AristotleonOntologicalPriorityinthe Categories
ElementsinAncientPhilosophy
DOI:10.1017/9781108874243 Firstpublishedonline:October2020
AnaLauraEdelhoff UniversityofOxford
Authorforcorrespondence: analaura.edelhoff@some.ox.ac.uk
Abstract: ThemainobjectiveofthisElementistoreconstructAristotle’s viewonthenatureofontologicalpriorityinthe Categories.Overthelast threedecades,investigationsintoontologicaldependenceandpriority havebecomeamajorconcernincontemporarymetaphysics.Manysee Aristotleastheoriginatorofthesediscussionsand,asaconsequence, thereisconsiderableinterestinhisownaccountofontological dependence.InlightoftherenewedinterestinAristotelianmetaphysics,it willbeworthwhile–bothhistoricallyandsystematically–toreturnto Aristotlehimselfandtoseehowheconceivedofontologicalpriority(what hecalls“priorityinsubstance”(proteronkataousian)or“priorityinnature” (proteronteiphusei)),whichistobeunderstoodasaformofasymmetric ontologicaldependence.
Keywords: ontologicalpriority,ontologicaldependence,Aristotle,Categories, primarysubstances
©AnaLauraEdelhoff2020
ISBNs:9781108812726(PB),9781108874243(OC) ISSNs:2631-4118(online),2631-410X(print)
1Introduction 1
2OntologicalPriorityinAristotle’s Categories 12and13 17
3OntologicalPriorityandSimultaneityamongRelatives inAristotle’s Categories 7 31
4ThePrimacyofPrimarySubstancesinAristotle’s Categories 50 5Conclusion
1Introduction
1.1WhatIsOntologicalPriority?
Overthelastthreedecades,investigationsintoontologicaldependenceandpriorityhavebecomeamajorconcernincontemporarymetaphysics.Manysee Aristotleastheoriginatorofthesediscussionsand,asaconsequence,there isconsiderableinterestinhisownaccountofontologicaldependence.For instance,FabriceCorreiawrites:
TheuseofnotionsofdependencegoesbackasfarasAristotle’sfourfoldclassificationofbeings,wherethedistinctionbetween(primaryandsecondary) substancesandnon-substancesisindeedcharacterizedbymeansofaconcept ofontological(in)dependence(Correia,2008:1013).1
ThisrecentinterestinAristotleisbestseenaspartofageneralrenaissanceof Aristotelianmetaphysics.Sincethe1990s,Aristotelianmetaphysics–includingcoreAristotelianideassuchasessentialismandhylomorphism–have becomepopularagain.2
InlightoftherenewedinterestinAristotelianmetaphysics,itwillbeworthwhile–bothhistoricallyandsystematically–toreturntoAristotlehimselfand toseehowhehimselfconceivedofontologicalpriority(whathecalls‘priorityinsubstance’(proteronkat’ousian)or‘priorityinnature’(proterontēi phusei)),3 whichistobeunderstoodasaformofasymmetricontologicaldependence.InthisElement,Iintendtoshowthatmyanalysisisofvaluenotonly asahistoricalreconstructionofAristotlebutalsotophilosopherswhoarecurrentlyworkingontheseissues,giventhatAristotleprovideskeeninsightsinto anddiscussionsofontologicaldependence.
Inordertounderstandwhatontologicaldependenceisandwhereitapplies,it ishelpfultoconsiderthewaysinwhichmetaphysiciansconceivethestructure ofreality.Somemetaphysicianstakerealitytohavea flatstructure:everythinghasthesameontologicalstatus(=allentitiesareequallyfundamental) andbelongstothesamecategory(=classofbeing).Othersclaimthateverythinghasthesameontologicalstatusbutthattherearedifferentcategories (e.g.objects,properties,events,etc.).Wemightcallthistakeonrealitya sortedstructure.Othersstillclaimthatthethingsthatexistcanhaveadifferent
1 Cf. Fine(1995:270).
2 KitFine’sworkhascontributedmosttothisrevivalofAristotelianmetaphysics.See Fine,1994a; 1994b; 1995; 2001 Strawson’s Individuals (1959)canbeseenasthefirstbreak fromthethenwidelypopularQuineanmetaphysics.
3 Inthefollowing,Iwillusetheterms‘ontologicalpriority’,‘priorityinnature’,and‘priorityin substance’interchangeably.
ontologicalstatusinadditiontobelongingtodifferentcategories(= ordered structure).4
AccordingtoAristotelianmetaphysics,realityisanorderedstructure.Itis thetaskofthemetaphysiciantostudybothwhatexistsandwhatisfundamental.5 Formetaphysicianswhotaketheworldtohaveanorderedstructure, understandingdependenciesisacentraltask.
Anentitycandependuponanotherentityinvariousways.Oneofthecentralformsofdependenceis ontologicaldependence.Toappreciatethisform ofdependence,considerthefollowingexamples:smilesontologicallydepend uponmouths,eventsontologicallydependupontheirparticipants,non-empty setsupontheirmembers,tropesupontheirbearers,wholesupontheirparts, organismsupontheirbiologicalorigins,boundariesuponthecorresponding extendedobjects,andholesupontheirhosts.6 Thisnotioniscloselyconnected toothercorenotionsinphilosophicaldiscoursesuchasfundamentality,substancehood,andgrounding.Questionsofontologicaldependencearecentral toallareasofphilosophy:inthephilosophyofmind,researchersinvestigate howthemindontologicallydependsuponthebrain.Inmeta-ethics,oneargues aboutthenatureoftheontologicaldependencebetweenevaluativeanddescriptiveproperties.Inthephilosophyofreligion,oneinvestigateshowtheworld ontologicallydependsuponadivinebeing.
Therearedifferentwaystocashoutontologicaldependence.Someaccounts focuson existence andsaythatabeingdependsontologicallyuponanother beingifits existence dependsuponthe existence ofthelatter.Otheraccounts focuson identity andsaythatabeingontologicallydependsuponanotherbeing ifits identity dependsuponthisotherbeing.Whereasphilosophersofthefirst groupbringinmodalnotions,suchasnecessityandpossibility,tocharacterise ontologicaldependence,philosophersofthelattergroupintroducethenotion of essence (Fine,1995:269–70; Correia,2008:1014).
Itisimportanttodistinguishbetweencausalandontologicaldependence.For instance,anevent(suchasthebreakingofawindow)cancausallydependupon anotherevent(Paul’sthrowingaball).Butonecanalsoaskwhatthebreaking ofthewindowconsistsin(thedestructionofsomemolecularstructures)and whatneedstobethereforittotakeplace(forinstance,awindow).Oronecan distinguishthecauseofJudy’shappiness(hermothergivingheracompliment)
4 Forthisoverview,see Schaffer(2009:347–256).
5 ItitpreciselythisAristotelianapproachtometaphysicsthathasbecomepopularagain.See Schaffer(2009:347)onthisrenaissance.
6 Thelistcanbeextended.See Koslicki(2013:1), Koslicki(2012:188–9),and Correia(2008: 1013).
fromthequestionofwhatJudy’shappinessconsistsin(perhapssomeneurons firing)andfromwhatisrequiredfortheexistenceofJudy’shappiness(for instance,Judy).Thekeypointisthattherecanbeanexistentialdependence relationoridentitydependencebetweentwothingswithouttherealsobeinga causalrelation,andviceversa.
Incontrastwithmanyflat-ontologistsofhistime(suchasmanyPresocratics) andinagreementwithPlato,Aristotlethinksthatrealityhasanorderedstructure.Consequently,whendoingmetaphysics,Aristotleisinterestedinwhat exists,inhowtoclassifyentities,andinthedependenciesamongthedifferent categories.Heisinterestedinthequestionofwhatthingsexistandhecriticises hispredecessors’andcontemporaries’theoriesofwhatexists.(Famously,he argueswiththePlatonistsoverthequestionofwhetherFormsexist.)ButAristotlegoesbeyondgivingamerelistofexistents.Healsobelievesthatthey belongtodifferentontologicalkindsandaimstoproduceasystematicclassificationofthese.Forinstance,inthe Categories Aristotleintroducesafourfold divisionofontologicalclasses:(1)primarysubstances(property-bearingindividuals;e.g.Socrates);(2)secondarysubstances(e.g.theuniversalhuman being);(3)accidentalparticulars(e.g.theindividualred);(4)accidentaluniversals(e.g.theuniversalred).Then,inthe Metaphysics,hefurtherpursuesthis systematisationandintroducesvariousclassificationswithintherealmofsubstancesbydistinguishing,forinstance,betweenperishableandnon-perishable substances.
