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After the War How the Ukraine War Challenges Political Theories 1st Edition Anton Leist
Diplomatic Challenges and Geopolitical Uncertainties
Contributions to International Relations
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Dynamics of the Ukraine War
Diplomatic Challenges and Geopolitical Uncertainties
Viktor Jakupec
Deakin University
Warrnambool, Victoria, Australia
Universität Potsdam
Potsdam, Germany
ISSN 2731-5061
ISSN 2731-507X (electronic)
Contributions to International Relations
ISBN 978-3-031-52443-1 ISBN 978-3-031-52444-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-52444-8
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Preface
Overview
It is precarious to write a book in the middle of the Russo-Ukraine war—a war with no end in sight, especially when the Western Alliance maintains that they will support Ukraine for as long as it takes. The author has taken this risk because it is essential to discuss, critique, and analyse the war’s background, consequences, and events as they unfold. Unsurprisingly, the Russo-Ukraine war is a divisive topic in which competing camps and actors grapple to control the narrative. However, more disturbing is that the Russo-Ukraine war may push European and North American countries into political and economic uncertainty and that there is no winner in sight. Despite the divisive nature of the Russo-Ukraine war and the looming political and economic uncertainty it may bring to European and North American countries, this book delves into explanatory discussions framed by the spirit of the times of the frst 20 months of the confict to shed light on the interconnected political sanctions and propaganda wars that have unfolded. This is encapsulated in explanatory discussions. The political war provides a broad-based background of the RussoUkraine confict, encompassing diplomatic failures, Russia’s denazifcation and demilitarisation claims, and Western discontent with the war in NATO countries (Goldgeier & Itzkowitz Shifrinson, 2023). The economic war discussion through the imposition of sanctions focuses on the controversies surrounding the fnancial and commercial effects of the war. Finally, the propaganda war brings to the fore the failure of the Fourth Estate and the manipulation of the mainstream media on both sides of the confict.
Approach
Against these explanatory discussions, this volume proceeds with an in-depth analysis of the Russo-Ukraine war triggered by the Russian invasion, which has ignited an unparalleled political, economic, and humanitarian crisis, reaching a catastrophic magnitude unseen in Europe since World War II. The war has pitted two nuclear superpowers, Russia and the USA, against each other, though with some level of restraint, at least for now. While there is a full-scale war occurring between the armed forces of Ukraine and Russia, the USA and its Western allies are engaged in a proxy war against Russia (DeYoung, 2023). Senator Lindsay Graham (cited in Blumenthal, 2023) boldly claimed that the USA’s military and fnancial support for Ukraine is worth every penny and even declared the readiness to fght this war until the last Ukrainian. Such cynical statements echo throughout Western political circles, promising unwavering support for Ukraine as long as necessary (Irish & Pollard, 2023). At the same time, the Russo-Ukraine war has divided the world, creating a discord between the Global North and the Global South.
Regarding the Russo-Ukraine war, there is discord between the G7 representing the Global North and G20 member countries representing the Global South countries to a large extent. Western Alliance countries advocated a strong condemnation of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, but Russia thwarted the censure. As a result, the declaration regarding Ukraine recognised different viewpoints and assessments of the Russo-Ukraine war (Miglani, 2023). In other words, most Global South countries expressed a cautious opposition to the stance taken by the Global North. This opposition forms a basis for challenging the existing USA-led world order and a proposition of the rise of a new world order (Ullah, 2023; Qingqing, 2023).
Throughout the discussion, the USA-led Western Alliance’s decision to support Ukraine through the provision of weapons, military training, economic sanctions on Russia, humanitarian assistance, and fnancial aid concerning the endgame of the war is canvassed. It is stipulated that both sides, the Western allies and Russia, have entered this confict without a clear vision of the military and diplomatic endgame. Simultaneously, Russia has expanded the goals of its special military operations to include territorial claims in addition to the demilitarisation and denazifcation of Ukraine. Against this lack of clarity, an in-depth analysis of the war politics suggests that neither Russia nor Ukraine may emerge as clear victors. It is shown that this ambiguity arises from the differing interpretations of what constitutes victory. Ukraine seeks the withdrawal of all Russian troops to pre-2014 borders, the establishment of an international tribunal for Russia’s alleged war crimes, and reparation for war damages.
In contrast, Russia views victory as achieving denazifcation and demilitarisation of Ukraine. The ambiguity in Russia’s defnition of victory is compounded by its evolving demands, including Ukraine’s acceptance of neutrality. The Western Alliance, led by the USA, is pursuing a proxy war aimed at weakening Russia militarily and economically, potentially diminishing Russia’s global power status and granting Western access to Russia’s natural resources.
It is claimed that the war’s objectives are further complicated by the fact that Ukraine is effectively fghting a proxy war for the USA-led Western Alliance, which exerts infuence, if not control, over Ukraine’s war efforts. With neither Russia nor Ukraine showing an inclination for a negotiated peace or armistice in the frst 20 months of confict, the prospects for a diplomatic solution appear bleak. So far, attempts by countries outside the Western Alliance, such as China, India, Brazil, and Indonesia, have failed to bring the warring parties to the negotiating table. This diplomatic stalemate contributes to the perpetuation of military actions on all sides.
Analysing the current situation and the views presented by military experts, political critics, and academics, a recurring theme emerges: Russia may not lose the war, but it may not win it. Claims that Ukraine will lose the war are also questionable. This ambiguity prompts the question addressed in the discussion: What constitutes winning the war? Several options are canvassed, such as a military victory by Ukraine, which in turn could potentially trigger Russia to exercise its nuclear option, which would likely lead to a swift end to the confict. Such a nuclear escalation would have devastating consequences for Europe, compelling Western political leaders to avoid an all-out war with Russia. Despite the importance of Ukraine’s status, including proposed NATO and EU membership, it could be sacrifced to preserve Europe and the Western world (Eichler, 2021).
In this context, the discussion and analysis point towards a situation where Russia is unlikely to lose the war. Nevertheless, the conditions for ending the war on Russia’s terms remain uncertain. Thus, the most plausible scenario is that the war will ultimately conclude through diplomacy. If this holds, the revision of critical diplomatic agreements, such as the Budapest Memorandum, the Bucharest Summit Declaration, and the Minsk Agreements 1 and 2, which have played pivotal roles in shaping the confict’s trajectory, will be integral to the discussion and understanding of a path forward.
A Realist Perspective on Power Dynamics
Much of the content discussed in this book, including the viewpoints, analyses, and commentaries presented, remains open to further discussions. The analysis presented here is based on thoroughly examining reports, discussions, news, opinions, policies, and information from public sources. An analysis informs the discussions of the causes of the war, the status quo after some 20 months of war, including events related to the counter-offensive, and the trajectory of the Russo-Ukraine war. These analyses are primarily driven by the propositions that the current circumstances do not lend themselves to a peace agreement acceptable to either party, and a resolution may only be achievable at some point in the future, following an armistice and establishing a frozen confict. In other words, the prospects for a shortterm resolution appear highly unlikely. The reason for this assertion is that over time, Russia may expand its control over additional parts of Ukraine in addition to the currently annexed and occupied territories. Without a ceasefre followed by
peace negotiations, Ukraine risks becoming a dysfunctional rump state, incapable of functioning effectively.
The above broad-based issues are discussed and analysed in detail through a discursive political introduction of the war and reframing the discourse within a Realist IR framework. This is followed by unpacking the political precursors to the Russo-Ukrainian war and the current aspects of international discontent. Subsequently, analysis and discussion on the sanctions war regarding the impacts and consequences of the propaganda war and the failure of the Fourth Estate are provided. Two additional aspects of the consequences of the Russo-Ukraine war are examined from a future-oriented perspective, namely fnancing the war and rebuilding Ukraine, and the notions of a Zeitenwende, NATO’s Renaissance and a potential rise of a New World Order.
As a fnal note, the theoretical locus of the book is couched in the Realist international relation (IR) theory (Mearsheimer, 2019), emphasising that states primarily prioritise power structures. Realism, as a prominent theoretical framework in international relations, posits that the fundamental concern of states lies in the equilibrium of power, particularly among the world’s ‘great powers.’ Great powers, the central actors in the realist perspective, are primarily preoccupied with assessing their power relative to other great powers, driven by an inherent fear of losing their status as such. This apprehension emanates from the perception that weaker states in the international arena are vulnerable to exploitation by their more powerful counterparts.
