[PDF Download] China football and development socialism and soft power 1st edition emanuel leite jun
China Football and Development Socialism and Soft Power 1st Edition Emanuel Leite Junior Carlos Rodrigues
Visit to download the full and correct content document: https://textbookfull.com/product/china-football-and-development-socialism-and-soft-po wer-1st-edition-emanuel-leite-junior-carlos-rodrigues/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant download maybe you interests ...
China's Education Aid to Africa: Fragmented Soft Power (China Policy Series) 1st Edition Wei Ye
China s Non State Soft Power Actors Tai Chi Traditional Culture and the Practice of Public Diplomacy China Policy Series 1st Edition Xiaoling Zhang Tony Hong
Social Urbanism in Latin America: Cases and Instruments of Planning, Land Policy and Financing the City Transformation with Social Inclusion Carlos Leite
This book uses football as a lens through which to examine China’s economic development, its political economy, and its political thought.
Focusing on the Chinese Football Development Plan, this book opens up new perspectives on the concepts of hegemony, soft power, socialism with Chinese characteristics, and China’s rise to the position of geopolitical superpower. Presenting a critical Marxist analysis of “soft power”, and drawing on Gramsci’s conceptualisation of hegemony, this book argues that football can be seen as a resource for seduction and persuasion, and therefore as an instrument to be used in the “hegemonic clash”. Reflecting on the idea of soft power in relation to imperialism and ideology, and standing in contrast to prevailing Western orthodox analyses of Chinese development, this book shows how the “Chinese Football Dream” is a significant component of the “Chinese Dream” of “rejuvenation of the nation” and shows how football can help us to better understand the role of the state as an inducer of development and creative destruction.
This is fascinating reading for anybody with an interest in sport policy, public policy, sport and society, football, development studies, political economy, or political thought.
Emanuel Leite Junior is Associate Researcher at the International College of Football at Tongji University, China. He was previously a researcher at the Centre for Asian Studies at the University of Aveiro, Portugal. His research is focused on the political economy and geopolitical implications of football in China. He has written on the history of football in the Soviet Union and on broadcasting rights in Brazilian football.
Carlos Rodrigues is Associate Professor in the Department of Social, Political and Territorial Sciences at the University of Aveiro, Portugal. His research focuses on territorial innovation systems, particularly on the role science, technology, and innovation policy and practice play in systemic, territorially based development processes, and Asian studies, particularly in the domains of EU–China relations, and sports, power, and development.
Routledge Research in Sport Politics and Policy
Series Editors: Jonathan Grix
Manchester Metropolitan University, UK
Laurence Chalip
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA
Barrie Houlihan
Loughborough University, UK
The Routledge Research in Sport Politics and Policy series aims to give shape to, and showcase, the burgeoning academic field of “sport politics and policy”. Highlighting the political nature of sport, the series shows how sport can illuminate our understanding of wider political themes such as, issues around governance; sport, foreign policy and “soft power”; gender politics, or the use of sport as a development tool. The series embraces all areas of sport politics and policy, including domestic, international and comparative studies, and includes work by world-leading and emerging scholars.
Available in this series:
Sport Policy in China
Jinming Zheng, Shushu Chen, Tien-Chin Tan and Barrie Houlihan
Sport, Statehood and Transition in Europe
Comparative perspectives from post-Soviet and post-socialist societies
Edited by Ekain Rojo-Labaien, Álvaro Rodríguez-Díaz and Joel Rookwood
Sport and Development in Emerging Nations
Edited by Cem Tinaz and Brendon Knott
Sport Participation and Olympic Legacies
A Comparative Study
Edited by Spencer Harris and Mathew Dowling
China, Football, and Development
Socialism and Soft Power
Emanuel Leite Junior and Carlos Rodrigues
For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/Routledge-Research-inSport-Politics-and-Policy/book-series/RRSPP
China, Football, and Development
Socialism and Soft Power
Leite Junior and Carlos Rodrigues
Emanuel
First published 2024 by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
The right of Emanuel Leite Junior and Carlos Rodrigues to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice : Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN: 978-1-032-51116-0 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-51117-7 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-40117-9 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003401179
Typeset in Optima by codeMantra
Foreword
A brilliant job. A bright young man
I’ve known Emanuel Leite Junior for a few years. I consider myself a very observant person and from the first contacts until our meeting at the University of Aveiro in 2019, I could see that I was in front of a great human being. This human greatness is expressed in some typical preferences of a people like ours – Brazilian, football lover, and the history of what this sport represents beyond the four lines. His consolidated Marxist background conditioned him to get out of appearances and realise the essence behind the role of football for the so-called “Chinese soft power”. Not only that. But also the meaning of football for socialism with Chinese characteristics and for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
The intellectual effort that Emanuel made in the face of the need to go beyond football was herculean. He went deep into working with concepts like hegemony. He was accurate in going over the history of sport’s role in early socialist experiments as a means of anti-war diplomacy. In fact, China faces an immense task that unfolds amidst a semiotic storm against its experience that invades our lives and relationships. Even so, the Chinese are starting to deliver what Javier Vadell calls, and very well explored by Emanuel, “Embedded Chinese Globalisation”. From an intellectual point of view, it is a very impressive and successful effort made by Emanuel to relate this “alternative globalisation” with the strategic objectives of the Chinese State.
I am a person increasingly interested in building concepts, categories, and a new theoretical framework about what happens to China – a way of capturing the concept forming in a real movement that escapes the theories that are at our disposal. The concept of “New Social-Economic Formation” and “New Projectment Economy” makes me proud to see its realisation in the brilliant work of Emanuel Leite Junior and Carlos Rodrigues. Yes, “Projectment” is a historical condition characterised by the elevation of human dominance over nature, raising economic planning to higher levels. This movement to elevate human dominance over nature should be accompanied by the search for new theoretical contributions. It is from this historical process that new theories
are constructed and elaborated. We can say that the degree of intellectual sophistication of Emanuel Leite Junior put a brick in this arduous task of capturing the essence of the concept manifesting itself in reality.
In addition to all the competence demonstrated by Emanuel, he also had the fundamental contribution of Professor Carlos Rodrigues. Director of the Department of Social, Political and Territorial Sciences at the University of Aveiro, coordinator of the Master’s in Chinese Studies, and director of the Centre for Asian Studies in the same department for many years, Carlos’s deep knowledge of China, and its political, economic, and social dynamics, was essential for the development of this work. Starting with the initiative to invite Emanuel to research the theme that materialised in the excellent doctoral thesis defended by Emanuel, and which is now made public through this indispensable book not only for anyone interested in the study of football and its impact on international relations, but for anyone who is particularly interested in understanding Chinese public policy and political economy – not just sports policy. I am aware that Carlos’s partnership with Emanuel went far beyond the usual supervisor-student relationship in doctoral research. Since when we became closer, I could see that Emanuel was very well accompanied in his academic career. I was also one of the discussants on Emanuel’s doctoral panel, and I am sure that the intellectual robustness and the contribution of the analysis of the case studies brought by this book are the result of this relationship between two intellectual partners that complement each other. Finally, I would just like to add that I consider Emanuel to be one of the most promising Marxist intellectuals of his generation. I am very proud to follow this trajectory. Actually, as I usually joke, I envy him. I always wanted to write about football, science, Marxism, and national project. I felt fulfilled by this beautiful work by Emanuel. A friend, brother, companion, comrade. A bright young man. And it is only at the beginning of a promising trajectory.
