong view that the U.S. must launch counter-attacks themselves.

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FOCUS

A NEEDLESS CONTROVERSY Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages Bill seeks to position India as a responsible nuclear power, by putting in place a domestic legal framework for compensating the victims of atomic damages. The bill envisages a total liability cap of about $450 million which is in conformity with the 1997 IAEA amendment to the Vienna convention, observes SAURAV JHA...

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g FOCUS SAFEGUARDING AGAINST MISHAPS: Nuclear liability legislation is in the eye of a storm for wrong reasons

T

HE UPA GOVERNMENT’S Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages Bill 2010 has run into rough weather, with opposition from both the left and the right refusing to endorse it. Nevertheless, the bill, which seeks to introduce a compensation framework for nuclear-related damages in India for the first time, is a significant piece of legislation without which nuclear majors will find it rather difficult to do business with India.

As India re-integrates into the international nuclear order, it is also trying to put in place a domestic legal framework that facilitates the participation of foreign nuclear companies. All foreign reactor suppliers seek a primary piece of legislation that governs compensation for civil nuclear damage.

India’s agreements on civil nuclear cooperation with the United States (US) and France explicitly mention this requirement.

Indeed domestic law in the US bars American nuclear suppliers from selling to countries that do not have a nuclear liability law in place. France too requires either a uni-

lateral or bilateral framework in this sphere.

If such a civil liability structure is absent, India’s attraction as a nuclear business destination diminishes vis-à-vis China, which is also rapidly expanding its nuclear programme through import and already has an interim liability law in place since 1986.

Civil liability laws for nuclear damages across the world are typically framed on the lines of the Paris (1960) and Vienna (1963) conventions, the Joint Protocol (1988) which brought these two conventions together in geographical scope and to a much lesser extent, the post-Chernobyl Convention on Supplementary Compensation (1997). While not all countries with nuclear liability legislation are members of these conventions, they nevertheless follow the philosophical principles enshrined in them. The first two conventions were framed at a time when governments around the world were seeking to promote nuclear power even as they wanted to adequately assuage the public with regard to nuclear safety and post-damage compensation - much the same situa-

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tion as India finds itself in today.

It was in seeking to reconcile these objectives that the new nuclear liability doctrines were framed. Ordinary tort laws were deemed inappropriate when dealing with nuclear incidents. It was agreed that compensation must be limited in scope and time so as to ensure that the operators can get insurance coverage. It is not difficult to understand that unlimited liability in both time and scope would scare way any business entity from setting up a nuclear plant.

However to protect the interests of those who may get affected by a nuclear accident, liability is made strict and is legally channelised towards the operator. By making the liability of the operator exclusive and exonerating the supplier, States ensure that victims have a single point of redressal for their claims. In fact it is precisely this point that nuclear suppliers look for from any civil nuclear liability law.

The new bill, of course, has all these features assigning exclusive liability to the operator and does not allow any direct claims on the supplier by potential victims.

This is being seen by the Indian opposition parties as a sellout to the interests of reactor suppliers but the fact is that it is immaterial where the compensation comes from for a victim. This principle removes the need for a victim to identify and pursue those who actually caused the accident, a task which, due to the difficulty of obtaining the necessary evidence after an accident has occurred, would be virtually impossible. On the other hand, suppliers of nuclear goods, services and technology are spared the considerable expense of defending complicated liability actions instituted by those suffering damage.

The bill, however, does, under Clause 17, allow the operator to sue the supplier for negligence and faulty equipment since the former is in the best position to judge the latter’s culpability.

The move to create a Nuclear Damage Claims Commission is also a step in providing a single point of reference for victims.

The liability is in any case strict, with the victims under no obligation to prove culpability. Thus, instead of having prolonged and expensive lawsuits, a bipartisan commission can probably make a swifter impact.

India, at the moment, has no mechanism for compensating the victims of nuclear damages. Both the Atomic Energy Act (1962) and the Public Insurance Act (1991) are silent May 2010

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g FOCUS on the issue. Thus, in the event of a major nuclear accident, compensation would be driven essentially by political will or the lack of it. Seen in this light the new bill is a positive development that envisages a maximum national liability equivalent to Rs 2,133 crore and an operator cap of Rs 500 crore. This translates to a total liability cap of about $450 million which is in conformity with the 1997 IAEA amendment to the Vienna convention. Moreover, in keeping with international practice of financial security for the liability amount, this bill also enjoins upon the operator to maintain an escrow account for the same.

Detractors are also attacking the amount of maximum operator liability stipulated by the bill for being too low. Their argument is based on the bill letting off foreign nuclear operators too easily in a hypothetical future where the Atomic Energy Act is amended to allow FDI into the nuclear sector. However, the truth is that in the medium term, there will not be any privately owned nuclear plant in India, much less the one operated by a foreign company.

Therefore, it is not very difficult to see why the government has kept the operator liability amount seemingly low for the time being. Any operator would naturally seek insurance cover for the liability amount and the premium would get reflected in the cost of power. It is this cost of power that the government seeks to keep in check by appropriating the lion’s share of the responsibility for possible civil nuclear damage even as it assuages foreign reactor suppliers by putting in place a contemporary liability framework While it is true that the move towards instituting a liability framework relevant to market based insurance will come in handy in a future where private and foreign companies are allowed to set up nuclear plants. As indicated above, that day is still far away. In any case, the bill does have a provision for adjusting the compensation amounts and in the future these would naturally have to be recalibrated, if private plants are allowed.

Another contentious area for some quarters is the bill’s incorporation of various clauses of the post-Chernobyl Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC).

The CSC was formulated in the aftermath of Chernobyl when it was understood that a nuclear event will have significant transboundary effects and that there is a need to both increase the number of those to be compensated as well as expand the scope of damage to be given. In that sense, the Nuclear Liability bill’s inclusion of environmental degradation as well as accidents that

IN SYNC WITH THE NUCLEAR ORDER: PM Manmohan Singh with world leaders occur during transportation of nuclear materials in the scope of nuclear damage is a reflection of the CSC philosophy, and, frankly speaking, a move that can benefit the public.

Readers would note that India has a number of plants both located as well as planned in border states. In this context, India probably seeks to position itself as a responsible nuclear power as well as do away with the doubts of smaller nations in the subcontinent. The Nuclear liability bill therefore signifies India’s intent in keeping neighbourhood sensitivities at the forefront of its developmental strategy. Now, although the CSC has been ratified by only 13 states as of today, it may gain in popularity since it provides a mechanism through which an international pooling system for nuclear risk can be formed.

The probability of a meltdown event in today’s reactors is as low as one in a million.

Moreover nuclear reactor containment structures can today withstand airliners crashing into them. In fact these are key reasons why risk premiums for nuclear power haven’t risen as much as one would have imagined post-Chernobyl. Nevertheless the operator liability amounts will always be guided by what national and international insurers at any point of time find acceptable.

(The author is a consultant in the energy sector)

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NUKE FACTFILE THERE ARE currently 30 countries that operate civil nuclear power, with 436 nuclear power plants (NPP). Of these 30 countries, 28 countries covering the operation of 416 NPPs, have some sort of nuclear liability act in force in their territory either as a result of adherence to some international liability regime (either the IAEA’s Vienna Convention for Nuclear Damage of 1963 or the OECD’s Paris Convention on Third Party Nuclear Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 1960, or through enacting a national liability law. Of the 28 countries, 22 are party to one of the two international conventions. The others, including Canada, China, Japan, Republic of Korea and South Africa have national laws on nuclear liability.

Only two countries operating 20 NPPS between them — India (18) and Pakistan (two) — are neither members of any international convention nor have any national legislation. Of these two, it is only India that has the plans and opportunity to substantially increase the share of nuclear power in their domestic energy scenario. There is no provision in the Indian Atomic Energy Act, 1962 about either nuclear liability or compensation for nuclear damage due to nuclear accident or incident. Nor are there any other laws that deal with nuclear liability.

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SPECIALREPORT

FISHING IN TIBETAN WATERS China is exploiting the potential of the rivers emanating from Tibet into India for hydro power projects as well as fulfilling its water needs.

MONIKA CHANSORIA investigates...

T

HE PROTECTION of water resources has been a ceaseless source of conflict since centuries and the increasing risk of water scarcity in the modern age has undeniably become the trigger for certain conflicts in many regions around the world.

Given that the misuse of water resources continues unabated among nations which share principal water sources, these confrontations could aptly be termed as ‘Water Wars.’

Among Asia’s mighty rivers, only the Ganges emanates from the Indian side of the Himalayas. Crucially, other major Indian rivers such as the Brahmaputra, Indus and Sutlej originate in Tibet. As a matter of fact, Tibet is the primary source of many rivers which are lifeline to almost 50 per cent of the world’s population residing in South and Southeast Asia. The glacial lakes that dot Tibet feed numerous streams. India needs to be cautious vis-à-vis the upstream use of water in Tibet as it is likely to cause reduction in the Himalayan river flow.

So far, India has been of the view that there would not be any problem of reduced flows or contamination of rivers emanating from Tibet because of the terrain conditions, limited cultivable land and the low

INDUS: India has given more water to Pakistan and got less water in return by signing the Indus Water Treaty

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Gan ges

Jamuna

Yarlung Tsangpo

population of Tibet. But, this stance has now come under significant debate and reconsideration given the recent Chinese activities that are aimed at exploiting the potential of the Tibetan rivers. This concern arises largely from repeated Chinese attempts to dam or redirect the southward flow of river waters from the Tibetan plateau-the starting point of the Indus, Mekong, Yangtze, Yellow, Salween, Brahmaputra, Karnali and Sutlej rivers.

China today faces an acute water scarcity due to its burgeoning population, increased industrial development, and water-intensive agriculture practices and does not want any future objectives thwarted by a major water crisis. Till date, the sharing of waters of a river between countries is directly linked to the kind of ‘use’ the river is being put to by different stakeholders. With the complexity involved in defining the term ‘use’, countries prefer to resolve this issue bilaterally by making water sharing arrangements that define a water sharing formula based on the extent of ‘use’ of the river water basins.

India has not adopted a holistic approach when entering into water sharing treaties with neighboring countries. A glaring case in point was the signing of the Indus Water Treaty with Pakistan, from which China was excluded altogether. Additionally, India has given more water to Pakistan and got less water in return by signing the Indus Water Treaty. Given that China’s regions wherein Indus, Sutlej and Brahmaputra rivers originate and flow, are scarcely populated, it was assumed that Beijing’s use of the water would be restricted to hydel-power generation, which would not aversely affect reduction of water flow into India from these rivers.

The vast arid and population free areas through which the Indus flows in Tibet lend it to the creation of large-scale dams and huge hydro-power projects. Given China’s proclivity for mega-projects and the conse-

SUTLEJ: Beijing’s use of Sutlej’s water is not restricted to hydel-power generation quent requirement of massive water supply, it could well be China’s long-term plan to divert the water of the Indus through tunnels and canals to its parched North. Although India is not using the water of the Indus except for local irrigational purposes in Ladakh, any future diversion of the Indus water by China is bound to have a major bearing on the sharing of Indus water between India and Pakistan.

On the eastern side of the Indian subcontinent, the Brahmaputra is a major river basin for both India and Bangladesh. Being

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one of the largest river systems emanating from Tibet, the Brahmaputra basin is one of the largest of the 260-plus international river basins which cover 45 per cent of the earth’s land surface to be shared by more than one nation. Since it flows through a harsh mountainous terrain, its direct use for mainland China might just be limited.

However, China’s plan of creating a grand South-North linkage of rivers has brought attention to this river. A report cited in the People’s Daily in July 2003 elaborated that China had in fact, conducted a feasibility May 2010

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TIBETAN PLATEAU PERMAFROST

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THE CHINESE ARE WELL AWARE THAT BEING THE UPPER RIPARIAN STATE, THEY HAVE A DISTINCT ADVANTAGE OVER INDIA. THIS WAS VISIBLY MANIFEST DURING THE PAREECHU LAKE CONTROVERSY

study for a major hydro-power project on the Yarlung Zangbo (as the Brahmaputra is referred to in China). Being the lower riparian state, India has long brought this issue to the notice of China. The proposed project would have an economic, social, environmental and political impact on communities which are heavily dependent on the river system. Nevertheless, China has accepted to share only hydrological information of the river system during the monsoon/flood season. As China’s water crisis worsens by the year, it does not seem ardently enthusiastic at sharing any additional information/agreement with India.

The Chinese are well aware that being the

Outside of the Arctic and Antarctic, the greatest store of ice lies at the Tibetan plateau-which is why it is sometimes referred to as 'The Third Pole.' 'Store of ice' means glaciers and snowpack—and it also means deep underground layers of permafrost. Frozen for millions of years, Tibet's permafrost is currently at risk of thawing due to climate change and other factors. If thisaccelerates, greenhouse gases trapped in the permafrost layers could be released into the atmosphere. This could have serious repercussions. It is unknown what effect the release of large amounts of methane into the atmosphere would have.

upper riparian state, they have a distinct advantage over India. This was visibly manifest during the Pareechu lake controversy in 2004 which, underscored yet again that the issue of river water sharing shall continue to be a point of discord between the two countries. As the lower riparian nation, India is vulnerable to manipulation of the river water supply by China. In 2004, China informed India that approximately 35 kms from the Himachal Pradesh border, an artificial lake measuring about 230 hectares had been formed on the Pareechu River-a tributary of the Sutlej river — thus causing panic since earlier in the year 2000, flash floods in the Sutlej river had caused massive damage. This incident triggered a debate in India whether the formation of the lake was a natural phenomenon or a man-made one. If the possibility of the latter being true, it provided China with the capability to devastate lower reaches of the river in India at will.

It could well be probable that China may

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well have resorted to directional blasting having caused the landslide that made a dam across the river. Significantly, India requested China to allow Indian experts to examine the topographical details of the lake and study the causes for its origin. China, however, denied visas to a fact-finding team from India to visit the spot of the lake formation, further fuelling speculation regarding the Chinese intent. Further, no maps or satellite imagery of the area were made available to the India’s Ministry of Water Resources so as to make a correct assessment of the development. The Pareechu lake incident highlights China’s awareness regarding the environmental vulnerability of India.

Since Tibet is the reservoir that holds more than 50 per cent of the water needs of China and South Asia, India will need to keep China constantly engaged on the issue in an integrated manner. The creation of an accurate database including updating of maps and full use of satellite imagery regarding river water details is an absolute necessity. Given that India has no water sharing treaty with China, there is a requirement to review the Indus Water Treaty with the potential scenario of bringing China on board. This is even more significant in the context of New Delhi and Beijing having to negotiate a water sharing agreement with reference to the rivers emanating from Tibet as neither country recognises the UN convention on the issue. These measures should be taken up with urgent priority to ensure that this issue does not become a flashpoint of future conflict between India and China.

(The author is Research Fellow, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi).

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What is the truth behind the Rs 300 crore Sukhna land ‘scam’? Raj Mehta delves into the controversy which has dented the Army’s image...

SCRUTINY

HONOUR F

OR THE past several months, Sukhna has been in the news, not for its wild tuskers or its scenic foothills setting, but for the insidious manner in which the Army and Chumta Tea Estate have got themselves into adverse media headlines that have traumatised a proud Army.

The case revolves around the recommendations of a Court of Inquiry presided over

by Lt Gen KT Parnaik, which was ordered by the Eastern Army Commander and then Chief designate, Lt Gen VK Singh, towards the end of October, 2009, to investigate the circumstances under which the then GOC 33 Corps, Lt Gen PK Rath, had accorded security clearance to a private real estate developer in March 2009, for starting a school complex on the 71 acre Chumta Tea Estate. The clearance was accorded after the Army had consistently maintained in the past that civilian presence adjacent to the Corps HQ was unacceptable from the security viewpoint.

Lt Gen PK Rath took over as GOC 33 Corps on September 1, 2008 from Lt Gen Deepak Raj, under whose tenure, an effort by a private tea estate owner who had taken over the estate on lease from the West Bengal government in 2006; to promote tea tourism was rejected by the Army. During Rath’s tenure, realtor Dilip Aggarwal, running the Geetanjali Education Trust of Siliguri, approached the General, offering to establish an educational institution as a franchise of the elite Mayo School in Ajmer, with a clause that some seat reservation would be ensured for Army children (Mayo School denies that it had any such intention). The inquiry found that Lt Gen Avdhesh Prakash, the then Mili-

tary Secretary and a Principal Staff Officer of the Army Chief dealing primarily with officers postings, was in constant touch with the real estate developer, Dilip Aggarwal, and had allegedly assisted in issue of the NOC by peddling his influence.

The completed court of inquiry was received by Army Headquarters on December 21, 2009. As per media reports, it had recommended “termination of services” of Lt

Gen Avdhesh Prakash, for “unduly influencing” the transfer of the civilian land adjacent to Sukhna military station to a private institution and court martial proceedings against Lt Gen P K Rath, whose appointment as Deputy Chief of Army Staff was later scrapped by the Ministry of Defence.

The inquiry also favoured disciplinary action and court martial against Major General P Sen for taking an active role, as the

THE SUKHNA CASE REVOLVES AROUND THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF A COURT OF INQUIRY PRESIDED OVER BY LT GEN KT PARNAIK, WHICH WAS ORDERED BY LT GEN VK SINGH

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AT STAKE then Brigadier-in-charge Administration, for issuing the NOC to Aggarwal and administrative action against Lt Gen Ramesh Halgali, the then Chief of Staff and currently GOC 11 Corps, for “omissions” in not reporting the incident to higher military authority. A separate inquiry was also recommended against a Colonel of the Army’s Judge Advocate General (JAG) Branch for giving unsustainable advice regarding the land deal.

The then Chief of Army Staff, General Deepak Kapoor, after exercising due diligence, issued a show cause notice to his Military Secretary, Lt Gen Avdhesh Prakash, on January 11, 2010, asking why “administrative action” (as opposed to “disciplinary action”, which was recommended by the Eastern Army Commander) should not be taken against him for his alleged lapses. Lt. Gen. Prakash was sanctioned 10 days leave after the notice was issued to him.

The Military Secretary submitted his reply to the show cause notice on January 22, 2010. Subsequently, acting on the unprecedented “advice” of the Defence Minister A K Antony, tendered by him to the Chief on January 27, 2010, General Kapoor, on January 29, 2010, ordered the initiation of disciplinary proceedings (as opposed to the earlier ordered administrative proceedings) against Lt. Gen.. Avdhesh Prakash for his involvement in the Sukhna case.

