Subversion in Institutional Change and Stability
A Neglected Mechanism
Jan Olsson
Örebro University
Örebro, Sweden
ISBN 978-1-349-94921-2
DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-94922-9
ISBN 978-1-349-94922-9 (eBook)
Library of Congress Control Number: 2016946834
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016
The author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
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FOR Gittan, Jonathan, and Oliver
A CKNOWLEDGMENTS
This book was developed from a conference paper entitled ‘Politics as Institutional Subversion: a neglected mechanism in explaining institutional change and continuity’. It was presented at the International Conference on Public Policy in Milan, Italy, 1–4 July 2015. Theme 10, Panel 12: Political Agency in the Policy Process. The idea of making a short book, a so-called Pivot, was suggested at the conference by the Commissioning Editor Jemima Warren at Palgrave Macmillan. I immediately liked the idea of developing my arguments on subversive action and institutional dynamics at greater length than a conference paper or an article could afford. I am really grateful to Jemima for this good idea and for our efficient cooperation during quite an intensive autumn!
There are a number of other persons who have supported me with comments in the process of theorizing and writing. A draft of the conference paper was presented at the Political Science Seminar at Örebro University, Sweden. My colleague Joachim Åström was a discussant at this seminar and contributed with critical comments that were really valuable for making the final version of the conference paper. I am also grateful for comments and ideas from a number of colleagues at the seminar: Renée Andersson, Cecilia Arensmeier, Viktor Dahl, Gun Hedlund, Erik Hysing, Ann-Catrin Kristianssen, and Mats Lindberg.
At the Milan conference I had the opportunity to present the paper and receive comments. I want to particularly thank the two discussants for important comments and a nice discussion: Petra Svensson (School of Public Administration) and Magdalena Zeijlon (Global Studies), both from Gothenburg University, Sweden. I am also grateful for comments
from other panel participants: Stijn Brouwer, KWR Watercycle Research Institute, the Netherlands, and Sina Leipold, University of Freiburg, Germany.
My dear colleague and intellectual partner Erik Hysing has read most of the manuscript at different stages of the process. His constructive comments have been really important and helpful, as always, and I look forward to our future cooperation. Of course, as the author I bear full responsibility for any remaining shortcomings of this book and I hope to be able to further develop some of the arguments in future texts. Last but not least, there are no words to express all that I owe to my near and dear ones: Gittan, Jonathan, and Oliver. Thanks for our intensive discussions, your honesty, and patient love!
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Abstract This introductory chapter gives an overview of how different versions of new institutionalism explain institutional change and continuity, and argues that traditional explanations have largely neglected the role of political agency with limiting effects on their explanatory power. It is argued that we need to pay more attention to the political nature of institutions and agency. In relation to this, the phenomenon of institutional subversion is presented and conceptualized. It is argued that subversive action is a neglected micro-mechanism that needs to be theorized in relation to other mechanisms of human action in furthering our knowledge on the micro-foundation of institutions. The purpose of this book is to theorize on how subversive action can contribute to a more elaborated understanding of institutional change and stability.
Keywords Institutional stability • Institutional change • Agency
STABILITY, CHANGE, AND POLITICAL AGENCY
It is a paradox that the family of institutional theories has dominated in a dynamic era of globalization, individualization, and Internet revolution, while at the same time not being perceived as useful in understanding change (Peters 2011). However, the opposite challenge is equally important: to understand institutional stability in times of changing environments. Continuity and change are two sides of the same coin, and both need to be addressed in intelligent ways by institutional theory and
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 J. Olsson, Subversion in Institutional Change and Stability, DOI 10.1057/978-1-349-94922-9_1
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policy change theories (March and Olsen 2006; Olsen 2010; Peters 2008, 2011; Sabatier and Weible 2007; Boin and Kuipers 2008; Lowndes and Roberts 2013). Change is often seen as the difficult challenge here, but as will be argued in this book, it is equally challenging to elaborate on the mechanisms behind continuity.
Institutions are structural features in societies and political systems which have a formal character, for instance, legislature and organization, and informal features such as norms and networks. The structural nature of institutions means that they have some stability over time and do not disappear or change dramatically when individuals are replaced or leave. Hence, institutions give some predictability to social and political life. A really essential feature of institutions is that they affect and constrain individual behavior through rules, norms, practices, and incentive structures (Peters 2011: 19–20; Lowndes and Roberts 2013: 3–10). These fundamental features of institutions are common to all versions of new institutionalism even though there are important variations in how these features are theorized.
‘New’ institutionalism was born in the 1980 debate between an increasingly influential group of scholars who stressed the importance of individual behavior (rational choice and behavioralism) and researchers who addressed ‘old’ institutionalist ideas and arguments in new ways. James G. March and Johan P. Olsen were particularly important in this debate and contributed to a renaissance of institutional theorizing in political science. In their view, often called normative institutionalism (Peters 2011), institutional dynamics are understood in relation to organizational factors and institutional legacies rather than to individual characteristics or to forces in the broader social context. In normative institutionalism change is perceived as an ordinary part of politics and administration and is argued to take place in terms of endogenous processes, conceptualized as institutional development, institutionalization, and deinstitutionalization. Institutions have dynamics of their own, and change is understood as rule-bound, following standard processes of interpretation, learning, and adaptation. The logic of action is adaptive behavior or, in the words of March and Olsen, appropriate action (March and Olsen 1984, 1989, 1995, 1996, 2006; Olsen 2010).
Since the early 1980s a number of different versions of new institutionalism have developed, partly in parallel and partly in debate with one another. The four dominant versions are normative, sociological, rational choice, and historical institutionalism (Peters 2011). Normative and
sociological institutionalisms differ in a fundamental sense from rational choice institutionalism. These approaches have quite different views on institutions and institutional change and the first two have their theoretical roots in sociology and social psychology, while rational choice institutionalism is based on ideas from economic theory. These contradictory theories represent a ‘cultural’ versus ‘calculus’ view on institutional agency (Hall and Taylor 1996; Hay and Wincott 1998). Notwithstanding this basic difference, both have inspired historical institutionalism theorists, who have borrowed ideas from them in elaborating on path-dependent action (Mahoney 2000; Thelen 1999). Still, historical institutionalism is the most structural version of new institutionalism.
