Governance and Intervention in Mali
Elusive Security
Susanna D. Wing
First published 2024 by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
RoutledgeisanimprintoftheTaylor&FrancisGroup,aninforma business
© 2024 Susanna D. Wing
The right of Susanna D. Wing to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademarknotice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.
BritishLibraryCataloguing-in-PublicationData
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN: 978-1-032-44440-6 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-44441-3 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-37219-6 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003372196
Typeset in Times New Roman by Newgen Publishing UK
Illustrations
Figures
Percentage of Malians who say that Mali is headed in the right direction (2012–2022)
Country is heading in the wrong direction (2020)
Support for the President
Popular trust in institutions and leaders (2020)
Opinions on corruption in Mali
Military expenditure as percentage of general government expenditure
Military expenditure in current US$ million (1961–2021)
Mali Net ODA received (percentage of GNI, 1967–2021)
Mali GNI in current US$ million (1967–2021)
Mali Net ODA received in current US$ million (1960–2021)
US military spending on G5 (2012–2022) in US$ millions
Criticisms of Barkhane(2016–2022) by percentage of interview responses
Confidence in actors and their ability to bring security to Mali
Malian armed forces
Insecurity
Civilian fatalities and groups responsible Greatest challenges Mali faces today
Perceptions of principal victims of violence in Mali
Trust in the 2015 Peace Accord (by region)
Youth confidence that the 2015 Peace Accord will bring peace and security
Number of reported civilian fatalities from direct targeting in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso
Casualties from conflict with the state in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso
Tables
International and Regional Security Initiatives (2001–Present)
Financial Support to G5 Sahel Joint Force (by Million USD)
United States’ Military and Police Contributions to G5 (by Million USD)
Armed Community and Regional Organizations and Affiliations
Peace Agreements
Decentralization Laws and Structure
Select National and Regional Dialogues (2013–2021)
Acknowledgments
This book would never have been possible without so many people that I met in Mali over the years and the support that they gave to me. First among these is Daniel Tessougué, who I was introduced to during my early years in Bamako. He was, and remains, not only an ardent defender of democracy and transparency but also a great supporter of academic research. I will be forever indebted to him for our long conversations. I also wish to thank Saouty and Aisha Traoré for welcoming me into their home and who, for more years than I can count, have always treated me like family on each and every return trip to Mali. Thank you also to the many taxi drivers who were always happy to talk with me and share their insights on politiki. There are indeed many Malians who I cannot name by name, but who took the time to have conversations with me. At the heart of this project are the Malian people, in all of their diversity, who deserve lasting peace and security.
I am very grateful to Timothy Clack and Oliver Lewis, the Editors of Routledge series Advances in Defence Studies, for including this book in the series. Tim Clack, along with Robert Johnson, invited me to present my work at conferences hosted by the Changing Character of War Centre at the University of Oxford. I am very grateful for those opportunities and for the insights that I gained in those venues.
At Routledge, thanks also to Andrew Humphrys, Senior Editor, of Military, Strategic, and Security Studies for his support of this book. Thank you to Devon Harvey who always replied to my inquiries with good cheer and timely, helpful, information.
Years ago, I was fortunate to have the opportunity to do research under the auspices of a Fulbright Dissertation Fellowship. That grant lies at the foundation of the work that I have been able to do in Mali. In subsequent years, Haverford College has supported my research in a number of ways. Haverford has provided me with numerous research grants for field work. They have also funded my student research assistants, as well as my sabbatical. I would like to thank several undergraduate research assistants at Haverford College who worked with me at different stages of my project. Thank you to Elom Tettey-Tamaklo, Jack Anderson, Rachel Bamberger, Sophia Kaplan, and Tommaso Wheeler. They were each extraordinarily hard working and inquisitive. In particular, I’d like to acknowledge Sophia and Tommaso, who provided me with last minute information and who were supporting me at what can most accurately be referred to as “crunch times” on this project.
Of course, essential to this project has been the support of my family. I want to thank my amazing partner, Matthew McKeever, not only for his editing skills, but mostly for his daily encouragement and deep confidence in me throughout this project. Thank you to Betsy Wing, who has been my editor extraordinaire from the start. Finally, thank you to my son, Luca Fiore, for his bright and always curious approach to the world around us and for being a steady reminder of what is most important in life.
