Accountability reconsidered : voters, interests, and information in us policymaking cameron full boo

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AccountabilityReconsidered

Thelasttwodecadeshavewitnessedasubstantialchangeinthemedia environment,growingpolarizationofthetwodominantparties,and increasinginequalityofwealthandincome.Theseprofoundchanges necessitateupdatingourunderstandingofpoliticalaccountability. AccountabilityReconsidered examineshowpoliticalaccountability functionsintheUSAtodaygiventhedramaticchangesinvoting behavior,media,congressionaldynamics,andrelationsbetween branches.Withparticularattentiontopolicymaking,thisvolume usesoriginalresearchtoanalyzemicro-foundationsofvoterbehavior, examiningitsimplicationsforincentivesandofferinginsightintothe accountabilityrelationshipsamongvoters,interestgroups,legislators, andgovernmentbureaucracy.Combiningcontributionsfromleading expertswhowriteaboutthepoliticalsystemsynopticallywiththose whofocusonspecificelements, AccountabilityReconsidered brings togetherdistinctperspectivestofocusontheeffectoftheinformational environmentongovernmentofficials,bridgingup-to-dateknowledge aboutaccountabilitymechanismswithouroverallunderstandingof politicalaccountability.

charlesm.cameronisProfessorofPoliticsandPublicAffairs atPrincetonUniversity.Theauthororco-authorofmanyarticlesin leadingjournalsofpoliticalscience,law,andlawandeconomics,heis alsotheauthoroftheprize-winning VetoBargaining:Presidentsandthe PoliticsofNegativePower (Cambridge,2000)andco-authorwithJohn Kastellecof MakingtheSupremeCourt:ThePoliticsofAppointments 1930–2020 (Oxford,2023).

brandicecanes-wroneisProfessorofPoliticalScienceand SeniorFellowattheHooverInstitution,StanfordUniversity.Duringthe courseofhercareer,Canes-Wronehaspublishedextensivelyintheareas ofpoliticalinstitutions,masspoliticalbehavior,andpoliticaleconomy inleadingjournalsofpoliticalscienceandothersocialsciences.Her book, WhoLeadsWhom?Presidents,Policy,andthePublic (University ofChicagoPress,2006)wasawardedtheRichardE.Neustadtprizeby theAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociationforthebestbookontheUS presidencythatyear.

sanfordc.gordonisProfessorinandChairoftheWilfFamily DepartmentofPoliticsatNewYorkUniversityandanAssociated Professor(bycourtesy)intheNewYorkUniversitySchoolofLaw. Hisworkhasappearedin TheAmericanPoliticalScienceReview, theAmericanJournalofPoliticalScience,TheJournalofPolitics,the ProceedingsoftheNationalAcademyofSciences,amongmanyother leadingjournals.

gregorya.huberistheForstFamilyProfessorofPoliticalScience andChairofthePoliticalScienceDepartmentatYaleUniversity. Heistheauthorof TheCraftofBureaucraticNeutrality:Interests andInfluenceinGovernmentalRegulationofOccupationalSafety (Cambridge,2007)aswellasovereightyarticlesinleadingjournals ofpoliticalscienceandrelatedfields.

AccountabilityReconsidered Voters,Interests,andInformation inUSPolicymaking

PrincetonUniversity

BRANDICECANES-WRONE

StanfordUniversity

SANFORDC.GORDON

NewYorkUniversity

GREGORYA.HUBER

YaleUniversity

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Informationonthistitle: www.cambridge.org/9781009168328

doi: 10.1017/9781009168311

© CharlesM.Cameron,BrandiceCanes-Wrone,SanfordC.Gordon andGregoryA.Huber2023

Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexception andtotheprovisionsofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements, noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplacewithoutthewritten permissionofCambridgeUniversityPress&Assessment. Firstpublished2023

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Names:Cameron,CharlesM.(CharlesMetz),1954–editor. | Canes-Wrone, Brandice,editor. | Gordon,SanfordClark,1972–editor.

Title:Accountabilityreconsidered:voters,interests,andinformationinUSpolicymaking/ CharlesM.Cameron,PrincetonUniversity,BrandiceCanes-Wrone,PrincetonUniversity, SanfordC.Gordon,NewYorkUniversity,GregoryA.Huber,YaleUniversity,eds. Othertitles:Voters,interests,andinformationinUnitedStatespolicymaking Description:FirstEdition. | NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2023. | Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.

Identifiers:LCCN2022032961(print) | LCCN2022032962(ebook) | ISBN9781009168328 (Hardback) | ISBN9781009168304(Paperback) | ISBN9781009168311(epub)

Subjects:LCSH:Governmentaccountability–UnitedStates. | Representativegovernmentand representation–UnitedStates. | Politicalparticipation–UnitedStates. | Communication inpolitics–Technologicalinnovations. | Socialmedia–Politicalaspects–UnitedStates. | Elite(Socialsciences)–UnitedStates. | UnitedStates–Politicsandgovernment.

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ListofFigures

1Introduction 1

CharlesM.Cameron,BrandiceCanes-Wrone, SanfordC.Gordon,andGregoryA.Huber

particandidateevaluationandselection

2TheImportanceofIssueRepresentationinaPolarizedCongress 15 JoshuaD.Clinton,MichaelW.Sances,andMaryCatherineSullivan

3CanCitizensAssessPoliciesBasedonPrograms’Costsand Benefits?TheRoleofYardsticksandContextualInformation inDemocraticAccountability 42 EricM.Patashnik,PatrickTucker,andAlanS.Gerber

4 Logic withPolarizedParties,ChangingMedia,andMotivated Reasoners 68 PatrickJ.EganandMarkusPrior

5Groups,Parties,andPolicyDemandsinHouseNominations 89 KathleenBawn,KnoxBrown,AngelaX.Ocampo, ShawnPatterson,Jr.,JohnL.Ray,andJohnZaller

partiithemediaandtheinformationalenvironment

6LocalNewspapersandIdeologicalAccountabilityinUS HouseElections 129 BrandiceCanes-WroneandMichaelR.Kistner

7Inequality,orInvisibilityandInaccuracy?HowLocal NewspapersCovertheOccupationalBackgroundsof CongressionalIncumbentsandChallengers 150 NicholasCarnes

8CongressionalAccountabilityintheContemporaryMedia Environment:Arguments,Data,andMethods 173 GregoryA.HuberandPatrickTucker

partiiipolicymaking,informationprovision,and accountability

9CoalitionLeadershipinthePolarizedCongress 197 FrancesE.Lee

10FireAlarmsandDemocraticAccountability 221 CharlesM.CameronandSanfordC.Gordon

11AchievingAccountability:AligningInstitutionsandBehavior 242 JohnW.Patty

partivoutsidethepubliceye?privateinterests andpolicymaking

12LegislatorAdvocacyonBehalfofConstituentsandCorporate Donors:ACaseStudyoftheFederalEnergyRegulatory Commission

EleanorNeffPowell,DevinJudge-Lord,andJustinGrimmer

13OrganizedInterests,Policymaking,andCongressional Accountability 295 LeeDrutman

14AdministrativePoliticswithClearStakesandVenues: StrategicCommentinguponFederalReserveDebitCard Regulations 311 DanielCarpenterandBrianLibgober