In addition to these dominant versions, a number of theorists claim more or less convincingly that other perspectives and approaches should also qualify as important versions of new institutionalism. We have, for instance, constructivist and discursive institutionalism (Hay 2006; Schmidt 2010), feminist institutionalism (Krook and Mackay 2011), and post-structural institutionalism (Panizza and Miorelli 2013; Bacchi and Rönnblom 2014). Besides that we have various applications of institutional theory, like international and empirical institutionalism (Peters 2011: ch. 5 and 9).
In contrast to the idea of adaptive, endogenous change of normative institutionalism, it is commonplace to argue that major changes in rules, norms, and practices occur occasionally and can be seen as an exception to institutional stability. In explaining why and how change takes place after long periods of stability and path-dependent action, there has been a strong focus on exogenous forces conceptualized as external shocks, punctuated equilibrium, critical junctures, and windows of opportunities (Kingdon 1984; Krasner 1984; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Peters 2011; Thoenig 2012). This view has been particularly strong in historical institutionalism and has been the object of much debate and elaboration (Peters 2011: ch. 4; Pierre 2009; Mahoney 2000; Thelen 1999). Also rational choice institutionalists have an idea of exogenously induced change; preferences or attitudes among rational agents are determined outside the ‘game’ and not in the interaction between the ‘players’ (Shepsle 1989; Peters 2011: ch. 3).
A particularly important debate among institutionalists is how they perceive of the interaction between institutions and individual actors. It is often argued that institutionalism is too structuralist and does not properly theorize on political agency and conflict (Peters 2011; Peters and
Pierre 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Lowndes and Roberts 2013). In normative institutionalism, single-action logics have mostly been in focus. Leading researchers have elaborated on the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989, 1995) but have theorized less on the importance of and the interactivity between different action logics or micromechanisms (March and Olsen 2006; Christensen and Røvik 1999; Brunsson 2006). Furthermore, in theorizing on the importance of agency in relation to change and continuity, there has been an overly strong focus on collective actors like organizations, advocacy coalitions, and networks (Pierre and Peters 2000; Sabatier and Weible 2007; Torfing et al. 2012), while the importance of individual key actors has got scant attention (Olsson and Hysing 2012; Mintrom and Norman 2009; Forester 1989; Lowndes and Roberts 2013).
The limited attention to individual key actors and micro-level theorizing is a bit odd if we consider important trends of today which tend to increase the degree of freedom for individual political agency and thus opportunities to influence institutional rules and norms. These trends are complex governance and multilevel governance (Pierre and Peters 2000; Stoker 1998; Bache and Flinders 2004; Olsson 2003; Torfing et al. 2012), increased civic engagement and alternative venues for social movement activism (della Porta and Diani 1999; Tarrow 1998; Olsson and Hysing 2012), increasing influence and legitimacy through knowledge and expertise in the policy process (Fischer 2009; Svara 2006), and, related to this, the increasing use of framework laws with multiple goals which tend to decentralize value priorities to public officials and professionals and their networks (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).
These trends not only increase the likelihood of influential action among individuals and groups within and outside public organizations, but also suggest that theoretical thinking on institutional change and stability has probably underestimated the importance of mutual interaction between endogenous and exogenous factors. In fact, Vivien Lowndes and Mark Roberts make a strong case when arguing that new institutionalism has now entered a third phase in which institutional change is theorized not only as a result of either incremental endogenous change or exogenous shocks (Lowndes and Roberts 2013), but increasingly as being stimulated by both endogenous and exogenous forces; that transformative effects can follow from gradual change; and that both change and stability are the product of human agency (Lowndes and Roberts 2013). New institutionalism theorizing now pays more attention to how political agency is
an important force behind institutional change, through mechanisms like protest, resistance, and subversive action. Politics of institutional change takes place in the interaction between actors that support and defend institutional rules, norms, and practices and opponents who question and try to undermine institutions (Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Lowndes and Roberts 2013).
This book will modestly contribute in this direction by theorizing on subversive action as a neglected micro-mechanism in new institutionalism. Subversive action is defined as secret political action against institutional rules, norms, and practices by ignoring, violating, or seeking to change them, or trying to preserve stability by secretly resisting or undermining activities or initiatives which are perceived as threats to existing institutions. One example of subversive action is a politician who promises change in public, but does something else behind the scenes to preserve the status quo or vice versa. In this book we will describe and discuss a number of other examples of this type of action. The main purpose is to theorize on how subversive action can contribute to a more nuanced and varied understanding of institutional change and continuity. In contrast to the dominant versions of new institutionalism, in particular rational choice and normative institutionalism, an institutional framework is formulated that is context-sensitive and open to different micro-mechanisms of political agency. It is argued that subversive action is a distinct and highly relevant mechanism that can complement other types of mechanisms like appropriate behavior. More precisely, this book addresses (i) the nature and meaning of subversive action and how it is conceptualized and discussed in the literature; (ii) what contexts tend to give rise to subversive action; and (iii) how it can work as an important mechanism behind institutional change and continuity. The book ends with a discussion on some ethical considerations and future research needs.
STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF THE BOOK
Chapter 2 starts with a critical assessment of how the dominant versions of new institutionalism understand and conceptualize agency (agents and actions) and concludes that it is a neglected and weakly developed part of institutional theory. Second, the third-phase argument of Vivienne Lowndes and Mark Roberts is addressed, which stresses that new institutionalism is now consolidating by more strongly acknowledging political agency and discursive aspects. Third, the theoretical positioning
of this book on how to perceive agency in new institutionalism in a more political sense is presented, which is partly based on the third-phase argument. A stronger focus on political mechanisms like resistance, protest, domination, and subversion is needed in relation to sociological mechanisms such as social identification and appropriate behavior. Furthermore, it is increasingly important to explicitly consider discursive aspects in problemframing, goal-formulation, and communications. Thus, it is an argument of consolidation and of upgrading political discourse and action in contrast to the dominance of new institutionalism theorizing inspired by economics and sociology.
