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The Gulf States in International Political Economy
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates, author.
The Gulf States in international political economy / Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Baker Institute Fellow for the Middle East, Rice University, USA. pages cm. —(International political economy series)
1. Persian Gulf States—Economic conditions. 2. Persian Gulf Region— Foreign relations. 3. Persian Gulf States—Politics and government.
4. Globalization—Persian Gulf States. 5. Gulf Cooperation Council. I. Title. HC415.3.U47 2015 337.536—dc23 2015021434
List of Tables
3.2
4.1
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Professor Timothy Shaw for commissioning this book and for his support throughout the writing process. Christina Brian and Judith Allan were also extremely helpful points of contact at Palgrave Macmillan and I thank them for their assistance. I thank also my colleagues at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, namely Ambassador Edward P. Djerejian, Marwa Shalaby, Ben Stevenson, Ariana Marnicio, and Jim Krane, as well as at Chatham House in London, whose ‘Future Trends in the GCC’ project was particularly useful in generating new ideas about the direction of travel in the Gulf States. My friends and family in the United Kingdom, Greece, and Norway provided muchneeded encouragement, as did my wife, without whose support this book could not have been written. Every academic career has to begin somewhere, and mine began with my doctoral work at the University of Cambridge under the supervision of Professor Sir Christopher Bayly. Chris passed away suddenly three days before I completed this manuscript and it is to his memory that I dedicate this book, for he taught me to think across academic disciplines and national and regional boundaries.
List of Abbreviations
AAOIFI Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions
ACD Asia Cooperation Dialogue
ADGM Abu Dhabi Global Market
ADIA Abu Dhabi Investment Authority
ADIC Abu Dhabi Investment Council
ADNOC Abu Dhabi National Oil Company
AFESD Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development
AHAB Ahmad Hamad Algosaibi and Brothers
ALBA Aluminium Bahrain
AQAP Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
Aramco Arabian American Oil Company
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASPA South American-Arab Countries Summit
BAPCO Bahrain Petroleum Company
BCCI Bank of Credit and Commerce International
BOT Build, Operate, Transfer
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, China
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CENTO Central Treaty Organization
CIC China Investment Corporation
CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Company
COP Conference of the Parties
CSB Central Statistical Bureau (Kuwait)
DFSA Dubai Financial Services Authority
DIFC Dubai International Financial Centre
DIFX Dubai International Financial Exchange
Dubal Dubai Aluminium
ECFR European Council on Foreign Relations
EEC European Economic Community
EDB Economic Development Board (Bahrain)
EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EIU Economist Intelligence Unit
EM Emerging Market
ENEC Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FGF Future Generations Fund (Kuwait)
FIA Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile
FSA Financial Services Authority (United Kingdom)
FTA Free Trade Agreement
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GECF Gas Exporting Countries Forum
GLMM Gulf Labour Markets and Migration
GOSI General Organization for Social Insurance (Saudi Arabia)
GRF General Reserve Fund (Kuwait)
GRI Global Redesign Initiative
GTL Gas-to-Liquids
ICT Information and Communications Technologies
IFDI Islamic Finance Development Indicator
IIRO International Islamic Relief Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
IOM International Organization of Migration
IONS Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
IPIC International Petroleum Investment Corporation
IPO Initial Public Offering
IRA Independent Regulatory Agency
IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ITUC International Trade Union Confederation
KAC Kuwait Airways Corporation
KA-CARE King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy
KAEC King Abdullah Economic City
KAFD King Abdullah Financial District
KAUST King Abdullah University of Science and Technology
KCIC Kuwait-China Investment Company
KEPCO Korea Electric Power Corporation
KFH Kuwait Finance House
KFUPM King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals
KIA Kuwait Investment Authority
KIO Kuwait Investment Office
KNOC Korea National Oil Corporation
KOC Kuwait Oil Company
KPC Kuwait Petroleum Corporation
KPI Kuwait Petroleum International
x List of Abbreviations
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
MICE Meetings, Incentives, Conferences, Events
MSCI Morgan Stanley Capital International
OBU Offshore Banking Unit
ODA Overseas Development Assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIC Organization of the Islamic Conference
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PACI Public Authority for Civil Information (Kuwait)
PDRY People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen
PETRONAS Petroliam Nasional Berhad (Malaysian National Petroleum Company)
PFLOAG People’s Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf
PIF Public Investment Fund (Saudi Arabia)
PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy
PPP Public Private Partnership
PSG Paris Saint-Germain
QAPCO Qatar Petrochemical Company
QFC Qatar Financial Centre
QFCRA Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority
QIA Qatar Investment Authority
QNFSP Qatar National Food Security Programme
QSI Qatar Sports Investment
QIPCO Qatar Investment & Projects Development Holding Company
RAF Royal Air Force (United Kingdom)
RUSI Royal United Services Institute
SABIC Saudi Basic Industries Company
SALIC Saudi Agricultural and Livestock Investment Company
SAEV Saudi Aramco Energy Ventures
SAMA Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency
SCAF Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (Egypt)
SIDF Saudi Industrial Development Fund
SoCal Standard Oil Company of California
SOE State-owned Enterprise
SQU Sultan Qaboos University
SRI Stanford Research International
SWF Sovereign Wealth Fund
TIP Trafficking in Persons
TRIPS Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
List of Abbreviations xi
UAE United Arab Emirates
UN United Nations
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WECG World Economic Centre of Gravity
WEF World Economic Forum
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
WWF World Wildlife Fund
Introduction
This book examines the changing position of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states within a global order which itself is in a state of flux. Against the backdrop of deep shifts in the structure and balance of geopolitical and geo-economic gravity, the Gulf States have become increasingly assertive centres of regional power and influence. Beginning in the 1990s, the GCC states became increasingly integrated with the world economy, gradually opened up to foreign direct investment, and eventually acceded to the World Trade Organization. Since the turn of the century, and backed by the world’s fastest-growing airlines and by governing methods that resemble a corporate structure grafted onto the principles of hereditary rule, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Doha have imprinted themselves on the global consciousness, their exposure magnified by the acquisition or sponsorship of landmark assets and prestige events across the world. Moving far beyond the longstanding role of Saudi Arabia in stabilising international oil markets, the Gulf States emerged in the 2000s as more muscular participants in attempts to rebalance and reshape the world around them. This process accelerated after the sudden outbreak of the Arab Spring upheaval in 2011, as the Gulf monarchies took unprecedented measures to contain and control the processes of change in the Middle East and North Africa, and peaked with the Saudi-led coalition that formed to conduct Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen in March–April 2015.
For many observers of international affairs, the awarding of the hosting rights to the 2022 FIFA World Cup to Qatar in December 2010 symbolised the rapid, even startling, rise of the Gulf States as regional powers with global reach. This breakthrough event took place in the wake of the global financial crisis and a series of high-profile investments by Gulfbased sovereign wealth funds and private investment vehicles. Within a
bewilderingly quick time, it appeared to many commentators that ‘Gulf money’ was everywhere, snapping up iconic global brands and investing in world-renowned institutions such as Harrods, Porsche, Ferrari, the Chrysler Building in Manhattan, the London Stock Exchange, Barclays Bank, Citigroup, and the ‘Shard’ skyscraper that towered over the skyline of London. Sports fans learned to navigate a new lexicon as they shuttled between Arsenal’s Emirates Stadium and the Etihad Stadium of Abu Dhabi-owned Manchester City, while the most famous team in the world, FC Barcelona, took the field bearing the logos of the Qatar Foundation and Qatar Airways. Indeed, the quarter-final of the 2015 UEFA Champions League saw Qatar-sponsored FC Barcelona take on (and defeat) Qatar-owned Paris Saint-Germain, whose shirt sponsor is Emirates airline, also the shirt sponsor of the defending European champions, Real Madrid.
