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Secular Institutions, Islam and Education Policy
France and the U.S. in Comparative Perspective
Paola Mattei
University of Oxford, UK and Andrew
S. Aguilar
St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, UK
SECULAR INSTITUTIONS, ISLAM AND EDUCATION POLICY: FRANCE AND THE U.S.
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Title: Secular institutions, Islam, and education policy : France and the U.S. in comparative perspective / Paola Mattei, University of Oxford, UK ; Andrew S. Aguilar, France Fullbright Fellow.
Description: New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
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Subjects: LCSH: Religion in the public schools—France. | Education and state—France. | Islam and secularism—France. | Religion in the public schools—United States. | Education and state—United States. | Islam and secularism—United States. | BISAC: EDUCATION / Multicultural Education. | EDUCATION / Educational Policy & Reform / General. | RELIGION / Religion, Politics & State.
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To my parents, for the opportunities they offered me Paola Mattei
To my family, for serving as my Esprit de corps Andrew S. Aguilar
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List of Figures and Tables
Figures
7.1 Number of charter and traditional public schools in the U.S., 1999–2013
8.1 Percentage of eighth-grade public school students assessed in 1990 and 2011, by race
8.2 Population in California with multiracial identifiers 175
8.3 Percentage of fourth graders at or above proficiency in Reading in 2011, by groups
8.4 Percentage of eighth graders at or above proficiency in 2011 in Reading, by groups
8.5 Percentage of fourth graders at or above proficiency level in Maths in 2011 by groups
8.6 Percentage of fourth graders at or above proficiency in 2011 in Science 181
8.7 Percentage of eighth graders at or above proficiency in 2011 in Science 181
Tables
5.1 Percentage of pupils achieving the basic competences at the end of CM2 and at the end of collège in 2008
5.2 Reading: aggregate score for PISA, 2000–2012
5.3 Reading: percentage of students at each proficiency level, 2003–2012
5.4 Maths: percentage of students at each proficiency level
5.5 Percentiles of achievement in Reading 2001
5.6 Percentiles of achievement in Reading 2006
5.7 Percentage of students at each proficiency level on the Reading scale
5.8 Percentage of students and Reading performance (mean score), by immigrant status
5.9 Percentage of students and maths results by immigrant status
8.1 Percentage of Hispanics of US total population
8.2 Percentage of eighth graders in public schools assessed by race in 2011
8.3 PISA results for the U.S., France, and the OECD in all subjects
8.4 PISA 2009 Reading results by immigrant status
Preface and Acknowledgements
This is a book about ideals, their resilience and malleability. We have experienced their contradictions, conflicting visions, and harsh realities. Yet we continue to study them, with uncorrupted aspirations for freedom of conscience and individual liberty. The puzzle we examine is the sustainability of secular institutions in light of the revival of religious identities in the world. Religion evokes the imagery of powerful symbols, beliefs, and titanic battles. It reawakens memories of bloody wars and deep-seated discrimination and exclusion. We focus on the French struggle with the challenge of religious diversity, in a comparative perspective with the U.S. We investigate empirically the integrative role of public schools, and what governments do to enforce ideals. Thus, we need to move beyond a discussion of abstract philosophies, and focus on public policies and practices.
We were writing this book when three attackers walked into the office of the satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo, in Paris, opened fire and killed twelve people, including a Muslim policeman, in the deadliest terrorist attack on France for fifty years. We paused the writing, and reflected, but we did not change our general research approach, and our aspirations only grew stronger. Secularism in France is a flexible concept, translated into contradictory policy programmes, and subject to varying political interpretations. Laïcité was born as a militant ideal –but, we argue, not inherently so. Our findings are about schoolchildren, the ‘lost children of France’, and their families, and how minority groups experience policies aimed at preserving the republican ideals of universalism and assimilation, a necessary evil in the eyes of many immigrants in France.
We live in a time of public anxiety and suspicion, because religion has returned to the centre stage of such collective fears in Europe and the U.S. As we write, world media show the latest images of children afloat in the Mediterranean Sea, in hope of a better future. Many of us claim this threat to national identity has once again arisen in an era of increasing mass migration and diversity, when the sense of belonging is challenged. Should we be worried about the upsurge in religious fear and animosity in the U.S., as well as Europe? This book argues that France and the U.S. share a common legacy of assimilation in public schools, which was a central objective of republicanism.
Preface and Acknowledgements xi
One of the most striking developments in contemporary French political discourse and public policy is the predominant framing of diversity in terms of religious ‘otherness’. Our findings are about the stigmatization and racism suffered particularly by Muslims in France, but also by other groups. In the U.S., religious affiliation has never represented an element of differentiation due to the primacy of the ethno-racial model. On the contrary, in France, religion has been an important dimension of diversity, and secularism a state policy response. Laïcité has been historically a titanic struggle against the Catholic Church. The complexity of flexible ideals can be captured best by a historical analysis of the relations between state and religion since the French Revolution.