ELIAS MARCO KHALIL JABBOUR
Rio de Janeiro, December 2, 2022
Acknowledgements
This book, which materialises a great personal, intellectual, and professional fulfilment, would not have been possible without the fundamental support of some people. As cliché it may sound, I can’t start these acknowledgements without mentioning my parents, Emanuel and Alice – without them I would definitely not have made this far. My wife, Neuza, my companion in the true sense of the word, always by my side. My daughter Isabela, the source of inspiration and motivation to move forward. Professor Carlos Rodrigues, an essential person for the realisation of this book, from the excellent relationship during my PhD; a supervisor who became an intellectual partner; and of course, as a co-author for the exchange of knowledge so that my thesis would become this book. I also thank the Research Unit on Governance, Competitiveness and Public Policies (GOVCOPP) and the Centre for Asian Studies of the Department of Social Sciences, Politics and the Territory, both at the University of Aveiro, throughout the necessary structure and by research scholarships that allowed me to conclude my PhD and start adapting my thesis in this book. Finally, I thank the Language and Culture Department, University of Aveiro, on behalf of Professor Carlos Morais, for the necessary support during my postdoc, during which this book was completed.
Emanuel Leite Junior Shanghai, January 26, 2023
This book is the outcome of an amazing research adventure. In retrospect, the adventurous path was made of a mix of planned and unplanned moves, the latter being clearly predominant. Let me hang on the coincidental part of the story. Firstly, my appointment as coordinator of Asian Studies at the University of Aveiro in 2011. A big and unexpected challenge for a researcher hitherto working on issues related to regional development and science, technology, and innovation policies. Challenge taken, I came to enthusiastically embrace the task, and Asia, particularly China, would emerge as a favourite field of scientific inquiry. The research on China would gain new strength in 2016.
x Acknowledgements
Coming from the other side of the Atlantic, namely from the Brazilian state of Pernambuco, a sports journalist joined the University of Aveiro’s PhD programme in Public Policy. The shared passion for both China and football made it easy for me to accept Emanuel’s PhD supervision and start the journey that culminated in this book. I am grateful for the opportunity to work with such a brilliant researcher.
Carlos Rodrigues Aveiro, January 27, 2023
Introduction
The reader who arrived at this book through its title – “China, Football, and Development: Socialism and Soft Power” – might find it strange that in the first two chapters of this work little is said about football and sport as a whole. Incidentally, dear reader, we perfectly understand that you may still wonder why Chapters 3 and 4 talk so much about topics (as the Sino-Soviet split or discuss China’s dominant economic and social formation in such detail) that, a priori, are not relatable or are not so associated with football and sport. Even those who purchased a copy of this book aware that components such as “development”, “socialism”, and “soft power” expressed in the title reflect the dimension beyond sport or sports practices, in particular football, and may wonder – or mentally question us, the authors of this work – why we work with so many theoretical concepts, such as power and even soft power, or why we present a historical analysis of politics and sports diplomacy in the People’s Republic of China since 1949 instead of simply sticking to the most recent period of experience of Chinese socialism, in particular the governance of Xi Jinping, responsible for documents such as “Opinions on Accelerating the Development of Sports Industry and Promoting Sports Consumption” (国务院
关于加快发展体育产业促进体育消费的若干意见), “The Overall Reform Plan to Boost the Development of Football in China” (中国足球改革发展总体方案), and, of course, the “China’s Medium and Long-Term Football Development Plan (2016–2050)” (中国足球中长期发展规划 2016–2050年).
Obviously, there is a reason for this. No, it is not the result of chance, and much less does it denote a lack of synthesis and objectivity; that is, it is not a problem of prolixity. If you are reading this book, it is certainly because you are interested not only in football but in the political and geopolitical dimension of the “beautiful game”. There is also the probability that you are also interested in Chinese studies and seek in this book to enrich your knowledge of China, with the aim of understanding more the dynamics of this aspect of Chinese society and economy in its developmental march that transformed one of the poorest countries in the world into one of the richest and most technologically advanced within four decades. Therefore, the starting point for this book and the option for structuring it are the notion
that sport is a cultural phenomenon, on the one hand, central in the cultural formation of different peoples and different nations, being, for example, a key element in the formation of identities – local, regional, national – and, on the other hand, being part of people’s daily lives; their conversations in bars and cafes, in the corridors of schools and colleges, and at work; and so on. In addition to the dimension as a cultural phenomenon, sport is also a preponderant component in the entertainment industry and has consolidated itself in recent years as a lucrative business. Much more than that. The so-called “sports industry” goes far beyond its entertainment facet. In the last decades, sports have been transformed into a large global business, in which it has been appropriated by the consumer culture. Sport has become a valuable commodity, and the sports business represents a market with a significant economic dimension, involving products, services, places, and events. The sports industry comprehends, among others, the entertainment industry, the sporting events industry, and also the sports teams and sports leagues industry, as well as the entire production and consumption chain related to the sports-related equipment and apparel industries. Bearing in mind that sport is, at the same time, a cultural phenomenon and a business on a global scale with ramifications in various economic sectors, and at the same time has a political and geopolitical dimension, we also agree with the idea that only a very limited number of sports attain the heights of genuine popular culture and reach well beyond the niche of their immediate producers and consumers, and in that sense football represents one of the very few languages that is understood on a global scale (Markovits & Rensmann, 2010). That is why we concur with John Hargreaves, for whom power is diffused and circulates throughout the social body and sport constitute a fundamental component of power networks (Hargreaves, 1987).
So, that is why the structure, theoretical framework and conceptual discussions of this book reflect the authors’ methodological option for dialectical historical materialism, that is, Marxism as science, as Lukács taught us, the proletarian science (Lukács, 1972). After all, the big difference between Marxism as a method lies precisely in the point of view of totality. Let us not forget that, as Lukács well put it, “the category of totality, the all-pervasive supremacy of the whole over the parts is the essence of the method which Marx took over from Hegel and brilliantly transformed into the foundations of a wholly new science” (Lukács, 1972, p. 27). Hence, for us, football serves as an instrument for the analysis of sociological, political, geopolitical, and economic; in short, it allows us to concretely analyse concrete situations. In the Chinese case, in particular football and the Chinese football industry, we understand that it is an excellent analytical tool to understand, on the one hand, the economic and social formation of China and, on the other, the disruptive dynamics caused by the Chinese rise in the scenario of global geopolitics and the shock to the western hegemonic status quo that this has caused in the centre of the capitalist world system, in particular the only
global superpower since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the United States. Therefore, contrary to the dominant logic in capitalism, just as one cannot separate the producer from the total process of production, nor should one dissociate the division of the process of labour into parts at the cost of the individual humanity of the worker; much less if it is necessary to proceed with the atomisation of society into individuals who simply go on producing without rhyme or reason (Lukács, 1972), it seems inconceivable to us, as it is insufficient, to analyse the Chinese Football Development Plan in its particular, dissociated from the whole. That is, we cannot look at the development planning of the Chinese football industry individually, but rather as part of the universal, integrated with its totality, that is, with its social, political, economic, and geopolitical context.
But more than that. As Gramsci rightly stated, “the subjectivist conception is characteristic of modern philosophy in its most complete and advanced form” and it was from it “and as its overcoming that historical materialism was born, which puts in realistic and historicist language what traditional philosophy expressed in a speculative form” (Gramsci, 1999, p. 131). Still according to the prominent Italian thinker, only “a more concretely historicist conception of philosophy, which, moreover, can only occur in the philosophy of praxis” (Gramsci, 1999, p. 117), is capable of overcoming common sense. The historicism present in the Gramscian method of analysis is fundamental, as it shows that under dialectical historical materialism, reality can only be understood in its totality if considered from its historical conditions. That is why we believe that the historical comprehension of the Chinese revolutionary process is essential, understood here in its initial stage of socialist transition. For it is the historical context that allows us to understand, on the one hand, why Xi Jinping does not represent a rupture with the legacy of Deng Xiaoping, while the latter did not represent a discontinuity of the revolutionary process led by Mao Zedong. And, on the other hand, it is only possible for us to understand the objectives posed by the Chinese Football Development Plan in the light of the historical evolution of sports in the People’s Republic of China and the internal and external conjuncture at each stage of this historical process.