Finally,Aristotleisinterestednotonlyinclassifyingentitiesbutalsoin determiningontologicaldependenciesamongtheseentities.Insomecases,the dependenciesaresymmetrical.Hecallssuchasymmetricaldependence‘simultaneityinnature’.Inothercases,thedependenciesareasymmetrical.Hecalls suchanasymmetricaldependence‘priorityinnature’.Importantly,heidentifiesthisfinaltask–namelytoestablishdependenciesandtoidentifythe fundamentalitemsofreality–asthecoresubjectofmetaphysics.Inthe Metaphysics,Aristotleexplicitlysaysthatheisseekingthemostfundamentalbeings inthishierarchy,thefirstprinciples(archai; Metaph. IV1,1003a22–1003a32; XII1,1069a29ff).Hedoesnotmakeanysuchprogrammaticstatementsinthe Categories,buthisinvestigationintothenatureofsubstancehoodandpriority inthe Categories suggeststhathemighthavebeenguidedbysimilarinterests inthenatureoffundamentalbeings.Understandinghisaccountofontological dependencieselucidateshisviewonthehierarchyofreality.Forthisreason, ananalysisofthenotionsofpriorityandsimultaneityinnatureiscrucialfor understandingAristotle’smetaphysicalsysteminboththe Categories andthe Metaphysics.
ThemainobjectiveofthisElementistoreconstructAristotle’sviewonthe natureofontologicalpriorityinthe Categories. 7 IintegrateAristotle’sdiscussionsofsimultaneityinnatureintoananalysisofontologicalpriorityinorder toarriveatamorepreciseaccountofpriorityinnature.8 Iintendtoshowthat thediscussionsofontologicalpriorityandontologicalsimultaneityilluminate oneanother.
Aristotlediscussespriorityandsimultaneityinnatureinthreepassagesin the Categories,inchapters7,12,and13.Inviewoftheimportanceofthediscussionsofpriorityandsimultaneityinnature9 forunderstandingAristotle’s viewsonthestructureofrealitybothinthe Categories andinthe Metaphysics, itisstrikingthatadiscussionofthecentralpassages,especiallyof Categories 7,hasnotyetbeenoffered–Ackrill,forinstance,dedicatesjustonepagetothe interpretationofalltherelevantpassages(Cat. 7,12,and13)takentogether. OtherinterpretershavemainlyfocusedonAristotle’sdiscussionsoftheprimacyofprimarysubstancesin Categories 5,2b1–6c.10 ThisElementoffers thefirstsystematicanalysisofAristotle’saccountofontologicaldependence inthesepassagesandshowsthatathoroughinvestigationofthesepassagesnot onlyleadstoabetterunderstandingofAristotle’sontologyinthe Categories butalsoprovidesabetterunderstandingofhismetaphysicalinvestigationsin the Metaphysics 11
Ananalysisofpriorityandsimultaneityinnatureyieldsimportantinsights intohisviewsaboutthestructureofrealityinthe Categories.Butitisalsoof particularinterestforunderstandingtherelationshipbetweenthe Categories andthe Metaphysics,becauseAristotlediscussespriorityinbothworks.For instance,theaccountofontologicalprioritythatheprovidesinthe Categories isinmanyrespectsmoreelaborateandexplicitthanhisdiscussionsofthistopic inthe Metaphysics.Assuch,itcanhelpustoilluminateAristotle’softencryptic remarksaboutontologicalpriorityinthe Metaphysics.Forinthe Metaphysics
7 Forthesakeofclarity,itisimportanttomentionthatAristotledistinguishesanddiscusses varioussensesofpriority:priorityintime,priorityindefinition,priorityinknowledge,etc. Thisstudyonlyconcentratesonwhathecalls‘priorityinnature’,‘priorityinsubstance’,and ‘priorityinsubstanceandnature’.
8 OnlyJohn Cleary(1988:25–32)offersabriefdiscussionofsimultaneityinnatureandits relationtopriorityinnature.
9 Inmyview,Aristotletakesupthenotion‘priorityinnature’fromthePlatonistsandlater renamesit‘priorityinsubstance’.Seesection1.4.
10 OnlyPaula Gottlieb(1993) dedicatesamoredetailedinvestigationtoapartof Categories 7, investigatingindetailAristotle’saccountofperceptionanditsrelationshiptohistheoryof relatives.
11 Iwillonlydiscusspassagesinwhichheexplicitlyspeaksaboutontologicalpriority.Iwillnot dealwithpassagesinwhichhediscussesseparation(chōrismos)ortheexplanatorypriorityof substantialforms.
heismoreinterestedinputtinghisaccountsofontologicalprioritytousethan indiscussingthemashedoesinthe Categories
IwillusemodernnotionsandlogicalformulationswhereverIfindthatthey aresuitabletoclarifyAristotle’sthought.IwillconnectAristotletorecent debateswhereIfindthisconnectionhelpfulforbetterunderstandingbothAristotleandthepresent-daydebates.IncontrasttosomeNeo-Aristotelianstudies onontologicalpriority,IdonotarguethatAristotlehasacompelling,univocalaccountofontologicalpriority(Peramatzis(2011)).Thisstudyismuch morecriticalinthisregard.IwillshowthatAristotlehasmanyinteresting andprofoundideasaboutontologicalpriorityandthatthisconceptplaysa crucialroleinhismetaphysicalsystem,butthestudywillalsodemonstrate thathisdiscussionisinsomerespects(atleastfromourpresent-daypointof view)problematicandunderdeveloped.Indeed,asitturnsout,hedoesnoteven developoneunifiedaccountofontologicalpriority,butratherasetofdifferent, non-reduciblecriteriawhoseexactrelationremainsunsatisfactorilyunclear.
1.2Aristotle’sAccountofOntologicalPriority
Atpresent,thereisadisputeintheliteratureonAristotle’saccountofontologicalpriority,inparticularwhetherheconceivesofitasasymmetric existential dependenceorasasymmetric essential dependence.12 Traditionally,Aristotle’s accountofontologicalpriorityhasbeenreadexistentially.Onthisreading,put forwardbyAckrillandwidelyaccepted(Ackrill,1963: 83; Moravcsik,1967: 95; Loux,1991:16; Fine,1995:270),AristotleclaimsthatAispriorinnature toBiffnecessarily,A’sexistenceimpliesB’sexistence,butnotnecessarily, B’sexistenceimpliesA’sexistence.13
TakingtheexistentialconstrualofontologicalprioritytobeAristotle’sconsideredview,manyphilosophersfollowAristotleanddefendaccountsof ontologicaldependenceandpriorityintermsofexistence,oftentyingtogether anunderstandingofontologicaldependencewiththenotionofsubstancehood. Forinstance,Descarteswrites:‘by substance wecanunderstandnothingother thanathingwhichexistsinsuchawayastodependonnootherthingforits existence’(Descartes,1985: 210,ascitedin Fine,1995).OrHusserl:‘AcontentofthespeciesAisfoundeduponacontentofthespeciesB ifanAcan byitsessence(i.e.legally,invirtueofitsspecificnature)notexistunlessaB alsoexists.’14 Inaddition,philosopherswhoareworkingonthisissuetoday
12 Thisdisputeechoesadebateinpresentmetaphysics.
13 Iusecapitalsinmyreconstructions.Thesecanstandforobjects,properties,statesofaffairs, propositions,etc.
14 Husserl(LogicalInvestigationIII,§21,p.475).Ascitedin Fine(1995)
defendexistentialconstrualsofontologicalpriority(oftenbyaddingfurther qualifications:bydistinguishing,forinstance,rigiddependencefromgeneric dependenceorbybringingintemporaloperators).15
However,understandingontologicalpriorityanddependenceintermsof existenceisproblematic.16 (1)Onthemodal-existentialaccount,itisnotpossibletoestablishanontologicalprioritybetweenanobjectandthesingleton setofthisobject.FortheexistenceofSocratesnecessarilyimpliestheexistenceofthesingleton{Socrates},andtheexistenceofthesingleton{Socrates} necessarilyimpliestheexistenceofSocrates.Yetwenaturallysupposethat thereissuchanontologicalpriority,namelythatthesingletonsetontologically dependsuponitsmember,butnottheotherwayround(Fine,1995:271).