15Conclusion:AssessingContemporaryAccountability 334 CharlesM.Cameron,BrandiceCanes-Wrone, SanfordC.Gordon,andGregoryHuber

2.1Percentageofallrespondentswithanopinioncontrary totheirrepresentativeoneachissue(black)orwithout anopinion(gray),byissue page 25

2.2Issue(γn )andparty(κ)misalignmenteffects,byyear 26

2.3Effectofoverallmisalignmentonapprovalof representativeamongpartisanleaners(2008–2012) 27

2.4EffectofmisalignmentonACAvotesbyincome

2.5EffectofmisalignmentonACAvotesandvotestorepeal theACAbyPartisanship

3.1PredictedevaluationbyrespondentpartyIDandgrantcontext

3.2ConservativesareMoreResponsivetoContextual InformationaboutRelativeGrantSizethanLiberals

3.3Subjectsareresponsivetoinformationthatalegislator’s grantsaresmallerthanaveragefunded

3.4Predictedlegislatorandpolicyratingsacrossvignettes

4.1Thefourvoterdecisionrulesin TheLogicof CongressionalAction

4.2Split-ticketvotinginUSpresidentialelections,1952–2020

4.3 Logic’sdecisionrulesrevisedtoreflectpolarizedparties, changingmedia,andmotivatedreasoners

7.1Stories,issues,evaluations,andoccupationalinformation

7.2Histogramsofmemberoccupationcounts,bysource

7.3Probabilitythatapastjobappearedonamemberwebsite orinthenews,bytypeofjob

7.4Coveragedidn’tseemtodependonclass

8.1Thedeclineinnewspapercirculation

8.2Thedeclineinnewspaperemployment

10.1CrimeandcorrectionalsupervisionintheUnitedStates, 1960–2020

12.1Thedistributionacrosstypesofcongressionalrequests FERCvs.allagencies

12.2Whattypesoflettersaresupportiveofbusinesses?

12.4Whowritesonbehalfofconstituentsvs.business?By legislatorparty,majoritystatus,andpresidentpartisanship

12.5Statepopulationandsenateletter-writing

12.7AverageenergysectorPACcontributionspermemberpercycle

12.8Cross-partydifferencesincampaigncontributionsfrom energysectorPACs(left)andnon-energysectorPACs(right)

12.10Bivariatemodels:Campaigncontributionsand letter-writingtoFERC

12.11Bivariatemodels:Partymembershipandletter-writingtoFERC

12.12Multivariatemodels:Campaigncontributions,party,and letter-writingtoFERC

12.13PredictednumberofletterstoFERC

12.14PredictedprobabilityofwritingtoFERC

12.A.1Exampleofconstituencyserviceletter.Thisisa constituencyserviceletterwrittenbySenatorSusan Collins(R-ME)toFERConApril28,2008

12.A.2Exampleofenergyprojectadvocacy.Thisisaletter writtenbyRep.AlexMooney(R-WV2)toFERCon October12,2017

12.A.3Exampleofpersonalbusinessinterest.Thisisaletter writtenbyformerSenatorBobGraham(R-FL)toFERC onSeptember30,2014,nearlyadecadeafterretiring fromtheUSSenate

14.1DistributionofDodd-Frankrulemakingdocketsranked bynumberofcommentsreceived

14.2Proportionofcommentsfrompubliclytradedcompanies accordingtoglobalindustrialclassificationsystem industrygroup 321

14.3PercentagereturnsforkeystocksonafternoonofNPRM, December16,2010

14.4Percentagereturnsonafternoonoffinalization,June29,2011

14.5 ˆ Qk iω(j) fortwofirmsbenefittinginexpectationandtwo firmsinexpectationnotaffected

14.6Illustrationofcommontrendsamongcommentersand abstainerspriortoruleannouncement:Debitcardfinal ruleannouncement,July2012 328

14.7ReturnstofinalruleforAmericanExpressandBestBuy2012

2.1VotesonAffordableCareActandrepealefforts

2.A.1Fullresults:CCES2008–CCES2012

2.A.3Fullresults:aggregatemisalignmentbyparty

3.1Measuringconstituentresponsivenesstothedollar claimed:ExtensionofGrimmer,Westwood,andMessing (2015)withclimatechangeeducationscenario

3.2Relative,notabsolute,sizeinfluencessubjects’ evaluations:climatechangeeducationvignette

3.3Treatmentconditionsforsurveyexperimentextensionon

3.4Meansandstandarderrorsacrossconditions:deliveringmoney

3.5Meansandstandarderrorsacrossconditions:feelingthermometer

3.6Predictingpolicyapprovalbydistributionofbenefitsandcosts

8.1MCsandmediaaccountability:existingdataandopportunities

9.1RevenueenhancementsinHouse,Senate,andfinal versionsoftheTaxCutsandJobsActof2017

10.1Archetypalinformationalenvironmentsinthepolitical theoryofagency

10.2Summaryofbaselinecasesabsentasentinel

10.3Theconditionaleffectsofthird-partysentinelson democraticaccountability

12.C.1Bivariatemodels:Campaigncontributionsand letter-writingtoFERC.BivariatePoissonRegression modelspredictingletter-writingactivitytoFERCusing campaigncontributionsfromtheenergyindustry

12.C.2Bivariatemodels:Partyandletter-writingtoFERC. BivariatePoissonRegressionmodelspredicting letter-writingactivitytoFERCusingLegislator’sParty

12.C.3Bivariatemodels:Loggedcampaigncontributionsand letter-writingtoFERC.BivariatePoissonRegression modelspredictingletter-writingactivitytoFERCusing loggedenergyindustrycampaigncontributions

12.C.4CareerBivariatemodels:Campaigncontributionsand letter-writingtoFERCoveramember’sentirecareer. BivariatePoissonRegressionmodelspredicting letter-writingactivitytoFERCusingenergyindustry campaigncontributions

12.C.5Multivariatemodels:Predictingdifferenttypesof letter-writingactivity.MultivariatePoissonRegression modelspredictingletter-writingactivitytoFERC

Contributors

KathleenBawn

ProfessorofPoliticalScience,UniversityofCaliforniaatLosAngeles(UCLA)

KnoxBrown

AssistantProfessorofPoliticalScience,TulsaCommunityCollege

CharlesM.Cameron

ProfessorofPoliticsandPublicAffairs,PrincetonUniversity

BrandiceCanes-Wrone

ProfessorofPoliticalScienceandSeniorFellowatTheHooverInstitution, StanfordUniversity

NicholasCarnes

CreedC.BlackAssociateProfessorofPublicPolicyandPoliticalScience, DukeUniversity

DanielP.Carpenter

AllieS.FreedProfessorofGovernment,FacultyofArtsandSciences,Harvard University

JoshuaD.Clinton

AbbyandJohnWinkelreidChair,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,Vanderbilt University