We think, then, that dialectical historical materialism only materializes through the philosophy of praxis which, according to Gramsci, can only present itself, initially, in a polemical and critical attitude, as overcoming the previous way of thinking and the existing concrete thought (or existing cultural world). And therefore, as Gramsci adds, first of all, the philosophy of praxis presents itself as a critique of “common sense” (and this after relying on common sense to demonstrate that “all” are philosophers and that it is not a question of introducing ex novo a science in the individual life of “everyone”, but of innovating and making “critical” an already existing activity; Gramsci, 1999, p. 101). It is for this reason that we base our book on a theoretical framework that takes Marxism, in its various interpretations, as a science. This
is also why we propose alternative and heterodox lines of debate in this work, seeking to contribute to the discussion and debate about the Chinese rise and its impacts on global geopolitics.
It is also in the sense of critique of the “common sense” established around concepts such as soft power that this book adopts a different perspective on this concept, seeking to reflect critically from the conceptualization of power and the influence of ideology in the exercise of power and, in particular, in the framework of soft power as an instrument of hegemonic dispute, that is, resorting to the theory of hegemony in Gramsci as the main theoretical foundation so that we can debate issues as current as the tension that the West created with China as a form of trying to stop its rise, at the same time as a means for us to seek to understand concepts such as “Embedded Chinese Globalisation” (Jabbour, Dantas, & Vadell, 2021) and how this practice effectively differs from that Western hegemon. Still in the sense of breaking a certain common sense, especially prevalent in the West, this book seeks to oppose the conception of the economic and social formation of China as state capitalism, aligning our understanding, here, with the thought of Elias Jabbour and others, who bring more complex understandings of Chinese socialism, such as, for example, the concept of the “New Projectment Economy” (Gabriele & Jabbour, 2022, p. 325; Jabbour & Dantas, 2021, p. 290).
This book is divided into nine chapters. In Chapters 1–4, as we already explained, we make a theoretical, conceptual, and dialectical historical materialist discussion that are obviously linked to Chapters 5-9, which are more concrete case studies on the practical dimension of the execution of the Chinese Football Plan (although Chapter 5 also brings some theoretical reflection).
In Chapter 1, which we called “Soft Power or hegemony?”, we bring a critical analysis of the concept of soft power and the incorporation of other theoretical frameworks to discuss and understand the concepts of power and hegemony. This is a dense chapter, from a theoretical point of view, as it presents a Marxist reflection on how the concept of soft power is ideological, serving the interests of maintaining Western imperialist hegemony. This is a fundamental chapter, because it contains the theoretical and conceptual foundation that helps us understand how the revolutionary process and Chinese development are characterized as anti-imperialist, while allowing us to understand how sport, in particular football, reflects the dynamics of imperialist expansion and how globalisation with Chinese characteristics, which has sports diplomacy as one of its instruments, differs from Western globalisation, in particular the globalisation of neoliberal capitalism.
In Chapter 2, “Soft power with Chinese characteristics”, we go deeper into the issue of soft power with Chinese characteristics, explaining from the initial discussions of the concept by academics and theorists of the Communist Party of China why in China this concept has an interpretation very much to its reality. In this chapter, we also introduce the subject of sports diplomacy. In this chapter, we see some of the tools that China seeks to use to attract
legitimacy, respect, and admiration from other peoples and nations, in the hegemonic dispute in which its rapid economic development and the success of its policies to eradicate extreme poverty and technological development put it, since the West, dominant for at least five centuries in global geopolitics, felt threatened.
In Chapter 3, “Sports and politics in the People’s Republic of China”, as the title indicates, we seek to demonstrate how sport is intrinsically related to political and geopolitical processes in New China, from the Sovietisation of Chinese sport to the Olympic Glory. Here we also bring some initial discussions about the public policy process in China.
In Chapter 4, “The Football Development Plan”, we start from the discussion on the impacts of globalisation on football and seek to frame the Football Plan to the historical context of contemporary Chinese politics to explain why the Plan was released in 2016 and not before. In this context, by dealing with how the plan is formulated and how it is being implemented, we deepen the question of Chinese public policies and socialism with Chinese characteristics. Having the Football Plan as an object of study and analytical starting point, what is done in this chapter is to seek to explain Chinese political economy and geopolitics, in particular socialism with Chinese characteristics, from the theoretical perspective of Marxism. In addition, we discuss the most recent changes in Chinese football between the end of 2020 and the beginning of 2021. Finally, we make a theoretical discussion on the concept of soft disempowerment, framed under something that guides the theoretical framework of this book, which is the discussion about hegemony, power, and imperialism.
Chapter 5, entitled “The Football Plan, creative destruction, and innovation”, is a transitional chapter, so to speak. This is because in this chapter there is still some theoretical and conceptual discussion, but we have also started the stage of the book in which a more concrete analysis of the role of the Football Plan is presented. Starting from the problem identified by the Chinese authorities and projected in the Football Plan – the need to increase the practice and consumption of football in China. The analysis of the policy document has been carried out under the light of the theory of innovation, namely, the contributions of Joseph Schumpeter and Peter Drucker, who look at innovation to foster change in the social and economic environment, inducing new patterns of behaviour and creating new habits. So, the role of Chinese state planning on creative destruction is highlighted here. In other words, the State as the engine of innovation and development of the industry (sports and football, in this case) and, consequently, of the economy, but also as the inducer of new practices and consumption, that is, the State that educates.
Chapter 6, “Barriers and shortcomings for naturalised players”, presents the recent discussion in China, which also had repercussions in the West, on the situation of naturalized foreign players who were called up to the Chinese national team. Considering the discussion held in Chapter 5 on the issue of social innovation, the challenges and barriers faced by China on this issue, in Chapter 6 we bring a concrete example of the obstacles and difficulties that
the concrete reality puts ahead of the development of a culture of football in China: the case of naturalized players.
Chapter 7, “People-to-people connections: belt, road and ball”, in addition to the Football Plan, we also analyse the document “Action plan for the development of sports tourism ‘Belt and Road’ (2017–2020)”. We focused on the Belt and Road Initiative, its importance for Chinese foreign policy, for China’s economic development, and for foreign trade, outlining the points of congruence of this ambitious and grandiose Chinese project with football and Chinese business in football. It can be said that this is the second case study, since, from the theoretical framework of sports diplomacy and Chinese geopolitics, we present football as a connecting element. Chapter 8, “China’s relationship with the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP): the case of football”, as the title indicates, we look at the strong relationship that China has with the CPLP countries is highlighted. This is yet another case study chapter, which seeks to demonstrate how some of the objectives of the Football Plan are, or are not, being achieved within the scope of China’s relations with Brazil, Portugal, and the African Countries with Portuguese as an Official Language (PALOP).
Finally, Chapter 9, “Football, socialism with Chinese characteristics, and hegemony: a possible synthesis and the prospects for an alternative globalisation”, in which we bring some conclusive reflections aiming to reinforce the main objectives of this book. That is, to elaborate a critical Marxist analysis of the concept of soft power, starting from Gramsci’s conceptualization of hegemony; discussing how the idea of soft power is related to imperialism and the inherent ideological domination; addressing football as a resource for seduction and persuasion, therefore, as an instrument to be used in the hegemonic clash; realizing how the Football Plan helps to better understand socialism with Chinese characteristics; and, accordingly, demonstrating how the “Chinese Football Dream” is part of the “Chinese Dream” of “rejuvenation of the nation”.
References
Gramsci, A. (1999). Cadernos do Cárcere, vol. 1 (C. N. Coutinho (ed.); 1st ed.).
Civilização Brasileira.
Hargreaves, J. (1987). Sport, Power and Culture: A Social and Historical Analysis of Popular Sports in Britain. Polity.
Jabbour, E., & Dantas, A. (2021). Ignacio Rangel na China e a “Nova Economia do Projetamento.” Economia e Sociedade, 30(2), 287–310. https://doi.org/10.1590/ 1982-3533.2021v30n2art01
Jabbour, E., Dantas, A., & Vadell, J. (2021). Da nova economia do projetamento à globalização instituída pela China. Estudos Internacionais, 9(4), 90–105.