Chapter 3 elaborates on the nature and meaning of subversive action. This concept is argued to be political in nature in that it questions some rules and norms, not in relation to narrow personal interests, but in trying to address important social and political problems and putting up a fight when specific values and norms are at stake. The meaning and implications of the concept are described and illustrated in relation to other concepts and theories, Furthermore, a literature overview is made of the phenomenon of subversive action and different conceptualizations of it. In contrast to previous contributions, the main argument is that institutional subversion is a fundamental mechanism in the daily life of public organizations. The chapter ends with the argument that subversive action deserves more attention in connection with other mechanisms if we are to better understand the forces behind institutional continuity and change.
Chapter 4 discusses what contexts tend to give rise to subversive action by focusing on three themes: the general argument of subversive action of public organizations; subversive actions on different levels of organization; and subversive action and value conflicts. Based on empirical and theoretical arguments, the main conclusion is that subversive thoughts and actions are fairly common in the daily life of public organizations. We find them on different levels of organization, in different policy areas, and among various policy actors (politicians, public officials, professionals, lobbyists, and experts). However, we can expect subversive actions to be particularly important in institutional contexts where value dilemmas and conflicts are sharp and difficult to handle. These may take place over and over again when it comes to dilemmas in specific policy areas, and can in others occur more temporarily, for instance, due to a period of organizational decline. Subversive action is illustrated by a number of empirical examples.
Chapter 5 is a key chapter because it theorizes on how subversive action can contribute to a more nuanced and varied understanding of
institutional change and stability. A central argument is that when subversive ideas are already in place, in most organizations minor changes in the environment can lead to newer or better opportunities to transform them into subversive action that may trigger change processes. Thus, subversive ideas are not dependent on external shocks to become activated. Furthermore, during change processes, subversive actions can spur interactivity between endogenous and exogenous forces, which may increase the dynamic power of the process. The neglect of subversive action probably means that institutional theory has underestimated the power of change that follows from gradual processes. Another argument is that subversive action can work as a mechanism to preserve stability by undermining change initiatives and reforms through secret resistance from inside, and also with support from external actors. A particularly important source of influence for both inducing and resisting change is subversive networking, that is, actors from different organizations cooperate in secrecy to try to change or preserve specific rules and norms.
Chapter 6 starts with a summary of the main arguments and findings (see above). It then goes on to discuss some ethical aspects by illustrating how different ethical theories can be applied and considered in relation to subversive action. The third part discusses future research needs. It is a difficult challenge to study something that is not meant to be known, but we are not on uncharted waters. This discussion draws on existing insights from extensive empirical research on whistleblowing but also on case studies. It is argued that a potentially fruitful strategy is to start with empirical studies of critical cases of observed change or potential change and then go on with backward-mapping, with particular focus on the working of different micro-mechanisms in critical stages of the process.
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CHAPTER 2
Agency in New Institutionalism
Abstract This chapter deals with agency in new institutionalism, often argued to be sparsely theorized. A critical assessment is made of the microlevel theorizing of the dominant versions of new institutionalism. After that we present and assess the argument of Vivienne Lowndes and Mark Roberts (2013: Why institutions matter: The new institutionalism in political science. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan) that new institutionalism is entering a third phase of consolidation. Partly based on this argument, a theoretical positioning is made on how to perceive agency in a more political sense with a focus on various micro-mechanisms of action. Thus, it is an argument of consolidation and of upgrading political discourse and action in contrast to the dominance of new institutionalism theorizing inspired by economics and sociology.
Keywords New institutionalism • Micro-level theorizing • Political agency
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF MICRO-LEVEL THEORIZING IN NEW INSTITUTIONALISM
Since the 1980s we have seen the emergence and development of different versions of new institutionalism with limited cross-fertilization (Peters 2011). Nonetheless, these different versions have a common understanding that institutions produce some level of a ‘stable, valued, recurring pattern of behavior’ (Huntington 1968: 12). To be more precise,
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this means that institutions are structural features in society with formal status, such as legislature and organizations and informal characters like networks and norms. The structural nature of institutions means that they constrain individual behavior in different ways, through rules, norms, practices, and incentives. Thus, institutions give some amount of stability and predictability to human behavior (Peters 2011: 19–20; Lowndes and Roberts 2013: 3–10).
However, it is often argued that institutional theory lacks a more nuanced understanding of the micro forces of human action and how it relates to institutions (Beckert 1999; Powell and Colyvas 2008). Guy Peters argues that there must be mechanisms through which institutions and individuals interact and if that linkage cannot be made clear, institutions will remain only abstract entities (Peters 2011: 38).
In order to understand the interaction between institutions and individuals and how it contributes to institutional change and continuity, new institutionalism has for a long time now treated political agency rudimentarily, which is partly due to hard-driven specialization within different versions of new institutionalism, implying fragmentation and limited possibilities for cross-boundary elaboration. However, in the last decades we have seen some efforts to theorize on institutional agency, which we will address in the second section. We will first take a closer look at the micro-level theorizing of the four dominant versions of new institutionalism: rational choice, normative, sociological, and historical institutionalism. Two concepts are essential in this chapter: logic of action and micro-mechanisms. Logic of action is a specific, dominant pattern of action which is theoretically deduced, for instance, appropriate action or economic calculation. Micro-mechanism is defined as praxis-relevant types of action in particular situations, for instance, imitation, rule interpretation, or subversive action.
Rational Choice Institutionalism
In rational choice institutionalism, institution is mainly conceptualized as ‘the rule of the game’, which gives a specific incentive structure for actors that are assumed to be rational (North 1990). This means strict assumptions about human agency, implying that individuals and other actors basically act according to the same type of action logic, labeled in various ways in the literature: ‘the classical model of rationality’ (Searle 2001), ‘decisionism’ (Majone 1992), ‘logic of calculation’ (Schmidt 2010), and ‘logic of consequentialism’ (March and Olsen 1989). This logic, in its pure form,
is about self-interested actors with fixed preferences who seek to maximize expected returns by choosing the best course of action among a number of systematically investigated alternatives. For most rational choice theorists the preferences of the actors are exogenous to the models and are of limited or no interest to the theorists. Researchers who have an interest in how individuals and institutions interact and how it creates or influences preferences usually argue that individuals have to adapt to and learn institutional values if they are to be successful within them (Katznelson and Weingast 2005; North 1990; 2007).
