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Generalleutnant Kurt Student, commander of the Luftwaffe’s airborne forces, inspecting his elite Fallschirmjäger troopers before the war. (Getty Images)
On 27 September 1939, the day after the conclusion of the German campaign in Poland, Adolf Hitler called together the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces), or OKW, and chiefs of the Heer, Kriegsmarine, and Luftwaffe, and ordered them to prepare plans for Fall Gelb (Case Yellow), an offensive move against the British and French armies in Western Europe. Hitler did not want to fight a long war against the Western Allies and believed that their forces would only grow stronger as time marched on; citing the vulnerability of Germany’s industrial Rühr region to a potential Allied offensive once their forces were organized, Hitler insisted on immediate offensive action in order to maintain German initiative in the conflict. The Oberkommando des Heeres (Army High Command), or OKH, drafted Aufmarschanweisung N°1, Fall Gelb (Deployment Plan No. 1, Case Yellow) for a westward sweep across the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, bypassing the Maginot Line but pitting German forces into a frontal attack against Allied forces in northern France. German ground forces in the west were divided into three army groups: Heeresgruppe B in the north (positioned against the Netherlands and northern Belgium), Heeresgruppe A in the centre (positioned against central and southern Belgium), and Heeresgruppe C in the south (covering Heeresgruppe A’s flank and the southwestern German border).
Hitler had no qualms about violating Belgian neutrality, arguing that the small nation was involved in active defence negotiations with the French, but questioned the strategic practicality of moving through Dutch territory. He insisted upon a revision to the original OKH plan, authorizing German movement through the Maastricht Strip, a narrow strip of Dutch territory running north-to-south along the River Maas for roughly 50km along the Belgian eastern border down to the city of Maastricht, but with a political arrangement to be worked out with the Dutch government; Dutch territory was not to be occupied and Dutch neutrality was to be maintained. Halder unveiled the amended Aufmarschanweisung N°2, Fall Gelb, which excluded the occupation of Dutch territory on 29 October 1939.
Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe (Luftwaffe supreme commander) Hermann Göring and Chef des Generalstabs der Luftwaffe (Luftwaffe chief-of-staff) Generalmajor Hans Jeschonnek
were immediately alarmed at the omission of the Netherlands from the territory to be occupied in the revised plan for Fall Gelb, fearing that the British would not hesitate to violate Dutch neutrality in order for the Royal Air Force to make use of Dutch airfields for attacks on targets in the Rühr. Jeschonnek went to see Hitler on 30 October and unsuccessfully tried to convince him to again make the Netherlands a target of Fall Gelb.
Hitler hoped to launch Fall Gelb on 12 November but poor weather compelled its postponement (Fall Gelb would ultimately be postponed 20 times for various reasons between 12 November 1939 and 10 May 1940); this postponement allowed Jeschonnek more time to plead his case for the Netherlands to Hitler. The threat of British use of Dutch airfields as well as Jeschonnek’s additional argument that the Dutch themselves were not fully capable of preventing British overflights of Dutch territory en route to targets in the Rühr finally persuaded Hitler to again earmark Dutch territory for occupation.
On 15 November at Hitler’s prompting, OKW issued new instructions that the occupation of as much Dutch territory as possible for the purpose of securing the air defence of the Rühr was now a priority for the army in Fall Gelb. OKH felt at the time it could only spare the X.Armeekorps (at the time two infantry divisions and the army’s sole cavalry division) from the 18.Armee, the force responsible for covering the German northern flank in the West, and several armoured trains for operations against the Netherlands; OKH concluded that these units could occupy Dutch territory leading up to the Grebbelinie (Grebbe Line) in the central Netherlands and territory south of the River Maas; this excluded the area of the Netherlands referred to as Vesting Holland (Fortress Holland).
The Dutch defences
It is necessary at this point to briefly discuss the Dutch defensive positions and geographical barriers facing German army planners at the time. The Grebbelinie was a modern defence line, made up of trenches and concrete bunkers, running north-to-south from the Ijsselmeer to just east of the town of Rhenen on the Rhine River and then southward to Ochten on the Waal River and ending near Appeltern on the Maas. To the south beginning at the town of Grave on the Maas was the Peel-Raamstelling (Peel-Raam Position), a lighter defence line of pillboxes, barbed wire, and peat marshes running south and west to the Belgian border near the town of Weert.
To the west of the Grebbeline was the Waterlinie (Waterline), running north-to-south from the Ijsselmeer through Utrecht and across the Rhine, Waal, and Maas. The Waterline, the traditional defensive line protecting the provinces of Holland and Zeeland since the Golden Age of the seventeenth century, ran along the easternmost part of the country below sea level
Generalmajor Hans Jeschonnek (right), the Luftwaffe’s chief-of-staff, was the primary proponent of the complete occupation of the Netherlands as the German high command planned its invasion of the West. Jeschonnek convinced his superior, Hermann Göring (left), that German control of Dutch airfields had to be immediately accomplished at the outset of the offensive or risk the threat of the British Royal Air Force occupying them and using them for raids against the Rühr industrial basin. (Getty Images)
and was composed of fields that could be flooded with several feet of water – just enough to prevent the advance of armies marching on foot. In the late 1930s modern pillboxes were added along the line.
The Waterlinie was the eastern boundary of the Vesting Holland, the area north of the Waal and Maas estuaries that encompassed the urban centres of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Den Haag, and Utrecht; it was considered the national redoubt of the country. If the Waterlinie was flooded, the only route of approach into the Vesting Holland were the road and rail bridges over the Hollands Diep at Moerdijk, the Oude Maas at Dordrecht, and the Nieuwe Maas at Rotterdam. The primary southern defensive boundaries of the Grebbelinie, Waterlinie, and Vesting Holland were the east-to-west flowing tributaries of the Rhine, Waal, and Maas.
Jeschonnek immediately made it known he was not satisfied with the ‘halfway’ occupation initially proposed by OKH as all but one of the major airfields in the Netherlands were located inside of the Vesting Holland – still leaving them open to potential British use. Generaloberst Fedor von Bock, commander of Heeresgruppe B, was also displeased with the plan not to occupy the Vesting Holland; he was uncomfortable with the idea of leaving open a potential staging ground for Allied forces which could threaten his flank and rear. The question of the partial- versus full- occupation of the Netherlands was not resolved until mid-January 1940 in the wake of the Mechelen Incident, in which the plans for the Aufmarschanweisung N°2 variant of Fall Gelb fell into Belgian hands when a Luftwaffe aircraft accidentally landed in Belgian territory in heavy fog.
As part of the now necessary revisions applied to Fall Gelb, on 14 January Hitler finally agreed with Jeschonnek and Bock that the Netherlands should be completely occupied, albeit quickly so as not to deter from the main push through Belgium and northern France. Bock concurred on the rapid conquest, wanting to secure his flank quickly, and assigned the entire 18.Armee to the task. The most potent unit in 18.Armee was the 9.Panzer-Division, recently formed in January 1940 from elements originating in the Austrian Bundesheer’s mobile Schnelle Division. On 10 May 1940, the 9.Panzer-Division possessed the following tanks and armoured vehicles: 30× PzKpfw I, 54× PzKpfw II, 41× PzKpfw III, 16× PzKpfw IV, 12× PzBfWg IV (Panzerbefehlwagen or ‘command tank’), and 62× armoured cars; around half of these tanks came from the Panzer-Lehr-Abteilung, or Panzer training unit. Although understrength, the mission of the 9.Panzer-Division was to surge through a breach in the Grebbelinie/PeelRaamstelling, race westwards parallel to the Maas, and then assault the Vesting Holland from the south, travelling up the motorway between Moerdijk and Rotterdam.
Fallschirmjäger and Luftlande troops
In order for the 9.Panzer-Division to enter the Vesting Holland quickly, the road bridges over the waterways of the Hollands Diep at Moerdijk, the Oude Maas at Dordrecht, and the Nieuwe Maas at Rotterdam had to be captured intact. On 11 January 1940, OKW enquired whether the Fallschirmjäger (airborne) units of the Luftwaffe could be used to secure these bridges and other key points within the Vesting Holland and hold them until the arrival of the 9.Panzer-Division. Initially OKH suggested that Fallschirmjäger units be dropped behind the Grebbelinie and assist army ground units with breaching it.
Generalleutnant Kurt Student, a World War I fighter pilot and commander of the Luftwaffe’s 7.Fliegerdivision, dismissed OKH’s proposed Grebbelinie operation as too limited in strategic value and countered with a much bolder proposal: using the paratroopers of his 7.Fliegerdivision and the troops of the 22.Luftlande-Division or ‘air-landing division’ (an infantry division trained to be deployed via transport aircraft) to secure not only the vital bridges at Moerdijk, Dordrecht, and Rotterdam but to seize other vital targets, such as Dutch airfields, within the Vesting Holland as well. If Dutch airfields could be secured by
Fallschirmjäger paratroopers, Luftlande troopers could be landed on and supplied via them by transport aircraft; this would allow for a sizeable force to operate well behind enemy lines and assist with the main effort to breach the Vesting Holland. This was something of a revolutionary proposal as airborne forces, experimented with by several nations during the interwar years, had never been deployed in combat, let alone in strength.
Originally Fallschirmjäger units were intended to serve in a commando role, landing behind enemy lines to capture or destroy key logistical targets such as bridges, airfields, crossroads, and supply depots. Student believed that Fallschirmjäger, deployed in force, could fulfil more than just unconventional tactical roles. Since taking command of all of the Luftwaffe’s airborne units in July 1938, Student incorporated light artillery, antitank, reconnaissance, and other specialized units into his force that could be dropped or landed alongside his paratroopers, with the intention that they could be deployed as a highly mobile light division capable of operating independently in the enemy’s rear. By the beginning of 1940, Student’s 4,500-man 7.Fliegerdivision consisted of two regiments, made of up of 2–3 battalions, each containing three rifle companies and one machine-gun company. The Fallschirmjäger of the 7.Fliegerdivision would be supported by the 12,000man 22.Luftlande-Division. The Luftwaffe realized the potential of using aircraft for the rapid movement and deployment of troops at the beginning of the Spanish Civil War when it carried out the transport, with Junkers Ju 52/3m airliners commandeered from Deutsche Lufthansa, of over 13,500 Nationalist troops and nearly 300 tons of weapons and supplies from Morocco to Spain in the late summer of 1936. In October 1939, OKW decided to convert the 22.Infanterie-Division into a Luftlande-Division and its units were put through rapid deployment exercises.
Student was confident that these elite units could perform such strategic objectives; he further emphasized that such an operation could meet the strategic needs of both the army (capture of bridges) and Luftwaffe (capture of airfields). Student presented his proposal to Jeschonnek and Generalmajor Alfred Jodl, Chef des Wehrmachtführungsstabes (Chief of Operation Staff) for OKW, who were both enthusiastic about the potential returns for the commitment of a relatively small number of forces and in turn presented the plan to Hitler. Der Führer was fascinated with the offensive potential, vis-a-vis other Blitzkrieg tactics, offered by airborne operations.
On 14 January 1940, Hitler approved the proposal for Unternehmen F (Festung, or fortress) and insisted that it achieve: 1. The capture of the bridges at Moerdijk, Dordrecht, and Rotterdam in order to secure the advance of the 18.Armee into the Vesting Holland and; 2. The rapid occupation of the Dutch capital, Den Haag, and capture of the Dutch military and political leadership. This second objective came from an idea, largely from the commander of the 22.Luftlande-Division Generalleutnant Hans Graf von Sponeck, that the Dutch leadership might be convinced to peacefully accept German military ‘protection’ if the attack on the Netherlands was called off at the outset. Kurt Student was to command the Luftlandekorps, created an der Kommandoweg aufgestellt or ‘provisionally’, made up of the 4,500-man 7.Fliegerdivision and the 12,000man 22.Luftlande-Division for the duration of Fall Gelb.