On February 15, 2010, a two-judge division bench of the Delhi High Court headed by Jus-

THE THEN CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF, GENERAL DEEPAK KAPOOR, AFTER EXERCISING DUE DILIGENCE, ISSUED A SHOW CAUSE NOTICE TO HIS MILITARY SECRETARY tice Geeta Mittal dismissed Rath’s petition alleging a “frame-up” and asked him to approach the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) to challenge the proceedings against him.

The AFT on February 22, 2010, gave interim relief to Gen. Prakash under the provisions of Army Rule 180, granting permission to him to cross-examine six witnesses, who had earlier given statements against him.

The tribunal directed the Court of Inquiry to

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submit its report in two months.

The Sukhna case was not thought through holistically or handled sensitively by a specially configured “crisis management team” of experts from the Army’s legal, discipline, vigilance related and media departments.

The media was thus left free to speculate on the complex legal interpretations that made the military handling of the case unique: (for instance, the differences between “administrative” and “disciplinary” proceedings; the embarrassing linkages of the case to a “scam”(as in fraud, swindle; a co-relation that is absurd, as no money changed hands), and the intense media speculation on alleged turf battles between the Generals and the presumed unhappiness of the Chief designate in accepting a “tainted” Lt Gen Rath as his Deputy Chief.

Gen Kapoor has admitted that the Army’s image has been dented. An extension of the sometimes uninformed hype surrounding the case was the frenetic public speculation that the RM had gone overboard in requesting the Chief to reconsider his decision of taking only administrative action against Gen Prakash.

The RM was actually within his rights to advise the Chief in the manner he did.

That said, the JAG Branch has gone seriously adrift by not insisting on compliance of Army Rule 180, which requires the presence of the officer whose military reputation is under jeopardy. The AFT censure in this respect is thus well deserved.

A public perception has been created that May 2010

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g SCRUTINY four Generals were indicted for their involvement in the “scam”, forgetting the stark fact that two of them were staff officers, and one, Gen Prakash, had personal obligations of friendship to meet. I cannot, however, remember any media coverage that has commented on the different levels of accountability affecting commanders’ vis-àvis their staff officers. Simply put, the job of commanders is to command; take decisions and stand by them. On the contrary, the job of staff officers is to tender professional advice. If their advice is rejected, it is their commander whose head should roll if things go out of kilter; not theirs. Maj. Gen. (now Lt. Gen.) Halgali was Chief of Staff to Lt Gen Rath Similarly, Brig. (now Maj Gen) Sen was Gen. Rath’s Principal Staff Officer for Administration. To brand these officers blamewor-

thy thus appears to be a travesty of justice. I say this with a modicum of experience, having served as Chief of Staff to three Corps Commanders.

Today, we have on record the acceptance

by Gen. Prakash that he might have gone overboard in promoting the interests of his civilian realtor friend. Gen. Rath has also accepted that he gave the NOC, in the hope that the Army would benefit from the transaction. It is now up to the military system to take a call as to their culpability.

However maladroitly the Sukhna case has been handled so far, the mass of evidence against Gens. Prakash and Rath is such, that, if proved in court, they will be dealt with as per the DSR. Providentially, with its handling of this first, major case the AFT has come into its own, and will pursue the case to its logical conclusion.

(The author is retired Major General of Indian Army)

CORNERED! O

N FEBRUARY 28, 2010, journalist Karan Thapar interviewed Lt Gen Avdhesh Prakash (Retd) on his widely viewed CNN-IBN TV programme, Devil’s Advocate. The key issues raised/discussed are as under: Gen. Prakash points out the technical violation of Para 518 of the Defence Service Regulations (DSR) which states that “when the character or military reputation of an officer is likely to be a material issue, the presiding officer, of the Court of Inquiry

wherever possible, will be senior in rank and other members at least equivalent in rank to that officer”. [The Lt Gen conducting the Court of Inquiry was junior to him, and its members were Maj Gens].

Gen Prakash says that the Court of Inquiry breached Army Rule 180 which determines how witnesses should be questioned, and makes it mandatory for the officer whose military reputation may be under question to be present and free to cross-examine such witnesses deposing against him.

Gen. Prakash feels that the then Army Chief didn’t apply his mind to his reply to the show cause notice. The Chief barely gave the matter three working days whereas, earlier, he had spent almost three weeks in determining how to respond to the Court of Inquiry’s findings. He also feels that the Chief was not speaking the full truth when, two weeks earlier, he said that he had

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ordered disciplinary action on the basis of Gen. Prakash’s reply to the show cause notice. Gen. Prakash points out that the letter he received from the Army ordering disciplinary action (No. C/06280/EC/411/AG/DV- dated January 29, 2010) begins by saying that the show cause notice is cancelled. Therefore if the notice is cancelled, the reply to the notice cannot be considered. In ordering disciplinary action after administrative action had commenced, Prakash says the Chief has violated the well established and long practiced military policy in vogue since 1993.

Prakash explains why the Army has no power or authority to object to the school that was proposed to be built on the 71 acres of Chumta Estate located outside the military station at Sukhna. In a military station the local military authorities have no jurisdiction what so ever on the land adjacent to their area.

Prakash also explains how the then Corps Commander at Sukhna, Gen. Deepak Raj, objected to the tea tourism proposal. When the developers switched to a school complex with seat reservation for the Army, Gen. Rath, the then Corps Commander, accepted. Also Prakash points out that if schools can exist within cantonments in Delhi then they can easily exist outside a military station at Sukhna.

Gen Prakash accepted that Dilip Aggarwal was a close personal friend. He accepts — the first of the indictments — that in the company of Dilip Aggarwal he had met Maharaja Gaj Singh of Jodhpur and discussed the school project, adding that “in the (sic) hind sight, one can presume that it was not correct, but at that point of time I thought it was a harmless thing to do”. He also accepts the second indictment against him that in the company of Dilip Aggarwal, he had visited the land at Sukhna where the proposed school was to be built. He has also accepted the final indictment that he had recommended to Lt Gen PK Rath, over dinner that he should give permission for this school.

Since money did not change hands, Gen. Prakash vehemently denies that the case should be branded as a scam.

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NAG: DRDO’S GIFT TO THE NATION EARLY MAY, Indian Army will be getting DRDO-developed NAG, “the world’s deadliest anti-tank guided missile” (ATGM). It is capable to meet the threat from modern tanks — be it Pakistan’s Ukranian T-80 or Chinese T-85 tanks.

Nag is the third generation “fire and forget missile” and better than America’s Javelin and Israel’s Spike. Though the latter two are lighter and can be carried by soldiers and Nag could be operated only from vehicles and helicopters, it is better in the sense that unlike the other two, it cannot be jammed by the adversaries. Besides, Nag can, through thermal imaging telescopes, detect enemy tanks even in night.

Another advantage of Nag is that unlike others which, when fired are visible and could provide scope for the enemy targets to go behind the cover, Nag is visible only during the first one second of the flight, when the missile’s booster imparts 90 percent of the momentum; after that a sustainer maintains the missile’s speed, burning a smokeless propellant that is practically invisible.

Nag is one of five missile systems developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) under the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP). Nag has been developed at a cost of Rs 300 crore.

TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS: As originally conceived, the Nag would have been available with three different types of guidance; these included a wire guided version, an infra-red version and a millimetric wave (mmW ) version. The cumbersome nature of a wire guidance system had led to plans for this being dropped. Currently, guidance is based on an imaging infra-red (IIR) passive seeker that ensures a high-hit accuracy in both top and front attack modes.

The mmW seeker, on the other hand, is

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TECH SCAN intended to operate as an optional system that can replace the IIR passive seeker as a module. Also incorporated into the guidance system, is a CCD camera. The missile has a weight of 42kg and can engage targets at ranges 4-5km. The Nag is claimed to be first anti-tank missile which has a complete fiberglass structure.

It has a flight speed of 230 metres per second, is armed with a eight kg tandem shaped-charge warhead, has a rocket motor using nitramine-based smokeless extruded double band sustainer propellant, has a single-shot hit probability of 0.77 and a CEP of 0.9 metres, and has a 10-year maintenance-free shelf-life.

The Nag will be produced in two main basic variants. The land version has been tested from a tracked vehicle known as

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NAMICA (Nag Missile Carrier). With the IR version of the missile, targets are acquired using a thermal sight, and are then assigned to the nose-mounted IIR seeker.

VARIANTS: In addition to basic land and helicopter variants the DRDO is now developing number of advanced variants of the Nag missile: ■ Helina, (HELIcopter launched NAg)with a range of 7-8km, launched from twin-tube stub wing-mounted launchers on board the armed HAL Dhruv and HAL Light Combat Helicopter produced by state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL). It will be structurally different from the Nag. The Helina will make use of an IIR seeker for target engagement like the Nag. ■ Land version will also have its range extended by development of a mast-mount-

ed missile launcher that will be hydraulically raised out to a height of five metres to enable the Nag missile to acquire its targets out to a distance of 7-8km.

■ Air-launched, 10km-range variant launched from tactical interdiction aircraft like the upgraded Jaguar IS. It will use a nose-mounted millimetric-wave active radar seeker.

■ Man portable, DRDL will also start working on the, Man Portable’ Nag very soon. It would weigh less than 14kg.

The Nag will replace the existing Russian Konkours and European missile Milan, both of which are manufactured under license by Bharat Dynamics Limited. An Indian official said a country in the Middle East had shown keen interest in Nag anti-tank guided missiles during Abu Dhabi Defence Expo-2009.

DRDO Bhavan

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g China to launch space module CHINA IS believed to be planning to launch an unmanned space module, Tiangong-1, in 2011. This is expected to accomplish the country’s first space docking and regarded as an essential step toward building a space station The 8.5 ton module, called Tiangong 1, or “Heavenly Palace”, will be used for docking practice by China’s Shenzhou spacecraft.

Before the completion of the station, the unmanned Shenzhou 8 missions is expected to dock about two years after Tiangong’s launch, followed by manned Shenzhou 9 and 10 flights.

As per reports, it would be slung into space atop a modified version of the twostage Long March 2F rocket capable of carrying payloads of more than eight tons.

A permanent orbiting space station is a component of China’s space ambitions.

When transformed into a manned space lab, Tiangong would be expected to provide a “safe room” for Chinese astronauts to live in and conduct research in zero gravity.

CSIO-TECHNOLOGY IN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT THE CENTRAL Scientific Instruments Organisation (CSIO), Chandigarh, has developed a technology called the Head Up Display (HUD), which will be soon be used in the next generation aircraft. The HUD is an optic-electronic device installed above the cockpit’s instruments with its screen at the pilot’s level. It provides information on the aircraft’s flight parameters like speed, direction, altitude, weaponstatus, among others.

It has already transferred 20 units of HUD to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited which would be fabricated in the Light Combat Aircrafts to be used by the Air Force. The CSIO is now is planning to develop the HUD systems for SU-30 MKI, Jaguar and MiG series. Reports claim that the organisation has recently received an order to develop 200 more HUD for the next generation aircraft. The HUD is supposed to be superior to similar systems in the international market. It is noiseless and offers a better field of view. It is compact, reliable, non-reflective and designed for high-performance aircraft.

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The aircraft carrier holds immense relevance for maritime powers.

ARUN PRAKASH makes a strong case for the carrier to augment India’s naval capability.

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B

EFORE 1890, says the maritime strategist George Baer, “few Americans thought that the USA was a maritime nation dependent on the seas for its security and prosperity.”

With weak states to the north and south, and with two oceans protecting their flanks, Americans assumed that they could live peacefully in a state of continental isolation.

It was in that year that Captain Mahan, through his celebrated book, sought to change the way his countrymen looked at their security. His strategy of offensive sea control backed by powerful battle-fleets seeking engagement, triggered the creation of a powerful navy and dominated United States Navy (USN) thinking for almost a century till the demise of the Soviet Union changed everything.

What Captain Mahan did for USA in the last decade of the 19th century seems to have been wrought for India and perhaps other countries by the phenomenon of globalisation in the 20th century. International trade — the sine qua non of globalisation and is carried overwhelmingly by ship. Ensuring the safety of shipping lanes and stability at sea, in the face of multifarious threats, has assumed prime importance. Nations are, therefore, looking for the appropriate force structures which will meet their maritime security needs.

The aircraft carrier is a weapon-system that can arouse deep passions within naval and air force circles, and also serious controversies in the political establishments of countries. The media then jumps into the fray to muddy the waters. This is often due, as much to vested interests as, to insufficient or flawed information available in the public domain.

So much so that navies have often had to indulge in deception and subterfuge to protect their carrier programmes. The Royal Navy used the euphemism “through-deck cruiser” to get the invincible class STOVL carriers past the politicians. The Soviets disguised their first carrier, the Kiev, as a “bolshoi protovolodochny kreyser” or large anti-submarine cruiser in an attempt to delude NATO. We too called our carrier an “air-defence ship” for many years to protect the project from air force friendly fire.

The subject of aircraft carriers may be somewhat arcane, but remains of intense relevance for maritime powers; existing as well as aspirants.

Just a few months from now, on November 10, 2010 we will observe the centennial of Eugene Ely’s intrepid demonstration that aircraft could be operated from the deck of a

LEVIATHAN IN SPLENDOUR: An awe-inspiring view of an aircraft carrier

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warship. At that juncture, aviation was mere seven years old, but this demonstration was enough to trigger a revolution in maritime warfare. Bold and imaginative men in a number of navies started experimenting with different methods of integrating the flying machine into different aspects of operations at sea.

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n the face of much opposition from traditionalists, who tend to view any innovation with suspicion, the aircraft made a hesitant entry into this domain – first for reconnaissance, then for bombardment spotting, and finally for shipping strike and fleet air-defence.

Starting from humble origins, like converted ferry boats and coal ships the aviation ship emerged in its definitive form as the flat-top aircraft carrier in the early 1920s in the form of HMS Argus, HMS Furious and USS Langley.

Such was the impact of aviation at sea that nobody felt safe without an aircraft on board or close at hand.

Cruisers and battleships began to be equipped with one or two seaplanes as a standard fit, but WW-II saw even merchant ships being equipped with fighters which could undertake a rocket-assisted take-off from a small ramp in the bows. Temporarily, this proved a useful measure against German Uboats and patrol aircraft, but when the casualty rate in convoys shot up, small merchant ship hulls were modified with a flight deck (but no hangar) and equipped with 15-20 aircraft. They became the famous escort carriers fondly dubbed “Jeep carriers.”

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ircraft carriers were instrumental in deciding the fortunes of the war at sea, in almost all theatres, and in every facet of maritime warfare during WW-II. An intense shipbuilding programme ensured that on cessation of hostilities the US Navy had over a hundred carriers including 78 Jeep carriers, and the Royal Navy about half that number. The Japanese had started the war with the biggest fleet of 10 carriers, but heavy attrition left them with just half a dozen at the time of surrender.

The post-war induction of jet aircraft, with higher operating speeds, on carriers led to the evolution of three innovative British concepts; the mirror landing sight, the steam catapult and angled-deck recovery operations. All these contributed to safety and efficiency of shipborne flight operations, and were universally adopted. The introduction of nuclear propulsion has endowed the carrier with great flexibility through enhanced speed, power and endurance.

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Every major conflict or crisis since WW-II has seen carrier air power being employed to good effect; often thousands of miles from home, as in Vietnam and the Falklands. It is instructive to examine the different courses adopted by the major navies, in this arena, and to speculate what it portends for the future.

The post-WW-II era found the US Navy groping for a strategic function to assign its battle fleet including carriers, since the adversary was deeply embedded in the Russian heartland. The newly formed USAF claimed strategic reach and coveted naval aviation assets. After a period of tension, the US Navy found a niche in the national strategy by assigning ship borne bombers a nuclear attack role against Soviet land targets. This brought the carriers back on the centre stage, and with the advent of the submarinelaunched ballistic missile, the navy reclaimed its strategic mission.

US naval forces likewise will continue to be capable of robust forward presence and power projection operations, even as they add capabilities and capacity for working with a wide range of partner navies. The rapid growth in sea and land-based ballistic missile defense capabilities will help meet the needs of combatant commanders and allies in several regions. The QDR has committed to maintain 10-11 carriers and 10 carrier air wings.

From USS Langley to USS Gerald Ford is indeed a very long way but the carrier has defied all predictions of its demise and leveraged technology to remain a step or

AFTER A PERIOD OF TENSION, THE US NAVY FOUND A NICHE IN THE NATIONAL STRATEGY BY ASSIGNING SHIP BORNE BOMBERS A NUCLEAR ATTACK ROLE two ahead of threats, counter-measures and obsolescence.

The critics and opponents of the carrier tend to zero-in on three aspects which they see as the soft underbelly of this leviathan: its relevance in a changing battle space, its vulnerability, and its cost. Let me address these issues briefly.

The concept of a carrier’s utility is often not quite clear to many who criticise it; and the fault possibly lies with the naval aviators who are the practitioners of an esoteric art and the sharp end of the ship. The carrier is too often presented as a helpless prima donna occupying the centre stage at sea, and needing protection.

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This image is compounded by dramatic photographs of US Navy carriers surrounded by about 20 ships with a huge formation of E-2, F-14, F-18 and A-6 aircraft flying overhead (with a B-2 bomber thrown in occasionally).

No wonder many of our bureaucrats and media people think that a carrier needs escorts costing billions of dollars. Little do the uninitiated realise that this is not a carrier escort – it is a photo opportunity!

The fact is that a carrier is as much of a working hand or service-provider as a destroyer or frigate. Depending on the tactical situation a carrier can provide surveillance, electronic warfare, air-defence, antisubmarine or anti-ship protection within a 3dimensional bubble, extending hundreds of miles over which it exercises sea-control and to all units within it.

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o, it is a fallacy to say that a carrier requires dozens of ships to provide protection and escort at all times. The correct utilization of a carrier is to deploy it to exercise sea control in a particular area of interest, and to provide protection and support to combatant or non-combatant units operating in the area. As far as escorts are concerned, a carrier capable of about 25 knots could do with just 23 escorts and a tanker. I am not going to dwell on the carrier’s immense power-projection capabilities here.