Lukács, G. (1972). History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics. The MIT Press.
Markovits, A. S., & Rensmann, L. (2010). Gaming the World: How Sports Are Reshaping Global Politics and Culture. Princeton University Press.
Chapter 1
Soft power or hegemony?
The concept of (soft) power
Soft power is one of several attempts to define what the term “power” means. When conceptualising soft power, Nye reveals his view about the meaning of power and, mainly, the ways through which power can be exercised. This is a major reason for Nye’s attempt to differentiate hard from soft power. However, to understand what soft power represents, first we need to know more about what power is. This is an old debate. Rothman says that from Thucydides to Machiavelli, “power is part of international relations studies” (Rothman, 2011, p. 49). Like Barnett and Duvall put it, “power does not have a single expression or form” (Barnett & Duvall, 2005a, p. 3). For this reason, the concept of “power” is, to this day, extensively discussed, particularly in the fields of political science and international relations (Barnett & Duvall, 2005a; Gilpin, 1981; Mistry, 2004; Moon, 2019; Xu et al., 2018).
Indeed, Nye himself, in different passages of his vast work on soft power, draws our attention to the difficulty of defining or measuring what power is. In his seminal book Bound to Lead, in which he first coined the term “soft power”, the political scientist compares power to weather, saying that “everyone talks about it, but few understand it” and adds, still in a metaphorical approach, that “power, like love, is easier to experience than to define or measure” (Nye, 1990, p. 24). The author repeats these comparisons when he says that although the definition of power is difficult to understand, despite everyone feeling it, this does not make it “less real” (Nye, 2004, p. 1). The author, however, reiterates the importance of understanding the meaning of power (Nye, 2011, p. 3), despite admitting that it is “a contested concept” (Nye, 2011, p. 5).
The classical definition of power is the one by Robert Dahl, who conceptualised power as a relation among people: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do” (Dahl, 1957, pp. 202–203). In other words, the relational idea behind Dahl’s definition is that power is the ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not do (Mistry, 2004; Nye, 1990). On the other hand, although admitting that
the concept of power is “troublesome”, Gilpin defines power simply as “the military, economic, and technological capabilities of states”, but he recognises that his conception “leaves out important and intangible elements that affect the outcomes of political actions” (Gilpin, 1981, p. 13).
A different framework to comprehend power is presented by Pierre Bourdieu, which proposes a general theory of social practices that combines material and symbolic dimensions. For Bourdieu, all social practices are oriented towards maximising material interests or symbolic results. Bourdieu conceptualises power as capital by recognising different types of capital “or power, which amounts to the same thing” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 16); that is, power has different origins and manifests itself through different forms. For him, forms of capital can be accumulated and exchanged with other forms, transforming into one another. These resources are transformed into capital when they are characterised as power relations in a structure of social hierarchies. According to Bourdieu, there are four forms of capital: economic capital, “which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalised in the form of property rights” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 16); cultural capital, derived from education, academic titles, epistemic knowledge, and recognised experience as one source of power (Bourdieu, 1986); social capital, “made up of social obligations – connections” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 16); and symbolic capital, “the power granted to those who have obtained sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition” (Bourdieu, 1989, p. 23).
Therefore, as we can see, power has several dimensions. Particularly in the international relations field, power can manifest itself as “economic and military capabilities, national will, internal strength, relative standing versus other states, soft power, fungibility, and an ability to influence others and to control international outcomes” (Mistry, 2004, p. 66). That is why Barnett and Duvall claim that “in general terms, power is the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate” (Barnett & Duvall, 2005b, p. 8).
Based on behavioural and relational assumptions, Nye defines power as “the ability to control others” (Nye, 1990, p. 26) or “more specifically, power is the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants” (Nye, 2004, p. 2). Another important aspect to take into consideration is that “power is conveyed through resources, whether tangible or intangible” (Nye, 2011, p. 8). Thus, it is necessary to have resources and, therefore, according to Nye, power can be considered “as the possession of resources”, which would be “population, territory, natural resources, economic size, military forces, and political stability among others” (Nye, 1990, p. 26). But, as the author points out, “power conversion is a basic problem”, especially because “some countries are better than others at converting their resources into effective influence” (Nye, 1990, p. 27). So, how can this conversion be done? Following the author, “power is the ability to influence others to
achieve the results they want, which can be done through coercion, payment or attraction” (Nye, 2012, p. 151). And “you can coerce them with threats; you can induce them with payments; or you can attract and co-opt them to want what you want” (Nye, 2004, p. 2). Therefore, according to Nye, we have two relational dimensions here. The first one is “to command others to change their behavior against their initial preferences” (Nye, 2011, p. 11) –for example, when the United States uses its military power to compel others to change their foreign policies (Barnett & Duvall, 2005b, p. 41) or the US economic blockade on Cuba. The second dimension is the one that “affect others’ preferences so that they want what you want and you need not command them to change” (Nye, 2011, p. 11).
The first dimension, characterised by coercion (e.g., military force) or pay (e.g., economic force), would be hard power, and, in contrast to that, there would be soft power. As Nye explains, “A country can obtain the results it desires in international politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example and aspiring to its level of prosperity – will want to follow it” (Nye, 2004, p. 5). Soft power is what he called “indirect or co-optive power behavior”. And a country can co-opt through the “attraction of ones’ idea or the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences that others express” (Nye, 1990, p. 32). This is why soft power is deemed as the “power of attraction and seduction” (Nye, 2004, p. 5). In order to set the agenda or determine the framework of a debate, a country relies on “intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions” (Nye, 1990, p. 32).
As Brannagan and Giulianotti (2018, p. 1140) put, Nye coined the term “soft power” seeking “to respond to two interlinked shifts in relationships between states and international society”:
First, following advances in global communications, a growing range of actors had gained the capacity to collate, shape and distribute everexpanding volumes of information to different audiences. Second, these diverse actors were transforming how political powers are acquired and exercised.
This matches the argument that “in the contemporary period transnational activists have been able to shame multinational corporations and abusive governments to alter their economic and human rights policies, respectively” (Barnett & Duvall, 2005b, p. 8). Nye (1990, p. 32) states, “In an age of information-based economies and transnational interdependence, power is becoming less transferable, less tangible, and less coercive”.
The states started to face the “paradox of plenty”. “A plenitude of information leads to a poverty of attention. Attention rather than information becomes the scarce resource, and those who can distinguish valuable signals from white noise gain power” (Nye, 2002a, pp. 68–69). With so many
actors striving for standing out amid so much information, which generates the noise of communication, states have the need to promote their legitimacy and attractiveness. China, by the way, realised the importance of dealing with this paradox, as can be seen in a President Xi Jinping’s speech: “Information resources have become important factors in production and social wealth. a major indicator of its soft power and competitiveness” (Xi, 2014, p. 219). Throughout this chapter, we will see how China seeks to mobilise its power resources to achieve desired results through the exercise of soft power.
Not by chance, as Jenni Hargreaves and Ian McDonald put it, cultural studies are concerned with the social significance and systematic analysis of cultural practices, experiences, and institution (Hargreaves & McDonald, 2000). John Hargreaves argues, in turn, that culture means “those activities, institutions and processes that are more implicated in the systematic production and reproduction of systems of meaning and/or those not concerned mainly or immediately with economic or political processes” (Hargreaves, 1987, p. 9). Among the major institutions, the author mentions religion, education, science, arts, mass communication, and sports. Accordingly, when characterising sport as a cultural formation, he points out that “cultural elements constitute absolutely fundamental components of power networks” (p. 8), and, moreover, he considers that sport, by playing different roles in relation to different cultures, has the capacity to reproduce power relations. Therefore, it is not surprising that cultural achievements and sports success are also ways to win the admiration of others. This can be done by adapting the state’s international agenda in the quest to shape the preference and behaviour of others in relation to the state (Brannagan & Giulianotti, 2018). That is why sports can be a very useful tool in the exercise of soft power (Brannagan & Giulianotti, 2015, 2018; Brannagan & Rookwood, 2016; Chari, 2015; Chen et al., 2012; Delgado, 2016; Grix & Lee, 2013; Korneeva & Ogurtsov, 2016; Krzyzaniak, 2016; Leite Junior & Rodrigues, 2017; Samuel-Azran et al., 2016) as we will see later.