Even more remarkable than the material manifestation of Gulf capital is the pace and scale of economic – if not political – development that has propelled the Gulf States to prominence within just two generations. This means that some of the most remarkable and all-encompassing socio-economic transformations in recorded history have been distilled into the space of a single human lifetime. In Rags to Riches: A Story of Abu Dhabi, the prominent Emirati businessman Mohammed al-Fahim described the circumstances of his 1950s childhood as a place where
the permanent and seasonal residents of Abu Dhabi island still lived in barasti huts built of palm fronds harvested from the date trees. The exceptions were a few wealthier residents and the ruling family who lived in earth or clay houses . . . The houses were clustered together for security, companionship, and warmth during the cooler months.1
In a similar vein, Khabeer Khan, a Pakistani advisor recruited by Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan to work on agricultural development, described his first arrival in Abu Dhabi in 1962 as ‘like stepping back into the Stone Age.’2 Writing in 1995, al-Fahim added that ‘the changes that have taken place throughout the Emirates over the past three decades have been incredible, difficult to believe even for those who have seen them with their own eyes.’3
As recently as the 1950s and 1960s, there was very little infrastructure in the small cities on the Arabian Peninsula as institutional mechanisms evolved slowly to absorb growing oil revenues. Saudi historian ‘Abd Al-Aziz ibn ‘Abd Allah al-Khwaiter offers the following description of rule in Saudi Arabia at the time of the creation of the kingdom in 1932:
The king was the source of power. He had the final word, which was bound solely by the power of the Sharia. He relied on no systematic administrative bodies other than the employees in his council, whose job was to submit to him the various matters that were raised in council, then to carry out his orders in addressing those matters. The king decided on administrative, political, military, economic, and social matters, and referred what concerned the Sharia to the relevant authorities.4
Indeed, as late as 1952, the only ‘government’ ministries in Saudi Arabia were those dealing with finance (founded in 1932), foreign affairs (1933), and the interior (1944).5 In 1959, mail from Kuwait to the newly emerging oil centre of Al-Khobar in eastern Saudi Arabia still took around 30 days and virtually no international telephone lines existed in the kingdom.6 Bureaucratic arrangements in many cases were limited to the presence of ‘gatekeepers,’ usually of foreign origin, who controlled access to the ruling sheikh and wielded enormous influence over the conduct of policy; examples of such personalised networks were those of Abdullah Suleiman, Fuad Hamza, and Yusuf Yassin in Saudi Arabia, Mulla Saleh in Kuwait, Charles Belgrave in Bahrain, and Abdullah Darwish in Qatar.7 Even as late as 1990, a remarkable photograph of the main thoroughfare running through central Dubai, Sheikh Zayed Road, showed only a few scattered buildings surrounded by desert, in remarkable contrast to the road’s centrepiece in an intensely built up ‘global hub’ just two decades later.8
Economic activity expanded rapidly with the growth of the oil industry following the discovery of oil in the 1930s, and the beginning of commercial extraction and export in the 1940s, following a hiatus during World War Two. Oil revenues transformed the political economy of the Gulf States, shaped the nature of state-society relations, and determined their subsequent development, while also enabling the sheikhdoms to evolve from little more than city-states dominated by local coalitions between ruling families and merchant elites into modernising and increasingly centralised states. However, certain rulers, such as Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan Al Nahyan in Abu Dhabi and Sultan Said bin Taimur in Oman, resisted the trappings of modernisation well into the 1960s, accounting in no small measure for their eventual toppling by more ambitious members of their immediate family. In 1965, for example, what is today the Abu Dhabi International Airport consisted of ‘little more than a sand landing strip and a single small building that was cooled by a wind tower’ with only a soft-sand track to connect it with
the town.9 Meanwhile Oman experienced what Marc Valeri describes as the ‘decade of remoteness’ as the Sultan withdrew from public life in the 1960s and sought to block all modernising influences, limiting running water and electricity, for example, to his royal palaces and the homes of a select group of trusted associates.10 In addition, just three schools existed in the entire country in 1970, with a total enrolment of 900 boys and an illiteracy rate of 66 per cent among Omani adults.11
The central aim of this volume is to describe the processes by which the Gulf States have become embedded in the global system of power, politics, and policymaking over the past four decades. A key question is the extent to which the far more active – and assertive – involvement of individual Gulf States in international institutions and global governance is merely adding another dimension to otherwise little-changed structures or leading to something qualitatively new as coalitions of emerging economies challenge the hitherto Western-centric global order. This is closely related to a further dimension of the Gulf States’ uneven engagement with the processes of globalisation, namely the degree to which the patterns of conspicuous consumption that have become characteristic of modern Gulf cities such as Dubai and Doha are gradually being augmented by productive integration into global economic structures and flows. A recent article in Race and Class summarised the ambivalence surrounding the political economy of the contemporary Gulf States by suggesting provocatively that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar have in fact been ‘consciously constructed as specialised geographic zones for the global elite and transnational capitalism.’12
Although the export of oil has connected the Gulf to the world economy for more than 60 years, far predating the great acceleration of economic globalisation from the 1970s on, the processes by which the Gulf States have ‘gone global’ nevertheless have proliferated beyond recognition since the 1990s. A rigorously interdisciplinary approach drawing upon historical development, international economics, international trade and international relations, comparative politics, and globalisation studies will situate the Gulf States firmly within their twenty-firstcentury context. Proceeding from the starting point that contemporary issues in global politics transcend traditional disciplinary boundaries, the book examines the complex interdependencies that mark the region as such an integral component of international affairs.
In addition, the book documents the thickening webs of inter-regional linkages between the Gulf States and major developing nations that are creating new ‘coalitions of convenience’ among rising powers with a
shared interest in reshaping the post-1945 international architecture. Patterns of global engagement and the pursuit of internationalisation are reconfiguring the position of individual states within the global order and injecting new dynamics into inter-regional and international relations. This is by no means a phenomenon unique to the Gulf States, as made clear by the deep divisions within the European Union over the handling of issues such as the Greek debt crisis or the response to a more assertive Russia, both of which highlight the resilience of bilateral approaches to foreign policymaking. Nevertheless, the great diversification of the GCC states’ geopolitical and geo-economic interests does represent a significant juncture in the process of internationalising the Gulf and repositioning it within the changing global order.
In common with many other ‘non-Western’ discourses, officials in the GCC states have embraced partial aspects of economic globalisation and focused on the practical measures of global engagement, over any attachment to theoretical or normative concepts of ‘global governance.’ Rather than posing a systemic threat to contemporary structures of international governance, the GCC states operate in a pragmatic manner designed to maximise influence and leverage in the existing architecture of world politics in which contemporary power and influence is dispersed among a greater number of active participants spread across a wider political and economic spectrum than before. This is also part of a broader trend whereby normative foundations of the international system – from governance and political reform to transparency and accountability – are increasingly seen through a prism that diverges from what may be termed the ‘Western-centric’ lens that characterised the post-1945 institutions of global governance and the political element of globalisation itself.
Yet such scepticism towards the more political (or cultural) dimensions of globalisation has not distanced the GCC states from acting as international players or from participating in the broader rebalancing of the global order. On the contrary, the Gulf States have become increasingly visible and proactive in setting international policy agendas on a wide range of issues, ranging from financial and energy governance to global aviation and food security. As is set out in the following chapters, this holds important implications for the continuing evolution of international institutions in a polycentric environment with multiple centres of influence and competing policy objectives. It is also significant in terms of the regional reordering triggered by the political upheaval across much of the Arab world and the active policy responses of individual Gulf States to the disorder in North Africa and the Levant.
Although this book covers the GCC (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) as a whole, it is important at the outset to highlight the significant differences that exist among the six member states. What is often termed ‘the Gulf’ is neither a monolithic bloc of major oil-producing Arab states nor a case of ‘Saudi Arabia plus five’ smaller states. On the contrary, three broad categories readily become apparent in terms of resource endowments and policy projection. These are the aggressively internationalising approaches of Qatar and the UAE (and specifically Abu Dhabi and Dubai within the seven-emirate federation); the niche-level significance of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the global energy and investment landscape; and the lesser importance of Bahrain and Oman, both comparatively resource-poor states that are grappling with the immediate challenges of transitioning towards a post-oil economy. While these categories are neither static nor unchanging, they are evolving as the Gulf emerges as the pivot around which broader shifts in global economic activity are occurring. Thus, any examination of the international political economy of the Gulf States inevitably focuses more on Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and Kuwait than on Bahrain and Oman. Yet the latter two states are far from insignificant actors on the regional stage, as the book makes clear.