Perhaps the most contentious issue regarding carriers is their vulnerability to attack and the question of survivability after sustaining damage. This aspect assumes sharper focus in May 2010

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g IN-DEPTH the context of reconnaissance capabilities as well as the proliferation of anti-ship missile capabilities on diverse platforms. There is also speculation that carriers may become the targets of ballistic missile attack.

One must start with the premise that no platform is invulnerable, and that ships, if not deployed with operational acumen, will suffer in action at sea. However, regardless of its size, a fast-moving carrier is not easy to locate and identify at sea; even through satellite imagery.

If found, the carrier’s air group is capable of neutralising hostile ships, aircraft and submarines before they become a threat. In the worst case, even if it sustains missile hits, the carrier’s chances of surviving serious damage are far greater than those of any other type of ship. The last carrier sunk was the USS Bismark Sea in February 1945. Since then carriers have had many close calls due to fires and accidents but none has been lost.

As far as the putative ballistic-missile threat to carrier groups is concerned, it appears to be somewhat exaggerated. Firstly, the launch of such a weapon will be instantly detected by many agencies, and it is likely to be intercepted and destroyed at some point in its ballistic trajectory. But even before that, a ballistic weapon launch is liable to be interpreted as a nuclear attack. With little reaction time, retaliatory nuclear strikes could follow, with catastrophic consequences. The use of ballistic missiles in this role, therefore, does not seem to be a particularly attractive anti-access option. Similarly, a cruise missile navigating a few hundred miles over water, with any degree of accuracy, seems an unlikely proposition.

Today, at least six nations have carrier building programmes under way, with huge investments at stake. In an era of dwindling defence budgets, the allocation of resources to such programmes is challenged from within navies as well as from the other two Services who question the capability of the carrier and its contribution to national security. The political establishment too, understandably, wants tangible and continuous proof of its cost-effectiveness.

In this context, a single carrier or even two of them on the inventory of a small navy lead a far more precarious existence, because they can be axed at short notice. Both as a major financial investment and a key weapon platform, the carrier can rely neither on past glory, nor on vague future promise. It must stand on its own demonstrated merit and the value it adds to national maritime capability.

(The author is a former chief of Indian Navy and Chairman of National Maritime Foundation (New Delhi)

THE LYNCH PIN OF MARITIME OPERATIONS ADMIRAL NIRMAL VERMA THE AIRCRAFT carrier’s air wing provides integral, ubiquitous, and enhanced combat power with extended reach and rapid response capability.

An aircraft carrier, thus, is the most effective platform for projecting the naval power of a nation.

Doctrinally, the aircraft carrier has been, and will continue to be the lynch pin for conduct of maritime operations and our Indian Maritime Doctrine 2009, and Maritime Military Strategy clearly recognise this truism.

Technology onboard an aircraft carrier is intrinsically linked with the aircraft operating from its deck which give the carrier its potency. The operational concepts and doctrines would by and large be dictated by two major factors; firstly, the number of aircraft that can be operated, and secondly, the capability of the aircraft. Therefore, while considering the carrier per se, the aircraft that would arm it and the capabilities that need to be incorporated into the carrier to operate such aircraft would need careful consideration. This is another area where technology and innovation would mature in the coming years.

Theoretically speaking, it would be desirable to be able to launch all types of aircraft, ranging from air-to-air refuellers, UAVs, to UCAVs, from aircraft carriers.

This may be made possible by two emerging new technologies; the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launching Systems and the Advanced Arresting Gear, for aircraft launch and recovery onboard carriers.

Both these systems could possibly replace the steam catapult and conventional arresting gear that has been in use for the last 60 years or so. These are future technologies that we can ill afford to ignore, and, we would be well served by investing

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for research and development in these fields.

Aircraft Carriers undoubtedly are expensive and some question the affordability and survivability of these large platforms at sea. Some even talk about carrying out land based missile attacks against an aircraft carrier; this statement must be weighed against the difficulties of targeting a mobile target out at sea. An aircraft carrier can move over 600 nm a day, which translates into one million square nautical miles of ocean area which an adversary has to search. This is a Herculean task for even the best of navies, satellite and aerial surveillance notwithstanding. Should an adversary manage to evade a plethora of air, surface and subsurface escorts and be capable of hitting a carrier, sinking it or putting a carrier out of action is by no means easy. The sheer size, build philosophy and damage control features provide an aircraft carrier an amazing capacity to absorb damage.

To the question of affordability, it can be said without hesitation that the range of capabilities across the spectrum of conflict which an aircraft carrier provides a nation with during times of peace and war, more than justify the costs. To give an example, an aircraft carrier, can at any given point in time, keep thousands of square nautical miles of ocean area and the airspace above under its surveillance and direct control. To do thatwithout an aircraft carrier is difficult to quantify but would probablyrequire an entire surface fleet and scores of land based fighters, airto-airrefuellers and surveillance aircraft that would multiply the costsmanifold and yet not achieve the same capabilities that an aircraft carrier possesses.

These capabilities are the ability to be deployed for a prolonged period of time, the ability to morph from a benign presence to a platform for power projection, and have a high degree of mobility. Their ability to influence the area around them is unmatched by any other platform, therefore, if one were to carefully consid-

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er, there is no other platform or weapon system that can successfully replace the aircraft carrier. Affordability quotient of any program has more to do with unit costs and procurement timelines.

Since an aircraft carrier and its aircraft are a composite package, which for operational reasons are required to be inducted in almost the same time frame, costs can be controlled to an extent by adhering to procurement timelines.

At a larger strategic level, affordability assumes a different nuance. Till date, only fourteen nations have ever operated aircraft carriers. Few nations, possibly due to the growing economic pressures, have restructured their force levels to let go of this crucial capability of naval aviation and with that their relevance to play a larger constructive role in the maritime arena.

Carriers have been used as ‘situation changers’, especially in times of crisis and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Therefore, we can ill-afford the loss of this vital capability which requires, amongst other things, continuity of operating skills.

To give an example, even though the

Indian Navy has been operating aircraft carriers continuously since 1961, we had to relearn the skill of catapult launch and arrested recovery, which we had lost after the conversion of our only carrier INS Vikrant into a ski-jump based carrier. This relearning of skills involves a considerable period of time to gain and maintain the requisite proficiency in full spectrum carrier operations from the ab initio stage.

This is significant because only nine of the fourteen countries that have operated carriers, currently retain the skill sets related to carrier based naval aviation and it is these nine countries that will have a greater role in the maritime scheme of things in the future.

While aircraft carriers may be expensive, they certainly afford any nation the ability to project power, and leverage a favourable shift in any emergent situation.

It is therefore noteworthy, that there are countries aspiring to acquire such platforms, to add a critical missing capability, by commencing their aircraft carrier construction programme. Despite there being 21 aircraft carriers in service with various navies, across different oceans, another 7,

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which is a third of this force, are currently under construction in various countries.

Many of these are larger than the carriers currently being operated by the navies that have ordered them. In fact, some are being built to bolster the existing force levels, and mind you, not as replacements.

Aircraft carriers will remain the most versatile and potent platforms to exercise military diplomacy and combat potential.

As hitherto, aircraft carriers will continue to be used across the spectrum of maritime operations, ranging from their traditional role in high intensity combat, to less than war situations and benign operations during peace. In a low intensity conflict scenario, the carrier could provide critical surveillance and reconnaissance, thus enhancing the real time Maritime Domain Awareness of the force, enabling timely and surgical response. New technologies will continue to improve the effectiveness of the missions that the carriers can undertake.

(Excerpted from the Chief of Naval Staff’s inaugural address at the Annual Maritime Power Conference 2010)

May 2010

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PERSPECTIVE

India’s military doctrine has been one of “dissuasive deterrence”, over-emphasising passive defence with a minimum counter-attack capability. Quite apparent in this is the absence of a strategic offensive capability. Isn’t it time to revisit this doctrine and tune it with changing national interests and global strategic environment, wonders DIPANKAR BANERJEE...

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N 9 FEBRUARY 2010, the Indian Armed Forces’ joint doctrine on sub-conventional operations, electronic warfare and maritime air operations was released by General Deepak Kapoor, the then Army Chief and Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, in the presence of the Air and Navy Chiefs, in New Delhi. This is a first, at least on two counts. It is the first time that such a joint doctrine has been prepared, rather than each service issuing its own doctrine as was done a few years ago. Second, this was done publicly.

This event has drawn attention to the significance of military doctrine in the preparation of the armed forces for war, and, thus, merits analysis, even though this paper does not attempt to examine these three documents specifically.

Different armies in different contexts have defined military doctrine. In its concise, as well as general concept, military doctrine is ‘the expression of how military forces are to operate in campaigns and battles’. From it emerges military strategy, and from this are derived the necessary tactics for the conduct of specific battles.

Military doctrine is determined after careful thought and detailed examination of relevant factors, and should be in tune with national ethos, and conditioned by the strategic environment. It provides a common frame of reference in an army, which then allows all commanders to standardise their operations, as well as allows maximum innovation and initiative in strategy and tactics within its overall rubric. An effective military doctrine links theory with practice. It also provides a common lexicon for use by military planners and leaders.

‘Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application’, thus goes a modern definition of military doctrine.

Another earlier definition has it as “those concepts, principles, polices, tactics, techniques, practices, and procedures, which are essential to efficiency in organising, training, equipping, and employing its tactical and service units. This also explains that doctrine is in the plural. For example, there would be separate doctrines for mountain warfare, for counter insurgency, for mobile operations and for defence. Ideally and realistically, in modern war there can be no separate service doctrines, but a combined one.

There is, sometimes, a confusion

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between doctrine and strategy. The two are distinct and different; strategy follows doctrine. NATO defines strategy as, “presenting the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations.” It is the application of military force, according to a well-developed plan, in keeping with the maxims of doctrine.

A doctrine should be evolved in response to three broad questions: first, ‘who are we’? Second, ‘what is our military mission’? Third, ‘how do we successfully achieve this mission’?

In so far as the first question is concerned, India has, historically, defined itself as a peace-loving, status quo power, satisfied within its existing borders. Its external influences have been civilisational, which, in today’s terms, would be defined as “soft power”. India is, of course, a peace loving country, having no ill will towards others.

Sometimes , this has been stretched to an extreme, with India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru questioning whether India needed an army at all! India craves for no external territory, but it is equally determined to safeguard its own. At the same time, a sense of natural justice is deeply imbued in Indian psyche, which justifies, and indeed, legitimises the use of force in pursuance of its objectives. India’s liberation of Goa, support to Bangladesh independence movement, intervention in Sri Lanka, and assisting Maldives, all come clearly under these criteria. Also, India’s extensive support to the UN peacekeeping operations around the world, unrelated to any other objective or gain reflects India’s world view. Were India an expansionist or a territory-grabber, it would not have ensured withdrawal from Bangladesh barely three months after birth of that country, and from Sri Lanka, soon after its President requested it. This approach, however, is by no means passive or non-violent. Even Mahatma Gandhi, the apostle of non-violence, accepted that against external and premeditated force, proportional counterforce was justified and, indeed, necessary.

The second question is one of fulfilling the military mission. India’s military mission has often been described, in my view, wrongly, as “the defence of every inch of India’s territory as defined by the Constitution.” Quite often, this has posed a major problem to strategic planners as this imposed too many debilitating strategic restrictions. This, again, is a burden of Indian history, but its legacy is not all that clear.

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BRIEFING THE BOSS: Former Army Chief with A K Antony at one of the forward posts In 1965, Lal Bahadur Shastri allowed the Army to expand the theatre of operations and counter-attack in the Lahore sector. But, in 1999, Vajpayee did not permit the crossing even of the LoC. Third criterion is about the best way to achieve the mission. This is a collective military judgment evolved over the years, of the best means of the use of military force or the limits imposed on it. For example, in counterinsurgency doctrine, a sacred tenet of the Indian Army has been the issue of “minimum force”. Unlike what we see, today, on a regular basis in Iraq and Afghanistan, Indian armed forces have never used air force or even heavy artillery against the militants. In the collective judgment of military leaders in India, use of such excessive force is counter-productive, and indeed, against the very doctrine of such operations.

Three principal factors affect the developments of doctrine of a country; military technology, national geography, and the capabilities of its likely adversaries. The implications of each of the above are obvious but may need a very brief explanation.

Technology has affected military operations, and hence doctrine, throughout history.

Stirrups on horses revolutionised mobility and led to the conquest of the then known world by the Mongols. Tanks and the revolutionary military thinking of General Guderian introduced Blitzkrieg, and led to Germany’s initial victories in World War II. Today, nuclear weapons have introduced a totally new dimension to the use of force, by making conventional wars between nuclear weapon powers near cataclysmic, and hence giving rise to doctrines of ‘mutual assured destruction’ and ‘minimum deterrence’.

Geography has always influenced military plans. For India, the Himalayas imposed a near-total barrier till modern technology helped breach it. Finally, the potential and capabilities of adversaries and the allies they can find, are important factors determining military doctrine.

In line with this thinking, India’s military doctrine, in conventional war, has been one of “dissuasive deterrence”, over-emphasising passive defence with a minimum counterattack capability. Quite apparent in this is the absence of a strategic offensive capability. Not only have we never planned for an offensive capability against China, but even against Pakistan, we do not have this potential. In the maritime doctrine, as well as in planning air force acquisitions, this stress on passive defence has shaped Indian defence doctrines.

Dissuasion without deterrence is never effec-

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tive and lacks credibility.

Two doctrinal issues need to be briefly discussed, here. The first is the declaration by the Indian Army Chief General Kapoor, in a closed military study circle, of the need to prepare for a two-front war, against Pakistan and China simultaneously. The other is what has been described in the popular press as the Cold Start Doctrine.

A two-front war is a major strategic challenge. Since the 19th century, this had been the dilemma that Germany faced till the Second World War, and to counter, which it made enormous and elaborate preparation.

In the case of India, this is a situation that we can ill afford to ignore. The collusion between our western and northern neighbour is well-established and needs no explanation. Therefore, to be prepared for a possible, although somewhat unlikely, situation of a simultaneous war on two fronts is a contingency that cannot be ignored by any military planner. That this is indeed being done by the relevant military authorities is a matter of comfort, and in turn, should act as a deterrent. This is in any case not doctrine, but contingent strategic planning.

Doctrinally, the Cold Start attempts to address a suitable response to “proxy war”, once again launched by our western neighbour. A conventional response may well be to pay back the aggressor in the same coin through a similar proxy response. But, launching illegal wars has never been Indian policy.

Besides, as our neighbour has realised, this option has a terrible blow-back effect, and hence should never be a preferred strategic option.

Another condition that needs to be examined is whether this option is at all possible under the so-called “nuclear threshold”. No matter what the conclusion, a deduction must be that the risks are unacceptably high and therefore, this option can be considered after great preparation and under conditions that will guarantee no adverse fall-outs.

Finally, there are two aspects of military doctrine that are vital to remember. The first is that military doctrine changes with national interests and national power, and is influenced by the regional and global strategic environment. Therefore, it needs to be revisited periodically, with time and changing geostrategic circumstances. Second, as with all things of national importance, its formulation should not be left to the military alone. It is the political executive that should generate the necessary inputs, and give shape to it.

(The author, a retired Maj Gen, is Director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies) May 2010

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HIS ISSUE of Geopolitics comprises a very thought-provoking piece on why the American Left fears the rise of India. The author, obviously, includes the Democrats under the “Left” label.

One may not exactly agree with him on this premise, but the fact remains that under the Barrack Obama Administration, India is not exactly a priority country for the American strategic establishment. And it so happens that compared to India, China and Pakistan, India’s two arch rivals, carry more weightage with the Obama regime.

There are various reasons behind this apparent shift in US policy. The ever-increasing importance of the Prakash Chinese bonds for the American treasury and the sheer desperation to pull out of Afghanistan through the help of Pakistan are too familiar facts to be commented on. But what all this underscores is the harsh fact that the United States under Obama is not a confident, benign and forward-looking nation.

Take the case of Pakistan. When Democrats were in opposition, Vice President Joseph R Biden, the then chairman of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, had termed Pakistan as “the most dangerous country in the world” and had slammed the Bush administration for having a “Musharraf policy” instead of a policy for Pakistan. “The fact of the matter is, Pakistan is the most dangerous, potentially... the most dangerous country in the world … A significant minority of jihadists with nuclear weapons. We have no Pakistan policy; we have a Musharraf policy.”

Biden then had stressed on the need to conduct a free and fair elections in Pakistan to prevent the moderates, who are in “overwhelming majority”, from going underground.

Today no other country on earth is arguably more dangerous than Pakistan. “If you were to look around the world for where Al Qaeda is going to find its bomb, it's right in their backyard,” says Bruce Riedel, the former senior director for South Asia on the National Security Council.

Reiedal is right when he says that Pakistan has everything Osama bin Laden could ask for, political instability, a trusted network of radical Islamists, an abundance of angry young recruits with a pronounced anti-Western outlook, seclud-

ed terrorist training camps, access to state-ofthe-art electronic technology, regular air service to the West and security services that don't always do what they're supposed to do. (Unlike in Iraq or Afghanistan, there also aren't thousands of American troops hunting down would-be terrorists.) Then, there's the country's extensive and ever-expanding nuclear weapons programme.

To compound the threat posed by Pakistan’s anarchic state of affairs, the Obama Administration, on its part, has done precious little to strengthen and consolidate the democracy in Pakistan. It has provided the country billions of dollars, but that has been precisely to buy the Pakistani military support for Nanda the war in Afghanistan. Pakistan may be having a formal civilian rule, but for all practical purposes it is the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani who calls the shots. Any doubt on this score has been dispelled by the very presence of Kayani in the delegation of Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi for the so-called Pak-US Strategic Partnership Dialogue, which took place on March 24 in Washington.

If General Musharraf was the Pakistani hero for the Bush Administration, General Kayani is the man of the moment for Obama. And what is the Kayani thesis that the Obama Administration has bought?

Put simply, Kayani believes that it is Pakistan that can create win-win situation for the United States in Afghanistan. In return, the United States has to provide unconditional, unquestioned and unlimited military, economic and technological assistance. The United States has also to ensure that Afghanistan becomes a virtual satellite of Pakistan by buying over the Taliban and installing them in power in Kabul.