Power and ideology
An additional definition of power is provided by Steven Lukes’s threedimensional perspective (Lukes, 1974). We have left to mention this conceptualisation in this section because it has, in some way, to do with the perspective on soft power that, henceforth, we will adopt, that is, soft power as an instrument of dispute for the exercise of hegemony, either for the conquest or maintenance of dominion or in search for recognition and legitimacy. After all, as the Gramscian perspective teaches us, consensus is born out of prestige, that is, trust, and soft power, as we saw earlier, is exactly a way to build and manage reputations.
Lukes, when theorising about power, identifies the existence of three dimensions of power and notes that, if considered separately, the understanding
power or hegemony? 11
of the term and its manifestations would be incomplete. The first dimension concerns “the study of concrete, observable behavior” (Lukes, 1974, p. 12), which, in short, would be related to Dahlian formulation. The author borrows the second dimension from Bachrach and Baratz (1962), who suggest that power has two faces. The “first face” is the one in which power would be exercised when A’s action affects B’s decision, but it would also be necessary to identify the “hidden” social forces that impede the formation of a political agenda. According to the two authors referenced by Lukes, power also manifests itself when the most powerful, with greater or lesser intent, act to prevent their interests from being contested or threatened, thus controlling the agenda setting process.
Finally, Lukes argues that a third dimension of power would be missing, the ideological one. Lukes’s understanding is expressed in the form of a rhetorical question: “is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences?” (Lukes, 1974, p. 24). The author considers that there are hidden manifestations in society and that power operates under various forms, including being hidden from the perception of those subjugated to it – there are “many ways in which potential issues are kept out of politics, whether through the operation of social forces and institutional practices or through individuals’ decisions” (Lukes, 1974, p. 24). Power, in Lukes’s view, goes beyond getting others to act in your interest or setting the agenda. Power actually embodies these two aspects in the sense that it gets results through dependence, adherence, alliance, or complicity, even when it does not need to be exercised or when there is no conflict of interest. As the same author puts it, “this, moreover, can occur in the absence of actual, observable conflict, which may have been successfully averted – though there remains here an implicit reference to potential conflict. This potential, however, may never in fact be actualized” (Lukes, 1974, p. 24). He adds that “what one may have here is a latent conflict, which consists in a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude” (Lukes, 1974, pp. 24–25).
Although Lukes mentions Antonio Gramsci, he does not devote much thought to the concept of hegemony proposed by the Italian philosopher. However, when Lukes describes a power that operates in a veiled way, hidden from the perception of those who are subjugated to it, it is evident that this “third dimension of power” is understood as a manifestation of power through the consensus given by the dominated classes to the ruling class, that is, the subordination of social classes in relation to the dominant class, adopting the dominant group’s conception of the world, thus allowing this group to maintain its position of domination and leadership. The conceptualisation of a “third dimension of power” demonstrates exactly this unequal appropriation of power and the development of a “hegemony” of the most powerful group over the others, including at the cultural level. After all, for
hegemony?
Gramsci, ideology is the ground on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, and struggle (Gramsci, 2007a). Thus, ideology is part of a natural or social reality as a sign whose meaning refers to something outside of itself. This is at the heart of Marxist theory. Ideological signs not only reflect social reality, but they are also fragments of that reality. Therefore, the awareness that Gramsci refers to, as we can find in Marx and Engels, becomes awareness only when imbued with ideological content. The establishment of this relationship between discourse and sign takes place within the ideological dispute. In addition, the hegemonic perspective of the dominant classes markedly influences this clash. After all, ideology, as Lukes himself points out in his definition of power, is directly linked to maintaining the status quo Accordingly, the idea of power as the active hegemony of the dominant group draws back to Marx and Engels, as we can find in The German Ideology
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas (…) The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance.
(Marx & Engels, 1976, p. 47)
Hence, ideology does not seem to be the result of chance, as implicit in the Nyean concept of soft power, which disregards the ideological dimension of power, since, as we will discuss later, although not explicitly, it is based on the idea that US values are universal. One must bear in mind that, as Eagleton (1991) points out, a single adequate definition of ideology, hitherto, has not been provided. Löwy (2010) suggests that it is difficult to find in social science a concept as complex, as diverse in meaning, as the concept of ideology. Even in the Marxist tradition, in which the concept is widely discussed, there is no consensus. As Eagleton (1991) explains, from Marx himself to later Marxist thinkers, the focus has been placed on the idea of true and false cognition (or false consciousness, we would add), with ideology as illusion, distortion, and mystification. An alternative tradition of thought, which has Lenin as one of its precursors, has been less epistemological than sociological, because is concerned with the function of ideas in social life, rather than with their reality or unreality (Eagleton, 1991).
When Marx conceptualises ideology, as Löwy (2010, p. 10) recalls, he takes up a term that was “literally invented (out of nowhere)” by the French philosopher Destutt de Tracy, “a third-rate disciple of the Encyclopedists, who published in 1801 a book called Eléments d’ldéologie”. When Marx resumes the concept again, he does so by taking its Napoleonic meaning (Löwy, 2010).
In Marx (and Engels), as in the quote above from The German Ideology, “the concept of ideology appears as equivalent to illusion, false consciousness, idealistic conception in which reality is inverted and ideas appear as the engine of real life” (Löwy, 2010, p. 11). In Marx and Engels words, “The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think” (Marx & Engels, 1976, p. 47). In the conception of the founders of Marxism, therefore, the term “ideology” implies understanding that this consciousness justifies a certain relationship of domination. It is thus a matter of class. As Lukács puts it, “the barrier which converts the class consciousness of the bourgeoisie into ‘false’ consciousness is objective; it is the class situation itself” (Lukács, 1972, p. 54). In the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859), Marx expands the concept and speaks of ideological forms through which individuals and society become aware of real life, bringing over the term “social consciousness”.
In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness [our emphasis].
(Marx & Engels, 1976, p. 503)
Here we are before the revolutionary consciousness that concerns the ability, of individuals or classes, to unravel the causality of society and find its own movement. After all, “at a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production” (Marx & Engels, 1976, p. 503). That is why Lukács states that “the fate of the revolution (and with it the fate of mankind) will depend on the ideological maturity of the proletariat, i.e. on its class consciousness” (Lukács, 1972, p. 70). However, it seems clear that for this line of Marxist thought, ideology is still seen under a critical bias, given the distorted consciousness of reality through the power relation that imposes the ideas of the ruling class as dominant ideology. It is not only necessary for the subjugated, the working class, to take consciousness, but also, using Lukács’s words, “abolishing class society as such”. That is the reason why “‘Ideology’ for the proletariat is no banner to follow into battle, nor is it a cover for its true objectives: it is the objective and the weapon itself” (Lukács, 1972, p. 70). In short, ideology is essentially a relationship of (and a struggle for) power.
hegemony?
It was Lenin, in 1894, in What the “Friends of the People” are and How They Fight the Social Democrats, who gave another meaning to the concept of ideology. For Lenin, ideology is like any conception of social or political reality. Ideology, therefore, is a set of beliefs which cohere and inspire a specific group or class in the pursuit of political interests judged to be desirable (Eagleton, 1991).
A distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the conditions of production, which should be established in terms of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic—in short, ideological—forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.