Rational choice institutionalism does not include theoretical assumptions about variations among individuals, even though our commonsense experience tells us that people vary in many respects to a considerable extent. In the words of Kenneth A. Shepsle, this is a self-conscious and selfimposed limit that constitutes an inherent part of the program, so that the conclusions can be stated in confidence. For rational choice critics, this is a weakness because limits are after all limiting and mean a ‘flight from reality’ (Green and Shapiro 1994; Shapiro 2005). However, in assessments of what rational choice theorists actually do, there is considerable variation in many respects, even in basic assumptions (Eriksson 2011; Shepsle 2006). It has also been argued that rational choice institutionalism is now less imperialistic and increasingly responsive. According to Shepsle, ‘The distinctions between it and its institutionalist cousins are beginning to weaken’ (Shepsle 2006: 35). However, this is highly debatable because, on the one hand, it still is quite a different approach compared to the other versions of new institutionalism and, on the other hand, we have in fact seen some interaction and borrowing of ideas, in particular between rational choice and historical institutionalism (Peters 2011: ch. 3–4; Pierson 2000; Mahoney and Thelen 2010). We have also seen increasing theorizing among rational choice scholars on how rational actors are constrained by rules and incentive structures (North 1990; Ostrom 2007) and how preferences are created in the interaction between individuals and institutions (Katznelson and Weingast 2005).
To define institution in line with the ‘rule of the game’ metaphor is quite common, both among rational choice scholars and others (North 1990; Rothstein 1996; Lowndes and Roberts 2013). Unfortunately, it is misleading and limiting in at least three ways. First, it gives a false impression that all players get basically the same conditions, even though we know that this is quite rare in real-life institutions where we can rather expect important differences in terms of power positions, responsibilities,
and remit of competencies. It would be more appropriate to use the metaphor of ‘role-play’ in which the roles are quite different when it comes to power resources. Second, the rule of the game metaphor seduces us to accept the view of a clear distinction between the rules of the game and the game actually played, as if the game in itself is not allowed to interact with its rules. In other words, the players cannot change the rules, which tends to put the question of institutional change aside. Third, this indicates that institutional rules will persist over time. How can the rules of the game be changed and by whom? It must, in some sense, occur through actions or events external to the game played. Thus, rational choice institutionalists using the rule of the game metaphor are better equipped to focus on interactions between actors (like negotiations) rather than to understand how and why institutions change and persist: institutionalization and deinstitutionalization (Peters 2011: ch. 3). As already argued, this is an effect of strict assumptions in general and when it concerns individual action in particular. Rational choice models are rigorous but static, with limited possibilities to understand and explain institutional dynamics. The most interesting contributions within the broad tradition of rational choice are when researchers elaborate on contextual factors (Axelrod 1984) or problematize basic conditions of rational action (Denzau and North 1994), but it could in fact be discussed in which tradition these types of contributions actually belong. There is thus considerable variation in rational choice theorizing, which indicates a possibility to theorize on the micro-foundations by softening some assumptions, for instance, the idea of a narrow self-interest (Eriksson 2011: ch. 3; Shepsle 2006). This would increase the potential for some cross-fertilization between rational choice institutionalism and its distant new institutionalism cousins.
Normative Institutionalism
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen developed a new form of institutionalism in the 1980s intended to challenge the dominant position of behavioralism and rational choice within political science (March and Olsen 1984, 1989). This new institutionalism was later called normative institutionalism (Peters 2011: ch. 2). Cross-fertilization between rational choice and normative institutionalism is unlikely. Guy Peters even argued that normative institutionalism is to a very great extent the antithesis of rationalism (Peters 2011). This is obvious when comparing with March and Olsen’s understanding of institutions as ‘a relatively enduring collection of rules
and organized practices’ which are perceived as relatively invariant with the turnover of individuals and changing environments (March and Olsen 2006: 3). Thus, institutions really matter. March and Olsen further argue that there are constitutive rules and practices prescribing appropriate behavior for specific actors in specific situations. The logic of appropriate action is a key concept, which can be interpreted to work as a micro-force of action among individuals and groups. This logic is essentially sociological and is fundamentally different to the economic-rationalistic logic of rational choice. Thus, one-sidedness is apparent in both these research traditions.
In normative institutionalism, appropriate action seems to be the only micro-level building block in understanding institutional change and stability. Furthermore, this building block is mostly used as a heuristic device rather than as a theoretical concept for systematic empirical inquiry on the individual level. Even in theorizing on fragmentation and unresolved conflicts, there is a tendency to discuss it in terms of different ‘pockets’ of appropriate action or ‘multiple cultures’ within organizations rather than to elaborate on institutionalized agency and different logics or forces of action (Olsen 2010; Peters 2011: ch. 2). It seems in fact that human action can be subsumed under social forces of institutional adaptation and that actions in institutional contexts are not so complex as to make a more varied toolbox of micro-mechanisms necessary.
March and Olsen made their vital theoretical distinction between the logic of consequentialism and the logic of appropriateness in their debate with rational choice scholars in political science (March and Olsen 1984, 1989). Rational choice and new institutionalism have dominated political science for decades and have developed mostly in parallel, which also holds for rational choice institutionalism, even though its name signals something else (Eriksson 2011; Peters 2011; Shepsle 2006). More recently, March and Olsen have argued that the logics of consequentialism and appropriateness are complementary (March and Olsen 2006: 9), but at the same time they have continued to distance themselves from ‘microrational individuals’ (March and Olsen 2006: 16). These two logics as conceptualized by March and Olsen are not commensurable in an ontological and epistemological sense unless some assumptions are relaxed in one or the other of the two perspectives or in both of them. The logic of consequentialism or anticipation is an economic–rationalistic concept with strict assumptions about agents but with limited elaborations on the importance of institutions and contexts, while appropriate action is sociological and
context-sensitive in nature. In short, we have here a calculus and cultural approach (Hay and Wincott 1998). It is therefore difficult to theorize on them in combination, which is also done rather infrequently (March and Olsen 2006; Christensen and Røvik 1999). Hence, it does not seem to be a fruitful way forward for a more elaborated micro-level theorizing. Despite that, normative institutionalism remains a fundamental perspective in new institutionalism, but appropriate action on its own cannot constitute the micro-foundation of new institutionalism.