The US, it seems, has bought the Kayani thesis.

So much so that it is now agreeing to a civilian nuclear arrangement with Pakistan on the pattern of Indo-US nuclear deal. Otherwise, Kayani has threatened that “an environment hostile to Pakistan (that) could strain America’s battle against militancy and extremism”.

One can only hope that Obama does not eventually succumb to Kayani’s pressure tactics.

Otherwise, he will regret his decision while in office or after being voted out of office.

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INDIA’S STRATEGIC NIGHTMARE Cooperation with neighbouring countries in tackling terrorism in the North-East is an important component of India's diplomacy. Lately, the government has been giving considerable importance to its Look East Policy as a means to fast-forward the development of the region — which has perennially defied integration into the Indian ethos.

PARTHA S GHOSH delves deep into the N-E’s significance for India’s geopolitics.

I

N A recent statement, Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah, said, “The government is trying to address issues (such as employment). (But) it’s all linked to the security environment.

It becomes a chicken-and-egg story: Do I first get investments into the state or hope to get the situation better?” This is the perennial dilemma for India’s policy makers: What comes first: development that would address the problem of insurgency and terrorism, or, rooting out insurgency and terrorism that would create the atmosphere conducive for development. Super-cop KPS Gill, who is noted for his no-nonsense police action that contributed the most to root out the Khalistan militancy from Punjab, argues in favour of the second alternative, whether the context is Kashmir or North East. His crit-

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THE PRIZED CATCH: Security forces displaying the arms recently captured from ULFA militants

ics, of course, disagree. It amounts to putting the cart before the horse, they say. That the solution lies somewhere in-between is to state the obvious.

But that is easier prescribed than administered.

The challenges facing India in its NorthEast region exemplify this correlation clearly.

Here, two sets of variables are to be addressed. The first consists of India’s national security and territorial integrity; the second consists of the dynamics of local politics, the role of security agencies, and the interface of the state and central bureaucracies. The intertwining of these variables is complex and requires the best of the stratagems of statecraft. Here we are concentrating only on the first.

Situated between 21.570N and 29.300N latitudes and between 89.460E and 97.300E longitudes, North East embraces an area of 2,55,000 sq km accounting for 7.8 per cent of India’s land space. The terrain of the region is 70 per cent hilly; there is rainfall for almost eight months. The plains are chronically flood-prone. Eight states comprise the region: Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim and Tripura.

Five foreign countries that border the region are Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Myanmar and Nepal and each state of North East abuts one or more of these countries.

Of the 15,000 km of India’s land borders, North East and West Bengal account for more than two-thirds of it and in most cases there are cross-border ethno-cultural linkages.

Domestic politics, internal security and foreign relations therefore are closely entangled in the region. The partition of India broke North East’s traditional links with the rest of the country and virtually made it land-locked.

A narrow Siliguri corridor in north Bengal joined the two parts.

Because of historical and above factors, the integration of North East into the Indian ethos has proved problematic. It is a matter of constant ire for almost all northeasterners, including Assamese, that even India’s National Anthem completely ignores the region. At the time of India’s independence, the Nagas and Mizos were tooth and nail against the idea of joining the India. Their movements had the support of some of the foreign nations in the neigbourhood, namely, China and (East) Pakistan. The tricky relationship with these neighbours made India’s policy towards the region a mixture of carrot and

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stick approaches, creating a vicious circle of underdevelopment, leading to youth frustration, leading to militancy, to state’s armed interventions, to allegations of human rights violations by the state, to further consolidation of militancy, to more state repression, and then back to square one, that is, underdevelopment. The fact that most of the state governors in the region have been former army or police personnel and the fact that such laws as Armed Forces Special Powers Act (1958) are still in place, notwithstanding protests from almost all in the region speak of a serious mistrust between the Indian state and the region.

In dealing with the insurgency, the efficacy of the security forces is as much dependent on their own efforts as on India’s diplomacy with the neighbouring countries, particularly Bangladesh, Bhutan and Myanmar. Better relations with Bangladesh matter a lot in dealing with the ULFA insurgency. Indeed, ever since the killing of celebrated social activist Sanjay Ghose on August 8, 1997, the ULFA’s popular base has been constantly eroding. It was exemplified by the fact that when during the Kargil war, ULFA gave a call to the Assamese soldiers in the Indian army not to participate in the war, not only was the call ignored it, was also condemned by the civil society through a number of write-ups and editorials in the Assam dailies.

The recent improvement in IndiaBangladesh relations following Sheikh Hasina’s becoming the prime minister has furthered the process. Prior to her visit to India in December 2009 her government had arrested Arvind Rajkhowa, the founder-chairman of ULFA, who had been operating from Bangladesh along with others including the ULFA ‘commander-in-chief’ Paresh Baruah.

During the Khaleda Zia regime India had made several requests for action but they were not heeded.

Of course, it is not only India’s appeal that has made Hasina government to respond.

The political mood there is veering towards the view that unless leashed, the anti-India forces that include the Islamists would eventually harm Bangladesh as well. Moreover, the Wahabi ideology there is losing its shine at the popular level, and then, the Saudi official funding of these forces is drying. Reportedly, following Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s February 2010 visit to Saudi Arabia the latter has stated that it had no truck with Al Qaeda and that Pakistan should contain the Islamic militancy on its soil. It is in this context that the recent arrest in Bangladesh of five Jaish-eMohammad activists by the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) assumes significance. What is

CLOSE NEIGHBOURS: North East shares common water resources with Bangladesh

even more significant is that the Indian IB and RAW are being allowed to interrogate them.

Cooperation with neighbouring countries in tackling terrorism in North East is ever an important component of India’s diplomacy. A few years ago with the support of Bhutan government the Indian army had cleared the kingdom of all ULFA camps. As recent as on February 18, 2010 the Home Secretary of India, G K Pillai, following his meeting with his Myanmarese counterpart, Brig. Gen. Phon Swe, said that the two countries would soon launch a coordinated operation to flush out all the North East militant outfits that were operating from the Myanmarese soil. It is hoped that the current talks with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) IsakMuivah (I-M) will help extend the Naga peace regime which is well in place since 1997 though it is likely that the question of NSCN

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UNLESS LEASHED, THE ANTI-INDIA FORCES THAT INCLUDE THE ISLAMISTS WOULD EVENTUALLY HARM BANGLADESH AS WELL May 2010

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FACING THE HEAT: ULFA leader Paresh Barua

(I-M) funding through drug trafficking and gun-running, in which the soil of Myanmar is being used, will figure in the talks.

While discussing relations with neighbours, China has to figure prominently.

Although significant improvements in the India-China relations have been achieved during the past few years the ghost of India’s China war still haunts. In the 1962 war large parts of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam had indeed been virtually lost. The situation was such that Indian officials were advised to destroy important official files lest they fell into Chinese hands. It was the time when China took active interest in the tribal insurgencies. That situation does not exist any longer, but Chinese activities in Tibet are a constant source of anxiety for India’s security planners. India’s lukewarm interest in expanding trade through the Nathu La pass by improving the roads there indicates this concern. There is a visible mismatch between the Chinese infrastructure development in Tibet and that in the neighbouring

Indian region.

The catch 22 syndrome for India is that if it does not develop its North East and continues to get bogged down with the ethnic identity protection issues a situation might arise when in the next door it would have a Tibet minus the tradition-bound Tibetans posing serious security threats to India. In such a situation the Chinese armoured vehicles would reach India’s borders in no time while India’s armed forces would be left with the difficult terrains to negotiate through. Bridging the gap in terms of security logistics in dealing with China is a challenge India’s North East policy is ever conscious of.

Lately, the government of India has been giving considerable importance to its Look East Policy as a means to fast-forward the development of the region. The idea is to integrate the regional economy to select critical regions in South East Asia which have comparable characteristics in geo-social terms. Politically as well that would help. It is still in India’s national memory that in

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Moirang, about thirty km from Imphal, the Indian National Army had hoisted the Indian Tricolour during the Second World War. But the problem is that beyond a limit the Look East Policy does not seem to have enough promise.

Keeping the recent historical past in mind, particularly the British period, India’s relations with South East Asia through North East were virtually nonexistent. Some analysts argue that instead of wasting time on the Myanmar connection India would do better if the sea trade through Chittagong and Kolkata ports are encouraged. In this connection it may be underlined that India must be prepared to face the challenge posed by the Chinese who are entering Myanmar in a big way both militarily and economically. Indeed both India and China are indulging in a tightrope walk to make their presence felt in the ASEAN politics.

This write-up started by referring to the umbilical connection between security and development. It is in the logic of the things that it should end by going back to the same labyrinth. Any discussion on North East is incomplete without factoring in the human rights situation. It is nowhere in India that the security forces have been maligned so much for their alleged violations of human rights.

But in all fairness the blame must be shared by the militants as well. In fact, who to blame how much is a matter of semantics. If human rights connote right to life, liberty, freedom of movement and the choice of jobs can anyone give a clean chit to the militants most of whom compete with one another in extorting money from the public particularly the successful ones. These are bitter truths but they must be said, for, they alone can in due course create the necessary synergy of security and development in India’s North East.

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COVERSTORY One of the world’s top disciplined units, the Indian armed forces today face a harsh truth. From qualitative decline in the barracks, outdated armaments coupled with delayed delivery of weapon systems, bureaucratic inefficiency, poor performance of the indigenous defence production to corruption in the procurement process, the woes of our defence forces seem to be unending.

ABHIJIT BHATTACHARYYA dissects the ills plaguing the country’s defence sector...

REALITY

ONEROUS TASK: Defence Minister A K Antony with the top brass of the armed forces

BITES May 2010

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Picture: Ministry of Defence

there have now emerged several pockets of turbulence in the areas where from recruits fill the regiments. Thus the 40,000 plus Gurkha soldiers (mostly from Nepal’s Himalayan region), today have a peculiar problem of being looked down upon by their own countrymen for serving in the “foreign Indian army” and facing the prospect of “doing-nothing” in case they leave the Indian barracks to go home. One can understand the mental agony of the serving soldiers for drawing flak from their own fraternity for doing no wrong. Similarly when the “caste-war” between the Gujjars and Meenas took an ugly turn in Rajasthan countryside, there was every possibility of the bad blood between them spilling over into some military regiments as both the communities are present in substantial numbers in the Indian army.

{

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ikewise, soldiers in three regiments viz.

Sikh, Punjab and Sikh Light Infantry, majority of whom hail from Punjab,

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I

NDIAN ARMED forces are known the world over for an impeccable apolitical professionalism in the midst of turbulent, rebellious armed forces in the neighbourhood. However, the Indian defence system, today, appears to be in the throes of an unprecedented mid-life crisis in matters relating to man, machine, management and money.

To start with the manpower recruitment, traditionally, there has been no dearth in the supply of raw recruits from the rural India to the infantry regiments owing to consistently high unemployment rate, socio-political turbulence and limited professional outlets.

However, now there has been a qualitative decline in the barracks owing to prevailing social tension in the catchment areas of the soldiers. And experts point to a plethora of factors leading to successive downturn in the number and merit of front-foot fighters in the frontier fraternity.

In matters relating to combat soldiers,

IN MATTERS RELATING TO COMBAT SOLDIERS,THERE HAVE NOW EMERGED SEVERAL POCKETS OF TURBULENCE IN THE AREAS WHERE FROM RECRUITS FILL THE REGIMENTS

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{

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INCREASING SOCIAL TENSION AND HOME-FRONT VIOLENCE ARE BOUND TO AFFECT THE MORALE OF THE FRONTLINE FIGHTERS

gave a torrid time to military command when the violent Khalistan movement engulfed the land of five rivers in the 1980s. Similarly, the more than three decades old Kashmir cauldron has also made the recruitment into J&K Rifles, J&K Light Infantry and Ladakh Scouts an arduous and strenuous task for those who are constantly facing bullets from cross-border actors and internal/indigenous non-state actors alike. The above two situations also portend the extremely difficult times to come, as increasing social tension and home-front violence are bound to affect the morale of the front line fighters, thereby affecting the overall professionalism in a crisis situation.

Besides the combat human resource irritants, the single most important factor that further erodes the morale of the men is the delayed delivery of weapon systems and the frequent failure thereof at the operational level. It, thus, gives no pleasure to the pilots to find themselves, virtually unemployed or underemployed owing to their aircraft getting grounded for “checks”, following a crash. It happened on November 30, 2009 when a new Sukhoi 30 MKI of the 24th squadron based at Bareilly crashed at Pokhran. The plane had earlier rolled out from Hindustan Aeronautics factory. This crash at Pokhran, involving the second Sukhoi (the first Sukhoi crash also occurred in Rajasthan and had killed the pilot on April 30, 2009) compelled the IAF to ground the entire fleet of 5 squadrons (one squadron usually consists of 16-18 aircraft) for several days thereby creating all round uneasiness and hampering the operational training of the air warriors. In fact in 2009 alone, the IAF suffered 14 crashes involving Sukhoi-30 MKI; MiG; Kiran Mark II trainer, HPT-32 trainer and Antonov-32 transport plane. This is equivalent almost to a

THE NATION’S PRIDE: Soldiers during a march-past squadron. If one adds to the cost of each aircraft, various other expenditure such as the cost incurred on pilot training, maintenance and logistics, and the grounding of 100 aircraft for eight days, one can appreciate the overall loss to the nation in terms of all – men, machines, management and money.

According to Jane’s World Air Forces – 2009, 5 squadrons of Indian Air Force Sukhoi-30 MKI multirole fighters, amongst others, were deployed at Central Command’s Bareilly station (8th and 24th squadrons) and SouthWestern Command’s Pune station (20th and 30th squadrons). Understandably, one cannot ignore the location of the air bases and fail to comprehend the tactical utility and importance of the Sukhoi-30 MKI’s area of operations.

Unfortunately, disaster struck again on

February 16, 2010 when a MiG-27 from Eastern Air Command’s 15 Wing, Hashimara (where two squadrons, 22nd and 222nd are based) crashed, killing its squadron leader.

Expectedly, but regretfully, the IAF grounded all the MiG-27 owing to suspicions of a “major engine snag”. The Indian Air Chief himself declared that –“The crash appears to be due to a fault in the low-pressure turbine blades of the aircraft.” He also commented on another previous MiG-21 crash – “That was owing to a sudden loss of engine power. But investigations are still on.” Facing a serious loss of face and erosion of pilot morale, IAF reported all six “tactics training” and “attack” MiG-27 aircraft squadrons based at Gwalior (Maharajpur), Kalaikunda, Hashimara and Jodhpur, as “not flying” instead of referring to them as “grounded” toavoid public embarrassment.

May 2010

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ndeed, the situation in the Indian air force inventory does look gloomy enough even for the annual Military Balance-2010 (published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London) to report thus – “With one eye firmly on developments in China and Pakistan, the air force’s short term priority is to prevent the continued decline of its combat squadrons. These have fallen to 30 from the sanctioned 39 in recent years, and will fall further with the imminent retirement of large numbers of MiG-21, MiG-23 and MiG-27 aircraft. With Pakistan taking delivery of American F-16s and Chinese J-10 and J-17 aircraft, the Air Force Chief has warned that India risks losing its long-held conventional edge over its neighbour.”

In this scenario, it would be pertinent to go through the full inventory of the IAF as provided by Jane’s World Air Forces-2009. There are broadly 10 types of aircraft in accordance with their operational role – (1) Fighter-interceptor/air defence MiG-29 and Mirage2000H; (2) Fighter-ground attack/strike MiG27 and Jaguar (interdiction strike); (3) Fightermaritime attack Jaguar; (4)Fighter-multimode Sukhoi-30MKI and MiG-21 bis L/M,J; (5) Transport HAL/Avro, Antonov-32, Ilyushin-76 MD, HAL/ Dornier 228 and Embraer-135BJ; (6) VIP transport Boeing 737(BBJ); (7)

Tanker/transport Ilyushin-78MKI; (8) Airborne early warning and control Ilyushin/ IAI Phalcon; (9) Electronic intelligence Boeing 737-2A8 and Boeing 707-337C; and (10) the various trainers, BAE Systems hawk Mk 132, Hal/HPT-32 Deepak, HJT-16 Kiran, MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-29, Jaguar IB and Mirage 2000 TH. It indeed constitutes a head-spinning, impressive array of hardware. Yet the problem, instead of getting resolved, has only aggravated. The aircraft are there for operation but are, in many cases, too old to be dependable owing to high cost of maintenance, spare parts, logistics and more-thanfrequent-failure of the systems.

For instance, the 57 fighter-interceptor /air defence MiG-29 and 38 Mirage-2000H are 24 and 25 years old respectively. The 100 grounded MiG-27 fighter-ground attack/ strike have completed silver jubilee and the 90 Jaguars are 31 years old. The multirole MiG-21 fighters (the total number of which has come down from 502 to 250) are aged between 33 and 37 years. The 40 odd, HAL/Avro will celebrate their golden jubilee in another four years. (Incidentally, the National Defence College of India, Delhi is all set to celebrate its golden jubilee next month, April 2010). Both Antonov-32 and Ilyushin-76MD celebrated / celebrate silver jubilee in 2009 and 2010 respectively. The only exception is the fleet of Sukhoi-30 MKI, inducted into the 24 squadron in 1997.

The inference is obvious: the air inventories of the IAF as well as navy appear to be going through a transitional phase of old age, maintenance, logistics and cost escalation.

With virtually no indigenous fighter production capability in sight as yet, import appears to be the only way out. And there lies the bigger problem of the traditional “mismanagement of money” and the historical mutual mud-slinging of corruption. The Military Bal-

{

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A trilogy of tragedy hit the Air Force aircraft inventory with the crashing of a navy Kiran Mark II, on the opening day of a civil aviation show at Hyderabad on March 3, killing both the pilots. Expectedly, the entire fleet of 12 HJT-16 Kiran Mark II was grounded at once, thereby demoralising the men in uniform who are supposed to be in “action station” 24x7.

RECENTLY, THE ENTIRE FLEET OF 12 HJT-16 KIRAN MARK II WAS GROUNDED AT ONCE

May 2010

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THE AIRCRAFT ARE THERE FOR OPERATION BUT ARE, IN MANY CASES, TOO OLD TO BE DEPENDABLE

trators posted for a few years in the defence ministry) and corruption in the procurement process saw the “Ministry return some Rs 225 billion (US $5.5 billion) of procurement fund to the Treasury”.