We argue that combative and militant secularism is incompatible with Islam, and for such matters with any religion. Our empirical findings are concerned with what governments do in practice, and their programmatic reforms, beyond ideological disputes. This book is not yet another abstract discussion of ideals, and their indoctrination, but how they become resilient through their implementation. Over the last three years, we have analysed a wealth of legal documents, policy documents, and policy programmes, and interviewed key policy makers in France.
We are grateful to the CNRS-John Fell Fund and Stanford Undergraduate Advising and Research for support in 2012–2013, and to the Stanford Humanities Centre and Stanford Department of History for support in 2013–2014. We are institutionally indebted to St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, for supporting the initial idea of the book in 2012 and for sustenance. The University of Oxford has provided a wonderfully vibrant and extraordinary rich intellectual home in which to think. We are obliged to the Warden of St Antony’s College and the Head of the Division of Social Sciences for granting sabbatical leave in Hilary Term 2013 to conduct fieldwork in Paris and relieve me from teaching and administration. They have been very generous in providing support for this book project. Conversations at Oxford and in Paris with Patrick Weil, Don Hirsch, Sudhir Hazareesingh, Robert Gildea, Philip Robins, Roland Hsu, Paul Sniderman, and Timothy Garton Ash were a welcome source of intellectual inspiration.
Stanford has also served as a source of institutional and personal inspiration. Joel Beinin deserves special commendation for his dedication to our understanding of French Islam and its relationship to the secular ideal. The Stanford Humanities Centre in the 2013–2014 academic year was also the source of fruitful academic conversations, in particular with Denis Lacorne and the cohort of graduate and undergraduate fellows, and the support of the Director, Caroline Winterer. Additionally, Lynn Eden,
xii Preface and Acknowledgements
Ali Yaycıog˘lu, Carolyn Lougee Chappell, and Gil-li Vardi provided critical support and feedback throughout this process.
While researching in Paris, we were supported by the Observatoire Sociologique du Changement, the Stanford BOSP Centre in Paris, and particularly by Mathieu Ichou and Agnes Van Zanten. Stéphane Lacroix provided invaluable feedback on the fieldwork leading to this publication, and Estelle Hallevi helped us to navigate the complexities of French administration in unsealing archives.
We are enormously indebted to the following interviewees for their generous time and patience: Fouad Aloui, Bernard Godard, Chemseddine Hafiz, Pierre Joxe, Didier Motchane, Vianney Sevaistre, and Sheila Lawlor. Finally, we must single out Anne Deighton for her support and generous friendship throughout the project, from the original brainstorming to publication. Sections of this book were presented at seminars at the Europe Centre, Stanford University, Sciences Po, and the Swedish Institute of Social Sciences. We thank all participants at these seminars, particularly Sheila Lawlor, Erica Greenberg, Derek Vanderpool, Prudence Carter, Rob Reich, Guadalupe Valdez, and Fagan Harris. We are grateful to Palgrave Macmillan for allowing the reproduction of some materials published in French Politics in 2012.
We thank our editors at Palgrave and the St Antony’s Book Series editors for their enthusiasm. We are greatly indebted to Emilia for her titanic struggle, to Chloe, Claudia, Mary Ann, Mihika, Mike, Stephanie, Teo, and Vanessa for their unwavering dedication, and to our parents for their criticism and curiosity. They provided invaluable moral support. We thank them with love and admiration.
Finally, we also thank all those who suffered racism and discrimination for sharing their personal stories with us, anonymously, while we were jotting down notes, often waiting at train stations, or taking a break from French libraries. They showed us that ideals are necessary evils, and laïcité inherently liberal.