Fallschirmjäger recruits making a practice jump near the Luftwaffe’s paratrooper training school at Stendal in 1938. Student instilled a fierce esprit de corps among his officers and troopers and placed special emphasis upon Auftragstaktik, or mission tactics, during their training. Independent initiative was encouraged to aggressively accomplish the mission objective by whatever means necessary. (Getty Images)
The road and rail bridges over the Hollands Diep waterway at Moerdijk were the southern gateways in the Vesting Holland and had to be captured intact by General Student’s Fallschirmjäger if the tanks of the 9.Panzer-Division were to breach the Dutch Waterlinie. (Collectie Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie)
OKW intended Unternehmen F to be a Strategischer Überfall or ‘strategic assault’ with a strategic objective: the rapid capitulation and occupation of the entire Netherlands within a matter of days, thus quickly securing the northern flank of Heeresgruppe B and allowing it to conduct its primary operations without the threat of Allied ground interference with its flank or rear. Jeschonnek saw it as the means to achieve a Luftwaffe strategic objective: to secure Dutch airfields from potential Allied use; an added bonus would be to demonstrate the versatility of the Luftwaffe as an independent arm of the Wehrmacht (particularly in light of the intense interservice rivalry among the branches of the Wehrmacht) as Unternehmen F would be solely a Luftwaffe operation – until the panzers of 9.Panzer-Division arrived to relieve the airborne units.
Generaloberst von Bock was initially sceptical about the importance or chance of success of the Luftlande operation at Den Haag but recognized the value of the Moerdijk-DordrechtRotterdam bridges being secured; in his mind it would be the 18.Armee, and specifically the 9.Panzer-Division, that ensured the defeat of the Netherlands and he believed that the airborne operations were merely tactical measures for this larger army operation. Bock instructed the commander of the 18.Armee, General der Artillerie Georg von Küchler, that he had three days to breach the Vesting Holland from the south after the first day of the airborne operation and bring about a Dutch capitulation. Regardless of what various commanders expected from Unternehmen F, it was a significant undertaking as it would be the first mass airborne operation in the history of warfare.
ATTACKER’S CAPABILITIES
Luftflotte 2 in the Holland operation
As mentioned previously, Unternehmen F was to be an independent Luftwaffe undertaking until ground elements of the 18.Armee arrived to relieve the airborne units and assume occupation of captured Dutch territory. As such it fell under the jurisdiction of the air fleet based in north-west Germany and assigned to support the operations of Heeresgruppe B in the Netherlands and Belgium: Luftflotte 2, commanded by General der Flieger Albert Kesselring.
Having served as Chef des Generalstabs der Luftwaffe in 1936–37 and commander of Luftflotte 1 during the Polish Campaign, Kesselring was a veteran air fleet commander who had helped to develop the Luftwaffe’s combat aircraft and offensive tactics, as well as the first Fallschirmjäger units. As demonstrated in Poland, he particularly understood the importance of immediate attacks on enemy airfields and aviation infrastructure as the means to achieving air superiority at the outset of a campaign. Unternehmen F was just one mission among several expected to be carried out by Luftflotte 2 at the outset of Fall Gelb however. Only two air fleets were assigned to Fall Gelb: Kesselring’s Luftflotte 2 and Luftflotte 3, led by General der Flieger Hugo Sperrle, which was tasked with covering the operations of Heeresgruppen A and C. By late February 1940, OKW had revised Fall Gelb yet again based upon proposals by Generalleutnant Erich von Manstein, Chef des Generalstabs der Heeresgruppe A: the Aufmarschanweisung N°4 variant called for the Schwerpunkt (main area of execution) of Fall Gelb to be a concentrated push through the Ardennes towards Sedan and was assigned to Heeresgruppe A, which was reinforced at the expense of Heeresgruppe B.
After the adoption of Aufmarschanweisung N°4 Fall Gelb, Heeresgruppe B consisted of 6.Armee and the previously discussed 18.Armee. As a result of the strengthening of Heeresgruppe B, Luftflotte 3, assigned to cover the operations of Heeresgruppe A and C, was given considerably more aircraft than Luftflotte 2. Nonetheless Kesselring’s squadrons were expected to support the airborne operations in the Netherlands, the ground assaults in the Netherlands and northern Belgium, and simultaneously provide air defence for the urban and industrial areas of the Ruhr. Of the five larger units which composed Luftflotte 2,
By the beginning of Fall Gelb, the majority of the Luftwaffe’s single-engine fighter squadrons had been re-equipped with the E variant of the Messerschmitt Bf 109. It was the most numerous of the German fighters to see action during Unternehmen F. This Bf 109E03, with markings for JG 51 and camouflage which would have been used in the spring of 1940, is housed in the Deutsches Museum in Munich. (Arjun Sarup/ CC-BY-SA-4.0)
General der Flieger Albert Kesselring, commander of Luftflotte 2, speaking with pilots of Zerstörergeschwader 26. (Getty Images)
Kesselring assigned VIII.Fliegerkorps and most of IV.Fliegerkorps to support 6.Armee’s drive across northern Belgium as well as the airborne operation against Eben-Emael.
Two of Luftflotte 2’s larger units were specifically designated for Unternehmen F. Fliegerkorps zbV.2 (Fliegerkorps zur besonderen Verwendung 2 or ‘air corps for special deployment’) was a mixed unit of He 111H/P, Ju 88A bombers and Ju 87B dive-bombers, which was assembled specifically to provide close support for the airborne and air-landing operations in the Netherlands. The Luftlandekorps, consisting of 460 Junkers Ju 52/3m transports and several other reconnaissance and support aircraft, was responsible for airborne and air-landing operations. Luftflotte 2’s final larger unit was Jagdfliegerführer 2’s, whose fighters would provide cover for Heeresgruppe B’s entire front. If needed, Kesselring could also call on the Bf 109D/E fighters of the Jagdfliegerführer Deutsche Bucht, based on airfields in northern Germany, for missions over the northern Netherlands (see pg. 15 for Luftflotte 2’s full order of battle).
Fighter cover for airborne operations
For an operation involving such a large number of transport aircraft, the cover provided by Jagdfliegerführer 2’s Bf 109s and Bf 110s would be essential for the success of the airborne and air-landing missions. Kesselring intended to use rotating flights of Jagdfliegerführer 2’s fighters as a continuous umbrella to provide cover for the airborne and airlanding target areas in the Vesting Holland. This was to protect the movement of the highly vulnerable Ju 52/3m transports carrying Luftlande units as well as defend the exposed Fallschirmjäger units from attacks by Dutch aircraft or interloping British or French aircraft.
With a maximum speed of 354mph and an armament of two 7.92mm MG 17 machine guns mounted in the engine cowl and two wing-mounted 20mm MG FF/M cannon, the Messerschmitt Bf 109E had proved to be a formidable fighter in the skies over Poland and at the outset of Fall Gelb, the Luftwaffe’s Bf 109 pilots had high morale and exuded a great deal of confidence. Unternehmen F would expose a serious limitation in the operational capabilities of the Bf 109 however. The Bf 109E only had a normal range of 412 miles and an effective combat radius of roughly 180 miles due to the high-power output of the DB601 engine, resulting in fuel being consumed at a high rate. This was not considered to be a problem during the fighter’s development as the aircraft was designed as a high-speed interceptor. Extended combat air patrol by Bf 109s had only previously been flown just
ahead of moving ground columns in Poland with the objective of clearing the skies of enemy aircraft. Bf 109s also provided escort for close air support missions primarily flown by Ju 87s, which themselves had a maximum range of 370 miles.
Messerschmitt Bf 109E-3
Length: 28ft 4in (8.6m)
Wingspan: 32ft 6.5in (9.9m)
Powerplant: 1,100hp Daimler-Benz DB 601A-1 inline engine
Maximum speed: 354mph (570km/h)
Range: 412 miles (663km)
Ceiling: 37,731ft (11,500m)
Armament: 2 x 7.92mm MG 17 machine guns, 2 x 20mm MG FF cannons
The Luftwaffe was aware of the range limitations of the Bf 109s and Stukas for these missions but remedied the situation through the use of mobile logistics units which could set up and maintain forward airfields near the front lines as well as quickly repairing and readying captured enemy airfields for German use. As Jagdfliegerführer 2’s Bf 109s were to provide cover for ground forces landing and operating behind enemy lines, the use of Luftwaffe mobile logistics units to operate forward airfields was not possible in Unternehmen F – not until army ground forces secured the captured territory and established a line of supply.
Jagdfliegerführer 2’s fighters, operating from airfields around the Dortmund-Essen area had an average distance of 90–100 miles to fly before reaching their patrol areas over the Vesting Holland; this allowed for 10–20 minutes of flight time over their patrol area depending upon the rate of fuel consumption if required to engage in combat. This shortcoming apparently did not overly worry Generalmajor Kurt-Bertram von Döring, commander of Jagdfliegerführer 2, since he drafted a timetable which on paper made it appear that his units could maintain a continuous fighter umbrella. Nevertheless, he underestimated the rapid fuel consumption of the Bf 109 as well as the actual area his fighters were required to cover – roughly 1,800 square miles.
Another reason why Döring may not have concerned himself with the limited range of his Bf 109 fighters was that he had four Zerstörergruppen of Messerschmitt Bf 110C/D twinengine heavy fighters available for extended combat air patrol duty. First flown in May 1936, the Bf 110 Zerstörer (destroyer) was intended to serve as a long-range escort fighter. At the time, designers reasoned that long range could only be achieved in a fighter that was larger and could thus accommodate larger fuel tanks; the larger size and greater weight however made this aircraft less manoeuvrable than single-engine fighters. To make up for this shortcoming two powerful engines were installed to give the aircraft enough speed to evade single-engine fighters as well as a heavy armament which could down enemy aircraft with only a short burst.
Messerschmitt Bf 110C-4
Length: 39ft 8.5in (12.1m)
Wingspan: 53ft 5in (16.2m)
Powerplant: 2 x 1,100hp Daimler-Benz DB 601B-1 inline engines
Maximum speed: 349mph (560km/h)
Range: 565 miles (910km)
Ceiling: 32,811ft (10,000m)
Armament: 4 x 7.92mm MG 17 machine guns, 2 x 20mm MG FF/M cannons, 1 x 7.92mm MG 15 machine gun for defence
Crew: 2
The pilots of the Luftwaffe’s Zerstörergeschwader achieved a number of kills, destroyed numerous aircraft on the ground, and sustained minimal losses during Unternehmen F. Misinterpreting the results of the Netherlands campaign, Luftwaffe planners overestimated the capabilities of the new Messerschmitt Bf 110 heavy fighter and, as a result, the aircraft and its pilots would suffer heavy losses against highperformance single-engine fighters in the Battle of Britain. This surviving Bf 110F-2 is housed in the Deutsches Technikmuseum in Berlin. (Author’s collection)
Beginning in February 1939 the Luftwaffe began to take delivery of the Bf 110C variant, powered by two DB601 engines which gave the aircraft a maximum speed of 349mph – only slightly slower than the Bf 109. Armament consisted of four MG 17 machine guns and two MG FF/M cannon in the nose. Göring was so confident about the capabilities of the Bf 110 that in late 1938 he formed specific Zerstörergeschwader and transferred a number of the Luftwaffe’s best fighter pilots to them.
The long-range escort missions which Zerstörergeschwader pilots were trained to perform were not intended to be close escort; rather the Bf 110s were to fly ahead of the bombers and clear the skies over the target area using dive-and-climb combat tactics, making maximum use of the aircraft’s speed and armament. Bf 110 pilots put these tactics to great use over Poland and the Zerstörer units shot down 54 Polish aircraft for a loss of only seven Bf 110s in combat. Bf 110s also saw success in the skies over Denmark and Norway during Unternehmen Weserübung, the German invasion of those countries on 9 April 1940, destroying most of their opposition on the ground during strafing runs; these actions seemed to prove to many Bf 110 pilots, and the Luftwaffe’s leadership, that the Bf 110 was perfectly suited to the longrange escort role as well as seeming to vindicate the theory that twin-engine heavy fighters could effectively duel with single-engine fighters.
