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Kemalist Turkey and the Middle East International Relations in the Interwar Period Amit Bein
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To my late father, Şefik ‘Baytar’ Başkan
P REF ACE
This book examines the foreign policies of Turkey and Qatar in the post9/11 period. More specifically, it examines how Turkey and Qatar have swum through the tidal waves unleashed successively by the US invasion of Iraq, the intensification of the geopolitical rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the promises and fallouts of the Arab Spring. The book contextualizes the experiences, successes, and failures of Turkey and Qatar in international politics within a broader discussion of the geopolitics of the region, as the latter has been shaped by the intensifying rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the same period. With the onset of the Arab Spring, this rivalry exploded into bloody conflicts that are still raging in Syria and Yemen.
I wished to write this book in order to fill a gap. That gap is ever growing, as scholarly treatments of Turkey’s and Qatar’s foreign policies before and after the Arab Spring by and large ignore one another. The few attempts addressing Turkey–Qatar relations are either Turkey- or Qatarcentric, and rarely contextualize the relationships between the two countries within the broader geopolitics of the Middle East.1 This is what I aim to do in this book.
The challenge I have faced in writing the book is that the period under consideration has not yet passed into history. There are many unknowns and few archival sources. What follows is therefore mostly a structural analysis. This means the following. I assume that states/regimes pursue their self-interests, as they perceive them, at all times. In other words, they seek to maximize their security and power; yet, they do so in a fluid and often rapidly changing regional and international environment. In
order to explain state/regime behavior—or more specifically the behavior of Turkey and Qatar—one must thus look at the changing regional and international environment within which this behavior takes place.
Fortunately, Turkey’s foreign policy makers speak often, and do so publicly. I have benefited from this and have incorporated and analyzed their perspectives in this book as much as possible. Unfortunately, however, as is typical of all Arab Gulf rulers,2 Qatar’s foreign policy makers do not often speak publicly; officials, be they in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or in other ministries, avoid discussing their country’s foreign policy choices, and if they do, they do so very defensively. As a result, this book necessarily discusses Turkish foreign policy in greater length and draws on a richer set of available material.
I am indebted to many friends and colleagues, especially from Turkey, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia, with whom I have conversed and exchanged views regarding regional and international developments. Without their input, I would not see the full picture in the way that I demonstrate in this book. I cannot name all of these people, they are simply too many, but I am most grateful to, in alphabetical order, Abdullah al Shammary, Afyare Elmi, Amira Sonbol, Ebtesam al Katbi, Emre İşeri, Fatih Okumuş, Gökhan Bacık, Husam Muhammed, Ibrahim Sharqieh, Mark Farha, Mazhar Al Zoby, Muhammed al Zayani, and Özgür Pala. I thank them all. I also thank Muhittin Ataman, editor of Insight Turkey, and Çınar Özen, editor of Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, for giving me permission to use some of the materials I previously published in their journals: “Turkey-GCC Relations: Is there a future?” and “Ankara Torn Apart: Arab Spring Turns into Turkey’s Autumn,” respectively.
I must also thank the anonymous reviewer from Palgrave Macmillan and of course Sara Doskow, my editor at Palgrave Macmillan, who not only put great trust in this project but also made excellent suggestions about the organization of the material.
Finally, I thank Feyza, herself an ardent follower of Gulf politics, for all the friendship, companionship, love, and of course color and joy, that she has brought to my life.
While writing this book, I lost my father, Şefik, from whom I have taken the best moral lessons of my life. I will always be grateful. I dedicate this book to his memory.
Birol Başkan Washington DC USA
NOTES
1. To my knowledge, the most detailed treatment of Turkey–Qatar relations is an unpublished master’s thesis submitted by Özgür Pala to Qatar University’s Gulf Studies Program. I was an external reader of Özgür’s thesis.
2. The sea that separates the Arabian Peninsula and Iran is alternatively called the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Gulf or the Basra Gulf. I simply call it the Gulf. The Arab Gulf states or the Gulf states refer to six Arab states located on the Arabian Peninsula, which are Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the UAE. The Arab Gulf rulers or the Gulf rulers refer to the rulers of these six states.
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Abstract The question this book seeks to shed light on is, how and why have Turkey and Qatar developed quite a special relationship in the last three years? The chapter elaborates on the question and claims that Turkey and Qatar were in fact unlikely countries to form such a special relationship. However, as the chapter notes, driven by their own interests, the two countries had already aligned their foreign policies on many critical and controversial issues by summer of 2013. What pushed them further together was their isolation in the region for the support they seemed to be extending to the Muslim Brotherhood movement.
Keywords Turkey-Qatar Relations • post-9/11 Middle East • the Arab Spring • the Muslim Brotherhood • the Gulf Security
By the time of the military coup in Egypt in the summer of 2013, Turkey and Qatar had already aligned their policies on many critical and controversial issues: for example, both fully supported the anti-regime opposition in Syria, developed working and even cordial relations with Iran, recognized and treated Hamas as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and supported Egypt financially and diplomatically during the presidency of the Muslim Brotherhood (henceforth, the MB or the Brotherhood)-backed Muhammed Mursi.1
The coup in Egypt and its aftermath pushed the two countries even closer. They exchanged numerous high-level visits. Qatar’s ruler, Sheikh
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Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, was the highest-ranking statesman from the Arab World to attend Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s inauguration dinner in August 2014. Erdoğan soon reciprocated with a highlevel visit to Qatar the next month. This was Erdoğan’s first visit to the Middle East after being elected president. At the end of the visit, Sheikh Tamim drove President Erdoğan to the airport in his own car. Turkey and Qatar declared 2015 the “Year of Culture.” More critically, the two have recently signed an agreement to not only increase cooperation in military training and defense but also deploy Turkish troops to Qatar.
If it is not blocked by new domestic, regional, or international developments, there is a potentially powerful Turkey–Qatar axis forming in the Middle East. In the 1990s and even in the 2000s, no one would have anticipated this. The two countries were then worlds apart and in many ways they still are. Turkey is an electoral democracy while Qatar is a monarchy. Turkey is among the largest countries in the Middle East, both in territory and population, while Qatar is among the smallest. Turkey calls itself secular while Qatar does not.