(2)Onthemodal-existentialaccount,everythingdependsuponnecessary existents.AsKitFineputsit:‘Adifferentkindofdifficultyarisesfromthe caseinwhichthe“dependee”yisanecessaryexistent.ConsiderSocratesand thenumber2,forexample.Giventhat2necessarilyexists,itisnecessarilythe casethat2existsifSocratesdoes.Butwedonotwanttosay,onthataccount, thatSocratesdependsupon2,thatwhatheisdependsuponwhatthenumber2 is;andsimilarlyforalmostanyothernecessaryexistentinplaceofthenumber 2’(Fine,1995:271).
(3)Inaddition,themodal-existentialapproachcannotaccountforontologicalprioritiesamongnecessarilyexistingitems.Thisisproblematic,sincewe supposethattherearesuchontologicalpriorities.
Inviewofthecriticismsagainstthemodal-existentialaccountofontological dependence,philosophershavesuggestedthatitmightbebettertoconceiveof ontologicalpriorityintermsof identity or essence.Forinstance,Finesuggests thatwereplacethetraditionalmodal-existentialaccountandcapturepriorityin termsofrealdefinitionsandessences.Usingthisapproach,Aisontologically priortoBiffBmentionsAinitsdefinitionbutAdoesnotmentionBinits definition.17
Inlightofthecriticismslevelledagainstthemodal-existentialaccountof ontologicaldependenceandtherecentsuggestionstoconceiveofontological priorityinessentialistterms,manyAristotlescholarsarguethathedoesnot conceiveofontologicaldependenceandpriorityinmodal-existentialterms, butratherinessentialistorexplanatoryterms.18 Theirstrategyistoreconsider
15 See Simons(1991); Moravcsik(1965:107); Tlumak(1983).Ascitedin Fine(1995)
16 TahkoandLowe(2009) highlightthatthemodalexistentialaccountisspecificallyproblematic whenitisusedtocapturesubstancehood.
17 Fine(1995:288–9).
18 NotethatinterpretersexplicitlyrespondtotheconcernsraisedbyFineandothers.Cf. Koslicki(2013), Peramatzis(2011),and Corkum(2016)
theunderstandingof‘einai’inthestatementsaboutontologicalpriorityandto understand‘einai’as‘whatitis’ratherthanas‘toexist’(asinthetraditional modal-existentialreading).Accordingtotheessentialistreadingofpriorityin nature,whichisverypopularamongNeo-Aristotelianinterpreters,19 theontologicaldependenceinquestionisan essentialdependence (Peramatzis,2011: 244):BisontologicallydependentonAiff‘AmakesBwhatitis’,butnot conversely.20
AsIamgoingtoargueinthisstudy,theessentialistreadingisunfortunately unpersuasive.IamnotdenyingthatinmanypassagesAristotleusesanessential dependence(especiallywhenhetalksabouttherelationbetweenaform-matter compoundanditssubstantialform).Certainlyessentialdependenceplaysa centralroleinthediscussionsofthe Metaphysics.However,IarguethatAristotleisnottalkingaboutasymmetricessentialdependencewhenspeakingabout priorityinnature and priorityinsubstance. MyownreadingofthepassagesonontologicalpriorityinAristotledoesnot fitnaturallywiththeclassificationoftheontologicalpriorityreadingsaseither existentialorpredicative(especiallyessentialist).Forontologicalpriorityis oftencapturedbymeansofaconditionalwhere‘einai’(being)showsupboth intheantecedentandintheconsequent,andIarguethatitcanbethecase that‘einai’shouldbereadexistentiallyintheantecedentandpredicativelyin theconsequent,andviceversa.Inmyview,theunderstandingof‘einai’is dependentupontherelata.If,forinstance,theprioritemisapropertyandthe lateritemitsinstance,‘einai’shouldbereadexistentiallyintheantecedentand predicativelyintheconsequent.Bycontrast,ifboththepriorandtheposterior itemisanobject,bothoccurrencesof‘einai’shouldbereadexistentially.Of course,onemustbearinmindthatAristotleseesacloseconnectionbetweenthe predicativeandtheexistentialreading,sincehedoesnotacceptemptyterms
19 Lowe(2009) and Peramatzis(2011)
20 InadditiontothosewhothinkthatAristotlehasaunivocalaccountofontologicalpriority(eitherintermsofexistence(Kirwan(1993); Witt(1994); Makin(2003))orintermsof essence(Peramatzis(2011)),therearethosewhomaintainthatheusestwodistinctaccounts ofontologicalpriority,namelyamodal-existentialaccountofontologicalpriorityandateleologicalaccountofontologicalpriority(Panayides(1999) and Beere(2009)).Thisquestion arisesspecificallywhenitcomestoAristotle’sdiscussionofontologicalpriorityinthe Metaphysics andisnotofcentralconcernforthe Categories.However,Iintendtoshowthatatleast onelineofinterpretation–namelythatAristotlehasaunivocalaccountbothinthe Categories andinthe Metaphysics –canbeseriouslycalledintoquestionbythisstudy.Foronmyreading, Aristotlealreadyinthe Categories employstwonon-reduciblydistinctcriteria.(Inasecond study,currentlyunderpreparation,Iarguethatapartfromtheaccountheputsforwardinthe Categories,heusesinsomepassagesasecondaccountofpriority,accordingtowhichAis priortoBifAistheaim(telos)ofateleologicalprocessofwhichBisalsoapart(butnotthe endpart).)
inascience,sohemightevenworrylessthanpresent-dayreadersaboutthe preciseunderstandingoftheaccountofontologicalpriority.
1.3Aristotle’sUseof‘Einai’(Being)
Sincethenotion‘einai’(being)iscrucialforunderstandingontologicalpriorityinAristotle,itwillbehelpfultogiveabriefaccountofAristotle’suseof thisnotionanditsvariousoccurrences,suchasthenoun‘ousia’andparticiple phrasessuchas‘toon’.
TheGreekverb‘einai’–likeitsEnglishcounterpart‘being’–hasanumber ofdifferentuses.CharlesKahnarguesconvincinglythatweneedtomakea syntacticandasemanticdistinctionasregardstheuseoftheverb‘tobe’inthe Englishlanguage(Kahn,1966).Asregardsthesyntacticdistinction,weneed todistinguishbetweenusesof‘being’thatareabsoluteorcompleteandothers thatarepredicativeorincomplete.Inthelattercase,theoccurrenceoftheterm ‘tobe’isfollowedbyapredicatesuchas‘aphilosopher’,‘known’,or‘inthe blackbox’.21 Kahnarguesthatinsofarasthesyntacticdistinctionisconcerned, wefindthesamedivisioninAncientGreek(thereareusesof einai thatare completeandothersthatareincomplete).However,hedrawsattentiontothe factthatwhenwehaveacompleteorabsoluteuseof‘einai’,‘einai’isused as‘toexist’,butalsoas‘istrue’,‘isthecase’,or‘isreal’(Kahn,1966:250).
Kahnalsoconvincinglyarguesthattheincompleteorpredicativeuseof‘einai’ doesnotmerelyservetoconnectsubjectandpredicatebutcanalsobeused asdurative(‘being’meaning‘enduringintime’)orlocative(‘being’meaning ‘beingspatiallylocated’)(Kahn,1966:254–62).Inaddition,onemustsingle outaspecialuse,namelythe‘is’ofidentity,withinthevariouspredicativeuses. Thus,Kahnargues,asregardstheGreekverb‘einai’,issuesofsyntaxshould betreatedseparatelyfromissuesofsemantics.
AsregardstheinterpretationofAncientphilosophers,onemightwonder whethertheyexplicitlyoratleastimplicitlydistinguishedbetweenthevarious uses.
