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Artificial Intelligence Governance and the Blockchain Revolution 2024th Edition Qiqi Gao
Lucio Biggiero , University of L’Aquila, L’Aquila, Italy
Derick de Jongh, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa
Birger P. Priddat, Witten/Herdecke University, Witten, Germany
Josef Wieland, Zeppelin University, Friedrichshafen, Germany
Adrian Zicari, ESSEC Business School, Cergy-Pontoise, France
This interdisciplinary book series examines recent developments concerning the “relational view” in economics. While the relational research perspective primarily has roots in philosophy, sociology and economic geography, this series offers contributions to the relational view from such diverse fields as institutional and organisational economics, management, organisational theory, and mathematics. Focusing on a relational approach to contracts and governance, leadership, rents, global cooperation, intersectoral cooperation and civil society, the series welcomes theoretical and empirical research on relational structures in market theory, institutional and organisational economics, the resource-based view of the firm, organisational studies, behavioural economics and economic sociology. Within this range of fields, researchers are invited to contribute to the further development of a relational view in economics.
Jessica Geraldo Schwengber
Organizational Learning
as Relational Governance
Jessica Geraldo Schwengber Zeppelin University Friedrichshafen, Baden-Württemberg Germany
ISSN 2662-9852
ISSN 2662-9860 (electronic)
Relational Economics and Organization Governance
ISBN 978-3-031-52014-3 ISBN 978-3-031-52015-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-52015-0
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Chapter 1 Introduction
This book proposes a relational conceptualization of organizational learning. Following relational economics (Wieland, 2020), organization is conceptualized as a nexus of stakeholders’ resources and interests. This nature of the organization implies a dynamic view of the organization beyond institutional boundaries while defining the organization as an entity in its own right. Entity is related to the noun “organization”, which is contraposed to the verb “organizing”. Nevertheless, entity does not mean a static view of organization, but is similar to what Schoeneborn et al. (2019) define as “processual entity”, which brings together organization as noun and organizing as verb. It brings together process and form (both-and approach). Furthermore, stakeholders are both within and outside the institutional boundaries of the organization, which implies a view of the organization that goes beyond the intra-organizational context, coherent with an open systems view of the organization. Although the organization forms a nexus of stakeholders, it is an entity in its own right; i.e., it exists beyond individual stakeholders and is therefore ontologically real. Following the existing literature on the theory of the firm and institutional economics (e.g., the works of Commons (1937), Coase (1934) and Williamson (2005)), transactions are considered as the unit of analysis in relational economics. Consequently, the organization as an entity is defined as a governance structure used by stakeholders to conduct transactions. Stakeholders contribute different rationalities that should be relationalized to carry out transactions. This view of the organization elucidates the ontological nature of organizations in this study and is the starting point for the conceptualization of organizational learning as a relational governance process. Such a conceptualization would provide a new perspective on organizational learning compared to existing theories. Although there is some consensus in the organization theory literature that the organization is not just the sum of its employees, in the organizational learning literature some scholars have struggled to make clear the distinction between individual learning and organizational learning by the entity. Yes, there are individuals within organizations and yes, they do contribute to organizational learning, but the overemphasis on the role of individuals for organizational
learning has somehow obfuscated a conceptualization of organizational learning as learning by the organizational entity. This is also because much of the existing organizational learning implicitly or explicitly relies on classic (e.g., Weber 1904/2005; Taylor, 1919) and neoclassical (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963; Mayo, 1945)viewof the organization. Although the relevance of these theories to the field, the emphasis on employees in organizational learning models and elaborations has led to some epistemological and ontological problems in the organizational learning literature, such as the organizational learning paradox (can an organization actually learn? Is organizational learning a mere metaphor?) and anthropomorphism (applying human characteristics such as the mind to inanimate entities such as organizations).