Although Qatar is an energy-rich country, and Turkey an energydependent country, they had not developed strong economic relations prior to the 2000s. In 1996, for example, the total trade volume between Turkey and Qatar was a meager $13 million2 and only 674 tourists from Qatar visited Turkey. To see how much relations have improved since then, in 2014, the total trade volume between the two countries was around $739 million, having increased more than 50 times from 1996 to 2014, and 29,743 tourists visited Turkey from Qatar.3
What happened in between? This book addresses this question. In a nutshell, it argues that Turkey and Qatar had pursued similar foreign policies throughout the 2000s and during the Arab Spring, realigning independently their positions on major issues, and eventually forged a special relationship in the aftermath of the military coup in Egypt in 2013 in order to break the state of regional isolation each found itself in. This isolation was the outcome of the efforts of both actors to remain bipartisan throughout the 2000s, in a Middle East increasingly marked by bipolarity between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and to form an alternative pole to balance these two countries with the onset of the Arab Spring.
Bipolarity in the Middle East is not something new. Throughout history, it has repeatedly emerged in the form of geopolitical rivalries between states/empires (the Romans vs. the Sasanids, the Ottomans vs. the Safavids, to cite a few examples). In 1979, the Middle East witnessed the emergence of a new bipolar regional environment in the form of a rivalry between Iran
and Saudi Arabia. In the 1990s, this rivalry waned, in large part thanks to the coming to power in Iran of a more pragmatist leadership. The rivalry intensified again, however, in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks.
In a post-9/11 regional context, Turkey and Qatar have become active international players, both expanding their economic relationships with the rest of the world and engaging in high-profile mediation efforts. In the years preceding the Arab Spring, however, both countries were also careful not to commit to either side of the Saudi–Iran rivalry. The Arab Spring changed the regional context once again, as it brought to power MB-affiliated political parties and leaders, who assumed new roles in major Arab countries, especially Egypt and Tunisia.
Unlike other Middle Eastern states, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Jordan, Turkey and Qatar saw little threat in the rise of the MB, as both had developed cordial relations with the movement throughout the 2000s. Rather, they saw it as an opportunity to turn this new regional context to their own advantage. To this end, for example, Turkey and Qatar became the major financial and diplomatic supporters of Egypt under the presidency of the Brotherhood-backed Muhammed Mursi.
In April 2013, King Abdullah of Jordan remarked, “I see a Muslim Brotherhood crescent developing in Egypt and Turkey.”4 Yet, the July 2013 military coup in Egypt cut short this development. In the post-coup regional environment, Turkey and Qatar became increasingly isolated, and as a result turned to each other and strengthened their mutual ties.
This book is about Turkey’s and Qatar’s foreign policies, but it is also to a certain extent about the security of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Bahrain. The security of these Gulf states is important for understanding Turkey’s and Qatar’s foreign policies, simply because it is a, if not the only, significant factor that molds the geopolitical space within which Turkey and Qatar act and pursue their foreign policies.
These Gulf states are wealthy, thanks to their oil and natural gas. But, they are not populous: some 36 million people live in them with a good number of them being non-citizens. More importantly, they are situated in the midst of a heavily populated and extremely poor region. This stark disparity in wealth constitutes the essence of the security problem of these Gulf states.5 A myriad of domestic, regional, and international developments can and often does unexpectedly aggravate this problem, often catching the Gulf rulers unprepared. Arab Gulf security is highly fragile, to say the least.
The 9/11 attacks and the aftermath brought new challenges for the Arab Gulf states. More specifically, three actors came to pose security challenges to the Arab Gulf states, successively. These were the USA, Iran, and the
transnational MB movement. I will say more about these actors later in the book as discussion necessitates, but here I would like to note briefly that this book narrates how these three actors have come to pose different security challenges for the Arab Gulf states in the post-9/11 period and thereby molded the space within which Turkey and Qatar have pursued their foreign policies.
In the midst of all these developments, Turkey came to the region with a renewed interest and a new outlook. In doing so, it became relevant to Gulf security. When the USA and Iran began to pose security challenges to the Arab Gulf states in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Turkey became a welcome actor in the region. Having their own agendas, Turkey and Qatar skillfully turned this new context to their own advantage, and became highly active actors in the region. When Turkey and Qatar became proMB, however, during the Arab Spring, they became part of the security challenge that the MB posed for Arab Gulf security. The two countries therefore faced a regional backlash and became isolated, which in turn led them to strengthen their relationship with each other.
Covering the post-9/11 period, this book is divided into three main parts. The first part looks at how the US response to the 9/11 attacks changed the regional geopolitics in the Middle East. The second part examines how Turkey and Qatar benefited from this new regional environment and aligned their policies. The third part discusses the impact of the Arab Spring and the subsequent military coup in Egypt on regional geopolitics as they have affected Turkey and Qatar. The book ends by assessing the future of Turkey’s place in the Middle East and, by implication, the place of Turkey–Qatar relations.
NOTES
1. As will be discussed in Chap. 5, Turkey and Qatar pursued similar foreign policies in the 2000s. For a short review, see Özgür Pala and Bülent Aras, “Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in the Turkish and Qatari Foreign Policy on the Arab Spring,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 17(3), pp.286–302.
2. Otherwise stated, all $ signs refer to US dollars.
3. These figures are from Turkish Statistical Institute, http://www.tuik.gov.tr
4. Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Modern King in the Arab Spring,” The Atlantic, April 2013. Available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ archive/2013/04/monarch-in-the-middle/309270/
5. See the very enlightening book on the topic, Kristian Coates-Ulrichsen, Insecure Gulf: The End of Certainty and the Transition to the Post Oil Era, Hurst/Columbia University Press, 2011.
CHAPTER 2
The Earthquake: The 9/11 Attacks and the US Response
Abstract Turkey and Qatar have begun to align their foreign policies in the post-9/11 regional context, a context that had been deeply shaken by the USA. To see how the USA had shaken the Middle East, this chapter discusses how the USA responded to the 9/11 attacks. The chapter argues that the USA in fact pursued two-pronged strategy: on the one hand, it sought ways to punish the regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq it held responsible for the 9/11 attacks; on the other hand, it promoted democracy in the Middle East.
Keywords the 9/11 attacks • the US Invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq • US Promotion of Democracy
On 11 September 2001, al Qaeda, an international terrorist organization based in Afghanistan, undertook four deadly attacks in New York City and Washington, DC. Thousands, mostly civilians, were killed and wounded. It was not the first time al Qaeda had attacked US targets: the organization had been at war, self-proclaimed to be holy, with the USA for at least half a decade by then, but none of its previous attacks had been of this magnitude. The numbers of dead and injured were shockingly high, but there were also other features that made the attacks unprecedented. The most important was perhaps that all previous al Qaeda attacks had involved US targets abroad; for the first time, they hit the very soil that had long been thought of by Americans as safe.