Abbreviations
ADC
Democratic Alliance for Change (Alliance Démocratique du 23 mai2006pourleChangement)
ADEMA-PASJ
Alliance for Democracy in Mali/African Party for Solidarity and Justice (Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali/Parti Africain pour laSolidaritéetlaJustice)
AFISMA
African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AFRICOM
US Africa Command
ANICT
National Agency for Investment in Territorial Collectives (Agence Nationaled’InvestissementdesCollectivitésTerritoriales)
APSA
African Peace and Security Architecture
AQIM
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (Al Qaïda au Maghreb Islamique(AQMI))
ASS
Alliance for the Alliance for the Salvation of the Sahel Sahel (AlliancepourleSalutduSahel)
ATT Lieutenant Amadou Toumani Touré
AU
African Union
CBAG
Community-Based Armed Group
CMA
Coordination of Azawad Movements (the Platform) (Coalition desMouvementsdel’Azawad(laPlateforme))
CM-FPR
Coordination of the Movements and Patriotic Resistance Fronts (Coordination des Mouvements et Fronts Patriotiques de Résistance)
CMI/CME
Coordination of Agreeing Movements (Coordination des Mouvementsdel’Entente)
CNSP
National Commitee for the Salvation of the People (Comité NationalpourleSalutduPeuple)
CNT
National Council for Transition (ConseilNationaldeTransition)
COIN
Counter-Insurgency (activities)
CONASCIPAL
National Coalition of Civil Society for Peace and Fight against the Proliferation of Light Weapons (CoalitionNationaledelaSociété
Civilepour la Paix et la Lutte contre la Prolifération des Armes Légères)
COVID
Coronavirus 2019
CSP
Permanent Strategic Cabinet (CadreStratégiquePermanent)
CVEO
Counter Violent Extremist Organization
CVR
Community Violence Reduction
DOD
Department of Defense
ECOWAS
Economic Community of Western African States (La Communauté Économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO))
EU
European Union
EUCAP Mali
European Union Capacity building mission
EUCOM
European Union Command
EUTF
European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa
EUTM Mali
European Union Training Mission in Mali
FAMA
Malian armed forces (ForcesArméesMaliennes)
FIAA
Arab Islamic Front of the Azawad (Front Islamique Arabe de l’Azawad)
FLN
Forces for the Liberation of the Northern Regions (Forces de LibérationdesrégionsNordduMali)
FPA
Azawad Popular Front (FrontPopulairedel’Azawad)
GATIA
Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies (Groupe AutodéfenseTouaregImghadetAlliés)
GFDS
Women’s Voting Rights Group (Groupe Féminin Droit de Suffrage)
GNI
Gross National Income
GOM
Government of Mali
GSPC
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe Salafistepour laPrédicationetleCombat)
GWOT
Global War on Terror
HCIM
High Islamic Council of Mali (HautConseilIslamiqueMalien)
HCUA
High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HautConseilpour l’Unité del’Azawad)
HDI (UN) Human Development Index
IBK
Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta
IED
Improvised Explosive Device
IS (or ISGS)
Islamic State or the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara
ISS Africa
Institute for Security Studies Africa
LG
MAA
Local Government
Arab Azawad Movement (MouvementArabedel’Azawad)
MCNL
Military Committee for National Liberation
MDP
Movement for the Defense of the Homeland (Mouvement pour laDéfensedelaPatrie)
MFUA
United Movements and Fronts of Azawad (Mouvementsetfronts unifiésdel’Awazad)
MINUSMA
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MNLA
National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Mouvement nationaldelibérationdel’Azawad)
MPLA
People’s Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Mouvement populairedelibérationdel’Azawad(MPLA))
MPGK
Ganda Koi Patriotic Movement (Mouvement patriotique Ganda Koi)
MPSA
Popular Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (Mouvement populairepourlesalutdel’Azawad)
MSA
Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (Mouvement pour le salutdel’Azawad)
MSA-D
Movement for the Well-being of Azawad-D (Dawsahak) (Mouvementpourlesalutdel’Azawad-D)
MUJAO
Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (Mouvement pourl’unificationetlejihadenAfriquedel’Ouest)
NGO
Non-Governmental Organization
ODA
Official Development Assistance
ORTM
Office of Radio and Television of Mali (Office de radio et télévisionduMali)
P3S
Partnership for Security and Stability in the Sahel
PSI
Pan-Sahel Initiative
PSPSDN
Special Program for Peace, Security and Development in the Northern Regions of Mali (Programme spécialepour lapaix, la sécurité,etledéveloppementdesrégionsduNordduMali)
QIP
Quick Impact Project
SGBV
Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SIPRI
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SOF (French) Special Operations Forces
SSA
Security Sector Assistance
TSCTI
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative
TSCTP
Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Partnership
UN
United Nations
UNDP
United Nations Development Program
UNSC(R)
United Nations Security Council (Resolution)
USAID
United States Agency for International Development
WPS
Women, Peace and Security
Introduction
DOI: 10.4324/9781003372196-1
When I first visited Mali, in 1994, there was a palpable excitement among the Malians that I met in Bamako. The 1991 revolution had opened the way for democratic changes after twenty-three years of oppressive authoritarian rule under President Moussa Traoré. The optimism was contagious. I interviewed members of women’s rights associations, lawyers, students, and young bureaucrats. They were once in the streets fighting for the chance to have free and fair elections and were now ensconced in the Malian government infrastructure. There was a vivid sense of a collective forging ahead after the path-breaking National Conference that brought together Malians from all walks of life to deliberate over and create a new constitution as a foundation for a democratic future. All of those with whom I spoke believed that Mali had turned a page and was, finally, building a vibrant democracy. Expectations were high. There was a lot of work to be done to lower poverty, to increase literacy, to increase access to justice, to reduce corruption, and to promote development throughout the country, but it was work that Malians would do together.