Some Zerstörer pilots noted that the Bf 110 suffered from very poor manoeuvrability however, and there were several losses in Poland and Norway to outmoded but highly manoeuvrable PZL P.11 parasol monoplanes and Gloster Gladiator biplanes. These concerns largely fell on deaf ears nevertheless due to the overall success experienced by the Zerstörer units as well as the perceptions of invincibility being fostered by the Luftwaffe high command. Within this context, Döring was confident that Bf 109s and Bf 110s, operating in concert, would provide sufficient cover for both longer-range bombing missions and the air-landing operations in the Netherlands.
Strike capabilities
Bombardment operations in support of Unternehmen F were to be carried out by Fliegerkorps zbV.2, led by Generalmajor Richard Putzier. As this unit was specially organized solely for the support of the airborne and air-landing missions in the Vesting Holland, the decision of
which targets to strike and its coordination with Fallschirmjäger and Luftlande forces on the ground was left up to Putzier. He realized that effective support of these missions required the ability to suppress aerial opposition by destroying enemy aircraft on the ground as well as disabling enemy airfields; it also called for the ability to attack individual targets, such as anti-aircraft and artillery batteries, defensive hardpoints, machine-gun positions, and enemy columns and vehicles with a high degree of precision.
To that end Putzier had three different types of bombers which each could perform such specialized tasks. The most numerous aircraft within Fliegerkorps zbV.2 was the Heinkel He 111 medium bomber. Its maximum payload of 4,410lb was comparable to most other medium bombers being developed by other nations and was not seen as light until the entry into service of American and British heavy bombers later in World War II. The Luftwaffe high command viewed the He 111 as a ‘long-range’ bomber and deployed it against targets in Poland beyond the range of its Stukas. He 111s would be deployed in the ‘long-range’ role by Putzier over the Netherlands and would be covered by Bf 110s from Jagdfliegerführer 2’s fighter umbrella.
Heinkel He 111P
Length: 53ft 9½in (16.4m)
Wingspan: 74ft 2in (22.6m)
Powerplant: 2 x 1,100hp Daimler-Benz DB 601A-1 inline engines
Maximum speed: 242mph (390km/h)
Range: 745 miles (1,200km)
Ceiling: 25,590ft (7,800m)
Armament: 3 x 7.92mm MG 15 machine guns
Payload: 4,410lb (2000kg) of bombs
Crew: 5
For precision attacks, Putzier was assigned a Gruppe of Junkers Ju 87 Stukas (abbreviated from Sturzkampfflugzeug or dive-bomber) from Lehrgeschwader 1, a Luftwaffe training unit which tested new equipment and tactics and which was equipped with both fighters and bombers. By the end of the Polish Campaign, the use of Ju 87s as airborne artillery, flying
The Heinkel He 111P was the most numerous Luftwaffe bomber assigned to Unternehmen F. This surviving He 111P is housed in the Forsvarets Flysamling Gardermoen museum near Oslo. (Aeroprints.com/CC-BYSA-3.0)
With its ability to serve as both a horizontal bomber and dive-bomber as well as its relatively high speed, the new Junkers Ju 88s assigned to Unternehmen F were highly prized by General Putzier and extensively used throughout the campaign. Their frequent use led to high losses however. This Ju 88D-1 is preserved in the National Museum of the United States Air Force in Dayton, Ohio. (Author’s collection)
in advance of the panzers, had become a refined tactic of the Wehrmacht and became the most visible image of the Blitzkrieg theory. As such, most of the Ju 87 units within Luftflotte 2 were earmarked for close support missions for the 6. and 18.Armee. IV.(St.)/LG1 however was tasked with supporting the Fallschirmjäger of the 7.Fliegerdivision, specifically for precision strikes against defensive hardpoints located around the paratroopers’ objectives. As IV.(St.)/ LG1 was the only Stukagruppe assigned to Unternehmen F, its capability for precision strikes had to be used judiciously.
The most versatile bomber Putzier had at his disposal was the Junkers Ju 88 but, as with the Ju 87, he only had a limited number: 21 Ju 88A-1s within III./KG4. The Ju 88A-1 was a reasonably fast aircraft which could perform horizontal and dive-bombing missions, with a payload of up to 6,600lb and a maximum range of 1,696 miles. Efforts to make the aircraft an effective dive-bomber slowed its development and its introduction into service was further delayed as its high-performance characteristics made it a more difficult aircraft to fly and bomber pilots switching to the type required extensive training. The Ju 88’s range particularly made the aircraft a valuable asset for operations over the Vesting Holland but, as with the Ju 87s, the small number available meant that their deployment would have to be prioritized.
Junkers Ju 88A-1
Length: 47ft 3in (14.4m)
Wingspan: 65ft 7.5in (20m)
Powerplant: 2 x 1,200hp Jumo 211B-1 inline engines
Maximum speed: 292mph (470km/h)
Range: 1,696 miles (2,730km)
Ceiling: 26,900ft (8,200m)
Armament: 3 x 7.92mm MG 15 machine guns
Payload: 4,189lbs (1,900kg) of bombs
Crew: 4
The transports
The final aircraft earmarked for extensive service in Unternehmen F was the Junkers Ju 52/3m/ transport, which made up the majority of the aircraft in Student’s Luftlandekorps. By the time of the Polish Campaign, 99 per cent of the Luftwaffe’s transport and lift capacity was made up of Ju 52/3ms. When used in Fallschirmjäger operations, a Ju 52/3m typically carried a squad (12 paratroopers) and its weapons. When assigned to air-landing missions, Ju 52/3m could carry 16–18 lightly armed troops aboard but, prior to Unternehmen F, the number of troops per aircraft was reduced to 9–10 so that each soldier had his full armament with him – a better tactical situation if they had to engage in combat immediately upon exiting the aircraft.
The Achilles heel of the Ju 52/3m in a combat situation, particularly airborne and airlanding missions, was the fact that it was an older airliner design; its maximum speed was only 168mph and had no dedicated defensive protection. Air superiority was thus deemed an essential prerequisite to the success of the airborne and air-landing missions in the Vesting Holland. Furthermore, the Luftwaffe could ill-afford to lose many of its transports; almost all were assigned to missions at the beginning of Fall Gelb, with 412 alone earmarked for Unternehmen F. It is worth noting that the Luftwaffe had already lost a substantial number of Ju 52/3ms in the Norway Campaign prior to Fall Gelb, total losses coming to roughly 25 per cent of its transport force by the end of the campaign in June 1940.
Junkers Ju 52/3m
Length: 62ft (18.9m)
Wingspan: 95ft 11½in (29.25m)
Powerplant: 3 x 715hp BMW 132T radial engines
Maximum speed: 168mph (270km/h)
Range: 795 miles (1,280 km)
Armament: 1-3 7.92mm MG 15 machine guns
Crew: 2
ORDER OF BATTLE – 10 MAY 1940
Luftwaffe Units Assigned to Unternehmen F Luftflotte 2 (Münster) – General der Flieger Albert Kesselring
Jagdfliegerführer 2 (Dortmund) – Generalmajor KurtBertram von Döring
2./ZG 76 (Köln-Wahn) – Oberleutnant Gustav Uellenbeck (10× Bf 110C/D)
The Junkers Ju 52/3m transport, first flown in 1932, was the most common Luftwaffe transport throughout World War II. It could accommodate 12 Fallschirmjäger or up to 18 lightly-armed Luftlande troops. This German-built Ju 52/3mg4e is preserved in the Forsvarets Flysamling Gardermoen museum near Oslo. (Clemens Vasters/ CC-BY-2.0)
II.(J)/Tr.Gr. 186 (Wangerooge) – Hauptmann Anton Seeliger (35× Bf 109E)
From roughly the 1840s to 1940, Dutch governments maintained a diplomatic policy of strict neutrality in the hope that the nation would not become drawn into a large-scale conflict between the Great Powers, provided it did not antagonize either side. Alongside this diplomatic policy ran an overall military strategy of ‘armed neutrality’ which reasoned that sufficiently powerful armed forces had to be maintained to protect national sovereignty, in the event of an attack by a Great Power, long enough for an opposing Great Power to come to Dutch assistance. Great strategic stock was held in the belief that one Great Power would not want to drive the Netherlands into the arms of another Great Power in a general European conflict. On the ground, this policy translated into a series of extensive fortifications: the aforementioned Vesting Holland, and later-constructed Grebbelinie, Peel-Raamstelling, and Waterlinie.
To supplement the fortifications and their garrisons, a standing Veldleger, or field army, was established in the late nineteenth century. It was intended that this force could be mobilized quickly and then rapidly deployed to conflict areas outside of the Vesting Holland, stabilizing breaches in any of the outer defence lines.
When the Dutch Luchtvaartafdeeling der Koninklijke Landmacht (LVA), or Air Service of the Royal Dutch Army, was established in 1913, its role was likewise strictly defensive. During World War I, while the Veldleger patrolled the nation’s borders, the LVA was tasked with defending Dutch skies from incursions by belligerent aircraft so that combatants could not accuse the Netherlands of allowing Dutch air space to be used by one side or the other. This mission was performed with great difficulty as the Netherlands did not yet have a capable domestic aircraft industry and was reliant upon aircraft purchased abroad or interned belligerent aircraft impressed into Dutch service.
Dutch military aircraft in the 1930s
By the early 1930s, the LVA was largely a token force, composed of a single Jachtvliegtuigafdeeling (JaVA), or fighter squadron, made up of Fokker D.XVI and D.XVII biplane fighters, two
Highly manoeuvrable for a twin-engine fighter and possessing a powerful armament of eight machine guns, the Fokker G.1A was an unpleasant surprise for Luftwaffe pilots. Luftwaffe planners had not effectively evaluated the capabilities of this aircraft prior to Unternehmen F. This G.1A replica, photographed in its previous home at the Militaire Luchtvaart Museum in Soesterberg, is now stored at the Nationaal Militair Museum in Soest. (Author’s collection)
Petrus Wilhelmus Best (front row, middle), as a Generaal-Majoor and commander of the Wapen der Militaire Luchtvaart (ML), or Dutch military air service, photographed with the staff of the Commando Luchtverdediging, or Dutch air defence command, in front of its headquarters in Den Haag. (Collectie Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie)
OPPOSITE
Fokker company preliminary diagram of its T.V luchtkruiser, or air cruiser, a Dutch variation on the late 1920s
Multiplace de Combat multi-role aircraft concept. While the heavy battleplane concept had largely been discarded by 1940, the ML’s T.Vs surprisingly served in their originally intended role during the early hours of the Meidagen campaign (literally ‘May Days’; Dutch term for the five-day German campaign to occupy the Netherlands).
(Courtesy of the Aviation Museum Aviodrome, Netherlands)
army-cooperation groups consisting of Fokker C.V multi-purpose biplanes, and a training squadron possessing three Fokker F.VIIa/3m transport/bombers and other trainers. The LVA had only one permanent ground installation and airfield at Soesterberg, just east of Utrecht, at which these units were based.
The rise of Hitler in Germany and the failure of the League of Nations to effectively counter Japanese, Italian, and later German military aggression created new defence concerns which the small LVA was unsuited to face. Luitenantkolonel Petrus Wilhelmus Best, who was appointed commander of the LVA on November 1, 1933, immediately recognized his service’s shortcomings against the rising tide of militarism and rearmament sweeping across the Continent in the mid-1930s. In large part due to Best’s lobbying, the Inspectie der Militaire Luchtvaart (Military Aviation Inspectorate) or IML was formed in April 1935 under the leadership of Generaal-majoor Marius Raaijmakers. The IML sought to remedy the poor operational status of the LVA, create a modern aircraft procurement programme, and construct new airfields in order to effectively disperse and service its aircraft. Despite lingering economic fallout from the Great Depression, the government of Minister-President Hendrik Colijn recognized the pressing need for increased military funding and on February 18, 1936, passed a new Defence Fund which prioritized funding for new aircraft and antiaircraft gun acquisition.