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The comments of the US president, George W. Bush, made on the same day perhaps best describe the general public mood in America regarding the attacks: “The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires burning, huge structures collapsing, have filled us with disbelief, terrible sadness and a quiet, unyielding anger.” Bush assured the Americans that the USA would bring to justice the perpetrators of the attacks and, while doing so, Bush warned, the USA “will make no distinction between those who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”1
Nine days later, George W. Bush addressed a joint session of Congress and declared “war on terror,” which would begin with al Qaeda, but would not end with it. Bush declared a war that would last “until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” In the same address, Bush also issued what amounted basically to an ultimatum to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, who were accused of harboring al Qaeda. Bush asked the Taliban to “deliver to the United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda.” Otherwise, the Taliban would share al Qaeda’s fate. Bush was not bluffing. Less than a month after the attacks, in October 2001, the USA attacked Afghanistan and toppled the Taliban government, which refused to hand Osama bin Laden, the prime suspect in the 11 September attacks, and other al Qaeda leaders to the USA. In the same speech that Bush issued an ultimatum to the Taliban, he also warned other countries, and did so quite explicitly. Bush said, “Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.” He somewhat softened his warning in the next sentence, “From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”2 But his message was clear: the USA was basically demanding unconditional support for its war on terrorism.
Many countries in the Middle East had long suffered from terrorism, and would normally have welcomed such a strong US commitment to combating international terrorism, but there was a problem in the way the US president framed the whole issue. Right from the very beginning, Bush claimed that al Qaeda targeted not just the security of the American people, but also their freedom. In his very first speech on 11 September 2001, Bush said, “Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts.” Bush also claimed that the terrorists picked the USA as a target because Americans were “the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world.”3
In his address to the joint session of US Congress nine days later, Bush reiterated the same argument. He said, “On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country.” In giving his own answer to the question, “why do they hate us?” he further elaborated: they hate Americans because, Bush claimed, the USA was ruled by “a democratically elected government.” The leaders of al Qaeda were not such a government, but instead “self-appointed.” Bush finally claimed that terrorists hated the freedoms Americans enjoyed: “They hate our freedoms—our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.”
For the Middle East rulers, a more worrisome implication of the speech was that George W. Bush had possibly found an almost transhistorical mission for the USA, in the war on terror, a mission to advance human freedom. In the words of Bush, “Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom—the great achievement of our time and the great hope of every time—now depends on us.”4
In the early stages, this mission was still expressed in such abstract terms, but as time passed, it acquired a more definite meaning: the war on terror was transforming into the active promotion of democracy. Bush sent strong signals in that direction in early 2002. For example, in his 2002 State of the Union address, the first after the 11 September attacks, Bush said that there were some non-negotiable demands for human dignity such as “the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women, private property, free speech, equal justice, and religious tolerance,” and he announced that “America will always stand firm for” these demands. More critically, Bush named the Islamic World as a potential target and promised to support advocates of democracy in the region. In his own words, “America will take the side of brave men and women who advocate these values around the world, including the Islamic world.”5
Bush made similar points in his West Point Speech in June 2002. “When it comes to the common rights and needs of men and women,” Bush said, “there is no clash of civilizations. The requirements of freedom apply fully to Africa and Latin America and the entire Islamic world.” He added, “The peoples of the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and opportunities as people in every nation. And their governments should listen to their hopes.”6
Six months later, in December 2002, the USA took a more concrete step in promoting democracy in the Middle East by establishing the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). In explaining the US objectives for this initiative, Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, was explicit.7 In his initiation speech, Powell observed that the Middle East had largely missed out on the prosperity and welfare generated by “the spread of democracy and free markets elsewhere.” This is a problem, Powell suggested, because when a lack of economic opportunities and rigid political systems meet, it becomes “a dangerous brew.” What the people of the Middle East needed was just the opposite: “freer economies” and “a stronger political voice.” With this initiative, the USA was declaring its readiness to help the region to develop economically, politically, and educationally. In a similar vein, the USA would spearhead another initiative in June 2004, called the Broader Middle East and North Africa Partnership Initiative (BMENA). With this second initiative, the USA aimed to include other G8 countries in the promotion of democracy in the region.
Soon after the announcement of MEPI, in February 2003, George W. Bush made a more explicit reference to democracy as an antidote to terrorism. In his speech at the American Enterprise Institute,8 Bush said, “The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and free nations do not breed ideologies of murder. They encourage the peaceful pursuit of a better life. And there are hopeful signs of a desire for freedom in the Middle East.”
This declaration came at a time when the Bush administration was struggling to make a strong case for regime change in Iraq. The USA was accusing Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi leader, of supporting terrorism and developing weapons of mass destruction. A regime change in Iraq would not only eliminate such immediate threats to security, but also, Bush believed, serve a broader objective. As Bush saw it, from intellectuals to leaders, the whole region was calling for a change in the same direction the Bush administration was preaching: greater political participation, economic openness, and free trade. “And from Morocco to Bahrain and beyond, nations are taking genuine steps toward politics reform.” Therefore, Bush claimed, “A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of freedom for other nations in the region.”
The USA could not secure the broad international support it wished to muster, but this did not stop the Bush administration. In March 2013, the USA invaded Iraq and toppled the Saddam regime for its alleged ties to al Qaeda, and the development of weapons of mass destruction. Soon
after the invasion, it turned out that Iraq had already stopped its program of developing weapons of mass destruction. It was, a report submitted to the US president concluded, an intelligence failure. “The Intelligence Community,” the report noted, “was dead wrong in almost all of its prewar judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.”9
Having failed to prove its prime justification for the war against Iraq, the Bush administration began to emphasize the potential benefits for the region of establishing a functioning democracy in Iraq.10 Fortunately, this did not really constitute a radical break in the Bush administration’s evolving narrative. The Bush administration had already been suggesting, implicitly and explicitly, the benefits of democracy in the region. After the invasion, the administration simply became more explicit. Five months after the invasion of Iraq, Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor in the Bush administration, for example, wrote in the Washington Post that a democratic Iraq would serve as a key element in the new Middle East, where “the ideologies of hate will not flourish” anymore, pretty much in the same way “a democratic Germany became a linchpin of a new Europe that is today whole, free, and at peace.”11
As discussed above, George W. Bush had already made the same point. He repeated it in a speech delivered at the National Endowment for Democracy in November 2003. This time Bush prophesized that “Iraqi democracy will succeed—and that success will send forth the news, from Damascus to Teheran—that freedom can be the future of every nation.” He also claimed, “The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution.”12
The USA has not invaded another country or toppled another authoritarian regime in the Middle East, but it adopted a threatening posture toward Iran. As early as January 2002, Iran was George W. Bush’s target. In his State of the Union address, Bush named Iran among the three countries in the so-called axis of evil. The two other countries were Iraq and North Korea. These states, Bush claimed, “constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.”13
Fortunately for Iran, the USA picked Iraq as its first target in the Middle East and did not attack Iran, at least militarily, but Iran remained
under pressure. In his State of the Union address in February 2005, Bush called Iran “the world’s primary state sponsor of terrorism” and accused it of “pursuing nuclear weapons while depriving its people of the freedom they seek and deserve.” Bush then called on Iranians: “as you stand for your own liberty, America stands with you.”14 The USA had already been on alert about Iran’s nuclear program. It finally succeeded in leading the United Nations (UN) in 2006 to impose heavier economic sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program.