Crucially, Realism adopts an impartial stance, refraining from discriminating between different types of states, such as democracies, non-democracies, liberal states, fascist states, or communist states. Instead, Realism treats all states as ‘black boxes,’ essentially regarding them as self-contained entities driven by a common objective: maximising their relative power. This perspective underlines the universality of state behaviour in pursuit of power, irrespective of the nature of their domestic political order.
This central tenet of Realism often invokes strong reactions from Western liberal democracies. These democracies tend to morally categorise themselves as ‘good,’ while authoritarian states, communist regimes, and similar entities are often cast as the ‘bad’ actors on the global stage. However, Realism contends that such valuebased distinctions are irrelevant to its analysis. In the realist view, there are neither inherently ‘good’ nor ‘bad’ states; all states are rational actors engaged in a competitive struggle for power due to their inherent concern for survival.
In essence, Realism can be summarised as a theory that simplifes the complex landscape of international relations by emphasising the pursuit of power as the paramount objective of all states, transcending normative judgements and characterisations of states as ‘good’ or ‘bad.’
Warrnambool, Australia Viktor Jakupec Potsdam, Germany
References
Blumenthal, M. (2023, June 30). Why are we tempting nuclear annihilation? Retrieved September 4, 2023, from https://scheerpost.com/2023/06/30/ why- are- we- tempting- nuclear- annihilation- max- blumenthal- addresses- unsecurity-council/ DeYoung, K. (2023, April 18). An intellectual battle rages: Is the U.S. in a proxy war with Russia? The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/nationalsecurity/2023/04/18/russia-ukraine-war-us-involvement-leaked-documents/ Eichler, J. (2021). NATO’s Expansion after the Cold War: Geopolitics and Impact for international security. Springer.
Goldgeier, J., & Itzkowitz Shifrinson, J. (Eds.). (2023). Evaluating NATO enlargement: From Cold War Victory to the Russia-Ukraine War. Palgrave Macmillan Irish, J., & Pollard, N. (2023, July 13). In a message to Russia, G7 unveils the security pledge for Ukraine. Reuters. Retrieved October 2, 2023, from https://www. reuters.com/world/sending- message- russia- g7- announce- long- term- securityassurances-ukraine-2023-07-12/
Mearsheimer, J. J. (2019). The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities. Yale University Press Miglani, S. (2023, September 10). Key takeaways from the 2023 G20 summit in New Delhi. Reuters Retrieved October 8, 2023, from https://www.reuters.com/ world/key-takeaways-2023-g20-summit-new-delhi-2023-09-10/ Qingqing, C. (2023, September 14). Upcoming G77+China Summit to enhance the voice of Global South. Global Times. https://www.globaltimes.cn/ page/202309/1298204.shtml
Ullah, A. (2023, May 30). The Sino-Russian-led world order: A better choice for the globe? Modern diplomacy. Retrieved July31, 2023, from https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2023/05/30/the- sino- russian- led- world- order- a- better- choicefor-the-globe/
About the Book
The book delves into one of our time’s most critical geopolitical conficts, the Russo-Ukraine War. It offers insightful analyses of the complexities and dynamics of the war, exploring frozen diplomatic solutions, navigating geopolitical uncertainties, and discussing the propaganda-Fourth Estate war.
The content goes beyond surface-level analysis, providing an in-depth and timely examination of the effects of diplomacy, diverse political perspectives, Western support strategies, and the intricate geopolitical and geo-economic challenges inherent in the confict. It critically analyses the political precursors to the war and the Russian and Western Alliance’s justifcations for it.
Against this background, the manuscript examines the existential threats perceived by the warring parties. It provides a thought-provoking discussion concerning pragmatic issues such as fnancing the war, post-war rebuilding agendas, and a scrutiny of the emerging notion of Zeitenwende that could shape the Global North and pave the way for a potential ‘new’ multipolar world order. In conclusion, the book articulates the layers of this multifaceted Russo-Ukraine confict, providing a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics that shape the emerging geopolitical landscape.
About the Author
Viktor Jakupec is an honorary Professor at Deakin University and the University of Potsdam and is a member of the Leibniz Sozietät der Wissenschaften in Berlin. His research focuses on political economy analysis and the nexus between international relations, development aid politics, and governance. Viktor has published extensively in the feld of political economy and foreign aid. He holds a Dr. habil. from Giessen University, a Dr. phil. from FU Hagen, and an M.Ed. from James Cook University.
Abbreviations
ADB Asian Development Bank
AfD Alternative für Deutschland Party
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
AUR Alliance for the Union of Romanians
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China South Africa alliance
EC European Commission
EU European Union
GDP Gross Domestic Product
G7 Group of Seven largest economies
G20 Group of Twenty economic entities
IMF International Monitory Fund
LNG Liquefed Natural Gas
MAP Membership Action Plan
MSC Munich Security Conference
NAM Non-Aligned Movement
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDB New Development Bank
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PiS Prawo i Sprawiedliwość [Law and Justice Party, Poland]
PR China People’s Republic of China
Smer-SSD Smer- Slovenská Sociálna Demokracia party (Slovakia)
SVP Schweitzer Volks Partei
UK United Kingdom
UNO United Nations Organisation
USA United States of America
WIIW Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies
Chapter 1 The Russo-Ukraine War: A Discursive Introduction
Introduction
The USA-led Western Alliance, including NATO, the EU, and some non-EU countries, is determined to support Ukraine in its war with Russia ‘for as long as it takes’. Yet, there is no indication of what the end game of the war may be. This makes it diffcult for Western countries to determine at which stage to seek a diplomatic solution. The matter is further complicated by the fact that, in addition to the military confict, the West is pursuing a political, territorial, and economic war through sanctions in Ukraine, whereby all parties are conducting a geo-political and domestic propaganda war.
As the Russian invasion of Ukraine has resulted in a USA-led Western Alliance proxy war, with subsequent tragic civilian and military losses and the destruction of livelihoods and infrastructure, it is important to note that Ukraine is conducting military battles. The USA-led Western Alliance is participating in the war through the supply of vast amounts of arms and weapons systems, military personnel training, the provision of intelligence services, fnancial and economic aid, and diplomatic support. Apart from the armed confict, the Western Alliance has imposed considerable economic and diplomatic sanctions on Russia, culminating in an economic war and isolation of Russia in the West. Despite initial Ukrainian successes on the battlefeld and the support provided to Ukraine by the Western Alliance, the Russian army has continued to either hold their positions in the annexed territories or launch offensives, as seen in Bakhmut. However, after around 20 months of war, neither party is closer to achieving its aims, and there is no sign that either party is ready to start negotiations to end the war. On the economic front, Russia has remained stronger than anticipated as Western sanctions have not yet produced the desired effect. On the other hand, Ukraine’s agriculture-based economy is being devastated. Given the destruction and the loss of human lives, it is not surprising that there are popular movements in the West demanding negotiations to end the war.
V. Jakupec, Dynamics of the Ukraine War, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-52444-8_1
1 The Russo-Ukraine War: A Discursive Introduction
The path to the negotiation table is, however, marred by diffcult propositions or schools of thought that have emerged in the Western political arena. One school argues that it is necessary for the Western Alliance to continue or even increase military, economic, and fnancial support for Ukraine until Russia is defeated to such an extent that it may not be able to launch another war or invasion for decades to come, if ever. The proponents of the second school of thought argue that Ukraine should receive only limited amounts of weapons, just enough to maintain the existing state of affairs, to give diplomacy a chance to bring the fghting to an end and to preserve human life.
Given the contrasting views of these two schools of thought, many debates concerning the Russo-Ukraine war in academia, the political arena, the media, and the public domain focus to a large extent on themes concerning the causes of the war, the stage and the current state of hostilities, and the trajectory of the war. Various and diverse discourses have been and are being pursued for each of these topics.
Competing Political Perspectives
Arguably, one of the central issues on both sides of the confict is NATO enlargement. From the Russian perspective, any NATO expansion to the East is a red line and an unacceptable aspect of US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Undoubtedly, any such expansion would infame nationalist, militarist, and antiWestern movements in Russia’s public opinion. This, in turn, would have an adverse effect on East-West relations, and an atmosphere akin to the Cold War would emerge. NATO’s expansion would push Russian foreign policy in the direction of hostility towards the Western political worldview.
