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4. Truth—Dasein—Being-With
§16. The uncoveredness of what is present at hand and the manifestness of Dasein
§17. The manifestness of Dasein qua Da-sein
§18. Dasein and being-with
§19. Leibniz’s Monadology and the interpretation of being with one another
§20. Community on the grounds of the with-one-another
5. The Realm of the Essence of Truth and the Essence of Science
Summary of the interpretation of truth
§22. Determining the essence of science in terms of the originary concept of truth
Science as a kind of truth?
§23. Science as a possible fundamental stance of human existence.
§24. The original belonging together of theory and praxis in
as making beings manifest
§25. Construction of the essence of science
a) Being-in-the-truth for the sake of truth
b) The originary action. The letting be of beings
§26. The change in the understanding of being in the scientific projection. The new determination of beings as nature
a) How the understanding of being precedes every conceptual comprehending
b) The change in our understanding of being: An example from physics
c) The positivity of science. The antecedent, nonobjective projection of the constitution of being that demarcates a field
6. On the Difference between Science and Philosophy
§27. The projection of the constitution of being pertaining to beings as the inner enabling of positivity, that is, of the essence of science. Preontological and ontological understanding of being
§28. Ontic and ontological truth. Truth and transcendence of Dasein
§29. Philosophizing as transcending belongs to the essence of human Dasein
§30. The different realms of questioning in philosophy and science
§31. A summary of what has been presented. The understanding of being as the primordial fact of Dasein: The possibility of the ontological difference. The ontological difference and the distinction between philosophy and science
f) Idea and ideal. The full determination of the concept of world as a transcendental ideal 202
g) The existentiell signification of the concept of world 207
2. Weltanschauung and Being-in-the-World 212
§35. Dasein as being-in-the-world 212
§36. World as “play of life” 215
a) Being-in-the-world as the original play of transcendence 216
b) Transcendence qua understanding of being as play 219
c) The correlation of being and thinking. Its narrowing in the “logical” interpretation of the understanding of being 220
§37. Achieving a more concrete understanding of transcendence 225
a) Selfhood (for the sake of oneself) as determining the being of Dasein. Exposure as an intrinsic determination of being-in-the-world 225
b) Exposure as thrownness 228
c) Facticity and thrownness. The nihilative character and finitude of Dasein. Dissemination and individuation 230
d) The lack of hold pertaining to being-in-the-world 234
§38. The structural character of transcendence
a) Retrospect on the structural character of being-in-the-world attained
b) Weltanschauung as holding oneself in being-in-the-world 237
3. The Problem of Weltanschauung 239
§39. Fundamental questions regarding the principle problem of Weltanschauung
a) Weltanschauung as factically engaged being-in-the-world 239
b) The concept of Weltanschauung in Dilthey 241
§40. How does Weltanschauung relate to philosophizing? 246
a) The ordinary form of the problem: Can and should philosophy construct a scientific Weltanschauung? 246
b) On the historicality of Weltanschauungen 247
§41. Two fundamental possibilities of Weltanschauung 248
a) Weltanschauung in myth: Shelter as a hold amid overwhelming beings themselves
b) The degeneration of shelter: Weltanschauung that has become busyness
§42. The other fundamental possibility: Weltanschauung as held bearing 254
a) Weltanschauung as held bearing and the confrontation with beings arising from it
b) Weltanschauung as held bearing and the transformation of truth as such
c) Forms of degeneration of Weltanschauung as held bearing
§43. On the inner relationship between Weltanschauung as a held bearing and philosophy
a) On the problematic of this relationship
b) Philosophy is Weltanschauung as held bearing in an exceptional sense
§44. In Weltanschauung as held bearing the problem of being irrupts
a) The awakening of the problem of being from Weltanschauung within myth as sheltering 266
b) Historical forms of development of philosophy from Weltanschauung as sheltering and held bearing
4. The Connection between Philosophy and Weltanschauung
§45. The problem of being and the problem of world
a) The question of being as a question concerning ground and the problem of world
b) In the problem of being and the problem of world, transcendence brings itself to conceptual unfolding
§46. Philosophy as held bearing in relation to ground: Letting transcendence happen from out of its ground
Translator’s Foreword