What came emerged from the Bush administration’s achievements in realizing its Freedom Agenda in the Middle East does not seem to be impressive.15 It is highly debatable whether the Middle East or Afghanistan has become noticeably more democratic, or if they are better places for women and youth as a result. Neither al Qaeda nor the Taliban has been exterminated once and for all, and Iran could not be stopped from developing its nuclear program. This is not to suggest that the US response to the 9/11 attacks did not bring change to the Middle East, however, it did. By promoting democracy in the region, invading Iraq and adopting a threatening posture toward Iran, the USA shook the strategic landscape in the region.
NOTES
1. “Text of Bush’s address,” CNN, Sept. 11, 2001. Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/bush.speech.text/
2. See “Text of George Bush’s Speech,” The Guardian, Sept. 21, 2001. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13
3. “Text of Bush’s address,” CNN, Sept. 11, 2001. Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/bush.speech.text/
4. See “Text of George Bush’s Speech,” The Guardian, Sept. 21, 2001. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13
5. “Text of President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address,” The Washington Post, Jan. 29, 2002. Available at http://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-srv/onpolitics/transcripts/sou012902.htm
6. “Text of Bush’s Speech at West Point,” International New York Times, June 1, 2002. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/01/ international/02PTEX-WEB.html?pagewanted=1
7. The quotes are taken from “The U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative: Building Hope for the Years Ahead,” US Department of State,
December 12, 2002. Available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/ former/powell/remarks/2002/15920.htm
8. The following quotes are from “President George W. Bush Speaks at AEI’s Annual Dinner,” American Enterprise Institute, February 28, 2003. Available at http://www.aei.org/publication/president-george-w-bushspeaks-at-aeis-annual-dinner
9. The report can be accessed at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/wmd/ about.html
10. See the discussion in F. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian Gulf, New York: Cambridge University Press. 2010, pp.228–233.
11. Condoleezza Rice, “Transforming the Middle East,” The Washington Post, August 7, 2003.
12. “Remarks by President George W. Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy,” the National Endowment for Democracy, November 6, 2003. Available at http://www.ned.org/ george-w- bush/remarks-by-president-george-w-bush-at-the-20thanniversary
13. “Text of President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address.”
14. “Text of President Bush’s 2005 State of Union Address,” The Washington Post, Feb. 2, 2002. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/transcripts/bushtext_020205.html
15. See Katerina Dalacoura, “US democracy promotion in the Arab Middle East since 11 September 2001: a critique,” International Affairs, 81(5) (October 2005), pp.963–979; Bruce Gilley, “Did Bush Democratize the Middle East? The Effects of External-Internal Linkages,” Political Science Quarterly, 128(4) (Winter 2013), pp.653–685.
CHAPTER 3
Unsettling the Middle East: The Implications of the US Rhetoric and Action
Abstract This chapter discusses how the US response to the 9/11 attacks has shaken the regional context in the Middle East. By overthrowing the regime in Iraq, the USA destroyed a Sunni Arab bulwark regime that balanced Iran in the region. As the Shia groups came to political prominence in Iraq, Iraq has become, or is perceived to be, an ally of Iran. The US efforts to isolate Iran further aggravated the problem as Iran began to speed up its nuclear program. It was in this context that the traditional leaders of the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, were in retreat, opening more space for new actors to expand their activism and dynamism.
Keywords Post-9/11 Middle East • Saudi-Iran Rivalry • the Arabs’ Leadership Crisis • US Promotion of Democracy • Iran’s Nuclear Program
The USA responded to the 9/11 attacks by overthrowing the regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, seeking ways to punish Iran and promoting democracy in the Middle East. The US response had serious implications for the Middle East.
THE RISE OF IRAN AS A REGIONAL HEGEMON
The USA’s most consequential action concerning the Middle East was its invasion of Iraq in 2003. By invading Iraq, the USA in fact destroyed the so-called Eastern Flank of the Arab World against Iran. Saddam’s Iraq
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could not overwhelm them, but at the very least, it militarily balanced Iran, and as such was pivotal in sustaining the balance of power, especially in the Gulf. By invading Iraq, the USA destroyed that pivot.
Iran turned out to be the chief beneficiary of this invasion. In the words of an expert on Iran, by toppling not only Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, but also the Taliban’s regime in Afghanistan, the USA basically demolished “two of Iran’s most difficult enemies.” In the ensuing “geopolitical vacuum,” Iran emerged as the regional hegemon.1 Iran actively sought ways to turn the chaos in Iraq and Afghanistan, which ensued from the US invasions, to its own advantage by reactivating its already existing ties, and cultivating new ones, among the Shias in both countries.2
Especially the prospect of Iraq falling under Iran’s spell alarmed the Arab states. The earliest warning came from King Abdullah of Jordan. In late 2004, the King accused Iran of interfering in the upcoming Iraqi elections, which were scheduled in January 2005. “I’m sure,” the King said, “there’s a lot of people, a lot of Iranians in there that will be used as part of the polls to influence the outcome.” Iran had an interest in influencing the elections because it wanted to “to have an Islamic republic of Iraq … to achieve a government that is very pro-Iran.” If this happened, the King prophesized, a new Shia “crescent” would be formed, which would stretch from Iran into Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. The King warned that this new crescent could undermine the political stability of the Arab Gulf countries. “Even Saudi Arabia,” the King claimed, “is not immune from this.”3 The president of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, and Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saud al Faisal, expressed their own concerns regarding Iran’s role in Iraq.4 The former, for example, explicitly blamed the Shias for being “loyal to Iran and not the countries where they live.”5
The extent of Iran’s, so to speak, political reach in Iraq is difficult to assess. It might be simply a problem of perception,6 but one could certainly speak of a rising Shia political activism in the region. As Vali Nasr put it, “The U.S. invasion of Iraq unleashed a process of Shi’ite empowerment,” which Nasr warned prophetically “won’t be confined to that country: From Lebanon to the Persian Gulf, through peaceful elections and bloody conflicts, the Shi’ites are making their presence felt.”7
Countries with sizable Shia populations such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait thus had good reasons to be worried. Not only could their restive Shia populations be emboldened by such a development, as had happened in the past after the 1979 Iranian revolution, but Iran could
turn this to its own advantage and create further problems for the Arab Gulf states. Coincidentally, an armed Shia rebellion, known as the Houthi rebellion, erupted in Yemen in 2004 and had grown so dangerously by 2009 that Saudi Arabia, already worried about the developments in the region, launched a military offensive against the rebels in 2009.