On the other hand, Ukraine, despite the undertakings given in the Budapest Memorandum (Yost, 2015), the Bucharest Summit Declaration (NATO, 2008), and Minsk Agreement 1 (Allan, 2020) and Minsk Agreement 2 (Allan & Wolczuk, 2022), did not feel secure as a sovereign country, especially following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. From Ukraine’s vantage point, the annexation of Crimea constitutes a violation of international law, unprecedented since the end of the Cold War, and Russia’s support for the Russian-speaking separatists as a blatant attack on its sovereignty. Admittedly, on balance, the cost of this military confict will probably be higher for Russia than the possible gains. It is also clear that the West will pay a high economic price. However, Ukraine, according to independent military experts’ assessment, will pay, per capita, the highest price in human terms.
As for Western economic sanctions, there are negative effects on both the EU and Ukraine and Russia, respectively. Regarding the EU, its dependency on Russian oil and gas has unexpectedly negative effects, leading to a recession in its major economies such as Germany. In short, the economic sanctions imposed by the Western Alliance on Russia have, in part, backfred. EU countries, due to their actions, are suffering from market losses as well as from limited access to energy supplies like gas and oil. The open question is: will EU countries be able to maintain their
Western Support: Weapons, Sanctions, and Alliances
support for Ukraine in the wake of economic downturns, rising living costs, and popular discontent? The short answer is that for EU countries to succeed and protect their economic interests, they must disentangle themselves from the existing Russian market. Subsequently, the EU and its member countries will need to seek new markets in competition with Russia, especially in the Global South. This may take years to achieve. On the other hand, Russia has quickly and successfully turned its economy towards the East and the Global South and has been able to circumvent Western sanctions. This does not mean that Russia has not suffered economic losses, but not to the same extent as the Western Alliance countries.
Taking a step back, the Russo-Ukraine war and the resulting tragedy can be explained—not justifed—by the collision of the geo-political interests of the USA via NATO to maintain its global hegemony, irrespective of the economic and military costs and regardless of the price, on the one hand, and in the face of the rising geo-political powers such as China, Russia, Turkey, and other Global South countries leading to (re)shaping a new multipolar world order. Given these competing geo-political interests, mirrored in part in the Russo-Ukrainian war, the subsequent discussion presents arguments central to a potential resolution of the Russo-Ukraine crisis. It is an explanation of factors and events from the vantage point of ‘great power’ politics based on Realist International Relations (IR) theory.
To analyse the broad-based discussions, several interconnected themes and topics need to be considered. These include the tenacious dangers mainly in the form of mutual distrust, exemplifed in perceived or real existential threats and the unresolved disagreement over the territories in Ukraine that Russia is claiming as its own. For a better situational understanding of political war tensions, it is useful to disentangle the two phenomena within a framework of weapons support for Ukraine, the Western sanctions imposed on Russia, and the newly emerging alliances.
Western Support: Weapons, Sanctions, and Alliances
At the July 2023 NATO summit convened in Vilnius, a spotlight was cast upon the signifcant security assistance that Western nations have been extending to Ukraine. Within the framework of this summit, the USA and its coalition partners unveiled a comprehensive initiative aimed at training Ukrainian pilots and ground crews to operate F-16 fghter aircraft. This endeavour represents a continuation of the decision taken by the US administration in May 2023, permitting NATO member states to supply Ukraine with F-16 fghter jets. Complementing this initiative, the French government announced its intention to dispatch long-range SCALP cruise missiles to bolster Ukraine’s defence capabilities. These announcements add to the growing number of commitments recently undertaken by NATO member states, most notably Germany’s commitment, declared in May 2023, to allocate a sum of $3 billion in military assistance to Ukraine. This assistance package encompasses the provision of tanks, artillery, and anti-aircraft weaponry, further fortifying Ukraine’s military defence capabilities.
Furthermore, it is important to note that a coalition comprising Canada, the EU, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the USA has recently introduced a comprehensive range of sanctions specifcally directed towards Russia. These sanctions have been strategically designed to impact various sectors of the Russian economy, including banks, oil refneries, and military exports. Additionally, the Western allies have articulated their intention to enforce restrictions on Russia’s central bank with the primary objective of curtailing its capacity to bolster the Russian Rubel and consequently diminish Russia’s ability to fnance its ongoing military campaign in Ukraine. In essence, these multifaceted measures have been articulated with the overarching goal of signifcantly constraining Russia’s economic capacity, a sentiment underscored by the French Foreign Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, who characterised these actions as a deliberate effort to ‘asphyxiate Russia’s economy’.
If one were to believe the Western mainstream media, Russia is having a diffcult time holding its occupied or annexed territory. To bring this proposition to a logical conclusion, it means that the Western Alliance has supplied Ukraine with suffcient weapons and provided adequate training for the Ukrainian armed forces to defeat Russia militarily, politically, and economically. In effect, at the beginning of the war, the successes of the Ukrainian armed forces were remarkably impressive. At the same time, the Russian army has not performed as expected in the Ukrainian theatre of war. This has led some Western military experts and political commentators to draw a conclusion that Ukraine is winning the war. Having said that, it may be useful to take a cautionary stance and pose the question: If the USA-led Western Alliance has indeed provided enough weapons, or if it must continue to supply Ukraine with an ever-increasing quantity of weapons, defence systems, training, and intelligence, when will Ukraine recapture the occupied and annexed territories? The Western Alliance has indeed provided Ukraine with an extraordinary amount of weapons, munitions, defence systems, and other military hardware, to such an extent that the Western countries have depleted their own military hardware reserves. Yet, the Ukrainian demand for an ever-greater supply of sophisticated weapons is increasing almost daily.
It is interesting to observe that while the USA-led alliance is talking about the training of fghter jet pilots on aircraft such as the F-16, Ukraine is talking about not only training but also the supply of such aircraft. By all accounts, it seems that the Western Alliance will oblige with F-16 deliveries later in 2023. Taking Ukraine’s government aims and further weapons deliveries into consideration, the question is how far will this situation usher in a new war phase? The tentative answer is that none of the above will change much as far as the existing situation is concerned. However, it was expected that the situation may change drastically with the Ukrainian counter-offensive. There is the question of how the counter-offensive will be played out. As history has shown thus far, there is every indication that it is not a ‘big bang’ event but a prolonged targeted military action. More importantly, up to now, this much-awaited Ukrainian ‘spring counter-offensive’ that started sometime in June 2023 is not as successful as previously imagined. To date, however, the USA-led alliance is prepared to provide everything militarily necessary to enable Ukraine to win the war.
The rhetoric of the Western Alliance using slogans such as providing support for Ukraine ‘as much as it takes’ and ‘for as long as it takes’ is a double-edged sword. First, given the superiority of Western weapons, the expectation among the USA-led coalition is that Ukraine will, with its counter-offensive, deliver a decisive victory. Second, if Ukraine cannot meet the expectations, it may lose the confdence of NATO and other allied countries and thus be deprived of ongoing military support. There is a third component that casts a shadow on ongoing USA support, namely the forthcoming 2024 US presidential election campaign. Depending on the USA’s domestic policies and voter sentiments, a more nationalist view may prevail. In the USA, there is already dissonance about the support for Ukraine discernible. This will most likely intensify as the campaign progresses. Irrespective of who the Republican party’s nominee may be, as a candidate, this person could be compelled to consider the growing sentiment among conservative voters that the US government is wasting taxpayers’ money and resources in its support of Ukraine. Finally, there will also be the European Parliament election in June 2024. If the current national support for right-wing parties in Germany, Austria, Spain, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Netherlands, and other EU countries will be refected in the European Parliament election, then the support for Ukraine may change.
Furthermore, as far as democracy is concerned, Ukraine should hold parliamentary elections in 2023 and presidential elections in 2024. The Ukrainian government declared that neither of these elections will be held as long as Ukraine is governed by martial law. Thus, Ukraine has lost much of its claims of being a democracy. Furthermore, Ukraine’s government has banned opposition parties, criminalised its opponents’ legitimate media outlets, imprisoned leading political opposition leaders, raided orthodox churches, and imprisoned clergymen. It has also imprisoned Gonzales Lira, a US citizen, for exercising freedom of speech by challenging the Ukrainian government’s war narrative (Feng, 2022; Quay, 2022). Together, this puts a dent in Ukraine’s claim to be a democracy.