The present text offers a translation of the lecture course Einleitung in die Philosophie, which Martin Heidegger delivered in the winter semester of 1928–29 at the University of Freiburg, where he had just been appointed to the chair in philosophy vacated by his mentor Edmund Husserl. Published as volume 27 of the Gesamtausgabe, the course represents an important bridge between the last course Heidegger offered at Marburg in the summer semester of 1928, the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic,1 and the seminal winter semester 1929–30 course, the Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics.2
It will come as no surprise to those familiar with Heidegger’s work and teaching that the course is anything but a schematic introduction to an academic discipline labeled philosophy. It is designed instead as a veritable initiation into philosophical thinking, with the stated aim of “getting philosophizing underway.” Aside from the two major themes treated in the course—namely, the relation between philosophy and science and that between philosophy and Weltanschauung—a number of topics emerge as especially significant. These include the analysis of truth as our sharing in unconcealment, with particular attention to being with one another and community; further development of themes from the 1928 course, such as transcendence, world, the neutrality of Dasein, nihilation, dissemination, and dispersion; and comments on so-called primitive or mythic Dasein and early childhood Dasein. Also of particular importance are the consideration of world and transcendence in terms of “play” (Spiel ) and the analyses of the “letting be” (Seinlassen) of things and of “releasement” (Gelassenheit), while the theme of “world-formation” (Weltbildung) anticipates the more extensive treatment of that issue in the 1929–30 course.
The most recent, second edition of the Gesamtausgabe text (2001) was used as the basis for this translation. Minor errors or inconsistencies in the German edition have been corrected. The German Sein has been translated as “being,” while
1. Martin Heidegger, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz , Gesamtausgabe Band 26 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978), translated as The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic by Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984).
2. Martin Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt—Endlichkeit—Einsamkeit, Gesamtausgabe Band 29/30 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1983), translated as The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995).
das Seiende has been rendered as “beings” or “a being.” Other translation choices are indicated in the glossaries. The translation of two word families in particular, those built on the roots Teil and Halt, proved especially challenging; some of the difficulties are discussed in translator’s notes at the appropriate points. Translator’s notes are indicated by “Trans.” All other notes stem from the source texts or from the German editors. See the editor’s epilogue for details on the sources used to compile the German edition. Occasional words in Heidegger’s manuscript that proved illegible or uncertain are marked by [?], as in the Gesamtausgabe volume. Corresponding pagination in the German edition is indicated in square brackets in the running heads.
There are various stylistic inconsistencies in the German volume. Since the translation is meant to be an accurate reflection of the Gesamtausgabe volume (which is supposed to accurately reflect Heidegger’s original manuscript, although I have not had the opportunity to consult the manuscript to check this), I have generally reproduced these inconsistencies in the translation. One prominent instance of such inconsistency concerns the use of single versus double (or no) quotation marks. Often this occurs in relation to instances where a word or term is not used functionally but is referred to as the word or term itself. For example, in sections 5 through 7, we find the following: the expression “scientific philosophy” (§5); the expression ‘philosophy’ (§6); the expression philology (§7). Rather than impose consistency where none exists in the German text, I have simply reproduced the inconsistencies of the Gesamtausgabe volume in this regard, except where the term is a foreign word (in which case I have set it in italics with no quotation marks).
Section 34 of the text, on Kant’s concept of world, cites extensively from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (as well as from other works of Kant). In translating passages from the Critique, I have consulted the existing English translation by Norman Kemp Smith, frequently adopting his solutions but often with modification or revision.3
My thanks are due to the College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences at DePaul University for a summer research grant that supported final preparation and revision of this translation. I also wish to thank my colleagues Avery Goldman and Sean Kirkland, each of whom provided valuable input at the final stage. My gratitude is due also to the anonymous reviewer for Indiana University Press who made numerous helpful suggestions for improvement.
3. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1965).