While this enthusiasm was evident in Bamako, in 1994, civilians across the North continued to bear the weight of ongoing war in northern Mali. This became known as the ubiquitous “Crisis” or “Problem of the North.” This was shorthand for the situation in which certain Tuareg leaders were demanding political recognition and inclusion in national political structures. A peace agreement known
as the Tamanrasset Accords had been signed in 1991 between the leaders of two Tuareg organizations, the Arab Islamic Front of Azawad (FIAA) and the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA), and the government of Moussa Traoré. The revolution took place a mere two months after this signing and the Tamanrasset Accords never went anywhere. The 1992 National Pact, a subsequent peace agreement, between the government and the United Movements and Fronts of Azawad (MFUA) was also ineffective and never implemented (Pézard and Shurkin 2015, 13). Without functioning peace agreements, violence continued in northern and central Mali. Clashes between community-based armed groups (CBAGS), such as Ganda Koi or “masters of the land,” and nomadic populations (mostly Fulani and Tuareg) were on the rise. In 1994 alone, over one thousand people were killed in Northern and Central Mali and 160,000 refugees fled to Mauritania, Algeria, and Burkina Faso (Wing 2010, 161). Violence was ongoing and little progress was being made on the implementation of the peace agreements.
Thus, there was a pervasive political disconnect. While the northern half of Mali was in turmoil, Bamako and much of urban Mali was caught up in enthusiasm as part of the wave of democracy spreading across Africa after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union marked not only the end of the Cold War, but also what seemed to be a victory for political and economic liberalism. Francis Fukuyama pronounced “the triumph of the West” and “the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism” (Fukuyama 1989). Oppressive dictatorships collapsed along with the disappearance of their Soviet allies. Neighboring Benin had launched the continent’s first Sovereign National Conference in 1990, sparking a series of National Conferences across Francophone Africa. Benin’s conference claimed to bring together Beninois from all walks of life in an Estates General that laid the groundwork for a new constitution and elections. In
reality, participants were members of the political class and educated elite (Robinson 1994, 579). Mali followed soon after (August 1991) with a National Conference of its own. While neither was truly inclusive, they broadened the scope of political participation and opened the door for democratic transitions in both countries. For many Malians, this political opening also increased popular expectations linking democracy to development and poverty reduction.
Moreover, Mali had a vibrant and rapidly expanding civil society. This led to a donor darling status for Mali which opened the floodgates of external aid. Building democracy was a thriving industry in Bamako and beyond. The four-wheel drive vehicles, driven by employees of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or bilateral agencies, were ubiquitous. Donors would venture across the country to consult, deliver, engage, dialogue, build, and listen. Decentralization and dialogue were the buzzwords of a new democratic order; but one didn’t have to venture far from the capital to meet those who had little connection to, and increasingly real skepticism about, the changes that were unfolding in Bamako. Farmers in nearby Kita region had not been part of the democratic dialogues and “neither desired nor approved of” the introduction of multiparty democracy (Schulz 2021, 64).
As would become clear over time, this political disconnect would prove devastating for Mali’s fragile democracy. Today, this disconnect has become a chasm. The government was never able to control its vast territory, and democracy did not change that. Development continued to focus on elites. Poverty reduction policies and programs never improved the lives of the vast majority of Malians (Bergamaschi 2016). Those living far from Bamako still had limited access to schools, health care, electricity, and other public goods. For most Malians, the local and national state authorities had very little presence in their daily lives, with elections and tax collection being the few exceptions (Mann 2014; Craven-Matthews and
Englebert 2018, 25). This was even more evident for the Tuareg, the vast majority of whom did not receive development aid. They had a history of unmet territorial claims in the north; their peace agreements with the government in the south had never been implemented; and their frustrations only increased over time (J. S. Lecocq 2010; Hall 2011).
Across most of Mali, the state was absent and many Malians felt abandoned (Bleck and Michelitch 2015, 10). While Malians felt abandoned, political leaders in both North and South made competing claims of sovereignty over Mali’s immense and diverse territory. As democracy, in theory, expanded rapidly and flourished in the South, vast geographic areas, and the people who lived there, were left behind. A select few parlayed their way into networks of power emanating from Bamako. Some accessed illicit markets that emerged and depended on crossing Mali’s Northern territories. These territories should have been under the surveillance of a government which instead routinely failed their duties and, in some instances, participated in and profited from illicit trade across the country (Lacher 2012).
Mali was once a promising democratic model for Africa. It has now become a country devastated by political upheaval and widespread insecurity. This book explains how this change happened. Specifically, I show that underlying Mali’s ongoing crisis is the fact that the Malian state has been absent from most people’s lives and that the only way to address this is to transform and improve governance. By governance, I mean the rules, norms, and actions of governing. In many ways, Mali’s democracy was shallow and its recognition as a model democracy was based on Mali’s promise, rather than effective and enduring democratic consolidation. The prevailing context for all external military and donor engagement is this framework of weak democratic consolidation, unmet development goals, and increasing popular distrust of the institutions of government. The situation in Mali is
constantly changing, as deals are negotiated among international, national, and local actors engaging (and disengaging) in the process of seeking peace and security. Underlying the shifting sands of politics and security is this constant – failed governance, that leads to failed development and public disillusionment that perpetuates instability.