Sociological Institutionalism
Sociological institutionalism has important similarities with normative institutionalism. Some scholars even group them together under the label of sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996; Lowndes and Roberts 2013), while others keep them apart as two distinct versions of new institutionalism, stressing essential differences as well as acknowledging similarities and connections between them (Peters 2011). While sociological institutionalism is a broad research tradition with great variety and with active scholars foremost within sociology and organization studies (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Greenwood et al. 2008), normative institutionalism is a more coherent theoretical project with great relevance to studies in political science in general and for understanding the life of political institutions in particular (March and Olsen 1989, 1995, 2006). Apart from these differences, there are many similarities between the two perspectives. In sociology, institutions and organizations have always been of great concern and institutions are seen as important structures in society that provide stability and meaning to social behavior through cognitive, normative, and regulative mechanisms. Thus, individual behavior is seen as socially constructed to a large extent, which means there is an important element of habits and taken-for-granted action (Jepperson 1991; Scott 1995). Sociological institutionalism has a broad interest in institutions, including intraorganizational and interorganizational studies (institutionalized fields), private and public institutions, symbolic and material aspects, and so on. A central perspective within sociological institutionalism is to view institutional change on the macro level as resulting from adaptions of organizations to their environments (imitation, diffusion, and isomorphism). Ideas are important in these processes and adaptions do not necessarily mean material change; symbolic changes are also perceived as important for organizations in order to get legitimacy.
This research tradition has been debated within sociology and Lynne Zucker, for instance, argues that these processes largely remain a ‘black box’ unless complemented by a micro-level approach, which pays attention to the cognitive processes involved in the creation and transmission of institutions (Zucker 1991: 103–106).
In theorizing on agency, sociological institutionalism has, as already stressed, important similarities with normative institutionalism and its idea of appropriate action, but within the sociological tradition there are also contributions on the theme of institutional entrepreneurship that tend to upgrade the role of actors (individuals or organizations) (DiMaggio 1988). Institutional entrepreneurship has been defined as ‘activities of actors who have an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform existing ones’ (Maguire et al. 2004: 657). In an overview of this literature, Cynthia Hardy and Steve Maguire argue that they can see evidence of two different narratives of institutional entrepreneurship in the literature: an actor-centric one and a process-centric one (Hardy and Maguire 2008). Research that more or less represents an actor-centric narrative tends to paint a picture of rational, problem-solving activities where the (usually successful) institutional entrepreneur possesses some reflexivity or insight (Hardy and Maguire 2008: 211). In this narrative entrepreneurs are perceived to have extraordinary political and social skills that allow them to intervene strategically to realize institutional change by mobilizing and combining different types of resources in creative ways. This narrative is very much in line with policy entrepreneurship research in the policy literature (Kingdon 1984; Mintrom and Norman 2009). In contrast, process-centric narratives focus on the process of entrepreneurship as an emergent outcome of various activities among spatially dispersed actors who face considerable difficulty in achieving effective collective action. In this view, the process is seen as impregnated by conflicts, power relations, and contested meaning-making where failure is just as likely as success, even though some individuals or organizations show entrepreneurial skills (Hardy and Maguire 2008: 211–213). Hardy and Maguire end their overview by warning that even though the institutional entrepreneurship theorists respond to the need to move beyond the constraining effects of institutions and to put agency back into institutional analysis of organizations, ‘there is a risk that the pendulum will swing too far in the other direction—celebrating heroic “entrepreneurs” and great “leaders”’ (Hardy and Maguire 2008: 213). They conclude that sociological institutionalism should keep matters of power and
process central to the study of institutional change. This illustrates the complexity within sociological institutionalism on how to understand the ‘paradox of embedded agency’, and as argued by Guy Peters this has for a long time been a source of controversy in sociological institutionalism (Peters 2011: 138–139).
Historical Institutionalism
Historical institutionalism is the most structural version of new institutionalism with path-dependency as a key concept. The logic of path-dependent action means that the legacy of the past is a strong force behind present and future actions. Considering that historical institutionalists perceive of institutions as powerful structural forces, it is of vital interest to them to understand the formative stage of institutions. Where do institutions come from and how were they established? Ideas are generally seen as important in the formative stage. However, ideas do not act on their own, but need some kind of creative actors who can efficiently represent the ‘new’ ideas, even though there also needs to be a favorable situation and context (‘an idea whose time has come’) (Kingdon 1984; Peters 2011: ch. 4). A problem here is that historical institutionalism for a long time has lacked theoretical elaboration on actors and their interaction with institutions, even though we have seen some recent contributions in this direction (Streek and Thelen 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2010), which we will discuss in more detail below. Furthermore, considering the powerful, structural character of institutions in historical institutionalism, major change may seem particularly difficult to explain. However, just like stability, major change is mainly explained in quite a simple way: long periods of path-dependent continuity will be punctuated by dramatic external disruptions, which means that institutions will be severely undermined and replaced by new institutions that will likely persist for some time. Thus, the lack of theorizing on actors means that the traditional version of historical institutionalism is a rather simple structural theory of institutions (Peters 2011: ch. 4).
To handle this basic problem, some historical institutionalists have increasingly borrowed ideas from other versions of new institutionalism, in particular rational choice and sociological institutionalism (Steinmo et al. 1992; Streek and Thelen 2005; Mahoney and Thelen 2010). This can be interpreted as an effort of integration and consolidation (Peters 2011: 89; Lowndes and Roberts 2013), but can also be more critically assessed as eclectic theorizing with unclear consequences for historical institutionalism
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upon him. He does not allow himself to be snared by the lure of vivid, brilliant language, nor by the intoxicating problems of inner truths whose surface he grazes. According to him the sum of all his work has been but to “shift a few grains of sand upon the shore” of knowledge, and it is useless for him to endeavour to sound the mysteries of life; he has not even learned—he does not even think it possible to human knowledge to learn—“the last word concerning a gnat.”