Introduction
The Task of an Introduction to Philosophy
§1. To be human already means to philosophize
The task of this lecture course is an introduction to philosophy. If your intention is to let yourself be led into philosophy, then this is based on the presupposition that we initially stand “outside” of philosophy. A path is therefore required that leads from this position outside of philosophy over and into the field of philosophy. This seems to be such a straightforward state of affairs that one need only point it out in order to understand it as a self-evident way of approaching the introduction to philosophy. The path taken by the introduction is supposed to lead into the field of philosophy. If we are not to go astray in the direction of our path, however, we must know the destination in advance. Before the introduction, therefore, and for it, we already need an idea in advance of what philosophy is. With this, a difficulty enters our entire undertaking, yet only apparently; for after all, we are not altogether cut off from the field of philosophy. We have a certain acquaintance with what today counts as philosophy, and we can gain a rough orientation from the philosophical literature as to what philosophy signifies. In addition, reference books about the history of philosophy provide us with a means of procuring information about this or that philosopher, this or that system. Admittedly, our task becomes difficult once more when we face the decision as to which of the philosophers is to be authoritative: Kant or Hegel, Leibniz or Descartes, Plato or Aristotle. Yet even this can be remedied by our attempting to provide an overview of all the philosophers and the entire history of philosophy, at least in its main traits—and this is precisely what an introduction is supposed to do.
However, we do not simply want some historiographical knowledge of what philosophy has been. Rather, we want to become acquainted with the “problems” in the field of philosophy, the various problem areas of the philosophical disciplines—logic, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics—not in depth, of course, but at least in outline, so that we can see how these disciplines are ordered among themselves, how they cohere, how they form a system of philosophy. In addition to the historiographical side, the introduction to philosophy
must have a systematic side, and the two can complement one another in the most perfect way.
If at the end of the semester we have gone through such a historiographical and systematic introduction, we shall be the fortunate possessors of knowledge of the historiographical and systematic field of philosophy. Certainly, the impression will not entirely disappear that this field is indeed very varied yet equally uncertain and changing; above all, however, the feeling, which we more or less concede, will become reinforced, namely, that we really don’t know where to start with what we have heard. We leave it to “professional philosophers” to occupy themselves with it and to believe they have finally eliminated the confusing mishmash of opinions.
If such reflection stirs, it is certainly a lot already. But for the most part, nothing at all stirs any more. One has also once heard a lecture course on philosophy—in the end, one should not neglect one’s general education entirely, even if today it is much more important to know about the newest types of race car or the most recent efforts in the field of cinematic art.
Such is the situation with regard to philosophy, and to a certain degree, it will always remain so, despite the many introductions. Yet why is it like this in general, despite the many introductions? Because an introduction to philosophy of the kind discussed merely leads out of philosophy—not only that, but in addition it gives rise to the opinion that one has now been introduced to philosophy. And why must the usual introduction to philosophy that we have depicted necessarily fail? Because in its approach, it rests on a fundamental illusion. The approach proceeds from the presupposition that we who are supposed to be introduced into philosophy initially have our position outside of philosophy and that philosophy itself is a field into which a path is supposed to be taken (cf. p.152).
Yet we are not at all “outside” of philosophy, and not because, for instance, we perhaps bring with us certain bits of knowledge about philosophy. Even if we know nothing of philosophy explicitly, we are already in philosophy, because philosophy is in us and belongs to us ourselves and, indeed, in the sense that we are always already philosophizing. We are philosophizing even when we know nothing of it, even when we do not “pursue philosophy.” We do not philosophize now and then but constantly and necessarily, insofar as we exist as human beings. To be there as a human being means to philosophize. The animal cannot philosophize; God does not need to philosophize. A God who philosophized would not be a God, because the essence of philosophy is to be a finite possibility of a finite being.
To be human already means to philosophize. Human Dasein as such by its very essence stands already within philosophy, not sometimes and sometimes not. However, because being human has different possibilities, manifold levels, and degrees of wakefulness, the human being can stand within philosophy in various ways. Correspondingly, philosophy as such can remain concealed or
§2. To get philosophizing underway [4] | 5
manifest itself in myth, in religion, in poetry, or in the sciences without it being recognized as philosophy. Now, because philosophy as such can develop itself explicitly and independently, it looks as though those who do not participate in explicit philosophizing stand outside of philosophy.