AtleastAristotle,onemightargue,explicitlydrawstherelevantdistinctions.InmanypassagesAristotlehighlightsthat‘being’issaidinmanyways (Metaph. IV2;V7;VIII2),andtherearesomepassageswhichstronglysuggest thatAristotledrawsaclear-cutdistinctionbetweenthesyntacticallycomplete andincompleteuseof einai,especially An.post. II1,89b32–5, Soph.e. V, 167a1–2,and Soph.e. V,180a36–8.Inthesepassages,Aristotledistinguishes between‘tobesomething’(einaiti)and‘tobewithoutqualification’(einai
21 WhereasKahnusesthelabels‘absolute’and‘predicative’, Brown(1994) usesthelabels ‘complete’and‘incomplete’.IwillfollowBrown.
haplôs),whichsuggeststhatwefindthedichotomybetweenasyntactically completeandincompleteuseof einai atleastinAristotle.
Inadetailedstudyoftheusesof ‘einai’ inAncientphilosophicalwriting (especiallythatofthePresocratics,Plato,andAristotle),LesleyBrownquestionsthisviewandtherebypushesKahn’sresultsfurther,arguingthateven withinthevarioussyntacticaluses,thereisnosharpdistinctionbetweenthe completeandincompleteusesof‘einai’inAristotle’sphilosophicalwritings.22
Onthebasisoftheseobservations,Brownconvincinglysuggeststhat,even thoughAristotleexplicitlydistinguishesa‘being something’from‘being simpliciter’,hepresumablydidnotseeasemanticdistinctionbetweenthe‘is something’fromthe‘is simpliciter’,andeventhesyntacticaldistinctionisnot asunambiguousasmightbehoped.Insum,(1)Aristotlewouldnotlicensethe movefrombeing F tobeing simplicter onlyforsomevaluesofF;(2)hetakes theretobeacloseconnectionbetweenquestionsofexistenceandwhat-it-is questions;(3)thedistinctionsinwhichheisinterested,namelythedifferencebetweenaccidentalandessentialbeing,andthedifferentsensesofbeing accordingtothetencategories,‘cutacrossthesyntacticdistinctionbetween completeandincomplete,anddonotcorrespondtothesemanticdistinction between“exists”andthecopula’(Brown,1994:236).
MyownfindingsinthisElementwithregardtoAristotle’saccountofontologicalpriorityfurthersupportBrown’sandKahn’sresults.Mostimportantly,I arguethatitisoftendifficulttodecidebetweenanexistentialandapredicative reading,andthatinsomecasesdecidingbetweenthemactuallymakesnodifference.Onceagain,Aristotledoesnotseemtopresenthistreatmentof‘einai’ asclearlyasonemightexpect.
1.4Aristotle,Plato,andtheAcademyonOntologicalPriority
SinceIbelievethatAristotletakesupsomeofthecriteriaforontologicalpriorityfromhisteacherPlato,itwillbehelpfultobrieflylookatthesimilarities anddifferencesbetweenPlato’sandAristotle’streatmentofontologicalpriority.IhavethreereasonsforholdingtheviewthatAristotleinheritsmanyofthe corefeaturesofhisownaccountofontologicalpriorityfromPlatoandother Academicphilosophers:(1)AristotlehimselfascribestheaccountofontologicalprioritythathehimselfemploystoPlatoin Metaphysics V11;(2)in apassagefromthe EudemianEthics I(EE I8,1217b2–15),Aristotleagain ascribesthisaccounttoPlato;and(3)weknowfromfragmentsofXenocrates
22 Brown(1994).ThesameistrueforPlato(Brown,1994:216–33).Seealso Ackrill(1957) and Vlastos(1981) onPlato.
(anotherofPlato’sstudents)thatthiskindofunderstandingofontologicalprioritywascommonintheAcademy.Ananalysisofthesepassagesshowsthat thediscussionofontologicalpriorityisanintegralpartofAristotle’sintellectualengagementwithandcriticismofPlatoandotherAcademicphilosophers, suchasXenocrates.
1.4.1MetaphysicsV11andEudemianEthicsI8
WhatinitiallysupportsmyreadingisthefactthatAristotlehimselfopenly acknowledgesthisinheritance.In Metaphysics V11heexplicitlyascribes anaccountofontologicalpriorityintermsofanasymmetricontological dependencetoPlato:
Somethingsarecalledpriorandposteriorinthisway,whileothersarecalled soinnatureandsubstance,thosewhichcanbewithoutotherthings,but notthelatterwithoutthem;thisdivisionwasusedbyPlato.(Metaph. V11, 1019a4–14;transl. Ross,1924 withmod.)
Adiscussionofontologicalpriorityinthe EudemianEthics andafragment byXenocratesconfirmthatAristotleascribesthisunderstandingofontological priorityintermsofasymmetricontologicaldependencetoPlato.Asweare goingtosee,the EudemianEthics passagenotonlyhelpsustounderstandbetter how(Aristotle’s)Platothinksabouttheaccountbutalsohowheappliedit. Xenocrates’fragmentshowsthattheaccountofontologicalpriorityinterms ofanasymmetricontologicaldependenceiswidespreadintheAcademy.
Inthe EudemianEthics I8,AristotlediscussesPlato’sviewofthepriority innatureoftheformoftheGoodoverallothergoodthings.23 Aristotlesaysasfollows:
[...]andit[sc.theformoftheGood]isfirstamonggoods;for,iftheobjectin whichthingsshareweredestroyed,withitwouldgothethingsthatsharein theForm,andarecalledwhattheyarecalledthroughsharinginit;andthatis thewaythatthefirststandsinrelationtotheposterior.(EE I8,1217b2–15; transl. Woods,1982 withmod.)
Inhisanalysisofthispassage, Peramatzis(2011:212–16)correctlyhighlights thatthestrikingnotioninthischaracterisationisthe‘anhaireisthai’.Thisnotion oftenmeans‘goingoutofexistence’(or‘beingtakenaway’or‘annihilated’or
23 Hereandinwhatfollows,IdiscusspassagesinwhichAristotlemostplausiblydiscussesPlato’s ownview,althoughAristotledoesnotsaysoexplicitly,butratherspeakslooselyof‘they’.See Woods(1982:66–7).NotethatAristotleveryoften,whenreferringtoPlato,speaksof‘they’ ratherthancallingPlatobyname.
‘destroyed’).AtextualsearchontheThesaurusLinguaeGraecae(TLG)shows thatthenotionisveryoftenusedtoexpressthedeathofaperson.24 Thepoint ofthe TLG searchistoshowthat‘anhaireisthai’isusedinordertodenote thetransitionofanobjectfrom existence to non-existence.ThusPeramatzisis correctinclaimingthatinviewofthestrikinguseofthetermanditsmeaning, onehasgoodreasonstobelievethatAristotleunderstandsPlato’sconception ofpriorityinnatureasanon-reciprocalnecessaryexistentialdependence.25
However,somequalificationsareneededhere.WhenAristotlesaysthat, accordingtothePlatonists,‘iftheobjectinwhichthingsshareweredestroyed, withitwouldgothethingsthatshareintheForm’,shouldwe,forinstance, understandthisclaimassayingthatiftheformofthegoodceasestoexist,its participantsceasetoexist simpliciter,ordotheyceasetoexist as beinggood? WehaveseenintheprevioussectiononAristotle’suseof‘einai’thatthere aredifferentusesof‘einai’,andItakeitthatthereisasimilarvarietyinthe caseof‘anhaireisthai’.Iproposethesethreeconceivablewaysofreadingthe conditional:
ExistentialReading Wehaveanexistentialreadingof‘einai’inboththe antecedentandtheconsequent.
IftheformoftheGooddidnotexist,thenalltheothergoodthings (thataregood)wouldnotexist,butnottheotherwayround.
PredicativeReading Wehaveapredicativereadingof‘einai’inboththe antecedentandtheconsequent.
IftheformoftheGoodwerenotgood,itwouldnotbethecasethat thereisan x suchthat x isgood,butnottheotherwayround.
MixedReading Wehaveanexistentialreadingof‘einai’intheantecedent andapredicativereadingintheconsequent.
IftheformoftheGooddidnotexist,itwouldnotbethecasethatthere isan x suchthat x isgood,butnottheotherwayround(=ifitwere notthecasethatthereisan x suchthat x isgood,itisnotthecasethat theformofthegooddoesnotexist).