There was another worrying possibility, that the USA would welcome and even support a Shia-dominated Middle East. In fact, Vali Nasr, the Iranian-born, influential American academic and public intellectual quoted above, who also served as an advisor to the US Department of State, was among those who were pushing this very same idea: that the balance of power had shifted toward the Shias thanks to the USA, and it was better that the USA lived with that fait accompli.8
The emerging Shia revival, Nasr suggested, “presents Washington with new opportunities to pursue its interests in the region. Building bridges with the region’s Shias could become the one clear achievement of Washington’s tortured involvement in Iraq.” The USA had to do more to finalize this achievement, however. It had to engage Iran, “the country with the world’s largest Shia population and a growing regional power, which has a vast and intricate network of influence among the Shias across the Middle East, most notably in Iraq.”9 This could be achieved, Nasr claimed, for “Iran’s long-term interests in Iraq are not inherently at odds with those of the United States.”10
The USA was having a great trouble in Iraq, as the sectarian civil war was tearing the country apart and the Bush administration was under heavy pressure about what seemed to be a failure. The Bush administration could remember Iran’s cooperation in Afghanistan when the USA invaded the country: Iran could also be of help to the USA in Iraq, but the Bush administration was not eager to cooperate with Iran. Iran was itself a target, named as one of the three countries in the axis of evil.
With hindsight, the USA’s threatening posture toward Iran provoked the latter into a new defensive/aggressive attitude toward the region.
IRAN’S DEFENSIVE/AGGRESSIVE ATTITUDE
Having closely watched what happened to Iraq, the second country in the “axis of evil,” Iran had every reason to worry about its own security. The world’s sole superpower, boosted by its seemingly swift success first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, was both hostile and non-compromising
toward Iran, and as such posed an imminent security threat. Mehran Kamrava well captures Iran’s trouble:
Threat perceptions in Tehran grew exponentially in the aftermath of the post 9/11 US posture, and especially after the fall of Baghdad and Iraq’s occupation by American forces. Overnight, Iran, now branded a member of an ‘axis of evil’ by the US president, found itself at the center of a storm brewing in its own immediate neighborhood, and the many initiatives it undertook to improve its image and to help the US in its fight against the Taliban –including pledging hundreds of millions of dollars toward the postwar reconstruction of Afghanistan and an offer to help rescue American servicemen stranded near its border in Afghanistan –did little to allay fears that it might be the next target of President Bush’s War on Terror.11
More importantly, the USA completely encircled Iran. Pro-US governments were in power in almost all countries in the immediate vicinity of Iran, from Pakistan to Turkey. Even more threatening, the USA had massive military presence in most of these countries, especially in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Arab Gulf states. It is highly likely that this new threatening regional environment in which Iran found itself greatly weakened the reformist position and strengthened that of the hardliners. As such the Bush administration’s hostile and provocative attitude toward Iran, directly or indirectly, contributed to the election of a hard-liner, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, in the first presidential elections in 2005.12
Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s presidency further complicated the security situation for the Arab Gulf states. Ahmedinejad certainly sought to develop better relations with the Arab Gulf states, attending, for example, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) annual meeting as a visitor in 2005, touring four Arab Gulf states, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and the UAE, in 2007 and Saudi Arabia in 2007, but his fiery and provocative rhetoric against the USA and Israel resonated in the Arab streets, as these two states generally appeared in the public opinion surveys as the greatest threat to the security in the region. More critically, perhaps, Ahmedinejad’s rhetoric made the Arab leaders appear too impotent and submissive in the face of a hostile and threatening USA, and thus had the potential to undermine their legitimacy in the eyes of their own people. How effective this was can be debated, but that was Ahmedinejad’s so-called “Arab Street” strategy, “speaking directly over the heads of Arab rulers to their publics, undermining the rulers’ legitimacy by portraying them as sclerotic lackeys of Washington.”13
Another random document with no related content on Scribd:
“The present work is of special interest in that it gives the feminine viewpoint.”
R of Rs 61:559 My ’20 60w
“About the letters there is a marked and pleasing individuality.”
+ + + Review 2:679 Je 30 ’20 820w
Springf’d Republican p10 Ap 16 ’20 280w
GRESHAM, MATILDA (MCGRAIN) (MRS WALTER QUINTIN GRESHAM).
Life of Walter Quintin Gresham, 1832–1895. 2v *$7.50 Rand
20–3856
“An unusual career, even for America, known as the land of eccentricities in public life, is summed up in these two sizable volumes. Soldier, lawyer, judge, statesman, Walter Q. Gresham seems never to have known an idle moment in the sixty-three years of his life. He had a distinguished record in the Civil war, enlisting as a private, and, after successive promotions for gallantry, receiving his discharge as a Major-General of volunteers in 1865. After fifteen years of service at the bar and on the bench he was made a member of President Arthur’s cabinet, and ten years later, because of disagreement with the Republican party on the tariff question, became a Democrat and was appointed secretary of state in
President Cleveland’s second administration. He died in 1895. This biography [is] written by his widow.”—R of Rs
Booklist 16:344 Jl ’20
“A veritable source book of American history.” F. B. N.
