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First published 2017 by Cornell University Press
Printed in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Shannon, Matthew K., 1983– author.
Title: Losing hearts and minds : American-Iranian relations and international education during the Cold War / Matthew K. Shannon.
Description: Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017012368 (print) | LCCN 2017012981 (ebook) | ISBN 9781501712340 (epub/mobi) | ISBN 9781501709708 (pdf) | ISBN 9781501713132 (cloth : alk. paper)
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017012368
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Jacket photographs: (front) Iranian students demonstrate in Washington, D.C., in 1980. Courtesy of the Library of Congress. (back) Mohammad Reza Pahlavi with University of Pennsylvania president Gaylord P. Harnwell, in 1962. From the Collections of the University Archives, University of Pennsylvania Archives.
For Samantha
Education between Iran and the West 1
1. The Foundation: Education, Development, and the Tenuous Path of the 1950s 17
2. The Window: Negotiating Modernization and Rights during the Kennedy Era 43
3. The Youth: Student Internationalism during the Global 1960s 69
4. The Boom: America’s Iran in the 1970s 93
5. The Reckoning: Human Rights, Iran, and the World 117
Acknowl edgments
This book, as with any decade-long project, owes so much to so many. It began at Temple University, where I was fortunate to have a broad support network. The anchor was Richard Immerman, and he provided feedback on all chapters in their crudest forms. I usually received that feedback so quickly that I had barely reflected on my arguments before he compelled me to consider new ones. He was a model critic who pushed me to explore new questions and frameworks without losing sight of the fundamental question of power in the international system. Conversations with Petra Goedde also generated new research questions, and it was with her that I first began to think about the question of human rights in American-Iranian relations. She helped me understand how to connect histories of ideas and nonstate actors with the diplomacy of nations. David Farber has an uncanny ability to cut to the heart of any research project, and his influence kept this book conversant with postwar American narratives. I am grateful to all three for helping me learn how to write history that focuses on the diplomatic, transnational, and domestic aspects of the contemporary past.
During my time in Philadelphia, there was a vibrant history department on the ninth floor of Gladfelter Hall. I learned a lot about the profession from Beth Bailey, Arthur Schmidt, and William Hitchcock. It was a pleasure to be part of a great cohort, too. Thanks are due to Ben Brandenberg, Carly Goodman, David Guba, Drew McKevitt, Tom Reinstein, Tim Sayle, Kelly Shannon, Matt Unangst, and Silke Zoller. For most of us, the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy was a second home. CENFAD enriched the already dynamic environment in Philadelphia and provided me with generous support on multiple occasions. I was especially fortunate to serve as the Thomas Davis Fellow during the 2010–11 academic year and to be part of the three-year Hertog Program in Grand Strategy. Outside of the foreign policy world, it was a thrill to close out my time at Temple as a fellow with the Center for the Humanities, a pleasant home to a lively group of scholars whose diverse methodologies kept my mind fresh when I thought that I had things figured out.
The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations has been a constant source of support and inspiration. I thank my fellow panelists from the 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2015 meetings for giving me a convenient excuse to present early drafts of this book’s chapters and to think about American-Iranian relations in different contexts. As any member of SHAFR knows, the list of friends
runs long, but I greatly appreciate the friendship of Matt D. Jacobs and Doug Snyder for their always-thoughtful conversations. Thanks, too, to the small group of Iran specialists that over the years has included Roham Alvandi, Claudia Castiglioni, Vittorio Felci, Richard Garlitz, Roland Popp, and others whose archival revelations routinely challenge old assumptions. Outside of SHAFR, I thank my fellow participants at the human rights workshops hosted by Howard University and the University of California, Davis, in 2010 and 2011 respectively, and the German Historical Institute and the Center for Advanced Studies of the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität for sponsoring conferences on student migration and international education in 2011.
Others also warrant a special acknowledgment. Jim Goode has been nothing but supportive. His scholarship has repeatedly pushed boundaries, and I welcome every opportunity to talk with him about Iran. The same is true for W. Taylor Fain. He, along with others in the history department at the University of North Carolina Wilmington, inspired me to study history and has since provided expert advice at all the right moments. I also thank Michael McGandy of Cornell University Press for patiently working with me throughout this process. He and two anonymous readers asked the tough questions and helped me understand that a historical monograph is very different from any other form of academic writing.
While any misstatements are entirely my own, all of these individuals helped me think in different ways about the long-term narrative of historical change over time in American-Iranian relations. Rather than drill into a particular episode or decade of the binational relationship, this book looks at the entirety of the U.S. relationship with the last shah’s Iran. All historical frames must be clearly defined, though, and the narrative thread that weaves through this book follows a particular “connector,” namely, international education and the resulting stream of Iranian student migration to the United States. I tell this story from the perspective of “America and the world.” This historical subfield is not diplomatic or military history in a new guise; nor is it an entirely new subfield that discards old insights for what can be fleeting methodological trends. It is both a “history from above” that, in this case, considers the opinions of presidents, diplomats, policymakers, and politicians, and a “history from below” that takes the pulse of student life in the United States and analyzes ideas, culture, and circuits of movement and exchange. The history of America and the world is the history of the nation, its peoples, and people from all over the globe operating within a web of political, military, economic, and cultural relations. In other words, my narrative places the question of power within the American-Iranian relationship before the 1979 revolution within its broader international and transnational contexts.