The concept of organization as a nexus of stakeholders’ resources and interests would require going beyond organization as a group of employees towards a shift to a transactional relation in which stakeholders invest resources and interests. In this book, it is argued that a fundamental methodological change is required to conceptualize organizational learning within the framework of relational economics: From methodological individualism to methodological relationism. The former implies defining organizational learning in terms of the parts (for instance employees) of the organizational system, which may make organizational learning difficult to distinguish from individual learning within the organization. By defining organizational learning as a process focusing on individuals in the organization, existing organizational learning literature can be placed within the meta-construct of methodological individualism because the learning process focuses on the components of the organization. In methodological relationism, organizational learning is defined as a micro-meso-relational process in which both the stakeholders (components of the organizational system) and the organization as an entity learn. This shift would then make it possible to view the organization as a processual entity1 capable of learning. This would then mean that organizational learning is not a purely cognitive process, but a relational process which, in turn, would mean that learning could be conceptualized beyond human cognition.
From the nature of organization in relational economics and further elaborations that are presented in Chap. 2, the following definition of organizational learning is proposed: Organizational learning is a process for the relationalization of rationalities for enabling the completion of multicontextual transactions in the context of organizations intended as entities in their own right. The conceptual clarifications in Chap. 2 represent the basis for further exploration: To what extent does existing organizational learning literature support the definition of learning as relational governance? How relational learning can be operationalized in organizations? With regard to the latter question, the role of the transcultural learning model (TLM) and communities of practice (CoPs) in operationalizing organizational learning is explored in the book.
After conceptualizing organizational learning as relational governance, the results of a case study conducted in a multinational company are presented. The purpose
1 When in the following the term “entity” is used, it will refer to a processual entity, in the sense that it is not intended as a static concept of organization, but organization that emerges, creates and transforms through transactions involving stakeholders that invest resources in the organization.
of the case study was to empirically explore the application of relational learning in organizations. The results provide some evidence for the concepts developed. In particular, it provides evidence for the concept of the organization as a nexus of resources and interests of stakeholders and of learning as a relational process in which both the organization and the stakeholders involved learn.
To summarize, the book is structured as follows: In Chap. 2, some basic concepts of relational economics theory are introduced and their implications for organizational learning are discussed. These conceptual foundations provide the basis for the definition of organizational learning proposed in this book, namely a process for the relationalization of rationalities for enabling the completion of multicontextual transactions in the context of organizations intended as entities in their own right.
Chapter 3 presents and discusses the extent to which existing organizational learning theories focus on individual learning within the organization rather than on organizational learning per se, providing evidence for arguing that the existing literature is methodologically individualistic.
Chapter 4 critically discusses the implications of the literature for the definition of organizational learning within the framework of relational economics. In particular, the following topics are discussed: The influence of individual learning on organizational learning, the nature of the organization behind the existing organizational learning literature, the distinction between relational and interpersonal relationships and the impact of these relationships on learning, the triggers and outcomes of organizational learning. Chapter 4 includes a conceptual analysis of the conceptual link between existing definitions of organizational learning and organizational relational learning, and the conceptual changes required to define organizational relational learning. Chapter 4 concludes with the argument that the conceptual changes can be summarized in one main change, namely a methodological shift from individualism to relationalism.
This transition from methodological individualism to methodological relationism is then discussed in Chap. 5. In particular, Chap. 5 first provides an overview of the different meta-constructs (individualism, holism and relationism), focusing on their differences. The second part of the chapter then discusses the implications of applying methodological relationism to organizations and organizational learning. Chapter 5 concludes by arguing that organizational learning in the meta-construct of methodological relationalism requires a micro-meso-relationalization process.
Chapter 6 focuses on the operationalization of organizational learning as a process of relationalizing rationalities through the transcultural learning model (TLM). In this chapter, TLM is introduced and discussed. The chapter also aims to link TLM to organizational learning. It also elaborates on the concepts of non-normativity and prosociality (which are crucial to TLM but not addressed in the organizational learning literature). Shared intentionality as well as social categorization are applied to explore how non-normativity and pro-sociality can be promoted at the organizational level and how they can support the relationalization of rationalities in the organization. Chapter 6 concludes by highlighting the need for a locus of contact to promote the relationalization of multiple rationalities.