Paola Mattei (Oxford) Andrew S. Aguilar (Oxford) September 2015
List of Abbreviations
BCC Bureau central des cultes (Central Office of Religions)
CE Conseil d’État (Council of State)
CFCM Conseil français du culte musulman (French Council of the Muslim Faith)
COMOR Commission organisation de la Consultation (Organization Commission of the Consultation)
CORIF Comité de réflexion sur l’islam en France (Reflection Committee on Islam in France)
CRMF Conseil représentatif du culte musulman (Representative Council of French Muslims)
EMF Étudiants musulmans de France (French Muslim Students)
FFAIACA Fédération française des associations islamiques d’Afrique, des Comores et des Antilles (French Federation of Islamic Associations of Africa, the Comoros, and the Caribbean)
FNMF Fédération nationale des musulmans de France (National Federation of French Muslims)
GMP Grande Mosquée de Paris (Grand Mosque of Paris)
HCI Haut conseil à l’intégration (High Council of Integration)
HCMF Haut conseil des musulmans de France (High Council of French Muslims)
JMF Jeunes musulmans de France (Young French Muslims)
RMF Rassemblement des musulmans de France (Assembly of French Muslims)
UFM Union des femmes musulmanes (Muslim Women Union)
UJM Union des jeunes musulmans (Young Muslim Union)
UOIF Union des organisations islamiques de France (Union of French Islamic Organizations)
Introduction
Nearly a century after the promulgation of the 1905 law separating state and church, the French state sparked a remarkable revival of the political debate regarding freedom of religion in schools and a new legislative impetus to regulate this relationship. The French Third Republic was committed to fighting against an established political and religious institution, the Catholic Church, over the fate of public education and more broadly the role of religion in the public sphere. The Church objected fiercely to the establishment of the principle of laïcité in schools, and more generally to the creation of a free, compulsory and secular primary education. Jules Ferry, then Minister of Education, stated in 1881 that ‘the subordination of schools to the Church is against all our institutions, which are based on an opposite concept, the concept of secularization of the state, of its institutions and public services’.1 Schools, as the principal mechanism of preparing a new generation of French citizens, could not be left in the hands of an external religious retrograde power. The tumultuous debates in the nineteenth century reflect a historical tension in French public education over the influence of religion and its role in public spaces such as education. While the social circumstances of the debate regarding schools and religion at the beginning of the twenty-first century have evolved from the time of the Third Republic, the secular republican education system remains the subject of an intense and complex dialogue on secularity. In 2004, amidst a highly controversial public debate (Lorcerie, 2005), the French government promulgated a law banning all ostentatious religious symbols in state schools. No other European country has yet adopted such an overarching approach to protect the neutrality of the state vis-à-vis increasing religious diversity, let alone through the legislative power. The law in principle aimed to protect the secular character
of French schools by regulating the manifestation of all religious symbols. Schoolchildren are allowed to wear only discrete and not ostentatious signs. The 2004 French law aimed to protect not only the state but also individuals (schoolchildren) from what the state deemed to be religious pressures in certain schools.
French society is divided along new conflicts concerned with religious identity (Muslim identity instead of Arab) that are increasingly visible in the classrooms. The Republican model, based on the solidarity of a single French community (Hazareesingh, 1994) is viewed by many as the cause of discrimination and unfairness against minority groups. Policies invoking laïcité (secularism) are frequently criticized as a disguised form of Islamophobia. The rise of the far right and its electoral success in France have raised concerns across Europe and fuelled anxiety over a perceived threat to laïcité posed by North African immigrants and their children. The French state has not remained still in the face of new challenges. It has responded in 2004 with the most assertive and militant interpretation of laïcité in recent years.
The relationship between freedom of religion and freedom of conscience has been at the heart of the scholarly disputes and public controversies over laïcité and state education, a Republican institution meant to mould French pupils into French citizens. The centrality of laïcité in schools as an instrument of social progress against the traditionalist Church is echoed by leading government officials such as former Minister of the Interior Jean-Pierre Chevènement: ‘The Republic was always a struggle. Public schools were formed historically in France with the spirit of free inquiry, contrary to Church’s stranglehold on the education and souls of students. If other forms of obscurantism emerge, the spirit of free inquiry remains as important today as in the past in the Republic. And, by consequence, laïcité.’2
Laïcité is the central inspiring concept of the 2004 reform, politically invoked across partisan divisions as the guarantor of freedom of conscience and the neutrality of the public space vis-à-vis all religious institutions. Whereas the American definition of secularism protects religion from state intervention, French laïcité theoretically protects the state against religious institutions attempting to impede on individual liberty of conscience (Bauberot, 2000; Barb and Lacorne, 2014). In her influential work, The Politics of the Veil (2007), Joan Scott argues that by banning the hijab, the French state intended first and foremost to defend its own national republican ideology, based on universalism, which inherently oppresses minorities and more specifically French Muslims. Thus, she argues, the 2004 ban is discriminatory insofar as
‘Muslim headscarves were taken to be a violation of French secularism, and by implication, a sign of the inherent non-Frenchness of anyone who practiced Islam, in whatever form’ (Scott, 2007, p. 15). The principle of laïcité would thus be a disguised cover for religious discrimination by the French state against Muslims. The republican ‘mythology’ of a unified France is deeply criticized by Scott.
In contrast to this view, we develop the argument that laïcité as a legal and philosophical principle is not at all inconsistent with religious pluralism, freedom of expression, and a liberal conception of the neutrality of the state (Rawls, 1993). Laïcité as a policy instrument might be implemented in ways that contrast with its principles, and that of republicanism. We do not believe, however, that French Republican ideology can be reduced to labels of ‘specialness’ or ‘superiority’ (Scott, 2007) without the risk of simplifying its complexity in the history of modern France.