LeeDrutman

SeniorFellow,PoliticalReformProgram,NewAmerica

PatrickJ.Egan

AssociateProfessorofPoliticsandPublicPolicy,NewYorkUniversity

AlanGerber

DeanofSocialScience,CharlesC.andDoratheaS.DilleyProfessorof PoliticalScience,andProfessorintheInstitutionforSocialandPolicyStudies, ofEconomics,andofPublicHealth,YaleUniversity

SanfordC.Gordon ProfessorofPolitics,andAssociatedProfessor(bycourtesy)ofLaw,New YorkUniversity

JustinGrimmer

ProfessorofPoliticalScienceandSeniorFellowattheHooverInstitution, StanfordUniversity

GregoryA.Huber

ForstFamilyProfessorofPoliticalScienceandresidentfellowofthe InstitutionforSocialandPolicyStudies(ISPS),YaleUniversity

DevinJudge-Lord PostdoctoralFellow,HarvardUniversity

MichaelR.Kistner

AssistantProfessorofPoliticalScience,UniversityofHouston

FrancesE.Lee

ProfessorofPoliticsandPublicAffairs,PrincetonUniversity

BrianLibgober

AssistantProfessorofPoliticalScience,UniversityofCaliforniaatSanDiego

AngelaX.Ocampo

AssistantProfessorofMexicanAmericanandLatina/oStudies,Universityof TexasatAustin

EricM.Patashnik

Julis-RabinowitzProfessorofPublicPolicyandProfessorofPoliticalScience, BrownUniversity

ShawnPatterson

AssistantProfessorofPoliticalScience,SouthernOregonUniversity

JohnW.Patty ProfessorofPoliticalScienceandQuantitativeTheory&Methods,Emory University

EleanorNeffPowell BoothFowlerAssociateProfessorofPoliticalScience,Universityof Wisconsin-Madison

MarkusPrior ProfessorofPoliticsandPublicAffairs,PrincetonUniversity

JohnL.Ray PhDCandidate,UniversityofCaliforniaatLosAngeles(UCLA)

MichaelW.Sances AssistantProfessorofPoliticalScience,TempleUniversity

MaryCatherineSullivan PhDCandidate,VanderbiltUniversity

PatrickTucker SeniorStatistician,EdisonResearch

JohnZaller ProfessorofPoliticalScienceEmeritus,UniversityofCaliforniaatLosAngeles (UCLA)

Acknowledgments

ThisvolumeisconcernedwithunderstandingthedynamicsofpoliticalaccountabilityinthecontemporaryUnitedStates.Itsoriginslieintheauthors’attempts tograpplewiththeworkofaparticularscholar,R.DouglasArnold.Doug’s workonpoliticalaccountability,centrallyfocusingonthelynchpinoftheUS Congress,isbroadlyinfluentialtomanyscholarsinterestedinthistopicand theperformanceoftheUSpoliticalsystemmoregenerally.Additionally,Doug isandhasbeenafriend,mentor,colleague,andinspirationtomanyscholarsof Americanpolitics.

InhonorofDoug’sforty-two-yearcareeratPrincetonandontheoccasion ofhisretirement,weassembledagroupofscholarsinMay2019toparticipate inaconferenceonthebroadthemeofpoliticalaccountability.Thechapters inthisvolumeareasubsetofthosepresentedattheconference,revisedand improveduponinlightofdiscussionsthattookplaceatthatevent.

Wewouldliketothanktheconferenceparticipantsanddiscussants, includingLarryBartels,JasonCasellas,JustinCrowe,AndrewGuess,Patricia Kirkland,JonathanLadd,AsyaMagazinnik,DavidMayhew,AdamMeirowitz, KevinMunger,RachelPotter,AndrewRoberts,KodiakSauer,Sebastian Thieme,DanielleThomsen,PhilipWallach,andKeithWhittington.Michele EpsteinandHeleneWoodlenttheirincalculableadministrativeacumentothe organizationoftheconferenceitselfandalsohelpedinnumerouswaysaswe preparedthisvolumeforpublication.IvanAleksandrov,MichaelPomirchy, andJamilaRuddockprovidedsubstantialadditionalassistanceinwhipping thevolumeintoshape.Wearealsogratefultothehelpfulsuggestionsofthe reviewersandteamatCambridgeUniversityPress.

AsforDoug,weexpecthe’llappreciateourdirectnessinadmittingthatwhile wecontinuetobeinspiredbyhiswork,wealsoenjoyedfindingtheareaswhere hegotthingswrong.

Introduction

HowdoespoliticalaccountabilityfunctioninthecontemporaryUnitedStates andwhataretheconsequencesforrepresentation?Thecontributionsinthis volumeprovidedistinctyetinterrelatedperspectivesonthisquestion,sharinga commonfocusonhowtheinformationalenvironmentconfrontedbypolitical actorsaffectstheaccountabilityofelectedrepresentativesandothergovernmentofficialstopublicpreferences.

Whatisaccountability?Ausefulstartingpointisthefollowingdefinition: accountabilityreferstoactionsbyanactororgroupofactorsonbehalfof anotherunderasystemofpunishmentsandrewardsatleastinpartunder thecontrolofthelatter.Asiscommon,welabelthosewiththeauthorityto offersanctionsprincipals,andthosewhoareoverseenasagents.Fromthe perspectiveofscholarsofUSpolitics,electoralaccountabilityisperhapsthe mostimportantsubspeciesoftheseprincipal-agentrelationships.Thistypeof accountabilitycentersontherelationshipbetweenvotersandelectedofficials, wherethesystemofpunishmentsandrewardsisimplementedprimarilyviathe electoralmechanism.

Atthesametime,theelectoralconnectionisclearlynottheonlypolitically relevantaccountabilityrelationship.Othersincludetherelationshipbetween privateinterestsandcandidateswhoseektheirfinancialsupporttorunfor office;betweenelectedmembersofpoliticalpartiesandtheirparty’slegislative leadership;andbetweenunelectedbureaucratswhoimplementpoliciesand electedofficials,thelatterofwhomareanintermediatelinkconnectingtheformertovotersandprivateinterests.Theseexampleshighlightthataccountability relationshipsarelayeredandoverlappingintheAmericanpoliticalsystem. Consequently,understandingpolicymakingrequiresappreciatingthecomplex relationshipslinkingvotersandprivateintereststoelectedandunelected policymakersandhowtheincentivesandbehavioroftheformerinfluencethe incentivesandbehaviorofthelatter.

Acomprehensiveunderstandingoftheserelationshipsalsobringstothefore thecriticalroleofinformation,withoutwhichaccountabilityisimpossible.For example,votersmaywanttheirrepresentativestochoosegoodpublicpolicy butmaylacktheinformationorexpertisenecessarytodeterminewhat“good” evenmeans.Instead,iftheyobserveanything,theymaybeforcedtorelyon imperfectproxiesforincumbentperformance(e.g.,rollcallvoting),orona thirdpartysuchasachallengertotellthemwhattheirincumbenthasbeen upto.Whataretheconsequencesofthesecontextsforincumbentincentives? Howmighttheseincentiveschangeinaworldwherekeypolicymakingis oftennegotiatedbehindcloseddoorsinadvanceofahighlypolarizedfloor vote?Andhowdoesinfluenceofoutsidepoliticalactorsoncandidateselection affecttheaccountabilityrelationshipbetweenrepresentativesandtheirnominal constituents?