The present Defence Minister of India, A K Antony (who is acknowledged even by his political opponents to be a man of unimpeachable probity) is, understandably, uncomfortable with the “state of affairs.” He concedes that “money is not the problem” as his “pockets are full”; yet he regrets the lack of “timely and judicious utilisation of money allocated”. Antony’s views, however, have had little comforting effect on senior commanders. In November 2009, the then Vice Chief of Air Staff (one of the senior most

BATTLE-WORTHY? IAF aircraft in flight; (extreme right) naval exercise in progress ance-2010 cryptically refers to the attempted modernisation of the IAF thus — “India’s dismal procurement record suggests this may be optimistic”.

The above opinion expressed by the London-based report does not appear harsh. In fact, “under-spending” and “procurement malpractices” continue to be the chronic bane of the wailing warriors in the war zone for decades. And not strangely, therefore, “between 2002 and 2008,” a combination of bureaucratic inefficiency and lethargy (one also suspects lack of technical competence and understanding of complicated defencerelated points on the part of general adminis-

three ace fighter pilots), at a seminar hosted by the Confederation of Indian Industry and the Centre for Air Power Studies, in an unprecedented burst, virtually lambasted the federal government thus — “Irresponsible politics over the years, sometimes when a party is in the government or sometimes when it is in the opposition, it has all along been seen that whenever the government of the day clears something, the opposition says ‘no’. This badly impinges (on the preparedness) of the defence forces”. The long list of grievances narrated by the Air Marshal in public was not proper from the point of view of diplomatic niceties, but struck a

chord with the senior soldiers while discussing the issue “off the record”. “The fact remains that the IAF’s fleet of fighter planes is getting depleted. The Navy’s submarine strength is dwindling and the Army has not added a new gun to its heavy artillery in more than 20 years” roared the Air Marshal, thereby incurring the wrath, fury and displeasure of angry politicians and the “entrenched” bureaucrats.

T

oday, three inadequately addressed problems still seem to afflict the professionalism of the Indian armed forces.

First, the paucity of officers in the combat regiments of the Army, pilots in the Air Force and Naval personnel.

The second crisis-like situation in the Indian military, today, is the steady growth and rise of a band of Generals who are “perceived” to be of “dubious integrity”. Whether it is true or not could be a matter of debate, but the recent media hype on alleged scams by military bosses along with the war room leaks of the naval documents in 2004-2005 have definitely eroded the image and credibility of the Indian military. And that is not good news for the subordinate soldiers in the barracks and on the border.

And finally, the performance of the indigenous defence production. Here, despite the professed policy declaration to produce 70 per cent of the military hardware for the armed forces, the truth, as revealed by a canMay 2010

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g COVERSTORY did Indian Defence Minister A K Antony in January 2009 is that “the country is still a long way from becoming a major producer of military platforms, as India’s defence companies were only supplying around 30 per cent of the armed forces’ hardware”. This “highly undesirable” situation clearly put the foreign military suppliers at a distinctly advantageous position with a 70 per cent Indian market being on their table without any effort whatsoever.

As on date, the fact remains that the Indian defence market is one of the biggest, hence potentially most lucrative, in the world, with defence procurement projected to be US $50 billion (or may be even more) by 2015. In this scenario, the chronic time and cost over-run

of India’s defence production units have put the burden on the Ministry of Defence to “pick and choose”. Hence, with a shrinking world defence budget and the consequential cut-throat India “bidding”, a section of the civil-military men are increasingly getting into the purchase/acquisition quagmire. With the legacy of purchase problem in the background, every future transaction is a potential “trap” for the Indian defence system. And one, like terrorism and fundamentalism facing the nation, has to live with this new threat perception.

(The author, an alumnus of the National Defence College, is a Member of International Institute for Strategic Studies, London) May 2010

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CHINKS IN THE ARMOUR The defence budget for army's modernisation is grossly inadequate. Even limited funds available are not fully spent and a large portion of these is surrendered year after year due to scams and bureaucratic red tape. This problem needs immediate government attention, says Gurmeet Kanwal

W

ITH STRENGTH of approximately 1.1 million soldiers, the Indian army has made a huge contribution towards keeping the nation together, particularly in facing internal security challenges.

Ours is a first-rate army. But, it has been saddled, for long, with second-rate weapons and equipment, despite heavy operational commitments towards border security and counter-insurgency operations. Yet, the budgetary support available for the modernisation of the Indian army is grossly inadequate. With this constraint it can undertake substantive modernisation only by simultaneously effecting large-scale downsizing so as to save on personnel costs — the largest chunk of the army’s annual budget. It would, however, not be prudent, considering that army’s operational commitments towards border management and internal security duties require a large number of manpower-heavy infantry battalions.

If this state of affairs continues for much longer, India’s quantitative military gap with China will soon become a qualitative gap as well, given that China is rapidly modernising its armed forces. China’s defence budget has been growing at a double-digit rate annually for about a decade. Also, the slender conventional edge that the Indian army enjoys over the Pakistan army will be eroded further as Pakistan is spending considerably large sums of money on its military modernisation, as well as getting subsidised weapons and equipment from the United States — ostensibly for fighting the so-called global war on terror.

While Pakistan has acquired 320 T-80 UD tanks and is on the course to enrich its armour fleet with Al Khalid tanks that it has co-

developed with China, vintage T-55 tanks continue in the Indian army’s inventory, despite their obsolescence. The indigenously developed Arjun MBT has not yet met the army’s expectations due to recurring technological problems and cost over-runs, though the tank has entered serial production to equip two regiments. Consequently, 310 T-90S MBTs had to be imported from Russia. In December 2007, a contract was signed for an additional 347 T-90 tanks to be assembled in India. Meanwhile, a programme has been launched to modernise the T-72 M1 Ajeya MBT that has been the mainstay of the army’s Strike Corps and their armoured divisions since the 1980s.

TAKING CHARGE: General V K Singh takes over as new Chief of Army Staff from General Deepak Kapoor

May 2010

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ARMS MODERNISATION: Need to go beyond mere posturing The programme seeks to upgrade the night fighting capabilities and fire control system of the tank, among other modifications. Approximately 1,700 T-72 M1s have been manufactured under license at the Heavy Vehicle Factory (HVF), Avadi. The BMP-1 and the BMP-2 infantry combat vehicles, which have been the mainstay of the mechanised infantry battalions for long, are now ageing and replacements need to be found soon. The replacement vehicles must be capable of being deployed for internal security duties and counter-insurgency operations, in addition to their primary role in conventional conflict.

Despite the fact that during the Kargil conflict of 1999, it was the artillery firepower that undeniably paved the way for India’s victory, modernisation of the artillery continues to lag behind. The last major acquisition of towed gun-howitzers was that of about 400 pieces of

39-calibre 155 mm FH-77B howitzers from Bofors of Sweden in the mid-1980s. New tenders have been floated for 155mm/ 39-calibre light weight howitzers for the mountains and 155mm/52-calibre long-range howitzers for the plains, as well as for self-propelled guns for the desert terrain but it will take almost five years more for the first batch of the new guns to enter service because their re-trials have not yet commenced. It has been reported, recently, that the MoD is in the process of acquiring 145 155mm/ 39-calibre M777 howitzers for the mountains from the US through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route in a government-togovernment deal. The artillery also needs large quantities of precision guided munitions (PGMs) for more accurate targeting in future battles. The present stocking levels of PGMs are rather low.

A contract for the acquisition of two regi-

ments of the 12-tube, 300 mm Smerch multibarrel rocket launcher (MBRL) system with 90 km range was signed with Russia’s Rosoboronexport in early-2006. The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile (Mach 2.8 to 3.0), with a precision strike capability, very high kill energy and maximum range of 290km, was inducted into the army in July 2007. These terrain hugging missiles are virtually immune to counter measures due to their high speed and very low radar cross section. The indigenously designed and manufactured Pinaka multi-barrel rocket system is likely to enter service in the near future. These three weapon systems together will provide a major boost to the artillery’s ability to destroy key targets at long ranges. It is also the time to now consider the induction of unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs), armed with air-to-surface missiles, into service for air-to-ground precision attacks.

The Corps of Army Air Defence is also faced with serious problems of obsolescence. The vintage L-70 40 mm AD gun system, the fourbarrelled ZSU-23-4 Schilka (SP) AD gun system, the SAM-6 (Kvadrat) and the SAM-8 OSAAK need to be urgently replaced by more responsive modern AD systems that are capable of defeating current and future threats. The Akash and Trishul surface-to-air missiles have not yet been successfully developed by DRDO. The short-range and medium-range SAM acquisition programmes are embroiled in red tape. This is one area where the army has lagged behind seriously in its modernisation efforts.

The modernisation plans of India’s cuttingedge infantry battalions, which are aimed at enhancing their capability for surveillance and target acquisition at night, and boosting their firepower for precise retaliation against infiltrating columns and terrorists holed up in built-up areas, are moving forward but at a snail’s pace. These include plans to acquire hand-held battlefield surveillance radars (BFSRs), and hand-held thermal imaging devices (HHTIs) for observation at night.

Stand-alone infra-red, seismic and acoustic sensors need to be acquired in large numbers to enable infantrymen to dominate the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan and detect infiltration of Pakistan-sponsored terrorists.

Similarly, the operational capabilities of army aviation, engineers, signal communications, reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) branches need to be substantially enhanced so that the overall combat potential of the army can be improved by an order of magnitude.

(The author is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi).

May 2010

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SPOTLIGHT

THE BIG

ARMS BAZAAR There is a need to debate arms acquisitions, which account for 40 per cent of India’s defence expenditure, as the world’s major arms companies vie to get a slice of the lucrative Indian arms market. DEBA R MOHANTY analyses.

T

HAT INDIA is a weapons merchants’ paradise is to state the obvious. Ever since India decided to undertake a massive long-term military modernisation drive to make its armed forces not only achieve military transformations but, also, in the process, play the role of a strategic stabiliser at the world stage in future, it has embarked on an ‘equipment driven’ acquisition programme that has attracted major arms companies to get a slice of the lucrative Indian arms market. In 2002, India announced a major policy initiative to open up the hitherto closed defence sector for 100 per cent private participation by Indian companies and allowed up to 26 per cent FDI in order to make the Indian military industry achieve a

reasonable degree of self-reliance. From 2002 till date, the standard procedural document for arms acquisition — defence procurement procedure (hereafter, DPP) — has been revised five times with the new additions announced as recently as late September 2009.

If one looks at the recent trends in arms acquisitions, one would not be surprised to find that practically every major system — land-based, aerospace and naval, most of which are worth multi-billions dollars — is being either purchased or negotiated for modernization. Since 2002, at least eight multi-billion dollar acquisitions, including $4.3 billion Scorpene submarines, $2.3 billion Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier, $10.4 billion MMRCA, $3.4 billion P-8I maritime

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surveillance, $2.6 billion C-130J Hercules maritime reconnaissance, $3 billion combat helicopters, $4 billion artillery, $2.7 billion Mirage upgrade, etc., are already in the inventory or are at different stages of negotiations.

Besides the above, military airfield infrastructure modernisation, equipment for net-centric warfare and various other programmes are also underway. Assuming that the governments tend to undervalue the worth of large-scale long term acquisition programmes, it may not surprise many if India ends up spending something close to $150 billion in the next ten years, although $100 billion is often cited by government sources. Close to Rs 3, 30,000 crore capital expenditure is envisaged by the Finance

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EQUIPMENT-DRIVEN: Military modernisation, instead, should be oriented towards ‘force transformation’ Commission for the next five years, although analysts find this sum insufficient. If futuristic projections are of any indication, at least twelve squadrons of fourth and fifth generation fighters, four to five squadrons of transport and other varieties of aircraft, a dozen-plus frigates and destroyers, two aircraft carriers, several thousands of artillery systems, 1,500-plus heavy and medium tanks, and a host of other items are factored into India’s future inventory.

Money is not a problem, as stated by highest level political leadership from time to time, as capital expenditure of the Indian defence budget has already seen a 500 per cent increase in the last ten years – from Rs 12,000 crore in 2001-02 to Rs 60,000 crore in 2010-11. Despite dissatisfactions among the members of strategic community on a marginal increase in Indian defence budgetary allocations, arms procurement budget has registered a 25 per cent growth – from a revised Rs 48,000 crore to estimated Rs 60,000 crore, thanks, primarily to Rs 6,000 crore from the previous year’s capital expenses not being utilised and hence returned to the central coffer. Moreover, the Finance Minister has assured on the floor of the Parliament that additional funds will be provided as and when required for national security purposes.

Three fundamental issues are relevant

here. First, what kind of a military modernisation drive is India attempting and for what purpose? The answer to the latter part is obvious that India’s ambitions to play a major role in international affairs is no secret (should not be so either) and necessitates possession of a formidable military power. It appears that the thrust of military modernization in current times is more ‘equipment driven’ rather than being oriented towards ‘force transformations.’ This could decisively impact India’s efforts, if other necessities like

right sizing, human resources, training etc are not addressed simultaneously.

Second, even while assuming that force multipliers and other requisite systems are needed for enhancement of military capabilities, how does India attain self-reliance in arms? Experiments with self-sufficiency and self-reliance through license production for decades have landed India in an import dependency syndrome. Opening up the private sector for defence production, as well as widening the import basket of choices are yet to prove beneficial as different participants – state-owned defence enterprises, Indian private industry and foreign manufacturers seem to be heading in different directions, leaving the government with limited choices of negotiating acquisitions through state-to-state mechanisms.

While open bidding systems have produced very few winners in the past three years and a few licenses for production of low-end items like multiple barrel rocket launchers, etc. have been awarded to private industries like Tatas, L&T and Mahindras & Mahindras, big-ticket items are being procured through foreign military sales route as has been the case with P-8I or C-130J. This is puzzling, as well as worrisome.

And, lastly, cumbersome procurement processes, despite several rounds of revisions in the DPP, have not only added to existing bureaucratic complexities but more importantly seem to complicate open competition and discourage private sector participation.

A set of observations and policy suggestions are in order for evaluation of India’s arms acquisition policy. First, India’s arms acquisition efforts do not seem to complement larger objectives of self-reliance. In the

FLIGHT FOR SELF-RELIANCE: Still eluding India’s arms modernisation drive

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UNREALISTIC PLANNING: fighter aircraft are inducted more for replenishment than force multiplication by the defence establishment absence of a clear roadmap, the armed forces tend to lean toward demands that may prove unrealistic, which in turn necessitates realistic equipment planning. For example, if joint strike fighter — F-35 — is largely dubbed as the last of its kind in fighter programme and ascendancy of unmanned systems like UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), UCAVs (unmanned combat aerial vehicles) and UUAVs (unmanned underwater vehicles) are the future systems, Indian Air Force seems to induct fighters more for replenishment than force multiplication and may not have factored the future role of unmanned systems.

Second, India’s arms acquisition efforts seem to be on the horns of a dilemma as to how to maximise benefits and returns in tangible and intangible terms. While military exigencies need to be addressed through fast track procedures, India is adopting the same route as is evident from the recent deals with the US, which are certainly not categorised as immediate needs. Introduction of novel ideas like ‘direct offsets’ need to be carefully implemented as such clauses could prove counterproductive in future. The government must negotiate hard with foreign firms, preferably on one-to-one basis, to generate more qualitative benefits (technology, manufacturing, etc) from offsets obligations; else India might land up as a large assembly industry which

was not the original purpose.

Third, India’s arms acquisition efforts do not seem to improve despite several rounds of revisions in the DPP. The DPP serves as a standard operating procedure whose objectives are to ensure transparency, bring in competition and ensure timely delivery of systems. While introduction of categorized items acquisition, integrity pact and other clauses have been positive features, there are

AUGMENTING MARITIME SECURITY: More war ships need to be added to the Indian naval kitty areas which need further attention. A review of the last five DPPs suggests that number of steps for trials and evaluation has not decreased (rather increased by one more step of induction of independent monitors to evaluate integrity pacts), which is often

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responsible for delays.

Fourth, India’s arms acquisition efforts suffer from what is known as systemic complexities. The process itself involves at least four types of stake-holding institutions – political executives, civil bureaucracy, military bureaucracy and defence scientific community (whom I refer to as ‘Golden Quadrangle’) – and one does not see real collective interactions on arms acquisition issues. All these institutions suffer from vertical structures and institutional rigidities with almost nil horizontal integration among them. Institutional mechanisms in countries like the US, UK and others provide enough insights into horizontal interactions and the government should draw up a model by taking inputs from such existing structures elsewhere.

Last but not the least, arms acquisitions, which account for 40 percent of the defence expenditure and which in turn accounts for about 14 percent of the total central government expenditure, must be debated not only in Parliament but also in the media and academia.

Arms acquisition issues are too important to be left to the ‘Golden Quadrangle’. Academia and the media must take the lead now.

(The author is a Senior Fellow in Security Studies with the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi) May 2010

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The defence budget is not a complete let down. The military should not again fail to spend the amount allocated to it for weapon purchases, points out SAURAV JHA

THE RUPEE

WARS (51)

B

udget is literally the best indicator of whether a country puts its money where its mouth is. To many observers, it seemed as if the defence budget for 2010-11 did not adequately address the increasing needs of the modernisation of defence forces.

However, a closer look at the budget shows that given the ongoing current fiscal consolidation, increased allocation for capital expenditure and returned unspent money from last year’s budget, the Rs 1,47,344 crore ($ 32 billion) outlay for defence is not really a let down. Out of the above-mentioned amount, the Army, with a budget of approximately Rs 74,582 crore in 2010-11, has the largest share, followed by the Air Force Rs 40,462 crore; Navy Rs 21,467 crore; Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) Rs 9,809 crore; and Ordnance Factories, Rs 1,015 crore.

Now some have argued that this year’s budget estimate is merely 3.98 per cent more than last year’s budgetary allocation of 1, 41,703 crores and that this is grossly inadequate to meet the modernisation needs of the forces. However, to dismiss it thus is to miss the crucial point. While last year’s budget showed a 34 per cent increase over the preceding year, it was primarily driven by an increase in revenue expenditure. The revenue allocation in last year’s budget showed a massive 50.85 per cent increase over the corresponding allocation in the year before it. This was chiefly on account of the need to accommodate the hike in pay structures in deference to the recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission.