(Lenin, 1960, 139)
With this distinction, Lenin inaugurates the idea of Marxism as a scientific ideology (Kelle, 1970), which implies the consideration of a bourgeois ideology and a proletarian ideology (Löwy, 2010), as well as that “the word ideology is used as a weapon by the proletariat against the dominant group” (Mannheim, 1979, p. 66). Eagleton, purposefuly, points out that “there is a need here for a broader definition of ideology, as any kind of intersection between belief systems and political power” (Eagleton, 1991, p. 6), arguing in favour of “a more political or sociological sense of ideology as the medium in which men and women fight out their social and political battles at the level of signs, meanings and representations” (Eagleton, 1991, p. 11).
We concur with Eagleton (1991), for whom both senses of ideology have their uses. Although acknowledging that Marx and Engels interpretation can be deemed as narrow, critical, and negative, there is ground to understanding that the dominant ideology reflects the class struggle, being, therefore, a reflection of the ideas of the dominant classes. This, however, does not exclude Lenin’s analysis and its wider conceptualisation, in which ideology is seen as any conception of social or political reality, linked to the interests of certain social classes. Ideology, as such, is a “world view”.
As Kelle recalls, “Lenin repeatedly proposed and emphasized the idea that neutral social science and philosophy, above the battle of classes, is an impossibility in class society” (Kelle, 1970, p. 104). And this is important to bear in mind, namely, when recalling Nye’s conception of power and, consequently, of soft power, which ignores the ideological dimension. This is not by chance. After all, as Kelle puts it,
Bourgeois sociologists (Aron, Bell and others) have propounded and developed the theory of “the end of ideology”, or “de-ideologization”. Reflecting in some measure technocratic tendencies – engendered by state capitalism – conducted in the interests of monopolists, the notion of political indifference and the positivist moods possessing certain strata of the bourgeois intelligentsia.
(Kelle, 1970, p. 104)
Also critical of this “end-of-ideology ideology” is Eagleton (1991, p. 4), for whom “the belief that ideology is a schematic, inflexible way of seeing the world, as against some more modest, piecemeal. pragmatic wisdom, was elevated in the post-war period from a piece of popular wisdom to an elaborate sociological theory”. It is an assumption of moral superiority of those who defend the ideas of the ruling classes, who dress in a technocratic costume to spread the idea that “ideologies are passionate, rhetorical, impelled by some benighted pseudo-religious faith which the sober technocratic world of modem capitalism has thankfully outgrown”, as if ideological were just the others (Eagleton, 1991, p. 4). Eagleton provides a very interesting example of this demagogic stance.
To seek some humble, pragmatic political goal, such as bringing down the democratically elected government of Chile, is a question of adapting oneself realistically to the facts; to send one’s tanks into Czechoslovakia is an instance of ideological fanaticism.
Additional illustrative ground is provided by what has been happening in Ukraine. Those who do not uncritically align themselves with the Western discourse, even if they criticise the war, defend diplomacy as a means of achieving peace, and criticise those who finance one of the sides with weapons are, “ideologically”, pro-Putin. Not by chance, in July 2022, Nye published an opinion article on the “The National Interest” in which he argues that “a good strategy will require the United States to work with China at the same time that we compete as strategic rivals”.1 Nye, however, does not hide his analytical bias towards the perspective and interests of US foreign affairs. When talking about the “distribution or balance of power”, the author suggests that “by reducing Russia’s hard and soft power and China’s soft power, the Ukraine War has slightly shifted the balance in our direction” – in other words, between the lines, the ideas that US values stand out from those of the “strategic rival” (China). As such, Chinese soft power was reduced due to the conflict in Ukraine, as China has so far adopted a neutral stance, ruling out any alignment with the West in their economic boycott to Russia. This highlights the pertinence of John Hargreaves’s observation that ideology has as its main function to misrepresent social relations, and so to legitimise the established power structure, being reproduced at the economic and political levels as well as at the cultural level (Hargreaves, 1987).
Ideology, however, is not to be confused with hegemony. Hegemony is a broader category than ideology: It includes ideology but is not reducible to it (Eagleton, 1991, p. 112).
The concept of hegemony
What is “hegemony” in the Gramscian perspective? “Hegemony” is a Greek word, which, in short, means “domination”. In the beginning, the term was
used only in the military sense, to designate the domination by force of one people over another. With Gramsci, however, the term takes a much broader meaning. Hegemony occurs when a group or a set of groups in society, organised in associations or parties, manage to exert sufficient influence over other people to the point of directing them. According to the Gramscian vision, hegemony is based on three pillars: political–economic conduction, coercion, and ethical–political leadership (i.e., the ability to generate consensus). The nature of this influence, though, can be physical (domain) or moral and intellectual (direction). As mentioned before, because including ideology, hegemony can assume political, economic, and cultural forms. Hegemony can be understood as a set of strategies and practices by which a ruling class obtains consent to its rule from those it subjugates.
To explain how this adherence from the subjugated classes occurs, Gramsci looks to historical and dialectical materialism as the methodological basis to explain the (dialectical) relationship between structure and superstructure and how it affects economics, politics, and the social totality, forming the “historical bloc”.
If the relationship between intellectuals and people-nation, between rulers and ruled, is given thanks to an organic adhesion, in which the feelingpassion becomes understanding and, in this way, knowledge (not in a mechanical way, but lived), only then is the relationship one of representation, with the exchange of individual elements between rulers and ruled, that is, the life of the whole takes place, the only one that is a social force; the “historic block” is created.
(Gramsci, 1999, p. 222)
Gramsci divides the State into two superstructural dimensions, the political society and the civil society, which form what he calls the integral state. As the author points out, the modern State “subordinates social groups to the active hegemony of the ruling and dominant group”, abolishing some autonomies, but allowing these to emerge “in other forms, such as parties, unions, cultural associations” (Gramsci, 2002, p. 139). That is why Gramsci emphasises that “the fundamental historical unit is the result of the organic relations between State, political society, and ‘civil society’” (Gramsci, 2002, p. 139), idea that he would transform into the equation “State = political society + civil society, that is, hegemony armoured by coercion” (Gramsci, 2007a, p. 244). According to Gramsci, both correspond to the sphere in which the dominant group maintains hegemony over the whole society. An example of this formation of the State as active hegemony of the dominant group is the case of Italian unification and what he called the “Southern Question” (la questione Meridionale). The argument is that it did not take place on a basis of equality but rely on the hegemony of the North over the Mezzogiorno and the exploitation of this condition by the ruling class, with the North taking advantage of unequal
economic and industrial development and getting rich at the expense of South’s misery (Gramsci, 2002).
State coercion is applied when consensus is not achieved or respected. Coercive methods are actualised through the political society formal institutions (judiciary, legislature, military, paramilitary, and other institutional structures), “of direct domain or command, which is expressed in the State and in the legal government” (Gramsci, 2001, p. 21). But, in the Gramscian point of view, the dominant group seeks to ensure “social hegemony through the ‘spontaneous’ consensus given by the great masses of the population to the orientation printed by the fundamental dominant group to social life”, and this consensus comes from the “prestige (and therefore trust) gained by the dominant group because of its position and function in the world of production” (Gramsci, 2001, p. 21). For this reason, achieving prestige and trust is fundamental, since to guarantee power from the submission of the dominated becomes the most important thing. After all “prestige, rather than power, is the everyday currency of international relations (…) is enormously important because if your strength is recognised, you can generally achieve your aims without having to use it” (Gilpin, 1981, p. 31). This relates to the argument that, when hegemony prevails, coercion is no longer necessary, but it is set aside if the need may arise for use in specific situations. Hence, “coercive state capacity reflects the development and strength of the civil society” (Lemus Delgado & Valderrey Villar, 2020, p. 3). Therefore, hegemony is something that is conquered, establishing a political–ideological direction from the various institutions of civil society.