Tobesure,theunderlyingquestionofhowaccountabilityfunctionsisnot newinAmericanpolitics.Canonicalresearchhighlightshowvoterpreferences (e.g.,Downs, 1957)andinterestgroupgoals(e.g.,Wilson, 1980)shapepolicy outcomes.Moreover,electoralincentivesareunderstoodasessentialforunderstandingtheinternalorganizationofCongress(Mayhew, 1974),thebehavior ofitsmembers(Fenno, 1978),andhowcoalitionleaderssometimesmanageto overcomeelectoralparochialismtoservethenationalinterest(Arnold, 1990). Similarly,someresearchstudiesthebureaucraciesasagentsofcongressional interests(McCubbins,Noll,andWeingast, 1987)orpresidentialinterests (Moe, 1985),whileotherscholarshipviewsthemasessentiallyungoverned (Lowi, 1979)oracutelyconcernedwithcultivatingsupportfromthepublic andspecialintereststopursuepreferredpoliciesintheabsenceofinterference (Carpenter, 2001).Butmuchofthiswork,evenifnotexplicitlyhistorical, comesfromadifferenteraofpolicymaking,andassuch,doesnotreflecta contemporarypoliticalcontextinwhichthepreferencesofkeyactorshave changedandtheinformationalenvironmenthasbeendramaticallyaltered. Asanon-exhaustivelist,considerfourfactsthathaveenormousimplications forthecontemporaryinformationalenvironmentandincentivesofpolitical actors:

1.Themediaecosystemhasfractured,andlocalnewspapershavedeclined precipitously.Themonolithicnationaltelevisionnewsthatgenerateda sharedunderstandingofcontemporarypoliticshasbeenreplacedbycable television,offeringnumerousnon-newsoutletsandmoreideological content.Morethanever,individualscanavoidpoliticsaltogetheror choosetheirownideologicalflavorofcoverage.Atthelocallevel,the declineoflocalnewspapersmeansthatakeysourceofinformationabout localpolitics,includingcoverageofindividualmembersofCongress,has diminishedprecipitouslyandinsomedistrictsdisappearedentirely.Each ofthesefactorshasbeenexacerbatedbytheinternetandsocialmedia.

2.Politicalpartieshavegrownmoreideologicallyhomogeneousatboththe massandelitelevels.Morepolarizedpartiespursuemoredistinctpolicy agendas.InsideCongress,membershavecededgreatercontrolofthe legislativeagendaandthecraftingoflegislationtopartyleadership,often bypassingthetraditionalcommitteesystem.Andvotersaremorelikelyto sharethepolicygoalsofthepartytheyidentifywith,evenwhilealarge portionoftheelectoratedoesnotofficiallyalignwitheitherparty.

3.Theconcentrationofwealthandeconomicpowerhasincreased,andwith it,theavenuesthroughwhicheconomicresourcesmaybedeployedfor politicalends.Accompanyingthesechangeshavebeenconcurrentonesin thelegallandscapesurroundingpoliticalspendingbycorporationsand individuals.Donationsfromandexpendituresbyindividualsandorganizationsoutsideofalegislator’sdistricthavedramaticallyalteredthesetof intereststowhichrank-and-filelegislatorsmustattend.Similarly,efforts tolobbybothelectedofficialsandunelectedbureaucratshavegrownin bothvolumeandsophistication.

4.Electoralfortunesarelessstable.Bothmajorpartiesrobustlycontest nationalelections,withfrequentchangesinpartycontroloftheHouse, Senate,andPresidency.Partiesworktorecruitcrediblecandidatesfor thoseelectionsthatdecidecontrolofCongress,andtheincumbency advantagehasshrunkwhileprimarycontestshavebecomemoreclosely contested.

Itisthisevolvingpoliticalcontextthatframesourinquiryintopolitical accountabilityintheUnitedStates.Thechaptersthatfollow,inadditionto offeringspecificcontributions,collectivelycontributetotworelatedthemes. First,thevolumejoinsanalysisofvoters’behaviorwithhowpolicymakers respondtoit.Oftenintheliterature,scholarshipexaminesinternallegislative dynamicswithoutconsideringvoters’incentivesandinformation,orelectoral behaviorwithouttheimplicationsforpolicymaking.Indeed,asthesubfields ofpoliticalsciencehavebecomemorespecialized,differentstrandsofAmerican politicsscholarshiprelevantforunderstandingpoliticalaccountabilityand representationhavedevelopedindisparateways.

Forexample,formalmodelsofpoliticalaccountabilityhaveinvestigated policymakers’incentivesundervariousinstitutionalarrangementsandpolitical contexts.1 ArichliteratureonCongresshasdelvedintointernallegislative dynamicsbyexaminingtherolesofparties,committees,andinstitutionalrules forlawproduction,rollcallvoting,andbureaucraticoversight.2 Meanwhile, empiricalexaminationsofpolicyresponsivenesshaveuncoveredevidence regardingtheextenttowhichmasspreferencestranslateintopolicy,andthe

1 SeereviewsbyAshworth (2012) andGailmardandPatty (2012a) on,respectively,electoral accountabilityandcongressional-bureaucraticrelations.

2 See,e.g.,Binder (2015) forarecentreviewarticle.

“credibilityrevolution”hasuntiedpreviouslyintractabledebatesaboutthe antecedentsofvoterbehavior.3 Yetasthefieldhasbecomemorespecialized, syntheticworkthattheoreticallyandempiricallyinvestigatespolicymakingas anexusofaccountabilityrelationshipshasbecomelesscommonorhasbecome increasinglydisconnectedfromthetheoreticalandempiricalinsightsfrommore specializedresearchlineages.Theneedforsuchworkisparticularlyimportant giventhemassivedevelopmentsinpoliticsandmediathathaveoccurredin recentdecades.

Thesecondthemeisaconsiderationofpoliticaldevelopmentsthatmay meritareevaluationofcanonicalaccountsofpoliticalaccountability.Inother words,thistreatmentofaccountabilityandpolicymakinghelpsdelineatewhat hasfundamentallychangedversuswhathasnot.Indeed,severalchaptersare explicitlyconcernedwithofferingupdatestoclassicresearchstudiesthat, whilestillfrequentlyassignedinbothundergraduateandgraduatecourses, aredatedinboththeevidencetheydrawonandtheperspectivestheytake. Thus,thevolumeservesasabridgefromthesecanonicalstudiestoamore contemporaryperspective.Evenchaptersthatarenotexplicitupdatesofthose studiesofferimportantinsightsintothewaysinwhichpoliticaldevelopments reshapeconventionalwisdom.

Nointellectualinquirycanbeabouteverything,andsoitisimportantto delimitthescopeoftheeffortsofthecontributorstothisvolumebyexplaining whatitis not about.Inparticular,thechaptershavelittletosayaboutthe president,thecourts,andstateandlocalgovernmentsormanyproposed institutionalreforms.Issuesofaccountabilityandrepresentationastheyapply toeachofthesetopicsarecritical,butbeyondthepurviewofthecurrent inquiry.