Boston Transcript p7 Ap 28 ’20 400w
“Mrs Gresham’s life of her husband is of value as far as political and economic information is concerned.” C. W. Alvord
Nation 111:sup424 O 13 ’20 430w
Outlook 126:600 D 1 ’20 160w
“This biography throws much light on the politics of the entire period from the middle of the nineteenth century to its closing years. ”
R of Rs 61:444 Ap ’20 160w
(17c) Houghton 824 20–5788
The booklet contains an address delivered by Viscount Grey at the Harvard union, December 8, 1919. He enumerates a number of things that make for happiness of which one is a degree of leisure and knowing what to do with it. He speaks of the forms of recreation most enjoyed by himself, certain games and sport and gardening but most of all books read for pleasure. Enjoyment of nature also finds a place and calls up a memorable walk he took with Colonel Roosevelt for the purpose of observing birds.
“His address, indeed, contains nothing that is original or profound. We read it for its personal note and for the light that it throws on the personality of the late Colonel Roosevelt. The lessons that may be learned from this charming and gracious little pamphlet are not quite the lessons that it professes to convey. ” E. M. F.
Ath p76 Jl 16 ’20 430w
“In depicting the incident [of Roosevelt’s visit] Lord Grey allows the Baconian clarity of his earlier pronouncements to take on poetic warmth and color.”
Nation 110:732 My 29 ’20 400w
“The one who has attained such an appreciation of the real place of recreation in life deserves to be called by a word which is very frequently abused—‘cultured.’”
Outlook 124:601 Ap 7 ’20 1800w
“Of artifice, literary, or any other, in the plan or style, there is not a trace. The diction is plain and simple, almost to the point of baldness. There are no flights and no flowers.” Archibald MacMechan
Review 2:518 My 15 ’20 1050w
“The address is not only a most attractive piece of literature but also an interesting pendant to Mr Roosevelt’s biography.”
Spec 124:799 Je 12 ’20 350w
“It strikes a sane and healthful note.”
Springf’d Republican p8 My 27 ’20 180w
Survey 44:309 My 29 ’20 80w
GREY, ZANE. Man of the forest. il *$1.90 (1½c)
Harper
20–2265
Milt Dale loves the silence and the romance of the mountains. There he lives in solitude, hunting animals for his food, and finding thorough happiness and contentment, until accidentally he overhears an unscrupulous plot against the property and safety of a young girl, newly arrived from the East. To save her and her sister he hides them in his woodland camp, entertaining them with hunting
trips and riding expeditions to keep their minds from brooding. When, however, Helen Rayner and her pretty sister Bo leave the camp, Dale finds it an empty, unsatisfying place. And Helen, mistress of a great ranch, which a conscienceless “ greaser ” is trying to take from her, keeps longing for the lonely man from the mountains. Her troubles reach their climax just after the long winter, and Dale, coming out of the forests, helps her in the most terrible moment. “Bo’s cowboy” is instrumental in completing the collapse of the “ greaser ” ; and afterward, Dale’s camp witnesses an unusual honeymoon.
“A story full of the thrills and charms familiar to readers of Zane Grey.”
Booklist 16:281 My ’20
“The tale has plenty of incident, and though it contains too numerous and too long passages of description not a few of them are well done, while the lover of horses will be sure to envy Helen her possession of the splendid Ranger.”
N Y Times 25:70 F 8 ’20 900w
“A western story conventional in plot and incident, but well written and with a certain nobility in its feeling for the freedom of the wide spaces. ”
N Y Times 25:190 Ap 18 ’20 40w
“Action is always rapid and there is an abundance of local color. On occasions Mr Grey gives play to his liking for descriptive
paragraphs, which sometimes bulk too large. But these are seldom formal. The book is among the author’s best stories.”
+
Springf’d Republican p11a Mr 14 ’20 580w
“Few romances make better business out of the wilds of the West than Mr Zane Grey: and he is well up to his mark in this stirring tale.”
The Times [London] Lit Sup p426 Jl 1 ’20 70w
GRIFFIS, WILLIAM ELLIOT. Swiss fairy tales. il *$1.75 (2½c) Crowell
20–13979
The first two chapters of the book are devoted to the author’s Swiss ancestors, their home in Switzerland in the shadow of the mountains, where it was finally burled by an avalanche, and later their American home in Pennsylvania whence they had brought their customs and traditions and, above all, the fairy tales of their native country. Some of these tales are: The wonderful alpine horn; The mountain giants; Two good natured dragons; The frost giants and the sunbeam fairies; The yodel carillon of the cows; The fairy of the edelweiss; The alpine hunter and his fairy guardian; The white chamois; The siren of the Rhine.
+ + + El School J 21:157 O ’20 80w
Ind 104:380 D 11 ’20 40w
Springf’d Republican p9a O 17 ’20 180w
GRIFFIS, WILLIAM ELLIOT. Young people’s history of the Pilgrims,
il *$3 (4½c) Houghton 974.4
20–10074
“In writing for, but not down to, young people, I have dwelt rather upon what was visible to, or interested, the Pilgrim boys and girls. Yet I have endeavored, also, to make clear the formative principles and impelling motives, as well as conditions and events; and this without any special interest in genealogy.” (Preface) One of the objects of the book is to show that the Puritans were “bona-fide everyday Englishmen” and to further a deeper unity and closer cooperation between all English-speaking people. The religious motive prompting the Pilgrims is also emphasized. A partial list of the contents is: How the world looked long ago; A mirror of English history; Fun and play in the old home; A girl’s life in merrie England; Puritan, Independent, Separatist, and Pilgrim; Brewster: the boy traveler; Bradford: boy hero and typical Pilgrim; The decision to emigrate and why; The new world: America; The first winter and the great sickness; The Pilgrim republic; The Pilgrim inheritance; Chronological framework of the story of a free church in a free state; Index; Illustrations.
“It is a scholarly history; shall we say a bit too scholarly for youthful tastes? At least it has the merit of being accurate,
thoroughgoing, and informing” W. A. Dyer
Bookm 52:125 O ’20 90w’
“Dr Griffis writes with enthusiasm, his writing discloses the most careful study of his subject in its every phase, and especially does his familiarity with the places trodden by the Pilgrims appeal to the reader.” E. J. C.
Boston Transcript p4 My 26 ’20 380w
“‘Young people’s history of the Pilgrims’ is packed with interesting information. The author has, however, an annoyingly priggish manner and he tends to paint the Pilgrims as rather unpleasantly noble.”
Ind 104:242 N 13 ’20 80w
N Y Times p15 O 3 ’20 80w
“In the closing pages of Dr Griffis’ book is a valuable chronology.”