Inwhatfollows,Iwillargueforthemixedreading.Firstofall,Ithinkitishelpfultotreatthebestreadingof‘einai’intheantecedentandintheconsequent independently.
24 Seeforexample Pol. V101311a22;V11,1313a41; Rh. I15,1376a6;1395a17.
25 Thenecessityisnotmentionedexplicitly,butItakeittobeimplicitlyunderstood.Insupportofthisreading,notethatAristotleascribestoPlatoamodal-existentialunderstandingof ontologicalpriorityin Metaph. V11,1019a4.
ReadingoftheAntecedent:SincewearetalkingaboutPlatonicforms,the existentialreadingoftheantecedentisarguablypreferableoverthepredicative reading.Fortheformsare,soPlatotellsus,nothingbutthemselves.Theform oftheGoodisnothingbutgoodness.TheformofLargenessisnothingbut largeness.Sothepredicativereadingoftheantecedentseemsforced(‘ifthe formoftheGoodwerenotgood ’),sincetheformoftheGoodisnothing butgood.Theexistentialreadingisthuspreferable:‘IftheformoftheGood didnotexist ’
ReadingoftheConsequent:Whatinitiallyspeaksfortheexistentialreadingoftheconsequent( thenthegoodthings(thatarenowgood)wouldnot exist)isthathesaysthat‘withitwouldgothethingsthatshareintheForm’. For,accordingtoPlato,thethingsthatshareintheformsarethesubstrata thatreceivetheproperties.Whatfurthersupportsthisreadingisthatarguably Plato’sremarksaboutthepriorityoftheformoftheGoodinthe Republic also implythatwithouttheGood,nothingelsewouldexist(Pl. Resp. 509b6–10). Onthisreading,Aristotlewouldbethen,atleastinthisregard,afaithfuland charitableinterpreterofPlato.
However,thepredicativereadingoftheconsequentseemslessproblematic, foronthepredicativereading,Aristotlemerelystatesthat,accordingtoPlato, theformofthegoodisontologicallypriortoitsparticipants,sincewithoutthere beingtheformofthegood,thethingslosetheirbeinggood,buttheydonot ceasetoexistaltogether.
Whatsupportsthepredicativereadingoftheconsequentisthatwhenwe analysethispassage,itseemsthatAristotleisnotexplainingthespecificpriorityoftheformoftheGood.Inotherwords,theontologicalpriorityoftheform oftheGoodoveritsparticipantsisjustoneexampleofacaseofontological priorityamongmany.Itlooksasifheisexplainingontologicalpriorityingeneralandhowthissubsequentlyworksoutforparticularcases.Thissuggests thattheaccountofpriorityneedstobeeasilyapplicabletolotsofotherforms. Forinstance,thesameaccountofontologicalpriorityshouldalsobeabletobe used(inthePlatonicframework)inthecaseoftheontologicalpriorityofthe formofLargenessoveritsparticipantsortheformofLongnessoveritsparticipants.Insuchcases,itisnotplausiblethatiftheformofLargenessceasesto exist simpliciter,thelargethingsceasetoexist simpliciter aswell.
Sinceweshouldarguablyprefertheexistentialreadingintheprotasisand thepredicativereadingintheapodosis,IproposethatAristotlemixesupthe existentialandthepredicativereadings:intheantecedent‘einai’shouldbe understoodexistentially,andintheconsequent‘einai’shouldbeunderstood predicatively.Somyreadingof EE I8,1217b2–15doesnotnaturallyfitin withtheclassificationofthepriorityreadingsasexclusivelyeitherexistential
orpredicative.WewillfindthesameresultwhenitcomestoAristotle’sown discussionofontologicalpriorityinthe Categories.
1.4.2OntologicalPriorityamongGenusandSpecies:AControversy betweenAristotleandXenocrates
InafragmentfromAlexanderofAphrodisias,whichsurvivedonlyinArabic, welearnthatXenocrates,afurtherpupilofPlato’sintheAcademy,isinterested inontologicalpriorityamongspeciesandgenera.Thepassagereadsasfollows:
Alexandersays:Xenocratessays:Iftherelationbetweenaspeciesanda genusisliketherelationbetweenapartandawhole,andifapartisanterior andpriortothewholeinvirtueofanaturalpriority(forifapartisdestroyed, thewholeisdestroyed–thisinviewofthefactthatnowholewillremainif oneofitspartsislacking),whereasapartwillnotnecessarilybedestroyed ifthewholetowhichitbelongsisdissolved,sinceitispossibleforcertain partsofawholetobeeliminatedwhileothersremain),aspeciesislikewiseundoubtedlypriortoitsgenus.(Xenocr. Fr. 121IsnardiParente;transl. Pines,1961 withmod.)26
Xenocratesnowappliesthiscriterionforontologicalprioritytogenusand species,andtopartsandwholes.Moreprecisely,hearguesthatbecausethe relationbetweenthespeciesandthegenusisaparthoodrelation(thespeciesis apartofthegenus),andbecauseapartisontologicallyprior27 toawhole,the speciesisontologicallypriortothegenus.
Thissurvivingtextstronglysuggests,togetherwiththepassagefromthe EudemianEthics,thatmanyphilosophersintheAcademywereinterestedin understandingboththenatureofontologicalpriorityanditsextension.Inthe passageinquestion(Xenocr. Fr. 121IP),Xenocratesconceivesofontological priorityintermsofasymmetricexistentialdependence.
Xenocrates’argumentandclaimsareinterestingforseveralreasons.First, itshowsthatthereevidentlywasadiscussionanddisagreementwithinthe Academy(andphilosophersclosetotheAcademysuchasAristotle)asto whetherthegenusisontologicallypriortothespecies.ComingfromPlato,one wouldevidentlytaketheAcademicdoctrinetobethatthegenusispriortothe species.Surprisingly,Aristotlehimselfarguesinthe Categories thatthegenus ispriorinsubstancetothespecies.28 NowweseethatthereisanAcademic
26 Seethediscussionofthisfragmentin Pines(1961) and Rashed(2004).
27 Aristotlespeakshereof‘priorityinnature’,whichIassumetobeontologicalpriority.Seemore onAristotle’suseof‘priorityinnature’intheconcludingremarksofthisElement.
28 ItisnoteasytoaccommodateAristotle’sclaimthatthegenusisontologicallypriortothe speciespreciselybecauseinrelevantrespectshemovedawayfromtheAcademicdogmaby assigningtoordinaryparticularobjectsthestatusofprimacysubstances.
philosopher,namelyXenocrates,whoquestionsthisdogma.For,accordingto him,thespeciesisontologicallymorefundamentalthanthegenus.29
Second,itshowsthatwithintheAcademictraditiontherearecaseswhere ontologicalpriorityisconceivedofinpurelyexistentialterms.Whenanalysing the EudemianEthics passage,wehaveseenthatweshouldunderstand ‘anhaireisthai’intheantecedentinexistentialterms.Here,inXenocrates’fragment,weshouldunderstand‘anhaireisthai’ both intheantecedent and inthe consequentexistentially.Itseemstometobeimportanttotaketherelatainto accountwhenwedecidewhetherweshouldpreferanexistentialreadingof ‘anhaireisthai’orapredicativereading.Giventhattheformsarethecausesof thepropertiesofobjects,apredicativereadingof‘anhaireisthai’and‘einai’is muchmoreattractivethaninacasewheretherelataareobjects(inXenocrates’ case,partsandwholes).