With funding in place, in early 1937 the IML published its plan to expand the LVA to a size necessary to meet the new objectives of an updated armed neutrality strategy, given the advances in technology and change of strategies and tactics after World War I. The IML’s plan detailed the types of aircraft required, the specifications of which were immediately issued to Dutch aircraft manufacturers, and laid out a new aircraft acquisition plan, intended to get the LVA to its recommended size within four years.
The new LVA structure created by the IML consisted of the 1e Luchtvaartregiment (1 LvR), or 1st Aviation Regiment, which was tasked with air defence. It would be made up of two reconnaissance squadrons, three bomber squadrons, and four fighter squadrons (two with single-engine interceptors and two with twin-engine jachtkruisers, or heavy fighters). The 2e Luchtvaartregiment (2 LvR) was tasked with supporting the Veldleger and was made up of four reconnaissance groups and Jachtgroep Veldleger, or Field Army Fighter Group (four fighter squadrons, two with single engine interceptors and two with twin-engine jachtkruisers). A third Luchtvaartregiment (3 LvR) was tasked with training for 1 LvR and 2 LvR and was composed of three training squadrons; one elementary, one intermediate, and one advanced. It is interesting to note that at the time the LVA regarded the reconnaissance of and the bombing of advancing enemy ground forces as part of the air defence role, hence the reconnaissance and bomber squadrons assigned to 1 LvR. Each fighter, bomber, and reconnaissance squadron in 1 LvR and 2 LvR’s Jachgroep Veldleger was allotted 18 aircraft: nine operational and nine to be kept in reserve. The four reconnaissance groups in 2 LvR would each receive 18 reconnaissance aircraft and 12 light multi-purpose aircraft.
The first aircraft acquired according to the IML’s four-year plan were for the 1e Luchtvaartregiment and initially the Ministry of Defence insisted that new aircraft be purchased by domestic manufacturers. At the time, only the Fokker company, formally known as the Nederlandsche Vliegtuigenfabriek, was equipped to deliver sizeable orders of aircraft.
Anthony Fokker had re-established his formerly German company in the Netherlands following the internal collapse and revolution in Germany in 1919, and continued to be a major designer and manufacturer of competitive military and commercial aircraft throughout the interwar years. As it had been the primary manufacturer of aircraft for the LVA throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, the LVA turned to Fokker for its new generation of aircraft.
The first of the four-year plan aircraft ordered was the Fokker T.V luchtkruiser, or air cruiser; the luchtkruiser concept was a Dutch variation on the late 1920s Multiplace de Combat multi-role aircraft designation which was studied by several air forces during the interwar years. In the LVA’s understanding, the luchtkruiser could serve both as a medium bomber in offensive missions and in a defensive role as a heavily-armed battleplane that could wade into and attack enemy bomber formations.
On 4 January 1937, the Ministry of Defence placed an initial order for 16 T.Vs from Fokker to form an initial bomber squadron with nine operational aircraft, six in reserve, and one to be used by the advanced training squadron. Construction began on the first aircraft in February 1937, and it made its first flight on October 16. The production T.V was powered by two 925hp Bristol Pegasus XXVI radials, had a payload of 2,205lb, and was armed with four 7.9mm FN Browning defensive machine guns. The aircraft’s primary weapon was its 20mm Solothurn cannon, mounted in the nose; such was the LVA’s insistence upon the luchtkruiser concept that the forward gunner/bombardier, rather than the pilot, was made the commander of each T.V crew. The lengthy development and production time for the T.V meant that it was surpassed by foreign medium bomber projects when it finally entered service in numbers in early 1939 and already in early 1938 the LVA was looking for a more competitive bomber.
Anthony Fokker and his aircraft company had great success with domestic and export sales throughout the 1920s but he was slow to adapt to all-metal construction methods. As a result, his sales waned throughout the early and mid-1930s. European rearmament in the late 1930s again increased sales and a new design team, coupled with updated construction techniques, led to a rapid modernization of designs. Fokker died of meningitis unexpectedly in December 1939 but by that time his company had state-of-theart aircraft designs entering the prototype phase. Fokker (front row, third from left) is seen here in 1931 in Berlin with pilot friends from World War I, Bruno Loerzer (far left) and Ernst Udet (front row, fourth from left), both of whom would later become generals in the Luftwaffe. (Courtesy of the Aviation Museum Aviodrome, Netherlands)
Although much slower than and not as heavily armed as the Bf 109, the superior manoeuvrability of the Fokker D.XXI would make it a competitive opponent in turning dogfights during the Meidagen. This D.XXI replica, photographed in the previous Militaire Luchtvaart Museum in Soesterberg, is now on display at the Nationaal Militair Museum in Soest. (Author’s collection)
Fokker T.V
Length: 53ft 1¾in (16.2m)
Wingspan: 68ft 10¾in (21m)
Powerplant: 2 x 925hp Bristol Pegasus XXVI radials
Maximum speed: 264mph (425km/h)
Ceiling: 26,247ft (8,000m)
Range: 963 miles (1,550km)
Armament: 1 x 20mm Solothurn cannon, 4 x 7.9mm Mitrailleur M.20 Vliegtuig machine guns, 2,205lb (1,000kg) of bombs
Crew: 5
For a single-engine interceptor fighter for the 1 LvR’s first two fighter squadrons, the Ministry of Defence ordered 36 Fokker D.XXI monoplane fighters on 31 December 1937. The D.XXI was initially designed to a 1934 request from the Luchtvaartafdeling van het Koninklijk Nederlands-Indisch Leger (Royal Netherlands East Indies Army Air Service) and did not impress Kolonel Best when the prototype was demonstrated before him in February 1936. Its 645hp Bristol Mercury VI-S engine gave the aircraft a maximum speed which was only 25mph faster than the biplane fighters in LVA service at the time.
Best was not inclined to purchase the aircraft when the four-year plan began but the Ministry of Defence requested that the LVA re-evaluate the design as Fokker was in the process of producing an improved version of the aircraft for Finland. This aircraft, powered by an 840hp Bristol Mercury VIII radial and armed with four 7.9mm FN Browning machine guns in its wings, had a more respectable maximum speed and, with its mixed welded steel tube/wood/fabric construction, was highly manoeuvrable. The mixed construction also resulted in a price tag significantly lower than those of all-metal construction, making it a seemingly prudent immediate purchase. Anachronistically, the D.XXI had fixed landing gear but the pilots that tested it thought it was a technological leap from their previous biplanes. The LVA’s D.XXIs were delivered between August 1938 and April 1939. The rapid pace of technological development abroad meant that the D.XXI would not remain a competitive interceptor for long, so the LVA had already decided in 1938 to transfer its D.XXIs to the
two fighter squadrons of the Jachtgroep Veldleger once a superior interceptor was available for purchase.
Fokker D.XXI
Length: 26ft 11in (8.2m)
Wingspan: 36ft 1in (11m)
Powerplant: 1 x 840hp Bristol Mercury VIII radial
Maximum speed: 286mph (460km/h)
Ceiling: 33,137ft (10,100m)
Range: 578 miles (930km)
Armament: 4 x 7.9mm FN Browning M36 machine guns
The aircraft under development at Fokker which Best was most eager to acquire was the Fokker G.1 jachtkruiser, a revolutionary design which was a domestic and international sensation when unveiled to the world at the Salon de l’Aéronautique in Paris in November 1936. The jachtkruiser, or fighter cruiser, concept was a twin-engine heavy fighter that could also perform the roles of fighter-bomber and long-range reconnaissance aircraft.
The production version of the G.1 had a large wing with a small fuselage in the centre, twin tail booms, and was powered by two 800hp Bristol Mercury VIII radials, similar to the engine used in the D.XXI; this was a purposeful choice as the LVA hoped to simplify powerplant logistics in its fighters through the use of a single engine. The heavy fighter’s armament was perhaps its most impressive feature: initially armed with two 23mm Madsen cannon and two 7.9mm Madsen machine guns, the LVA decided to arm the aircraft with eight 7.9mm FN Browning machine guns in the nose and a single one in the rear nose. The G.1 was also of mixed construction like the T.V and D.XXI, and demonstrated surprising manoeuvrability for a larger aircraft when the prototype was tested throughout the spring and summer of 1937.
Best was so impressed with the G.1 that he wanted to equip all of his fighter squadrons with it, believing that it was superior in the interceptor role than the D.XXI; his more-conservative superiors in the Ministry of Defence were unsure of relying exclusively on such a revolutionary design and compelled Best to divide his initial fighter orders between the D.XXI and G.1. That being said, the Ministry of Defence placed an order for 36 Fokker G.1As on December 31, 1937, and these were delivered from November 1938 through October 1939.
Fokker G.1A
Length: 35ft 9in (10.9m)
Wingspan: 56ft 5in (17.2m)
Powerplant: 2 x 800hp Bristol Mercury VIII radials
Maximum speed: 295mph (475km/h)
Ceiling: 30,840ft (9,400m)
Range: 932 miles (1,500km)
Armament: 8 x 7.9mm FN Browning M36 machine guns
Crew: 2
By the end of 1937, enough new aircraft had been ordered to equip a bomber squadron and four fighter squadrons, and in May 1938 the Minister of Defence requested a list of recommended purchases from the IML for the remainder of squadrons yet to be equipped under the four-year plan. The IML requested the opportunity to recommend aircraft from foreign manufacturers, due to design and production delays at Fokker, and this was granted.
OPPOSITE MILITAIRE LUCHTVAART PRIMARY AND AUXILIARY AIRFIELDS IN USE ON 10 MAY 1940, AND COMMANDO LUCHTVERDEDIGING PRIMARY AIR DEFENCE SECTORS
After the beginning of World War II, the ML had dispersed its squadrons to a number of newly built military airfields, civilian airports, commandeered flying clubs, or auxiliary airfields. The map shows the airfields where ML aircraft were stationed on 10 May 1940 (see pp. 26 for the ML’s order of battle). In addition to the squadrons of the 1e Luchtvaartregiment assigned to air defence, the Commando Luchtverdediging also controlled the ground-to-air defences stationed throughout the country. The Brigade Luchtdoelartillerie possessed 273 modern and 39 obsolete anti-aircraft guns, and 452 machine guns designated for anti-aircraft use. The Brigade Luchtdoelartillerie’s batteries were divided up among eight air defence sectors and a number were assigned to the Veldleger (IIe, IIIe, and IVe Legerkorps) and the Ie Legerkorps. Throughout the Meidagen, Dutch anti-aircraft fire proved to be much more lethal to Luftwaffe aircraft than the fighters of the ML; anti-aircraft fire accounted for roughly 50–60 per cent of all Luftwaffe losses over the Netherlands. The distribution of the Brigade Luchtdoelartillerie’s guns is shown on the map.
Dissatisfied with the D.XXI as an interceptor, Best and the IML examined the Hawker Hurricane, Supermarine Spitfire, and a variant of the Heinkel He 112B powered by a Daimler-Benz engine. In the Netherlands, Fokker and the smaller De Schelde aviation firm were also developing designs for state-of-the-art interceptors, the Fokker D.XXIII and De Schelde S.21, which both had twin booms and a pusher configuration (the D.XXIII additionally had a second engine in a tractor configuration). Also under consideration was the FK 58 monoplane, a refined version of the Fokker D.XXI design, being developed by the Dutch Vliegtuigenfabriek Koolhoven. The IML recommended the purchase of 36 Dornier Do 215 (export version of the Do 17Z) high-speed bombers to serve as both bombers and strategic reconnaissance aircraft for 1 LvR’s reconnaissance squadrons. For the two jachtkruiser squadrons intended for the Jachtgroep Veldleger, multi-purpose heavy fighter designs from Fokker, Koolhoven, and De Schelde were considered, along with the Douglas DB-8A/3N light bomber/ground attack aircraft already in production in the United States. Development and production delays, budgetary arguments between the LVA and the Minister of Defence, and the inability to acquire aircraft from belligerent nations after the start of World War II in September 1939 resulted in almost none of these aircraft being acquired for Dutch squadrons by May 1940; only 18 Douglas DB-8A/3Ns and 26 partially finished Fokker G.1B jachtkruisers (a smaller export version of the G.1, powered by Pratt & Whitney Twin Wasp Jr. engines and armed with only four machine guns) were purchased prior to the German invasion.