R of Rs 62:335 S ’20 60w
This work by a professor of industrial education in the University of Illinois “is intended as a text for use in normal schools and colleges. Its primary aim is to assist in the making of necessary connections between the more general courses in educational psychology and theory of teaching and the special work of practice teaching in manual and industrial arts.” (Preface) Contents: Introduction; Classification and differentiation of the manual arts; Industrial arts; Instincts and capacities; Application of the principle of apperception to manual and industrial arts teaching; Interest and attention: Individual differences: the group system; Correlation and association; The doctrine of discipline: Types of thinking inherent in the manual arts: Teaching methods in manual and industrial arts; The lesson; its component parts; Class management: discipline; Standards and tests; Conditions which make for progress. There are two appendices devoted to Special method procedure and Type outlines.
“Very useful to any teachers of hand work.”
Booklist 17:52 N ’20
“Although one feels the need for a more extended discussion of many of the points, there is left in the mind of the reader the conviction, nevertheless, that Mr Griffith has sought to present the facts in as simple and untangled a form as possible, with the specific purpose in mind of establishing a workable pedagogy on the psychological principles developed. One feels that he has succeeded in his purpose in an admirable degree.”
El School J 21:236 N ’20 640w
“Written in a concise and convincing manner. It is the kind of a book that teachers of drawing, design and applied arts should read and absorb. It will connect them with the technique of teaching.”
School Arts Magazine 20:41 S ’20 120w
GRIFFITHS, GERTRUDE (MRS PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS). Lure of the manor. *$1.75 (1½c)
Duffield
A20–1264
The story opens in England but soon shifts to America, there to be played out in a quaint old-time South Carolina setting. At the close of the Civil war, General Sutledge of the Confederate army had retired from the world, and his three daughters had continued to follow his example, living and dressing in the style of the sixties. To them comes the Honorable Patricia Denham, daughter of an adored and much younger sister who had married a British peer. This sister, Millicent, is a cold, heartless woman, engaged in her own love affairs and indifferent to her children. It is partly to escape her that Patricia comes to America. Peter d’Eresby, who has been in love with Millicent, also comes to America. Patricia marries a rich northerner, who has been looked down upon by the three impoverished old southern aristocrats. Peter marries Sophia, a young Sutledge cousin and to the end the three elderly sisters are kept in ignorance of Millicent’s real character.
“A romance written with amusing naïveté and some freshness.”
Booklist 17:32 O ’20
“A very uneven story, amateurish at times and very much too long but by no means devoid of merit. It suffers from the fact that it has two heroines, the story of one of them being fairly interesting, while that of the other is dull, and the connection between them seeming forced and artificial.”
N Y Times 25:21 Jl 11 ’20 400w
“‘The lure of the manor ’ reads unevenly and strikes the reader as being considerably too long. Strengthening of the story could be obtained through elimination of that which gives an impression of being artificial and exaggerated.”
This adventure story of the South seas has two mysteries, the mystery of “Lady Mary” who walks up out of the sea and the mystery of Ku-Ku’s island. Lady Mary is suffering from amnesia. She doesn’t know who she is or how she came to her present plight. All that she can remember is a meaningless string of words, which her listeners rightly interpret as the directions for finding the half-legendary KuKu’s island, reputed to be rich in the valuable red shell that passes as currency in the islands. The three men, with Sapphira Gregg and the girl from the sea, set out in search of it and then begin their adventures on the terrible island. In the end they conquer all obstacles, including the mysterious blindness that inflicts those who
land on the island. Lady Mary’s memory is restored, and two romances come to a satisfactory conclusion.
Ath p194 F 6 ’20 90w
Booklist 17:157 Ja ’21
“The scheme of the story is very good, but it is so tangled up in verbiage and moralizing that one loses interest, and wishes the author had made another of the group her mouthpiece.”
Boston Transcript p7 D 4 ’20 230w
“It is a capital tale, quite novel in its plot and incident, and with amusing character depiction as well as the thrill of adventure.”
Outlook 126:600 D 1 ’20 50w
“The narrative is set forth interestingly and with some humor.”
Springf’d Republican p7a N 28 ’20 170w
“She shows her tact in the touches of individuality that she gives to characters who have to be drawn broadly. So much is she in sympathy with them, and so clearly does she see the situations in which they find themselves, that they come to respond by creating their own difficulties for her to write about. This seems to be the secret of her fertility of invention. For a lady not in her first book she is most prodigal of her good things.”
GROGAN, GERALD. William Pollok, and other
tales. *$1.50 (2c) Lane
20–7728
This volume of short stories opens with a memoir of the author, who was killed in 1918. As the son of a soldier he led a wandering life in childhood, and later his work as a mining engineer took him to Mexico, where the scenes of most of these stories are laid. Only one is a story of the war. The collection opens with a series of eight tales, The trials and triumphs of William Pollok, mine superintendent. The other titles are: Encinillas; The faith of Henderson; A warm corner in Mexico; The casting vote; The subjugation of the Skettering; The failure; The cat; The weregeld; A moral victory.
Ath p1386 D 19 ’19 80w
“He wrote well because he lived well and fully, he depicted character in an entertaining fashion because he knew men. He has produced a group of stories worth reading more than once. ” G. H. C. Boston Transcript p11 My 15 ’20 500w
“When his feet are off the romantic soil of Mexico, Mr Grogan seems less at home. One story, however—his latest—is distinguished by a quality only a little short of genius. It is a vision of the wars of the future. The story is a prophecy that may be fulfilled in a happier day; it is Gerald Grogan’s chief contribution to literature.”
N Y Times 25:25 Je 27 ’20 430w
“They have the excessive cleverness of the young writer, who will not tell a plain tale. Nevertheless the book is full of vitality; and readers to whom this quality, even if it goes with some immaturity, is the all-important one will enjoy the book.”
The Times [London] Lit Sup p698 N 27 ’19 280w
GROSSMANN,
LOUIS.
Aims of teaching in Jewish schools; a handbook for teachers. (Isaac M. Wise centenary publication) *$1.50 Bloch 377
19–27517
“Dr G. Stanley Hall, who contributes the introduction, pronounces this ‘by far the best treatise on religious pedagogy that has anywhere yet appeared. It places religious education on its proper scientific and constructive basis.’ Something over half of the volume is devoted to the successive stages in the child’s advancement from the kindergarten to the eighth grade. The latter part is devoted to special phases such as the use of stories, the textbook, the Hebrew language, music, etc.” Am J Soc
“The discussions are rather general to constitute a ‘handbook,’ but they make good reading for anyone who is interested in recent pedagogy and modernist religion.” F. R. Clow
Am J Soc 25:502 Ja ’20 340w
“Designed as a teacher’s handbook, but it has a broader interest.”