This book’s narrative is driven by that fuel of historical research: archival documents, more specifically, English-language documents that reconstruct the points of connection between Iranian students and a range of official and unofficial Americans. Researching a process with many stakeholders that evolved over four decades took me to a wide variety of government and nongovernmental archives. I owe more than I could ever express to the countless archivists from California eastward to Great Britain who guided me through their collections. I tracked down the documents of the American Friends of the Middle East from various repositories, did targeted research at the Rockefeller Archive Center and universities such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and combed through the papers of various social change movements at the Swarthmore College Peace Collection. Still, government documents remain essential to any researcher of U.S. foreign relations. This book is informed by material from the John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Jimmy Carter Presidential Libraries. It is also informed by a host of record groups at National Archives II in College Park, Maryland, especially those of the Department of State, the U.S. Information Agency, and the various military and aid missions that operated in Iran. Any researcher of international education knows too well that the records of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs are not with their kin in College Park but at the University of Arkansas; I am indebted to the archivists there for getting a large box of paper to me in such a timely manner. Documents from the National Archives of the United Kingdom also contextualize key moments in this book, and a trip to Kew is worthwhile to any student of international affairs.
I have recovered Iranian voices from a number of sources. The Ford Foundation grant files provide insight into the inner workings of the Iranian bureaucracy. The papers of Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas at the Library of Congress contain letters to and from Iranian student leaders in the United States, along with oppositionist publications that were circulated widely, including in the Supreme Court. The records of the International Commission of the U.S. National Student Association house a wealth of material and indicate that young American activists from the United States and Iran conversed regularly about international politics. I have also accumulated from various archives from Palo Alto to Manhattan, and with the indefatigable support of interlibrary loan librarians at three institutions, my own collection of English-language Iranian student publications. The history that emerges from these documents is of America’s relationship with Iran during the decades between the Second World War and the Iranian Revolution. But the extent to which Iranians had an impact on the United States, individual Americans, and global discourses on modernization and human rights is quite remarkable.
Beyond documents, a major source of this book’s Iranian inspiration comes from an individual and an experience. The individual was Jerry Dekker, who spent countless hours with me on the telephone discussing all things Persian over a few years’ time. A scholar of the Middle East and tireless promoter of citizen diplomacy between the United States and Iran whose heart was closer to poetry than politics, Jerry was instrumental in arranging my first experience in Iran. The three weeks that I spent in Iran in mid-2015 transformed the way that I thought about the country, its warm people, and rich cultures. It is difficult to explain how volleyball in a park in Kermanshah, a conversation outside a mosque in Isfahan, or a cool walk in Hamadan’s hills affects the way one approaches the study of the past—but it does. I am grateful to Mozaffar, Maliheh, and Phillip for helping to make my time in Iran so enjoyable and rewarding.
I would be remiss not to thank Emory and Henry College, a small liberal arts college in southwest Virginia that has been my intellectual home for the past four years. My colleagues have been great company and a wealth of methodological inspiration. Tom Little and Jack Wells are fine historians, and they keep the department running smoothly. Alise Coen and Mark Finney are wonderful friends, Celeste Gaia an international educator par excellence, and Ed Davis and Shelley Koch a constant delight. I am grateful for the Melon grants that I received from Emory and Henry in the summers of 2014 and 2015 to support international travel and research on this book. The most important part of the past four years in Emory has been the ways in which teaching the liberal arts in small classrooms (an increasing rarity these days) feeds into my research in unexpected ways. A special thanks goes to the students who have taken my senior seminar on Iran and the West. Their curious comments and relentless questioning have forced me to think more thoroughly and comprehensively about the ties between the United States and Iran.
The most important base of support throughout this process, and in life in general, has been my family. My parents have always assisted me in every way imaginable. Conversations with my mother combined with rounds of golf and baseball outings with my father to provide much needed respite from work during graduate school. My brother is always great fun, whether in Munich or Austin. My grandmother, Pearl Shannon, was always encouraging. I’m sure that she is somewhere smiling with a twinkle in her eye. The therapeutic walks on which my dog, Bonzo, took me provided the best endings to long days of writing. Finally, I thank Samantha. A historian herself, she edited and commented on the drafts of the manuscript. Most inspiring, it was her love that for so long provided me with the energy to meet each day’s challenge.
LOSING HEARTS AND MINDS
EDUCATION BETWEEN IRAN AND THE WEST
It was November 1977 and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (r. 1941–79) was in Washington, D.C., for his twelfth and final state visit to the United States. During his nearly four decades in power, Iran’s last shah knew eight U.S. presidents and manipulated the court of public opinion to establish an image of a benevolent and modernizing monarch despite the illiberal nature of Iranian politics during the Pahlavi era. On the eve of the Iranian Revolution, however, Iranians at home and abroad were no longer willing to sacrifice personal rights for national development. This was true in 1977 for the tens of thousands of Iranian students in the United States, many of whom criticized the Pahlavi state and U.S. support for it through the language of human rights. Iranian students had a history of confronting the shah during state visits. Over the years they petitioned presidents and members of Congress, organized with like-minded Americans, published pamphlets, wrote articles, and picketed with signs to express their opinions, often using masks to conceal their identity. But the 1977 protest was different. The tension between the shah’s U.S.-backed approach to modernization and the opposition’s demands for civil and political rights exploded on November 11. As Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter greeted the shah and his empress on the south lawn of the White House, some seventeen hundred anti-shah students and nineteen hundred of the shah’s supporters (many hired by the Ira nian government) rehearsed for an imminent revolution. When police responded, shifting winds took the tear gas they sprayed at the protesters toward the White House, forcing a teary-eyed president and his guests to reach for their handkerchiefs. Students in Tehran staged simultaneous demonstrations and those in the United States Introduction
FIgure 1. The effects of tear gas and revolutionary student politics on the American and Iranian heads of state in November 1977. Note the students’ use of “human rights” and “torture” to criticize the Car ter administration’s Iran policy and the shah’s international reputation. ISAUS, Resistance, December 1977, 1, ISAP.
Courtesy of the Swarthmore College Peace Collection.
touted their “victory in Washington” (see Figure 1). Carter later described the embarrassing scene as “an augury” of things to come.1 Why were so many Iranian students in the United States, and what accounted for such an astounding manifestation of diaspora politics in Washington on the eve of the Iranian Revolution?