Russia may wait and see how far the postponement of these elections and antidemocratic measures will be acceptable to the opposition parties and the Ukrainian populace. The unanswered question is, will, due to the suspension of elections and limiting democratic rights, Ukraine’s political stability become problematic? Ultimately, one may be forgiven for asking, does the deferment of elections constitute a disregard for democracy? How does the suspension of basic democratic rights coincide with the Western Alliance and Ukraine’s claim that the war is a battle for democracy and its shared values? The answer is simple: these two phenomena cannot be reconciled, and smack of political situations are found in countries governed by autocracy (Blumenthal, 2023). This problem has been recognised by the Ukrainian government, which, under pressure from the Western Alliance, agreed to hold elections as long as the latter provided suffcient funding. Such requests for additional fnancial support smack of a ‘democracy for sale’ (Baysha, 2021).
The overriding question is how long Ukraine will be able to convince the Western Alliance countries to provide ‘unlimited’ funding. Ukraine is surely cognisant that the Western slogan ‘for as long as it takes’ has fnancial and military limitations. It will not last forever. Thus, it is not surprising that Ukraine is doing everything in its
1 The Russo-Ukraine War: A Discursive Introduction
power to gain NATO membership, if necessary, through a back door, by asking that normal membership conditions should be suspended. However, at the European Political Community summit in Moldova in June 2023, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz gave Ukraine little hope of a quick invitation to join NATO. Furthermore, Ukraine is trying to involve NATO overtly as a war participant. Finally, Ukraine, with its weapons and weapon systems supplied by the Western Alliance, is escalating the confrontation by taking the war across the border into Russia. The Russian counterattacks are seen as a justifcation for requesting the Western Alliance to increase its supply of missiles, tanks, weapon systems, and, lately, fghter jets. This should ensure Ukraine’s victory in reclaiming the Russia-occupied and annexed territories. The open question is to what extent could a Ukrainian success on the battlefeld suffce to secure its sovereignty and a future as an EU and NATO member? An answer may well be that until Ukraine fulfls the explicit criteria for membership in either or both organisations, including an absence of border conficts, it will not be admitted to NATO or EU membership.
In addition to the military support for Ukraine, the Western Alliance is imposing economic and political sanctions on Russia. The aim is to weaken Russia’s economy by curtailing its international trade income, including limiting banking services and cutting Russia off from the international fnancial facilities, among other sanctions. In effect, the sanctions were directed politically at the Russian government’s inner circle and economically on Russian companies and enterprises. Since the imposition of the initial sanctions, others were added focusing on valuable exports mainly to Europe. This includes, among others, exports of oil and gas to Europe and limiting Russia’s access to products which could be used in Russia’s war against Ukraine.
As far as Western sanctions are concerned, there are two schools of thought. One is articulated by the proponents of sanctions who argue that it takes time for these to take effect. The other school uses the counterargument, namely that since neither the military pressures nor the sanctions politics have been successful, different economic pressures may be required. It needs to be recognised that Russia has over time been successful in partially disconnecting its economy from the EU. This was achieved through economic collaboration with China, Brazil, Turkey, India, and other countries, mostly from the Global South. Against this background, Germany and France are uneasy with the ban on bypassing sanctions, for they fear this could harm diplomatic relations with non-EU, especially the Global South countries.
In parallel to the weapons and military support and the imposition of sanctions on Russia by the Western Alliance, Ukraine has gained signifcant political support from the fact that the EU and the NATO states have, as a result of the Russo-Ukraine war, formed a stronger supporting alliance. During the Trump presidency era, NATO as an organisation was side-lined. Indeed, Trump questioned the rationale for the USA’s support of NATO. Similarly, the EU was divided on many issues which caused the rise of blocs such as the Visegrád Group (Schmidt, 2023), the Eurosceptic Group (Kopecký & Mudde, 2002), and others. With the advent of the Russo-Ukraine war, the NATO alliance has become increasingly united in support of Ukraine— with very few exceptions such as Hungary, Turkey, Bulgaria, and more recently
Slovakia. All these countries are reluctant to follow the political and economic policies of the NATO alliance. There is also much talk and discussion among the NATO member countries, especially the Baltic states, in favour of Ukraine joining the organisation. At the same time, NATO has stated clearly that it will not be drawn into the Russo-Ukraine war directly but will support Ukraine in its self-defence for as long as it takes. The NATO agenda is focused on Ukraine’s pressing long-term military and other needs and wants, the wide-reaching impacts of the war affecting broader Western security and addressing the critical matter concerning the capabilities of the respective defence industries.
Geo-Political and Geo-Economic Consequences
The geo-political and geo-economic consequences of the Russo-Ukraine war have not fully played out yet. However, there is a certainty, namely that the consequences are not contained within the Euro-Asian region but have impacted the Global North and the Global South alike. The important point is that irrespective of the outcome of the Russo-Ukraine war, the lessons learned will prevail and provide a basis for similar future geo-political events. Very briefy, there are three main consequential standpoints to consider.
Firstly, one of the initial outcomes of the Russo-Ukraine war is the geo-political and geo-economic merging of the liberal West under the leadership of the USA. The provision of weapons supply to Ukraine and, in parallel, the imposed economic sanctions on Russia were achieved through seamless cooperation between the European and North American allies. Furthermore, to strengthen its geo-political sphere of infuence, NATO fast-tracked Sweden’s and Finland’s membership. Additionally, neutral Central European countries such as Austria and Switzerland agreed to participate in and support the geo-economic agenda of the Western Alliance’s sanctions on Russia. This is especially surprising since both countries have maintained and fercely defended their neutrality over a long period.
Depending on one’s interpretation, this seems to be pointing towards a phenomenon where the Russo-Ukraine war is a catalyst for the West’s unprecedented concord in responding to the war. Here, an argument may be articulated that, after all, the West is weakened through various global crises, internal contradictions, and global geo-political and geo-economic challenges. Combined, these crises challenge the USA’s hegemonic status on the world stage. Thus, in light of the various crises and subsequent challenges, it may be argued that the Western geo-political and geo-economic agenda is to (re-)build itself into a ‘fortress’ and thus preserve the USA as a global hegemon. From such a vantage point, the Russo-Ukraine war is simply a stepping stone towards ensuring the USA’s hegemonic status and its goals.
However, there are signs that the Russo-Ukraine war is also bringing to the fore a certain amount of internal disunity within the Western Alliance concerning Russia. These contentious trends of disunity appear to be intensifying as the war continues, without a clear outcome in sight. If this stands to reason, then the above-mentioned
enlargement of NATO through Sweden’s and Finland’s membership brings about a potential increase in heterogeneity. To illustrate the point, Turkey initially vetoed the admission of both countries to NATO and exercised its right to pursue independent policies within NATO. This, in turn, may lead Turkey to separate from the alliance altogether. This is not unusual, for it can be shown that Turkey is on many political issues more closely aligned with, for example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation than with its Western partners. But Turkey is not alone. There are other troubling differences among NATO countries. Here, one may refer to the rise of illiberalism, for example, in Hungary and Poland under the former PiS government, which could spill over to other EU NATO countries.
The second outcome arising from the Russo-Ukraine war is that the Western Alliance is becoming increasingly isolated on the world geo-political and geoeconomic stage—mostly by its own actions. It was in October 2022 that Josep Borrell, EU Chief Diplomat, alienated the ‘rest’ of the world by equating Europe to a garden and the rest of the world to a jungle that threatens to overgrow it (Mouyal & Levy, 2022). Borrell’s and the Western Alliance’s interpretation of the war is at face value neither embraced nor accepted by the rest of the world, which is observing the situation from a guarded and often neutral standpoint. Notwithstanding that most UN member countries have denounced the Russian conquest and subsequent occupation of Ukraine’s territory and have accepted the argument that Russia has violated international law, a majority of countries, which represent a greater part of the world population, oppose the Western Alliance’s sanctions policies. This includes countries such as BRICS member countries including Brazil, China, India, and South Africa, and non-allied states in Africa, South-East Asia, Latin America, and the Pacifc region. A signifcant number of these countries agree with the Russian view that NATO, under the USA’s leadership, is to be held responsible for the Russo-Ukraine war and the continuing rise of geo-political and geo-economic tensions (Ratten, 2022; Alonso-Trabanco, 2022).