Yet if human Dasein already stands essentially within philosophy, then an introduction in the sense depicted, as leading one into the field of philosophy from a position outside of it, becomes meaningless. What point does an “introduction to philosophy” still have, then, in general? Why not then break with this custom?
§2. To introduce means: To get philosophizing underway
If we nevertheless make it our task to provide an introduction to philosophy, then it must have a different character. It indeed looks as though we initially stood outside of philosophy. The question is: What are the grounds for this appearance and semblance? If philosophy already lies within our Dasein as such, then that semblance can only arise from the fact that philosophy is, as it were, asleep in us. It lies within us, albeit fettered and entangled; it is not yet free, not yet in motion in the manner possible for it. Philosophy is not happening within us in the way that it ultimately could and should happen.
This is why an introduction is required. However, introduction now no longer means: leading into the field of philosophy from a position outside; rather, introducing now means: getting philosophizing underway, letting philosophy happen within us. Introduction to philosophy means: introducing philosophizing (getting it underway). Yet how should we bring this about? Surely, we cannot be transposed into the state of philosophizing through some trick or other, a technique or some kind of magic.
Philosophy is to become free in us, that is, it is to become an inner necessity of our ownmost essence, in such a way that it gives this essence its ownmost dignity. Yet whatever is to become free within us in this manner is something that we must take up into our freedom; we ourselves must freely take hold of and awaken philosophizing within us.
Yet to do this, we must surely already be familiar with it once again; we require a preunderstanding of philosophy. Thus, it could be that we have to keep to the history of philosophy. Perhaps history, yet not only the history found in philosophical literature, is in a much more originary sense essential for philosophizing. For reasons that we have yet to see, it would be a grave mistake to think that we could ever cultivate philosophy while completely casting aside the historical tradition.
Yet it does not follow from all this that the usual path of a historiographical overview of the history of philosophy could accomplish anything essential for
our intent to introduce philosophizing. Acquiring bits of knowledge, even comprehensive and erudite knowledge of what and how philosophers have thought, may have its uses, only not for philosophizing. To the contrary, possessing bits of knowledge about philosophy is the chief cause of the illusion that one would in this way have arrived at philosophizing.
Yet how else can a preunderstanding of philosophy be attained, which we require if philosophizing is not to be a blind process but to be an action taken hold of in freedom? Manifestly, we must seek this preunderstanding of philosophy in the way that is already prefigured for us by the essence of philosophizing. For now, we know about this only in the sense of an assertion: philosophizing belongs to human Dasein as such. Within human Dasein as such, it happens and has its history (cf. p.157).
Philosophizing is to get underway in Dasein. Yet human Dasein, after all, never exists in some general way; rather, each Dasein exists, if it exists, as itself. Philosophizing is to be brought to happen within our Dasein itself. Within our Dasein—yet this too not in some general way, but within our Dasein here and now, in this moment and within the perspectives that this moment has, this moment in which we get ready to deal with philosophy. Philosophy is to become free within us, within us in this situation. In which situation? In the situation that now primarily and essentially determines the existence of our Dasein, that is, our choosing, wanting, and everything we do.
§3. The preunderstanding of philosophy
By what is our entire existence now decisively determined? By our claiming our civil right to university. With this claim, however, we have given our Dasein a commitment; with this commitment, we have struck out in a certain direction in our Dasein, something has been decided in our Dasein. That can either happen with clarity about our existence or not—we may have entered the sphere of university existence through convention, even out of embarrassment.
If we are not simply hanging out here, partly to learn all sorts of useful things, partly to find some new form of entertainment, then something must have been decided in us. Every decision of existence is a breaking into the future of Dasein. What has decided itself? Our vocation. By vocation, however, we do not understand our outward position in life, nor even how it is ranked in a specific, even elevated class of society. By vocation we understand the inner task that Dasein gives itself within the whole and essential aspect of its existence. The historical and factical repercussions of one’s vocation always entail an outward position in life, yet in the first and last instance, this remains of lesser significance.