The Gulf States in international political economy
Recent years have seen an explosion in the academic literature on the Gulf States, much of it rooted in political science, comparative politics, international relations, and security studies. While the majority of publications focus on a specific discipline, several edited volumes since the mid-2000s have examined the global emergence of the Gulf States through the prism of globalisation studies. A pioneer in this regard is Globalization and the Gulf, published in 2006, which offered innovative perspectives on the interaction within the global system of the processes of globalisation with the deeply held traditions of Gulf society and culture. As the three authors write in their introductory essay, ‘no part of the world has come into the global market more rapidly and with more change in material abundance than the Arab Gulf oil states.’13 Five years later, The Transformation of the Gulf: Politics, Economics and the Global Order, published on the very cusp of the Arab Spring, explored the mechanisms by which the GCC states were both shaping, and being reshaped by, globalisation. The volume outlined a roadmap of their repositioning in a global order itself in a state of flux following the 2008–2009 world financial crisis. It also provided material for a new theoretical approach
to global studies by analysing the region as a barometer of globalisation, and a cockpit of transformative shifts in standards and patterns of living within a highly compressed time period.14
Three research articles by the present author have further investigated the global profile of the Gulf States. In Rebalancing Global Governance: Gulf States’ Perspectives on the Governance of Globalization, I detailed how officials in the Gulf States evolved in their perspectives on the ‘governance of globalisation’ that differ significantly from Western-centric norms of ‘global governance.’ A second article, The GCC States and the Shifting Balance of Global Power surveyed the motivations and objectives behind the Gulf States’ rise to international prominence in the first decade of the twenty-first century, and examined the implications for the future of global and regional politics in light of the growth of new interregional blocs and linkages. In a third article, Repositioning the GCC States in the Changing Global Order, I provided important historical context not only to the rebalancing of global power around multiple centres of political and economic influence, but also to the newfound set of pressures generated by the Arab Spring. In a separate article for the Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations, I explored the multifaceted and lengthy integration of the Gulf States within frameworks of SouthSouth relations, going back to the 1950s and 1960s when Saudi Arabia and Kuwait made important religious and humanitarian contributions to Arab and Islamic causes across the world.15
Similarly, the field of international political economy has matured and broadened significantly in the last decade. A comprehensive review of the literature is beyond the scope of this study, but it is sufficient to note some of the more important recent works. Research by Thomas Oatley has analysed the interplay between domestic and international politics, and surveyed the complex array of interests and institutions that together constitute the ‘rules of the game’ within which state and non-state actors pursue wealth and power. His work emphasises the importance of integrating the political and economic dimensions of the global economy, which itself is a competition that produces both winners and losers. As he notes in his overview textbook on the subject, ‘politics in the global economy revolve around enduring competition between the winners and the losers generated by global economic exchange.’16 In Debates in International Political Economy, Oatley also provides an accessible overview of the major theoretical and empirical debates on the nature of the contemporary international system, trade and migration patterns, the role of multinational corporations and sovereign wealth funds, international finance and monetary issues, and the global politics of climate change.17
In Analysing the Global Political Economy, authors Andrew Walter and Gautam Sen conduct a wide-ranging survey of critical areas of international political economy, with an emphasis on the importance of economic theory. Walter and Sen engage rigorously with the political economy of finance and financial integration, the international monetary system and foreign direct investment, and the evolution of a multilateral trading system. By bring economics ‘back in’ to the core of the study of international political economy, the book complemented and added value to much of the existing literature that prioritised political science and international relations-based approaches.18 Other significant contributions to recent literature are a spate of works addressing the global political economy, with an eponymous volume edited by John Ravenhill one of numerous examples. This examined issues such as regionalism and the impact of globalisation in the Global South in another wide-ranging survey of contemporary issues of international political economy.19
Robert Gilpin’s Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order (2001) built upon the author’s path-breaking 1987 work, The Political Economy of International Relations, which did much to provide the conceptual underpinnings for the breakthrough and subsequent maturation of international political economy as an academic discipline. His books explored the intensifying interdependence of national economies, the rise of regional and inter-regional economic cooperation, and the ways that political, economic, and technological forces have transformed the world. In addition, they integrate political and economic analysis with historical and theoretical insights to produce a nuanced examination of the complex interaction between nation-states and the world economy. In a third study, The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century, Gilpin argued that secure political foundations, wise leadership, and a set of fair rules were urgently required to ensure the stability of the international capital system.20
A different yet innovative approach to contemporary global issues has been provided by Richard Beardsworth in Cosmopolitanism and International Relations Theory. Beardsworth links the concerns of cosmopolitanism to international relations and world politics on the grounds that ‘specific problems facing actors in the field of world politics are of an increasingly global nature, and since the solutions to them call for both global cooperation and global vision.’21 This builds upon earlier research into what David Held labels ‘the paradox of our times’ –namely that ‘the collective issues we must grapple with are of growing extensity and intensity, yet the means for addressing these are weak and
incomplete.’22 In Global Covenant, Held identifies two major challenges for policymakers: identifying the economic, political, and security realms in the global arena, and moulding public institutions to regulate and manage these connections. Held argues that solutions to these dilemmas are required in order to support the rapid growth not only in mutual interconnectedness but also vulnerability in a world where ‘the fate and fortunes of each of us are thoroughly intertwined’ in virtually every facet of modern-day life.23
Greater attention also has been paid to the transnational role of civil society and non-governmental organisations, in recognition of the fact that these constitute critical stakeholders that operate beyond the territorial constraints of nation-states. As Fred Halliday noted in 2003, on many issues ranging from political prisoners, the environment, and landmines, ‘it is non-governmental organisations which have (within countries and internationally) developed the policies of global institutions.’24 This forms part of what Jan Aart Scholte has labelled a ‘more polycentric [system of] governance’ whereby sub-state actors and suprastate agencies coexist alongside nation-states, albeit with some autonomy from them.25 Meanwhile, work by Mary Kaldor and others in the series of Global Civil Society yearbooks has added depth to the concept and understanding of global civil society. This they define as the development of ‘new forms of civic participation and involvement in a globalising world’ through connecting people, organisations, values, and ideas located ‘in some trans-national arena, and not bound or limited by nation-states or local societies.’26
Building on this brief overview of recent approaches in critical concepts of international political economy, the need for a focused study on the role of the Gulf States in the broader global rebalancing becomes clear. Combining elements of international relations, international economics, comparative politics, and historical approaches, this book maps out and analyses the myriad patterns of Gulf States’ engagement with the regional, inter-regional, and international system. Within the overarching shifts in geopolitical and geo-economic power, the Gulf States often stand out by virtue of eye-catching and headline-grabbing policy pronouncements, but deeper issues also lie behind their greater engagement. These factors are explored in the sections and chapters that follow, and collectively amount to a desire among policymakers in the Gulf States to proactively participate – on their own terms as far as possible although also through the creation of informal coalitions with other groups of emerging economies – in the shifting distribution of regional and international power (which itself is being redefined as a concept).
Structure of the book
There are two parts to this book which each address a different aspect of the Gulf States’ interaction with the global arena. Part I, entitled ‘Globalisation and the Gulf,’ consists of four chapters that provide an introduction to the major theoretical and empirical units of analysis. The opening chapter offers a historical overview of the Gulf States’ interaction with the global economy. It describes how the Gulf region has for centuries been a commercial and strategic pivot located astride the major trade routes linking India, Africa, and Europe, and connected to each through a dense network of transoceanic influences. Powerful processes of migration and acculturation shaped a cosmopolitan identity and externally focused trading mentality long before the discovery, extraction, and export of oil integrated the region firmly into the international economic system.
This leads into Chapter Two, which explores the evolving role of small states in world politics and international relations as the acceleration of global processes has opened up new possibilities for the exercise of power and influence. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have, for decades, been embedded in networks of South-South relations through the generous provision of overseas development assistance and leadership in the pan-Islamic arena, but since the end of the Cold War the complexity of the Gulf States’ connection with the international system has grown exponentially and far exceeded the Global South. Closer examination of Qatar and the UAE illustrates how, in both states, neither their territorial limitations nor their small population has constrained the projection of power and influence at levels that far outmatch many much larger and more conventionally ‘powerful’ states. This calls into question some of the dominant assumptions regarding international structures and power in the global age, as both are being radically reconfigured.
Chapter Three analyses the mechanisms of the Gulf States’ projection of power and influence at a regional and global level through the prism of ‘state capitalism’ and the creation of national development plans and strategic niches. Emphasis is placed on specific niche developments in the Gulf, with particular emphasis on renewable and alternative energy in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, refined products and petrochemicals in Saudi Arabia, and higher education and research in Qatar and, to a lesser extent, Oman. The final chapter in this opening section explores the motivations and objectives that have underpinned Gulf officials’ strategies of global engagement, not least in how policymakers have sought to derive maximum advantage from
economic globalisation while minimising the spillover of its political and cultural dimensions.
In Part II, ‘Changing Patterns of Global Engagement,’ five chapters address the Gulf States’ changing patterns of engagement with the global system. Chapters Five and Six focus on international finance and the enmeshment of GCC states in global trade. The development of GCC states into regional financial hubs for both conventional and Islamic finance is detailed in Chapter Five, which contextualises their growth against the deeper shift in global economic power from west to east and from the market to the state. A key feature of the chapter is the internationalisation of Gulf-based Islamic financial institutions and new acquisitions patterns of sovereign wealth funds, which are creating durable new connections between the Gulf and Southeast Asia, in particular. Such ties are examined more fully in Chapter Six, which delves into the significant diversification of Gulf States’ trade relationships not only with existing states such as those in Pacific Asia, but also with new partners in South and Southeast Asia during the 2000s. The chapter ends with an extended case study of the emerging ‘nexus’ of food and energy security that is creating durable new connections between the Gulf States and a range of partners across Africa and Asia.