Democracy Founded in Protest
When is it okay to have a coup in a democracy? (anonymous Malian military officer)
At the heart of this question raised during a US training seminar for Malian military officers is the role that a military should play in politics. While the question may appear counter-intuitive to many, in the context, it is not particularly out of place. What the officer seems to be asking is “If a democratically elected government is failing, at what level of decline is it okay for the military to step in and to remove them from power?” This idea of a “corrective coup” was evident in Mali’s 1991 revolution. It is present in other West African countries as well. For example, in neighboring Niger in the 1999 and 2010 coups d’état (Baudais and Chauzal 2011) and the attempted coup in Guinea-Bissau in 2014 (Meiser 2015). The tradition has continued. Mali’s military has now stepped in, repeatedly since 1991, following popular protests. The result has been the removal of more than one elected president. We cannot understand Mali’s current trajectory without understanding the ways in which governance, insecurity, and development are interlinked and how this relates to the very foundation of Mali’s Third Republic in the 1991 revolution and Malian National Conference.
In March 1991, students converged in the streets of Bamako to demand free and fair elections and an end to the reign of the unpopular President and former General, Moussa Traoré. Hundreds
of protestors were killed when soldiers shot into the crowds. Lt. Col. Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) stepped in, overthrowing Traoré and making way for a transitional government. ATT was lauded as a “soldier of democracy” because he did not hold onto power and he paved the way for a transition government and elections. In 1992, Alpha Oumar Konaré, a history professor and leading member of the anti-Traoré movement ADEMA (Alliance for Democracy in Mali), was elected president. President Konaré completed two terms in office (1992–2002) and ATT was elected president in 2002. This peaceful transition from one elected leader to another, from one political party to an independent candidate, was widely perceived to be a sign that Mali was on a path to successful democratic consolidation.
The National Conference, the adoption of a new constitution in 1992, a vibrant free press, and ballooning civil society movement resulted in a celebratory mood in Bamako in the early 1990s. This was, however, not ubiquitous across the country. Poverty was unabated. Corruption was ever present. Legislative elections in 1997 were boycotted by numerous opposition parties who saw little chance that they could effectively challenge the dominant majority party, ADEMA. Building and sustaining the new democracy would require political will and commitment that proved ephemeral. Mali’s democratic foundation was riddled with fissures. Konaré’s presidency was challenged not only by the opposition boycotts but also by the persistent violence in the North. Nevertheless, the smooth transition in 2002, in which the majority party lost, overshadowed the political troubles (Wing 2010, 81–100).
ADEMA’s presidential candidate, Soumaïla Cissé, came in second place with a very narrow victory over Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (21.31% versus 21.03% of the vote) (IFES 2002) in an election with widespread irregularities (The Carter Center 2002). In Mali’s tworound voting system, this result meant that Cissé and ATT would face each other in a runoff election. Because Konaré did not endorse Cissé, the candidate from his own party, there were rumors that a
tacit deal had been made between ATT and Konaré from the very start. According to this view, after the 1991 coup, ATT would not seek office but would wait his turn and run for President in 2002. Whether or not this is an accurate description is irrelevant, what matters most is that there was a growing sense that popular opinion either did not matter with respect to who became the next president or could be easily manipulated by those in power. The Presidency had become a baton that was passed between political elites, rather than the outcome of free and fair elections and a popular vote.
By the middle of President Touré’s two terms in office, it was not uncommon to hear Malians referring dismissively to him as “a king.” ATT was perceived as ruling the country as if it were his own, oblivious to the needs of its citizens. Rather than a “soldier of democracy” he was yet another example of personal rule, long considered ubiquitous across Africa (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). In March 2012, just one month prior to scheduled presidential and legislative elections, ATT was overthrown. Thus, even though Mali had earned a recent reputation for democracy, coups were not in fact unheard of in the country, and this was Mali’s third coup since independence from France in 1960. Over the course of twenty years, ATT went from being a widely celebrated Malian hero, to narrowly escaping an attack on the Presidential palace by armed gunmen and tumbling down Koulouba (or big hill, where the palace sits atop Bamako) to a getaway car waiting below.
Mali’s military has repeatedly overthrown Presidents in response to popular demands. This has happened in 1968, 1991, 2012, and 2020. In each instance, the people in the streets (members of “la base”: students, workers, unemployed youth) distrusted the political process, elections, and the political class associated with it. They demanded change and the military has been willing, and able, to step in and oust governments. In any democracy, elections are supposed to determine the timing and nature of political transitions. This was the plan set up by the National Conference and during the
heyday of Mali as a “model democracy.” This plan seemed to be working, but the underlying truth has been much starker. Even under Alpha Konaré and the early years of ATT’s presidency, the building blocks of democracy have been weak: elections, decentralization, rule of law, state institutions all contained fatal flaws that undermined democracy in Mali. Elections, while generally free and fair, were not always transparent. Decentralization did not effectively shift governance to the local level and was constrained by continued central government control of financial resources. The rule of law was persistently undermined by a culture of impunity and limited access to justice. The weakness of democracy coexisted with the lingering and unfulfilled promises of the 1991 revolution. All of this has resulted in political violence and unrest. In 2020, political violence had reached an all-time high in the country. Consequently, the military has seen itself as in control of the timing and nature of political transitions.