Yet to what extent have we given our Dasein a particular vocation with our claim to our academic civil right? With this claim—to the extent that we
§3. The preunderstanding of philosophy [7-8] | 7
understand it at all—we have planted in our Dasein the obligation to assume something like a leadership within the respective whole of our historical being with one another. By this we understand not the outward assumption of a socalled leading position in the field of public life, not that here or there we perhaps play the role of superior or director, rather leadership is being obligated to an existence that in a certain way understands the possibilities of human Dasein as a whole and in the last resort in a more originary manner, and is to be exemplary in this understanding. To be this, it is by no means required for someone to belong to those figures who are prominent. Still less, however, does such leadership already entail without further ado some moral superiority over others—to the contrary, the responsibility that such leadership carries with it, a responsibility that precisely cannot be regulated and is altogether nonpublic, is a constant and intensified opportunity for moral failure on the part of the individual.
Yet why does a specific claim to such leadership lie precisely in our actual belonging to the university? It arises from the fact that the university, through the fostering of scientific research and in imparting a scientific education, provides Dasein with the possibility of assuming a new position within the world as a whole, one in which all of Dasein’s relations toward beings experience a transformation and Dasein can, but not must, become more conversant with all things in a new way, because a specific transparency and enlightenment enters our Dasein.
The fact that we know more than others and know many things better, that we come to possess authorizations and exam certificates, is completely irrelevant. But that an inner privilege comes to prevail throughout our entire Dasein, one that in itself none of us have earned; thus the fact that, in a more originary ground, science cultivates within us the possibility of a leadership within human community as a whole, a leadership that is inconspicuous, yet all the more effective on that account—this determines the moment of our current Dasein.
Science and leadership, together in this unity, are accordingly those powers under which our Dasein—if it has any lucidity at all—is now placed, not in the sense of some fleeting episode, but as a unique stage that essentially determines the singularity of our Dasein. If we want to let philosophy become free in our Dasein here and now, and if the task of an introduction is to get philosophizing underway, then from this situation we shall also gain a certain understanding of what philosophy means. We must draw this preunderstanding that we initially need from an elucidation of the essence of philosophy in its relationship to science and leadership.
Leadership determines the vocation of your Dasein already from the very fact that you now exist at the university. Leadership here means, however, disposing over higher and richer possibilities of human existence that are not imposed on others but are presumably lived and modeled unobtrusively and in this way alone effectively. This concealed exemplarity of genuine leadership, however,
requires its own clarity and assuredness, that is, Dasein itself requires a reflecting upon the fundamental positions taken by Dasein toward the whole of beings, a reflecting that continually renews itself, however, and that is determined directly from out of the respective historical situation of Dasein and has an effect on it. What thus lies within leadership—not only in it, of course—we call Weltanschauung [world-view].
The task of gaining a preunderstanding of philosophy in terms of those powers now determining our Dasein thus means nothing other than posing the question: How does philosophy relate to leadership, Weltanschauung, and science?
§4. How does philosophy relate to science, Weltanschauung, and history?
In particular, we shall have to ask: Is philosophy a science among other sciences, or is it the “universal” science as distinct from the individual sciences, or is it the “foundational science” by contrast with the derivative sciences, or is it not a science at all, that is, not to be determined in its essence at all if it is housed and classified under the general concept of science?
Correspondingly, regarding philosophy and Weltanschauung we shall have to ask: Is it the task of philosophy to cultivate a Weltanschauung, is philosophy the doctrine of a Weltanschauung, or does it primarily have nothing to do with world-formation? Does philosophy rest on a Weltanschauung, or is this connection not at all decisive?
Finally, we shall take the two groups of questions together: Is philosophy either science or Weltanschauung, or is philosophy both science and Weltanschauung, or is philosophy neither science nor Weltanschauung?
Yet we do not want to discuss all these questions concerning the relationship of philosophy and science, philosophy and Weltanschauung, and science and Weltanschauung as though we were comparing fixed quantities to one another, as it were—for we do not yet know at all what philosophy is. Rather, proceeding from the powers of science and Weltanschauung that determine us, we shall ask what they themselves mean, why philosophy is brought into relation to them precisely, and with what legitimacy. Thus we shall gain an initial preunderstanding of philosophy from the powers that determine us, that is, by recourse to our Dasein itself.