Chapter 7 introduces and discusses the concept of CoPs as one such locus of contact. The concept of CoPs in organizations is presented to clarify the theoretical framework from which CoPs have emerged. This discussion provides the starting point for a conceptual analysis of the conceptual links between CoPs and TLM and the conceptual changes required to apply CoPs to the operationalization of organizational relational learning. The chapter then presents an updated version of TLM at the organizational level. The chapter concludes with some elaborations on the assessment of the success factors of TLM. In particular, the cooperation rents achieved through organizational learning and the relational costs of enabling relational learning are used as variables to evaluate organizational learning.
The empirical application of the concept of organizational learning as relational governance and the updated version of TLM is then explored in a case study (Chap. 8). Despite some limitations, the case study provides empirical evidence for the concept of the organization as a nexus of stakeholders’ resources and for the relational view of learning as a micro-meso-relational process in which both the stakeholders who invest in the resources and the organization as a whole can learn.
While the first five chapters deal with the nature of organization and organizational learning, with questions related to what organization is and what is organizational learning (questions that Simpson & den Hond 2022 define as “metaphysical stances”), the last chapters take a pragmatic approach towards organizational learning. It is pragmatic because the operationalization and the following empirical case study contribute to understanding the everyday organization in a complex and continuously changing economy and society. In this way, this study aims to contribute both to understanding the nature of organization and organizational learning and their empirical evidence.
References
Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16), 386–405. Commons, J. R. (1934). Institutional economics: Its place in political economy. MacMillan. Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G. (1963). A behavioral theory of the firm. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign’s Academy for Entrepreneurial Leadership Historical Research Reference in Entrepreneurship.
Mayo, E. (1945). The social problems of an industrial civilization. Harvard University/The Andover Press.
Schoeneborn, D., Kuhn, T. R., & Kärreman, D. (2019). The communicative constitution of organization, organizing and organizationality. Organization Studies, 40 (4), 475–496. Simpson, B., & den Hond, F. (2022). The contemporary resonances of classical pragmatism for studying organization and organizing. Organization Studies, 43(1), 127–146.
Taylor, F. W. (1919). The principles of scientific management. Harper & Brothers Publishers. Weber, M. (2005). Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology.Universityof California Press.
Wieland, J. (2020). Relational economics. Springer. Williamson, O. E. (2005). The economics of governance. American Economic Review, 95 (2), 1–18.
Chapter 2
The Nature of Organization and Its Implications for Organizational Learning
2.1 The Nature of the Firm in Relational Economics
Organizational learning as relational governance, as articulated in this book, has its theoretical roots in the theory of relational economics (Wieland, 2020, 2022). Nevertheless, learning or organizational learning has not yet been conceptualized in relational economics. Learning theories in general are not central to the current debate in relational economics (see, e.g., the collection of contributions to the relational view of economics in Biggiero et al., 2022, none of them focus explicitly on organizational learning). However, relational economics does address the nature of the firm, which can provide theoretical inputs for the conceptualization of organizational learning as relational governance.
Making clear the nature of organization is relevant because the applied definition of organization shapes how a phenomenon (in this case organizational learning) is approached. According to the relational economics theory, firms are a nexus of stakeholders’ resources and interests.1 Figure 2.1 provides a representation for firms as defined in relational economics.
At the centre of the representation of the firm as a nexus of stakeholders, there are transactions. The latter is the fundamental unit of analysis for relational economics. The elaborations on transactions in relational economics draw on the debate in the institutional economics literature. In this literature, the concept of the transaction has been intensively discussed and has had a great influence on the theory of the firm. John Rogers Commons (1934) argues that transactions are the smallest unit of institutional economics and that institutions (organizations) are ongoing concerns existing in their transactions. The ongoing concern is held together by working rules, i.e., a governance structure. From this view, the firm exists in its transactions,
1 On his elaborations on the nature of the firm, Josef Wieland´s theory is placed into the theoretical framework of the theory of the firm. For an overview of some of the most relevant theoretical contributions to the theory of the firm, see Coase (1937), Machlup (1967), Richardson (1972), Alchian & Demsetz (1972), Jensen & Meckling (1976), Pensore (1997), Williamson (2005).