The answer is a cold war story. During the cold war, the threat of nuclear war forced the superpowers to wage war by other means and to compete to win the “hearts and minds” of people around the world. Hard power—particularly wars along the periphery of the Eurasian core and economic might at home and among allies—was central to American and Soviet cold war strategies. But “soft power,” defined as “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion,” became an essential tactic of the larger U.S. strategy of containment.2
Education, a form of soft power with the ability to transform nations and, perhaps, to win hearts and minds, became a means by which the United States could cultivate friendly relations with nations at risk of falling under Soviet influence.
In this sense, international education was the “fourth dimension” of U.S. strategy, alongside military, economic, and political affairs.3 The arrival of Americans in Iran to provide technical, military, and educational assistance was one side of the coin; student migration to the United States was the other.4 As the superpowers moved “from total war to total diplomacy,” there were few countries outside of Europe where the United States waged “total cold war” with more intensity than Iran.5
In strictly geostrategic terms, Iran was significant to U.S. policymakers. It shared a sixteen hundred-mile border with the Soviet Union to the north, adjoined the Persian Gulf to the south, and sat atop 10 percent of the world’s petroleum deposits. The shah and his American supporters wanted to keep Iran anticommunist and integrated into the global economy. Together, they established a relationship that gave the United States a toehold in the Persian Gulf, created a bulwark against Soviet expansion along the northern tier of the Middle East, guaranteed the outward flow of Iranian oil, and strengthened the shah’s repressive security state. The classic narrative of U.S.-Iran relations during the shah’s reign centers on these geostrategic considerations and consists of statecentered histories that pay little attention to transnational ideas and actors.6 The best of the recent scholarship focuses either on particular episodes in U.S.-Iran relations or fleshes out the classic narrative of diplomacy and arms deals.7
This book reinterprets American-Iranian relations through the lens of international education. Although the official American entrance into Iranian life occurred during the Second World War, 1950 gave birth to the first sustained exchange programs as Iranian Fulbright scholars began to arrive in the United States and education became the centerpiece to U.S. technical and military assistance programs in Iran. The start of the Iran Hostage Crisis in November 1979 and the severance of official diplomatic relations in April 1980 marked the end of the educational project that began during the early years of the cold war and the beginning of a new, chillier era of U.S.-Iran relations. The interpretation that follows favors the epochal over the episodic, and it foregrounds the remarkable number of individuals inside and outside of government who shaped the contours of the binational relationship. It demonstrates that there was nothing inevitable about thirty-seven years of U.S. support for the Shah of Iran.
Losing Hearts and Minds argues that international education served a dual function in the American-Iranian relationship. The volume of Iranian student migration to the United States was evidence of an intercultural dialogue exceptional in the history of Amer i ca’s relationship with the world. The Iranian student population grew from a mere five hundred in 1950 to upward of fifty thousand in the late 1970s to become the largest national group of students in the United States by the onset of the Iranian Revolution. U.S. policymakers, diplomats, aid officials, philanthropists, and educationalists created a vast array
of government-sponsored and nongovernmental educational programs to lay a cultural foundation for the Washington-Tehran alliance and to supply the shah with trained manpower to administer his modernization program, known as the White Revolution. Iranian alumni of American universities were elected to the Iranian parliament (majlis), entered the shah’s bureaucracy, staffed the Plan Organization and the National Iranian Oil Company, worked in the financial sector, served in the armed forces, joined university faculties, and assumed the premiership. During their time abroad, Iranian students mingled with their American friends, shared ideas, and were the most important “linkage figures” between the two countries from the Second World War to the Iranian Revolution.8
International education was not simply a means toward a strategic end that was defined by the U.S. and Iranian governments, however. It also provided a means of resistance. Iranian students abroad produced one of the most impressive oppositional movements of the cold war era, and their movement expanded in size and diversified in composition over the years as the shah refused to include political liberalization as part of his modernization program. Because the Pahlavi state did not tolerate opposition within its borders, dissent became part of the educational networks that connected the United States and Iran. Although Washington supported the shah in the name of security and development, most anti-shah students distinguished between the U.S. government and the American people. That distinction made it possible for Iranian students to serve as unofficial ambassadors and form an alternate alliance with progressive Americans critical of the shah’s authoritarianism.9 Iranian students and their American allies adopted worldviews that transcended traditional calculations of national interest, served as an alternative power center to national governments, and engaged in an evolving human rights discourse to delegitimize the shah’s claim to be a benevolent and modernizing monarch. Their evolving rights-based critique of the Pahlavi state reached the halls of power in Washington and Tehran, reshaped the international community, and contributed to the Iranian Revolution of 1979 that replaced the shah’s Iran with Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini’s Islamic Republic.
Iran, Education, and the Modern World
International education was a defining feature of Iran’s and the broader Middle East’s modern encounter with the West. Iranian culture has always valued education, an emphasis found in texts ranging from Zoroastrian scriptures to Saadi’s poems.10 But two developments precipitated the establishment of educational contacts between Iran and the West as the modern world system took shape in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. First, the nation-building project in Iran
that began during the nineteenth century depended on a well-educated cadre of military officers and civil servants to protect Iran’s sovereignty and administer nationalizing reforms. What began as a defensive response to European imperialism evolved until the 1970s when Iran, an oil-rich U.S. ally, was able to dictate the terms of its own development. Second, Europeans and Americans saw education as a means to remake Iran in their own post-Enlightenment image. Before the Second World War, Presbyterian missionaries were the face of American soft power and the “chosen instruments” that introduced new ideas to Iran. 11 Nongovernmental organizations remained active after the war, but the U.S. government assumed greater responsibility for directing Iranian student migration as part of a broader cold war strategy. While the ties between Iran and the United States were as strong as ever during the reign of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the tension between development and rights was never resolved.