In these discussions, which at the same time are meant to make the situation of our current Dasein transparent in several of its fundamental traits, we shall come across a connection throughout that is of essential significance: philosophy and philosophizing, precisely in reflecting upon themselves, are repeatedly thrown back upon what we call history, especially because philosophy initially presents itself to us in and through the tradition that is transmitted to us historiographically. By history, I am referring here not to historical science but rather
to the happening of Dasein itself. It will become manifest that it is not only philosophy that stands in a peculiar inner confrontation with history.
We heard already that philosophy presents itself to us as always already known in a certain way, in and through its history, or better: in the tradition that is transmitted to us historiographically. The same also holds true, however, for science and Weltanschauung, and they both are historical from the ground up, each in their own way. This means, however: Our consideration of philosophy and science, philosophy and Weltanschauung, entails at the same time the underlying question: How does philosophy in general relate to history, that is, to the essential determination of human Dasein itself, which is in itself historical?
We are thereby faced with three groups of questions:
I. How does philosophy relate to science?
II. How does philosophy relate to Weltanschauung?
III. How does philosophy relate to history?
The discussion of these three groups of questions marks the first stage that we shall cover, so as to get philosophy underway in doing so.
We do not want to learn philosophy here; we do not want to increase our study of subjects by one subject further, if only because philosophy is not a “subject” at all. Philosophizing is not some matter of skillfulness and technique, and certainly just as little a game of sudden, undisciplined inspiration. Philosophy is philosophizing, and nothing more. It is a matter of grasping this simple point.
We said: Dasein never ever stands outside of philosophy; rather, philosophy belongs to the essence of the existence of Dasein. Therefore, we must get it underway within Dasein itself; what is required is, therefore, an investigation of the Dasein that we ourselves each are. It thus seems as though we would be getting into a psychological self-observing, as though philosophizing would amount to an egoistic preoccupation with oneself, a dissecting of one’s own psychic life.
Negatively, we may at first just say this: freeing the philosophizing within Dasein has nothing to do with any psychological, let alone egoistic, gaping at oneself. Yet letting philosophizing become free within us is just as little some morally edifying fussing over one’s own ego.
Our deliberations here have nothing to do with all of that. At issue is neither psychology nor morality. Presumably Dasein will come into a center of its own in the course of these deliberations, but this so-called anthropocentric standpoint has something strange about it. In this anthropocentric consideration we shall arrive at the insight that this being, the human being, which supposedly stands in the center here in love with itself, is in its innermost core ex-centric, which means that precisely in keeping with the essence of its existence it can never stand objectively at the center of beings. For precisely philosophizing will make it manifest that herein the human being is thrown out of himself and over beyond himself,
and is altogether not the property of himself. In order for this insight that Dasein does not have itself as center to be really attained, Dasein must precisely come into the center in a certain way.
Subjectivism is overcome not by becoming morally indignant about it but by posing the problem of the subject, that is, the question concerning the subjectivity of the subject, in an actual and radical way. There thus lies a great truth in the demand that ancient philosophy already expressed: Γνῶθι σεαυτόν, know yourself, that is, know what you are, and be what you have come to know yourself as. This self-knowledge, as knowledge of the humanity in the human being, that is, of the essence of the human being, is philosophy, and it is as far from psychology, psychoanalysis, and morality as possible. In the course of such a reflection upon one’s own Dasein, it may, however, emerge that we are grasping the entire nihilative character of the human essence from the ground up.
The first stage of our introduction is therefore determined by three questions: the relationship of philosophy to science, to Weltanschauung, to history. We begin with the first question.
Division 1: Philosophy and Science
1 What Is Philosophy?
§5. Is philosophy a science?1
Science is one of those powers that determine what, to a certain extent, we may call the atmosphere of the university. However, sciences are not an accumulation of knowledge that is taught and learned in the manner of technical subjects. Rather, to the concept of science there belongs primarily the fact that it is research. Science exists only in the passion of questioning, in the enthusiasm of discovery, in the relentlessness of rendering critical account, of demonstrating and grounding.
It is not just an extrinsic peculiarity of the German university, but its intrinsic merit and the source of power of its historical existence that it is not a technical college, but that the necessary technical knowledge is also acquired in the course of the labor of research in the more or less serious and penetrating pursuit of the very problems that science faces.