The Absent State
Although internal and external actors are focused on rebuilding the state, Mali cannot be reconstructed until there is an acknowledgment that the political institutions designed in the1990s to build democracy, and the political leaders entrenched in those institutions, have failed. As Craven-Matthews and Engelbert have noted “(t)here has been no lack of ambition from donors and Malian actors in reforming governance” and the multiple development projects are evidence of this ambition (Craven-Matthews and Englebert 2018, 6). For instance, in 2014, under President Keïta, a Central Office for the Fight Against Corruption was created by the government. This office became the Central Office in the Fight Against Illicit Enrichment. This infrastructure was meant to support the already existing Office of the Auditor General that was created in 2003 (Craven-Matthews and
Englebert 2018). Nevertheless, there has been neither the political will on the part of those political elites entrenched in power nor the capacity to follow through on economic and political projects. Similarly, despite the fact that anti-corruption rhetoric was often central to political campaigns, there was very little effective follow through. In the case of the Auditor General’s Office, certain government officials actively undermined their work.1 As we will see in Chapter 2, the core initiative of President Touré, the Special Program for Peace, Security, and Development in the Northern Regions of Mali, PSPSDN (Programme spéciale pour la paix, la sécurité,et ledéveloppement des regions dunordduMali) ignored the needs of Northern populations and their demands for infrastructure and development, in favor of increasing the presence of a southern dominated military in Northern regions (International Crisis Group 2012). The program failed to provide public goods to citizens but instead was a tool used by ATT to reinforce the state’s security presence and line the pockets of his close allies. These examples illustrate how what was once a disconnect between the political class in Bamako and Malians across the country has grown into a great chasm (Wing 2023).
In 2002, as an independent candidate, ATT spearheaded what he called a “politics of consensus.” Despite the sound of inclusiveness, it rapidly undermined Malian democracy by doing away with all forms of opposition. “Touré’s ‘rule by consensus’ had become a mere euphemism for absolute rule with checks and balances existing only on paper while journalists and others were afraid to challenge the president’s agenda” (B. Lecocq et al. 2013, 347). The results were devastating and ultimately undermined the President’s legitimacy. Over the course of his presidency, Touré
kept a tenuous peace in the north by buying off northern leaders, but failed to deliver on promises to bring development. He took millions of dollars of US military assistance intended to help drive
out AQIM, but never went after the group on Malian territory. The gangrene of corruption had long infected the army, where nepotism and profiteering ran amok. The outcome of elections was widely considered to be determined in advance, and voter turnout was consequently always low. Few Malians regretted ATT’s departure, and the coup initially met with significant, although far from universal, support.
(B. Lecocq et al. 2013, 347)
This description of Mali a decade ago, at the time of the March 2012 coup d’état, shows that every aspect of rule of law in Mali was, essentially, a farce. There were no checks and balances, corruption was rampant, security assistance was diverted, elections were not free and fair, and the opposition had been coopted. And yet, Mali persisted in being lauded by the international community as one of the continent’s most successful democracies. This imbalance, of financial and military resources flowing into the country combined with praise for the country’s democratic progress on one hand, and the popular observations of widespread impunity, the absence of checks and balances, and systemic corruption on the other pushed the country to a precipice. The popular support for coups that was evident in 2012 and 2020 is grounded in this history in which the vast majority of Malians were excluded from the expected benefits of democracy.
Not only were the benefits usually associated with a democratic state absent, but external aid exacerbated the situation. Across the country, civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provided schools, health care, and famine relief. The state did not provide these goods which, inevitably, diminished the view of what the state was capable of, and ultimately, limited its sovereignty.
At best, aid to Mali has been ineffective from an economic or institutional development perspective, enabling corruption,
undermining the government’s will and ability to raise revenue through productive means or taxation, and insulating it from accountability to the population… . At worst, these conditions directly led to the conflict in the north and political crisis in Bamako.
(“Mali’s Aid Problem” 2013)
An increase in the presence of non-governmental organizations does not necessarily result in a weak or absent state. When combined with a functional polity, NGOs can help to increase human development and improve democracy. The problem in Mali was that the very tasks that one might rely on a state to provide have simply escaped the grasp of the state itself (Whitehouse 2015). As far back as the 1970s, a decade after independence, “certain characteristics of government itself began to be defined as beyond the prerogatives of the state” (Mann 2014, 5). By the 1990s, the promotion of democracy by international NGOs, Malian civil society, and bilateral donors became a business that increased popular expectations and Malians believed that they would see benefits of democracy. However, external aid for democratic development perpetuated a system in which Mali remained a lifelong student of democracy. That is, as Thomas Ginsburg argues, “there is little political incentive to graduate” from democracy promotion (Ginsburg 2011, 229). He writes:
Why should local groups take the risk of enforcing democracy when an external actor is willing to bear the costs? Creating selfenforcing democracy in ordinary circumstances is difficult; with the possibility of external enforcement, it may become impossible.