This book argues that state schools have become, once again, a central theatre of political action and public engagement regarding laïcité, an ideal grounded in the republican origins of the public education system in France. While schools and their involved communities have been at the centre of significant political action and debate, scholars have not yet fully investigated the independent role of public schools in the analysis of the policy reforms of laïcité and its most recent reforms and interpretations. The debate over laïcité resurfaced in a contentious way through several affaires des foulards that all took place in schools. In 1989, the principal of a Creil school, Ernest Chenière, expelled three girls, aged thirteen and fourteen, for refusing to remove the headscarf in the classroom. The latest occurred in 2003, when two sisters – Alma and Lila Lèvy – were expelled from their high schools after they refused to remove their headscarves. It is remarkable that schools have been from the start at the centre of the public debate and media attention. Indeed, schools also played a major motivating factor in the 2004 ban on ostentatious religious symbols, citing the corruption of the public space as a reason to enact what some would see as discriminatory and ‘racist’ legislation (Scott, 2007).
The politicization of the affaires des foulards has generated great interest in the relationship between religion and the state, freedom of religion and conscience, and assimilation of religious groups. It has also generated fear and public anxiety about the place of national identity (Benhabib et al., 2006; Nussbaum, 2012), which will be the subject of our analyses. The purpose of this work is to bring out again the centrality of education as both an institutional instrument of republicanism (Hazareesingh, 1994) and a public policy of modern laïcité. An
approach that is not narrowly focused on top-down legal theories, but also extends to the policy developments and the politics of education, will illuminate what governments do in practice to meet their militant ideals and values. If the principle of laïcité is questioned in schools, we need to understand what happens and why. What happens in the classrooms? How do teachers implement laïcité in schools? How do schools accommodate religious diversity, if at all, in France?
We aim to place schools as one of the main foci of the scholarly and policy debate on laïcité and French politics. In addition to studying the policy developments of the principle of laïcité, particularly the relationship between freedom of religion and schools, our approach in this book intends to redirect the debate towards a bottom-up understanding of how actors in individual schools live through these policy reforms. Concepts are not only built through abstract theorizing, but also from their implementation in individual classrooms, by teachers, students, head teachers, and families. Thus far, most of the literature on religion and education has been top-down, focusing on the approach of the French state and political elites to laïcité and what matters to them.
The relationship between education and freedom of religion is one of the most fundamental questions shaping the evolution of the French republican tradition. Freedom of religion is a fundamental right, protected by Article 10 of the 1789 Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen. In France, schools do not only provide education; they are an essential instrument for the pursuit of national identity and republican objectives. Schools are foundational institutions of the French republic and democracy (Dubet, 1997). Education was a major part of the political project during the Third Republic to build French citizenship and political legitimacy, the basis of the First Republic’s blueprint. As Dubet points out, primary schools and train stations were powerful symbols of modernity (Dubet, 1997).
More recently, schools also played an important role in the 2015 Charlie Hebdo terror attacks, which once again refocused attention on the relationship between religion, society, and practice of laïcité. Twelve people died in the terror attack on the magazine’s office after Charlie Hebdo published a vignette mocking the Prophet. In the aftermath of these recent tragic events, state schools became the theatre of political controversies and vehicles of political mobilization. President Hollande asked the French to observe a nationwide minute of silence for the victims of the terror attack on Charlie Hebdo’s Paris offices. Some Muslim students in French schools did not honour this request, which became the subject of both French and international media sensations (‘Charlie
Hebdo’, 2015; Veruzier and Beyer, 2015).3 The point here is that schools were at the centre, once again, of the political controversy and relationship between religion and the French state. Yet the predominant scholarship overlooks laïcité as a public policy, emphasizing instead its philosophical or ideological implications.
The ideological, philosophical, and political studies of the reforms associated with laïcité, Islam, and citizenship abound in recent years. There is a mushrooming of books on Islam, radicalization, and security. Yet there is an unforgiving silence about the policy developments and the different ramifications of laïcité in policy practices, not just in the classrooms but also in other critical areas of social policy. Why has the debate over laïcité focused exclusively on legal and philosophical doctrines, and not on policy developments and outcome? What does laïcité mean in the context of both education programmes and broader state policy regarding integration of religious and cultural minorities? More importantly, how can we define laïcité in an era of increasing diversity and religious pluralism, without failing into the risk of simplifying the 2004 reform into a ‘racist’ plot?
In this book, we discuss laïcité as both a legally defined principle and a central theme of modern political debate. In particular, we adopt the analytical distinction between laïcité and laïcité d’État (Méjan, 1960) Laïcité as a concept consists of a mix of legal, moral, and philosophical maxims establishing the separation between church and state. Laïcité d’État refers to the instrumental use of the legal and philosophical doctrine of laïcité for purposes of nation-building, reinforcing a particular political project, and assimilating ethnic differences. This distinction is critical to understanding how contemporary debates on identity and integration directly impact social institutions, particularly those of public education. The laïcité d’État effectively influences the perceived normative value given to laïcité at any given time. In effect, the distinction between these two aspects of laïcité downplays any rigid normative value of laïcité and emphasizes the flexibility and malleability of this concept.