Thevolumeisorganizedintofourparts. PartI focusesoncandidatesrunningforCongress,andconsidershowthesecandidatesareselectedinprimary andgeneralelectionsinlightoftheinformationavailabletootherpolitical actors. PartII honesinonthemediaasacriticalsourceofsuchinformation, particularlyhowitservesasakeyintermediarybetweenvotersandboth incumbentsandnewcandidatesforoffice. PartIII againfocusescentrallyon information,butshiftstotheperspectiveofgovernmentofficials,toanalyze howinformationalasymmetriesinthecontemporarypoliticallandscapeaffect policymaking.Morespecifically, PartIII considersthepolicyimplicationsof suchasymmetriesbetweenvotersandpublicofficials(especiallyCongress)as wellasbetweenCongressandthebureaucracy.Finally, PartIV considershow interestsaffectpolicymakinginwaysthataregenerallyoutsidethepurviewof votersandthuslimitvoters’abilitytoholdofficialsaccountable.

3 See,e.g.,Canes-Wrone (2015) forarecentreviewarticleonpolicyresponsivenessandJacobson andCarson (2019) forevidenceoncongressionalelections.

part i:candidateevaluationandselection

Thechaptersinthissectionopenuptheblackboxofcongressionalelections. Towhatdegreeareincumbentsheldaccountablefortheirpolicydecisions? Howdovotersinterpretdifferentpiecesofinformationwhenforminginferencesaboutincumbentperformance?Whataretheimplicationsofdifferent understandingsofvoterpsychologyandtheinformationalenvironmentforthe discipliningforceofelections?Andwhatofprimaries,whereintheabsence ofpartylabels,votersandinterestgroupsfacemuchtougherchallengesin choosingamongcandidates?Together,thechapterspointtoaworldthatmoves beyondtheclassicperspectivessuchasDowns(1957),Mayhew(1974),and Arnold(1990),butalsoretainscriticalcomponents.Inparticular,legislators continuetofacesubstantialpressuresthatfacilitatesomeformofelectoral accountability,butthenatureofthosepressuresdiffersfromthatdetailedin theearlierperspectives.

Thesectionopenswith Chapter2, byJoshClinton,MichaelSances,and MaryCatherineSullivan.ThischapterconsiderswhethervotersholdincumbentHouserepresentativesaccountableforpolicyactionsinoffice,focusing onthecontextinwhicharepresentativetakesapositionthatisunalignedwith constituents’views.Twoanalysesarepresented.First,theauthorsexaminethe universeofissuesinthe2008–2017CongressionalCooperativeElectionStudy (CCES)surveysinwhichrespondents’positionscanbematchedtoaHouse rollcallvote.Second,theyconductanin-depthanalysisofrecentlegislative activityconcerningtheAffordableCareAct(ACA),includingwithrespect tohowdemographicgroupsvaryinholdingmembersaccountablefortheir positions.Acrossbothtests,theresultssuggestthateventhoughpartisanlabels exertanindependenteffectonvoterevaluations,issuepositionsmatter.These findingsimplythatdespitetheincreasingroleofpartisanshipinUSelections, issue-basedconsiderationsasobservedinrollcallvotesremainimportantwith respecttovoters’willingnesstoholdincumbentsaccountable.

In Chapter3, EricPatashnik,PatrickTucker,andAlanGerbercontinue theexaminationofwhetherandhowvotersholdlegislatorsaccountable. Buildingonbehavioralresearchconcerningthewaysinwhichindividuals evaluatepolicycostsandbenefits,theauthorsemployaseriesofsurvey experimentstoexaminevoterchoice.Onesetinvestigateswhetherindividuals aremoreresponsivetoinformationabouttheabsolutesizeofagranta legislatorsecuresforthedistrict,orinsteadinformationaboutobtaininga grantofaboveorbelowaveragesize.Asecondsetmanipulatesinformation concerningroadbenefits,socialprograms,andanabstractpolicy.Theresults suggestthatcitizens’sensitivitytotheincidenceofcostsandbenefitsdepends substantiallyonwhethertheypossessapointofreferencethatenablesthem tobenchmarkthemagnitudeofpolicyeffects.Additionally,respondentsare responsivetoinformationaboutchangesinpolicycostsandbenefitswhen thevignettesconcernaspecificpolicybutnotanabstractone.Together,these

CharlesM.Cameron,BrandiceCanes-Wrone,SanfordC.Gordonetal.

findingshighlighthowincumbentaccountabilitydependsonthenatureofthe informationvotersreceive.

Chapter4 byPatrickEganandMarkusPriorstepsback,consideringhow anoptimizinglegislatorconcernedbothwiththeirownpolicypreferences andthethreatofelectoralsanctionwouldbehaveinlightofcontemporary evidenceregardingvoters’tighterpolicyagreementwiththeirparties,their limitedinformationaboutincumbentsandpolicyoutcomes,andheightened partisan-motivatedreasoning.Eachofthesephenomenarequiressignificant modificationtoourunderstandingoflegislatorincentives.Evenso,theauthors showthatthechangesdonotimplyWestminster-styleaccountabilityoflegislatorsbasedonpartylabels;therealconsequencesofpoliciescontinuetomatter tovoters.Atthesametime,partylabelsandprimariesmattermuchmorethan formerly,potentiallyweakeningtheincentivesforcross-partycooperationto enactpoliciesthatservethegeneralinterest.

Thefinalchapterofthissection, Chapter5, byKathleenBawn,KnoxBrown, AngelaX.Ocampo,ShawnPatterson,Jr.,JohnL.Ray,andJohnZaller,examinestherolesofvotersandorganizedinterestsincongressionalprimaries.The authorspresentfindingsfromextensivefieldwork,whichinvolvedinterviews withsupportersandcandidatesinfifty-threepotentiallywinnableopenseat Houseracesinthe2013–2014electioncycle.Theyarguethatgroups,including sometimeslocalpartyorganizations,arethekeyprincipalsthatmonitor candidates.Bothgroupsandvotersareinterestedinminimizinguncertainty aboutacandidate’scommitmenttoparticularpolicygoals,competence,and competitiveness.Groupsarecentraltoreducingthisuncertainty,withvoters relyingongroups’signalstodistinguishamongpotentialnominees.Notably, thisperspectivediffersfromtheclassicDownsianmodelinwhichaselectorate simplysupportsthecandidateclosesttotheirideologicalposition.InBawn etal.’sperspective,differencesincandidates’commitmentsorabilitiestosecure agroup’spolicygoalsmaycausethecandidateclosesttotheselectorate’s ideologicalpositionstolosetheprimary.Thesefindingshighlightthevitalrole ofprimariesandsuggestanexplanationastowhygeneralelectioncandidates donotadoptmoreideologicallymoderatepositions.

part ii:themediaandtheinformationalenvironment

Thesecondsetofchaptersconsidershowmediadevelopmentsshapevoter knowledgeaboutcandidateactionsandpreferences.Becauseinformationcollectioniscostly,rationalindividualslargelyrelyonotherstoprovidethispublic goodorturntolesscostlyheuristicsubstitutes,suchaspartylabels,toinform theirchoices.The“media”–broadlyconstruedtoincludeforumsasvariedas localnewspaperandtelevisionsstations;nationalnewspapers,broadcast,and cabletelevisionstations;andtheinternetandsocialmedia–arearguablythe keysourceoffreeorlow-costinformationfromwhichvoterscanmovebeyond partylabelsinmakingelectoralchoices.Historically,localnewspapershave

servedasthecriticalsourceofinformationaboutcongressionalcandidates,but localnewspapersaredisappearingorbeinghollowedoutatanalarmingrate whilecableTV,theinternet,andsocialmediaprovidenewoutletsthatbypass traditionalmediagatekeepingandwherecontentisoftendevoidoftraditional journalisticnormsaboutcoverage.Thesechangesraisenewquestionsabout howpoliticalaccountabilityfunctionsinthecurrentmediaenvironmentas wellashowaccountability-relatedincentiveshaveevolvedwithchangesin themedia.Thethreechaptersinthissectioneachapproachthesequestions indifferentways.