(Ginsburg 2011, 228)
Julie Leininger explains, “Mali’s political elite soon internalized the EU’s financial and technical assistance and the UN’s primary technical support, as regular and reliable tools to maintain state structures and provide minimal level of services to the population” (Leininger 2010, 67). In Mali, then, state structures are both produced and maintained by international support rather than becoming self-sustaining. Networks between donors and local actors are built that maintain a steady flow of finances to support the political elite, bureaucrats, and local development experts (Leininger 2010). This results in a state that is primarily in the capital, Bamako, and is absent not only in the far reaches of Malian territory but even just outside of the capital. Consequently, there are huge issues in terms of who the state is serving. Mali is not alone here. Peter Uvin has argued that, in Rwanda, “Development aid is the fuel that allows the government machinery to exist, to expand, to control, to implement” (Uvin 1998, 227). This is a problem for any country because it reinforces dependence on donors at the same time that it limits the accountability of the state to the people it is supposed to serve. In a similar fashion in Mali, international aid, while not by any means solely responsible for the crisis, cannot be separated from the collapse of the state. Government machinery was maintained by external support and accountability mechanisms were therefore very weak. Democracy promotion fueled and maintained a political class who were not constrained by internal institutional checks and balances. This lack of accountability resulted in a gap between popular expectations of democracy and the stark reality of what the state would, and would not, offer to the people.
As we will see below, widespread disillusionment in the state of Mali’s democracy is at the core of Mali’s insecurity. Elections are a key feature of democracy, and the regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), along with other international actors, including the French, prioritize elections. Today, this has led to pressure from external actors such as the European Union, the
Another random document with no related content on Scribd:
“That will be first rate, Flora,” said Frank. “She shall have all my money, too, and I’ve got more than you have.”
“You are real good, Frank,” replied Flora. “We can buy ever so many things. Won’t we have a nice time! And won’t Mrs. White be glad, and won’t she be surprised when we take the things in to her!”
“Won’t she, though!”
“We must send her a load of wood too. Don’t you want to give something, Henry?”
“Yes, I should like to, but I haven’t got much to give.”
“I have got a dollar, and so have you,” said Sarah.
“I don’t want to give all of it. I want to buy something for myself.”
“I will give all of mine.”
“I will give half a dollar,” added Henry.
Then Frank and Flora took their money boxes out of a drawer in the play room. They were little wooden boxes with holes in the top to slip the money through. Each of them had a key, and the savings banks were emptied upon the floor.
Henry helped Flora count her money, and they found there was two dollars and seventy cents. Frank’s box had contained three dollars and twenty cents. The two cousins gave a dollar and a half; and the whole sum for the poor widow was seven dollars and forty cents
To the children this was a great sum of money, and they thought it would pay all of Mrs. White’s expenses for the winter. Frank was chosen to keep the funds, and he put them into one of the boxes.
Then Flora said they had better go down and tell her father all about the plan, and he would show them how to go to work.
Flora was so delighted, she could not walk, but went dancing down the stairs and through the entries. She kept thinking all the time how glad the poor widow would be to see the things, and how happy they would all be when they carried them to her.
Mr. and Mrs. Lee were in the sitting room when the party rushed through the entry. They saw that “something was in the wind,” and Mr. Lee threw down the newspaper which the little merchant had just brought to him, and Mrs. Lee stopped sewing. The children came just as though the house was on fire, and they would all be burnt to death if they did not run as fast as ever they could.
“Father!” shouted Flora, as she bolted into the room, followed by the others.
“What is the matter, my dear? Have you hurt you?”
“O, no, father. I’ve got something to tell you something first rate; and I want you to help me—I mean we—for we are all going to do it.”
“What are you going to do? I should think you meant to set the river afire!”
“O, no, nothing of that kind, father. We are going to give a Christmas present to Mrs. White. You know she is very poor, and has a hard time to take care of all her family.”
“She has, indeed, my child.”
“We have put all our money together, and we are going to buy a load of wood, a barrel of flour, lots of potatoes, and meat, and coffee,
and tea, sugar, and and pepper, and salt, and mustard ”
“Stop, stop, my child! You will have a fit if you run on in this way.”
Her father and mother, and the children, all laughed to hear Flora talk so fast, and add such things as pepper and mustard to her list I suppose they thought the poor widow could get along very well without such things as these.
Mr. Lee said he liked the plan, and that he would take the money and buy such things as he thought Mrs. White needed. He promised to have every thing ready for them to start at eight o’clock the next morning.
While the children were at tea, the parlor doors were unlocked, and the room lighted. One end was occupied by a beautiful Christmas tree, which was covered all over with candles and pretty things
When Flora and Frank and their cousins entered the parlor, they were very much surprised, for none of them had ever seen any thing so brilliant before, and they all passed a merry Christmas Eve.
The Procession.
I I I .
T children were up bright and early at Mr. Lee’s on Christmas morning. They had expected a visit from Santa Claus during the night, and the stockings had all been left so that he could easily find them.
Truly Santa Claus had been kind to them, for the stockings were not only well filled, but a table was also covered all over with fine things. There were all kinds of playthings, and books, and games, and pictures.
The parents of Frank and Flora were rich, and could afford to give them a great many nice things. I don’t think they cared so much for playthings as some children I have seen. They had so many of them that they did not value them as some poorer children would have done.
After Flora had emptied her stocking, and gathered up the books, games, and pictures that belonged to her, she told Frank she wished she had all the money they cost, so that she could give it to poor Mrs. White.
Frank said he wished he had the money for his presents, for he was sure it would make the poor widow happier than the things would him. But they were both very grateful to their parents for
thinking of them, for they knew that Santa Claus was only another name for father and mother.