By posing laïcité as having two separate yet related analytical dimensions, we wish to contribute a robust scholarship on public policy to the largely philosophical and legal debates surrounding laïcité. By examining the relevant policy developments from the 1989 Conseil d’État judgement to the 2004 ban, representing a huge policy break, we suggest that the political ramifications of laïcité are much more complex than determining whether laïcité is illiberal or not, racist or not. This is not the right question to ask. Laïcité is not simply a dogmatic assertion
of republican ideology and a value of national Frenchness, consecrated by the 1905 law of separation between state and church. This concept is remarkably adaptive according to new contextual circumstances and new contemporary demands. This book approaches the study of laïcité within the framework of a dialogue between principle and policy, between ideology and institutions.
1
The New Challenges to the École laïque: Integrating Islam
On 11 November 2013, a series of five reports reflecting on the current state of integration in France was posted on Prime Minister Jean-Marie Ayrault’s website. The reports focused on how to incorporate multiculturalism into the French Republican model through initiatives such as incorporating diversity into French history, teaching foreign languages in school, and emphasizing the contributions of immigrants to French society. Among the justifications for a revised approach to diversity, the findings of a commission sponsored by Ayrault commented on the discriminatory effects of laïcité, writing: ‘It is important to reflect on the conditions of development of an inclusive and liberal conception of laïcité, of a communal laïcité, sensitive to both the contexts and consequences of its implementation’ (Boubeker and Noël, 2013). By advocating the development of a liberal and inclusive conception of laïcité, the report assumed that the current state of laïcité was illiberal, exclusive, and therefore a hindrance to integration.
The reports on integration and the implied critique of this national value immediately generated a backlash from the entirety of the political spectrum. Marine Le Pen called it a ‘declaration of war against the French’ (Rovan and de Royer, 2015), and French President and member of the Socialist Party (PS) Francois Hollande immediately distanced himself from the report. In a later interview with the original authors, they played down the critique that they attacked foundations of French identity or flawed ideas of equality. In fact, the authors of the report cited the non-radical nature of the report, stating, ‘These reports do not propose anything more than a transition from a republican model of laïcité to a liberal Anglo-Saxon model open to communalism.’
Similar reactions to critiques of laïcité are commonly found in French media. In September 2013, the Ministry of Education issued a ‘Charte
de la Laïcité à l’École’ to help teachers reinforce secularism in schools (Ministère de l’éducation nationale, de l’énseignement supérieur et de la recherche, 2013). The charter bans pupils from boycotting classes for religious and political reasons. It also promotes total respect for the freedom of conscience. Article 12 states: ‘No student can invoke their political or religious convictions, in order to dispute a teacher’s right to address a question on the syllabus.’ The Charter was contested and criticized by various Muslim associations and activist groups. Emmanuel Todd is currently facing mounting criticism regarding his views that the 2015 Charlie Hebdo public demonstration effectively represented an ultraconservative and closed-minded approach with regards to religion.
The politicization of laïcité in the past thirty years demonstrates how it evokes mixed reactions, and sentiments, among lay and religious people, political elites and ordinary citizens alike. On one hand, it is invoked as a hopeful solution to social and political conflicts associated with an increasingly heterogeneous population. Laïcité serves as the method of integration for foreign-born populations and their French-born children (Kastoryano, 2005; Schnapper, 2007). As a result, French politicians and academics from all sides of the political spectrum assert the fundamental value of laïcité for French citizenship. On the other hand, it is increasingly seen by academics outside France as an instrument of aggressive secularism that limits individual and group freedoms.
The implications of the Ayrault report demonstrate that the ‘neutrality’ of laïcité often focuses on minority groups like Muslims, who become stigmatized and singled out from the rest of the population. Those who defend the principle of laïcité note the role it plays in maintaining an open and neutral public space, tolerant of all religious beliefs. Robert Badinter delivered a speech in Oslo in 2011, arguing that laïcité is the precondition for the creation of a neutral state that respects religious beliefs without explicitly favouring any of them. ‘Laïcité is the guarantee of human dignity of all people in the Republic,’ argues Badinter, citing Article 10 of the Déclaration des droits de l’homme de 1789 (Cerf and Horwitz, 2012). Patrick Weil develops this point in his scholarly work on citizenship (Weil, 2011); he suggests that the historical success of the French model of laïcité rests in the priority that the state has bestowed upon the protection of all individuals against the pressure of religious groups (Weil, 2005a). Laïcité regulates religion to protect the right of freedom of conscience, an individual right of all members of the community.