1.4.3DivisionesAristotelis
Finally,inthe DivisionesAristotelis 64,acollectionofshorttextsaboutthe relationshipbetweenterms(Mutschmann,1907),ontologicalpriorityisagain capturedintermsofasymmetricontologicaldependence,whichisherebest understoodasasymmetricexistentialdependence:
‘Prior’issaidinfiveways:Foritissaidinnature,intime,incapacity,in setting,inorder.[…]Somethingispriorinnature,forexample,theoneis priortothetwo,andtheparttothewhole,andthegenustothespecies,and ingeneraleverythingthatdoesnotreciprocallydestroyeachother.Inthese cases,thatwhichdestroystheotherthingwithitselfispriorinnature,andthat whichisdestroyedisposteriorinnature.Forexample,ifthenumberoneis destroyed,thetwoisdestroyedandeverynumber,butifthetwoisdestroyed nothingpreventstherebeingthenumberone.Therefore,thenumberoneis priorinnaturetothenumbertwo.Likewiseifthepartisdestroyedthewhole isdestroyed,butifthewholedoesnotexist,nothingpreventstheexistence ofthepart.(DivisionesAristotelis, Mutschmann,1907:64)
Itsauthorshipiscontested,butscholarsagreethattheauthormusthavebeena memberofAristotle’sschool.Thefragmentonpriorityisinterestingbecause
29 Aristotleisstillconcernedwiththisissueinthe Metaphysics andhetreatsitthereasanongoing debate.ItisinterestingtoseethatXenocratesispartofthedebateandaninterlocutorfor Aristotle.SeeAristotle’sdiscussionsin Metaphysics III:‘Again,whethertheprinciplesand Elementsofthingsaretheclasses,orthepartspresentineachthingintowhichitisdivided; andiftheyaretheclasses,whethertheyaretheclassesthatarepredicatedproximatelyofthe individuals,orthehighestclasses,e.g.whetheranimalormanisthefirstprincipleandthe moreindependentoftheindividualinstance?’(Metaph. III1,995b27–31;transl. Ross,1924). Cf. Metaph. III3,998a20–999a2.
itconfirmsmycentralclaims:(1)thattherearemajordiscussionsinthe AcademyandinAristotle’sschoolabouthowtoconceiveoftheconceptand extensionofontologicalpriority;and(2)thatwithintheAcademictradition therearecaseswhereontologicalpriorityisconceivedofinpurelyexistential terms.
InthispassagePseudo-Aristotlefirstdrawsdistinctionsbetweendifferent kindsofpriority(asdoesAristotlefrequentlyinthepassageswherehetheorises aboutpriority(cf. Cat. 12; Metaph. V11andIX8)).Whendiscussingpriority innature(proterontēiphusei),Pseudo-Aristotlegivesanaccountofitandits extension.Theaccountheprovides,thoughslightlydifferinginitsformulation, isthesameastheonewefindinAristotle’sdiscussioninthe EudemianEthics, intheXenocratesfragment,and,aswewillseeinthefollowingsections,inthe Categories (Cat. 7,7b22–8a12).
1.4.4TheAcademyandAristotle
Ananalysisofthepassagesunderdiscussionstronglysuggeststhatboth AristotleandAcademicphilosophersunderstandontologicalpriorityasan asymmetricdependenceinbeing.Ihavearguedthattheterms‘einai’and ‘anhaireisthai’inthestatementsaboutontologicalprioritycanbeunderstood bothpredicatively(excludingtheessentialistreading)andexistentially.SometimesAristotle(andtheAcademics)usedifferentunderstandingsof‘einai’and ‘anhaireisthai’withinthesamestatementaboutpriority.Thisisthecase,for instance,in EE I8,1217b2–15.
Onthebasisofourtexts,itseemsthattheAcademicsuseonlyasymmetricdependenceinbeingasacriterionforontologicalpriority.Thissuggests thatasymmetricdependenceinbeingisanecessaryandsufficientcondition forpriorityforAcademicphilosophers.Inthefollowingchapters,Iarguethat Aristotleaddsafurtherconditiontotheaccountofontologicalpriority,sothat asymmetricdependenceinbeingisnolongeranecessaryconditionforontologicalpriority,althoughitremainsasufficientcondition.Inaddition,wewill discoverthatwhilePlatoandotherAcademicsmightnotyethaveusedmodal operatorsinaccountsofontologicaldependence,30 theynonethelessforman integralpartofAristotle’saccountofdependence.
Onmyreading,thedisagreementbetweenAcademicphilosophersandAristotleonontologicalprioritydoesnotderivefromtheirdifferentviewson thepreciseunderstandingofasymmetricdependenceinbeing,assomehave
30 Wefindthemodaloperatormentionedin Metaph. V11,1019a4–14andXenocr. Fr. 121IP, butnotin EE I8,1217b2–15and DivisionesAristotelis 64.
claimed(Peramatzis,2011:212–16);ratheritisduetotheirdifferentviewson whatsatisfiestheconditionsofbeingontologicallyprior.
1.5SectionOverview
ThestructureofthisElementisasfollows:31 thesecondsectionoffersadetailed accountofAristotle’sunderstandingofpriorityinnaturein Categories 12and 13.IarguethatAristotleproposesadisjunctiveaccountofpriorityinnature consistingofthefollowingtwoconditions:
(1)AisontologicallypriortoBifnecessarilyB’sbeingimpliesA’sbeing,but notnecessarily,A’sbeingimpliesB’sbeing.
(2)AisontologicallypriortoBifnecessarilyA’sandB’sbeingsymmetrically implyeachother,andA’sbeingisacauseofB’sbeing.
Iarguethatimplicationofbeingcanbeunderstoodeitherexistentiallyorpredicatively.Ithenarguethatanexistentialreadingispreferabletoapredicative readinginmostcases.
Thethirdsectionoffersaclosereadingof Categories 7.Iaddresssomeconcernsconcerningthetreatmentofdependenciesamongrelatives.Bytakinginto accountAristotle’sdiscussionsofsimultaneityinnature,Iarguethathedistinguishesbetweendifferentkindsofdependenciesrelativetowhatkindof entitiesheisdiscussing(forexample,whetherheistalkingaboutnecessarily existingorcontingentlyexistingentities,entitiesexistingintime,orproperties andobjects).
Thefourthsectionexaminesoneofthemostcontroversialchaptersinthe entire Categories,namely Categories 5,whereAristotleassertstheprimacy oftheprimarysubstances.Onmyreading,Aristotleaccountsfortheprimacy oftheprimarysubstancesonthegroundsthattheyaretheultimatesubjects ofpredication.
Thefinalsectionsummarisesthemajoroutcomesoftheprevioussections andexplainswhyAristotle’sdiscussionmightbeopentocriticism.Itconcludes withalookathowthediscussionofontologicalpriorityinthe Categories might berelevantforunderstandingAristotle’sdiscussionofontologicalpriorityin the Metaphysics
31 Notethatmyorderinvolvesmovingbackwardsthroughthiswork.Istartwiththechaptersin whichAristotle’sexpositionisespeciallyclear(chapters12and13).Ithenmovetochapter 7,whichoffersimportantrefinements.Iconcludewithchapter5,whichcontainsanimportant discussionoftheprimarysubstancesthathasoftenbeenseenasanapplicationofhisaccount ofontologicalpriority.
2OntologicalPriorityinAristotle’s Categories 12and13
2.1Introduction
ThissectionoffersthefirstsystematicanalysisofAristotle’sdiscussionofontologicalpriorityin Cat. 12and13.Onmyreading,Aristotleputsforwardtwo non-reduciblecriteriaforpriorityinnaturethatareindividuallysufficientand disjunctivelynecessaryandsufficientforpriorityinnature.Accordingtothe firstcriterion,AispriorinnaturetoBifnecessarilyB’sbeingimpliesA’s beingbutnotnecessarilyA’sbeingimpliesB’sbeing.Accordingtothesecondcriterion,AispriorinnaturetoBifnecessarilyA’sbeingandB’sbeing symmetricallyimplyeachotherandA’sbeingisinsomewayacause(aition pōs)ofB’sbeing.Iarguethatinbothcriteria,‘being’canbeunderstoodeither existentiallyorveridicallybutneveressentially.32
2.2PriorityoftheGenusovertheSpeciesin Categories 13
In Cat. 13,15a4–7Aristotleclaimsthatgeneraarepriorinnaturetospecies.In thissubsectionIarguethatin Cat. 13Aristotleconceivesofpriorityinnature betweenagenusandaspeciesintermsofnon-symmetricnecessaryexistential dependencebetweentheobjectsthatfallunderthegenusandthespecies.