The huge increase in revenue spending in 2009-10 resulted in revenue expenditure accounting for 61.3 per cent of the total defence budget in that period. Compared to this, revenue expenditure accounts for 59.3 per cent of the defence budget for 2010-11.

This can be attributed to the fact that the Rs 87344 crore kept aside for revenue expenditure in 2010-11 is only 0.5 per cent greater than the budget estimate for the same in 2009-10 Clearly, the lion’s share of this year’s increment in the overall defence budget can be attributed to an increase in the outlay for capital expenditure. Capital expenses show a healthy 9.44 per cent increase over last fiscal’s allocation for the same and now stand at Rs 60,000 crore. When looking at increases in capital expenditure, analysts often try to assess whether it is commensurate with inflation in weapon cost, which is generally in the 10 per cent range. By even that metric, the proportional increment in capital expenditure is satisfactory. The increase looks even more impressive if one compares this year’s budget estimate for capital expenditure with last year’s revised estimate (i.e. actual amount spent) for the same head which stood at Rs 47,284 crore for the period 2009-10. This May 2010

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SEVERAL EX-SERVICEMEN ADVOCATE RAISING DEFENCE EXPENDITURE TO 3 PER CENT OF GDP corresponds to a 25.4 per cent raise which is substantial by any yardstick.

Readers would note that the revised estimate for 2009-10 is Rs. 5,439 crore less from the original allocations. This amount could have actually been more had revenue expenditure not been revised upwards by Rs 1,561 crore over the original budget estimates.

Capital expenditure, of course, was revised downward by a whopping Rs 7,000 crore in 2009-10.

The smaller revised estimate for the umpteenth year running of course means that the military has yet again failed to spend the amount allocated to it for capital i.e. weapon system purchases. This naturally does not portend well for a country that is in the midst of a massive conventional force modernisation programme.

Meanwhile, the Indian Air force (IAF) continues to be the most capital intensive service in the Indian military and its share of this year’s capital expenditure reflects the same. In terms of capital expenditure, the Air Force with a budget of Rs 25,251 crore holds the largest share (42 per cent) among the three services, followed by the Army (Rs 17,255 crore; 29 per cent) and the Navy (Rs 12,138; 20 per cent).

Interestingly, almost 78 per cent of the capital expenditure allocation for 2010-11 or Rs 46,521 crore will be available to the three services for procurement of aircraft and aeroengines, heavy and medium vehicles, naval ships, and other equipment such as armaments, electronics etc. Within each service’s acquisition budget, the Air Force will have Rs 15,206 crore for procurement of aircraft and aero-engines; while Rs 10,464 crore has been provisioned for the procurement of other equipment for the Army. The Navy will get Rs 6,950 crore for addition to the naval fleet.

The amount marked for the Air Force sug-

gests that a decision on the $10.5 billion Multi-Role Medium Combat Aircraft tender is likely this fiscal.

Now how does India’s budget stack up with that of its rivals? Well, for the year 201011, China has declared a budget of $78 billion which is roughly 2.4 times India’s official military budget. Importantly, after almost two decades of consistent double-digit growth, Chinese defence expenditure shows a modest increase of 7.5 per cent in 2010-11.

This is probably a reflection of the fact that China like India also wants to consolidate its fiscal spend after pump priming the economy last year to escape the effects of the global financial crisis. While it is true that China outspends India by a considerable margin, it must be noted that they also have differing priorities not the least of which involves deterring the US. Moreover, China’s official budget is less than 2 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

Pakistan’s official military budget although around 5 per cent of its GDP is about a fourth of India’s in absolute terms. However Pakistan’s defence budget is generously supple-

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mented by American aid in the form of weapons’ transfers which have totalled $11.5 dollars since the beginning of the avowed ‘global war on terror’. The equipment transfers of course allow Pakistan to punch above its weight and in a sense reflect what is good with Pakistani capability planning. For better or worse, Pakistani Army generals have managed to wrangle out of the Americans the equipment they think are necessary to counter the emerging doctrines such as Cold Start propounded by India. Thus, in a sense, there is greater coherence in Pakistani defence spending which is in greater consonance with the aims of the decision makers than what is happening elsewhere.

To tell you the truth, there is a lesson to be learnt by India from this example. Several ex-service men advocate raising defence expenditure to 3 per cent of GDP as opposed to the present 2.12 per cent. But that by itself does not mean anything unless there is a cogent national strategy behind it. That is probably why the Thirteenth Finance Commission in its report noted that “there exists considerable scope to improve the quality May 2010

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and efficiency of defence expenditure through increased private sector engagement, import substitution and indigenisation, improvements in procedures and practices and better project management, within the parameters of Government of India’s policy. Efforts in this direction will further expand the fiscal space available for defence spending.”

Indigenisation is of course something that the Indian military is still grappling with, in the sense that it has been unable to come up with an optimal immediate requirementindigenisation tradeoff. However the military probably does understand the need for indigenisation since a country cannot pursue an independent foreign policy whilst sourcing most of its weapons from abroad. What is instead required, is seamless synchronisation between the military’s long term integrated procurement plan and DRDO’s projections.

There are reports which suggest that such a move is indeed underway and if successfully managed, India’s defence spending will become a key contributor to India’s claim to great power status. Ultimately the defence

A COUNTRY CANNOT PURSUE AN INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY WHILST SOURCING MOST OF ITS WEAPONS FROM ABROAD sector must also contribute to national development directly by creating an indigenous base and indirectly by giving the country manoeuvering space in the comity of nations.

There is also a need to curtail unnecessary expenditure as enumerated by Standing Committee on Defence in its report on Demand for Grants (2009-10), placed in the Lok Sabha on December 16, 2009. Although the finance ministry has projected a 7 per cent growth rate for defence revenue expenditure, it is clear that this kind of support may not come consistently. The two major heads under revenue expenditure are pays and allowance and stores and equipment.

Given India’s continuing commitments that range from deterring two extremely large conventional militaries on its borders to fighting terrorists of various shades it is unlikely that any manpower rationalization would take place in the future. This neces-

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sarily means that it is on the stores and equipment side of things that revenue expenditure will have to be brought down.

Bringing this down without impairing preparedness and combat capability is something that the military will have to look at very closely indeed.

Although we have pointed above that the defence budget must be in consonance with the needs of fiscal prudence, it must nevertheless be understood that the government must not restrain the military unduly on price grounds when it seeks a particular capability. Especially, not when negotiations for a given system have already been completed. Such unnecessary intrusion has recently been in evidence with the Finance Ministry shooting down the IAF’s bid to obtain six more mid air refueling aircraft from Europe on the grounds of cost.

Ad-hoc cancellations obviously do not help the cause of the IAF whose everexpanding area of responsibility requires that aircraft be kept in the air for longer. Funnily enough, it does not help the cause of fiscal consolidation, too, either.

The defence budget, at the end of the day, is more than a set of numbers and in truth represents the most crucial statement made on a country’s security priorities. While it is drafted in consultation with all concerned parties, it nevertheless reflects the pulls, pressures and pitfalls of competing agencies and overall fiscal management. It is, therefore, in the supreme interest of the country that a more co-operative approach is adopted by all concerned in the quest for security with equity.

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POLICING THE POLICE

Police in India has to deal with both cultural conflict and fragmented social control in rural areas. Only concrete steps to strengthen and train the police, coupled with the spread of education and urbanisation, can reverse this continued negative trend, feels D M (John) Mitra...

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C

ULTURAL AND social factors affect policing in India more profoundly than it is generally thought of. This is more pertinent for rural and semi-urban areas where nearly 70 per cent of the country’s population lives. These factors, which hinder law enforcement as well as fragment state’s monopoly on coercion, increase as education and urbanisation decrease as one moves farther away from urban centres.

Police itself is also afflicted by these factors which limit their capacity to help the state in enforcing its laws. Existence of police-subculture and strong peer pressure within the police further compound the difficulties in Indian policing. However, the subculture has

legislations which define crime. These definitions are not necessarily understood or germane to the social norms and conduct rules of the various sub-cultures or cultural groups within the country.

“Primary conflict” occurs when there are two different cultures governing behaviour.

For example, when a person belonging to one culture immigrates to an area with another culture, the “old” culture simply does not vanish and takes time to be replaced by the norms of the “new” culture.

Within India, culture conflict arises due to the norms and values still prevalent in rural areas of our country which are different from the norms and values enshrined in the Constitution of India which forms the basis of

Similarly, due to the way imperial powers preferred to rule, the former colonies had fragmented social control where the state had to compete with local social institutions for control. This fragmented control continued even after their independence and emergence as nation states. For example, many parents who have their roots in areas where child marriage is preferred, come under pressure from family members and relatives (commonly referred as “Biraderi”) to get their children married at young ages.

They may be aware of the law of the land which prohibits such marriages, yet they may succumb to the social pressure. The more rooted the person is to such a Biraderi, the more likely he or she is to succumb to the pressure. Unlike the First World where family or social values and norms are considered subordinate to the laws of the land, in the Third World the state laws have to compete with the local norms of an area and may lose out to some of them in controlling behaviour of its citizens in living in that area. In India, like most of the Third World, about 70 percent of its population live in rural areas as compared to about 20 percent in the developed countries. Urbanisation and education are not only low but also decrease with the increase in distance from the urban areas in India. Therefore, in view of the demographic distribution between urban and rural areas, both culture conflict and fragmented social control increase with the increase in distance from the urban areas in India. Consequently, psychological acceptance of the laws of the land and the laws’ capacity to influence the behaviour of people decrease in the rural areas.This does not mean that crime rate is higher in rural areas or urban areas are more peaceful. Firstly, all crimes do not depend on culture conflict the same way.

Secondly, many other factors influence inci-

SHEER BRUTE FORCE: Police thrashing a hapless commoner

developed because of the severe resource constraints that Indian police in general and rural police in particular had to deal with, since colonial days. Strengthening of police, and spread of education and urbanisation can reverse the continued negative trend of policing in rural areas.

Experts say that various sections of a population can come in conflict with the legal definitions of behaviour, accidentally or intentionally, because the legal definition of crime in a country is based on the norms and values of the dominant social group of that country. In India, the educated urban population contribute more to the formulation of

our laws and legal system.

For example, a study on rape prevention has revealed that there is a significant and unmistakable difference between the perception regarding what amounts to rape between those who are urbanised compared to those who have recently migrated to Delhi from rural and semi-urbanised areas. Rights of individuals, particularly those of women and girl children, in rural areas are different from what is envisaged in the legal system and laws adopted by modern India. The role of education in decreasing the culture conflict has also come out in the analysis of responses in this study.

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THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF CRIME IN A COUNTRY IS BASED ON THE NORMS AND VALUES OF THE DOMINANT SOCIAL GROUP May 2010

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g INTERNALSECURITY dence of crime. For example, situational factors in urban areas provide more opportunity for certain types of crime. Relative anonymity in urban areas, loneliness due to prevalence of nuclear families, differential association with criminals and many other factors influence higher incidence of crimes in urban areas.

Police, which is responsible for enforcement of laws passed by the constitutionally established governments and also maintain the monopoly of coercion of the state, has to deal with both culture conflict and fragmented social control which limit and distort enforcement of law.

Secondly, depending on the area and the cultural baggage of a police person, he or she is likely to be afflicted by similar or same culture conflict and fragmented social control as that of the local population where the police person is serving. These factors limit the police person’s capacity to help the state enforce its laws and maintain its monopoly.

For example, in areas having communal tension, the prevalent suspicion between persons belonging to antagonistic communities can be harboured by some members of the local police, which is bound to diminish the impartiality which is expected from police. Often women, children and persons belonging to weaker sections face the same type of stereotyping discrimination from police personnel that they otherwise face from the local community.

Thirdly, the difficulties are further compounded by the existence of a subculture and a strong peer pressure within the police which are similar to culture conflict and fragmented social control. For example, within the police, the outcome is valued more than the method by which it was achieved. Small violations or deviation from legal provisions in order to solve a crime or manage a law & order situation are often tolerated or hailed in view of the positive outcome. Therefore, if by restoration of a newly married couple, belonging to different communities, to their parents was able to pacify the escalating tension between the two communities in an area, it does not bother anyone in the department that police was expected to actually protect the rights to freedom of the young couple. In such a case, police may even register a case against the couple knowing well that the complaint by their parents is evidently false. This is done to give police some legal basis for coercing the couple to come back to their parents. Thus, the apparent peace in the rural areas is maintained at the cost of rights of the individuals.

In fragmented social control, often the

THE DIFFICULTIES ARE FURTHER COMPOUNDED

BY THE EXISTENCE OF A SUBCULTURE AND A STRONG PEER PRESSURE rights of the women and others who do not belong to the dominant section of the local population are violated by the members of dominant section. Police by cooperating or by not taking the legal action it is supposed to take is perceived to be a part of the structural violence. Such violence comes to the notice of the intelligentsia in urban areas when an extreme incident happens like victim getting killed or raped as result of the reprisal by the dominant section.

The subculture in police has developed because of the severe resource constraints that Indian police had to deal with since colonial days. A reading of National Police Commission Report and other reports clearly shows that the per capita income of police in India is one of the lowest and much below what is considered desirable. Similarly, the police stations in most of the states receive

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very little money for stationery, fuel for police vehicles and other such essential dayto-day requirement of the police station. The burden not only passes on to the complainants, it does greater damage by perpetuating sub-cultural acceptance of such demands by police persons from complainants.

The paucity of wherewithal and manpower has resulted in the high value given to the “executive” policemen who can “manage” to perform within the limited resources by compromising and partnering with local conditions, notwithstanding their illegality.

There is also peer pressure to hail such efforts and ignore the aberrations as they are done with no personal intentions and purely from professional point of view. Unless the manpower and wherewithal situation in most of the civil police organisations improves significantly, it is difficult to imagine how police can get over these handicaps.

Even training which is necessary for changing attitudinal changes is bound to become ineffective till objective realities remain the same. However, training capacity in police remains very inadequate and needs to be upgraded urgently.

Therefore, immediate steps need to be taken to strengthen and train the police, while education and urbanisation bring about transformation in the society, in general. ( The author, an Additional DGP in Madhya Pradesh, is also a Visiting Research Fellow at Institute of Social Sciences, New Delhi) May 2010

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DIPLOMACY

INDIA IN A GLOBALISED WORLD

The MEA’s policy planners will have to cast India’s foreign policy in a new perspective and come up with an inclusive mapping exercise. SREERAM CHAULIA takes a close look...

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HE REVIVAL of the long-dormant Policy Planning Division of India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in September 2009 through the initiative of the then Minster of state for External Affairs Shashi Tharoor is a positive step for a country that wants to climb up the rungs of global status and power.

Policy planning bureaus have played a vital role in foreign ministries of great powers by providing broad direction, outlook and blueprints that percolate through the veins and arteries of the system. The famous Cold War doctrine of containment, for instance, was the brainchild of George Kennan, the first Director of Policy Planning in the US State Department. His ‘X’ article in the journal Foreign Affairs (July 1947) recorded his acute observations on the wellsprings of Soviet conduct and laid out the parameters of a global response to the USSR’s “expansive tendencies.” Encouraged by his mentor — the powerful Secretary of State George Marshall — Kennan and his team of researchers produced the fundamentals that became the bedrock of American foreign policy for decades to come.

India’s policy planners must always bear in mind that power of any kind is relative in international relations, and accordingly come up with power-enhancement plans that factor in the prospects of other states in a dynamic environment. For instance, if India keeps growing at around 8-9 per cent for twenty years and China stays the course with double-digit growth, both states will be absolutely better off but India will be relative-

ly weaker. If India’s nuclear deterrent improves through our scientific community’s efforts (the latest figure is that we have the capacity to assemble a 200-kiloton nuclear device) but falls below the shifting definition of ‘credibility’ due to the even more rapid weapon experimentation by other powers, we will continue to be subjected to blackmail and bullying.

Decisiveness about what kind of a power China is and where it is heading has to be a key formulation for the MEA’s policy planners.

Just as Kennan instinctively grasped the reality of Stalin’s USSR and made a value judgement that it was characteristically aggressive, India has to make up its mind about its northern neighbour one way or the other and compose a broad set of measures to manage this relationship. At present, vacilla-

tion and ambiguity about China’s motives, behaviour and future trajectories predominate in Indian policy circles, leading to a confusing approach that is neither fish nor fowl.

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hile some degree of open-mindedness and flexibility, to some extent, are definite assets in the highly unpredictable and volatile social world, Indian foreign policy planners cannot be paralysed with a wait-and-see attitude

Winning over Africa: MEA under S M Krishna faces a formidable task; (left) former junior minister Tharoor during his Africa visit

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IN TUNE WITH NEHRUVIAN GLOBALISM: Mrs Indira Gandhi with Richard Nixon; (left) Manmohan Singh with G-8 leaders

towards a China that is undertaking a rapid revolution in military affairs and has a predatory commodity exports and foreign investment-promotion strategy.

Even the booming bilateral trade between India and China must be tempered with comparisons to China’s trade equations with other countries. This will help New Delhi foresee longer-term tensions and avoid a scenario where Beijing can convert thick economic exchanges into unacceptable political domination through lobbies or infringement of India’s foreign policy autonomy. How and through what means China might attempt to parlay its ballooning trade surplus with India (which stood at $16 billion, as of 2009) into a superior-inferior power relationship must be closely monitored and countered. Comparative examples of China’s relations with Taiwan, South Korea, Russia, Japan, the EU and the USA must be studied extensively by Indian planners before crafting appropriate defensive and offensive mechanisms.

Unlike the days of the ‘Indira Doctrine’, when domination of South Asia was a transparent and suffused aim of Indian foreign policy, we now live in an interconnected world where we must register our strong presence in far-flung parts of the world to be

recognised as a genuine, global power. Indian policy planners have to revisit lessons from the gradual displacement of New Delhi by Beijing as the pre-eminent Asian power in Africa: first by means of Mao Zedong’s radical “Afro-Asianism” and later through proactive loans and natural resource-centric infrastructure building sprees.

Be it the 1960s or the 2000s, India has been passive and lacking in concrete tools for courting and winning over African nations and people. It is largely due to foreign policy neglect and underestimation of Africa’s economic and human potential that New Delhi has been left with a tough mission of playing catch-up with Beijing. Given the high priority of gaining traction in Africa, the MEA’s policy planners must devise quickimpact projects, funds and programmes on a war footing that would reconnect African states and societies with their Indian counterparts.