In an increasingly diverse France, the debate over how to interpret and implement laïcité has become one of utmost urgency. Despite this
urgency, the debate has reached an intellectual blockage as rightly suggested by Michel Terestchenko in his book Un si fragile vernis d’humanité, contrary to other European countries (Terestchenko, 2005). Islam is the second religion in France, after Catholicism. Islam has doubled its followers from the end of the 1960s to 2007. There are 2.1 million selfreported Muslims (3.2 per cent of the population) and 800,000 practising Muslims (Joignot, 2012). Against these figures, in 1966 self-reported Catholics were 80 per cent of the population. By 2007, this number had decreased to 51 per cent. One of the central questions, for instance, in the contemporary public debates over the ban of the full hijab: ‘Faut-il permettre le port de signes religieux dans les écoles au nom de la liberté ou l’interdire au nom de la laïcité?’1
Tariq Ramadan, an extraordinary observer and scholar, has stressed the religious fervour associated with laïcité and has called it the new religion of the state. Scott condemns laïcité as a discriminatory principle against Muslims, while Martha Nussbaum has deemed it illiberal and incompatible with individual liberty (Scott, 2007; Nussbaum, 2012; Ramadan, 2014). Conservative authors like Henri Pena-Ruiz have stressed the necessity of laïcité in an increasingly religious world (Pena-Ruiz, 2005, 1999). Academic discourse has taken an increasingly combative approach to argue for a change in the philosophy of laïcité rather than a specific policy change. A new generation of scholarship, led by Philippe Portier, has insisted on the need to transition away from combative rhetoric to allow for a more reflective and sustained approach on the implications of laïcité in contemporary France (Lagrée and Portier, 2010).
In a similar vein to Portier, we believe that an analysis of laïcité beyond value judgements, normative underpinnings, and a focus on explicit policy programmes and reforms in the public education system is much needed. As John Bowen boldly states, laïcité is politically useful precisely because it means something to everyone (Bowen, 2007). We wish to avoid the ideological debates regarding this provocative term, and reground laïcité in the policy and programmatic activities of the French state, in the corpus of French laws, and in the classrooms of the French Republic.
Laïcité: a short history of the principle
The modern debate over laïcité brings up an important question: what is laïcité? It is not secularism in the American sense. Unlike in the U.S., there is no inherent right to unlimited, unmediated liberty of religious
expression in France. In the words of Jean Baubérot, noted historian of French laïcité, this agreement between church and state is called the ‘pacte laïque’ and results in an ‘imposed peace and the transition to a dominant and inclusive laïcité’ (Baubérot, 2000, 2004). Such a pact is non-negotiable and holds serious penalties if breached. Therefore, church and state are separate in the French system, but the church operates in a state-operated space under the ‘imposed peace’. The legal basis of laïcité rests on its 1958 constitutional guarantee and a series of laws passed at the turn of the twentieth century, with the most important being the sacrosanct 9 December 1905 law that officially separated church and state. However, laïcité is also strongly associated with French national values and a sense of French identity. According to a 2015 poll by the Institute of French Public Opinion, 71 per cent believe laïcité is the most important Republican principle, an increase of 41 points since 2008 (Institut français d’opinion publique, 2015). The clear link with identity politics makes the upholding of laïcité a critical priority, and a useful political tool for building up public sentiment. Recent political dialogue has voiced an underlying need to ‘protect’ laïcité from the threat of religious fundamentalism. Another 2015 poll by Le Monde and Ipsos reveals that 74 per cent believe laïcité is currently under threat, further underscoring the importance placed on preserving and protecting laïcité. The worry over laïcité and the role it plays in public opinion result in mixed and uneven definitions.
Laïcité is first a legal principle historically rooted in asserting the sovereignty and power of the state over the Catholic church. As astutely noted by Olivier Roy, laïcité is a series of laws and legislative acts that have direct policy implications (Roy, 2005). In 2013, Hollande created the Secularism Monitoring Centre to help set an official state interpretation of laïcité. According to this institution, laïcité guarantees ‘all citizens, whatever their philosophical or religious beliefs, to live together, enjoying freedom of conscience, freedom to practise a religion or to choose not to, equal rights and obligations, and republican fraternity’ (Observatoire de la laïcité, 2013). The Centre, the 1905 law, and numerous legal scholars clearly articulate the three core legal principles that form laïcité: liberty of individual conscience, equality of religious expression, and the guaranteed religious neutrality of the state (Messner et al., 2003, p. 40). The concept of neutrality serves as the guarantee for individual expression against undue religious expression. This idea of secularism protects individuals against the pressure from organized religious institutions, a common characteristic found in the history of church–state relations in France (Hazareesingh, 1994; Baubérot, 2000; Merle, 2005).
Laïcité is the legal relationship between the state and various cultes. The neutrality of the state, according to Valerie Amiraux, ‘structures a certain equality between faith communities’, but this equality does not apply between church and state (Amiraux, 2010). Religions do not, and have never had, absolute free reign in France during the twentieth century. The state actively intervenes in the affairs of religious cultes in order to preserve the free exercise of religion and, most importantly, the liberty of conscience guaranteed by Article 1. The state guarantees religious equality by asserting its dominance over the religious sphere. Therefore, laïcité also serves as a guarantor of individual rights through state policies that are meant to protect the neutrality of public spaces. Many modern debates regarding laïcité often diverge based on whether it regulates religion or guarantees individual expression, but in fact both are explicitly guaranteed in its overarching principles. The 1905 separation law is thus a negative guarantor of religious freedom, distinct from the positive guarantee found in the U.S.