Chapter Seven consists of a case study of global aviation as the arena in which the Gulf States have been the most visible and dynamic generators of global change. It compares and contrasts the startling rise of Emirates, Qatar Airways, and Etihad and describes how these three airlines have redefined traditional aviation markets. Operating without the political or workplace constraints of ‘legacy carriers’ and benefiting from their hosts’ ‘state capitalist’ models of development, the Gulf States’ airlines have reshaped global aviation around the hubs of Dubai, Doha, and Abu Dhabi, turning them into ‘super-connectors’ capable of linking any two points on the globe with a single stopover in the Gulf. Moreover, the announcement of a series of record airplane orders provides further leverage to Gulf airlines as their business assumes ever-greater importance to manufacturers such as Boeing and Airbus at a time of contraction and consolidation elsewhere in the industry. Nevertheless, the chapter ends on a note of caution as it assesses whether three aggressively expanding competitors can be sustainable in such a concentrated market.
Chapter Eight explores how mass inward migration has resulted in a highly stratified workforce underpinning a distinctive form of ‘Gulf capitalism’ built upon rigid hierarchies of power that are subject to endemic and often systematic abuse. Flows of remittances create overlapping webs of human and socio-economic ties linking labour-sending
countries in South and Southeast Asia with the Gulf, but in fundamentally unequal ways. These have contributed to a tense relationship with international non-governmental organisations and global civil society groups over calls for greater scrutiny of working conditions and transparency in protecting migrants from human rights violations.
Chapter Nine ends by examining how the themes outlined in this book, such as the internationalisation of the Gulf and the projection of different forms of power and influence across the regional and global economy, nevertheless coexist uneasily alongside potent existing and potential new sources of insecurity. This is part of a changing approach to the concept of security, in which non-traditional and longer-term challenges to stability are reshaping regional security agendas with the rapid rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) only one of numerous policy challenges facing Gulf policymakers. Others include threats from state failure in neighbouring states, resource insecurity arising from the over-consumption and depletion of oil reserves, the difficulty of overhauling patterns of unsustainable economic development to cushion the eventual transition to a ‘post-oil’ era, and the new challenges presented by the post-2011 Arab Spring upheaval across the Middle East.
The conclusion will draw attention to the ‘Gulf paradox’ – that the global emergence of the Gulf States and the new challenges posed by the Arab Spring constitute two profoundly diverging trends for the contemporary Gulf. The interaction of these two diverging trends will shape the dynamics of the Gulf States’ political economy and international relations in the years and decades ahead. New domestic priorities may temper some (but not all) of the Gulf States’ global positioning that appeared to reach its apotheosis in December 2010. Nevertheless, the shifts in geo-economic power do present the Gulf States with opportunities to increase their leveraging influence in a global order in flux and to create or thicken mutual interdependencies with a multiplicity of partners. This is already leading to new inter-regional realignments and portends a future in which the Gulf States’ traditional political and security alignment with the US and Western powers will coexist alongside economic (and possibly ideational) reorientation towards a variety of new partners in Asia, Africa, and even Latin America.
Part I
Globalisation and the Gulf
The Gulf and the Global Economy
The opening chapter in this book assesses the multifaceted reasons behind the Gulf States’ uneven record of integration into the global economy. It begins by documenting how the ties binding the Gulf States into the global economy are both deep-rooted and long predate the discovery and extraction of oil in the twentieth century. Rather, the opening section highlights the historical interconnectivity of the transnational flows that tied the region into a broader economic hinterland spanning the Indian Oceanic world. Nevertheless, these processes were patchy and subject to partial reversal during the early oil years. Thus, the second section in this chapter examines the entrenched dynamics that also served to limit the Gulf States’ relationships with the international system, both politically and economically. Such dynamics included the conservative leanings of many of the ‘post-traditional’ governing systems in the (Arabian) Gulf, and the Gulf States’ enmeshment in Western political and military spheres of influence, during the period of prolonged British protection and following the passage to independence.
In the second half of the chapter, the focus shifts to the role of energy in framing the role of the Gulf in global economic structures and international trade and investment flows. Beginning in the 1940s, oil exports integrated the Gulf States firmly into the international economic system as Gulf oil became a motor of Western economic growth in the postWorld War Two era. Securing stable access to regional supplies and the Western guarantees of security that underpinned this became the pillars that structured the international relations of the Gulf after 1945. Oil from the Gulf, particularly Kuwait, supplied 51 per cent of British requirements in 1971, while Saudi Arabia and the US enjoyed a similarly symbiotic relationship. The chapter ends by describing how the Gulf States were only partially impacted by the broader acceleration of
economic globalisation in the 1970s and 1980s and by the rapid spread of global interconnections in the 1990s.1
An inter-regional crossroads
By virtue of its geographical location, both the Arabian and Persian shores of the Gulf and its hinterlands have been inter-regional crossroads for centuries. Powerful processes of settlement and exchange tied the area into a cosmopolitan network of inter-regional trade and migration. Such social and commercial links extend back into antiquity and the pre-Islamic era. Archaeological discoveries of imported Persian ceramics and seals at many sites in modern-day Kuwait and Bahrain indicate the presence of thriving traffic between the two coasts of the Gulf as far back as the third millennium BC. In about 2000 BC, the island of Failaka, lying just off the Kuwaiti coastline, was inhabited by colonists from the Dilmun civilisation, centred on modern Bahrain, who developed it into a commercial and trading outpost for the entire region.2 Later, the Gulf’s geographic location astride the meeting-point of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia was instrumental in shaping economic development in the region. The lucrative frankincense trade routes that linked Oman and Yemen with the Levant, North Africa, and the Mediterranean were one early example of inter-regional networks in operation; another example was provided by the dhows and booms that from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries sailed among the Gulf sheikhdoms, the coast of western India, and the port cities of East Africa. Dhows and booms departed each season from Basra and the coastal settlements on both sides of the Gulf for the east coast of Africa and the west coast of India, laden with goods and binding the region into a much broader ‘transoceanic’ maritime community.3
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, important new export markets for Gulf dates and pearls emerged in Europe and as far away as North America. Global demand for both commodities boomed in the later years of the century, as international seafaring trade networks proliferated. The value of the date export trade in Muscat (today the capital of Oman) doubled between 1899 and 1906 and increased twoand-a-half times in Bahrain in the same period. Meanwhile, lifestyle changes and the expansion of the middle and upper classes in industrialised countries generated a substantial boom in demand for pearls, and the total value of pearls exported from the Gulf as a whole trebled between 1893 and 1904.4 The Kuwaiti historian Fahad Ahmad Bishara has documented how:
By the early twentieth century, as the boom reached its zenith, the merchants and mariners of the Gulf had established sizeable communities in a number of western Indian ports, including Karachi, Bombay, Goa, and Calicut, with some venturing further into the interior and taking up residence in such trading centres as Hyderabad and Poona. Western India quickly became a cornerstone of the Indian Ocean world of Gulf merchants, providing them with access to foodstuffs such as rice, sugar, tea, and spices as well as textiles, building materials such as Indian teak and other types of timber, which were vital to the burgeoning dhow-building industry in the Gulf.5
The powerful merchant families of the Hejaz (including the Ali-Rida, Zainal, Shobokshi, and Jamjum) constituted the mainstay of economic power in the Arabian Peninsula, together with immigrant merchants, many of whom came from Hadramawt in Yemen (the Bin Mahfouz, Bin Ladin, Bin Sakr, and Ka’aki families being prominent examples). These early economic elites operated within a broad transnational sphere stretching from East Africa to India and were cosmopolitan in their outlook and connections to international economic interests. In his seminal study of the major Gulf merchant families, Michael Field described how one of the scions of the Alireza family (in modern-day Saudi Arabia), Mohammed Ali, visited Paris for the first time in 1920.
Drawing on the help of business friends, he opened an office at 62 rue La Fayette, on the edge of the main shopping area of Paris . . . From the early 1920s, Mohamed Ali made it his habit to spend several months at a stretch in Paris each year – he bought a house on the Champs Elysees . . . During the height of his career in pearls, he lived almost permanently in Bombay and Paris.6
Writing about Bahrain’s most prominent merchant family of the nineteenth century, the Safar, James Onley provides an evocative description of a relentlessly trans-regional family hailing from Hillah in modern-day Iraq but putting down deep roots across Bahrain, Iran, and India.