Gramsci’s conceptualisation of hegemony, following Gill (2008, pp. 60–61), refers to “a historical congruence between material forces, institutions, and ideologies, or broadly, an alliance of different class forces politically organized around a set of hegemonic ideas that gave strategic direction and coherence to its constituent elements”. The author adds that, for a new historic bloc to emerge, “its leaders must engage in ‘conscious, planned struggle’ in both political and civil society”, meaning that the new historic bloc “must have not only power within the civil society and economy but it also needs persuasive ideas, arguments and initiatives that build one, catalyse and develop its political networks and organization”. This matches Giulianotti’s (2016) idea that hegemony is always open to contestation, implying that resistant counter-hegemonic formations may arise. It also helps to explain why consensus “is negotiated through civil society”, as argued by Gow (2017, p. 95). Hence, if hegemony is conquered, it can be contested. In a Gramscian vein, the hegemonic status quo must be challenged.
Where does this imperative to challenge hegemony lie? Gramsci provides the answer, when arguing that there is no single pattern of culture and ideology, since the hegemonic cultural and ideological trends do not subtract or extinguish the different conceptions of the world that oppose them. It is necessary to understand that no society is homogeneous, no matter how great
the hegemonic domination of the ruling classes over the classes subjugated to them. This assertion is of utmost importance; after all, hegemony presupposes power relations, which implies recognising an underlying concrete reality: There is only dispute/contestation (power relation) when there is no homogenisation, that is, because there is social heterogeneity. Regarding this heterogeneous characteristic of societies, Gramsci, when reflecting on the relationship between politics and religion, asked himself about the possible relationship between the religious unity of a country and the multiplicity of parties, and inversely, the relative unity of the parties and the proliferation of religious sects and churches (Gramsci, 2007a, p. 280). His attempt to find purposeful answers was based on three examples: the United States, where there were “two or three parties” and a multitude of confessions and religious cults; France, known for its religious unity and the existence of dozens of parties; and tsarist Russia, where parties practically did not exist and there was an enormous religious fragmentation, “more impregnated with fanaticism”. He concludes that
Every man tends to have a single organic and systematic conception of the world, but because the cultural differentiation is very deep, society takes the form of a bizarre variation of currents, presenting a religious colouring or a political colouring according to historical tradition. (Gramsci, 2007a, p. 281)
This, however, does not mean that the ruling classes do not seek to achieve a kind of one-dimensional society, that is, a society marked by the unity of conduct and thought. They seek to “massify” their worldview, their culture, their politics, their morals, or their ideology. Accordingly, hegemony becomes the way through which the dominant class imposes its power, and its direction, on the dominated classes. For this reason, hegemony needs to be impregnated with a set of collective values, presented themselves as the values of that society. And for this to be achieved, as we have already stated, the ruling class resorts to the negotiation of consensus throughout civil society.
In the Gramscian concept, civil society belongs to the private sphere, as the church, mass media, schools, universities, chambers of commerce, trade unions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), etc. In that regard, sport must be viewed as a civil society institution, a “private” instrument of hegemony, and a locus for the development and contest of worldviews. Then, civil society represents one of the faces of the State: the one of consensus and legitimacy. This supports the view that hegemony theory can be a purposeful reference to know more about the relationships of domination, opposition, and struggle in the field of sport (Giulianotti, 2016). Furthermore, it endorses the argument that sport is far from politically neutral and it is part of the state, meaning that “may become a way to build consent and to create social practices that may lead to the consolidation of hegemonic activities” (Lemus Delgado & Valderrey Villar, 2020, p. 3).
Another random document with no related content on Scribd:
The Stern Chase
A stern chase is a long chase
And the wind dies every hour, And the veil that covers the ocean’s face Is Death and Wealth and Power.
Ten leagues behind, we cursed the wind That would not blow by day, Three nights we tried to trail her blind And thrice she crept away; O the fog blew thin and the breeze drew in And the leagues lay green and gone, By our keel that quivered we vowed to win Ere the birth of the dismal dawn.
The wind’s awake, the rollers break, Split by the scurrying prow, We gulp our haste for the booty’s sake And reef the tops’ls now; For haste is dear, but the goal is near And she hath not seen nor heard; Our lights are lost, but our steel is here, Our ears are sick for the word.
Our eyes are bright for the chance of night, We strain across the gap
That yawns ’twixt us and the tossing light That rocks in the rollers’ lap.
The span half-sped, we loose the head In the teeth of the ocean’s frown,— When the waves recoiled from the things we said, For the stubborn fog dropped down!
The fog that shifts, the fog that drifts
Sank lazily onto the sea, And we snatched one glimpse thro’ the final rifts And steered from memory.... Like a wraith of snows her sheets arose,— “’d-a-port!” her lookout cried; And our steel leapt forth for its meal of blows, As our chains caressed her side!
A stern chase is a long chase And the wind dies every hour, And the veil that covers the ocean’s face Is Death and Wealth and Power.
The Minstrel of the Fleet
It was the minstrel of the fleet
That lured the notes from the willing strings, He holds the heart of you there at his feet By the call of heart when the minstrel sings.
Years unsped and the world was young
And the haws were green in an English glen; We kissed by night and the songs we sung My love and I ne’er sang again.
I kissed my love on her red red lips, And my love she wept as her heart would break; And I left my love for the Love-o’-Ships
And my love believed for our True-Love’s sake.
I sailed the heart of the year away, And I sailed the seal of another twain, And I loved my love for every day When shone the Sun or rained the rain.
Years were three and I harked me back To the hawthorn glen in the golden morn, I heard the beagle upon my track
And I cursed the soul where the sin was born.
Your love is gone (in scorn they said), She would not wait for a buccaneer;— My love was true for my love was dead, Her grave is green as my soul is sere.
Years be-sped and the world is old
And the dew is fresh on the English green,
And my love’s at rest in the English mould Here in my heart that ye now have seen.
Hard eyes are soft for the song is sweet, Hard hearts are soft for the song he sings, It was the minstrel of the fleet That woke dead Youth from the wailing strings.
The Ballad of the FortyYear
One, men saw for an honest man And one they saw for a buccaneer, But no man knew when the hunt began, Lost in the haze of the Forty-Year.
Friends were they ere the Forty-Year, Boys together and merry twain; Youth was on them and Youth was dear Till Love came by to molest his reign.
One was gay, and he stole the maid, In the dark of the moon he bore her far, And the grave one followed them down the glade And tracked them close by star and star.
He caught them by the yellow sea-shore, To light the rivals the dawn did rise, And the grave man’s love the gay one bore, And love for her captor lighted her eyes.
They fought with knives and the captor bled So he called on her who was loved of each, And she sheathed the blow that would stretch him dead, And slain she lay on the pallid beach.
The victor gazed for deep and long, Kneeling beside them, his love and friend; And the vanquished swore to right the wrong Ten hells for one, at the other end.
And the victor saw the lovelight glow Deep in her eyes, a wondrous flame, And the word her dying lips crooned low Was heard of him for his rival’s name.
The victor looked on her dead, dear face And hied him off at the dawn of day;— But the vanquished kissed her lips for grace, And side by her side he swooned away.
The victor hied him where brave men be And turned his trick at the wheel of trade; Many the merchant he steered to sea,— Free wi’ his liquor and free wi’ a maid.
He sailed the seas from Pole to Pole, An honest captain, as all men knew, But he drowned in sin his hidden soul To cheat his Master out of His due.
But the vanquished set him upon his trail And tracked him over the world and gone, And year by year he fared to fail, Yet tracked and hoped by dawn and dawn.
The vanquished got him a pirate keel And wreaked his hate on the merchant-kin Of the one who fled from his sleepless steel,— And shuddered the earth at his open sin.
He whipt the seas in a blind black ship That wrought its woes ’twixt tide and tide,— For the Forty-Year he touched no lip Save only that of his dying bride.
The deep is cruel, and danger naught, And life is lightly of tempest held;
The Forty-Year their manhood bought, By the axe of Time was their vigor felled.
And syne the tracker’s heart is woe, And the Forty-Year but mocks his ire,— Yet zone by zone his lean sails go Till the gilded east meets the western fire.
And the Forty-Year befogged his brain Fettered his hand and clogged his feet, And he saw the Past as a wraith of rain ... And they met by noon on the open street.