From the Napoleonic Wars (1798–1815) through the First World War (1914–18), education was the centerpiece of the “defensive development” efforts of Egypt and the Ottoman Empire.12 The “gunpowder empires” of the Middle East enjoyed military superiority during the early modern era, but Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798 shifted the balance of power in Europe’s favor. Military setbacks compelled reform-minded Egyptian khedives and Ottoman sultans to create new militaries that were centrally administered, filled with conscripts, and staffed by salaried officers versed in European ways of war. Egypt’s Mohammad Ali (r. 1805–48) led the way when he staffed his new officer school in Aswan with European teachers and sent teams of Egyptians to France to study war. Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808–39) followed suit. He opened the Imperial War College, brought in British, French, and Prussian officers to train his army and navy, and sent military men to Europe. Leaders in Cairo and Istanbul also broke the religious establishment’s hold on land, law, and public life, established new schools that emphasized European languages, and sent young elites and civil servants to study in European capitals. As the Egyptian and Ottoman states grew, they needed technocrats, or “French knowers,” to guide the bureaucratic reforms. By the midnineteenth century, “the path to state employment passed through Paris,” and the road to nationalism passed through the new militaries, bureaucracies, and secular education systems.13
A similar process unfolded in Iran during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Qajar Dynasty (1785–1925) established the first links between national development and international education.14 In 1811 the modernizing crown prince, Abbas Mirza, arranged for two Persians to study medicine in England. Five others left in 1815 to study engineering and military sciences. The Qajars expected their young subjects to acquire skills in Europe and, upon return, help ward off Great Britain and Russia, two empires that competed for influence in Southwest
Asia during the Great Game of the nineteenth century. In 1845, after suffering two crushing military defeats at the hands of Imperial Russia, Naser ad-Din Shah financed a “self-strengthening” mission of five Persians to study military tactics and strategy in France. The establishment in 1851 of a polytechnic in Tehran, the Dar al-Fonun, opened up valuable training to many more Iranians but did little to curtail Iran’s reliance on European education. Realizing its importance, the Qajars renewed their commitment to international education in 1911 by designating thirty government scholarships for study abroad. When the First World War came to a close in 1918, approximately five hundred Persians were enrolled in European universities, two hundred of whom resided in France.
Iran’s educational connections with the world accelerated under the Pahlavi Dynasty (1925–79). After toppling the last Qajar shah, a former Cossack Brigade commander named Reza Khan assumed the title Reza Pahlavi, pulling his dynastic name from a pre-Islamic Persian script. He centralized state authority by undercutting the influence of the clergy (ulama) in the schools and courts, an approach that signaled his determination to put secular education and European ideas to the service of the state. In 1928 he signed a law that paid for 640 students to go to Europe, and in 1934 he opened Tehran University, an institution based on the French educational model that remains Iran’s first and most prestigious institution of higher learning. When Tehran University’s doors opened, only 16 of the 1,175 Iranian students abroad were in the United States.15 In fact, only 130 Iranians went to the United States between the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.16 It was not until the cold war that the tide of Iranian student migration shifted away from Europe and toward the United States.
While few Iranians studied in the United States before the cold war, many Iranians received an American education from Presbyterian missionaries. Harrison Gray Otis and Eli Smith arrived in Iran in 1830 to determine if the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions should open a post there. They concluded it should, and in 1835 five missionaries began work in Iran’s northwest. While the greatest legacy of the missionary presence in the Middle East is the American University of Beirut, the Iranian equivalent was Alborz College. Founded in 1873 as a primary school for Armenian and Jewish boys, it became a college in 1925 that enrolled young women and men and educated Muslims alongside Christians and Jews. In large part because of the school’s staffing needs, the American proselytizers in Iran outnumbered those from all other countries combined by the 1880s when the United States and Iran established official diplomatic relations. The most influential and respected of the Presbyterian missionaries was Samuel Martin Jordan, a Pennsylvanian and alumnus of Lafayette College who arrived in the country in 1898. Jordan strengthened the relationship between his alma mater and Alborz College, and by the 1920s Lafayette considered the school its
“special interest abroad.” Until its nationalization in 1940, Alborz College marked the first attempt by Americans to win the hearts and minds of young Iranians.17
International Students in the United States
Part and parcel of the rise of American globalism was the push from American universities to, for the first time, enroll a sizable number of international students. “China’s first hundred” exited the United States as nativist sentiment reached a fevered pitch in the 1880s, but a new generation of Chinese students returned in the early twentieth century as part of the Boxer Indemnity Scholarship Program.18 At the same time, Filipino students migrated to their colonial metropole as part of the pensionado program.19 While education was an instrument of state power as the United States burst onto the world stage in the early twentieth century, the educators and philanthropists who founded the Committee on Friendly Relations among Foreign Students, the Institute of International Education, and the International House Movement considered the exchange of people part of an internationalist project.20 Yet the nationalist fervor that smoldered during the global depression of the 1930s meant that international education was once again “frankly envisaged as an instrument of official policy.”21 In 1936 U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull traveled to Buenos Aires to announce the creation of a governmentfunded scholarship program, directed by the new Office of Inter-American Relations, designed to stave off fascism in the Western Hemisphere. Two years later, the Department of State established the Division for Cultural Relations, which presaged the further integration of education into the national security state.22 For American strategists, attracting students to the United States from all corners of the world was a cold war imperative. U.S. officials worried that, as communism superseded the fascist threat, the Soviets were beating the United States to the punch in the educational sphere. George Kennan, the architect of the strategy of containment, expressed concern in his “Long Telegram” of February 1946 that the Soviet Union schemed to infiltrate international youth organizations.23 As the devaluation of European currencies cut in half the number of students capable of seeking respite from the war-torn continent during the immediate postwar years, many youths enrolled in tuition-free, “sovietized” universities in Eastern Europe.24 To counter Soviet maneuvers, President Harry Truman worked to “find more opportunities for foreign students to study in our schools and universities” so that they might “learn here the skills and techniques needed in their own countries. . . . [and] see at first hand the rights and duties of citizens in our land of democratic institutions.”25 To stabilize Europe, the Truman