All the little boys and girls don’t know this. Emma that is one of my little girls—asked me if I did not take out the register, so that Santa Claus could get into the room, and fill up her stocking. But she is only four years old.
“Merry Christmas” rang through the house till breakfast was over, and then the children were in a great hurry to make the visit to Mrs. White. Mr. Lee had gone out early in the morning, and they were all sure that he would do every thing right.
At eight o’clock, Mrs. Lee had bundled up the children in their warm hoods and cloaks, ready for a start. Then they wanted to be off at once, and Flora’s mother could hardly keep her from running out in the cold, before the things were ready.
I suppose my readers all know that in the city, or any where, when they want to have a great time, they get up a procession, and march through the streets. They sometimes have wagons, and chariots, and carriages.
Mr. Lee, who was very glad to find that the children were so kind as to remember the poor widow on Christmas, meant to surprise them. So he got up a kind of procession. Perhaps you will think it was a queer procession; but it pleased the children ever so much, and Flora was almost wild with delight.
While they were looking out the window, they saw Mr Lee drive up with the carryall. He came very slowly, for behind him was a wagon with a cord of wood on it, drawn by two yokes of oxen. Then
came a cart with two barrels of potatoes, a barrel of flour, and a barrel of apples on it. Behind this was a wagon loaded with buckets of sugar, rice, coffee, with packages of tea, salt, and other groceries; a ham, a turkey, a keg of salt pork; and a great many other things.
Flora screamed with delight when she saw this procession. It was more grand than an army of soldiers, and she thought she would rather go in it than be the Queen of England.
Frank was pleased, and so were the two city cousins. Henry even went so far as to wish he had given all his money, instead of half of it.
The children all bolted out at the front door, and Mr. Lee helped them into the carryall.
“This is first rate, father,” said Flora. “Won’t Mrs. White be surprised!”
“I think she will be,” replied Mr. Lee. “She will have good reason to be surprised.”
“I hope you have got lots of things.”
“I have ”
“Did you spend all the money?”
“Yes; every cent of it, my child.”
“And more too,” said Henry, as he looked back upon the procession of “goodies ”
“Did you, father?”
“I thought I would add a little to your gift,” said Mr. Lee, with a smile.
“How kind you are, father!”
“But all the things shall be called the children’s Christmas gift ”
Mr. Lee got into the carriage, and told the drivers of the wagons to follow him. The two horses were wide awake. They did not want to wait for the slow oxen, but Mr. Lee made them, for he wanted the procession to keep together.
When the procession had got about half way to Mrs. White’s house, a man covered with dirt and rags stopped the carriage. He said he was very poor, and had not eaten any thing since the morning before.
“Poor man!” said Flora. “Do give him something, father.”
“Bless you, little miss! Your father is too kind to refuse me,” said the man.
“I can’t do any thing for you,” said Mr. Lee, firmly.
“Do, father,” added Flora.
“Any small change, to buy me something to eat,” said the man, in pleading tones.
“If you are hungry, go to my house, and my wife will feed you,” replied Mr. Lee.
“Won’t you give me the matter of a few cents?” begged the man.
“Not a cent.”
“I will,” said Henry. “I don’t want the poor man to go hungry;” and he threw him a ten-cent piece.
“God bless you, my little man!” said the beggar, as he picked up the money. “May you never want for a meal of victuals!”
Mr. Lee started his horses, and the procession again moved on. Flora wondered that her father should deny the poor man. She pitied him very much, when he said he had eaten nothing since the morning before. She thought what a dreadful thing it was to be hungry, and have nothing to eat.
She wanted to cry, she felt so badly, and she thought her father was very hard not to give him a little money when he needed it so much. If she had only had some money, she would have given him the whole of it.
“You did very wrong, Henry,” said Mr Lee, when they had gone a little way farther.
“Wrong, sir?” replied Henry. “Why, didn’t the man say he had eaten nothing for a whole day.”
“That may be, and it may not be.”
“But I know he was hungry by the looks of him,” said Flora.
“Those who have any thing to give away ought to be very careful to whom they give it. The man looked like a drunkard. Very likely he will spend the money you gave him, Henry, for liquor. It is not charity to give a man rum.”
“Do you think he is a bad man, father?” asked Flora.
“I don’t know that he is. I told him to go to the house, and your mother would give him something to eat. You saw that he wanted money more than food. I am afraid, Henry, your money will do him more hurt than good.”
“I hope not, uncle.”
“It is not charity to give money to such persons. When you have any thing to give, you ought to use a great deal of care. We should visit the poor, and find out about them.”
“We know Mrs. White is good,” said Flora.
“We do; and we may give to her without fear.”
The children had learned a new lesson about giving a lesson which every body ought to learn.
The Christmas Tree.
M . W , the poor widow, had been able to get along very well while she could obtain work, and while David, her oldest son, could sell plenty of newspapers. But it was very hard times, and there was not much work to be done; so the poor had to get along as well as they could.
Many of the mills had ceased to work because the times were so hard, and therefore the men who had bought a paper every day could not afford to do so now. David lost about one half of his trade. His mother earned very little, and she had no idea how she should be able to get through the hard winter.