Contemporary India is not known for ‘thinking big’ on foreign policy thrusts despite the legacy of Nehruvian globalism.

The narrow educational and experiential backgrounds of the current Indian political class and the obsessive media focus on just the country’s immediate neighbours have

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reproduced a frog-in-the-well mentality that discourages knowledge accumulation and production beyond a certain geographical radius or comfort zone. There are, for example, countless Pakistan and Sri Lanka hands in and outside government in India but hardly anyone who has a masterly grasp of the politics and predilections of the Caribbean or Bolivarian America.

The revived Policy Planning Division should have the luxury of not being entrusted with one particular brief and instead should have the whole world as its horizon.

It must acquire the acumen to interpret the direct or indirect ramifications for India of a disputed election in Ukraine, a coup in Côte d'Ivoire, or a flared up boundary dispute between Thailand and Cambodia. Inputs do come into the MEA from different embassies and consular missions around the world, but more than collating in-house diplomatic cables and emails is required to arrive at comprehensive estimates and policy adjustments that keep relating back and forth to the refrain of pre-eminent doctrinal foreign policy principles. Intellectual talents that are outside the charmed circle of power holders will have to be mined extensively for situating Indian concerns within larger contexts.

MEA’s policy planners should embark on their historic mission with the basic presumption that the entire world is or soon will be India’s backyard. While the primacy of some regions or issues may demand greater attention at times, Indian foreign policy must be ready with doctrines and deeds to exert influence in the remotest of corners. Since all of planet earth and outer space are India’s theatres, a robust and competent foreign policy planning arm to execute this challenging role becomes a pressing imperative.

(The author is Associate Professor of world politics at the O.P. Jindal Global University) May 2010

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DIPLOMACY

A TACTICAL INTERLUDE

Encircling India remains a long term Chinese strategy, with Afghanistan and Pakistan as its pivotal points. But with India consolidating its relations with the US and Russia, Beijing has chosen to cozy up to New Delhi as a short term adjustment.

BHASKAR ROY takes a close look...

T

HE RISE of People’s Republic of China is an indisputable fact. Of course, this communist nation has its own unique but inevitable internal challenges. A country the size of China, with a population of around 1.4 billion, medium developed with one-party command political system remains under constant pressure. People living in this vast country have serious grievances as borne out by between 85 to 90 thousand workers’ protests and strikes every year. The rural China is also not so stable. The people at large are struggling to have their voices heard and their problems addressed by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the government.

Yet, China holds $2.4 trillion in forex reserves and US treasury bonds worth $760 billion. In fact, its total US holdings amount to around $1.6 trillion. China may soon edge out Japan as the second biggest economy in the world. It demonstrated its importance in stabilising the global economic meltdown to a significant extent, though being a mainly export dependent economy, it has obvious limitations vis-à-vis global economic downturn.

China’s military strength has raced ahead in the last two decades with

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DEALING WITH THE DRAGON: P M Manmohan Singh with Chinese premier Wen Jiabao quantum jumps, especially in its missile force (including nuclear). The Chinese navy, already deployed off the Somali coast to counter piracy, is poised to make its presence felt in the Indian Ocean.

With good reasons, most countries in the world question China’s transparency of intentions. No one knows what those minds in the Political Bureau (PB) of the Party and the Central Military Commission (CMC) think, but bits and pieces coming out in their open strategic writings do give a good idea of their thinking. And some of these are not very heartening.

Apart from the Asia-Pacific region where China directly interfaces with Japan, the USA, Australia and Latin/South America, its main connectivity to the largest population in the world lies through Central Asia and South Asia (Indian Ocean). In the last one decade some major developments have taken place in these two regions that pose a challenge to China’s overall strategy. In these areas, it has blustered through, threatened, tried to divide and balance countries and power centre in the region. But in very recent times, say, in the last six months or so, it realized that this policy was not working as some countries were not willing to bow down to China and were quite emphatic on their own rights.

Earlier, China had felt that the shift of global focus to Asia with the slogan “21st century is Asia’s Century” would allow it to dominate the region. One was that in the earlier part of 21st century, the USA under President George W Bush got engrossed with Iran and Afghanistan, and there was a sense of declining US interest in south East Asian and Far East region. Moreover, after the cold war and the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia’s power had dwindled. The Chinese began to

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feel that they were bigger than Russia, because Beijing’s relations with the USA and the European Union (EU) were far better than that of Russia’s.

It is true that Moscow was floundering in an economic and political mess. The evolvement of this situation combined by its own growing power made China increasingly arrogant. This finally pushed Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh, a highly understated and polite person, to publicly opine in the US late last year that China had become arrogant. Nevertheless, Singh wanted to have a stable and co-operative relationship with China. He did not allow China’s border violations and verbal transgressions against India to spoil the bilateral relations.

As usual, China had presumed that the demoralization of the 1962 border war was still haunting an ‘ineffectual’ India. But this one small statement of Manmohan Singh apparently hit home in Beijing. The Chinese had already got a message from Dr Singh last year when they sharply attacked his visit to Arunachal Pradesh. Manmohan had made it clear that India’s sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh was indisputable, and India did not consider this state as a disputed territory. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao took immediate correcting steps seeking a meeting with Dr Singh at the ASEAN meeting in Hua Hin (Thailand).

China sees India as a major impediment to its global aspirations. Over the decades, the Dragon has tried in every way to stymie India; China opposed the India-US peaceful nuclear agreement almost to the last hour at the Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG) meeting in Vienna in 2008. It wanted a similar status for Pakistan even with the latter’s ignominious reputation in nuclear proliferation.

It is well known that China is the father of May 2010

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g DIPLOMACY Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and missile programme. It is generally said that PakistanChina nuclear collaboration started after India’s 1974 nuclear test. The truth is otherwise. Their bilateral agreement started before 1974, soon after India-Pak war of 1971. And, the co-operation has never ceased.

All the pearls in China’s string may not be shining at the moment, but encircling India remains a long term strategy. When the Chinese make a strategy, it is well thought over, long term and alive. But short term adjustments are made according to the shifts in geostatic ambience. This is what China is doing at the moment in South Asia, especially with India.

A recent assessment of global challenges conducted by the CCP’s Study Cell on International Issues (Liaowang Weekly, Issue 59/2009) gave an insight into China’s latest India policy shift. The weekly concluded that while India was consolidating its relations with the US and Russia to contain China, it would be prudent on China’s part to consolidate its relations with India through dialogue. Though written sometime in October/November 2008, and published in December 2008 after vetting by the top Chinese Foreign policy establishment, they have been implementing this policy on the ground.

For example, when Indian Minister of State for Defene Pallam Raju said India was willing to provide security to Chinese mercantile shipping in the Indian Ocean, China gave a guarded welcome. Six months ago China would have warned India that it was trying to control the Indian Ocean, and the Indian Ocean was not India’s Ocean. Earlier, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxun refused to be drawn into controversy when a journalist asked him about India’s Agni-III missile test which section of the Indian media said was aimed at China. Ma replied that China and India were friends and co-operative partners.

Even more recently, the Chinese officially declined to extend any public support to Pakistan’s efforts to draw China in India-Pakistan issues. Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahamud Qureshi, on a visit to China told a Chinese think tank (Feb. 23, 2010) in Beijing that Pakistan had given China a “blank cheque” to mediate between Pakistan and India. This was two days before the IndiaPakistan Foreign Secretary level talks in New Delhi on February 25. There was no reaction from China, and the entire Chinese media blanked out Qureshi’s statement on the issue. China had also declined a US proposal to get involved in South Asian issues, when

WHILE CHINA BOLSTERED PAKISTAN TO COUNTER INDIA, IT HAS EXPLOITED PAKISTAN AS A FRONTLINE ALLY TO PROMOTE ITS INTERESTS President Barak Obama visited China in November 2009.

This brings us to China’s strategic thinking on its time-tested ally, Pakistan. While China bolstered Pakistan to counter India, it has exploited Pakistan as a frontline ally to promote its interests and influence in the Gulf and the West Asian countries, and the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC). A militarily powerful Pakistan with nuclear weapons is supposed to be the jewel in the crown of the Islamic countries. China built the Gwadar Deep Sea in Pakistan at a cost of $2 billion as a strategic asset – both in economic and military terms.

Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics together form a sub-region very important to China, especially energy resources of the Central Asian countries. Gas and mineral resources of Afghanistan are equally important for China which has already acquired one of the largest copper

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mines in the world, the Aynak mine in Afghanistan, allegedly through bribing. The Central Asia route through Afghanistan to Pakistan and joining along the proposed Karakoram highway gasoil pipeline to China’s Xinjiang forms a part of China’s energy security. But all these are threatened by Xinjiang’s Uighur Muslim separatists who enjoy support and security with and from militant groups in Pak-Afghan border areas.

What complicates China’s South Asia strategy is America’s Af-Pak policy. This policy is much larger than it seems commonly.

Although the policy is primarily to eradicate terrorism from Afghanistan and Pakistan, it does not necessarily mean American troops will start withdrawing from the region in July 2011.

At one level, China would welcome American success in AF-Pak to eradicate Islamic extremism and terrorism. It has declined America’s invitation till now to directly join foreign efforts to stabilise Afghanistan. Beijing does not know who will be the ultimate winner. China enjoyed very good relations with the erstwhile Taliban government in Afghanistan without according diplomatic recognition. The Taliban did not care and Pakistan helped China. Did China misread the Taliban and the Al Qaeda? Or was it benefitting from this situation? One does not know clearly, but the latter question appears nearer to the answer.

The US domination over Pakistan for an indefinite future jeopardises China’s strategy and security interests. The American military and intelligence apparatus is too deeply embedded in Pakistan at this moment. China now sees a return of the USA to the South Asian extended region and South East Asia. There was never full trust with Russia, and Moscow is seen getting more engaged not only in Central Asia and Afghanistan, but with India and in the Indian Ocean. Recent Russian interest in Sri Lanka points to that. On top of it all, China sees these powers including Japan working against what it thinks China’s heaven bestowed interests.

The only manageable area out of this enclosing atmosphere is India. China believes India pursues an independent foreign policy, notwithstanding New Delhi’s military and high technology relations with the US and Russia. Therefore, it is in Beijing’s interest to pursue a stable relationship with India for the time being. But this must be understood as an interlude. China’s long term India policy remains intact.

(The author is a retired civil servent) May 2010

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CEMENTING THE BOND: Sheikh Hasina with Manmohan Singh Photo by H.C.Tiwari

A NEW VISION B Post-Sheikh Hasina’s visit, Bangladesh and India come together as partners in progress and cooperative development. Now, the need is to ensure that the agreements reached during Hasina’s visit do not disappear in the bureaucratic labyrinth, feels TARIQ A KARIM...

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ANGLADESH PRIME Minister’s recently-concluded visit to India received much attention, generated anticipated hype and raised expectations on both sides. The visit was termed variously as ‘historic’, ‘pathbreaking’, ‘landmark’ and in other similar terms by people, political analysts and media. I choose to describe this visit rather as a ‘game-changing’ visit, since the heads of governments of our two neighbouring countries have redefined not only the game they would play but the rules by which they would, henceforth, play it. We have chosen to view each other as partners in progress and cooperative development rather than as mutually distrustful neighbours constantly May 2010

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g NEIGHBOURS needling each other. Instead of ignoring each other and donning cloaks of injured innocence and continuing in the old trajectory of mutual recriminations and mutually reinforcing antagonism that tended to gorge on itself, we have chosen to talk to each other and address each others’ concerns with sincerity and good faith, with a view to reaching win-win solutions.

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hat are the major concerns of India with regard to Bangladesh? Roughly, first, Bangladesh should not harbour anti-India and extremist elements and not allow them to carry-out attacks against India. Second, Bangladesh should allow India thorough fare to its north-eastern states. And, what are the major expectations of Bangladesh from India? First, India should help Bangladesh to narrow the yawning gap in their bilateral trade by increasing imports from Bangladesh. Second, the issue of water sharing of all the common rivers should be resolved in a fair, equitable and transparent manner.

Let us look at the Joint Communiqué issued on January 11, 2010, by the two Prime Ministers. It is by far the boldest and most forward looking document to have emerged from a meeting at this level since the MujibIndira era. Let me fleetingly parse the various elements of the Joint Communiqué, essentially what I call the ‘work order’ that the two Prime Ministers have sent down to their respective governments to operationalise. While a time-frame has not been mentioned, both sides are acutely aware of the importance of concretizing results on the ground as early as possible.

Both the countries are plagued by terrorism that is being wreaked upon them by international terrorist networks. The two leaders recognised terrorism as a common challenge to security as well as development of both the countries, and condemned it in all its forms and manifestations. They reiterated that the territory of either would not be allowed for activities inimical to the other.

This was a bold recognition of the fact that allowing one’s territory to be used against the other serves the purpose of neither India nor Bangladesh, but only of forces inimical to their common well-being.

With the objective of ensuring greater cooperation on security related matters and strengthening of democracy and fight against extremism, the leaders signed three security-related pacts on mutual legal assistance on criminal matters, transfer of sentenced persons, and on combating international terrorism, organised crime and

BOTH THE COUNTRIES ARE PLAGUED BY TERRORISM THAT IS BEING WREAKED UPON THEM BY INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST NETWORKS drug trafficking. These agreements may well be viewed as the harbingers of increasing cooperation between our two countries and their respective justice and security apparatuses in the future.

Now, the need is to ensure that these agreements do not disappear in the bureaucratic labyrinth. For the first time in the history of Indo-Bangladesh relations, their Prime Ministers have directed that their respective Home Ministers should regularly,

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MONGLA SEA PORT: An important trade point between India and Bangladesh

at least once a year, take stock of the situation on the ground and initiate corrective measures, where needed.

It is evident from the document that the two Prime Ministers attach immense importance to allow access to India to its northeastern states through Bangladesh. They have set in motion the process whereby severed connectivity in different sectors would be progressively restored, or upgraded. This will result in immense economic gains for both economies. Their call for resumption of road and rail-links would allow both countries to restore the entire network of the roads and railways, in stages.

Connectivity initiatives that have been set in motion include the construction of the proposed Akhaura–Agartala railway link, making Rohanpur–Singabad broad gauge railway link available for transit to Nepal, conversion of Radhikapur–Birol railway line into broad gauge to facilitate movement of goods within Bangladesh, as well as from and to Bhutan, and declaring Ashuganj in Bangladesh and Silghat in India as additional ports of call.

Bangladesh will, henceforth, also allow use of Mongla and Chittagong sea ports for May 2010

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g NEIGHBOURS shipment of goods to and from India, whether moved by rail, waterways or road.

Bangladesh made it clear that these same ports would also be open for use by Nepal and Bhutan for trade with Bangladesh, as well as transit trade through Bangladesh.

This, incidentally, would not only greatly facilitate trade and transit for Nepal and Bhutan, but also inject into the BIMSTEC process greater substance, depth and dynamism. Bangladesh, by these bold measures, operationalises its natural role as the vital bridge between South and Southeast Asia, triggering the dynamics that can only lead to greater integration of these two vibrant economic regions to the larger global economy. Nested within this larger dynamic, India’s access to its northeastern states through Bangladesh is not only a given fact but also entirely logical. Bangladesh (as indeed, will, in all probability, Nepal and Bhutan, both of whom enthusiastically welcomed this initiative) will now look to India to see how meaningfully the latter responds.

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he Joint Communiqué also projects watershed initiatives in the area of trade matters. The huge trade deficit between Bangladesh and India, tilted towards the latter, has been the cause of great angst and a constant irritation in Bangladesh.

The Communiqué encourages imports from Bangladesh by India, by removing tariff and non-tariff barriers and port restrictions and facilitating movement of containerized cargo by rail and water. India is also to provide duty-free access to SAARC LDCs and take off from its negative list, an additional 47 out of 101 items, requested by Bangladesh, that are of direct interest to Bangladesh. While this will immediately translate into trade dividends for Bangladesh, India has assured that

A NUMBER OF MEASURES HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO PROMOTE AND FACILITATE TRADE BETWEEN INDIA (IN PARTICULAR, ITS NORTH-EASTERN STATES) AND BANGLADESH

the negative list will be further meaningfully shortened. A number of measures have been taken to promote and facilitate trade between India (in particular, its north-eastern states) and Bangladesh.

Other trade facilitation measures include India’s support for upgradation of the Bangladesh Standard Testing Institute for building capacity for certification, encouraging joint investment and joint ventures, operationalising land customs stations at Sabroom-Ramgarh and Demagiri-Thegamukh, strengthening existing land custom stations that would allow India access to remote areas of Tripura and Mizoram, establishing border haats on a pilot basis at selected areas to allow trade in specified produces and products, and allowing trucks for movement from Bhutan and Nepal to enter 200 meters into Zero Point at Banglabandh at the Banglabandh-Phulbari land customs station.

If I may recall here, way back in 1985, late Rajiv Gandhi had the vision and foresight to assert in a private conversation that it was in India’s interest that Bangladesh should be economically prosperous and stable; and it was not only India’s duty, but indeed in her own larger interest to assist Bangladesh to achieve this. Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh has now set in motion the translation of that early prescient vision into reality.

India’s $1 billion Line of Credit for Bangladesh (the largest line of credit given at one time by India to any single country, to date) signals it loudly and clearly. It serves to project India as a trusted and valued partner in the endeavours of Bangladesh for development. This huge loan would stimulate road, railway and waterway infrastructure development and reclamation in Bangladesh, as well as help restore lost connectivity in the greater region. This credit would be used for a range of projects, including railway infrastructure, supply of locomotives and passenger coaches, rehabilitation of Saidpur workshop, procurement of buses, and river-dredging projects in Bangladesh. Indian experts and technicians will be able to assist in Bangladesh’s development. The leaders agreed to conclude the agreement and arrangement of the Line of Credit and the framework agreement on cooperation at an early date.

Good things have also started happening in the field of investment. Without any sense of complacency, I may mention here that Bharti Airtel will be acquiring 70 per cent share in Warid Telecom which happens to be

SHARED HERITAGE: A view of Teesa river

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SIGNIFICANT LINK: Chittagong sea port is very crucial for shipment of goods to and from India the fourth largest mobile phone company in Bangladesh (entailing fresh infusion of $300 million cash, and taking over nearly $700 million of Warid’s debt liabilities). You may know that mobile phone operators in Bangladesh have seen an exponential growth over the last ten years. This is expected to continue in the years ahead.