Aristotlesaysasfollows(andwewillseeonthenextpagethattherearealso severaldifferentreadingsofthispassage):
Genera,however,arealwaysprior[sc.innature]tospeciessincetheydonot reciprocateastoimplicationofbeing;e.g.ifthereisafish,thenthereisan animal,butifthereisananimalthenthereisnotnecessarilyafish.(Cat. 13, 15a4–7)33
InthispassageAristotleisconcernedwiththeasymmetricdependencebetween twouniversals,34 namelytheuniversal‘animal’andtheuniversal‘fish’. Theinterpretationoftheprioritydependsuponhowoneanswersthefollowingtwosetsofquestions:
32 Inagreementwiththeessentialistreading,Iarguethatessentialdependenciesamongtherelata ofontologicalpriorityorsimultaneityrelationsplayanimportantrolewhenitcomestodeterminingwhatitistobepriortoorsimultaneouswithanotheritem,yetIdonotidentifypriority innaturewithasymmetricessentialdependence.
33 Ijustifythistranslationlaterinthissection.
34 ‘Genera,however,arealwayspriortospecies’.Theseare,forAristotle,universals.Theview thatAristotleisconcernedherewithuniversalsissupportedbythefactthatwhenAristotleis discussingsimultaneityinnaturerelationsthatregardgeneraandspecies,heultimatelyaimsto determinetherelationbetweenuniversalsandnotbetweenpropertiesorinstancesofuniversals.
In Cat. 13,14b33–15a4hesaysthat‘animal’issubdividedinto‘bird’and‘beast’and‘fish’.He is,thus,clearlytalkingaboutthetaxonomyoftheuniversal‘animal’ratherthanitsinstances ortheinstantiationofthepropertybeingananimal’.
(1)Aretheterms(‘fish’(enhudron);‘animal’(zōon))subjectsorpredicatesin theconditionals?
(2)Howshould‘being’(einai)beinterpreted?Inparticular,doesAristotlesay somethingabouttheexistenceoftheitemsinquestion?
Itakeitthatamongthegreatvarietyofconceivableinterpretations,thereare onlythreeviableoptions:
(1)A predicative reading,accordingtowhichtheontologicalpriorityofthe genus‘animal’overthespecies‘fish’consistsinapredicativepriorityof thegenusoverthespecies.Onthisreading,‘fish’and‘animal’aretaken tobepredicatesand‘einai’isreadpredicatively.
Necessarily,35 ifsomethingisafish,itisananimal,butnotnecessarily,if somethingisananimal,itisafish.
(2)An existential-universal reading,accordingtowhichtheontologicalpriorityofthegenus‘animal’overthespecies‘fish’consistsinanexistential priority ofthegenusoverthespecies.Onthisreading,‘fish’and‘animal’aretakentobesubjectsandstandforuniversals.‘Einai’isread existentially.
Necessarily,ifthespecies‘fish’exists,thegenus‘animal’exists,butnot necessarily,ifthegenus‘animal’exists,thespecies‘fish’exists.
(3)An existential-instances reading,accordingtowhichtheontologicalpriorityofthegenus‘animal’overthespecies‘fish’consistsinanexistential priority oftheinstancesofthegenusovertheinstancesofspecies.Onthis reading,‘fish’and‘animal’aretakentobesubjectsandstandforinstances ofuniversals.‘Einai’isreadexistentially.
Necessarily,ifa‘fish’exists,an‘animal’exists,butnotnecessarily,ifan ‘animal’exists,a‘fish’exists.
Inthefollowing,Idiscusseachofthethreereadings.Iwillcontendthat(3)is themostpromisingoption.
ThePredicativeReading Onthepredicativereading,theontologicalpriority betweentheuniversals‘fish’and‘animal’consistsinapredicativedependence betweentheproperties‘beingafish’and‘beingananimal’.Onthisreading,the genusispriorinnaturetothespecies,sincenecessarilyifsomethingbelongs tothespecies,itbelongstothegenus,butnotnecessarily,ifsomethingbelongs tothegenus,itbelongstothespecies.
35 IassumethatAristotleimplicitlyusesamodaloperator(‘necessarily’)alreadyinthefirst conditional.Infact,onecouldtakethe‘anangkē’togovernbothconditionals.
Whatseemstosupportthismoresophisticatedreadingisacomparative analysiswithsimilarpassagesinthe Analytics.SusanneBobzien,inanalysing similarconditionalsinthe PriorAnalytics,arguesthatweshouldpreferthe predicativereadinginthecaseofsuchconditionals.Herprevailingmotivation forthisreadingisthatifwereadsuchconditionalspredicatively,theyaremore easilyreformulableintopropersyllogisms.Andwearegenerallyoperating undertheassumptionthatsuchareformulationisdesirable.
Forinstance,in PriorAnalytics I32,47a28–31Aristotlesaysthat:
ἀνθρώπουὄντοςἀνάγκηζῷονεἶναι
καιζῷουοὐσίαν,
ἀνθρώπουὄντοςἀνάγκηοὐσίανεἶναι.
First,aliteraltranslationthatdoesnotcommitustoanyreading:
beingahumanbeing necessarily beingananimal beingananimal necessarily beingasubstance beingahumanbeing necessarily beingasubstance
Beingahumanbeing, beingasubstance,and beingananimal canbereadin twoways.
Predicatively:
Ifitisahumanbeing,itisnecessarilyananimal.
Ifitisananimal,itisnecessarilyasubstance.
Hence,ifitisahumanbeing,itisnecessarilyasubstance.
Existentially:
Necessarily,ifahumanbeingexists,ananimalexists.
Necessarily,ifananimalexists,asubstanceexists.
Hence,necessarily,ifahumanbeingexists,asubstanceexists.36
Bobzienoptsforthepredicativereading,sinceshethinksthatitispossible onthepredicativereadingtoreformulateelegantlyintoasyllogism.Sheaims
36 Notethatthenecessityoperatorinthetworeconstructionsisplaceddifferently.Aristotle’suse ofmodaloperatorsisnotaspreciseasonemightwish(sometimeshedropsthemaltogether). ForthisreasonIthinkthatbothreconstructionsarelegitimatereadingsoftheGreek.
toshowhowthisreformulationcouldbedone,firstofall,bytidyingupthe formulation.OnBobzien’sreading,thegrammaticalformoftheargumentreads asfollows(Bobzien,2000:92):
τοῦΑὄντοςἀνάγκητὸΒεἶναι
τοῦΒὄντοςἀνάγκητὸΓεἶναι τοῦΑὄντοςἀνάγκητὸΓεἶναι
beingA,itisnecessarilyB beingB,itisnecessarilyC
beingA,itisnecessarilyC
Bobzienholdsthatthisargumentbecomesapropersyllogismifitisreformulatedinthefollowingway(Bobzien,2000:93):
substancebelongstoeveryanimal animalbelongstoeveryhumanbeing thereforesubstancebelongstoeveryhumanbeing
Putinto modusBarbara thisreadsasfollows:
CbelongstoeveryB
BbelongstoeveryA thereforeCbelongstoeveryA
BobzienarguesthatontheassumptionthatAristotletakestheargumentin Prior Analytics I32,47a28–31tobereformulableintheaforementionedmanner(a validsyllogismwith modusBarbara),weshouldunderstandthetwoformulationsasbeingmoreorlessequivalent.Thissuggeststhatweshouldunderstand thepremisesandconclusionasfollows: IfanythingisTA,itisnecessarythatitisTB.
Bobziensuggeststhat‘thisisanaturalwayofparaphrasingsentencesofthe kindTA ὄντοςἀνάγκηTB εἶναι.37 Fortheyhaveexactlytwoterms(TA,TB), andthereisnosingularsubjecttermexplicitlymentionedineitherthegenitive absoluteorthemainclause’(Bobzien,2000:93).
37 Cf.Arist. Top. 112a17–19,ἄνθρωπονεἶναιfor‘somethingisaman’.
Sincetheconditionalsin An.pr. I32,47a28–31andin Cat. 13,15a6–7are quitesimilar,Bobzien’sanalysisstronglysuggeststhatweshouldpreferthe predicativereadingof‘einai’andtakeAristotleastalkingaboutpropertiesin theconditional.Thepredicativereadingreadsasfollows:
Necessarily,forall x,Sx → Gx,but ¬ necessarilyforall x,Gx → Sx.(S= beinganinstanceofthespecies;G=beinganinstanceofthegenus.)
Onthisreading,theontologicalpriorityofthegenusGoverthespeciesS consistsinapredicativepriorityofbeingGoverbeingS.