Does this imply that he has relapsed into scepticism; that finally, in despair, he renounces the ambition of his whole life, vitam impendere vero? By no means. He has striven to attain it even beyond his strength. [380]
When he considers himself incapable of adding further volumes to his work he busies himself with preparing a definitive edition, and in a touching farewell to his beloved studies he declares that they are so full of charm and unexplored marvels that could he live several lives he would devote them all to them without ever succeeding in “exhausting their interest.”
There we have Fabre. After labouring all his life without troubling about fame, ploughing his straight
furrow like his peasant forebears, like them, when the night has come, he simply binds his sheaves with a humble and profound realisation of the narrow limits of his work as compared with the immensity of the world and the infinite mystery of things.
It is a fine spectacle, that of the entomologist on the summits of science, as of fame, raising himself, by his humility, above both, and fully prepared, to return to Him toward whom aspire those souls that have attained the limit of human climbing:
O Jesu corona celsior Et veritas sublimior.
[Contents] III
Neither science nor fame could prevent him from suffering. To begin with, there is [381]suffering attaching to these, for all labour has its burden, all light its shadow.
This none knew better than he whose genius was a protracted patience and his life a hard-fought battle. And as though it was his destiny to suffer to the end, he did suffer still when the tardy hour of his fame had struck. Was it not an ordeal still to be assailed by visits and speeches when “nothing was left but rest and silence”? How can a man delight in the incense of his admirers when he is broken with fatigue?
To express this contrast, to show that all was not unmixed joy in these flattering visits to the patriarch of Sérignan, I will borrow the delicate brush of an artist friend of Fabre’s:
Night falls upon Sérignan, serene, limpid, violet and amethyst. The sounds of day fade one by one Still a few distant hoots from the horns of motor-cars flying along the dusty roads, or the sound of a dog baying the new moon, which shows its slender sickle on the horizon; sometimes, too, as though to eclipse the first stars, a rocket roars, a prelude to the fireworks which are about to conclude the apotheosis.… J. H. Fabre, the hero of the fête, the lover of the Sphex, the Mantis, the Dung-beetle, is very tired. Think of it ninety years of age, and almost ninety years of labour!… and [382]a world-wide reputation to sustain … and visits to receive. To-day it was the visit of a Minister and all the flies on the ministerial wheel. And he had to return thanks, feeling upon him the eyes of the reporters and the photographer’s lens. What an ordeal! Fabre can hold out no longer!…
Do you not feel that the harvest of fame at ninety years of age and after almost ninety years of labour is perhaps even more painful than the harvest of science in the ardour of youth?
Meditating upon his history, with its full days and hours, Fabié, in a delightful flight of imagination, shows us the harassed entomologist escaping from the past to find himself alone with his thoughts and his beloved insects. “He slips silently to the gate of his harmas. There he lies down on a bank thickly carpeted with lavender and withered couch-grass”.… A few moments pass. His children intervene: “he is relaxing himself, stretching himself, soothed, happy as a little child.—‘But, father, you aren’t thinking! When the dew is falling!’ ‘Ah, my children, why did you wake me? I was having such a beautiful dream!’ For in his sleep he had entered into conversation with the crickets of his native country-side.”
Fatigue of the body, weariness of the mind, [383]and a breaking heart! Suffering pressed closely upon him at the close of his days.
“It is better to be loved than to be celebrated,” said Aubanel, the delicate poet of Avignon. As long as Fabre had beside him his beloved brother, his adored wife, and his darling children, he was at least
conscious of a kindly atmosphere of memories, and of tenderness that made up for what he lacked and helped him to endure his afflictions with serene resignation.
But now, little by little, there came a void about him. Death has its surprises and life its demands.
With the death of his wife, in July 1912, half his own soul died. With that of his brother, in 1913, his life was almost wholly shattered, crushed, buried in the tomb.
With the marriage of the last of his sons and his two youngest daughters almost all the life of the house, all the caressing grace of light, considerate footfalls, of clear tender voices, of smiles and kisses, had forsaken the old man, to return only in passing and at distant intervals. His isolation became more and more complete.
Was all over? No, this was hardly the beginning of his afflictions. In the great silence of the harmas there burst of a sudden [384]the terrible thunderclap of war which roused to a protest of intolerable grief the uttermost fibres of his being.
The whole man suffered. The Frenchman, to see his beloved country the victim of the brutal and underhand aggression of a predatory nation: the father to see his dear children, a son and two sonsin-law, cast into the furnace; the idealist and the great-hearted man who had held war to be a relic of barbarism, doomed to disappear from the annals of the human race, to see war declared, and spreading with the violence of a conflagration, surpassing in horror all that history tells us of the armed conflicts of the past.
Before the bloody vision of the battlefields, how should he not feel shaken to the depths of his being by the tremors of a terrible anger and a vast pity, he who had never been able to see an insect suffering without a pang at the heart?
True, in his incomparable Iliad, the Homer of the Insects had often described creatures that hunt one another, kill one another, devour one another with indescribable ardour and ferocity, and he knew that he had only written a chapter of that “struggle for life” which is to be found on every step [385]of the biological ladder, with the same disregard of weakness and suffering.
But he would fain have seen man assert his superiority over the animals by repressing these instincts, which come from below, by the free flight of the aspirations vouchsafed from above, by the progressive subordination of the brute power of force to the spiritual power of justice and love.
While these distressing problems were filling his mind, and while, in protest against happenings so utterly contrary to his ideas, he would thump his fist upon his famous little table, a woman was moving gently to and fro, playing the parts, alternately, with the same calm countenance, of Martha and of Mary; and when he asked her her secret, she showed him her crucifix and read the Gospel to him, as though to wring from his heart the cry that was uttered by the poet of La Bonne Souffrance:11
“Vingt siècles de bonté sont sortis de ces mystères, Je crois en toi, Jésus.… ”
In moments of affliction, Fabre is even closer to the Truth than on the heights of knowledge and fame. For we are never [386]nearer the God of the Gospel than when we most feel the want of Him.