Plans are being drawn up, presently, to provide Bangladesh — a hugely power deficit country — 250 MW electricity from India’s grid. An MOU was signed during the visit to start of cooperation in power trading and power sharing via linking up the power grids of the two countries, in the eastern, western and northern sectors, step by step. Let no one doubt the tremendous significance of this seemingly insignificant decision. Development needs power to fuel it, and development of both, Bangladesh and the northeastern region, has been hostage to acute shortages of power. Once operationalised, these significant transformatory steps will help to bring people of these regions closer through their ties of inter-dependence.

As the two countries have shared history and culture, so they have shared resources.

We share 54 rivers between us, some gigantic, others smaller but no less significant. Our life revolves around these waters. Sharing of

waters with our neighbours is no less emotionally charged than water-sharing disputes between Punjab and Haryana, for instance, or between other states within India. So let not, our friends here underestimate the powerful emotions triggered by water-sharing concerns that inevitably translate into the turmoil of domestic politics in Bangladesh.

However, it was heartening to see that both the leaders demonstrated sincere resolve to start working on resolving the outstanding water-sharing issues.

The historic Ganges Water Sharing Treaty of 1996, in the finalisation of which I played a small role, epitomised goodwill and cooperation. Bangladeshis will hope to see that spirit replicated in reaching a speedy solution to the sharing of waters of the Teesta, and other rivers. Taking cognizance of this necessity, the two Prime Ministers directed their respective Ministers to expeditiously conclude discussions on the sharing of the Teesta waters. The Joint Rivers Commission has been directed to discuss issues relating to Feni, Manu, Muhuri, Khowai, Gumti, Dharla and Dudhkumar. Dredging of Ichhamati, and river protection at Mahananda, Karatoa, Nagar, Kulik, Atrai, Dharla, and Feni have also been given due importance with the objective of addressing water shortage in the north of Bangladesh, along with flood-control, navigation and access to ports in the country, and ensuring flood protection in India.

India has also assured that it would not take any steps on Tipaimukh project that

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adversely impact Bangladesh. This has been a long pending apprehension of Bangladesh which has been assuaged during this visit. On India’s part, it is a confidence building measure for better environment for cooperation.

It is India’s enlightened self-interest to coopt Bangladesh in its own prosperity. Being a much greater economy, India may demonstrate a more expansive will and generosity to set Bangladesh-India relations on an upswing trajectory. I may be forgiven for descending from the sublime to the ridiculous by quoting something from a Hollywood movie (but I have gleefully cited this as a profound lesson in realpolitik to my students in government and politics in the United States!) In the film “Spiderman”, the superhero learns to his great chagrin that “with great power comes greater responsibility”.

The redeeming part of this homily is that the superhero grows into this role, quite easily!

India can help Bangladesh in emerging as a new economic partner and engine. Our two countries may even devise innovative ways to address the issue of better conserving and more efficiently managing resources that they share. Equality and mutual benefits should be the bedrock of our understanding of this relationship. Any deviation from these twin principles would be a blunder that neither history nor our successive generations will easily forgive.

(The author is High Commissioner of Bangladesh to India) May 2010

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GEOPOLITICS

MOUNTING MISGIVINGS

Will they address the bottlenecks?: PM Manmohan Singh with President Barack Obama during his recent US visit

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HE AMERICAN relationship with the republic of India is heading in the wrong direction. Given recent history, where strong and positive US-Indo relations were in full bloom, this is especially disconcerting. President George W Bush’s administration, long maligned as arrogantly unilateralist, forged a close bilateral partnership or even friendship — with the rising South Asian power. Bush saw India as a natural ally: the world’s largest multiethnic democracy, looking at its place in the world at the turn of this century through much the same prism our own ancestors looked through in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. As Harvard historian Sugata Bose observed, the strengthening of ties between India and the United States “may turn out to be the most significant foreign policy achievement of the Bush administration.”

Under President Barack Obama, however, those ties are undergoing a moderate but steady decline. Since Obama’s inauguration, our relationship with India has begun to erode. To its credit, the Obama administration authorized a $2.1 billion arms sale with New Delhi last year. But there is more — there should be more — to the American-Indian friendship than signing off on a Boeing contract with the Indian defence ministry For instance, trends in trade are worrisome.

Whereas in 2008 the United States exported $17.6 billion worth of goods to India, by 2009 that figure had dropped by more than $1 billion. Some of this is due to the recession, but consider: from 2001 through 2008, imports from India to the United States had gone up by $2 or $3 billion annually, culminating in $24 and $25.7 billion worth of goods imported in 2007 and 2008. That figure plummeted by $4.6 billion in 2009. During Bush’s tenure, protectionist economic policies were done away with. Outsourcing, that dirty word, was embraced. The United States became India’s largest investment foreign direct investment in petroleum exploration, infrastructure, mining, telecommunications, and other good things accounted for much of all investment into India.

The free trade policies agreed upon by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh liberated markets and destroyed barriers in agriculture, textiles, iron, steel, coffee, tea, information technology, pharmaceuticals, and more — and as a consequence, helped develop the rise of India’s first genuine middle class in history. According to the National Council for Applied Economic Research, there are approximately 220 million “aspiring” Indians — a “consumer class” — living in households earning between $2,000 and $4,400 per year,

CONTINUITY AT STAKE: Hillary Clinton needs to carrry on the US-India bonhomie of the Bush era who can now afford to buy niceties and luxuries. Some estimates have India’s middle class even larger. This was not the case fifteen or even ten years ago.

And when a caveat in this relationship deemed less beneficial to the United States arose, President Bush still kept things in longterm perspective so as not to denigrate our newfound camaraderie with India. When American food prices skyrocketed in 2008, Bush attributed it to India’s progress and implored Americans to place developments into a broader context: “Their middle class is larger than our entire population,” Bush said.

And when you start getting wealth, you start demanding better nutrition and better food.

And so demand is high and that causes the price to go up.

Today, President Obama sounds markedly different about India. He has employed populist oratory, criticizing “a tax code that says you should pay lower taxes if you create a job

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in Bangalore, India, than if you create one in Buffalo, New York.” Such language has increased anxieties in New Delhi. “We are already witnessing signs of protectionism in the world’s biggest economy,” the Indian external affairs minister was quoted as saying , proclaiming that “we will need to argue against this trend at the international [forums].” Just one month into Obama’s presidency, India was prepared to present its grievances with the new administration’s protectionist policies to the World Trade Organization The Obama-Reid-Pelosi trio eagerly cancelled the highly successful H-1B visa program, which was designed to encourage U.S. companies to hire Indian IT services (as well as tens of thousands of Indian engineers at a time of talent shortages). Congress barred U.S. corporations with bailout dollars from hiring foreign workers. This sparked largely overlooked outrage across India’s polity. “This is just irrational protectionism. … It makes no economic sense at all,” said the deputy chairman of India’s Planning Commission.

Opposition leaders called for boycotts of U.S. companies. “If these policies hurt Indians abroad,” said heavyweight politician Praveen Togadia, “then we have to take steps to hurt American companies in India.” In just a few short weeks, during the Bush-to-Obama transition, U.S.-Indo relations had gone from having never been better to tense and laced with rhetorical rancor.

For those of us who view India as an invaluable future ally, these are disturbing developments. Not unsurprisingly, as trade between the two countries deteriorates, it has adverse implications for other areas too. Our current disregard of India is risking nothing short of causing “great damage … to the foundations underlying the geostrategic partnership” itself, in the words of National Interest columnist J. Peter Pham. When President Obama seemed to blame India over the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan, India’s national security advisor promptly said Obama was “barking up the wrong tree”.

Additionally, Secretary of State Clinton skipped a visit to New Delhi during her maiden voyage to Asia, stoking concerns that the new administration was putting India on the back burner (opting instead to prioritize relations with an ascendant China). As former U.S. ambassador to India Robert D. Blackwill phrased it, “China today appears … to be on a substantially higher plane in U.S. diplomacy than India, which seems to have been downgraded in the administration’s calculations.” Validating this view, India was not mentioned even once in the Obama adminMay 2010

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istration’s official foreign policy agenda. The world’s largest democracy, more than one billion people — ignored This antagonism towards New Delhi is not merely an Obama phenomenon; the American Left itself has expressed its unease with a powerful India for quite some time. It was in 1998, after all, when President Bill Clinton imposed sanctions on India for conducting underground nuclear tests - treating an ally and proud democracy as if it were a rogue enemy and brutal tyranny. President Bush, on the other hand, lifted those sanctions in 2001 and signed a historic civilian nuclear agreement with India in 2006.

Why is there such a disparity of views on India between conservatives and liberals in the United States? Not all members of the Left, of course, hold a hostile opinion of India (Christopher Hitchens comes to mind). But by and large, the American Left seems to consider India the “biggest pain in Asia” in the words of Barbara Crossette, a writer at Foreign Policy.

Crossette criticizes India for not adhering to international accords which infringe upon a democracy’s sovereign right to control its nuclear destiny, as well as climate change treaties which would destroy India’s growth some of the very reasons American conservatives respect India. The Left is wary of India for the same reasons it remains wary of Israel: both democracies are fiercely nationalistic and unapologetically defend themselves against the Islamic lunatics.

The American Left simply prefers to play hardball with allies than with adversaries.

Recall President Carter’s handling of Iran: the allied Shah was condemned as an autocrat; the enemy Khomeini, a “holy man.” For Carter, our anticommunist allies were violators of human rights first, second, and third; the Soviets, murderers of tens of millions, were benign enough for Carter to proclaim Americans had an “inordinate fear of communism.”

Contemporaneously, the Left’s is a world where dictatorial Venezuela is to be apolo-

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gized for, democratic Colombia economically punished; where the fascists and racists and bus-bombers in Palestine are “misunderstood” and the democrats in Israel are Nazi brownshirts incarnate. Anti-American terrorists in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Lebanon are euphemised as “guerrillas,” whereas pro-American militiamen are castigated as “warlords” — and on and on it goes.

Embroiling the Indians in such amoral nonsense would threaten not only our present rapport with India, but also what could potentially become the most significant American alliance with another country this century - an alliance rooted in a commonality of values, genuine companionship and affection for one another, and solidarity against the totalitarian evils of the world. The United States should welcome India’s rise. We’re largely the reason it’s occurring.

(The author is with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, USA).

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TECHNO-SAVVY TERRORISTS DR. CORI E. DAUBER takes us to the new world of 'networked warfare' where terrorists have set up their own media labs, equipped with high-definition cameras, laptop computers and the software that permits images to be edited and manipulated. They are also effectively exploiting the Internet to capitalize upon the new information and media environment.

T

HERE IS a vast literature on the potential for new technologies to create a Revolution in Military Affairs or "networked warfare," but that is a discussion of the impact of military technology on the way the force itself can be used. Today, there is a question regarding the impact of new communication and information technologies in the hands of civilians — some of whom are combatants on the environment in which the force will be used. This monograph argues that the impact of these technologies has been, and will be, great enough that the way they are shaping the battlefield needs to be understood.

Waging war against terrorists (or insurgents using a terrorist playbook) is a qualitatively different enterprise from earlier wars.

By definition, terrorists are too weak to fight successful conventional battles. They fight to shape the perceptions and attitudes of the public — a battle over the public's will to continue fighting, whether that is the indigenous public insurgents seeking to intimidate or the American public they seek to influence so as to force counterinsurgents to withdraw from the battlefield prematurely. And in the modLog on geopolitics.com

ern world, this will be a battle to shape media coverage.

Terrorist attacks ought to be understood as consciously-crafted media events, and while that has always been the case, today it is more true than ever before in two ways. First, the terrorist attack is itself often designed and intended for the cameras. Terrorist attacks are designed for an audience. Their true target is not that which is blown up — that item or those people — for that is merely a stage prop.

What are really being targeted are those watching at home. The goal, after all, is to have a psychological effect (to terrorize), and it isn't possible to have such an effect on the dead.

Understanding the interaction between media needs and the way terrorist attacks satisfy those needs is essential. This is the case because developing strategies to fight an insurgent enemy has become more challenging as today's wars are taking place in a radically new information and media environment, and today's terrorists and insurgents have been brilliant at capitalizing on this environment in their operational art.

For today, terrorism is a media event in a second sense. Terrorists and insurgents are

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now no longer dependent upon the professional media to communicate. In fact, to an unprecedented degree, the professional media have become dependent upon them.

This is due to technological developments which permit any terrorist to film, edit, and upload their actions virtually in real time whether Western media are there to serve witness or not.

In the last few years, cameras of increasing quality (even high-definition) have become progressively cheaper and smaller even in countries without dependable electricity.

Laptop computers are similarly available worldwide and at progressively lower prices and higher quality. The software that permits images to be edited and manipulated is available worldwide, requiring no training beyond the instructions that come with the software.

The Internet alone is a powerful, even revolutionary, tool; the Internet in combination with these other technologies has the potential to be used as a weapon.

Technology, however, and the rapidly improving ways to distribute and disseminate content that technology makes possible, is nothing without the content itself. Consider

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g CYBERSPHERE that, ". . . al-Qaeda [AQI] and other terrorist organizations used to articulate their battle plan with rocks, and stones, and sticks, now we see them using Power Points with laptops and projectors on a wall." The content is sophisticated and improved steadily (although there is evidence that, at least in some areas, coalition efforts did manage to ultimately degrade their sophistication substantially.) Media labs are decentralized, (even as media strategies seem to be centralized) and the labs themselves are never connected to the Internet. Rather, any editing, production, and video compression are done in the labs. Once complete, videos are downloaded to thumb drives or (more likely, given the size of video files) portable hard drives and then taken elsewhere to be uploaded to the web.

How important was this effort to the insurgency in Iraq — and how important was the effort against their use of media technology to the ultimate success of the coalition effort?

Between June and roughly November 2007 (roughly the period corresponding to the "surge"), American forces captured eight media labs belonging to AQI. In these labs they found a total of 23 terabytes of material that had not yet been uploaded to the web.

Coalition forces made the labs a priority target under General David Petraeus because of their importance to AQI operations, recruitment, and funding. The loss of those labs, according to the Multi-National ForceIraq (MNF-I), resulted in more than an 80 percent degradation of AQI's capacity to get new material on the web as of September 2007, critical because it was the videos that played a large role in bringing in recruits from the larger Arab world.

All of this is made more urgent by the fact that the American television networks — unable for a variety of reasons to obtain usable combat footage on a regular basis — all depend on insurgents for visual products.

That is, they download footage of attacks insurgents have staged, filmed, and posted, then use that as news footage as if it had been filmed by Western photojournalists. The audience is almost never provided adequate warning as to the source of the footage. A number of ways audiences could be properly "cued" to the source of footage is offered. The government has no way to compel the press to comply with these recommendations.

Therefore, we must be aware of ways technology works for the insurgent — and look for ways to make technology work for us.

The Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, KS, has taken the lead here, for example, by embracing the potential inherent in blogging, but these kinds of initiatives will

require Army-wide support, both in terms of resources (bandwidth) and education (ensuring users are sensitive to security concerns, for example.) But the primary issue will continue to be responding to insurgents' use of technology in a more nimble and powerful way.

If the truth about an event that has made the news is not known, then by all means an investigation is in order, because nothing will erode credibility more rapidly than to reverse positions already taken. But it is critical that investigations be completed as quickly as possible while issues remain in the public eye, and that they not be used as a rhetorical crutch if there is no real need for them.

If the truth is known, military spokespeople need to be proactive, to engage in rapid response or, if at all possible, to get out ahead of stories that are predictable. When investigations are necessary, the military must

THE AMERICAN TELEVISION NETWORKS DOWNLOAD FOOTAGE OF ATTACKS INSURGENTS HAVE STAGED, FILMED, AND POSTED ON THE WEB understand that bringing them to closure as rapidly as possible-meaning before the story has fallen off the media's radar-is absolutely essential. It is not about satisfying the press, an annoyance that interferes with the mission. If the story has the potential to erode public support, either domestically or internationally, then it is, in fact, mission critical.

Because once the story leaves the natural ebb and flow of the news cycle, announcing the results of an investigation will mean very little. The resolution of a story never gets the same attention as the original story and the original impression is the one that most people will be left with. Over and over, accusations that the American military killed civilians are page 1 news. Reports of the investigation proving those accusations false, if they come after the story has played out, are page 32 news. Trying to change that approach to reporting the news is wasted effort —

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understanding the way the news is reported and adapting to it is critical.

Whenever possible, the military must be proactive. Opportunities come along to get ahead of a particular story or, on occasion, make news, and the military has too often been too hesitant. For example, when enemy media labs were captured, some of the material found was what might be referred to as Islamist blooper reels, and would have been quite powerful, if released. Having footage of that nature presents an opportunity. Circulated, it would have made that group look ridiculous, puncturing their carefully crafted image of competence, toughness, and manliness. Why the hesitance? There was, of course, a famous video released of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, one which made him look very foolish. Apparently, there were negative reactions to that video that led to the decision to hold off on further releases.

These polling data were unavailable, so it is impossible to comment on it, but when a communications strategy does not work as hoped, it is often better to look for ways to improve upon the execution of the strategy than to toss it out entirely. Was the response to the Zarqawi video so negative that there is absolutely no point revisiting the use of such material, in any configuration, with any framing or presentation, at any point? Or, were there nuances to those responses that could be used in crafting such releases? I cannot say without access to the data, but surely there is some way to make use of material such as this when it falls into the military's possession. Closer study of the Zarqawi data is clearly warranted — if this material has been found in some labs, it will be found in others, and having a skeletal strategy in place that takes that experience into account, would be well worthwhile. At a minimum, determining if the negative response was to some extent context-based is very important.

The problem is that all too often the American military has been reactive, for example, responding by saying that an incident is "under investigation." That is not a response.

That answer simultaneously freezes the potential for response-because what it says is that no real response will be forthcoming for an indefinite period of time — and one that opens the possibility that the claims made by the other side might be true, because if they were not, what would be the need for an investigation?

(The author is an Associate Professor of Communication Studies and of Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina) May 2010

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