Even a cursory analysis of the tensions emerging from the Russo-Ukraine war clearly shows the isolation of the West from the Global South. To explain, there is evidence to show that developing countries do not acknowledge the West’s exclusive authority to set the rules, values, and norms that govern the respective international order. The sanctions policies, unilaterally formulated and implemented by the EU and the USA, respectively, are not well received by the governments of emerging economies. One reason for this situation is that emerging economies have not forgotten Western Alliances’ violations of international law in recent decades, including in the Middle East, the Balkans, and Central Asia. Developing countries do not accept any moral legitimacy claimed by the West, which claims to be the guardian of the world order (Kentikelenis & Voeten, 2021). Russia appears to be counting on these isolating tendencies within the realm of international relations allowing it to rise as a winner on the geo-political and geo-economic world stage.
The third consequence arising from the Russo-Ukraine war is mostly within the geo-economic domain. It refers to the economic weakening of Europe. This is a result of Europe’s wide-ranging economic alignment with the USA’s strategic geopolitical goals. The build-up of anti-Russian sanctions by the Western Alliance 1 The Russo-Ukraine War: A Discursive
brings Europe’s access to the usual Eastern trading partner to a potential end. This has serious consequences for the supply of raw materials, including oil and gas, which in turn creates, among others, an energy crisis. Furthermore, through the imposition of sanctions, the EU is losing signifcantly in terms of world market competitiveness (European Investment Bank, 2022). European industry, due to the sanctions, is paying globally the highest commodity and energy prices. At the same time, emerging economies are able to source relatively inexpensive raw materials from Russia. Another factor is that the EU as a trading block has lost the Russian technology export market. To conclude, the Russo-Ukraine war and the Western sanctions are economically isolating the EU and other allied countries from the rest of the Euro-Asian and the Latin American continents, and the India-Pacifc region. The European economy is becoming increasingly exposed to de-industrialisation (Ergen, 2022) and devaluation of the Euro against the USD.
Against the above backdrop, there is a compelling argument to be made that the Russo-Ukraine war is creating huge insecurity in international relations, globally. The EU is becoming the frst casualty of the war rationality in which the governments of EU countries and Russia, respectively, became entrapped. The problem is that Europe and Russia have entered an epoch of hostility that militates against any reasonable diplomatic and geo-political confict resolution options, which in turn impedes on the respective economies. Given the EU-Russia geo-economic and geopolitical tensions, it is the USA that appears to be the premier winner. Despite the advantages the USA has gained through the Russo-Ukraine war, there is a risk not only for a slowdown of the US economy and its geo-economic position but also to its medium-term hegemonic geo-political status. Thus, it is in the interest of the USA to prolong the Russo-Ukraine war for as long as it takes—whatever this may mean.
However, the promise to support Ukraine for as long as it takes may be diffcult to realise, for after some 20 months since the beginning of the Russian invasion, there are signs of USA frustrations with Ukraine’s counter-offensive. To explain, in the realm of geo-political discourse, a discernible shift in the USA’s stance concerning Ukraine’s ongoing counter-offensive has emerged, characterised by expressions of dissatisfaction with the Ukrainian progress made thus far. Nearly 3 months after the initiation of the counter-offensive, USA offcials have chosen to express their concerns indirectly, predominantly through the US media outlets. This shift raises pertinent questions regarding the underlying motives and implications thereof, thus necessitating a thorough analysis.
The delicate intricacies surrounding the counter-offensive results are not lost on either the US administration or the Ukrainian government, as the former grapples with the quandary of how to publicly critique the military tactics employed by the Ukrainian armed forces without concurrently diminishing Ukraine’s strategic position or its endeavour to reclaim territories currently under Russian occupation or annexation. Approaching the end of autumn, the culmination of some 4 months of the counter-offensive, it appears that the diplomatic reticence of the USA is diminishing, thus heralding a more overt expression of discontent. As the duration of the Ukrainian counter-offensive persists without yielding signifcant progress, USA
1 The Russo-Ukraine War: A Discursive Introduction
offcials are increasingly venting their frustration at the strategic approach adopted by the Ukrainian military.
In response to the USA’s dissatisfaction and critique of the counter-offensive, the Ukrainian government is reiterating a commitment to the liberation of Crimea and other Ukrainian territories currently under occupation, emphasising its determination to expel Russian forces from the country. This stance, however resolute it has been, has become a consistent theme since the commencement of the counteroffensive. Ukraine, much like its Western supporters, has harboured hopes of a swifter advancement in the counter-offensive. Alas, thus far this has not been achieved, and it does not look like it will be achieved in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, in response to critics of the counter-offensive, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba, while acknowledging the sluggish pace of the counteroffensive (Balmforth, 2023), stressed that Ukraine remains unwavering in its commitment to the complete reclamation of its territory, irrespective of the duration required to achieve this objective.
On the other hand, the recent tendency of US offcials to express their reservations publicly regarding Ukraine’s counter-offensive through prominent USA media outlets can be attributed to a confuence of factors. Foremost among them is the impending US presidential campaign, which casts a considerable shadow over these developments. USA President Joe Biden is reliant on garnering support from a majority of Republicans in Congress to sustain current levels of American military aid to Ukraine, especially given the proximity of the 2024 election year. Currently, a majority of Republican members of the Congressmen are in favour of maintaining such support. However, there exists a degree of uncertainty as to whether the vociferous faction aligned with former President Donald Trump, staunchly opposing further assistance to Ukraine, can successfully sway additional Republican representatives and senators to their position. To conclude, it is sure that after some 20 months of the confict, there is a strong indication that the USA is becoming impatient with the current trajectory of the Ukrainian counter-offensive. It is also evident that neither the USA, Ukraine, nor Russia are at the point where they would pursue a diplomatic solution. Given the competing visions from all parties of what constitutes winning the war, a solution to the war is diffcult to achieve.
Conclusion: Squaring the Circle
In light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, various parties across the global stage are earnestly endeavouring, although with limited success, to discern any meaningful rationale that may explain Russia’s actions. Simultaneously, many political actors are striving to formulate viable strategies to resolve the ongoing confict and assess the manifold geo-political repercussions destined to emanate from this momentous occurrence. Furthermore, similar to the international community, many governments are confronted with an inundation of information, the content of which seeks a way to end the war.
References
Finding a solution to end the war is currently neither politically, militarily, nor ideologically attainable. Two main reasons account for why the warring parties have reached an impasse. On the one hand, there is the question of territory, and on the other, there is the alliance question. With regard to the latter, Russia is pursuing a policy of Ukrainian neutrality and does not wish to have NATO at its doorstep. Conversely, Ukraine seeks an alliance with the West, specifcally NATO and EU membership. These two positions are simply irreconcilable. Concerning the former, namely territorial sovereignty, Russia shows no intention of withdrawing from the occupied territory, and if anything, it will attempt to expand the territory it controls in Ukraine. Simultaneously, Ukraine aims to reinstate its pre-2014 borders through all available means. Once again, there is simply no way to square the circle.
This irreconcilable situation is exacerbated from the Russian perspective and supported from the Ukrainian vantage point by the war cries resonating from Washington, London, Berlin, Paris, Ottawa, Warsaw, and other citadels of the USA-led Western Alliance. Their stance is clear: they will support Ukraine against Russia for as long as it takes and with all necessary means. But what does this mean? The position of the USA-led Western Alliance is straightforward: increase support for Ukraine with weapons, military intelligence, and the training of the armed forces, in the hope that Ukraine will emerge victorious in the confict. This hope has a weak point, as the Western Alliance has not precisely articulated what constitutes ‘victory’. In short, thus far, the West has provided the Ukrainian government with all possible military hardware, including equipment and ammunition. Additionally, the Western Alliance is offering fnancial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. In support of Ukraine, the West has imposed economic, fnancial, diplomatic, and other sanctions on Russia with the aim of weakening it and thus diminishing Russia’s ability to fnance its war efforts.
The great tragedy is that in this war, as in many others, the civilian population is suffering from injuries, death, and loss of livelihood. Many soldiers, both Ukrainian and Russian, are killed or maimed on the battlefeld. But for what purpose? While it is possible to attempt to untangle the political web, which is often constructed on both sides from disinformation, misinformation, propaganda, and untruth, and to justify the war from one warring party’s perspective, such undertakings will not ultimately stop the war or prevent the loss of lives. After all, the Western Alliance promises support for Ukraine for as long as it takes and with all necessary means. Since the West does not have direct on-the-ground involvement in the war, aside from supporting Ukraine with military, economic, and fnancial aid, neither their citizens nor their soldiers are killed in the confict. For the people of Ukraine, the loss of lives is an unmitigated humanitarian tragedy and a political and national existential threat.