On that bright, cold Christmas morning, the poor widow thought how happy the rich must be, who had plenty to eat, and plenty of coal to keep them warm. She thought of the future, and feared she should be obliged to ask the town to help her. She did not want to do this, but she could not think of letting her children suffer for the want of food, or shiver in the cold.
While she was thinking of these things, Mr. Lee drove up to the front door, and the children all got out of the carryall. Mrs. White wondered what they had come for, and she was still more surprised
when she saw the great load of wood, the cart with the barrels, and the wagon full of buckets and bundles.
She did not know what to make of it, for she did not understand that all these things were for her.
“I wish you a merry Christmas!” shouted Flora, as she rushed into the kitchen, where Mrs. White and the children were.
“Thank you, Miss Flora,” replied Mrs. White. “May you live to see a great many, and all of them happy as the present.”
All the rest of the children wished the poor widow and all her family a merry Christmas. Flora capered about the room, almost beside herself with joy.
“We have brought you lots of good things, Mrs. White,” said she, when the children had all wished the family a merry Christmas. “We put all our money together, and bought you a load of wood, some flour, and potatoes, and apples, and tea, and sugar, and pepper, and salt, and mustard, and ”
“That will do, Flora,” said her father. “Mrs. White will soon find out what you have brought.”
“I am very grateful to you all, children, for thinking of me. May God reward you for your kindness!” replied Mrs. White, with tears in her eyes.
“We wanted to make it a happy day for you, and David, and the rest of the children,” added Flora.
“It will be the happiest day I have seen for a month,” said Mrs. White. “I was thinking this very morning what would become of us;
but you have filled my home with plenty. I shall never forget you, children.”
Then Flora danced three or four times round the room, for she was so happy she could not keep still. I hope my readers have all found out that “it is more blessed to give than to receive.” I am sure Flora and Frank were quite as happy as the poor widow—though her fears about her children being cold and hungry had suddenly been driven away.
She felt that God had heard her prayers, and made these children the agents of his bounty. Her eyes were full of tears, but they were tears of joy. As she heard the rattling of the sticks of wood which the men were throwing from the wagon, it seemed like sweet music to her ears. Then the barrels were rolled into the kitchen, the buckets placed in the closet, and the bundles on the table, so that the room looked just as though she had set up a store.
“These things are the Christmas gift of the children,” said Mr. Lee, when the articles had all been brought into the house. “They got up the affair themselves, without my knowledge. No one told them to do it; and I am sure they will all remember to-day as one of the happiest days of their lives ”
“They are very kind; and I shall think of them and pray for them as long as I live,” replied Mrs. White. “I was afraid this morning that we should all have to go to the poorhouse. I spoke to David about it, and the poor boy cried as though his heart would break. He is a very tender-hearted child.”
“I hope I shall be able to pay you for all these things some time,” said David.
“O, we don’t want any pay,” exclaimed Flora. “That would spoil every thing. This is our Christmas gift, David. You wouldn’t pay for a gift—would you, David?”
“You are very good, and I hope I shall be able to do something for you one of these days, Flora,” replied David. “You are very rich, and we are very poor, so that we can’t do much for you.”
“Yes, you can,” said Flora.
“What can I do?”
“You can love us; and that is all we want isn’t it, father?”
“Yes, my child; and we must always deserve their love. We may yet be poor, and David may yet be very rich.”
“When he is, David will be good to us, I know. Wouldn’t it be funny, if we should get poor, and David should bring us a load of wood, some potatoes, flour, tea, sugar, and apples?”
“And mustard and pepper,” added Henry, laughing.
“It would not be very funny for us, but I know we should be thankful to him,” replied Mr. Lee, with a smile.
“Well, David, when things change, you shall do for us what we have done for you, and then it will be all square.”
“I hope you never will be poor, but if you are, I will give you every thing I have,” said David, in a feeling and earnest tone.
The children stopped nearly an hour at the little black cottage; but they were so happy, it seemed like a palace to them. They had all felt the luxury of doing good. The plenty they had carried to the home of
the poor family filled their own hearts with plenty with love and peace.
Before they went away, Mr. Lee gave Mrs. White money enough to buy some warm clothes for all the children, and for herself. She had nothing more to fear from the cold winter and hard times; and she hoped in the spring to be able to take care of her family herself.
The party, so happy they could hardly keep from shouting, bade the family good by, and started for home. As they passed through the village, they saw, in front of a store where rum was sold, two men fighting. They were soon parted by some people, and Henry saw that one of them was the man to whom he had given the money.
Mr. Lee said he had been drinking. He stopped the horses, and asked a gentleman who the man was. He was told that he was a poor man who spent all he could earn for liquor, and that he had just taken enough to make him ugly, so that he wanted to fight
“You see what good your money has done, Henry,” said Mr. Lee, as he started the horses.
“Yes, sir; it has done more harm than good. I will never give money again, unless I am pretty sure that it will do good.”
“That is a good lesson for you to learn. It is not charity to give to every one that asks us.”
In a little while the party reached Mr. Lee’s house, where they had a nice time all the rest of the day a better time, I am sure, for having begun the day with a good deed.
*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE CHRISTMAS GIFT ***
Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will be renamed.
Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG™ concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away—you may do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark license, especially commercial redistribution.
START: FULL LICENSE