administration unveiled the Marshall Plan for its economic reconstruction and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for its military protection. The administration also piloted cultural and informational programs to “sell the American way” to global publics.26 To those ends, Truman allocated money from the sale of surplus war material to globalize American education when he signed the Fulbright Act into law in 1946. Two years later, the Smith-Mundt Act bolstered the Fulbright Program by authorizing two-way exchanges financed by congressionally appropriated dollars, not from the sale of war junk.27 Iran signed a Fulbright agreement with the United States on September 1, 1949; it was the first Middle Eastern nation to do so and its impact was profound.28 Commenting on the relationship between economic aid and international education, one Iranian professor stated, “The United States has provided two great things for the world: the Marshall Plan and the Fulbright Program.”29
Modernization and International Education
While the Marshall Plan was the first U.S.-directed aid effort overseas and the Fulbright Program the gold standard for educational exchange, academics linked development and education within the framework of “modernization theory.” A theory of social, cultural, political, and economic change over time, modernization was a product of the cold war academy. During the superpower conflict, the United States sought an ideology to match its material wealth and power.30 Walt Whitman Rostow, an economist, modernization theorist, and presidential adviser during the 1960s, outlined a “non-communist manifesto” to blunt the appeal of Marxist-Leninist doctrines as the race for influence in the third world began. Like Marxist-Leninists, Rostow argued that all nations passed through stages of development as part of the larger process of modernization. But Rostow saw a different end point, insisting that “traditional” societies were destined to reach an American-style of “modernity.” Rostow and other theorists such as Daniel Lerner bolstered, then, a much older liberal teleology with the authority of social science. The telos they envisioned for third world nations was, on paper, defined by meritocracy, technical efficiency, mass production and consumption, mobility and urbanization, and democratic governance.31 In particular cases such as Iran’s, however, policymakers slighted democratic governance because of security and economic interests.32 More generally, modernization theory was deeply flawed because it erroneously assumed a universal and transferable American way of life. Nonetheless, it was the dominant global paradigm at midcentury, and it was a theory that required educated global elites to implement. As David Menashri, the leading scholar of Iranian education, writes, a consensus existed during the first
two postwar decades that “education is the key that unlocks the door to modernization.”33
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 erased the final traces of that midcentury consensus, but the early twenty-first century saw scholars historicize modernization theory and argue for its centrality in the history of U.S. foreign relations.34 In the modernization literature, the shah’s Iran is but one example of many to which authors briefly point to demonstrate that U.S. policymakers, particularly during the presidency of John F. Kennedy, erred in waging cold war by employing modernization as a means to guide the processes of revolutionary change that unfolded in the postcolonial world.35 While scholars of Iran, most notably Fred Halliday and Ali Mirsepassi, provide comprehensive treatments of the Pahlavi state’s modernization project, American historians have been slow to analyze the relationship between that project and the United States. The centrality of international education to the successes and failures of the shah’s modernization program is also conspicuously absent from the literature.36 Nevertheless, international education was the staple ingredient to Iranian modernization because of the longterm educational connections between Iran and the West, various push and pull factors that made the United States the preferred destination for Iranian students during the cold war, and the worldviews of postwar American internationalists and Iranian leaders.
During the cold war, the volume of Iranian student migration increased rapidly and the United States became the largest host country for Iranian students abroad. One “push” factor that drove Iranian students overseas related to the structural limitations of Iran’s system of higher education. While the shah opened five new schools between 1949 and 1955, Iran’s population continued to outpace seats available at the nation’s universities.37 There were also “pull” factors that made American universities appealing to young Iranians. The United States had a wealth of technical knowledge to share with the world, and Truman’s Point Four Program and later efforts by the U.S. Agency for International Development signaled America’s commitment to sharing that knowledge. Overseas Consultants, Inc., one of the most influential of the shah’s American advisers, recognized as much when it reported that overseas training was “highly desirable” because it “assures the latest and best technical training and provides valuable contacts with foreign societies as well as with foreign equipment and methods.”38
The assumption that only a superpower could properly educate Iranian modernizers owed a lot to older stereotypes and prejudices that emerged out of nineteenth-century imperialism. One group of American officials expressed candidly their impression that Iranian universities were “not geared to produce an expanded leadership cadre emotionally and intellectually equipped to act along lines favorable to American interests.”39 Postwar social scientists and aid workers
concurred, theorizing that the “change agents” had to be local actors who, after they studied abroad or received training from foreign advisers, would initiate societal transformation.40 The political scientist Leonard Binder articulated the prejudicial worldview of many postwar Americans when he wrote that modernization required “both a rejection of the existing system and a denial that beneficial change can grow out of it naturally.” For modernization to occur, Binder continued, target groups needed to be “separately educated” to become capable of operating “independent of their social and cultural environment.”41
Despite power imbalances that grew out of nineteenth-century imperialism and carried into the cold war, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was committed to accelerating student migration and cultural exchange. Himself a product of Switzerland’s Le Rosey boarding school, the shah was eager to realize his father’s vision of a modern Iran through an approach to nation building that resembled “a military campaign.” Recognizing that he came to “largely rely upon the young men whom we send abroad” to “transplant Western technology effectively to a country like Persia,” the shah viewed “Westernization” as a “welcome ordeal.” While the monarch wanted the West’s military prowess, technological capacities, infrastructural achievements, and consumer economy, he did not want political ideals from the United States and Europe to interfere with his tightly controlled modernization program. The second Pahlavi shah, like his father, firmly believed that “education must first of all serve to create the patriotic devotion to Iran.”42
Student Migration and Human Rights
Despite the shah’s vision, rights advocates negotiated and contested the parameters of modernization in Iran, whether the defensive development efforts of the Qajars or the Pahlavis’ more sustained reforms. Since the nineteenth century, Middle Eastern leaders aspired to harness the technical knowledge and secularizing influences of the West to build nations and to erode traditional forms of authority. Those same leaders often worked to keep out other European influences, namely liberalism and democracy, but that proved a difficult task. As the historian Roy Mottahedeh writes, Iranians who went to Europe in the nineteenth century “learned more from their French-speaking instructors than the calculation of cannonball trajectories and double-entry bookkeeping.”43 The same can be said for the Iranians who went to the United States during the cold war and became rights advocates. While nation building and modernization efforts compelled states to invest in educational programs, the postwar networks of globalized education provided unprecedented opportunities for individual students to pursue their own academic interests and establish relationships with Americans
who saw rights—rather than development—as the most important priority for the international community.