References
Allan, D. (2020, May 22). The Minsk conundrum: Western policy and Russia’s War in Eastern Ukraine. Chatham House. Retrieved July 9, 2023, from https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/05/ minsk-conundrum-western-policy-and-russias-war-eastern-ukraine-0/minsk-2-agreement
1 The Russo-Ukraine War: A Discursive Introduction
Allan, D., & Wolczuk, K. (2022, February 16). Why Minsk-2 cannot solve the Ukraine crisis Chatham House. Retrieved July 9, 2023, from https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/02/ why-minsk-2-cannot-solve-ukraine-crisis Alonso-Trabanco, J. M. (2022, March 6). The geoeconomic front of the Ukraine War Geopolitical Monitor. Retrieved August 5, 2023, from https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/ the-geoconomic-front-of-the-ukraine-war/ Balmforth, T. (2023, September 1). Ukraine tells critics of slow counteroffensive to ‘shut up’. Reuters. Retrieved September 8, 2023, from https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ ukraine-tells-critics-slow-counteroffensive-shut-up-2023-08-31/ Baysha, O. (2021). Democracy, populism, and neoliberalism in Ukraine: On the fringes of the virtual and the real. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003228493 Blumenthal, M. (2023, June 30). Why are we tempting nuclear annihilation? Scheerpost. Retrieved September 8, 2023, from https://scheerpost.com/2023/06/30/ why-are-we-tempting-nuclear-annihilation-max-blumenthal-addresses-un-security-council/ Ergen, T. (2022, May 12). Deindustrialization as fact and fction. Max Planck Institute for the Study of Society. Retrieved October 17, 2023, from https://www.mpg.de/18631468/ deindustrialization-as-fact-and-fction European Investment Bank. (2022). How bad is the Ukraine war for the European recovery? EIB. Feng, E, (2022). Zelenskyy has consolidated Ukraine’s TV outlets and dissolved rival political parties. NPR News. Retrieved September 30, 2023, from https://www.npr. org/2022/07/08/1110577439/zelenskyy- has- consolidated- ukraines- tv- outlets- anddissolved- rival- political- par Kentikelenis, A., & Voeten, E. (2021). Legitimacy challenges to the liberal world order: Evidence from United Nations speeches, 1970–2018. The Review of International Organizations, 16, 721–754. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-020-09404-y Kopecký, P., & Mudde, C. (2002). The two sides of Euroscepticism: Party positions on European integration in East Central Europe. European Union Politics, 3(3), 297–326.
Mouyal, A, & Levy, O. (2022, October 16). Les jardiniers européens doivent aller ‘dans la jungle’. Le Grand Continent. Retrieved July 31, 2023, from https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2022/10/16/ les-jardiniers-europeens-doivent-aller-dans-la-jungle/ NATO. (2008, April 3). Bucharest summit declaration. Issued by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic council in Bucharest. Retrieved October 7, 2023, from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/offcial_texts_8443.htm
Quay, G. (2022). Zelensky nationalizes TV news and restricts opposition parties. The Week. Retrieved August 31, 2023, from https://news.yahoo.com/zelensky-nationalizes-tv-newsrestricts-173820471.html?fr=yhssrp_catchall
Ratten, V. (2022). The Ukraine/Russia confict: Geopolitical and international business strategies. Thunderbird, 65(2), 265–271. https://doi.org/10.1002/tie.22319
Schmidt, A. (2023). Visegrad group–real entity or mirage. In R. Zięba (Ed.), Politics and security of central and Eastern Europe. Contributions to political science (pp. 201–218). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16419-4_12
Yost, D. S. (2015). The Budapest memorandum and Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. International Affairs, 91(3), 505–538.
Chapter 2 Uncertainties of the Russo-Ukraine War: Reframing the Discourse
Introduction
The opening of the chapter underscores the role of uncertainties in shaping the conduct and outcomes of the Russo-Ukraine war. These uncertainties can manifest in various forms, including military strategies, political decision-making, and the unpredictable nature of confict itself. These uncertainties often infuence not only the actions of military forces but also the strategies employed by the political leadership. Understanding these uncertainties is critical for comprehending the broader dynamics of the Russo-Ukraine confict and its implications for international security. Within these uncertainties, there is an additional phenomenon to be observed, namely the political rhetoric in Ukraine, the West and Russia (Baysha, 2023), respectively. Therefore, an analysis of political rhetoric emanating from both Western nations and Russia is part of the Russo-Ukraine war. In other words, political rhetoric plays a pivotal role in shaping public opinion, rallying support for war efforts, and defning the objectives of a confict. It serves as a lens through which we can explore each side’s changing perceptions and priorities, shedding light on how these rhetorical shifts impact the trajectory of the confict. Moreover, political rhetoric can sometimes refect domestic political considerations, international alliances, and the broader geo-political context.
Against this background, it is essential to focus on three main concepts embedded in the underpinnings of the war. Firstly, there is a changing representation of the war. It is argued that the narrative of a confict often evolves in response to changing circumstances on the ground and shifting political narratives. Understanding how each side portrays the war to its audience and the international community provides valuable insights into their respective objectives and strategies. This evolving representation may include narratives of victory, sacrifce, heroism, or victimhood, which have signifcant psychological and strategic implications. Secondly, there is the issue of territorial claims and discourse changes, referring to a critical juncture in
V. Jakupec, Dynamics of the Ukraine War, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-52444-8_2
the confict, namely the territorial gains and losses during the 2022–2023 winter months. This period was a turning point where the confict dynamics and political discourse underwent a discernible transformation. For a better understanding of the uncertainties, it is useful to delve into the specifcs of these changes and how they have shaped the present state of the confict, focusing on the implications for diplomatic efforts.
Thirdly, notwithstanding the impasse on the battlefeld, there is also a diplomatic impasse. In short, diplomatic solutions to end the war had yet to gain traction on either side. If anything, the world has witnessed what one may call the ‘death of diplomacy’ in the Russo-Ukraine war, a concept that is explored in some detail. Acknowledging that the ‘death of diplomacy’ is a complex concept with signifcant ramifcations is important. It signifes that the confict has reached a stage where diplomatic solutions appear unattainable due to the deeply entrenched positions of the warring parties. Thus, it is crucial to examine the factors contributing to this ‘death of diplomacy, ‘which include perceived existential threats, realpolitik calculations, and the hardening of political stances. By dissecting this argument, the author seeks to provide a nuanced understanding of the current impasse in diplomatic efforts.
Fourthly, it becomes apparent that there is no clear winner in sight by bringing together the discussions concerning changing the representation of the war, territorial shifts, discourse changes, and the ‘death of diplomacy’. If this stands to reason, it is possible to reaffrm that, despite the passage of 20 months since the onset of the Russo-Ukraine confict, there is no apparent victor on the horizon. This protracted nature of the confict has far-reaching implications for Ukraine, Europe, the geo-political landscape, and the international community. It also prompts a critical question: What conditions would be necessary for a confict resolution that does not result in a decisive victory by one side but instead brings stability to the region?
In response to this question, one may refer to discussing and analysing potential diplomacy prospects. That is, while the discussion in this chapter asserts the ‘death of diplomacy’, it is important to consider the potential avenues for a diplomatic solution. The chapter could explore the role of international mediators, potential compromises, and the conditions under which diplomatic negotiations may become viable. It is crucial to analyse what factors may need to change or evolve for diplomacy to be revived as a realistic path towards ending the confict. By extending and elaborating on these points, the chapter comprehensively examines the Russo-Ukraine confict, the evolving dynamics of contemporary warfare, and the challenges and opportunities for diplomacy in a complex and protracted confict.
However, when one digs deeper, a more complex picture emerges. The problem with the failure of taking the diplomatic route is that Russia and Ukraine, respectively, are perceived to be facing an existential threat. In contrast, the USA is facing a potential hegemonic crisis, which is expressed as a dichotomy characterised as a fuid state of affairs, and thus, it reframes the discourse. 2
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Title: Bismarck
some secret pages of his history (Vol. 1 of 3). Being a diary kept by Dr. Moritz Busch during twenty-five years' official and private intercourse with the great Chancellor
Author: Moritz Busch
Release date: July 30, 2022 [eBook #68651]
Language: English
Original publication: United Kingdom: Macmillan and Co, 1898
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Transcriber's Note
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BISMARCK
SOME SECRET PAGES OF HIS HISTORY
BISMARCK
SOME SECRET PAGES OF HIS HISTORY
BEING A DIARY KEPT BY D .