Fig. 2.1 Firm as a nexus of stakeholder resources and interests (Wieland, 2020: 71)
it “lives”, in the sense that it continues to exist as it reproduces itself in concrete transactions. The metaphor of Lego can be used to explain the transaction view of organization (Scott & Davis, 2016), namely the transaction is like a Lego brick, and the organization emerges while assembling the multiple Lego bricks. Williamson (2005) argues that the firm is a governance structure to economize on transaction costs. From a macro-perspective, in the transaction view, the economy is viewed as “a nearly endless series of value chains linking organizations and industries into a network of transactions” (Scott & Davis, 2016: 223).
In relational economics, transactions are performed by the stakeholders who invest their resources in the firm, expecting to earn both factor income and cooperation rents. Factor incomes are agreed in legal contracts (Möhrer, 2022). Cooperation rents are rather to be understood as the above-average profit that results from the combination of the different resources that are brought together by the different stakeholders and can be either tangible or intangible (Möhrer, 2022; Wieland, 2020). The stakeholders’ resources form a nexus. Such a nexus is formed both by stakeholders within the organizational institutional boundaries (e.g., employees) and outside the organizational institutional boundaries. The latter concerns both inter-organizational links (e.g., suppliers, joint ventures) and extra-organizational links (e.g., NGOs, government and community) (Wieland, 2014a, 2020, 2022). OEMs, NGOs, suppliers, investors, joint ventures, communities, workers, consumers and others invest their resources
(e.g., liquidity, capital, infrastructures, etc.) in the firm. The stakeholders then “use” the organization to carry out their transactions.2 The governance structure provided by the organization should therefore be designed to enable cooperative value creation. In this sense, the organization is a system of relations (between stakeholders and their resources) (Coase, 1937) whose existence is a form of collective action (Commons, 1934; Wieland, 2014b, 2020). This view of organization as a nexus of stakeholders’ resources, as a system of relationship and as a form of collective action, focuses on the portfolio of ties of the organization (Scott & Davis, 2016). This view also raises the issue of boundaries since it makes the organizational boundaries blurred. The organization is no longer confined to its institutional and legal boundaries. To identify the organizational boundaries, the nexus of stakeholders who invest resources are to be identified. This implies an open system view of organization.3
Although in the relational economic theory, the firm is a nexus of stakeholders’ resources and interests, it is an entity in its own right, namely it exists beyond its stakeholders. Stakeholders are “citizens” of the organization (Commons, 1934). The latter will live before and after single “citizens” will come and go (ibid.). The organization as an entity is itself a stakeholder of society. While stakeholders are citizens of the organization, the organization is, on the other hand, a citizen of the society (Rendtorff, 2021; Wieland, 2020). As a “good” citizen, it should create value for all stakeholders involved in its transactions (ibid.).
The concept of organizations as nexus of stakeholders’ resources and interests and entity in its own right may require further elaboration, especially concerning specific types of organizations, like shell companies and individual enterprises. Shell companies exist only on paper. They have no employees, no significant assets and operations. Although shell companies can be legal, sometimes they are used for criminal aims such as tax avoidance and corruption. Individual enterprise refers to self-employment and can be either with or without employees. The legal definition of individual enterprise can vary in different national legal frameworks but, in general, it refers to individual entrepreneurs that perform economic activities. The nature of organizations as nexus of stakeholders’ resources and interests and as entities in their own right may apply to these organizations as well. As for the entity in its own right, these examples of companies are, at least from a legal perspective (and I would also add from an ontological perspective),4 separate entities. Indeed, in all the cited examples, the legal entity (legal person) is legally separated from the individual (natural person), and in some cases also the connected responsibilities are kept separated. The concept of organization as nexus of stakeholders’ resources may also apply to these organizations. As for individual enterprises, although the economic activities of these enterprises may be conducted by a single entrepreneur,
2 Rendtorff (2021) interpreted this passage in Wieland´s theory as firms as entities that can be “rented” by stakeholders to conduct transactions.