Similar to the modernization literature, though, the growing historiography on human rights has left Iran on the sidelines.44 By and large, the human rights record of the Islamic Republic attracts more scholarly attention than those of the Pahlavi era. Ervand Abrahamian’s excellent investigation of torture in Iran, which includes chapters on the two Pahlavi shahs, is the exception to the rule.45 While this book offers a corrective to the temporal lopsidedness of the Iran literature, it refocuses the U.S.-centered literature that otherwise remains blinded to the importance of American-Iranian transnational advocacy during the 1960s and 1970s because of a preoccupation with Jimmy Carter’s human rights policies.46 The circuits of migration and the cosmopolitanism of the Iranian student community created sites of exchange with politically active Americans that facilitated the rise of a global human rights discourse. Human rights ultimately recalibrated the international community and inserted the question of democratic governance into American-Iranian relations before the revolution of 1979.47
Global interconnectedness, more specifically the relationship between student migration and rights advocacy, helped to produce two revolutions in Iran during the twentieth century: the second was the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the first was the Constitutional Revolution of 1906–11.48 To be sure, developments unique to Iran contributed to the historic drafting of a constitution and opening of the majlis, as powerful mullahs and traditional merchants (bazaaris) were essential to the constitutional coalition. But the professional middle class, new to Iran at the turn of the twentieth century, provided the movement’s intellectual foundation as culturally significant writers, teachers, activists, professionals, and bureaucrats adapted philosophies from abroad to Iranian realities.49 Despite its vast empire, British parliamentarianism influenced Iranian reformers. The first Persian to study at Oxford University, Mirza Mohammad Saleh, described Great Britain in his memoirs as a “country of freedom,” and it was the British legation that provided shelter to Iran’s revolutionaries as they faced retaliation from their government in summer 1906.50 Moreover, Mansour Bonakdarian’s scholarship has demonstrated that Great Britain was a base from which Iranian students and expatriates organized with like-minded Britons to support the Constitutional Revolution as it unfolded at home. 51 If educational migration galvanized the constitutional movement, it also created a transnational space in which the political opponents of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi organized during the midtwentieth century. Anti-shah students were therefore part of the broader effort at home and abroad to reconcile the contradictory legacies of the Constitutional Revolution and balance the relationship between monarchical authoritarianism and constitutional rule in Iran.52
The inherently transnational nature of student migration and the rights discourse that grew out of this space produced unintended consequences that ran counter to the strategic objectives of U.S. and Iranian leaders. That it did was not the result of any fault in the binational educational project or the free flow of individuals between the United States and Iran, but rather the incongruity of national leaders promoting inherently liberal ideas—the freedom of movement and global education—while supporting the illiberal Pahlavi government. Although some Iranians arrived in the United States with deeply held political views rooted in Iran’s past, others were relatively apolitical before stepping onto American campuses during the tumultuous 1960s. Whatever their formative experiences, Iranian students enjoyed the relatively free environment in the United States and asked why their experiences abroad contrasted so sharply with the shah’s iron-fisted rule in Iran. As the leading anti-shah Iranian student organization described its mission and that of other oppositionist groups in the diaspora, “These organisations working in the relatively free atmosphere of Western Europe and America, rightly take advantage of their position in serving as forums for free expression of opinion and especially of discontent with the state of affairs in their country.”53
Despite the ubiquity of Iranian student organizing at the time, the historiography of this significant phenomenon is sparse. Only one English-language study, by Afshin Matin-Asgari, focuses on the student movement abroad. Drawing on Persian-language material and interviews with former leaders, he concentrates exclusively on the Confederation of Iranian Students National Union (CISNU).54 By contrast, this book expands on and adds texture to Matin-Asgari’s pioneering study, both by incorporating a broader spectrum of actors and placing Iranian student migration within the context of U.S. international history. Jeremi Suri was the first historian to establish connections between student activism and foreign policy, and the narrative here builds on Suri’s exploration of the ways in which the “global revolutions” of the 1960s contributed to the realignment and reimagining of the international system.55 More broadly, the pages that follow respond to Paul Kramer’s assertion that “the history of foreign student migration ought to be explored as U.S. international history, that is, as related to the question of U.S. power in its transnational and global extensions,” in order to “bring to the fore intersections between ‘student exchange’ and geopolitics.”56
The Iranian student movement bloomed during the years of preponderant American influence in Iran. The event that sparked the rights discourse was the Anglo-American coup that overthrew democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq in 1953. The subsequent crackdown on the opposition and the shah’s U.S.-supported program of authoritarian development meant that, if the concept of rights was to acquire any real meaning in Iran, an extended “intellectual field,” or “transnational public sphere,” would be the site of discursive negotia-
tion.57 Indeed, the rights discourse was never static and had multiple sources of inspiration. The Iranian student opposition abroad was ideologically, politically, and socioeconomically diverse during the shah’s most repressive years, as MatinAsgari’s dissection of the internal workings of the CISNU reveals. Many were inspired by the revolutionaries of the early twentieth century and objected to the ways in which the shah rendered their predecessors’ two major achievements—the constitution and the majlis—irrelevant as he consolidated all authority within the confines of the Royal Court. Liberal nationalists inspired by the Constitutional Revolution and later Mosaddeq’s National Front guided the Iranian student movement during the 1950s and early 1960s. The latter part of the decade saw supporters of Maoist revolution emerge as the most powerful faction in student circles overseas. By the 1970s, two new ideas—Islamism and universal human rights—entered the student diaspora at a time when the shah’s government began to teeter on the brink of collapse.58 Despite the fact that the shah’s opponents were influenced to varying degrees by constitutionalism, liberal nationalism, strands of MarxismLeninism, Islamism, and universal human rights, their core objectives remained consistent. Peyman Vahabzadeh makes this point in his study of Iran’s guerrilla movement. He argues that Iran’s young secular-Left fighters were, despite the inherently violent nature of guerrilla warfare, “obliquely enlivened by a democratic impulse that was cloaked under the revolutionary discursive mantle of the time.”59
The “democratic impulse” became manifest in the United States as the Iranian student movement embraced the language of rights during the 1960s and 1970s. That language resonated with a wide range of Americans who received information from Iranian students but often had their own reasons for opposing U.S. support for the shah. Progressive Americans and Iranians rejected the idea that freedom and authority, democracy and modernization, were mutually exclusive in the Iranian context. They opposed the official alliance between Washington and Tehran that was predicated on the premise that anticommunist statism, a less vibrant political milieu, and a more forceful role for the military and security forces would ensure the continued flow of Iranian oil and keep Iran firmly entrenched in the Western camp. To the frustration of the shah and U.S. policymakers, politically active Iranian youths forged relationships with empathetic Americans who shared with them a politically progressive internationalism that rejected the shah’s authoritarian model of development, challenged the American assumptions that propelled U.S. ascendance in the Persian Gulf region, and called for the realization of civil and political rights in Iran.