Hajji Mirza Muhammad Ali Safar (1778–1845) was born in Bushehr; lived in Hillah, Mochah, Bahrain, Bushehr and Bombay; was a Persian, Ottoman and possibly British Indian subject; wrote his letters in Farsi and Arabic . . . His brother, Hajji Muhammad Jafar, was born in Bombay to a Persian mother from Shiraz, lived in Bombay and Bushehr, was a British Indian subject, dressed in the style of an
Indian merchant in Bombay, and probably spoke Farsi, Arabic and Hindi.7
Such movement (and opportunity) was restricted to elites and was not generally available to the majority of the inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula but, in addition to the intermixing of merchant elites and economic migrants, tribal movements were also fluid, as allegiances and relationships shifted over time, and in response to localised factors.8 A case in point was the movement of large numbers of people as a result of the collapse of the pearling economy in the Gulf in the aftermath of the Great Depression in 1929 and the Japanese introduction of cultured pearls. Socio-economic hardship and conditions of near-famine caused more than one-third of the population of Qatar at the time to migrate to neighbouring states in search of work and sustenance.9
Countervailing forces of conservatism
The intermixing of peoples and cultures described above had a strong influence on the emergent states and societies in the Gulf. This rich geographical history belies any notion of the region as peripheral to world history in the pre-oil era or any attempt to define the Gulf solely by its possession of some of the largest energy reserves in the world. Nevertheless, the integration of the coastal Arabian Peninsula sheikhdoms into the network of British protected states between 1835 and 1916 profoundly influenced the region’s subsequent political development. Beginning with the signing of a General Treaty of Peace in 1820 and a ‘perpetual’ Maritime Truce in 1835 and motivated by imperial considerations of safeguarding the coastal flanks of the maritime route to India, British officials representing the (British-controlled) Government of India concluded individual treaties with the Trucial States (now the UAE) in 1835, Bahrain in 1861, Kuwait in 1899 and again in 1914, and Qatar in 1916. Together, the agreements enmeshed the emerging proto-state entities into an inward-oriented, sub-regional unit in which British ‘protection’ was extended in return for exclusive political and economic relations.10
British protection elevated and formalised the roles of the ruling families in each sheikhdom, as Lisa Anderson documented in her important article on the ‘resilience of monarchy’ in the Middle East in 1991. This external protection additionally gave ruling elites in the Arabian Peninsula – whether members of the ruling families or the British political officers – a considerable stake in maintaining the conservative
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binnacle. On this, and other accounts, he was so much esteemed in the ship, that more than the usual degree of regret was felt for his melancholy fate. I saw the poor fellow pitch into the water, and watched him as he floated past, buoyant as a cork, and breasting the waves most gallantly, with an imploring look towards us, which I shall never forget. In less than a minute he was out of sight. A boat could hardly have lived in such weather, and no further attempt was made, or could have been made, to save him, than to throw over ropes, which all fell short of their mark. Although we soon lost all traces of him, it is probable he may have kept sight of us, as we drifted quickly to leeward under our bare poles, long after we had ceased to distinguish his figure in the yest of waves.
This gale, the first I ever saw, was also, I can recollect, one of the fiercest. It lasted for three days, totally dispersed our little squadron, well nigh foundered one of them, the Cambrian, and sent her hobbling into Bermuda some days after us, with the loss of her mainmast and all three top-masts.
Bermuda seemed to us mids a very barren place, as it produced few articles of any great utility—at least such as we required. There were then so few bullocks or sheep reared on the island, that I remember it was rather a wonder to see fresh meat on any table; and amongst the lower classes such a luxury was never known in those days. What may be the case now, I know not. The ships did get fresh meat now and then, but only very seldom; whereas in all other places, we were supplied regularly with fresh grub, as we called it, every day.
The Bermudas consist of upwards of a hundred little islands, clustered round two or three large ones. The seat of government is in St. George’s Island, which is about four or five miles long, by two broad, and very low The town is built on the south-east side, on a gentle and very pretty declivity which fronts the harbour. None of the houses have more than two stories, and they are all built of the soft freestone, of which all these islands are composed. Most of these dwellings have but one chimney. In walking through the streets in hot days, such is the extreme whiteness of the walls, that the glare is most painful to the eyes. But as many of the buildings are
surrounded by bananas, calabashes, orange trees, and by various members of the palm tribe, the disagreeable effect of the light is not felt, except in the open streets. This pretty town is about half a mile each way, and is mostly inhabited by blacks; but a great many of these possess houses, and have gained their freedom by some means or other. What is curious enough, all these manumitted negroes hold slaves as black as themselves; of course the whites own them in still greater numbers. The slaves are never allowed to have firearms in their hands, for fear of revolt; indeed it is said they are considerably more numerous than the freemen in the island; and no slave is allowed to go about the streets after nine o’clock at night.
We found the black people, generally speaking, gentle, docile, and kind. If we entered any of their houses, though they had but little to offer us, that little was always given with much simple hospitality. To say the truth, we saw much less reserve amongst the blacks than amongst those of our own colour. It is true, the means of entertaining strangers are but scanty; for the inhabitants, even of the better class, we were told, live mostly upon salt meat, brought from America in vessels which pass, like market boats, backwards and forwards during all the year.
We had read somewhere in fanciful tales, of countries in which the forests were of cedar; but, until we visited Bermuda, we hardly believed in such stories. At that fairy island, however, this tree constitutes the chief wood; so that every ship and boat built there is made of cedar: the beams also, and the furniture of the houses, are likewise constructed out of this fragrant timber. It is not the cedar of Lebanon, but resembles in appearance the yew of England, though it seldom grows to the same height. It has an agreeable smell, and bears a little blue berry, about the size of a pea, which, though sweet to the taste, is very dry. The wood, after it is cut up and planed, looks well for a little while, but it soon turns pale and chalky; nor is it capable of receiving a good polish. For ship-building, it is much esteemed on account of its durability. We saw orange and lemontrees growing, also, in such abundance, that at first we were enchanted to see the fruit thickly clustered upon all the branches. But when we climbed up and picked them off, in hopes of a grand
feast, we found them all of that bitter kind which, though very excellent for making marmalade, are good for nothing else.
Except a few wild pigeons, hardly any birds are to be seen, the most common being of blue and red colours, about the size of a fieldfare. The blue kind is pretty enough, but they do not sing any more than the red birds; so that, in the midshipman’s birth, we had no scruple of conscience about baking many a score of them in our pies.
Besides St. George’s, there are numerous lesser islands, and a large district, called the Continent, from its being by far the most extensive in the cluster, no less, I believe, than twelve or fifteen miles from end to end! At the north-western end of the group lies Ireland Island, on which an extensive naval establishment has of late years been erected; close to that spot is now the anchorage for ships of war. The population of those islands was calculated, at the time I speak of, at near twenty thousand, the greater part of whom were blacks, and principally slaves.
The rock of the islands of Bermuda is of a very soft coarse freestone, full of pores; so soft, indeed, that if it be required to make an additional window in a house, there is nothing to be done, we were told, but to hire a black fellow, who, with a saw, could speedily cut an opening in any part of the wall.
How far this sketch of Bermuda, taken from old scanty notes and faint recollections, may now be true, I cannot say. The cedar-trees and oranges, the blue birds, the rocks, the negroes, and the islands, I dare say, all remain just as before; but I think I have heard that the seat of government has been changed to the western end of the island; and now the men-of-war, instead of lying in Murray’s anchorage, on the north side of St. George’s, find, as I have said before, a far more secure roadstead.
There is nothing more remarkable in this singular cluster of islands than the extensive coral reefs which fend off the sea on the northern side, and stretch out in a semicircular belt, at the distance of two or three leagues from the land. If I recollect rightly, only one of these ledges, called the North Rock, shews its head above water. All the
others lie out of sight below the surface, and consequently form one of the most dangerous traps that nature has ever set in the path of mariners. On these treacherous reefs we saw many a poor vessel bilged, at moments when, from seeing the land at such a distance, they fancied themselves in perfect security.
Dangerous though they be, however, there are few things more beautiful to look at than these corallines when viewed through two or three fathoms of clear and still water. It is hardly an exaggeration to assert, that the colours of the rainbow are put to shame on a bright sunny day, by what meets the view on looking into the sea in those fairy regions. On the other hand, there are not many things, in the anxious range of navigation, more truly terrific, or, in fact, more dangerous, than these same beautiful submarine flower beds, raising their treacherous heads, like the fascinating sirens of old, or the fair and false mermaids of a later epoch. If, by sad fortune, the sailor once gets entangled amongst them, it is too well known that his chance of escape is but small.
They tell a story at Bermuda—‘the still vexed Bermoothes,’—of a boatman who, it was said, lived by these disasters, once going off to an unlucky vessel, fairly caught amongst the coral reefs, like a fly in a cobweb, not far from the North Rock. The wrecker, as he was called, having boarded the bewildered ship, said to the master,
“What will you give me, now, to get you out of this place?”
“Oh, any thing you like—name your sum.”
“Five hundred dollars?”
“Agreed! agreed!” cried the other. Upon which this treacherous pilot ‘kept his promise truly to the ear, but broke it to the hope,’ by taking the vessel out of an abominably bad place, only to fix her in one a great deal more intricate and perilous.