Because science determines the university in this manner and philosophy is taught like one subject among others, we are asking about the relationship of philosophy to the sciences. Is it one subject among others, or is it distinguished by being the universal science? Or is it indeed not only the science that embraces the others but the one that even grounds them, the foundational science?
All these questions move on the basis of the general presupposition that philosophy is in any case a science. It is indeed a characteristic of modern philosophy since Descartes that it attempts, in ever new approaches, to elevate itself to the rank of a science, indeed to the absolute science. We must disregard the particular questions concerning how philosophy relates to the other sciences and initially decide the question: Is philosophy a science at all? Is there any sense in speaking of scientific philosophy, in wanting to ground philosophy “as rigorous science”?
To the question of whether philosophy is a science, we may say by way of anticipation: no, philosophy is not a science. Is philosophy therefore intrinsically unscientific, does it not belong in the university, are those people therefore right who, echoing Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, regard so-called “university
1. Cf. §30.
philosophy” as a highly questionable creation? Yes and no. Is, then, the endeavor on the part of modern philosophy from Descartes through Kant and Hegel and up to Husserl to elevate philosophy to the rank of a science not only futile but fundamentally mistaken in its intent? Yes and no. Is, then, the term “scientific philosophy” as nonsensical as the concept of “wooden iron”? Yes and no. Does not the thesis ‘philosophy is not a science’ precisely also deny and disown the effort that phenomenology has been making for decades, to ground “Philosophy as Rigorous Science”—the title of a well-known essay by Husserl in Logos I, from 1910? Yes and no.
Our thesis ‘philosophy is not a science’ therefore remains ambiguous at first and must remain so, so long as it is expressed only negatively and only says in general what philosophy is not. From the fact that philosophy is not science it perhaps by no means follows that it would have to be, or even ought to be, “un-scientific.”
Yet what does this thesis mean, then, that philosophy is not science? Initially this: philosophy cannot be subordinated to the concept of science as a higher genus. In the manner that we rightly say: red is a color, green is a color, or: physics is a science, philology is a science, so we may not say: philosophy is a science.
Yet if we so boldly declare: ‘philosophy is not a science,’ then no less decisively the question arises in response: What is it, then? We answer: philosophy is philosophizing. But surely this is a piece of information that tells us nothing, that seems to tell us just as much as: a table is a table. Yet we are not simply saying: philosophy is philosophy, but: philosophy is philosophizing. Thus an answer ultimately indeed lies hidden in this positive thesis: philosophy cannot be determined in terms of something else—in terms of the idea of science, for instance, but just as little in terms of the idea of “poetry” or of art—rather, if philosophy equals philosophizing, then that means: philosophy must determine itself from out of itself.
Far too little attention is paid to the peculiar problematic that lies within the fact that philosophy has to determine itself from out of itself. Even if—in a certain way—it were to be impossible, only philosophy itself could show that. Whether and how philosophy is possible, only it itself can decide. That philosophy is related back to itself is only a consequence of the fact that it is something originary.
If, therefore, we say that philosophy is not a science, and if science is not the idea or the ideal by which philosophy can or may be measured, then the thesis that denies philosophy the character of a science is not also without further ado claiming that philosophy is tainted with the shortcoming of being unscientific. If something cannot and should not be science, then being unscientific cannot be attributed to it as a weakness. Yet we heard already: ‘Philosophy is not science’ does not mean that it is unscientific, if unscientific means: contravening the norms and methods of science. Not unscientific, because not “scientific”
either—these are not possible predicates in a primary sense. Only one thing is provisionally clear. The thesis says: philosophy does not belong under the “genus” science, if we may be permitted to use this term of formal logic for now.
Yet unequivocal as this information is, it remains unsatisfying in view of the historical fact that thinkers like Kant and Hegel endeavored to raise philosophy to the rank of a science. Perhaps the relationship of philosophy to science, precisely if philosophy is something that cannot be traced back to anything else, is an altogether peculiar one, one that we have not by a long way grasped if we declare: “philosophy does not fall under the genus science.”