The five chapters that follow collectively reconstruct the American-Iranian relationship during the cold war through the lens of international education. They
demonstrate that the fundamental tension in the binational relationship derived from the incompatibility between U.S. support for the shah’s modernization program and the collective American and Iranian calls for greater access to rights in Iran. The tone is critical and rejects the notion that U.S. policy treaded a road that was “paved with good intentions,” instead marching lockstep with the shah to promote “dictatorship and development” at the crossroads of domestic stability and regional security.60 Consequently, contradictions emerged between the various “tracks” of American diplomacy in Iran. High-level diplomacy between heads of state was committed to the shah’s military buildup and program of authoritarian development that did not allow Iran’s educated citizenry to participate meaningfully in the political process. By contrast, people-to-people exchanges were more participatory and provided opportunities for Americans and Iranians to rethink the nature of development in Iran, the importance of rights in the international community, and the relationship between their countries.61
Chapter 1 locates the origins of American-Iranian educational cooperation in the 1950s and tracks the evolution of the U.S. approach toward international education from Harry Truman’s presidency to that of Dwight Eisenhower. While the national security state partly co-opted international education during the cold war, student exchange was the product of public-private cooperation.62 On the one hand were the government-directed security assistance programs, Point Four technical aid, and the State Department’s International Educational Exchange Program. On the other were two important but nominally private organizations: the Ford Foundation and the American Friends of the Middle East (AFME). While the number of organizations dedicated to strengthening educational ties between the United States and Iran proliferated throughout the decade, the contradictions between encouraging student migration and supporting the shah as an agent of modernization and anticommunism remained unresolved.
Chapter 2 shows how those contradictions became visible during the early 1960s as Iranian student activists in the United States contributed to debates on modernization and rights during the Kennedy administration. In 1961 and 1962, Supreme Court Justice William Douglas and Attorney General Robert Kennedy corresponded regularly with a cohort of Iranian students in New York and Washington, D.C. They lobbied Kennedy administration officials to make political liberalization part of a policy that was allegedly designed to promote comprehensive development in Iran. This transnational community of “free speech modernists” put forth the first rights-based critique of the Pahlavi state. Its members argued that modern societies must necessarily welcome freedom of expression and accept constitutional restraints on centralized leadership. But their narrow focus on the political aspects of modernity pitted them against the Iran analysts in the State Department and the National Security Council who regained a grip
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Like this, there is a great deal in the laws and the religion and the public opinion of the world of yesterday that will need revision. Lastly, there is that which is of more significance than all the rest. Way back in the beginning of things, the lady who was called Eve, you remember as the Sunday school lesson ran, got the world into a lot of trouble, it was said, by eating of the fruit of the tree of knowledge. Too little knowledge, some one else has told us, may prove a dangerous thing. But there is a Latin proverb on which a school of therapeutics is founded, “Similia similibus curantur.” Then, if “like cures like,” what we need to-day is more knowledge to make right the ancient wrong that afflicts the earth! Well, we have it.
THE WHISPER OF GOD
This new woman will look back into the dear eyes that search hers. In her level glance there will flash an understanding of life that never was in woman’s eyes before in all the ages of sorrow since the angel fixed up the flaming swords that shut her out of Eden. For in the white silence where she has found her soul, she has heard even the closest whisper of God. If man before missed it, why, maternity was naturally the matter that he could not know and could not understand. This is the new revelation, that maternity shall be made more divine! There has been a halo about it in song and picture and story. But we want to put a halo on in London’s east end and New York’s east side. Creation itself is to be corrected.
Doesn’t it need to be? See how many men, it is being discovered to-day, are not well enough made for soldiers. England is obliged to reject 25% of her men as physically unfit. America is reported to have rejected 29%. The other nations cannot show any better figures. If in the great arsenals that are manufacturing munitions of war, one shell in four turned out was spoiled, the industry would have to be at once investigated and put on a more efficient basis than that. Quite likely the mistake might be discovered to be “speeding up.” There had been an effort to turn out too many shells. If fewer shells are made, they can be better made. And you will get just as
many in the end. For by the present process, all these shells that fail, you see, do not count in the real output.