“Now,” said the wrecker to the perplexed and doubly-cheated stranger, “there never was a vessel in this scrape, that was known to get out again; and, indeed, there is but one man alive who knows the passages, or could, by any possibility, extricate you—and that’s me!”
“I suppose,” drily remarked the captain, “that ‘for a consideration’ you would be the man to do me that good service. What say you to another five hundred dollars to put me into clear water, beyond your infernal reefs?”
This hard bargain was soon made; and a winding passage, unseen before, being found, just wide enough, and barely deep enough, for the vessel to pass through, with only six inches to spare under her keel, in half an hour she was once more in blue water, out of soundings, and out of danger.
“Now, master rascallion of a wrecker,” cried the disentangled mariner, “tit for tat is fair play all the world over; and, unless you hand me back again my thousand dollars, I’ll cut the tow rope of your thievish-looking boat, and then, instead of returning evil for evil, as I ought by rights to do, I’ll be more of a Christian, and do you a very great service, by carrying you away from one of the most infamous places in the world, to the finest country imaginable—I mean America. And as you seem to have a certain touch of black blood in your veins, I may chance to get good interest for my loan of these thousand dollars, by selling you as a slave in Charleston negro market! What say you, my gay Mudian?”
We lay, moored in Murray’s anchorage at Bermuda, for the greater part of the winters both of 1802 and of 1803. The war had not yet broken out, and, in the absence of active service, we were fain to catch hold of any thing to amuse and occupy ourselves. The master, and a gang of youngsters who were fond of navigation, set about surveying the coral reefs already mentioned. This party of philosophers, as they were of course dubbed, landed on St. David’s Head, and other conspicuous points of land, to ascertain the longitude with more care; to observe the latitude and the variation of the compass; or to measure the perpendicular rise and fall of the tides; or, lastly, and much the most frequently, to have a good hour’s swim in the deliciously-warm sea. It will be easily understood, that all and each of these inquiries furnished to those persons, whose duty and pleasure it was to attend to them, an inexhaustible field of occupation, and of interest likewise.
At first sight, many of these pursuits may appear trivial; but it ought to be recollected, that, although it be easy enough to make the observations enumerated, and many others of the same nature, in a rough sort of way, there is hardly any one of them which, if it be required to be done in the best possible style, does not demand much attention and labour. For example, it seems a very simple affair to draw a base or straight line on the ground; but if this line is required to be, very exactly, of a particular length, so as to be neither more nor less, the problem is one of the utmost difficulty, which has fully exercised, and still employs, the talents of some of the ablest engineers of the day. In fact, these refinements in surveying and in observing, are pretty much like the pound of flesh question in the Merchant of Venice; with one comfortable difference, that the philosopher’s neck is not in such danger, even if, in a base of half-adozen miles, he should happen to err in the estimation of half-adozen hairs-breadths! It is well for young officers to recollect, however, that there is still a tolerably formidable professional tribunal, before which a man who undertakes such tasks is apt to be arraigned, and, if found wanting, pretty severely dealt with.
Sailors, like the element upon which they are tossed about, are scarcely ever at rest, and are seldom satisfied with what has been done before them. Consequently, the moment a ship arrives at a port, the navigators straightway erect their observatory, fix up their instruments, set their clocks a-going, and commence an attack, like the giants of old, upon the very heavens themselves,—and all for what? They say to themselves, that this is done for the benefit of science, for the advancement of geographical or astronomical knowledge—and so it is. But, along with these pure and lofty motives, there may enter some others, not quite so sublime, but perhaps equally operative in producing diligence. We have a lurking kind of malicious expectation of discovering that our predecessors have not made out their latitudes, or longitudes, or whatever the observations be, with the precision we ourselves hope to attain. It does not much matter whether the superior accuracy we expect to reach arises from our having better instruments in our hands, or from having more leisure, or better opportunities at command. So long as we contrive to do the required job better than it has been done
before, so long do we count upon getting the credit due to superiority. These honours, it is true, are worn only till somebody coming later shall jostle us out of our seats, by substituting still better work. The desire to avoid being thrust on one side in this way, and forgotten, is a strong motive to vigorous application on the occasions alluded to, and helps essentially to quicken that delightful interest which almost always attends an investigation of the properties of natural objects.
It is probably requisite to this enjoyment, that the pursuit followed should have some specific purpose in view;—if professional, so much the better. If a man, quite uninstructed, shall start up and say, in the abstract, “I mean to study botany—or astronomy”—or whatever else his fancy may select, he will, in all probability, find the pursuit as great a bore to himself as it will inevitably prove to those friends whom he endeavours to persuade that it is the most delightful thing in the world to be a savant. Still, young folks, in any situation, and most of all in the navy, need not be afraid; for they can hardly ever be cast into situations where, if their minds have been properly trained, first at school, and then on board ship, they may not hit upon ample materials to keep their heads and hands in motion, and at the same time to advance their professional objects.
One of our party of mids, who has since turned out a valuable and enterprising officer, took it in his head to make a trip in one of the whale-boats of the Bermuda fishery. Having ascertained the time of starting, he obtained leave to go on shore, and completely succeeded in his object by being present at the capture of a whale. The monster, however, led them a considerable dance off to sea, and it was long after the time appointed for his return, when the youth made his appearance, delightfully perfumed with blubber, and with a glorious tale to tell of his day’s adventures.
This was voted by acclamation to be ‘something like an expedition;’ and the youngster, of course, gained great credit for his spirit. I was one of another party who, I suppose, being a little jealous of our companion’s laurels, took the earliest opportunity of trying to signalise ourselves in a similar way. A monstrous whale was seen one morning playing about the Leander, in Murray’s anchorage,
and, of course, far within the belt of reefs already described as fringing the roadstead on its eastern and northern sides. How this great fellow had got into such a scrape, we could not conjecture. Possibly, in placing himself alongside of the rugged coral ledges, to scrub off the incrustations of shell-fish which torment these monsters of the deep, he had gradually advanced too far;—or, more probably, he may have set out in pursuit of some small fry, and, before he was aware of it, have threaded his way amongst this labyrinth of rocks, till escape was impossible. At all events, he now found himself in comparatively deep water, from eight to ten fathoms, without any visible means of retreat from his coral trap. All hands crowded into the rigging to see the whale floundering about; till at length some one proposed—rashly enough, certainly,—to pay him a visit in one of the ship’s boats, with no better implements, offensive or defensive, than the ordinary boat-hooks. These are light poles, with a spike, not unlike a shepherd’s crook, at the end of them, and not bad things for fishing up a turtle when caught napping, but slender reeds, in all conscience, against a fish forty or fifty feet long!
Away we went, however, in our wild-goose, whale chase, without any precise idea as to what we were to do if we should come up with the game. When we got near the great leviathan, his aspect became more and more formidable; and it was necessary to think of some regular plan of attack, if any were to be made. As to defence, it may easily be imagined that was out of the question; for one whisk of his tail would have sent the cutter and her crew, boat-hooks and all, spinning over the fore and yard arm of the flag-ship. All eyes were now upon us, and, after a pause, it was agreed unanimously, that we should run right on board of him, and take our chance. So we rowed forward; but the whale, whose back was then shewing just above the water, like a ship keel upwards, perhaps not approving of our looks, or possibly not seeing us, slipped down, clean out of sight, leaving only a monstrous whirlpool of oily-looking water, in the vortex of which we continued whirling round for some time, like great ninnies as we were, and gaping about us. At this time, we were not above half a ship’s length from the Leander; so that our disappointment caused considerable amusement on board, and the people came
laughing down from the rigging, where they had been perched, to see the grand fight between the whale and the young gentlemen!
As we were lying on our oars, and somewhat puzzled what to do next, we beheld one of the most extraordinary sights in the world;— at least I do not remember to have seen many things which have surprised me so much, or made a deeper impression on my memory. Our friend the whale, probably finding the water disagreeably shallow—for, as I have said, it was not above fifty or sixty feet deep —or perhaps provoked at not being able to disentangle himself from the sharp coral reefs, or for some other reason of pleasure or of pain,—suddenly made a spring out of the water.
So complete was this enormous leap, that for an instant we saw him fairly up in the air, in a horizontal position, at a distance from the water not much short, I should think, of half his own breadth! His back, therefore, must have been at least twenty feet, in perpendicular height, over our heads! While in his progress upwards, there was in his spring some touch of the vivacity with which a trout or a salmon shoots out of the water; but he fell back again on the sea, like a huge log thrown on its broadside; and with such a thundering crash, as made all hands stare in astonishment, and the ‘boldest held his breath for a time.’ Total demolition, indeed, must have been the inevitable fate of our party, had the whale taken his leap one minute sooner, for he would then have fallen plump on the boat! The waves caused by the explosion spread over half the anchorage; nor, if the Leander herself had blown up, could the effects have extended much further. As we rolled about in the cutter from side to side, we had time to balance the expediency of further proceedings, against the tolerable chance of being smashed to atoms under the whale’s belly at his next leap.