3 Davis used the metaphor of a bowl of oatmeal to highlight how blurred organizational boundaries are. In particular, he argues that, at least in some sectors, “to distinguish between separate organizations is like trying to separate out distinct lumps in a bowl of oatmeal” (Davis, 2006: 480).
4 For the debate on the ontology of the organization, see Chap. 5
this individual enterprise may still be a nexus of stakeholders’ resources. Indeed, while conducting economic activities, customers may pay for the services and/or products, governments may provide infrastructures in return for taxes, suppliers may supply services and products and the entrepreneur her/himself may invest in the entity her/his finances and skills to obtain an income and will be her/himself a stakeholder of the entity. As for shell companies, the purpose of this type of organization may make it difficult to identify its nexus of stakeholders’ resources and interests, as the scope (at least in some cases) would be to hide resources and interests (for instance, hidden financial resources to avoid paying taxes). Although not visible, there are nevertheless many stakeholders’ resources and interests involved. Examples of resources may be financial funds or skills in hiding funds by stakeholders such as clients, banks and brokers. The interest may be to get a financial return, to commit criminal acts, etc. Although these are not the type of organization this book is focused on, the concept of organization as a nexus of stakeholders’ resources and interests that form an entity in their own right can find broad application.
One important further contribution of relational economic to the theoretical debate is the definition of relational transactions and their distinction from exchange transactions. While the latter are dyadic and discrete, a relationship but not relational, the former are dynamic attractors of polyvalent events (Wieland, 2020, 2022). This means that stakeholders involved in the transaction come from different contexts (polycontextuality) and have different logics (polycontexturality) and language games (polylinguality) (ibid.). Polyvalent events are brought into the transaction by multiple stakeholders and should be relationalized to enable ongoing cooperative relations. In this context, the term “relational” in relational economics is not limited to inter-personal relationships, but rather refers to:
The successful integration of multiple rationalities in an adaptive governance structure for the dynamic processing and development of specific economic transactions. (Wieland, 2020: 9)
Relation in the sense of inter-personal relationship would be a rather reductive view of relation since, in the current economy and society, relations take place not only among persons but also among organizations. In relational economics, relational means integration of different types of rationalities and is not a synonym for personal relationship. Organization as a nexus of stakeholders then requires governance structures in which multiple rationalities are relationalized for the process and development of specific transactions.5
5 In his interpretation of the nature of the firm in Wieland´s relational economics, Rendtorff (2021) highlights the cosmopolitan dimension of the firm as a nexus of stakeholders´ resources. It is cosmopolitan because this is a view of the firm that takes into consideration rationalities of different stakeholders involved in the transactions, both regional and international, which reflects the complexity of the operating of firms in the global economy. The firm would be embedded in networks which may include stakeholders from different systems and for creating value these different rationalities are to be relationalized. Josef Wieland has, to the best of my knowledge, never used the term “cosmopolitan” while elaborating on the firm as a nexus of stakeholders.
2.2 Implications for Organizational Learning
These debates have at least two implications for organizational learning. First, if organizations are entities in their own right, then organizational learning should regard this entity. Single stakeholders who invest resources can learn, but this learning would not be sufficient to define organizational learning. To illustrate this last point, let us consider the case of employees (a type of stakeholder): Although employee learning can influence organizational learning, it alone cannot be defined as organizational learning. This does not mean that single stakeholders do not play a role in the learning process, but this is important to distinguish between the stakeholder learning process (either individuals like employees, or collective actors like other organizations) and the organizational learning process (learning process by the entity). Secondly, if the organization exists in its transactions, and if transactions attract multiple rationalities to be relationalized, then the organization should be able to relationalize these rationalities, thereby being able to continue conducting transactions and ultimately continuing to exist. If organizational learning is intended as a process that permits the organization to keep developing and existing, combining the concept of organization as entity in its own right with the need to relationalize rationalities for conducting transactions to keep developing and existing, organizational learning would be:
Definition A process for the relationalization of rationalities for enabling the completion of multi-contextual transactions in the context of organizations intended as entities in their own right.