Although the LVA did not receive the full complement of modern aircraft envisioned by the IML’s four-year plan, Kolonel Best and the IML had significantly improved the combat potential of Dutch squadrons since Best took command in 1933. On 1 November 1938, in a further improvement for the LVA, Minister of Defence van Dijk created the Commando Luchtverdediging (C.-Lvd.), or Air Defence Command, and the newly-promoted GeneraalMajoor Best was named as its commander.
The Commando Luchtverdediging, with a central headquarters in Den Haag, encompassed all units associated with air defence including the fighter, bomber, and reconnaissance squadrons of the 1e Luchtvaartregiment, the Luchtvaartbrigade (depot, technical and airfield garrison units), the Brigade Luchtdoelartillerie (anti-aircraft batteries), the 3e Regiment Genietroepen (searchlight engineer units), the Luchtwachtdienst (air observation service), and the Vrijwillig Landstormkorps Luchtwachtdienst, or volunteer reserve air observation service. The 2e Luchtvaartregiment, which consisted mostly of reconnaissance units, remained under the command of the Veldleger. This was a long-overdue development as before this the Netherlands had few effective anti-aircraft guns and no coordinated air defence network.
Upon the C.-Lvd.’s creation, Best immediately went to work placing orders for hundreds of modern anti-aircraft guns from both domestic and foreign manufacturers. By May 1940, the
1. Amsterdam
15× 7.5cm Vickers/Skoda antiaircraft guns
9× converted 7.5cm Krupp 1903 L30 eld guns
3× 4cm Bofors antiaircraft guns
23× 2cm Oerlikon/Scotti cannon
72× M.25 (Spandau M08) machine guns
2. Den Haag/Rotterdam
36× 7.5cm Vickers/Skoda antiaircraft guns
6× 4cm Bofors antiaircraft guns
29× 2cm Oerlikon/Scotti cannon
108× M.25 (Spandau M08) machine guns
3. Utrecht/Soesterberg
15× 7.5cm Vickers/Skoda antiaircraft guns
21× converted 5.7cm Krupp fortress guns
4× 2cm Oerlikon/Scotti cannon
148× M.25 (Spandau M08) machine guns
4. Den Helder
3× converted 10.5cm Krupp SK L40 naval guns
9× 7.5cm Vickers/Skoda antiaircraft guns
2× 2cm Oerlikon/Scotti cannon
26× M.25 (Spandau M08) machine guns
5. Zeeland
3× 7.5cm Vickers/Skoda antiaircraft guns
3× converted 7.5cm Krupp 1903 L30 eld guns
3× 4cm Bofors antiaircraft guns
20× M.25 (Spandau M08) machine guns
6. Bergen
3× 7.5cm Vickers/Skoda antiaircraft guns
3× 4cm Bofors antiaircraft guns
3× 2cm Oerlikon/Scotti cannon
4× M.25 (Spandau M08) machine guns
7. Limburg
3× converted 7.5cm Krupp 1903 L30 eld guns
6× M.25 (Spandau M08) machine guns
8. Friesland
3× 2cm Oerlikon/Scotti cannon
9. Veldleger and Ie Legerkorps (Mobile batteries for the Veldleger)
26× 4cm Bofors antiaircraft guns
86× 2cm Oerlikon/Scotti cannon
Marius Beeling (left), the chief engineer at Fokker when World War II began, standing in front of the Fokker D.XXIII advanced twin-engine pusher/puller fighter prototype. By the end of 1939, both the Fokker and De Schelde aviation firms were developing prototypes for new fighters which would have rivalled the best of other foreign manufacturers. The German invasion brought an abrupt end to these promising developments. To the right of Beeling is Fokker test pilot Gerben Sonderman, who as a G.1A pilot in the 3e JaVA scored more kills than any other ML pilot during the Meidagen. (Courtesy of the Aviation Museum Aviodrome, Netherlands)
Dutch Brigade Luchtdoelartillerie (antiaircraft brigade) troops training on a 7.5cm Vickers/Skoda anti-aircraft gun, stationed at Bergen Airfield. (Courtesy of the Douglas Dildy Collection)
C.-Lvd. received 155 Oerlikon and Scotti Isotta Fraschini 2cm guns, 46 Bofors 4cm guns, and 72 Vickers 7.5cm guns, and their accompanying fire control systems.
Best also oversaw the set-up of an effective telephone communication network, connecting the Vrijwillig Landstormkorps Luchtwachtdienst’s 146 observation posts to the Centraal Luchtwachtbureau , or Central Air Observation Office. This office disseminated incoming reports and passed them on to the C.-Lvd.’s headquarters, which then, through direct telephone lines or radio receivers, alerted appropriate squadrons or anti-aircraft batteries. Experiments were under way in early 1940 in which the C.-Lvd. vectored Dutch aircraft toward incoming ‘bogies’ by radio but this was not standard practice by May 1940 as not all Dutch aircraft were equipped with radios by then. Shortly before the war the C.-Lvd. also experimented with an early radar set, being developed by the Philips electronics firm in Eindhoven, which could detect aircraft up to 18km away.
Best’s plans for a modern, integrated air defence network were not complete by May 1940 but he had created the most sophisticated and effective air defence system in western Europe, much more advanced than anything the larger armed forces of France and Belgium could boast. On 1 July 1939, all of the former LVA squadrons and the Commando Luchtverdediging’s organizations were formed into the Wapen der Militaire Luchtvaart, or simply the Militaire Luchtvaart (ML), with Best as its commander.
War looms
In spite of a declaration of neutrality at the beginning of the war and Hitler’s promise that Germany would respect Dutch neutrality, the government and armed forces of the Netherlands were sceptical of German promises by January 1940. Despite German attempts at secrecy, various intelligence sources suggested German offensive action against Dutch territory as well as the possible use of airborne units. The Generale Staf sectie III (GS III), the intelligence service of the Koninklijke Leger, maintained mobile listening posts which disseminated Wehrmacht radio traffic on a routine basis. It had broken parts of the Wehrmacht’s codes and notably the code of the German Auswärtiges Amt, or foreign office. Dutch businessmen and KLM pilots travelling through Germany, who were GS III agents, brought back reports of suspicious troop concentrations and exercises throughout the winter and spring of 1940. The increasing frequency of German reconnaissance flights in the months leading up to May and suspected Lufthansa photographic flights were an ominous portent as well.
GS III also had a special ‘ace-in-the-hole’; the Dutch military attaché in Berlin, Major Gijsbertus Sas, received clandestine intelligence data from Oberst Hans Oster, deputy chief of the German Abwehr, the Wehrmacht’s intelligence service, and leading figure among the German resistance to Hitler and the Nazis. Oster routinely updated Sas as to the pending execution dates for Fall Gelb, but due to the plans' numerous cancellations and rescheduling throughout, Sas’ warnings eventually began to fall on deaf ears within the Koninklijke Leger’s leadership. Prime Minister Dirk Jan de Geer, who was insistent upon giving the Germans no excuse to violate Dutch neutrality, refused to take any pre-emptive steps against a possible German invasion.
Oster did inform Sas in advance of Unternehmen Weserübung, the German invasion of Denmark and Norway on 9 April 1940, and when this took place on the day Oster specified, the Dutch military leadership began to reconsider the reports coming from Sas. Generaal Best in particular was concerned about the use of heavily armed German infantry, flown in by transport aircraft, in the capture and securing of Fornebu Airport in Oslo on 9 April. The operation was witnessed first-hand by KLM pilot Evert van Dijk, also a GS III agent who happened to be on a routine flight there; van Dijk extensively briefed Best on what he saw on his return to the Netherlands. The details of this operation fell into place with other pieces of intelligence suggesting German offensive action against Dutch airfields and Best immediately increased the security details at his airfields. All combat squadrons were withdrawn to airfields within the Vesting Holland and obstacles were placed around the unused areas of airfields as well as sections of highways which transport aircraft might use
In the centre background of the photograph is KLM’s DC-3 airliner Kemphaan, which happened to be on a routine flight at Fornebu Airport at Oslo on 9 April 1940 when the Germans captured the airport in a daring airlanding operation. Kemphaan’s pilot, Evert van Dijk, was a member of the Dutch GS III intelligence service and, upon his return to Schiphol, provided a valuable eyewitness account of the tactics used by German troopers, rapidly deploying from Ju 52/3m transports. Van Dijk’s report played an important role in improving airfield defences in the Netherlands prior to the coming German invasion. (Collectie Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie)
for landing. On April 22, Best briefed his airfield commanders about the full details of the German operation at Oslo and ordered them to prepare contingency plans for the effective defence of their airfields. Best also ordered his combat squadrons to have patrols ready to scramble, if needed, at dawn on every morning.
Despite the accuracy of Oster’s intelligence regarding the invasion of Denmark and Norway and the ominous events at Oslo, elements of the Dutch civilian and military leadership still vainly hoped to maintain Dutch neutrality and refused more proactive defensive preparations beyond what Best had already done on his own initiative. Given that, the Commando Luchtverdediging and its squadrons were as ready as they could be on the evening of 9 May when Sas phoned from Berlin, instructing GS III that Oster warned him that Fall Gelb would be executed at dawn the following morning and that this time the counter-order had not been issued.
ORDER OF BATTLE, 10 MAY 1040
Units of the Militaire Luchtvaart
Wapen het Militaire Luchtvaart (Den Haag) –
Generaal-majoor Petrus Wilhelmus Best
1e Luchtvaartregiment (Schiphol) – Majoor H.G. van Voorthuijsen
Strategische Groep (Schiphol) – Majoor J.T.H. van Weeren
Strategische Verkenningsvliegtuig Afdeling, or StratVerVA (Bergen) – Kapitein J. van der Werff (10× Fokker C.X )
Bombardeervliegtuigafdeeling, or BomVA (Schiphol) –
Kapitein J.G.Sissingh (9× Fokker T.V )
Jachtgroep (Den Haag) – Majoor H. van Weerden Poelman
1e Jachtvliegtuigafdeeling, or 1e JaVA (De Kooy) –
Kapitein H.M. Schmidt Crans (11× Fokker D.XXI ) 2e Jachtvliegtuigafdeeling, or 2e JaVA (Schiphol) –
Kapitein P.J.E. Janssens (9× Fokker D.XXI )
3e Jachtvliegtuigafdeeling, or 3e JaVA (Waalhaven) –
Kapitein H. J. Scholtmeijer (11× Fokker G.1A)
4e Jachtvliegtuigafdeeling, or 4e JaVA (Bergen) –
Kapitein T.J.A. Lamers (12× Fokker G.1A)
2e Luchtvaartregiment (Zeist) – Luitenantkolonel J.H. Sar
Ie Verkenningsgroep, or Ie Verk.Gr. (Hilversum) – Majoor H. van der Zanden (1× Fokker C.X; 4× Fokker C.V; 4× Koolhoven FK 51)
IIIe Verkenningsgroep, or IIIe Verk.Gr. (Ruigenhoek)
– Majoor F. Raland (9× Fokker C.V; 4× Koolhoven FK 51)
IVe Verkenningsgroep, or IVe Verk.Gr. (Gilze-Rijen) -
Kapitein A.W. de Ruyter van Steveninck (7× Fokker C.V; 3× Koolhoven FK 51)
Jachtgroep Veldleger, or Ve Jachtgroep (Ockenburg) –
Kapitein W.H. Wijnkamp
1e Afdeling van de Jachtgroep Veldleger, or 1-V-2 (Ypenburg) – 1e Luitenant P.J.B. Ruijs de Perez (8× Fokker D.XXI )
3e Afdeling van de Jachtgroep Veldleger, or 3-V-2 (Ypenburg) – Kapitein J.A. Bach (11× Douglas DB-8A/3N )
3e Luchtvaartregiment (De Vlijt) – Kapitein J. L. Zegers Elementaire Vliegschool (Vlissingen) (11× Fokker S.IV; 17× Fokker S.IX )
Voortgezette Vliegschool (Haamstede) (9× Fokker C.V; 1× Fokker C.IX; 1× Fokker F.VIIA; 10× Koolhoven FK 51; 2× Koolhoven FK 56)
Jachtvliegschool (De Vlijt) (1× Bücker BU 131; 1× Fokker D.XVI; 7× Fokker D.XVII; 2× Fokker D.XXI; 1× Fokker G.1A; 1× Fokker S.II; 1× Fokker T.V; 2× Focke-Wulf Fw58B-2; 3× Koolhoven FK 56; 1× North American NA27 )
Author’s Note
Both the German and Dutch orders of battle only include aircraft that were at operational status on 10 May 1940. Also note, not included in the Dutch order of battle are the 101 aircraft, mostly floatplanes and trainers of the Marine Luchtvaartdienst (Naval Air Service), or MLD, of the Koninklijke Marine (Royal Netherlands Navy); these aircraft did not participate in combat during the Meidagen, or May Days (the colloquial Dutch name for the Netherlands Campaign in 1940), in any significant way.
CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES
Unternehmen F
With the method of attack determined as well as targets selected from the extensive reconnaissance missions, Göring, Kesselring, Student, and von Sponeck presented their final plan for Unternehmen F to Hitler on 2 May 1940, who in turn approved it the following day. On May 8, Kesselring, Student, and Sponeck presented the full plan to their subordinates. The prerequisite of air superiority over the Vesting Holland for any chance of success for the subsequent airborne and airlanding operations was not lost on Kesselring and neither was the importance of the element of surprise.
Kesselring had been involved in the Luftwaffe’s campaign of air superiority over Poland, which was achieved by the end of the first week of the invasion through sustained attacks on Polish airfields the Polish air force’s logistics infrastructure. The combat aircraft of the Polish air force were not destroyed on the ground however as they had been successfully dispersed and camouflaged when the Poles mobilized on 29 September 1939, two days before the German attack. While Polish aerial resistance was largely ineffective and could not be conducted en masse, it was a nuisance and inflicted losses upon the Luftwaffe.
Attempting to learn from the Polish experience, emphasis was especially placed upon the element of surprise for the aerial attack on Dutch airfields. In a ruse de guerre, the initial Luftwaffe bomber sorties would fly from their bases out into the North Sea and head to the northwest of the Netherlands, giving the impression to Dutch observers that they were on their way to Great Britain for a raid. Once outside visual range of the Dutch coast, roughly 15–20 miles to the west, the bombers would turn south, parallel to the Dutch coast, and then turn east towards their targets. The bombers would then fly to their targets at low altitude so that their approach would not be spotted until the last minute by airfield defences; it was anticipated that a low-altitude approach from the west would catch the defenders by surprise. The timings of the initial attacks on the airfields also had to be coordinated as closely as possible to minimize any warning given to other targets and hence the defenders’ response time to prepare countermeasures.
The Willemsbrug road bridge across the Nieuwe Maas in Rotterdam, seen here just to the left of the railway bridge on the left side of the photo, was a key objective of Student’s Fallschirmjäger landing around Waalhaven. The bridge was needed intact if the panzers of the 9.Panzer-Division were to advance on Den Haag and Amsterdam. Some of the most intense fighting of the campaign took place in the streets and buildings adjacent to the Willemsbrug. (Collectie Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie)
OPPOSITE LUFTFLOTTE 2 HOME AIRFIELDS AND TARGETS IN THE NETHERLANDS AT THE BEGINNING OF UNTERNEHMEN F, WITH ATTACKS BEGINNING AT 0355HRS, 10 MAY 1940
In the final Luftwaffe plan for Unternehmen F, the bid to achieve air superiority over the Vesting Holland was left to General Putzier’s Fliegerkorps zbV.2. Putzier decided that, if surprise could be achieved, an initial heavy blow against the ML’s airfields with the majority of his bombers gave the best hopes of destroying its strength, hopefully on the ground. Putzier formed an initial bombing wave that would circle around the Netherlands, via the North Sea as suggested by Kesselring, and attack its targets from the west. The aircraft assigned to this first bombing wave were to remain off the Dutch coast until 0350hrs and then all head for their targets simultaneously. A number of secondary targets, primarily airfields where aircraft not considered front-line were based, were assigned as part of the mission of a first wave of fighters, flying directly from their bases in Germany. Other fighters in this first wave would take station over a predesignated patrol area and perform bomber escort, combat air patrol, and what would later be termed Freie Jagd – or free hunt – fighter sweeps as needed.
The latter type of fighter mission was not yet specifically defined at this time in the war as the Luftwaffe was still in the process of honing operational strategies for its single- and twin-engine fighters. In addition to previously assigned fighter units, General Döring was loaned the II.(J)/Tr.Gr.186, IV.(N)/JG 2, and 2./ZG 76 from Jagdfliegerführer Deutsche Bucht for these early-morning missions. Putzier had saved his Gruppe of Stukas for a thorough neutralization of the anti-aircraft and ground defences around the road and rail bridges at Moerdijk as their capture was absolutely essential to the success of Unternehmen F.
Generalmajor Kurt-Bertram von Döring, commander of Jagdfliegerführer 2, which made up almost all of Luftflotte 2’s fighter units. (Author’s collection)
FIRST BOMBING WAVE
Waalhaven Airport –Stabskette KG 4 and II./KG 4 (Faßberg)
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and the several answers which were returned by each of the martyrs. I copy from Baronius the most important of these. They were arrested while they were celebrating the Lord’s sacrament according to custom.[514] The following is the charge on which they were arrested: They had celebrated the Collectam Dominicam against the command of the emperors.[515] The proconsul asked the first whether he had celebrated the Collectam, and he replied that he was a Christian, and had done this.[516] Another says, “I have not only been in the Collecta, but I have celebrated the Dominicum with the brethren because I am a Christian.”[517] Another says we have celebrated the Dominicum, because the Dominicum cannot be neglected.[518] Another said that the Collecta was made (or observed) at his house.[519] The proconsul questioning again one of those already examined, received this answer: “The Dominicum cannot be disregarded, the law so commands.”[520] When one was asked whether the Collecta was made (or observed) at his house, he answered, “In my house we have celebrated the Dominicum.” He added, “Without the Dominicum we cannot be,” or live.[521] To another, the proconsul said that he did not wish to know whether he was a Christian, but whether he participated in the Collecta. His reply was: “As if one could be a Christian without the Dominicum, or as if the Dominicum can be celebrated without the Christian.”[522] And he said further to the proconsul: “We have observed the Collecta most sacredly; we have always convened in the Dominicum for reading the Lord’s word.”[523] Another said: “I have been in [literally, have made] the Collecta with my brethren, I have celebrated the Dominicum.”[524] After him another proclaimed the Dominicum to be the hope and safety of the Christian, and when tortured as the others, he exclaimed, ”I have celebrated the Dominicum with a devoted heart, and with my brethren I have made the Collecta because I am a Christian.”[525] When the proconsul again asked one of these whether he had conducted the Dominicum, he replied that he had because Christ was his Saviour.[526]
I have thus given the substance of this famous examination, and have set before the reader the references therein made to the Dominicum. It is to be observed that Collecta is used as another name for Dominicum. Now does Baronius use either of these words to signify Lord’s day? It so happens that he has defined these words with direct reference to this very case no less than seven times. Now let us read these seven definitions:—
When Baronius records the first question addressed to these martyrs, he there defines these words as follows: “By the words Collectam, Collectionem, and Dominicum, the author always understands the sacrifice of the Mass.”[527] After recording the words of that martyr who said that the law commanded the observance of the Dominicum, Baronius defines his statement thus: “Evidently the Christian law concerning the Dominicum, no doubt about celebrating the sacrifice.”[528] Baronius, by the Romish words sacrifice and Mass refers to the celebration of the Lord’s supper by these martyrs. At the conclusion of the examination, he again defines the celebration of the Dominicum. He says: “It has been shown above in relating these things that the Christians were moved, even in the time of severe persecution, to celebrate the Dominicum. Evidently, as we have declared elsewhere in many places, it was a sacrifice without bloodshed, and of divine appointment.”[529] He presently defines Dominicum again, saying, “Though it is a fact that the same expression was employed at times with reference to the temple of God, yet since all the churches upon the earth have united in this matter, and from other things related above, it has been sufficiently shown concerning the celebration of the Dominicum, that only the sacrifice of the Mass can be understood.”[530] Observe this last statement. He says though the word has been employed to designate the temple of the Lord, yet in the things here related it can only signify the sacrifice of the Mass. These testimonies are exceedingly explicit. But Baronius has not yet finished. In the index to Tome 3, he explains these words again with direct reference to this very martyrdom. Thus under Collecta is this statement: “The Collecta, the Dominicum, the Mass, the same [ . .] 303, xxxix.”[531] Under Missa: “The Mass is the same as the Collecta, or Dominicum
[ . .], 303, xxxix.”[532] Under Dominicum: “To celebrate the Dominicum is the same as to conduct the Mass [ . .], 303, xxxix.; xlix.; li.”[533]
It is not possible to mistake the meaning of Baronius. He says that Dominicum signifies the Mass! The celebration of the supper by these martyrs was doubtless very different from the pompous ceremony which the church of Rome now observes under the name of Mass. But it was the sacrament of the Lord’s supper, concerning which they were tested, and for observing which they were put to a cruel death. The word Dominicum signifies “the sacred mysteries,” as Ruinart defines it; and Baronius, in seven times affirming this definition, though acknowledging that it has sometimes been used to signify temple of God, plainly declares that in this record, it can have no other meaning than that service which the Romanists call the sacrifice of the Mass. Gilfillan had read all this, yet he dares to quote Baronius as saying that these martyrs were tested by the question, “Have you kept Lord’s day?” He could not but know that he was writing a direct falsehood; but he thought the honor of God, and the advancement of the cause of truth, demanded this act at his hands.
Before Gilfillan wrote his work, Domville had called attention to the fact that the sentence, “Dominicum servasti?” does not occur in the Acta Martyrum, a different verb being used every time. But this is the popular form of this question, and must not be given up. So Gilfillan declares that Baronius uses it in his record of the martyrdoms in . . 303. But we have cited the different forms of question recorded by Baronius, and find them to be precisely the same with those of the Acta Martyrum. “Dominicum servasti?” does not occur in that historian, and Gilfillan, in stating that it does, is guilty of untruth. This, however, is comparatively unimportant. But for asserting that Baronius speaks of Lord’s day under the name of Dominicum, Gilfillan stands convicted of inexcusable falsehood in matters of serious importance.
CHAPTER XVI.
ORIGIN OF FIRST-DAY OBSERVANCE.
Sunday a heathen festival from remote antiquity Origin of the name Reasons which induced the leaders of the church to adopt this festival It was the day generally observed by the Gentiles in the first centuries of the Christian era To have taken a different day would have been exceedingly inconvenient They hoped to facilitate the conversion of the Gentiles by keeping the same day that they observed Three voluntary weekly festivals in the church in memory of the Redeemer—Sunday soon elevated above the other two— Justin Martyr—Sunday observance first found in the church of Rome Irenæus First act of papal usurpation was in behalf of Sunday Tertullian Earliest trace of abstinence from labor on Sunday General statement of facts The Roman church made its first great attack upon the Sabbath by turning it into a fast.
The festival of Sunday is more ancient than the Christian religion, its origin being lost in remote antiquity. It did not originate, however, from any divine command nor from piety toward God: on the contrary, it was set apart as a sacred day by the heathen world in honor of their chief god, the sun. It is from this fact that the first day of the week has obtained the name of Sunday, a name by which it is known in many languages. Webster thus defines the word:—
“Sunday; so called because this day was anciently dedicated to the sun or to its worship. The first day of the week; the Christian Sabbath; a day consecrated to rest from secular employments, and to religious worship; the Lord’s day.”