MORITZ BUSCH
DURING TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE INTERCOURSE WITH THE GREAT CHANCELLOR
IN THREE VOLUMES VOL. I
R C S , L ,
Copyright in the United States of America
NOTE
The English edition of Dr. Busch’s work which we publish to-day has been translated from the original German text in the possession of the publishers. A few passages have, however, been omitted as defamatory, or otherwise unsuitable for publication. Dr Busch contemplated incorporating bodily in the first volume a reproduction of his earlier work: Prince Bismarck and his People during the Franco-German War; but while the many valuable additions which he made to it have been preserved, such portions as would no longer have presented any special interest for English readers have been considerably abridged.
PREFACE
The work which I now present to the German people contains a complete[1] account of all the events of which I was a witness during my intercourse of over twenty years with Prince Bismarck and his entourage. Part of it is not entirely new, as I have embodied in it portions of the book published by me in 1878, under the title: Prince Bismarck and his People during the Franco-German War. I have, however, restored the numerous passages which it was then deemed expedient to omit, and I have also dispensed with the many modifications by which, at that time, certain asperities of language had to be toned down. The bulk of the present work consists of a detailed narrative of the whole period of my intercourse with the Prince both before and after the French campaign. I collected and noted down all these particulars respecting Prince Bismarck and his immediate supporters and assistants, in the first place for my own use, and secondly as a contribution to the character and history of the Political Regenerator of Germany. The sole object of the diary which forms the basis of this work was to serve as a record of the whole truth so far as I had been able to ascertain it with my own eyes and ears. Any other object was out of the question, as it was impossible that I could desire to deceive myself. Subsequently, when I thought of publishing my notes, I was fully conscious of my responsibility towards history, the interests of which could not be promoted by material that had been coloured or garbled for party
purposes. I wished neither to be an eulogist nor a censor. To my mind, panegyric was superfluous, and fault-finding was for me an impossibility. A tendency to the sensational is foreign to my nature, and I leave the pleasure to be derived from grand spectacular shows to lovers of the theatre. I desired to record the mental and other characteristics which our first Chancellor presented to me under such and such circumstances, thus helping to complete, and at times to rectify, the conception of his whole nature that has been formed in the public mind from his political activity. The profound reverence which I feel for the genius of the hero, and my patriotic gratitude for his achievements, have not deterred me from communicating numerous details which will be displeasing to many persons. These particulars, however, are part of the historic character of the personality whom I am describing. The gods alone are free from error, passion, and changes of disposition. They alone have no seamy side and no contradictions. Even the sun and moon show spots and blemishes, but notwithstanding these they remain magnificent celestial orbs. The picture produced out of the materials which I have here brought together may present harsh and rough features, but it has hardly a single ignoble trait. Its crudeness only adds to its truth to nature, its individuality, and its clearness of outline. This figure does not float in an ethereal atmosphere, it is firmly rooted in earth and breathes of real life, yet it conveys a sense of something superhuman. It must furthermore be remembered that many of the bitter remarks, such as those made previous to March, 1890, were the result of temporary irritation, while others were perfectly justified. The strong self-confidence manifested in some of these utterances, and the angry expression of that need for greater power and more liberty of action, common to all men of genius and energetic character, arose from the consciousness that, while he alone knew the true object to be pursued and the fitting means for its achievement, his knowledge could not be applied because the right
of final decision on all occasions belonged by hereditary privilege to more or less mediocre and narrow minds.
I will allow the Prince himself to answer the question as to my authority for communicating to others without any reserve all that I ascertained during my intercourse with him. “Once I am dead you can tell everything you like, absolutely everything you know,” said Prince Bismarck to me in the course of a conversation I had with him on the 24th of February, 1879. I saw clearly in the way in which he looked at me that, in addition to the permission I had already received on previous occasions, he wished that I should then consider myself entirely free and expressly released from certain former engagements, some of which had been assumed by myself, while others had been imposed upon me. Since then my knowledge increased owing to his growing confidence in me, while his authorisation and the desire that I should use what I knew to the advantage of his memory remained undiminished. On the 21st of March, 1891, during one of my last visits to Friedrichsruh, the Prince —apparently prompted by a notice which he had read in the newspapers—remarked, “Little Busch (Büschlein) will one day, long after my death, write the secret history of our time from the best sources of information.” I answered “Yes, Prince; but it will not be a history, properly speaking, as I am not capable of that. Nor will it be long after your death—which we naturally pray to be deferred as long as possible—but on the contrary very soon after, without any delay. In these corrupt times, the truth cannot be known too soon.” The Prince made no answer, but I understood his silence to indicate approval. Finally, in the preceding year he had affirmed the absolutely unrestricted character of my authority. On the 15th of March, 1890, when the measures for his dismissal were already in progress, and he himself was engaged in packing up a variety of papers preparatory to his journey (a work in which I was allowed to assist him), he asked me to copy a number of important documents
for him and to retain the originals and copies in my possession. On his remarking that I could get these documents copied, I called his attention to the fact that a stranger might betray their contents to third parties. He replied, “Oh, I am not afraid of that! He can if he likes! I have no secrets amongst them—absolutely none.” That statement, “I have no secrets,” gave me liberty, at least for a later time, to publish those State papers the contents of which I had hitherto kept secret, as he must unquestionably have known better than I or the rest of the world who may have held other views on the subject.
So far respecting the essential point. That he whom I honour as the first of men sanctioned my undertaking is entirely sufficient for me. I do not ask whether others give it their blessing. The great majority of those referred to have since departed from this life and taken their places in the domain of history, where the claim for indulgent treatment is no longer valid. Those who are still with us may believe me when I assure them that in now publishing these pages I have no thought of causing them pain or of injuring them in any way. I simply consider that I am not at liberty to preserve silence on those matters which may prove unpleasant to them in view both of my own duty to tell the whole truth, and of the desire expressed by the Chancellor (to whom I still feel myself bound in obedience) that nothing should be concealed. The diplomatic world, in particular, must be represented here as it really is. In that respect this book may be described as a mirror for diplomatists.
I must leave the reader to form his own opinion as to my capacity for observation and the discovery of the truth. I may, however, be allowed to say that several long journeys in America and the East, a lengthy tour in Schleswig-Holstein during the Danish rule, undertaken for the purpose of reconnoitring that country, and a period of rather confidential intercourse with the Augustenburg Court at Kiel were calculated to sharpen my wits. A mission which I filled at
Hanover during the year of transition, and, above all, my position in the Foreign Office in Berlin and the intimate relations in which I stood towards its Chief during the war with France, together with the renewal of that intercourse from 1877 onwards, gave me exceptional opportunities of developing both my memory and power of observation. For several years I was acquainted with everything that went on in the Central Bureau of the German Foreign Office, and later, in addition to what I ascertained through the confidence of the Prince, I obtained not a little information from Lothar Bucher which remained a secret, not only for private persons, but often for high officials of the Ministry.
The diary on which my work is based, and which is often reproduced literally, gives the truest possible account of the events and expressions which I have personally seen and heard in the presence and immediate vicinity of the Prince. The latter is everywhere the leading figure around which all the others are grouped. The task I set myself, as a close observer and chronicler who conscientiously sifted his facts, was to give a true account of what I had been commissioned to do as the Prince’s Secretary in connection with press matters, and to describe how he and his entourage conducted themselves during the campaign in France, how he lived and worked, the opinions he expressed at the dinner and tea table, and on other occasions, respecting persons and things of that time, what he related of his past experiences, and finally, after our return from the great war, what I ascertained respecting the progress of diplomatic negotiations from the despatches which were then exchanged and of which I was at liberty to make use either immediately or at a later period. I was assisted in the fulfilment of this task by my faculty of concentration, which my reverence for the Prince and the practice which I had in the course of my official duties rendered gradually more intense, and by a memory which although not naturally above the average was also developed
by constant exercise to such a degree that in a short time it enabled me to retain all the main points of long explanations and stories, both serious and humorous, from the Chancellor’s lips almost literally, until such time as I could commit them to paper—that is to say, unless anything special intervened, a mishap which I was usually able to avert. The particulars here given were accordingly, almost without exception, written down within an hour after the conversations therein referred to occurred. For the most part they were jotted down immediately on small slips of paper, only the points and principal catchwords being noted, but which made it easy, however, to complete the whole entry later on.