The relationalization of rationalities is a process of pattern and structure formation (Wieland, 2022). In the former, the relationalization of rationalities changes the nature of the transaction and forms temporalized patterns (ibid.). The formation of structure refers instead to the governance structure that enables the stabilization of relationalized rationalities. The organization itself provides the governance structure for transactions to take place. It is the investment of the organization as an entity in its own right in the cooperative project of the firm (Möhrer, 2022). Governance structure involves, among other things, policies, procedures and organizational culture, all organizational constructs traditionally explored in the organizational learning literature. In this view, organizational learning would promote what Möhrer (2022) calls the continuous re-organization of existing and new stakeholders’ resources for the benefit of the stakeholders and for the organization as entity. Möhrer (2022) claims that governance structure is an economic resource because it can increase the productivity of the various resources invested. In this sense, the value creation of an organization depends on the suitability of governance structures and learning process would be a relational corporate governance mechanism.
2.3 Firms and Organizations
While Commons (1934) contributed to the institutional economics stream and therefore focused on institutions (in the broadest sense), scholars of the theory of the firm (e.g., Coase, 1937; Williamson, 2005) focused on firms. The concept of organization is broader. The firm is one type of organization, but not the only one. Organizations can also be non-governmental organizations, trade unions and political parties, to name but a few examples. Organizational scholars have focused their research on specific types of organizations (political parties, factories, firms, etc.). This has resulted in a lack of theoretical generalization of organizational theories beyond the specific type of organization studied by scholars in a specific organizational field (e.g., scholars from the theory of the firm have focused on the type of organization firm). Despite this lack of generalization, Scott and Davis (2016) highlighted that different types of organization have some common features: All types of organizations have objectives, need resources for their activities, have members, etc. Although the case study presented in the last chapter regards the type of organization “firm” and much of the literature presented and discussed in this book regards firms (because much of the existing literature on organizational learning has focused on firms), this book aims to contribute to a generalization in the field of organizational learning. Indeed, the definition of organizational learning as “a process for the relationalizing of rationalities for enabling the completion of multicontextual transactions in the context of organizations intended as entities in their own right” is not limited to the organizational type “firm”, as relationalizing of rationalities to enable the completion of multicontextual transactions can also be carried out in other organizational types. Although the elaboration within relational economics contributes to the theory of the firm, it also addresses the broader stream of institutional economics and the role of other types of organizations has not been neglected. On this point, the theory of relational economics, drawing on systems theory (Luhman, 1987), identifies different binary codes and modes of communication of different types of organizations operating in different systems (Wieland, 2020). The scholar argues that multicontextual transactions, as the name suggests, take place in a multifaceted environment of operationally closed, communicatively open and functionally autonomous systems (e.g., market, politics, civil society, etc.) (polycontextuality). Consequently, different binary codes, intended as different decision logics (polycontexturality) are applied in multicontextual transactions (Market: payment/no payment; politics: legal/illegal; civil society: common good/ private interest, etc.) (ibid.). Different organizations operate in different systems (firms in the economic system; political parties in politics; NGOs in civil society, etc.) and specialize in distinct guiding differences, intended as different modes of communication (polylinguality) (e.g., firms: earnings/costs; political parties: govern/oppose; NGO’s: engagement/non-engagement, etc.) (ibid.). The various systems are open and communicate with each other. They can interact with and complement each other (Fig. 2.2).
The existence of multiple systems provides the theoretical basis for the discussed definition of “relational” in terms of relational economics theory. Namely, “relational” in relational economics theory refers to the successful integration of multiple rationalities in a governance structure to carry out transactions. This means that organizations such as firms (coupled with the market system) can operate in the context of specific multicontextual transactions and, on a temporary basis, in relation to other systems, such as the law and civil society (Wieland, 2020). This may be the case, for example, when the organizational type “firm” engages in social responsibility projects or when transactions have a legal dimension and therefore integrate different decision-making logics or rationalities (ibid.). If all systems are
Fig. 2.2 Polycontextural and polylingual codes (Wieland, 2020: 58)
communicatively open, just as transactions in the organizational form “firm” integrate multiple rationalities, this can also be true for other organizational forms. If this is accepted, then the concept of organizational learning as “a process for the relationalizing of rationalities for enabling the completion of multicontextual transactions in the context of organizations intended as entities in their own right” may apply to organizations broadly conceived.