Now knew they both what man was there, And cared they not what Hand had led, And the tracker lifted his eyes in prayer, And the tracked man found his voice and said:
“Now here is my breast and here the knife, But hear my word, my last in life, And there above is Heaven’s dome, And then ye may hurry the hot blade home.
“Now the Forty-Year is sped and past And glad am I to behold your face, To flee no more from fear at last, To hug the dagger that ends the race.
“For I have died a thousandfold, Stabbed have I been by a million blades, ’Tis worse than death to see the gold That crowns the heads of living maids,
“To see and know that mine I slew, So that nevermore might she greet the day,— In all my life hath no man been true, For the scourge I bear drives Truth away.
“Friends have I sought by like or lure, And begged their hands in fellowship, And felt their stabs, than steel more sure, The scorn that curls the sneering lip;
“So never a friend have I known to love, And never a love have I known to keep, Now grip this life I am weary of, And stab me down to a dreamless sleep!”
The tracker thought of the crimson path For the Forty-Year his feet had trod, And he saw the wreck that was left of wrath, Purged by the flame of the Wrath of God.
“Take up your life and go your way, No judge am I to fill your bier, Wait ye the call of Judgment Day!”
This is the tale of the Forty-Year.
Marooned
In all the earth
There is no thing except the sand, and me. An endless bleaching yellowness lies here
Subject to silence and the silent Sun. The sand has no beginning, neither end; Around the isle have I sought end for it And have found none, and when the wind is high Even my footprints have been blown away That marked one circuit ere I made the next. Sometimes I curse the sea, but all the time I know that she is guiltless, and I know That she is kinder than the soulless sand, For in the end she shall be good to me, Embrace me tired within her mother-arms And so shall give me peace. Yet still I curse Her, for her luring brought me unto this: Had she not called me those long summer nights With soft seductive cadence and sweet words I should not now be waiting here for death.
Life is a ceaseless hunt for turtle’s eggs. (O humorous employment!) Day on day I rise up in the crimson morn and see The red irrevocable Sun rise too Out of the eastern wave. All day I watch Him slowly travel his unyielding path, Hating him all the while, yet hating more The sullen gloom of twilight that his fall Forces the world to wear.... All through the day I search the stolid sand for what may be Of life that lies where turtles lay before;
For if today I have enough, tomorrow
Demands relentless meed, and thus I live, Loathing the living, yet afraid to die.
How often have I tried to end it all!
So often have I failed. I, who was known Wide as a living terror of red death, Whom countless victims of my sword have cursed Dying,—I am afraid to kill myself.
I have lain down and bade goodbye to earth, Glared at the jeering sea and mocking sand, Taken my dagger by its jade-green hilt, Looked on the edge that was to drink my blood, Loosened the shirt upon my breast, and there Fumbled with grey unfeeling finger-tips
To find the proper rib, have placed the point Sharp on the spot, have closed my eyes and laid My left arm down beside me, clutched the dagger,— And felt the end with thrice ten thousand pangs.
Yet always at the first fierce prick of death
Trembling I snatch the blue unwilling blade
Off from my breast and fling it far away
Hoping that I may lose it, and not know
Such torture more.... And after wide-eyed night, I have crept back at the first streak of dawn And sought about the drifted, smitten sand
To find the blade that is my only friend, And kissed it when I found it.... Suicides
Men brand as cowards; they are more brave than I. For death would be so quiet. I should hear Not even the surges beat upon the reef.
I am so far from all the living world
I know the natural vultures come not here; So would my body lie unpicked and still Until the Sun had bleached it all away.
Time has unfolded to me many things ...
I am more wise than when I came: I know
That it is folly to upbraid the Sun
For he can take no harm of it; ’tis folly
To rush each morning to the barren cliff
O’erlooking all the ocean, and to scan
The bare horizon for a sail,—because
There is no sail on this side of the earth.
’Tis mad to hope—and surely Hope is dead?
I have killed hope so many aching days, By myriad hopeless nights has she been slain, Till I have learned that she is really dead....
And yet, and yet,—she has a terrible ghost!
I have learned too that it is very mad
To rail at Fate, or at the sea or sand,
To curse the coming in or going out
Of days like, each to each. It is in vain
That I do keep my dagger sharp and bright For I shall never sheathe it in his breast.
I dread the stubborn days’ relentless round, The dazzling sunlight on the waves that dance
To mock my soul that shall not dance again; The days are twice as long as may be borne, Yet must be borne. Sometimes I even laugh
To see how small a thing a man’s life is.
The nights are loneliest. The buoyant stars May rove across the heavens. I must lie
Flat on my back and watch them; I alone Must live in one small corner of the world.
There is a tavern in a place I knew, Kept by a shrew, a veritable hag,—
I cannot even wander in her door,—
How sweet to me her railing now would sound. I fear the nights ... for then comes Memory. I am more brave when I forget to think.
... O Love, your eyes shine for me in the night.
I taste the perfume of your last caress, The last, long, throbbing kissing of your mouth. Your “I love thee” is magic in my ear To mingle with the surf upon the shore.
I have lived the life of every man in mine. I have been sullen as a convict is, I have been sad as any maid in love, I have outgibed the mad loud mirth of fools, I have been happy as a little child, Have grown religious, touched philosophy, Have in a breath blasphemed and laughed and wept. Yet all moods pass. The sea is just the same, And I am grown old looking on its face. I know that every wave that laps the strand Is like to every other wave that comes, As many follow this one, as the last.
I say my prayers to him, because I know Somehow that wheresoever he may be He is awake and hears me. It is sweet To call around his head the flames of hell,— It is my only pleasure. And he hears Across the gulf of time, and in his turn Curses my hate that will not let him sleep.
The Sun is falling low. Upon the earth There is no thing except the sand, and me.
Explicet
Dying, you tell me, dying?
The day drifts fast to night; The craft by the headland lying Lean to the headland light; I hear the stout sea-cables sighing,— And I die tonight....
The ghost of a breeze is blowing, Failing and falling faint, There’s none where I am going— ’Fore God, I’m bound there ain’t; None knew more surely than I’m knowing I’m no sculptured saint.
I’d hoped to meet him fighting, Be dead before I fell,— Death should be more exciting Than this dull dipsey swell; I’d always thought to end it fighting,— But maybe it’s just as well.
Away with that dead grinning Mimicking crucifix!
I’ll see out my own sinning, Last cards shall take last tricks; No whining end to my beginning, My creed and His won’t mix.
Dying.... I know it: dying. The sun is sunk from sight; The stars alone are trying
To send me down some light; The dead day-wind in the dark is sighing.... It is night....
Here ends the Buccaneer Book; written by Alden Noble, Press-mark designed by Harry Townsend, and the whole imprinted at the Green Mountain Press, Brattleboro, Vermont, in December, Nineteen Hundred and Eight, the Edition being limited to One Hundred and Fifty Copies
*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BUCCANEER BOOK: SONGS OF THE BLACK FLAG ***
Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will be renamed.
Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG™ concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away—you may do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark license, especially commercial redistribution.
START: FULL LICENSE
THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE
PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK
To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the free distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work (or any other work associated in any way with the phrase “Project Gutenberg”), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project Gutenberg™ License available with this file or online at www.gutenberg.org/license.
Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works
1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg™ electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property (trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works in your possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project Gutenberg™ electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.
1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only be used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg™ electronic works even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project Gutenberg™ electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg™ electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below.
1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation (“the Foundation” or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the United States and you are located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg™ works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg™ name associated with the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg™ License when you share it without charge with others.
1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project Gutenberg™ work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any country other than the United States.
1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:
1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg™ License must appear prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg™ work (any work on which the phrase “Project Gutenberg” appears, or with which the phrase “Project
Gutenberg” is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, copied or distributed:
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before using this eBook.
1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase “Project Gutenberg” associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg™ trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is posted with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked to the Project Gutenberg™ License for all works posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work.
1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg™ License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg™.