All idea of capturing him was now, of course, given up; if, indeed, any such frantic notion could ever seriously have entered our heads. But our curiosity was vehemently roused to witness such another feat; and, after lying on our oars for some time, we once more detected the whale’s back at a little distance from us.
“Let us poke him up again!” cried one of the party.
“Agreed! agreed!” roared out the others; and away we dashed, in hopes of producing a repetition of this singular exploit. The whale, however, did not choose to exhibit any more, though we were often near him. At last he fairly bolted, and took the direction of the North Rock, hoping, perhaps, to make his escape by the narrow passage known only to the most experienced pilots of those intricate regions.
It was not until after we had entirely lost sight of the chase, and when we had rowed so far, that we could just see the top of St. George’s Island astern of us, that we had leisure to remark the change of weather, which had taken place during this absurd pursuit. The sky had become overcast, and the wind risen to such a smart breeze from the south-west, that, when we again put the boat’s head towards the island, it was quite as much as we could do to make any headway at all, and sometimes we hardly held our own. Had the wind increased only a little more, we must inevitably have been blown to sea—and even as it was, it cost us many hours of severe tugging at the oars to regain the anchorage, just before night-fall, completely worn out.
I have not related this story of the whale’s leap without considerable hesitation, the source of which distrust will be found, better than I can express it for myself, in the following anecdote, related to me by Sir Walter Scott; which I recommend to the attention of travellers who have any thoughts of communicating to the public, what they have seen in distant lands.
It appears that Mungo Park, the first, and still, perhaps, the most interesting of African travellers, was in the habit of relating, in a quiet way, to his most confidential friends, sundry curious and highly amusing incidents, that had occurred to him during his celebrated journey in search of the Niger. Of these anecdotes, however, no mention is to be found in his printed statements—while many others are inserted, not nearly so interesting as these rejected stories.
“How is this?” asked his friends. “Why did not you put these things also into your book?”
“Oh,” replied Park, “the case is simply this:—I was sent to Africa for certain public purposes, and expressly required to investigate
particular points. Now, it seemed to me of consequence not only that these inquiries should be carefully made, but that a credible, as well as a faithful account, should be rendered to the world.”
“Very true,” resumed his friends; “but as there is nothing which you have now told us, in addition to what you have printed, which is not strictly true, while it is certainly very entertaining, why should you wantonly deprive your book of so much that would recommend it still more to general favour?”
“There is nothing wanton in the matter,” answered the traveller; “indeed, it is precisely because I believed it would have had no such good effect as you suppose, that I have kept out the matter alluded to. It might, indeed, have gained for the work a little more temporary popularity; but that was not what I desired. At all events, I had, as I conceived, a still higher duty to perform. Being sent to execute a given service, I performed my task to the best of my ability. But on returning, I felt I had another obligation to attend to, not less binding, which was, to give such an account as, over and above being strictly true, should carry with it such evidence of its own good faith, as should insure every part of my story being credited. These anecdotes, however, which I only venture to tell you because you have known me all my life, I have shrunk from repeating to the world, whose knowledge of my character is drawn from this book alone. In short, I did not feel that I was at liberty to shake my own credit, or even to risk its being shaken, by relating anecdotes so much out of the ordinary line of events as some of these stories are. As a servant of the public in the great field of discovery, I considered my character for veracity as part of their property, which was not to be trifled with, merely for the sake of making idle people laugh or stare a little more. And I feared, that even one doubtful point in such a work, no matter how small, or how true, might have weakened the authority of the whole, and this I did not choose to hazard.”
After Park’s death, and when a biographical sketch of this most amiable and persevering of travellers was in the course of preparation, one of this circle of friends, whose memory for such things was known to be very retentive, was applied to for these
suppressed anecdotes, the existence of which had, somehow or other, leaked out. After a moment’s reflection, he said—
“No!—I won’t tell you one word of them. If my friend Park, in his soberest and most reflecting moments, considered it proper to keep these things out of his book, and only betrayed them even to his intimates, over a glass of toddy, I don’t see that we should be acting a generous part by his memory to publish them after he is gone, however true we are convinced they must be.”
After preparing the above adventure of the whale’s leap for the press, I felt, on Park’s principle, a certain hesitation as to trusting it before the public; but in order to fortify myself by an authority of the highest rank in whaling matters, I sat down and wrote the following letter to my friend Captain Scoresby:—
“More than twenty-eight years ago, I saw a whale leap right out of the sea, in Murray’s anchorage at Bermuda. The depth of water, if I recollect right, was about ten fathoms, and he had, somehow or other, got inside the barrier of coral reefs which gird these islands on the north. When the whale was at his greatest elevation, his back may have been twenty or thirty feet above the surface of the water, and at that moment he was in a horizontal position. His length could not have been less, I should imagine, than fifty or sixty feet. As I never saw such a thing before or since, I am a little afraid of relating it, and have no mind to risk my credit by telling a story too big to be swallowed by the average run of gullets, however true in point of fact. You will oblige me, therefore, very much, by telling me whether, in the course of your extensive experience, you have seen one or more such incidents. If not, I fear my story of the whale’s jump at Bermuda must be kept out of a little work I am now preparing for the use of young folks. But if I have your authority to back me, the anecdote shall stand, and so take its chance for being valuable in the way of information.”
To this I received the following reply from Captain Scoresby, who, as all the world will admit, is the highest authority on such questions: “Liverpool, 25th August, 1830.
“And now having come to the subject, which, I allow, is one of magnitude, I have much pleasure in being able to speak to the point, in attestation of the not infrequency of the exhibition of the huge leaps which you witnessed, however ignorance might charge it as ‘very like a whale.’ Whilst engaged in the northern whale fishery, I witnessed many similar exploits of the whales in their frisks. Generally, they were of a middle size; but I think I have seen instances of full-grown fish, of forty or fifty feet in length, forgetting their usual gravity, and making out these odd exhibitions of their whole form from head to tail. Certainly, I have several times seen whales leap so high out of the water as to be completely in air, which, reckoning from the surface of the back (the real extent of the leap), could scarcely be less than twenty feet, and possibly might be more. I have, at different times, gone in pursuit of these frolicsome fish; but in all cases they avoided either catastrophe—the leaping upon the boat, or allowing the boat to pull upon them.
“By the way, whilst the breathing of the whale has been magnified into a resemblance of water-works, to the abuse of the credulous, the frolic feats of the leaping whales have been neglected as a source of interest. In referring to my account of the arctic regions, I perceive the fact is named, but with little commentary for general amusement.”[1]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] See Capt Scoresby’s exceedingly curious and valuable Account of the Whale Fishery in the Arctic Regions, vol i p 467
CHAPTER V.
MIDSHIPMEN’S PRANKS.
During the long winters of our slothful discontent at Bermuda, caused by the Peace of Amiens, the grand resource, both of the idle and the busy, amongst all classes of the Leander’s officers, was shooting—that never-ending, still-beginning amusement, which Englishmen carry to the remotest corners of the habitable globe— popping away in all countries, thinking only of the game, and often but too reckless of the prejudices or fears of the natives. This propensity is indulged even in those uninhabited regions of the earth which are visited only once in an age; and if Captain Parry had reached the Pole, he would unquestionably have had a shot at the axis of the earth!
In the mean time, the officers and the young gentlemen of the flagship at Bermuda, in the beginning of 1803, I suppose, to keep their hands in for the war which they saw brewing, and hourly prayed for, were constantly blazing away amongst the cedar groves and orange plantations of those fairy islands, which appeared more and more beautiful after every such excursion. The midshipmen were generally obliged to content themselves with knocking down the blue and the red birds with the ship’s pistols, charged with His Majesty’s gunpowder, and, for want of small shot, with slugs formed by cutting up His Majesty’s musket-bullets. The officers aimed at higher game, and were, of course, better provided with guns and ammunition. Several of these gentlemen had brought from England some fine dogs—high-bred pointers; while the middies, also, not to be outdone, must needs have a dog of their own: they recked very little of what breed; but some sort of animal they said they must have.
I forget how we procured the strange-looking beast whose services we contrived to engage; but, having once obtained him, we were not slow in giving him our best affections. It is true, he was as ugly as any thing could possibly be. His colour was a dirty, reddish
yellow; and while a part of his hair twisted itself up in curls, a part hung down, quite straight, almost to the ground. He was utterly useless for all the purposes of real sport, but quite good enough to furnish the mids with plenty of fun when they went on shore—in chasing pigs, barking at old, white-headed negresses, and other amusements, suited to the exalted taste and habits of the rising generation of officers.