2.4 Different Organizations, Different Success Criteria of Learning
What might distinguish organizational learning between different organizations would be the success criteria for assessing learning outcomes. Although an organization from a particular system can operate in relation to other systems when carrying out temporal specific multicontextual transactions and apply the guiding difference of different systems temporally, the organization remains coupled to its system of reference (firms/market; political parties/politics; courts/law, inter alia) and will not adopt the binary coding of other systems (Wieland, 2020).
Consider the example of firms (system market; binary code payment/nonpayment; guiding difference earnings/cost) and NGOs (system civil society; binary code common good/private interest; guiding difference engagement/nonengagement). Although firms may engage in the context of specific transactions with civil society, as organizations in the system market, they will not adopt the binary code common good/private interest but will remain coupled to the system market and will specialize in the guiding difference earnings/costs. Against this background, the success criteria of organizational learning may depend on the guiding difference of the different organizations (Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 Success criteria of different types of organizations (own table)
Type of organization
Success criteria
Firm Earnings > costs
Political parties To govern
NGOs
Religious institutions
Increase in engagement
Increase in believers
Universities Increase in academic seminars, publications, conferences
Alchian, A. A., & Demsetzt, H. (1972). Production, information costs, and economic organization. The American Economic Review, 62(5), 777–795.
Biggiero, L., de Jongh, D., Priddat, B., Wieland, J., Zicari, A., & Fischer, D. (2022). The relational view of economics. Springer.
Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16), 386–405.
Commons, J. R. (1934). Institutional economics: Its place in political economy. MacMillan. Davis, R. J. (2006). Firms and environments. In: N.J. Smelser, R. Swedberg (Eds.), Handbook of economic sociology (pp. 478–502). Princeton University Press & Russell Sage Foundation. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behaviror, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Finance Economics, 3, 305–360.
Luhmann, N. (1987). Soziale Systeme: Grundriß einer Allgemeinen Theorie. Suhrkamp. Machlup, F. (1967). Theories of the firm: Marginalist, behavioral, managerial. The American Economic Review, 57 (1), 1–33.
Möhrer, M. (2022). Shared value statement: New perspectives on measuring business value creation. In L. Biggiero, D. de Jongh, B. Priddat, J. Wieland, A. Zicari, & D. Fischer (Eds.), The relational view of economics (pp. 111–132). Springer.
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Williamson, O. E. (2005). The economics of governance. American Economic Review, 95 (2), 1–18.
Chapter 3
Organizational Learning Versus Individual Learning in the Organization
3.1 What is Organizational Learning?
The concept of organizational learning is not unambiguous as it has been influenced by many disciplinary perspectives and ontological issues. In a literature review, Easterby-Smith (1997) identified five disciplines and associated ontologies that have contributed to the literature on organizational learning: Psychology and organizational development, management science, sociology and organizational theory, production management and cultural anthropology. Many more sub-streams are identified for each discipline. For the discipline of “psychology and organizational development” alone, the researcher identified five strands: Human development, cognitive, experiential, learning styles and problems related to difficulties in learning from experience. This fragmentation has been described as a “babylonian confusion of languages” and even an “OL-Jungle” (Klimecki & Laßleben, 1998b: 4). Fragmentation in the concept of organizational learning has been widely emphasized and discussed in the literature (for discussions on this point see, e.g., Huber, 1991; Dodgson, 1993; Crossan et al., 1995, 1999; Easterby-Smith, 1997; Klimecki & Laßleben, 1998b; Popper & Lipshitz, 1998, 2000; Easterby-Smith et al., 2000; Bapuji & Crossan, 2004; Argote, 2011). As a result of this fragmentation, many different definitions of organizational learning and many models to explain organizational learning processes in organizations have been developed over the years. Table 3.1 lists some definitions of organizational learning that have been proposed by different scholars over the years.