And Worcester, in his large dictionary, uses similar language:—
“Sunday; so named because anciently dedicated to the sun or to its worship. The first day of the week; the Christian
Sabbath, consecrated to rest from labor and to religious worship; the Lord’s day.”
These lexicographers call Sunday the Christian Sabbath, etc., because in the general theological literature of our language, it is thus designated, though never thus in the Bible. Lexicographers do not undertake to settle theological questions, but simply to define terms as currently used in a particular language. Though all the other days of the week have heathen names, Sunday alone was a conspicuous heathen festival in the days of the early church. The North British Review, in a labored attempt to justify the observance of Sunday by the Christian world, styles that day, “T [i. e., festival in honor of the sun] .”[534]
Verstegan says:—
“The most ancient Germans being pagans, and having appropriated their first day of the week to the peculiar adoration of the sun, whereof that day doth yet in our English tongue retain the name of Sunday, and appropriated the next day unto it unto the especial adoration of the moon, whereof it yet retaineth with us, the name of Monday; they ordained the next day to these most heavenly planets to the particular adoration of their great reputed god, Tuisco, whereof we do yet retain in our language the name of Tuesday.”[535]
The same author thus speaks concerning the idols of our Saxon ancestors:—
“Of these, though they had many, yet seven among the rest they especially appropriated unto the seven days of the week.... Unto the day dedicated unto the especial adoration of the idol of the sun, they gave the name of Sunday, as much as to say the sun’s day or the day of the sun. This idol was placed in a temple, and there adored and sacrificed unto, for
that they believed that the sun in the firmament did with or in this idol correspond and co-operate.”[536]
Jennings makes this adoration of the sun more ancient than the deliverance of Israel from Egypt. For, in speaking of the time of that deliverance, he speaks of the Gentiles as,
“The idolatrous nations who in honor to their chief god, the sun, began their day at his rising.”[537]
He represents them also as setting apart Sunday in honor of the same object of adoration:—
“The day which the heathens in general consecrated to the worship and honor of their chief god, the sun, which, according to our computation, was the first day of the week.”[538]
The North British Review thus defends the introduction of this ancient heathen festival into the Christian church:—
“That very day was the Sunday of their heathen neighbors and respective countrymen; and patriotism gladly united with expediency in making it at once their Lord’s day and their Sabbath.... If the authority of the church is to be ignored altogether by Protestants, there is no matter; because opportunity and common expediency are surely argument enough for so ceremonial a change as the mere day of the week for the observance of the rest and holy convocation of the Jewish Sabbath. That primitive church, in fact, was shut up to the adoption of the Sunday, until it became established and supreme, when it was too late to make another alteration; and it was no irreverent nor undelightful thing to adopt it, inasmuch as the first day of the week was their own high day
at any rate; so that their compliance and civility were rewarded by the redoubled sanctity of their quiet festival.”[539]
It would seem that something more potent than “patriotism” and “expediency” would be requisite to transform this heathen festival into the Christian Sabbath, or even to justify its introduction into the Christian church. A further statement of the reasons which prompted its introduction, and a brief notice of the earlier steps toward transforming it into a Christian institution, will occupy the remainder of this chapter. Chafie, a clergyman of the English Church, in 1652, published a work in vindication of first-day observance, entitled, “The Seventh-day Sabbath.” After showing the general observance of Sunday by the heathen world in the early ages of the church, Chafie thus states the reasons which forbid the Christians attempting to keep any other day:—
“1. Because of the contempt, scorn, and derision they thereby should be had in, among all the Gentiles with whom they lived.... How grievous would be their taunts and reproaches against the poor Christians living with them and under their power for their new set sacred day, had the Christians chosen any other than the Sunday.... 2. Most Christians then were either servants or of the poorer sort of people; and the Gentiles, most probably, would not give their servants liberty to cease from working on any other set day constantly, except on their Sunday.... 3. Because had they assayed such a change it would have been but labor in vain; ... they could never have brought it to pass.”[540]
Thus it is seen that at the time when the early church began to apostatize from God and to foster in its bosom human ordinances, the heathen world—as they had long done—very generally observed the first day of the week in honor of the sun. Many of the early fathers of the church had been heathen philosophers. Unfortunately they brought with them into the church many of their old notions and principles. Particularly did it occur to them that by uniting with the
heathen in the day of weekly celebration they should greatly facilitate their conversion. The reasons which induced the church to adopt the ancient festival of the heathen as something made ready to hand, are thus stated by Morer:—
“It is not to be denied but we borrow the name of this day from the ancient Greeks and Romans, and we allow that the old Egyptians worshiped the sun, and as a standing memorial of their veneration, dedicated this day to him. And we find by the influence of their examples, other nations, and among them the Jews themselves, doing him homage;[541] yet these abuses did not hinder the fathers of the Christian church simply to repeal, or altogether lay by, the day or its name, but only to sanctify and improve both, as they did also the pagan temples polluted before with idolatrous services, and other instances wherein those good men were always tender to work any other change than what was evidently necessary, and in such things as were plainly inconsistent with the Christian religion; so that Sunday being the day on which the Gentiles solemnly adored that planet, and called it Sunday, partly from its influence on that day especially, and partly in respect to its divine body (as they conceived it), the Christians thought fit to keep the same day and the same name of it, that they might not appear causelessly peevish, and by that means hinder the conversion of the Gentiles, and bring a greater prejudice than might be otherwise taken against the gospel.”[542]
In the time of Justin Martyr, Sunday was a weekly festival, widely celebrated by the heathen in honor of their god, the sun. And so, in presenting to the heathen emperor of Rome an “Apology” for his brethren, Justin takes care to tell him thrice that the Christians held their assemblies on this day of general observance.[543] Sunday therefore makes its first appearance in the Christian church as an institution identical in time with the weekly festival of the heathen, and Justin, who first mentions this festival, had been a heathen
philosopher Sixty years later, Tertullian acknowledges that it was not without an appearance of truth that men declared the sun to be the god of the Christians. But he answered that though they worshiped toward the east like the heathen, and devoted Sunday to rejoicing, it was for a reason far different from sun-worship.[544] And on another occasion, in defending his brethren from the charge of sun-worship, he acknowledges that these acts, prayer toward the east, and making Sunday a day of festivity, did give men a chance to think the sun was the God of the Christians.[545] Tertullian is therefore a witness to the fact that Sunday was a heathen festival when it obtained a foothold in the Christian church, and that the Christians, in consequence of observing it, were taunted with being sunworshipers. It is remarkable that in his replies he never claims for their observance any divine precept or apostolic example. His principal point was that they had as good a right to do it as the heathen had. One hundred and twenty one years after Tertullian, Constantine, while yet a heathen, put forth his famous edict in behalf of the heathen festival of the sun, which day he pronounced “venerable.” And this heathen law caused the day to be observed everywhere throughout the Roman Empire, and firmly established it both in Church and State. It is certain, therefore, that at the time of its entrance into the Christian church, Sunday was an ancient weekly festival of the heathen world.
That this heathen festival was upon the day of Christ’s resurrection doubtless powerfully contributed to aid “patriotism” and “expediency” in transforming it into the Lord’s day or Christian Sabbath. For, with pious motives, as we may reasonably conclude, the professed people of God early paid a voluntary regard to several days, memorable in the history of the Redeemer. Mosheim, whose testimony in behalf of Sunday has been presented already, uses the following language relative to the crucifixion day:—
“It is also probable that Friday, the day of Christ’s crucifixion, was early distinguished by particular honors from the other days of the week.”[546]
And of the second century, he says:—
“Many also observed the fourth day of the week, on which Christ was betrayed; and the sixth, which was the day of his crucifixion.”[547]
Dr. Peter Heylyn says of those who chose Sunday:—
“Because our Saviour rose that day from amongst the dead, so chose they Friday for another, by reason of our Saviour’s passion; and Wednesday on the which he had been betrayed: the Saturday, or ancient Sabbath, being meanwhile retained in the eastern churches.”[548]
Of the comparative sacredness of these three voluntary festivals, the same writer testifies:—
“If we consider either the preaching of the word, the ministration of the sacraments, or the public prayers: the Sunday in the eastern churches had no great prerogative above other days, especially above the Wednesday and the Friday, save that the meetings were more solemn, and the concourse of people greater than at other times, as is most likely.”[549]
And besides these three weekly festivals, there were also two annual festivals of great sacredness. These were the Passover and the Pentecost. And it is worthy of special notice that although the Sunday festival can be traced no higher in the church than Justin Martyr, . . 140, the Passover can be traced to a man who claimed to have received it from the apostles. See chapter thirteen. Among these festivals, considered simply as voluntary memorials of the Redeemer, Sunday had very little pre-eminence. For it is well stated by Heylyn:—
“Take which you will, either the fathers or the moderns, and we shall find no Lord’s day instituted by any apostolical mandate; no Sabbath set on foot by them upon the first day of the week.”[550]
Domville bears the following testimony, which is worthy of lasting remembrance:—
“Not any ecclesiastical writer of the first three centuries attributed the origin of Sunday observance either to Christ or to his apostles.”[551]
“Patriotism” and “expediency,” however, erelong elevated immeasurably above its fellows that one of these voluntary festivals which corresponded to “the wild solar holiday” of the heathen world, making that day at last “the Lord’s day” of the Christian church. The earliest testimony in behalf of first-day observance that has any claim to be regarded as genuine is that of Justin Martyr, written about . . 140. Before his conversion, he was a heathen philosopher. The time, place, and occasion of his first Apology or Defense of the Christians, addressed to the Roman Emperor, is thus stated by an eminent Roman Catholic historian. He says that Justin Martyr
“Was at Rome when the persecution that was raised under the reign of Antoninus Pius, the successor of Adrian, began to break forth, where he composed an excellent apology in behalf of the Christians.”[552]
Of the works ascribed to Justin Martyr, Milner says:—
“Like many of the ancient fathers he appears to us under the greatest disadvantage. Works really his have been lost; and others have been ascribed to him, part of which are not his; and the rest, at least, of ambiguous authority.”[553]
If the writings ascribed to him are genuine, there is little propriety in the use made of his name by the advocates of the first-day Sabbath. He taught the abrogation of the Sabbatic institution; and there is no intimation in his words that the Sunday festival which he mentions was other than a voluntary observance. Thus he addresses the emperor of Rome:—
“And upon the day called Sunday, all that live either in city or country meet together at the same place, where the writings of the apostles and prophets are read, as much as time will give leave; when the reader has done, the bishop makes a sermon, wherein he instructs the people, and animates them to the practice of such lovely precepts: at the conclusion of this discourse, we all rise up together and pray; and prayers being over, as I now said, there is bread and wine and water offered, and the bishop, as before, sends up prayers and thanksgivings, with all the fervency he is able, and the people conclude all with the joyful acclamation of Amen. Then the consecrated elements are distributed to, and partaken of, by all that are present, and sent to the absent by the hands of the deacons. But the wealthy and the willing, for every one is at liberty, contribute as they think fitting; and this collection is deposited with the bishop, and out of this he relieves the orphan and the widow, and such as are reduced to want by sickness or any other cause, and such as are in bonds, and strangers that come from far; and, in a word, he is the guardian and almoner to all the indigent. Upon Sunday we all assemble, that being the first day in which God set himself to work upon the dark void, in order to make the world, and in which Jesus Christ our Saviour rose again from the dead; for the day before Saturday he was crucified, and the day after, which is Sunday, he appeared unto his apostles and disciples, and taught them what I have now proposed to your consideration.”[554]
This passage, if genuine, furnishes the earliest reference to the observance of Sunday as a religious festival in the Christian church. It should be remembered that this language was written at Rome, and addressed directly to the emperor. It shows therefore what was the practice of the church in that city and vicinity, but does not determine how extensive this observance was. It contains strong incidental proof that apostasy had made progress at Rome; the institution of the Lord’s supper being changed in part already to a human ordinance; water being now as essential to the Lord’s supper as the wine or the bread. And what is still more dangerous as perverting the institution of Christ, the consecrated elements were sent to the absent, a step which speedily resulted in their becoming objects of superstitious veneration, and finally of worship. Justin tells the emperor that Christ thus ordained; but such a statement is a grave departure from the truth of the New Testament.