In Chapter6, BrandiceCanes-WroneandMichaelKistnerexaminehow localnewspapercoverageaffectstheextenttowhichideologicallyextreme candidatesarepunishedatthepolls,andwhetherthisrelationshiphaschanged overtimewiththedeclineinlocalnewspapers.Specifically,theauthorsexploit variationacrossdistrictsandtimeinthecongruencebetweenHousemembers’ districtsandlocalnewspapermarketstoestimatetheeffectofcoverageon therelationshipbetweencandidateideologyandelectionoutcomes.While forincumbentstheimpactismodest,forchallengers,reducedcoverageis associatedwithasubstantialreductioninthepenalty(reward)associatedwith ideologicalextremity(moderation).Additionally,theauthorsshowthatthis effectincreasedduringtheperiodinwhichtheinternet,socialmedia,andcable TVincreasedandthecoverageoflocalnewspapersdeclined.

NicholasCarnescontinuesthefocusonlocalnewspapersin Chapter7 byinvestigatinghowtheycovermembersofCongress.Alackofinformationaboutcandidatesoftenmakesitdifficultforvoterstolearnimportant characteristicsthatcouldaltervotingchoices.Giventhisasymmetry,thepreelectionemploymenthistoryofcandidatesmayfillinsomeofthegaps.Class backgroundmaybeanimportantfactorforvoterstoconsider,forexample,if theydesiretheexpertiseofcandidateswithaparticularbackgroundand/or descriptiverepresentation.Dolocalnewspapersprovidethatinformation? Carnesexaminesthecoverageof25Houseraceswithincumbentmembers runningforreelectionin2006,selectedtooversamplethoseincumbentswith workingclassbackgroundspriortotakingoffice.Contentanalysisrevealsthat theoccupationalhistoryofincumbentsrarelyreceivesmuchcoverage.The backgroundsofchallengersaremorenewsworthy,butoverallcoverageofthis aspectremainsmodest.Thefindingssuggestthatcoveragenearelection-time focusesonincumbentparty,issuepositions,andperformanceinofficebutnot signalsofclassbackground.Thislackofbiographicalinformationmayprevent votersfromobtainingdescriptiverepresentationthattheydesire.

Finally,in Chapter8, GregoryHuberandPatrickTuckerreconsiderthe centralroleoflocalnewspapersincongressionalaccountabilitygiventhe declineinlocalprintmedia,expansionofnationalnewspapersandcable television,andgrowthoftheinternet.Astheauthorsargue,thesechanges callintoquestionwhetherclassicworksaccuratelycharacterizethecurrent environmentandthedynamicsofelectoralaccountability.Thechapterbegins

bydiscussingthetheoreticalrelationshipbetweendevelopmentsinthequantity aswellasnatureofcoverageandtheensuingincentivesforcandidatesand officeholders.Itthenusesthistheoreticalframeworktoreviewpriorwork onthenature,frequency,andcorrelatesofmediacoverageofcongressional membersandelectionsacrossdifferentmediums.Finally,theauthorspropose anagendaforaunifiedcross-mediadatacollectionprojectoncitizens’political informationenvironmentsvis-á-visCongress.

part iii:policymaking,informationprovision, andaccountability

PartIII ofthevolumeshiftsfromafocusonvotersandthemediatohowthese externalpressuresandotherdevelopmentsaffectpolicymaking.Acommon threadacrossthechaptersistheroleofinformationinshapingpolicymakers’ incentives.Howdocoalitionleadersseektobuildlegislativecoalitionsthat cansurviveinaworldofstronger,morepolarizedparties,andhowdoesvoter informationaboutpoliciesandoutcomesaffecttheseincentives?Giventhat votershavestrongmotivationstodelegatetoothersthetaskofbringingto lightlegislativemalfeasance,whathappenswhenthose“firealarms”arebiased andvotersknowit?Finally,giventhecomplexityofbureaucraticpolicymaking andaninformationalasymmetrythatfavorsbureaucratsoverlegislators, howdolegislatorsengenderbureaucraticaccountabilitywhenoverseeing agencies?

FrancesLeebeginsthissectionin Chapter9 byasking:Whatstrategies docoalitionsuseinthecontemporary,polarizedCongresstobuildfeasible legislativecoalitions,anddothesestrategiesdifferfromthoseinperiodswith lessdistinctandlesshomogenousparties?Carefullyexaminingthetwomajor legislativeeffortsofthe115thCongress(2017–2018),taxreformandtherepeal andreplacementoftheAffordableCareAct(ACA),Leefindsthatcoalition leadersusedmanyofthesamepolicyandproceduraltechniquesofprevious periods.Inparticular,leadersdeployedproceduraltacticstobreaktheclear linkagebetweencongressionalactionandpainfulpolicyeffects,reducingthe traceabilityoftheiractionstovoters.Similarly,coalitionleaderssubstantially modifiedtheirproposalstoreducethecostsimposedontheconstituentsof legislatorswhosevotestheyneeded,allowingthemtogathersupporteven fromreelection-mindedmembers.Whentheseeffortsfailedoutright,asinthe caseoftheACA,thereasonswerethatthepolicyreformsaffordedinsufficient benefitsbeyondapartyfulfillingacampaignpromisewhileimposingtraceable costsonconstituents.Ultimately,sheconcludesthatalthoughpolarization mayhaveloweredprospectsformajorlegislativesuccess,coalitionbuilders’ optimaltacticsandproceduraltechniquesdemonstratemorecontinuity thanchange.

In Chapter10, CharlesCameronandSanfordGordonconsidertheimplicationsforpoliticalaccountabilityofbiasesinthesourcesofinformationvoters

usetoevaluateincumbentperformance.Votersoftendependonknowledgeable thirdparties,suchaschallengersandinterestgroups,toprovidesuchinformation,whichoftencomesintheformof“firealarms”alertingvoterstodamaging factsabouttheperformanceoftheirelectedofficials.Groupsandchallengers arehardlydisinterestedparties,however–theyhavepoliticalmotivationsof theirown.CameronandGordonshowthatthedesireofincumbentstoavoid triggeringafirealarmfromsuchabiasedobservermayleadthemtoeschew actionsthatservetheinterestsoftheirconstituentsortotakeactionsagainst thoseinterests.Thus,third-partyfirealarmoversightofincumbentscancreate perversepolicymakingincentivesthatundermineaccountability.Incumbent credit-claimingcanmitigate,butnoteliminate,thesedistortions.Inshort,firealarmaccountabilityisnosubstituteforknowledgeablevoters.