More than ninety years of life and almost as many of labour, nearly five years of overwhelming fame, and almost as many of unspeakable suffering: must not a man be “built of heart of oak,” as they say in Aveyron, to survive so many trials?
Like the oaks of his native parts, the patriarch of Sérignan continued to brave the assaults of time, and even when he began to feel that his life was declining, it seemed as though it was only withdrawing itself from its long and manifold ramifications in the external world to take refuge, as in an inexpugnable asylum, in the depths and roots of his being. He was one of those of whom people say with us that they “cannot die.”
Fabre’s work is immortal—that is agreed. But the artisan?
Let us resume our comparison. Like the oak that loses its boughs, one after the other, he saw falling one by one the several factors of his life. His life was the harmas, that paradise of insects, that laboratory after his own heart, where he could make his
observations under the blue sky, to the song of the [387]Cicadæ, amid the thyme, lavender, and rosemary. Now he was seen there no longer; hardly were the traces of his footsteps yet visible through the untrimmed boughs that crossed the paths and the grass that was invading them.
His life: it was his study, his museum of natural history, his laboratory, where, with closed doors, face to face with Nature, he repeated, in order to perfect them, to consign them to writing, his open-air researches, his observations of the to-day or yesterday. Now he no longer sets foot in it, and now one saw—with what respect and tenderness—only the marks left by his footsteps upon the tiled floor, as he came and went about the big observation-table, which occupies all the middle of the room, in pursuit of the solution of the problems propounded by his insects.
And we have a feeling that we are looking upon, and handling, relics, when on this table we still see the pocket-lenses, the microscopes and modest apparatus which has served for his experiments. And we have the same feeling before the collections in the glass-topped cases of polished pine which stand against the whitewashed walls, and before the hundred and twenty volumes of [388]the magnificent
herbarium which stand in a row beneath them, and before the innumerable portfolios of mycological plates, in which vivid colour is blended so well with delicacy of drawing, and before the registers and stacks of notes in fine, clear handwriting, without erasures, which promised a fresh series of Souvenirs.
Must they be left thus abandoned previous to their being dispersed or falling into other hands—all these precious fragments of an incomparable life, and these venerable premises, consecrated by such rare memories?
The great naturalist’s disciples could not resign themselves to the thought, and by a touching inspiration of filial piety they have found the means to secure these treasures, as by a love stronger than death, against this harrowing dispersal.
To keep the dead in their last dwelling, or attract them thither, the ancient Egyptians used to place there the image of their earthly dwelling, offering them at least a reduced facsimile of their life’s environment, of the objects and premises which had in some sort made part of their life and their soul.
Fabre’s friends sought to do still better. In order to preserve it in its integrity, they [389]determined to acquire the Harmas, with its plantations, its collections, and all its dependencies, and in order to make their homage as complete as possible they made, with this object, an appeal for international subscriptions, which were unhappily interrupted by the war.
“This is the museum which we wish to dedicate to him,” said the chief promoter of this pious undertaking,12 “so that in after years, when the good sage who knew the language of the innumerable little creatures of the country-side shall rest beneath the cypresses of his harmas, at the foot of the laurestinus bushes, amidst the thyme and the sage that the bees will still rifle, all those whom he has taught, all those whom he has charmed, may feel that something of his soul still wanders in his garden and animates his house.”
However, the soul of the “good sage” which they thus sought to capture and hold here on earth—in short, to imprison in his work and its environment made its escape and took flight toward loftier regions and wider horizons.
To see him in the twilight of the dining-room [390]where he silently finished his life, majestically leaning back in his arm-chair, with his best shirt and old-fashioned necktie, his eyes still bright in his emaciated face, his lips fine and still mobile, but thin with age and at moments trembling with emotion, or moved by a sudden inspiration—to see him thus, would you not say that he was still observing? Yes, but his observations are now of an invisible world, a world even richer in mysteries and revelations than the world below, so patiently explored for more than fifty years.
One day, when two professors of the GrandSéminaire de Saint-Paul-Trois-Châteaux13 had come to see him, as the time drew near to bid them goodbye, the old man held out his hands and tucked them under their arms, and, not without difficulty, rose from his arm-chair, and arm-in-arm with them advanced, tile by tile, to the threshold of the house, whither he had determined to accompany them. Suddenly, pressing their arms more closely and alluding to their cassocks and their vocation, he said, energetically:
“You have chosen the better part”; and, holding them back for a last word, he [391]added: “Life is a horrible phantasmagoria. But it leads us to a better future.”
This future the naturalist liked to conceive in accordance with the images familiar to his mind, as being a more complete understanding of the great book of which he had deciphered only a few words, as a more perfect communion with the offices of nature, in the incense of the perfumes “that are softly exhaled by the carven flowers from their golden censers,” amid the delightful symphonies in which are mingled the voices of crickets and Cicadæ, chaffinches and siskins, skylarks and goldfinches, “those tiny choristers,” all singing and fluttering, “trilling their motets to the glory of Him who gave them voice and wings on the fifth day of Genesis.”14
This last passage might be underlined, for now more than ever, in our thoughts of this scientist, of whom it has been said that “with a taste for Nature he has given us an appreciation of God,” the work cannot be divorced from the artisan without the grossest inconsistency.
One who had the good fortune to become intimate with Fabre during the last days of his life tells how eagerly the naturalist [392]used to accept the wild flowers which he brought in from his walks, how tenderly he would caress them with his frail fingers and brilliant eyes. Both looks and gestures
expressed an infinite admiration for the pure and simple work of Nature as God has ordained it:
“And when one evening,” says his friend, “I remarked that these little miracles clearly proved the existence of a divine Artificer: ‘For me, I do not believe in God’ declared the scientist, repeating for the last time his famous and paradoxical profession of faith: ‘I do not believe in God, because I see Him in all things and everywhere.’”
Another day he expressed his firm and profound conviction to the same friend, in a slightly different form. “God is Light!” he said dreamily.—“And you always see Him shining?” “No,” he said suddenly, “God does not shine; He obtrudes Himself.”