It’s just like this about people. We’ve been trying to have too many When Mrs. Smith in London or in New York or Frau Schmidt in Berlin, has six or eight or more children in, say, two rooms, some of them are going to have rickets and some of them are going to have tuberculosis and some of them are going into penal institutions. So that when you come to want them for the army, you find that one in four has failed. Why, even chickens would. A poultry fancier does not presume to try to raise a brood of chickens in quarters too crowded for their development. He measures his poultry house and determines how many chickens he can accommodate with enough air and space—and how many he can afford to feed. He limits the flock accordingly. Mrs. Smith in London or New York and Frau Schmidt in Berlin, can too!
Fire and electricity and other useful forces we have long since obtained the mastery over and turned from a menace to a blessing to mankind. But another even mightier force has ravaged the world like unchained lightning. Because it has not been controlled. Men thought that it must not be. So the fear of its consequences has haunted homes in every land since the pronouncement, “I will greatly multiply thy conceptions.” All of the great religious teachers said that you must not take the misery out of maternity. It was meant to be there. And science, which had accomplished miracles in mitigating other suffering, stood afar off from the woman in childbirth. So much as an anæsthetic to deaden the pain was forbidden, until quite recent times, as an interference with the will of the Almighty. It was Queen Elizabeth of England who broke that taboo. By virtue of her royal authority, she demanded chloroform. And got it. Her daring could then, of course, be followed by other women. Newer iconoclasts are calling for twilight sleep, that achieves maternity in a dream. Add birth control. And we shall be out of the trouble in which the unhappy lady called Eve so long ago involved all of her daughters.
Birth control means, instead of a maternity that is perpetual, unregulated and haphazard and miserable, a maternity that is
intelligently directed and limited. So that it shall be volitional. The rising value of a baby at last requires that people shall be as carefully produced as the shells we are making with such infinite accuracy. Most of all, it is important that there shall not be too many babies lest some of them not well done shall be only worthless and good for nothing. You see, you have to think about quality as well as quantity when you are counting for a final output. Russia, which had a birth rate of 50 per thousand, the highest birth rate in Europe, is the nation whose military defences have crumpled like paper. It was France, with a birth rate of 28 per thousand, the lowest in Europe, that held the line for civilisation at the Marne. And it was Germany, which has always imposed on its women as a national service the speeding up of population, that plunged the world into the agony of this war. Because 55% of the families of Berlin live in one-room tenements and there is nowhere to put the babies that have kept on coming, Germany reached out for the territory of her neighbours. The pressure of population too large for too narrow boundaries is as certain in its consequences as is the pressure of steam in a tea kettle with the spout stopped up. There’s sure to be an explosion. Germany exploded. Back of her military system, it is her maternity system that is responsible for the woe of the world to-day. It’s plain that the way not to have war anywhere ever again is not to have too many babies!
John Stuart Mill, the great economist who two generations ago looked into the future and saw a vision of the woman movement that would be, said: “Little advance can be expected in morality until the production of large families is regarded in the same light as drunkenness or any other physical excess.” And he added: “Among the probable consequences of the industrial and social independence of women, I predict a great diminution of the evil of overpopulation.” John Stuart Mill meant Mrs. Webber and Mrs. Smith. Two children to be enjoyed instead of ten to be endured, is an ideal of family policy possible of attainment even in the east ends and the east sides of the world. For to Mrs. Webber or to Mrs. Smith, handling her own wage envelope, no one any more may say, “I shall not give you money for shoes to-morrow unless—” Volitional motherhood is the final truth that shall make women free. No one
can compel the new woman to be anything that she does not wish to be, not even to be a mother until she chooses the time.
After that curse pronounced upon Eve, there was a promise: “The seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent’s head!” “We can do it, dear.” That’s what the new woman will say triumphantly to the man who comes back to her from the Great War. Together they will take up the task of making, not only a new earth, but a new race!
And I think he will be glad for what she tells him. The wonder is, not so much that women in the past were willing to endure the “subjection of women,” but that men consented to it. A bird in a cage can of course be made to eat out of the hand of the owner who feeds it. But see the bird that is free and will come at your call!
The women in industry and commerce and the professions and in government, whom we are seeing in these years of war passing all barriers, will at last make their final stand for what? It is for happiness. Look! Even now, who has the vision to discern, may discover the gates of Eden swinging wide. And when the man in khaki, with the age-old yearning in his heart, “Woman wanted, my woman,” comes back to clasp her in his arms once more, these two everywhere shall enter in. For the ultimate programme toward which the modern woman movement to-day is moving is no less than paradise regained! It may even, I think, have been worth this war to be there.
THE
END
Transcriber’s Notes
Page 27—changed l’Opera to l’Opéra
Page 27, Page 49— changed de identitie to de identité
Page 50— changed Medaille to Médaille
Page 64—changed Endel Street, London to Endell Street, London
Page 95— changed Blessés Militairs to Blessés Militaires
Page 106— changed leggins to leggings
Page 112, Page 127— changed attache to attaché
Page 145— changed commune of Exoudon to commune of Exoudun
Page 208— changed grey and while to grey and white
Page 145, Page 210— changed President Poincare to President Poincaré
Page 247— changed perservered to preserved
Page 248— changed Harvard University a few years incorporated to Harvard University a few years later incorporated
Page 251— changed Edinborough to Edinburgh
Page 251— changed Aldeborough, Suffolk to Aldeburgh, Suffolk
Page 299, Page 304 —changed Dr. Poliksena Shiskina Yavein to Dr. Poliksena Schiskina Yavein
Page 302— changed zur kenntisnahme to zur kenntnisnahme
Page 304— changed Hermila Galinda to Hermila Galindo
Page 323— changed invesment to investment
Page 328— changed minstry to ministry
Page 330— changed Mutualite to Mutualité
Page 377— changed paternite to paternité
Page 382— changed there is not where to there is nowhere
*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WOMEN WANTED: THE STORY WRITTEN IN BLOOD RED LETTERS ON THE HORIZON OF THE GREAT WORLD WAR ***
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