Though governed by a series of laws and constitutional guarantees, laïcité as a normative principle is fraught with numerous political exemptions and unclear legal interpretations. Laïcité was first legally established through a series of laws at the turn of the twentieth century, with the 9 December 1905 separation law achieving a canonical place in its legal interpretation. This law establishes three principles of laïcité: liberty of individual conscience equality of religious expression, and neutrality of the state (‘Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Églises et de l’État’, 1905). Most scholarship only emphasizes the 1905 law, neglecting the other bases of its legal standing. Its most important guarantee comes from the 1958 constitution, which fails to define the precise legal ramifications of laïcité. Additionally, various exceptions to laïcité can be found in contemporary France. Religious education still occurs in Alsace-Moselle because it was not part of France when the 1905 law was enacted, Similarly, the French state funds approximately 90 per cent of Catholic churches, 50 per cent of Protestant churches, and 10 per cent of synagogues. In addition to the funding places of worship, the French state also funds religious private education, with the large majority going to Catholic schools. (Bowen, 2007, p. 32)
As with any legal principle, the interpretation of its legal corpus is left to the legislative and judicial bodies of the French state. Its interpretation by lawmakers and other political actors gives laïcité a political dimension that relies on its immediate cultural context. The policy of laïcité is subject to the political and social ramifications of a time period.
Given the complex and contradictory corpus of laws and court rulings, the laïcité de l’État is ultimately a state policy used to achieve a particular social or political goal that might not necessarily be laïque in the legal sense. In the words of a former Minister of Religion, ‘The state could be laïque in principle but clerical in reality’ (Méjan, 1960).
The idea of neutrality as a stable normative value also needs to be reframed in a political sense. Laïcité as neutrality is a relatively new legal interpretation emerging in the 1950s and 1960s. Historically, laïcité was defined as ‘not religious or ecclesiastical’ according to its original definition in the Littre Dictionary and not as ‘neutral’. In having a non-religious connotation, laïcité is juxtaposed against religious influence and beliefs. For the first part of its history, it was the power mechanism through which to counter and control the Catholic church. Current debate has centred on the concept of neutrality, a concept that some legal scholars argue was not the intent of the original 1905 law.
The influence of legislative bodies in the interpretation of laïcité is particularly influential, and indicates how public opinion plays a critical role in its interpretation. The 2004 ban on religious symbols in schools was in direct contradiction to a 1989 ruling by the Conseil d’État, France’s highest administrative court that determined the headscarf was compatible with laïcité. 2 Chapter 4 explores in detail this policy discontinuity in relation to the interpretation of religious freedom in schools. Although laïcité is widely and fervently endorsed in France, its ramifications have been subjected to different emphases over time. Laïcité is not a monolithic principle, but rather has different undercurrents that resurface at different points in time under different circumstances. President Chirac and the Stasi Committee that he created played a key role in breaking the established consensus on the interpretation of laïcité. Far from being a concept ossified in time, laïcité is a living and malleable concept. Likewise, Sarkozy’s quest to transition Islam en France to Islam de France warranted direct state intervention in the affairs of the Conseil français du culte musulman (CFCM). Chapter 2 argues for the malleability of this concept, one of our central arguments, by looking at how multiple definitions of laïcité contributed to the rise of French Islam in the contemporary France.
Laïcité and education: an extended history
Noted historian Emile Poulat states that ‘Our laïcité has one history but two memories’ (Poulat, 1987). Both defenders and critics of laïcité
construct two different remembrances of a complex and tumultuous divisions between church and state. For the entirety of French political history after the revolution, the role of religion and the extent of its influence has been the subject of intense political and philosophical debate. Laïcité was meant to dismantle completely the influence of the Catholic church in French politics and to prevent its influence from affecting both state and citizen.
The establishment of the French public education during the Third Republic was the mechanism through which laïcité would be instilled as a republican value in the nineteenth century. Through this new education system, the holy trinity of French values – liberty, equality, and fraternity – would replace the Catholic holy trinity as a method of identity. Debates during the late Third Republic focused on how far to promote Republican identity in schools and how much to exclude religion from the public sphere. This debate is best characterized as a debate between centralism, the philosophical underpinnings of the state, and centralization, the process of organizing a modern nation (Prost, 1968). As will be discussed later, the exact role of Republicanism in the education system was a great subject of debate, namely due to the limitations it would place on other key liberal values like freedom of expression. The historical role of schools as a method of secular identity earned the school system the nickname La Laïque.