This statement of reasons for Sunday observance is particularly worthy of attention. He tells the emperor that they assembled upon the day called Sunday. This was equivalent to saying to him, We observe the day on which our fellow-citizens offer their adoration to the sun. Here both “patriotism” and “expediency” discover themselves in the words of Justin, which were addressed to a persecuting emperor in behalf of the Christians. But as if conscious that the observance of a heathen festival as the day of Christian worship was not consistent with their profession as worshipers of the Most High, Justin bethinks himself for reasons in defense of this observance. He assigns no divine precept nor apostolic example for this festival. For his reference to what Christ taught his disciples, as appears from the connection, was to the general system of the Christian religion, and not to the observance of Sunday. If it be said that Justin might have learned from tradition what is not to be found in the New Testament relative to Sunday observance, and that after all Sunday may be a divinely-appointed festival, it is sufficient to answer, 1. That this plea would show only tradition in favor of the Sunday festival. 2. That Justin Martyr is a very unsafe guide; his testimony relative to the Lord’s supper differs from that of the New Testament. 3. That the American Tract Society, in a work which it
publishes against Romanism, bears the following testimony relative to the point before us:—
“Justin Martyr appears indeed peculiarly unfitted to lay claim to authority. It is notorious that he supposed a pillar erected on the island of the Tiber to Semo Sanchus, an old Sabine deity, to be a monument erected by the Roman people in honor of the impostor Simon Magus. Were so gross a mistake to be made by a modern writer in relating a historical fact, exposure would immediately take place, and his testimony would thenceforward be suspected. And assuredly the same measure should be meted to Justin Martyr, who so egregiously errs in reference to a fact alluded to by Livy the historian.”[555]
Justin assigns the following reasons in support of Sunday observance: “That being the first day in which God set himself to work upon the dark void in order to make the world, and in which Jesus Christ our Saviour rose again from the dead.” Bishop Jeremy Taylor most fittingly replies to this:—
“The first of these looks more like an excuse than a just reason; for if anything of the creation were made the cause of a Sabbath, it ought to be the end, not the beginning; it ought to be the rest, not the first part of the work; it ought to be that which God assigned, not [that] which man should take by way of after justification.”[556]
It is to be observed, therefore, that the first trace of Sunday as a Christian festival is found in the church of Rome. Soon after this time, and thenceforward, we shall find “the bishop” of that church making vigorous efforts to suppress the Sabbath of the Lord, and to elevate in its stead the festival of Sunday.
It is proper to note the fact also that Justin was a decided opponent of the ancient Sabbath. In his “Dialogue with Trypho the
Jew” he thus addressed him:—
“This new law teaches you to observe a perpetual Sabbath; and you, when you have spent one day in idleness, think you have discharged the duties of religion.... If any one is guilty of adultery, let him repent, then he hath kept the true and delightful Sabbath unto God.... For we really should observe that circumcision which is in the flesh, and the Sabbath, and all the feasts, if we had not known the reason why they were imposed upon you, namely, upon the account of your iniquities.... It was because of your iniquities, and the iniquities of your fathers, that God appointed you to observe the Sabbath.... You see that the heavens are not idle, nor do they observe the Sabbath. Continue as ye were born. For if before Abraham there was no need of circumcision, nor of the sabbaths, nor of feasts, nor of offerings before Moses; so now in like manner there is no need of them, since Jesus Christ, the Son of God, was by the determinate counsel of God, born of a virgin of the seed of Abraham without sin.”[557]
This reasoning of Justin deserves no reply. It shows, however, the unfairness of Dr. Edwards, who quotes Justin Martyr as a witness for the change of the Sabbath;[558] whereas Justin held that God made the Sabbath on account of the wickedness of the Jews, and that he totally abrogated it in consequence of the first advent of Christ; the Sunday festival of the heathen being evidently adopted by the church at Rome from motives of “expediency” and perhaps of “patriotism.” The testimony of Justin, if genuine, is peculiarly valuable in one respect. It shows that as late as . . 140 the first day of the week had acquired no title of sacredness; for Justin several times mentions the day: thrice as “the day called Sunday” and twice as “the eighth day;” and by other terms also, but never by any sacred name.[559]
The next important witness in behalf of first-day sacredness is thus presented by Dr. Edwards:—
“Hence Irenæus, bishop of Lyons, a disciple of Polycarp, who had been the companion of the apostles, . . 167, says that the Lord’s day was the Christian Sabbath. His words are, ‘On the Lord’s day every one of us Christians keeps the Sabbath, meditating on the law and rejoicing in the works of God.’”[560]
This testimony is highly valued by first-day writers, and is often and prominently set forth in their publications. Sir Wm. Domville, whose elaborate treatise on the Sabbath has been several times quoted, states the following important fact relative to this quotation:
“I have carefully searched through all the extant works of Irenæus and can with certainty state that no such passage, or any one at all resembling it, is there to be found. The edition I consulted was that by Massuet (Paris, 1710); but to assure myself still further, I have since looked to the editions by Erasmus (Paris, 1563), and Grabe (Oxford, 1702), and in neither do I find the passage in question.”[561]
It is a remarkable fact that those who quote this as the language of Irenæus, if they give any reference, cite their readers to Dwight’s Theology instead of referring them to the place in the works of Irenæus where it is to be found. It was Dr. Dwight who first enriched the theological world with this invaluable quotation. Where, then, did Dwight obtain this testimony which has so many times been given as that of Irenæus? On this point Domville remarks:—
“He had the misfortune to be afflicted with a disease in his eyes from the early age of twenty-three, a calamity (says his biographer) by which he was deprived of the capacity for reading and study.... The knowledge which he gained from books after the period above mentioned [by which the editor
must mean his age of twenty-three] was almost exclusively at second hand, by the aid of others.”[562]
Domville states another fact which gives us unquestionably the origin of this quotation:—
“But although not to be found in Irenæus, there are in the writings ascribed to another father, namely, in the interpolated epistle of Ignatius to the Magnesians, and in one of its interpolated passages, expressions so clearly resembling those of Dr. Dwight’s quotation as to leave no doubt of the source from which he quoted.”[563]
Such, then, is the end of this famous testimony of Irenæus, who had it from Polycarp, who had it from the apostles! It was furnished the world by a man whose eyesight was impaired; who in consequence of this infirmity took at second hand an interpolated passage from an epistle falsely ascribed to Ignatius, and published it to the world as the genuine testimony of Irenæus. Loss of eyesight, as we may charitably believe, led Dr. Dwight into the serious error which he has committed; but by the publication of this spurious testimony, which seemed to come in a direct line from the apostles, he has rendered multitudes as incapable of reading aright the fourth commandment, as he, by loss of natural eyesight, was of reading Irenæus for himself. This case admirably illustrates tradition as a religious guide; it is the blind leading the blind until both fall into the ditch.
Nor is this all that should be said in the case of Irenæus. In all his writings there is no instance in which he calls Sunday the Lord’s day! And what is also very remarkable, there is no sentence extant written by him in which he even mentions the first day of the week![564] It appears, however, from several statements in ancient writers, that he did mention the day, though no sentence of his in which it is mentioned is in existence. He held that the Sabbath was a typical institution, which pointed to the seventh thousand years as the great
day of rest to the church;[565] he said that Abraham was “without observance of Sabbaths;”[566] and yet he makes the origin of the Sabbath to be the sanctification of the seventh day.[567] But he expressly asserts the perpetuity and authority of the ten commandments, declaring that they are identical with the law of nature implanted from the beginning in mankind, that they remain permanently with us, and that if any one does not observe them he has no salvation.[568]
It is a remarkable fact that the first instance upon record in which the bishop of Rome attempted to rule the Christian church was by S . It had been the custom of all the churches to celebrate the passover, but with this difference: that while the eastern churches observed it upon the fourteenth day of the first month, no matter what day of the week this might be, the western churches kept it upon the Sunday following that day; or rather, upon the Sunday following Good Friday. Victor, bishop of Rome, in the year 196,[569] took upon him to impose the Roman custom upon all the churches; that is, to compel them to observe the passover upon Sunday. “This bold attempt,” says Bower, “we may call the first essay of papal usurpation.”[570] And Dowling terms it the “earliest instance of Romish assumption.”[571] The churches of Asia Minor informed Victor that they could not comply with his lordly mandate. Then, says Bower:—
“Upon the receipt of this letter, Victor, giving the reins to an impotent and ungovernable passion, published bitter invectives against all the churches of Asia, declared them cut off from his communion, sent letters of excommunication to their respective bishops; and, at the same time, in order to have them cut off from the communion of the whole church, wrote to the other bishops, exhorting them to follow his example, and forbear communicating with their refractory brethren of Asia.”[572]
The historian informs us that “not one followed his example or advice; not one paid any sort of regard to his letters, or showed the least inclination to second him in such a rash and uncharitable attempt.” He further says:—
“Victor being thus baffled in his attempt, his successors took care not to revive the controversy; so that the Asiatics peaceably followed their ancient practice till the Council of Nice, which out of complaisance to Constantine the Great, ordered the solemnity of Easter to be kept everywhere on the same day, after the custom of Rome.”[573]
The victory was not obtained for Sunday in this struggle, as Heylyn testifies,
“Till the great Council of Nice [ . . 325] backed by the authority of as great an emperor [Constantine] settled it better than before; none but some scattered schismatics, now and then appearing, that durst oppose the resolution of that famous synod.”[574]
Constantine, by whose powerful influence the Council of Nice was induced to decide this question in favor of the Roman bishop, that is, to fix the passover upon Sunday, urged the following strong reason for the measure:—
“Let us then have nothing in common with the most hostile rabble of the Jews.”[575]
This sentence is worthy of notice. A determination to have nothing in common with the Jews had very much to do with the suppression of the Sabbath in the Christian church. Those who rejected the Sabbath of the Lord and chose in its stead the more popular and more convenient Sunday festival of the heathen, were so infatuated with the idea of having nothing in common with the Jews, that they
never even questioned the propriety of a festival in common with the heathen.
This festival was not weekly, but annual; but the removal of it from the fourteenth of the first month to the Sunday following Good Friday was the first legislation attempted in honor of Sunday as a Christian festival; and as Heylyn quaintly expresses it, “The Lord’s day found it no small matter to obtain the victory.”[576] In a brief period after the Council of Nice, by the laws of Theodosius, capital punishment was inflicted upon those who should celebrate the feast of the passover upon any other day than Sunday.[577] The Britons of Wales were long able to maintain their ground against this favorite project of the Roman church, and as late as the sixth century “obstinately resisted the imperious mandates of the Roman pontiffs.”[578]
Four years after the commencement of the struggle just narrated, bring us to the testimony of Tertullian, the oldest of the Latin fathers, who wrote about 200. Dr Clarke tells us that the fathers “blow hot and cold.” Tertullian is a fair example of this. He places the origin of the Sabbath at the creation, but elsewhere says that the patriarchs did not keep it. He says that Joshua broke the Sabbath at Jericho, and afterward shows that he did not break it. He says that Christ broke the Sabbath, and in another place proves that he did not. He represents the eighth day as more honorable than the seventh, and elsewhere states the reverse. He states that the law is abolished, and in other places teaches its perpetuity and authority. He declares that the Sabbath was abrogated by Christ, and afterward asserts that “Christ did not at all rescind the Sabbath,” but imparted “an additional sanctity” to “the Sabbath day itself, which from the beginning had been consecrated by the benediction of the Father.” And he goes on to say that Christ “furnished to this day divine safeguards—a course which his adversary would have pursued for some other days, to avoid honoring the Creator’s Sabbath.”
This last statement is very remarkable. The Saviour furnished additional safeguards to the Creator’s Sabbath. But “his adversary” would have done this to some other days. Now it is plain, first, that Tertullian did not believe that Christ sanctified some other day to take