Finally,in Chapter11, JohnPattyinvestigateshowprincipalsincomplex politicalrelationships(e.g.,legislatorsoverseeingbureaucraticagencies,administratorsoverseeingcivilservants)managetheirownthornyinformational problems.Inparticular,heaskshowtheselectiveincentivesanddiagnostic criteriaemployedbypoliticalprincipalsaccountfortheprofoundcomplexity ofpoliticalorganizationsandpolicydecisions.Drawingondevelopments inbehavioraleconomics,Pattyintroducestheconceptof bracketing –how principalsandagentsgroupchoiceswhencontemplatingactions.Asthechapter shows,bracketingcanaffectthewaysinwhich,forexample,congressional membersevaluatetheconsequencesofbureaucraticchoices,theflowofevaluativeinformationavailabletomembers,andtheincentivesforagencyofficials tomisallocateefforts.Pattyalsodiscusseshowbracketingmayconsequently influencefeaturesofinstitutionaldesignincludingexantecontrols,suchas noticeandcommentprocedures,andexpostmonitoring,suchascongressional oversighthearings.

part iv:outsidethepubliceye?privateinterests andpolicymaking

Movingawayfromafocusonvotersasthechiefpoliticalprincipalinaccountabilityrelationships,thecontributionsinthissectionfocusongovernment officials’accountabilitytoadifferentsetofpoliticalactors:privateinterests. Whenpolicymakingtakesplacebehindcloseddoors,eitherinthebureaucracy or,increasingly,withinpartycaucuses,doprivateinterestssupplantvotersas theprimaryoutsideinfluenceonpolicydecisions?Thisquestioniscentraltothe chaptersthatfollow,eachofwhichtakesonadifferentaspectoftheissue.For instance,whenmembersofCongresscommunicatetheinterestsoftheirconstituentstobureaucraticagencies,howmuchdothosecommunicationsreflect biasesintheresourcesavailabletodifferentgroups?Areinterestgroupsmoreor lesspowerfulinthecontemporaryhighlypolarizedCongresswherecommittees andotherpolicymakingpartsoftheinstitutionhavebecomeweakervis-à-vis partyorganizations?Andhowdifferentfromlegislativepolicymakingishighly

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6, 19, 172

mizlāgōth, 184

mizrāḳōth, 184

Moab, 116 f.

Moabites, invasion by, 249 f.

Molech (Malcam, Milcom), 125, 293

Mount Gerizim, Samaritan Temple on, xxi, xxxviii

Mount Moriah, 176

Mount Seir, 32, 251, 281

Mount Zion, xxxviii f.

Mulberry trees, 100

Music, the Levitical service of, lii, 305 f.

Musical guilds, xxiii, 145, 333

Muski, 5

Muṣri, 19, 172

Nabonidus (Nabu-na’id), 344, 351

Nabopolassar, 344, 350

Nabulus, 49

nāgīd, 33, 92, 295

naḥal, 252

Names, significant, 24, 145 f.; lists of, in oriental Histories, 1 f., 79

Nathan the prophet, 113, 168, 207, 305

Navy, 206

nēbhel, 96 f.

Nebuchadnezzar (Nebuchadrezzar), 347 f., 351

Neco I and II, 327, 336, 343 f.

nēr (nīr), 259

Neriglissar (Nergalšar-uṣur), 351

Nethinim, 65, 137

New Testament (passages of) referred to: Matthew i. 3‒6, 15

Matthew i. 7, 23

Matthew v. 22, 293

Matthew v. 39, 244

Matthew xxiii. 35, lviii, 277

Matthew xxv. 15, 290

Mark ii. 26, 102

Mark ix. 43, 293

Mark xi. 2, 7, 96

Mark xvi. 1, 235

Luke i. 5, 143

Luke i. 7, 266

Luke ii. 36, 335

Luke iii. 31, 22

Luke vii. 44‒46, 297

Luke xi. 51, 277

Luke xii. 55, 192

Luke xv. 18, 21, 296, 321

Luke xix. 4, 172

John i. 45, 16

John iii. 27, 296

John xi. 54, 222

John xii. 3, 7, 235

John xviii. 1, 303

John xix. 39, 40, 235

Acts vii. 60, 278

Acts viii. 40, 287

Acts ix. 32, 27

Acts xii. 1, 228

Acts xii. 21, 159

Acts xii. 23, 222

Acts xiii. 2, 138

Acts xxi. 37, 163

Acts xxii. 24, 163

Romans i. 1, 138

Romans xi. 2, xxxii

Galatians i. 15, 138

2 Thessalonians ii. 11, 243

1 Timothy iii. 15, 114

Hebrew ii. 16, 297

1 John i. 9, 215

Revelation ii. 20, 335

Revelation xxi, 12‒16, 182

Nimrod, 7

Nineveh, 327

Nisan, the first month, 89, 301, 310, 339

Nobles, the, 273

Numbering of the people, see David

Numbers high in Chronicles, xlix, 92, 133, 135 ff., 164 f., 178, 195, 204, 210, 218 f., 221 f., 225 f., 239, 281, 294

ōb, 325

Obelisk of Shalmaneser II, 122, 206

Oblations (tᵉrūmāh) 314

Obsolete English words: At (after verbs of asking), 241

Grave (verb = carve), 174

Magnifical, 134

Play (= dance), 96, 106

Polls (= heads), 137

Skill (verb), 174, 333

Oded,

229, 295 f.

ōhel, 197, 274

Omar, the Mosque of, 181

‘ōnēn, 325

Onyx, 164

Ophel, 291, 328

Ophir, 164, 202, 257

Oracle, the, 180, 185, 187

Ornan, 131, 177

Osorkon, 226

Overseers, 173, 176, 333

P, or “Priestly” narrative, xx, 2 f.

paḥōth, 205

Palace, the, 163, 166

Palmyra, 199

Paphos, the temple of, 180

Parbar, 151

Parvaim, 178

Passover, the, of Hezekiah, 308 ff.; of Josiah, 310, 320, 339 ff.

Pelethites, 120, 167

Pentateuch, the, xiv, xx, 238, 337 ff.

Perfect heart, a, 93, 160, 165 f., 231, 248

Pestilence, 130 f.

Petrie, W. M. Flinders, History of Egypt, 226, 344

Philistines, the original seats of the, 7; war with the, 74, 99 ff., 126, 286 f., 297; invasion by, 262 f.

Phinehas, 69

Phœnician language, 173

Physicians, 235

Pillar, 271

Pillars (Jachin and Boaz), 179 f., 184

Plague, 193

Play on words, 15, 57, 254, 282

Poll-tax, 274, 347

Porch of the Temple, 177

Porters, see Doorkeepers

Posts (= runners), 309

Precious stones, 178

Priesthood, the double, 102, 167

Priests, 51 f., 303, 307, 312 ff.; courses of, 66; sons of the, 71; David’s organisation of the, 141 ff.