Indeed, it is not because it would not attain the ideal of a science and have to remain inferior to it, not because it would lack that which determines science as such, that philosophy is not a science but rather because there pertains to it in a more originary way that which science has only in a derivative sense. Philosophy is not a science—not on account of a shortcoming; rather, it is on account of an excess that it cannot be science, an excess, moreover, that is a fundamental one, not merely quantitative.
We said already that the expression “scientific philosophy,” just like the expression “wooden iron,” is ambiguous. The designation “roundish circle” corresponds much better to the expression “scientific philosophy.” Here something is attributed to the circle that does not pertain to it; for the circle is indeed not roundish, that is, approximately round, but rather is absolutely round. Yet something is also attributed to the circle that precisely pertains to it in an exceptional sense, insofar as it perfectly represents the idea of round. Correspondingly, in the expression “scientific philosophy,” something is attributed to philosophy that does not pertain to it—it is never merely a science; at the same time, however, something is attributed to it that it already has in an originary sense: it is more originary than every science because all science is rooted in philosophy and first arises from it.
To state of the circle that it is roundish is at once superfluous and inappropriate. That fact that the circle is not roundish, this not being able to be roundish, is not an inability but an excess of ability: it is essentially able to be more. To say of philosophy that it is science is at once inappropriate and superfluous. Correspondingly, it holds that it is not because of an inability, but because of an essential excess of ability that philosophy is not a science.
Yet because philosophy is science in a way that science never can be and because philosophy is more originary than science, and science has its origin in philosophy, it was possible to reach the point where the origin of science, namely, philosophy, was itself designated as science and determined as such, indeed even as the primordial science and as absolute science.
Scientific philosophy is not to be understood like “wooden iron,” two things that are mutually exclusive, but rather like “roundish circle.” Yet illuminating though this comparison may be, it too falls short and gives rise to a dangerous
misunderstanding that we must eliminate right at the beginning. We cannot and may not designate the circle as “roundish,” because it is absolutely round, that is, because “roundish” would merely be a deficient approximation to “round.” The circle cannot be defined by something that to a certain extent presents only a shortfall, a privation of its essence.
Correspondingly, science is a deficient approximation to philosophy, which is therefore the purest and first science. Here is the place where the most fateful errors arise, errors that could also be supported by the said comparison. For philosophy is indeed not science, nor is it the purest and strictest; but nor is it, for instance, the strictest science and something else in addition and beyond. We can only say: what science is, for its part, already lies within philosophy in an original sense. Philosophy is indeed the origin of science yet precisely on this account not science—not primordial science, either.
The task is to hold on to this thought because without it, the tendency to determine philosophy as science imposes itself repeatedly, that is, inadvertently indeed to approximate it to a particular science, for instance to mathematics, as the supreme and most rigorous science. Whenever the step in the direction of the idea of science is taken, there is a failure to recognize philosophy’s essence. No matter how rigorously one takes science and subsequently sticks on a Weltanschauung, the two added together and fused fail to attain the essence of philosophy.
As we have already emphasized a number of times, it is a characteristic tendency of modernity to determine philosophy with respect to the idea of science and, indeed, to the science of mathematics—mathematical taken in a very broad sense, certainly. However, we notice precisely the opposite intent within ancient philosophy, that is, in the decisive commencements of our Western philosophy in general, and this is no accident. In antiquity, philosophy does not fall under the sciences but the reverse: the sciences are particular kinds of “philosophies.”
§6. Ancient and modern conceptions of philosophy
For φιλοσοφία, the Greeks characteristically have a plural: φιλοσοφίαι. Mathematics and medicine, which already in antiquity attained a prominent flourishing and independence, were accordingly called “philosophies.” By contrast, what we simply call philosophy is, according to Aristotle’s designation, πρώτη φιλοσοφία, “first philosophy,” that is, not first within the philosophical disciplines, but rather philosophy in the original sense pure and simple. One usually interprets this expression prima philosophia as meaning that within the entirety of the philosophical disciplines, this would designate the first discipline, before ethics, aesthetics, and so forth. This is an erroneous conception, and it becomes still more erroneous if one reinterprets this concept of first philosophy in a modern way, as the first science, the primordial science. The originator of this fundamental error is Descartes, who appeals to the ancient concept of πρώτη
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