Booklist 16:42 N ’19
“A very complete outline for the teacher in the religious school.”
Cleveland
p55 My ’20 50w
GROVE,
SIR GEORGE.[2] Grove’s dictionary of music and musicians; Waldo Selden Pratt, editor, Charles N. Boyd, associate editor. il *$6 Macmillan
780.3
This American supplement adds a sixth volume to Grove’s dictionary of music. It is made up of two parts, the first consisting of an historical introduction with chronological register of names; the second of Personal and descriptive articles and alphabetical index. The register in Part I gives brief reference to about 1700 persons. In the descriptive articles of the second part there is more extended treatment of some 700 of these, with cross references from one section to the other, Canadian musicians are included under the term American and to a limited extent Latin American names have been
included. The preface states further: “Inasmuch as the latest edition of Grove’s dictionary was issued ten to fifteen years ago, the publishers desired that this volume should include continuations of those articles that relate to the more conspicuous foreign musicians.... Accordingly, in the dictionary proper will be found statements regarding more than a hundred musicians who are entirely outside the American field.”
GROZIER, EDWIN ATKINS, ed. One hundred best novels condensed. 4v il *$5; ea *$1.50 Harper
20–6493
A series of books giving synopses of one hundred works of fiction. They have been prepared under the direction of the literary editor of the Boston Post, assisted by Charles E. L. Wingate and Charles H. Lincoln, various writers contributing to the contents, among them John Kendrick Bangs, George S. Barton, Sara Ware Bassett, Alfred S. Clark and James B. Connolly. There is no ordered plan of arrangement and the word novel is given a broad interpretation to embrace the “Iliad,” “Pilgrim’s progress ” and “Alice in Wonderland.” Famous translations are included in addition to all the well-known English novels. A biographical sketch and portrait of each author is provided. “Perhaps the best condensation of all is that of ‘Far from the madding crowd.’ Many of the synopses approach this, but some fall far behind it in quality.” A. A. W.
Boston Transcript p4 My 12 ’20 500w
“As for giving any real idea of the originals, these condensations are about as satisfying as the description of a banquet would be to a starving man. ”
N Y Times 25:244 My 9 ’20 800w
GUILD, ROY BERGEN
, ed. Community programs for cooperating churches; a manual of principles and methods. *$1.90 Assn. press 261
20–17803
The book contains the reports of the Church and community convention held in Cleveland, June 1–3, 1920, under the joint auspices of the Commission on councils of churches of the Federal council of churches of Christ in America, and the Association of executive secretaries of church federations, and contains: Principles and methods of organization; Survey, program, and comity; Evangelism; Social service; Religious education; Missions; International justice and good-will; Religious publicity; Securing and training executive secretaries; “The church and its new cooperative power, ” by Dr Robert E. Speer; “The spiritual basis for the unity of the churches,” by Rev. M. Ashby Jones, D.D.; Appendix.
Booklist 17:92 D ’20
“The book is a practical manual for those interested in interchurch work.”
Boston Transcript p9 D 1 ’20 630w
N Y Evening Post p13 O 30 ’20 100w
GUILD, THACHER HOWLAND. Power of a god, and other one-act plays. il $1.25 Univ. of Ill. 812
20–84
The volume is a memorial to the author, an account of his short career as a dramatist and his early death in 1914, and contains, besides the plays, a tribute from Prof. George P. Baker of Harvard university; Preparation days at Brown, by Prof. Thomas Crosby, jr., Brown university; The fullness of his life, by Prof. Stuart P. Sherman, University of Illinois; Dramatic reminiscenses, by F. K. W. Drury, University of Illinois library; and a bibliography. The title play shows a scene in the office of a celebrated surgeon who has taken up mental therapy and in his practice of it, finds himself before the alternative, for the love of a woman, to use his power as a “god” or as a “devil.” After much soul anguish he chooses the better way. The other plays are: The class of ’56; The higher good; and The portrait.
“At least the first two plays are distinctly above the average in their realistic dialogue. The eloquent and sympathetic introduction by Professor Baker, of Harvard, adds to the value of the book.”
Cath World 111:698 Ag ’20 90w
“Each [play] is interesting and each has distinct merits, while as a whole they display a steady growth in literary power and technical
expertness.”
N Y Evening Post p2 F 14 ’20 500w
GUILLAUMIN, EMILE.[2] Life of a simple man; tr. by Margaret Holden. *$2 Stokes
“The good brown earth, the sheep and the swine; stretches of sparkling, bedewed meadows with perfumed masses of golden broom, white daisies and honeysuckle.... From such a background Emile Guillaumin has drawn ‘La vie d’un simple.’ Small wonder that a simple man speaks from its pages. The book is called a novel. In reality it is a biography and, as it happens, one with only a slight vista into the realm of Eros. The author tells us that Tiennon is his neighbor, but it is suggested in a foreword by Mr Garnett that Guillaumin has attempted a portraiture of his own father. At any rate it is interesting to observe that the book received an award from l’Académie Française in 1904, and that the author is a peasant, unschooled, in our modern sense of the word, whose life has been spent in a town of some 1,800 inhabitants, and who has ‘remained faithful to the soil’ in spite of literary laurels.” N Y Times
Ath p1050 O 17 ’19 50w
“For those who evaluate standards of living in terms of their simplicity, reality and intensity, the farmer Tiennon, as he stands revealed in ‘The life of a simple man, ’ will find a place with friendly philosophers of the highways and byways.”
“Invaluable to us as a standard of comparison, quite apart from its charm as a human document.”
The Times [London] Lit Sup p600 O 30 ’19 1050w
GUITERMAN, ARTHUR. Ballads of old New York. il *$1.50 Harper 811
20–3010
In this collection of ballads, the author tells us, he has been “martialing the varied traditions of New York and its neighborhood, piecing together colorful stories of the past for those who are to inherit the future.” And in the prologue he bids us “Hear! for I carol in lilting rhymes rollicking lays of the good old times!” The contents are grouped under the headings: Dutch period; English colonial period; Revolutionary period; and Miscellaneous, and the verses are interspersed by descriptive prose paragraphs by way of interludes. The illustrations are pen and ink sketches by J. Scott Williams.
“A delightfully whimsical book.”
+ + + N Y Times p26 Ja 9 ’21 550w
Booklist 16:234 Ap ’20
“The book is a happy book, done by a genuine lover and historian of the greatest city in the new world. Washington Irving would have