This sharp ear and faithful memory, joined with a quick eye, stood me in good stead in the years of welcome service which I undertook as a private individual for the Prince. To these and to the habit of putting all that I had experienced, seen, and heard in black on white without delay, I owe the accurate accounts of the memorable conversation of the 11th of April, 1877, of the visit to Varzin and the statements made by the Chancellor on that occasion, as well as the long list of detailed reports of pregnant and characteristic conversations that I had with him from the year 1878 up to 1890 in the palace and garden at Berlin when, at times of crisis or under other circumstances, I was either invited by the Prince or called on him without invitation for the purpose of obtaining news for the Grenzboten or foreign newspapers. I kept up the same habit of committing everything of moment to paper during my various visits of shorter or longer duration between the years 1883 and 1889 to Friedrichsruh, where in the year last mentioned I was engaged for several weeks in arranging the Prince’s private letters and other documents. This custom also served me well in that ever memorable week in March, 1890, when I spent some of the darkest days of that period in the Prince’s immediate vicinity, nor did it fail me when I again greeted him in the Sachsenwald in 1891 and 1893, and was
able to convince myself that in the interval his confidence in me had as little diminished as had my loyalty towards him.
Whoever is familiar with the style in which the Prince was accustomed to express his thoughts when in the company of his intimate associates will be at once impressed with the genuineness of the instructions, conversations and anecdotes communicated in the following pages. He will find them almost without exception literally reproduced. In the anecdotes and stories, in particular, he will nearly always observe the characteristic ellipses, the unexpressed pre-suppositions, and the manner in which the Prince was apt to jump from point to point in his narratives, reminding one of the style of the old ballads. He will also at times note a humorous vein running through the Prince’s remarks and frequently become conscious of a thread of semi-naïve self irony. All these features were characteristic of the Chancellor’s manner of speaking. It is therefore hardly necessary for me to add that my reports, with all their roughness and sturdy ruggedness, are photographs that have not been retouched. In other words, I believe that I have not only been quick to observe, but I also feel that I have not intentionally omitted anything that was worth reproducing. I have neither blurred any features nor brought others into too sharp relief. I have put in no high lights, and above all I have added nothing of my own, nor tried to secure a place in history for my own wisdom by palming it off as Bismarck’s. Any omissions that now remain (there can hardly be more than a dozen in all of any importance) are indicated by dots or dashes. In cases where I have not quite understood a speaker, attention is called to the fact. Should any contradiction be discovered between earlier and later statements my memory must not be held responsible for them. If I am blamed for the fragmentary character of my recital then all memoirs must be rejected. If I am reproached with not having produced a work of art, I believe I have already made it sufficiently clear that I never intended anything of the kind. I desired,
on the contrary, so far as it was in my power, to serve the truth, and that alone. Nevertheless, my work may not only be utilised by historians, but may also possibly inspire a dramatist or a poet. Such a writer must, however, be no sentimentalist, and no idealist. It would be wise for him and for others to let themselves be guided by some counsels of experience which will be useful as a warning against certain misunderstandings both as to the sources of my information and the degree of my credulity. These counsels have always been present to my mind, although, perhaps, through a sense of politeness towards the public, or even, it may be, a real confidence in their common sense, I have rarely thought it necessary to call attention to the fact. This advice I propose to repeat here in a general form and without any special application. In the first place, then, there are people who sometimes really believe that they have actually said or done that which it was their duty to say or do in certain circumstances. Others, again, frequently leave their hearers to judge whether their remarks are meant to be sarcastic or serious. Furthermore, inter pocula and in foraging for news, the meanings of words must not be taken in altogether too literal a sense, if one does not wish to make a fool of himself. Although truth may be found in the bowl, it usually contains more alcohol than accuracy; and the scribblers of the press very often thoughtlessly accept appearances for realities when they come from “well-informed circles.” Finally, even those who wilfully mislead serve the truth in so far as they enable the experienced to detect their falsehood.
A good deal of what I report and describe will appear to many persons trivial and external. My view of the matter, however, is this. The trifles with which the prætor does not trouble himself often illustrate the character of a man or his temper for the time being more clearly than fine speeches or great exploits. Now and then very unimportant occurrences and situations have been, as it were, the spark which lit up the mind and revealed a whole train of new and
fruitful ideas pregnant with great consequences. In this connection I may recall the accidental, and apparently insignificant, origin of many epoch-making inventions and discoveries, such as the fall of an apple from a tree that gave Newton the first impulse towards his theory of gravitation, the greatest discovery of the eighteenth century; the steam from the boiling kettle which raised its lid and ultimately led to the transformation of the world by the locomotive; the brilliant reflection of the sun on a tin vessel which transported Jacob Boehme into a transcendental vision; and the spot of grease upon our table-cloth at Ferrières which formed the starting-point of one of Prince Bismarck’s most remarkable conversations. The morning hours affect nervous constitutions differently to the evening, and changes of weather depress or raise the spirits of persons subject to rheumatism. Indeed it must be remembered that learned theories have been formed which, expressed in a plain and direct way, amount roughly to this—that a man is what he eats. However odd that may sound, we really cannot say how far such ideas are wrong. Finally, it appears to me that everything is of interest and should receive attention which has any relation to the prominent central figure of the great movement which resulted in the political regeneration of our country—to that powerful personality who, like the angel mentioned in the Scriptures, stirred the stagnant pool, and gave health and life after the lethargy and decay of centuries. I followed the Chancellor’s career with the eyes of a future generation. At great epochs trifles appear smaller than they actually are. In later decades and centuries the contrary is the case. The great events of the past bulk still larger in men’s minds, while things which were regarded as unimportant become full of significance. It is then often a matter for regret that it is impossible to form as clear and lifelike a picture of a personality or an event as one could wish for want of valuable material originally cast aside as of no account. There was no eye to see and no hand to collect and preserve those materials
while it was yet time. Who would not now be glad to have fuller details respecting Luther in the great days and hours of his life?
In a hundred years the memory of Prince Bismarck will take a place in the minds of our people next to that occupied by the Wittenberg doctor. The liberator of our political life from dependence upon foreigners will stand by the side of the reformer who freed our consciences from the oppression of Rome—the founder of the German State by the side of him who created German Christianity. Our Chancellor already holds this place in the hearts of many of his countrymen; his portrait adorns their walls, and they inspire the growing generation with the reverence which they themselves feel. These will be followed by the masses, and therefore I imagine I may safely take the risk of being told that I have preserved, not only the pearls, but also the shells in which they were found.
Many of the Chancellor’s expressions respecting the French may be regarded as unfair and even occasionally inhuman. It must not be forgotten, however, that ordinary warfare is calculated to harden the feelings, and that Gambetta’s suicidal campaign, conducted with all the passionate ardour of his nature, the treacherous tactics of his franctireurs, and the bestiality of his Turcos, was bound to raise a spirit in our camp in which leniency and consideration could have no part. Of course, in reproducing and in adding other and still more bitter instances of this feeling, now that all these things have long ago passed away, there can be no intention to hurt any one’s feelings. They are merely vivid contributions to the history of the campaign, denoting the momentary temper of the Chancellor, who was at that time sorely tried and deeply wounded by these and other incidents.
I trust my reasons for including a number of newspaper articles will commend themselves to the reader I do so in the first place to show the gradual development and change which certain political ideas underwent, and the forms which they assumed at various
times. Furthermore the greater part of them were directly inspired by Prince Bismarck, and some were even dictated by him. By mentioning the latter articles I hope to do the newspapers in question a pleasure in so far as they will now learn that they once had the honour of having the most eminent statesman of the century as a contributor All these articles furnish material for forming an opinion upon the journalistic activity of the Prince, which hitherto only Wagener of the Kreuzzeitung, Zitelmann, the Prince’s amanuensis during the years he spent as Ambassador at Frankfurt, and Lothar Bucher were in a position to do. On the 22nd of January, 1871, the Chancellor himself remarked, referring to the importance of the press for historians: “One learns more from the newspapers than from official despatches, as, of course, Governments use the press in order frequently to say more clearly what they really mean. One must, however, know all about the connections of the different papers.” This knowledge will in great part be found in the present work.
The reason for reproducing certain portions of my previous writings in this book is that they are essential for the purpose of completing the character portrait given in the diary. Without them it would be deficient in some parts, and unintelligible in others. The reproductions referred to are in almost every instance considerably altered and supplemented with additional matter, and they now occupy a more suitable position in the work than before.