The history of laïcité as a legal principle begins with the French Revolution. The 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man guaranteed the freedom of conscience in order to break the political power of the First Estate over the French government. Citizenship becomes entirely detached from its religious ties to the Church. Article 10 states that Nul ne doit etre inquiété pur ses opinions, meme religieuses, purvou que leur manifestation ne trouble pas l’ordre public établi par la loi. While such reforms were also meant to create an ethically independent citizen, they were first and foremost designed to rebase the sovereignty of France its new government and not in Rome. Laïcité was thus a political method to reassert state sovereignty in the lives of its newly created citizen through the elimination of religion from public life. The Directorate passed laws that halted public financing of Catholic religious institutions, banned the use of religious signs in public, and annulled the religious vows made by citizens forced into the Catholic clergy. The origins of laïcité were conceived as a combative ideology to assert the dominance of a non-religious sovereignty.
Although many of these laws would eventually be repealed at the turn of the nineteenth century, the debate over the role of religion in
political and public life continued. The Concordat of 1801 recognized Catholicism as the religion of the majority of the French but also recognized the Jewish and Protestant religions. The Bourbon Restoration served as a warning that the results of 1789 were not permanent. Indeed, the fact that provincial citizens voted overwhelmingly for the monarchists indicated that a new civic education system needed to disseminate new civic, Republican values.
The establishment of the Third Republic in 1871 placed laïcité at the centre of a new conception of state and citizen. One of the major reforms during this period removed religious instruction from public education to separate the affairs of church from the affairs of state. Within this framework, two views of laïcité existed: first, an aggressive and combative secularism espoused by Emile Combes, aimed at eliminating religion entirely from the public sphere; second, a pluralistic secularism supportive of mutual separation of the State and religions in the spirit of respecting all spiritual faiths. Jules Ferry, Jean Jaurès, and Aristide Briand sustained this latter, more tolerant model.
The debate between separation and elimination led to major Republican disagreements. The issue peaked in 1877, after enacted legislation ordered the closure of Congregationalist schools and the deportation of members of unauthorized religious orders. Critics condemned Combes’ approach and claimed that laïcité violated core liberal principles. Combes’ approach was rejected in favour of one that preserved the Catholic church while maintaining the dominance of the state in important policy areas like education. The ultimate passage of the 1905 law was a triumph not just for the state but also for the state’s dominance in public institutions. The book will elaborate fully how schools in France have ultimately served both as a battleground and as a test range for the extent to which laïcité is enacted and national identity developed.
New challenges to the école laïque
In France, schools have been institutional agents of republicanism. They encourage republican ideals such as individualism and secularism (Lorcerie, 2005; Kepel, 2012a). In 2003, the Ministry of Education issued a Guide républicain to all schools to help define contemporary republicanism in the classroom setting (Ministère de l’éducation nationale, de l’énseignement supérieur et de la recherche, 2004b). They have been secular institutions (l’école laïque) and the primary institutional fortress of republican values.
At the heart of our intellectual concern is the following question: how does the perceived challenge to one of the most fundamental republican values in France – laïcité – generate turbulence to the longestablished and powerful French educational system, if at all? How does it generate policy reforms aimed at re-establishing the primacy of the republican ideology in the wake of increasing religious diversity? How do such policies impact school actors, in particular teachers and head teachers? Reforms do not only concern political elites, and abstract concepts; they also mobilize actors and public opinion. We shall approach this question not only from the top-down state perspective, but also from the bottom-up approach, and we shall look at the role that local communities and Muslim associational life played in this debate. We shall do so in Chapters 2 and 6.
The 2004 ban was intended to serve as a defence of laïcité as a republican value, from the perceived threat of religious extremism and radicalization of schoolchildren (Lorcerie, 2012). In the opening section of the Stasi Commission’s Report, written in December 2003 by Bernard Stasi, the President of the Special Commission created by President Jacques Chirac to reflect on the state of laïcité in France, stated that ‘it is important to respect the value of laïcité and, whenever it is under threat, to defend it’ (Stasi and Commission de réflexion sur l’application du principe de laïcité dans la république, 2004). Republican values need to be defended in a combative way and with direct state intervention, because they are universal. Such a perception of laïcité harkens back to the combative form it took against the Catholic church as recently as the late 1950s in order to minimize the influence of religion in official affairs. Indeed, the first line of the report vividly asserts the place of laïcité in French national identity: ‘The French Republic is constructed on laïcité.’
If the French state cannot avoid an assertive and combative response to the ‘new’ threat of religious extremism, what is the exact challenge in schools? To whom is this a challenge? Why is this a serious and credible threat and what is its nature, socio-economic or religious? The republican value of laïcité is seen to be under threat in public institutions and in schools by religious extremism. The public anxiety in 2003 turned into outright terror in early 2015, after the attack on Charlie Hebdo and on the Jewish supermarket in Paris. The events generated a public reflection upon the French model of integration and the risks of youth radicalization. This is not a book about Islam and its radicalization, but it is a book about the French approach to freedom of religion in schools in the context of the new circumstances posed by failed integration and consequently the search for new models of integration.
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