Princes of the sanctuary, 142

Princes of the tribes of Israel, 155

Prophetess, 335

Psaltery, 96, 103, 146, 188, 204

Psalms xcvi, cv, cvi,

Pul, 34, 37

Punt (Put), 6

Rabbah, 121, 125

Ramoth-gilead, 51, 240, 245

Rechabites, the, 21

Recorder (= chronicler), 120, 332

Rehoboam, 211 ff.

Rephaim, 126 f.; valley of, 81, 99

Rhodians, 5

River, the (= the Euphrates), 13, 206

Robertson Smith, W., Old Testament in the Jewish Church, 16; Religion of the Semites, 83, 180, 213, 219, 224

Robinson’s Arch, 150

Ruler of the house of God, the, 66, 315, 340

Ryle,

Genesis, referred to, 2 f., 6; (on Ezra and Nehemiah), 143, 163, 273, 296, 334 f.; Prayer of Manasses, 328

Sabbath, 351

Sackcloth, 131

Sacrifice,

consumed by fire from heaven, 195; daily morning and evening, 141, 276; sevenfold, made by Hezekiah, 304; of thank offerings and burnt offerings, 306 f.; of peace offerings, 106, 132, 307, 328

St Mary’s Well, 323 f., 327

Salt, covenant of, 219; the valley of, 119, 281

Samaria, 266, 309

Samaritan schism, the, xxi, xxxviii

Samuel, the descent of, 41; the seer, 70, 168, 234

Sargon, 309, 317

Satan (= the Adversary), 128

Saul, genealogy of, 62 f., 72;

defeat, death and burial of, 73 ff.

Saws, 126

Scorpion, 209

Scribe, 120, 142, 157

Sea of the Temple, the, 119, 181 f., 184, 300

Seer, 70, 168, 234

Sennacherib, threatened invasion by, 316 ff.

sēpher hattōrah, 338

Septuagint, the, version of Chronicles, lviii f.

Shalmaneser, 122, 206, 309

Sharon, 35; the great maritime plain, 156

Sheba, 6 f.; Queen of, 202 ff.

shēbhet, 83

Shechem, 48, 56, 207

shelaḥ, 270, 319

shĕlāṭīm, 118, 270

Shemaiah, 210, 215

Sheminith, set to the, 104

Shephēlāh, 156, 172, 207, 288, 298

Shewbread, 71 f., 139, 141, 162, 174, 221, 304

Shields of gold, 118, 205, 270, 323

Shihor, brook of, 96

Shishak, invasion by, 214 ff.

Siloam, the Lower Pool of, 318

Singers, the families of the, xvi, xlii, 38, 42, 104, 145 ff., 341

ṣinnah, 205

sippim, 269

Slings, 288

Smith, G. A.,

Historical Geography of the Holy Land, 74 f., 81, 83, 171, 184, 192, 207, 212, 226, 249 f., 255, 294, 297; Jerusalem, 78 f., 163, 288, 291, 318 f., 324, 327;

(in Encyclopedia Biblia), 118; Early Poetry of Israel, 294

Sojourners, 165 f.

Solomon, 133 ff., 160 ff.; twice crowned, 167; great sacrifice of, 169 f.; vision of, 170 f.; horses and chariots of, 171 f.; makes preparations for building the Temple, 173 ff.; begins to build the Temple, 176 ff.; brings the Ark into the sanctuary, 186 f.; blessing and prayer of, 189 ff.; the night vision of, 197 f.; cities of, 198 ff.; arrangements of, for the Temple worship, 201 f.; the fleet of, 202; the greatness of, 204 ff.

Sorcery, 325

Spices, 204, 235

Stir up the spirit, 37, 262, 352

Store cities, 233, 238

Strangers, see Aliens

Suburbs, 47, 95, 212, 316

Sun-images, 224, 331

Sycomore,

156, 172, 207

Syria, Syrians, 9, 17, 116, 124; invasion by, 278

Syriac Version, the, lix

Syro-Ephraimite war, the, 294 f.

Tabali, 5

Tabernacle, 70, 94, 133, 274 f.

Tabor, 50

Tadmor, 199

Tamar, 199

ṭaph, 252

Tarshish (= Tartessus), 5, 54, 205 f., 257 f.

Tarsus, 5

Task-work, 126, 134, 200

Tekoa, 18, 26, 254

Tell el-Amarna letters, 5, 58, 78, 121, 212

Teman, 11

Temple, the, gates of, 68, 268 f., 272 f., 291; David’s preparations for building, 133 ff.; measurements of, 134, 177; the pattern of, 161 ff.; Solomon prepares to build, 173 ff.; description of, 176 ff.; dedication of, 186; restoration of, 274 ff.; cleansing of, 301 ff.; repair of, 332 ff.; Cyrus decrees the rebuilding of, 351 f.

Tenderhearted, 220

Tent, 69, 94, 101, 106, 186, 274

tĕrū‘ah, 106, 230

tĕrūmāh, 314

Testimony, the, 270 f., 274

Text of Chronicles, the, xxii, lviii, 7, 13, 15, 16, 18, 21, 27, 28, 35, 41, 42, 46, 49, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 68, 82, 85, 115, 182, 214, 217, 227, 248, 255, 259, 323, 336

Thistle (= thorn), 283

Threshing-floor, 97, 131 f., 242

Thucydides referred to, xlviii

Tigris, 122

Tilgath-pilneser (Tiglath-pileser), 34, 37, 292, 297 ff., 309

Times (= changes, opportunities), 93, 168

Tisri, the seventh month, 186

Tithe, 313 f.

Titus, Arch of, 230

tōrah, 191, 228, 338

Torrey, C. C., Ezra Studies, xxxiii f., xlvi, lviii, lx, 38, 218, 237, 264 f., 343, 345

Treasuries, the, 161

Trees, large, 76, 294

Tree-worship, 224

Trumpets, silver, 105, 112, 188, 196, 221, 230, 305

Tyre, 5, 8, 134

Tyrseni, 5

Uriah, 86, 120

Urim and Thummim, 99

Uzziah, 285 ff.

Valley of salt, the, 119, 281

Veil of the Temple, the, 179

Ventriloquism, 325

Vessels of gold, 185 f.

Vulgate, the, lix

Wardrobe, keeper of the, 335

Wellhausen, J., references to, lvi, lix, 20, 237, 271

Wilson’s Arch, 150

Wrath, 247, 249, 277, 323

Zadok, 39 f., 92, 102, 111, 142, 155, 167, 314

Zechariah, martyrdom of,

Zedekiah the king, 349 f.

Zedekiah the prophet, 242, 244

Zemaraim, the battle of, 218 ff.

Zerah the Ethiopian, 225 f.

Zidon, Zidonians, 8, 134

Ziz, 252

Zobah, 116 f., 122, 124, 199

CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A. AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

WESTERN ASIA (EARLY TIMES)

Cambridge University Press.

Copyright Cambridge University Press.

THE ENVIRONS OF JERUSALEM

Cambridge University Press

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