The man who thus bows before God has truly attained, on the heights of human knowledge, what we may call with him the threshold of eternal life. To him God sends His angels to open the gates, that he may enter by the straight paths of the Gospel and the Church. [393]
After the death of Mme. Fabre in 1912, a nursing Sister of the Congregation of Saint-Roch de Viviers was installed at the Harmas; her name was Sister Adrienne.
The old man appreciated her services so greatly that he was overcome with dejection by the very thought that she might be recalled by her superiors, according to the rule of her Order, after the lapse of a certain period of time. And he would gratefully press her hand when the good Sister sought to relieve his anxiety and inspire him with the hope that she would be allowed to remain in his service till the end of his days.
He found her simplicity, her delicacy, her good nature, and her devotion so delightful that he could not refrain from telling her so plainly in the direct, forcible manner familiar to him: “You are invaluable, Sister; you are admirable. I love religion as you practise it.”
“He has often told me,” she writes, “that when he could not sleep at night, he used to pray, to think of God, and address to Him a prayer which he would himself compose.”
In the spring of 1914 the aged naturalist, who was more than ninety years of age, felt that his strength was failing more perceptibly, [394]so that the doctors diagnosed a fatal outcome in the near future.
On receiving the news of this alarming condition, Monseigneur the Archbishop of Avignon hastened to the Harmas. The invalid expressed his delight and gratitude for the visit. Their relations were so cordial that the prelate decided to continue them by a series of admirable letters which have fortunately been published.
In these letters, with great delicacy, Monseigneur Latty avoided all that might run contrary to the naturalist’s opinions, and very gently endeavoured to induce him to die as a Christian.
To draw him more surely to the light that shines from the Cross and the grace which raises the soul above itself, he asks him to recite every evening, in unison with him, the beautiful prayer of the dying Saviour, which he calls “the prayer of the heights,” the height of Golgotha, the height of life: In manus tuus Domine commendo spiritum meum. (Into Thy hands, O Lord, I commend my spirit.)
However, Fabre was not yet at the end of his Calvary. Contrary to the expectation of the doctors, a return of strength enabled him to live to see another Spring, and it needed [395]nothing less than the terrible shocks of the tempest unloosed upon Europe to
overcome the powers of resistance that had braved so many storms.
During the summer of 1915 his weakness grew more marked, so that there was no hope of many more days of life. The curé of Sérignan having been mobilised, the absence of the priest at this time was a cause of great anxiety to Sister Adrienne always on the watch for the soul ready to escape her.
Providence happily came to her assistance; and a Breton priest, who had come to the South to recover his health, and had for some time been acquainted with the master, was admitted to terms of intimacy. After some hesitation he decided to speak to the scientist of the Sacrament of Penitence. With that beautiful simplicity of his, and to the astonishment of the priest, Fabre, who seemed expecting the invitation, replied: “Whenever you will.”
“Purified by absolution, fortified by the Extreme Unction, received, in full consciousness, into the Church, Fabre displayed a wonderful serenity.
Pressing the hand of the priest who was officiating, he listened to the recommendation of the soul. And when he [396]heard the sacred words that were
familiar to him—In manus tuus, Domine—his lips moved as though to pronounce the Amen of supreme acceptance, while his gaze, which was beginning to grow dim, settled upon the Sister’s crucifix.”
It was the 11th October 1915, at six o’clock of the evening, that the great scientist so gently surrendered his soul to God.
The obsequies, celebrated on the 16th October, “were simple and affecting, as he would have liked them to be. For a few moments before leaving the church, the old naturalist’s fine face was again exposed. It reflected an immense serenity. On his peaceful features one divined the satisfaction of the man who is departing with his work accomplished. In his parchment-like hands he clasped a wooden crucifix with ivory tips. Beside his head was a wreath of laurestinus. Beside one arm was his great black felt hat.”
The service was celebrated by the Arch-priest of Orange, in the little church; and then the harsh, rocky soil received the body of him who had so often stooped over it.
This “life of J. H. Fabre told by himself” would not be complete if we did not give here the text of the
epitaph which he himself had composed beforehand. It is [397]magnificent: it gives one the impression of an unfurling of wings:
“Quos periisse putamus Præmissi sunt.
Minime finis, sed limen Vitæ excelsioris.”
Fabre was preceded to the tomb by several months by Mistral, who was seven years his junior. “Very different in an equal fame, these two men are inseparable. Mistral and Fabre both represented Provence; one was born there and never left it, and to some extent created it; the other adopted and was adopted by it, and, like his illustrious compatriot, covered it with glory.”15
But while Fabre represented Provence, which saw the unfolding of his rich and vital nature, and while it lavished upon him all the beauty of its sky, all the brilliance of its Latin soul, all the savour of its musical and picturesque language, and all the entomological wealth of its sunny hills, he none the less represents the Rouergue, whence he derived his innate qualities and his earliest habits, his love of nature and the insects, his [398]thirst for God and the Beyond, his indefatigable love of work, his tenacious enthusiasm
for study, his irresistible craving for solitude, the strange, powerful, striking and picturesque grace of his language, his almost rustic simplicity, his blunt frankness, his proud timidity, his no less proud independence, and with all these the ingenuous and unusual sensitiveness and sincere modesty of his character.
THE END
This chapter was written by the Abbé Fabre especially for the English edition. B. M. ↑
This was the pilgrimage of the young girls of the Université des Annales politiques et littéraires. ↑
The French words are “Cousins, ” “Cousines. ” Cousin = cousin, good friend, crony B M ↑
Jules Clarétie, Jean Richepin, Adolphe Brisson, etc. ↑
E. Lavisse, quoted by Dr. Legros, op. cit., p. 81. ↑
M. l’Abbé Germain, ex-curé of Sérignan. ↑
François Fabié ↑
In Provence, as in Italy, the plaster statues sold by itinerant Italians are known as santi belli = beautiful saints. B. M. ↑
The text is from Ecclesiastes, i 2: “Vanity of vanities, all is vanity,” but Fabre cites it according to the Discours contre Eutrope, in which he had learnt it at school, alluding to the appropriate reflection of Saint John Chrysostom:
etc (Semper quidem, nunc vero maxime opportunum est dicere: Vanitas, etc ) ↑
Psalm 100, verse 3. ↑
Françoise Coppée ↑