Problemforthepredicativereading:Thereisagrammaticalaspectthatspeaks againstBobzien’sreconstruction,namelythatinthecaseinquestionAristotle employsagenitiveabsolute.OnBobzien’sreading,thethreeconditionals–
Ifitisahumanbeing,itisnecessarilyananimal. Ifitisananimal,itisnecessarilyasubstance.
Hence,ifitisahumanbeing,itisnecessarilyasubstance.
–allhavethesamesubject.Butsincetheyallhavethesamesubject,onedoes notexpectagenitiveabsolute,butaparticipleandpredicateinthenominative, orratherintheaccusative(sinceweareinreportedspeech).So,onBobzien’s reading,theGreekshouldratherread:
Inshort,IthinkthatifAristotlehadwantedtosaywhatBobzienclaimshe says,hewouldhaveformulateditinadifferentway.ForthisreasonIthink thatthepredicativereadingof An.pr. I32,47a22–31suggestedbyBobzien andananalogouspredicativereadingof Cat. 13,15a4–7isunsatisfactory.38 I
38 Notethatevenifthepredicativereadingisthecorrectreadingofthepassageand‘einai’ shouldbeunderstoodpredicativelyandnotexistentially,thereadingwouldhaveanexistential implication,sincetermsarenotemptyinAristotle’ssyllogistic.
findanexistentialreadingofbothpassagesmoreconvincing.39 Iwilldiscuss theexistentialreadingof Cat. 13,15a4–7inthenextsection.
In Cat. 12,14a29–35Aristotlealsospeaksofimplicationofbeing.Iwill discussthispassageinSection2.3,buthereIwouldpointoutthatasregardsthe interpretationofthatpassage,thepredicativereadingisevenmoreproblematic: Aristotlesaystherethat‘andifhalfis,doubleis’(καὶἡμίσεοςὄντοςδιπλάσιόν ἐστιν).OnBobzien’sreconstruction,thiswouldread:beingA,itis(necessarily) B.Halfbelongstoeverydouble.Thisisevidentlyfalse.Inthiscaseweshould optforanexistentialreading,andifweuseanexistentialreadinginthiscase, onemightthinkthatweshouldalsouseanexistentialreadingin Cat. 13,15a4–7 and An.pr. I32,47a22–31.
TheExistentialReading Ratherthanreading‘einai’in Cat. 13,15a4–7predicatively,itisalsopossibletoreaditexistentially,asmeaning‘toexist’. Therearetwodifferentexistentialreadings,though.Theyagreeinsofaras bothtake‘fish’and‘animal’intheprotasisandtheapodosistobesubjects. Theydifferinsofarasthefirsttakesthesetermstostandforuniversals,while thesecondtakesthetermstostandforobjectsthatfallundertheseuniversals.Iwillargueforthesecondview,butletusbeginbyexaminingthefirst reading.
Ontheexistential-universalreading,Aristotleformulatesinthispassage anexistentialdependencebetweentheuniversal‘animal’andtheuniversal ‘fish’,wheretheuniversalsfunctionthemselvesintheconditional.Itreadsas follows:
Necessarily,iftheuniversal‘fish’exists,theuniversal‘animal’exists,but notnecessarily,iftheuniversal‘animal’exists,theuniversal‘fish’exists.
Thisreadingisstraightforward.Thegenusispriortothespecies,sincethe existenceofthe species dependsupontheexistenceofthe genus butnotthe otherwayaround.
However,thereadinghassomemajorproblems.
(1)Thefirstconcernisagrammaticalone.Aristotledoesnotuseanarticle before‘fish’and‘animal’in Cat. 13,15a4–7.Thissuggeststhatheisnottalking
39 Thereis,ofcourse,acloseconnectionbetweentheexistentialreading,whichIwilldefend –i.e.thatweshouldunderstandtheconditionalsratherasfollows:‘Necessarily, ∃x Sx → ∃y Gy’–andthepredicativereadingforwhichBobzienisarguing–i.e.‘Necessarily,forall x Sx → Gx’;namelythatsinceanimalispredicatedofallhumanbeings,theexistenceofa humanbeingimpliestheexistenceofananimal.Thepredicationexplainswhyanexistential dependenceholds,butthepredicationisnotitselftheobjectoftheconditionalsthatAristotle formulateshere.
aboutdeterminateentitiesbutindeterminateones.Itissomefishorotherand notthedeterminatespecies‘fish’.NotethatAristotleusesthearticleearlier inthesamesectionwhenhediscussesthegenusandthespecies(14b35–6: to pnēton,tōipezōikaitōienhudrōi;14b37–15a1: tozōion,toptēnon,topezon,to enhudron;15a2–3: topezon,toptēnon,toenhudron).Ifheweretocontinueto speakabouttheuniversalsthemselvesin Cat. 13,15a4–7,hewouldprobably continuetouseanarticle.
(2)Thesecondconcernisametaphysicalone.Aristotleclaimsthat‘notnecessarilyifanimalexists,fishexists’,yet,atthesametime,hebelievesthatthe species‘fish’necessarilyexists.Accordingtoasimplereadingoftheexistentialaccount,theclaimissimplyfalse,giventhathethinksthatthespecies‘fish’ necessarilyexists.40 ThequestioniswhetherAristotleismakingablatanterror here.
Inlightofthedifficultiesofthis existential-universal reading,Ithinkthatthe secondexistentialreading–whichtakes‘fish’and‘animal’tobeobjectsthat fallundertheuniversalsratherthanastheuniversalsthemselves–tobemore promising.Onthisreading,theontologicalpriorityamongthegenus‘animal’ andthespecies‘fish’consistsinanexistentialpriority oftheinstancesofthe genusovertheinstancesofthespecies:
Necessarily,ifafishexists,ananimalexists,butnotnecessarily,ifananimal exists,afishexists.
Theexistential-instancesreadinghastheadvantageovertheexistentialuniversalreadinginthatitcanaccountforthefactthatAristotledoesnotuse thearticleintheconditional(sinceittakesAristotletobespeakingaboutsome fishorotherandsomeanimalorother).
However,thisreadingshareswiththeexistential-universalreadingthedifficultythatitisfalsethat‘notnecessarily,ifananimalexists,afishexists’. ThisisbecauseAristotlebelievesthatspeciesarebynecessityinstantiated,whichmeansthat,bynecessity,therealwaysexistssomethingthatis afish.
Nevertheless,despitethissignificantdifficulty,sinceithasfewerproblemsthantheexistential-universalreadingbutsharesthatreading’svirtues incomparisonwiththepredicativereading,Itakeittobemostpromising interpretationoverall.
40 Notethattheessentialistsarecommittedtoreadingthisconditionalasfalseaswell,sinceas theirreadingwouldhaveit:‘Iffishiswhatitis,animaliswhatitis,butifanimaliswhatit is,fishisnotnecessarilywhatitis.’Thespecies‘fish’isnecessarilywhatitis,accordingto Aristotle.
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EPICUREAN SAUCE.
Mix well, by shaking them in a bottle, a wineglassful of Indian soy, half a pint of chili vinegar, half a pint of walnut catsup, and a pint and a half of the best mushroom catsup. These proportions make an excellent sauce, either to mix with melted butter, and to serve with fish, or to add to different kinds of gravy; but they can be varied, or added to, at pleasure.
Indian soy, 1 wineglassful; chili vinegar, 1/2 pint; walnut catsup, 1/2 pint; mushroom catsup, 1-1/2 pint.
TARRAGON VINEGAR.
Gather the tarragon just before it blossoms, which will be late in July, or early in August; strip it from the larger stalks, and put it into small stone jars or wide-necked bottles, and in doing this twist some of the branches so as to bruise the leaves and wring them asunder; then pour in sufficient distilled or very pale vinegar to cover the tarragon; let it infuse for two months, or more: it will take no harm even by standing all the winter. When it is poured off, strain it very clear, put it into small dry bottles, and cork them well. Sweet basil vinegar is made in exactly the same way, but it should not be left on the leaves more than three weeks. The jars or bottles should be filled to the neck with the tarragon before the vinegar is added: its flavour is strong and peculiar, but to many tastes very agreeable. It imparts quite a foreign character to the dishes for which it is used.