People will differ as to the merits of dogs; but we had no doubts as to the great superiority of ours over all the others on board, though the name we gave him certainly implied no such confidence on our part. After a full deliberation, it was decided to call him Shakings. Now, it must be explained that shakings is the name given to small fragments of rope yarns, odds and ends of cordage, bits of oakum, old lanyards,—in short, to any kind of refuse arising out of the wear and tear of the ropes. This odd name was perhaps bestowed on our beautiful favourite in consequence of his colour not being very dissimilar to that of well-tarred Russia hemp; while the resemblance was increased by many a dab of pitch, which his rough coat imbibed from the seams between the planks of the deck, in the hot weather.
If old Shakings was no great beauty, he was, at least, the most companionable of dogs; and though he dearly loved the midshipmen, and was dearly beloved by them in return, he had enough of the animal in his composition to take a still higher pleasure in the society of his own kind. So that, when the high-bred, showy pointers belonging to the officers came on board, after a shooting excursion, Mr. Shakings lost no time in applying to them for the news. The pointers, who liked this sort of familiarity very well, gave poor Shakings all sorts of encouragement. Not so their masters;—they could not bear to see such an abominable cur, as they called our favourite, at once so cursedly dirty and so utterly useless, mixing with their sleek and well-kept animals. At first their dislike was confined to such insulting expressions as these; then it came to an occasional kick, or a knock on the nose with the butt-end of a fowling-piece; and lastly, to a sound cut with the hunting-whip.
Shakings, who instinctively knew his place, took all this, like a sensible fellow, in good part; while the mids, when out of hearing of
the higher powers, uttered curses both loud and deep against the tyranny and oppression exercised against an animal which, in their fond fancy, was declared to be worth all the dogs in the ward-room put together. They were little prepared, however, for the stroke which soon fell upon them, perhaps in consequence of these very murmurs. To their great horror and indignation, one of the lieutenants, provoked at some liberty which Master Shakings had taken with his newly-polished boot, called out, one morning,—
“Man the jolly-boat, and land that infernal, dirty, ugly beast of a dog belonging to the young gentlemen!”
“Where shall I take him to, sir?” asked the strokesman of the boat.
“Oh, any where; pull to the nearest part of the shore, and pitch him out on the rocks. He’ll shift for himself, I have no doubt.” So off went poor dear Shakings!
If a stranger had come into the midshipmen’s birth at that moment, he might have thought His Majesty’s naval service was about to be broken up. All allegiance, discipline, or subordination, seemed utterly cancelled by this horrible act. Many were the execrations hurled upwards at the offending ‘knobs,’ who, we thought, were combining to make our lives miserable. Some of our party voted for writing a letter of remonstrance to the admiral against this unheard-of outrage; and one youth swore deeply that he would leave the service, unless justice were obtained. But as he had been known to swear the same thing half-a-dozen times every day since he joined the ship, no great notice was taken of this pledge. Another declared, upon his word of honour, that such an act was enough to make a man turn Turk, and fly his country! At last, by general agreement, it was decided that we should not do a bit of duty, or even stir from our seats, till we obtained redress for our grievances. However, while we were in the very act of vowing mutiny and disobedience, the hands were turned up to ‘furl sails!’ upon which the whole party, totally forgetting their magnanimous resolution, scudded up the ladders, and jumped into their stations with more than usual alacrity, wisely thinking, that the moment for actual revolt had not yet arrived.
A better scheme than throwing up the service, or writing to the admiral, or turning Mussulmen, was afterwards concocted. The midshipman who went on shore in the next boat easily got hold of poor Shakings, who was howling on the steps of the watering place. In order to conceal him, he was stuffed, neck and crop, into the captain’s cloak-bag, brought safely on board, and restored once more to the bosom of his friends.
In spite of all we could do, however, to keep Master Shakings below, he presently found his way to the quarter-deck, to receive the congratulations of the other dogs. There he was soon detected by the higher powers, and very shortly afterwards trundled over the gangway, and again tossed on the beach. Upon this occasion he was honoured by the presence of one of his own masters, a middy, sent upon this express duty, who was specially desired to land the brute, and not to bring him on board again. Of course, this particular youngster did not bring the dog off; but, before night, somehow or other, old Shakings was snoring away, in grand chorus with his more fashionable friends the pointers, and dreaming no evil, before the door of the very officer’s cabin whose beautifully-polished boots he had brushed by so rudely in the morning,—an offence that had led to his banishment.
This second return of our dog was too much. The whole posse of us were sent for on the quarter-deck, and in very distinct terms positively ordered not to bring Shakings on board again. These injunctions having been given, this wretched victim, as we termed him, of oppression, was once more landed amongst the cedar groves. This time he remained a full week on shore; but how or when he found his way off again, no one ever knew; at least no one chose to divulge. Never was there any thing like the mutual joy felt by Shakings and his two dozen masters. He careered about the ship, barked and yelled with delight, and, in his raptures, actually leaped, with his dirty feet, on the milk-white duck trousers of the disgusted officers, who heartily wished him at the bottom of the anchorage! Thus the poor beast unwittingly contributed to accelerate his hapless fate, by this ill-timed shew of confidence in those who were then plotting his ruin. If he had kept his paws to himself, and staid quietly
in the dark recesses of the cock-pit, wings, cable-tiers, and other wild regions, the secrets of which were known only to the inhabitants of our submarine world, all might yet have been well.
We had a grand jollification on the night of Shakings’ restoration; and his health was in the very act of being drunk, with three times three, when the officer of the watch, hearing an uproar below, the sounds of which were conveyed distinctly up the wind-sail, sent down to put our lights out; and we were forced to march off, growling, to our hammocks.
Next day, to our surprise and horror, old Shakings was not to be seen or heard of. We searched every where, interrogated the coxswains of all the boats, and cross-questioned the marines who had been sentries during the night on the forecastle, gangways, and poop; but all in vain!—no trace of Shakings could be found.
At length, the idea began to gain ground amongst us, that the poor beast had been put an end to by some diabolical means; and our ire mounted accordingly. This suspicion seemed the more natural, as the officers said not a word about the matter, nor even asked us what we had done with our dog. While we were in this state of excitement and distraction for our loss, one of the midshipmen, who had some drollery in his composition, gave a new turn to the expression of our thoughts.
This gentleman, who was more than twice as old as most of us, say about thirty, had won the affections of the whole of our class, by the gentleness of his manners, and the generous part he always took on our side. He bore amongst us the pet name of Daddy; and certainly he was like a father to those amongst us who, like myself, were quite adrift in the ship, without any one to look after them. He was a man of talents and classical education, but he had entered the navy far too late in life ever to take to it cordially. His habits, indeed, had become so rigid, that they could never be made to bend to the mortifying kind of discipline which it appears essential every officer should run through, but which only the young and light-hearted can brook. Our worthy friend, accordingly, with all his abilities, taste, and acquirements, never seemed at home on board ship; and unless a
man can reach this point of liking for the sea, he is better on shore. At all events, old Daddy cared more about his books than about the blocks, and delighted much more in giving us assistance in our literary pursuits, and trying to teach us to be useful, than in rendering himself a proficient in those professional mysteries, which he never hoped to practise in earnest himself.
What this very interesting person’s early history was, we never could find out; nor why he entered the navy; nor how it came, that a man of his powers and accomplishments should have been kept back so long. Indeed, the youngsters never inquired too closely into these matters, being quite contented to have the advantage of his protection against the oppression of some of the other oldsters, who occasionally bullied them. Upon all occasions of difficulty, we were in the habit of clustering round him, to tell our grievances, great and small, with the certainty of always finding in him that great desideratum in calamity—a patient and friendly listener.
It will easily be supposed, that our kind Daddy took more than usual interest in this affair of Shakings, and that he was applied to by us at every stage of the transaction. He was sadly perplexed, of course, when the dog was finally missing; and, for some days, he could give us no comfort, nor suggest any mode of revenge which was not too dangerous for his young friends to put in practice. He prudently observed, that as we had no certainty to go upon, it would be foolish to get ourselves into a serious scrape for nothing at all.
“There can be no harm, however,” he continued, in his dry and slightly-sarcastic way, which all who knew him will recollect as well as if they saw him now, drawing his hand slowly across his mouth and chin, “There can be no harm, my boys, in putting the other dogs in mourning for their dear departed friend Shakings; for, whatever is come of him, he is lost to them as well as to us, and his memory ought to be duly respected.”
This hint was no sooner given than a cry was raised for crape, and every chest and bag ransacked, to procure badges of mourning. The pointers were speedily rigged up with a large bunch of crape, tied in a handsome bow, upon the left leg of each, just above the knee. The