This fragmentation of the literature is also characterized by conceptual debates, such as the distinction between organizational learning and learning organization and the relationship between organizational learning and organizational knowledge creation and management. The former, namely the distinction between organizational learning and learning organization, dominated the literature until the early 2000s, only to die off thereafter (Easterby-Smith et al., 2000). Both concepts overlap
Table 3.1 Definitions of organizational learning proposed over the years by different scholars (own table)
Scholar Definition
Levitt and March (1988: 319)
“Organizational learning is viewed as routine-based, history-dependent, and target-oriented. Organizations are seen as learning by encoding inferences from history into routines that guide behaviour”
Huber (1991: 126) “An organization learns if any of its units acquires knowledge that it recognizes as potentially useful for the organization”
Cook and Yanow (1993: 378f.)
Kim (1993: 10)
“Organizational learning, (…), refers to the capacity of an organization to learn how to do what it does, where what it learns is possessed not by individual members of the organization but by the aggregate itself. That is, when a group acquires the know-how associated with its ability to carry out its collective activities, that constitutes organizational learning”
“Organizational learning is defined as increasing an organization’s capacity to take effective action”
Argyris (1995: 20) “Learning occurs whenever errors are detected and corrected, or when a match between intentions and consequences is produced for the first time”
Klimecki and Laßleben (1998b: 29)
“Organizations learn by observing differences. (…) Organizations observe differences by drawing distinctions”
Crossan et al., (1999: 522) “Organizational learning can be conceived as a principal means of achieving the strategic renewal of an enterprise”
Holmqvist (2003: 98) “We may define organizational learning as the social production of organizational rules based on experience that leads to a changed organizational behaviour”
Singh (2011: 357)
Jiménez-Jiménez and Sanz-Valle (2011: 409)
Argote and Miron-Spektor (2011: 124)
“Organizational learning may be considered as long-term activities that build competitive advantages over time and requires sustained management attention, commitment, and effort”
“Organizational learning is the process by which the firm develops new knowledge and insights from the common experiences of people in the organization, and has the potential to influence behaviours and improve the firm’s capabilities”
“Organizational learning is a change in the organization that occurs as the organization acquires experience”
Brix (2017: 117) “Organizational learning is the process of creating new knowledge for strategic renewal and disseminating it to where it is relevant so that it can be used, reworked or rejected”
Liu (2018: 258)
“Organizational learning (e.g., exploitative learning and explorative learning) is the critical mechanism linking the relationship between social capital and knowledge transfer”
Zhu et al., (2018: 213) “Organizational learning is a process of acquiring, disseminating, interpreting, using and storing information within the organizations, leading to new knowledge or insights that affect organizational strategies”
(continued)
Table3.1 (continued)
Scholar
Definition
Nyman (2019: 334) “Learning involves both cognitive processes as sense making by the individuals, and processes of actions as new policies or procedures on the organizational level by new behaviour at team and individual level”
Tortorella et al., (2020: 290)
“Learning at an organizational level is represented by the way a company creates systems to capture and share learning, empowers individuals into a collective vision and direction, connects organization and its environment, and provides strategic leadership for learning”
in a sense. The learning organization has been defined as the applied domain of organizational learning (Easterby-Smith, 1997), which refers to structures and strategies for maximizing organizational learning (Dodgson, 1993: 377). Following the same path, Popper and Lipshitz define the learning organization as “organizations that embed institutionalized learning mechanisms within a learning culture” (2000: 181). Learning organizations thus represent the pragmatic aspect of the more theoretical concept of organizational learning but in a sense, as Popper and Lipshitz (2000) point out, they are twin concepts.
The debate on the relationship between organizational learning and organizational knowledge creation and management has similar characteristics. They are also seen as distinct areas of research, but as with learning organizations, knowledge creation and management are in some ways intertwined with the concept of organizational learning. Indeed, organizational learning can be viewed as a process of knowledge creation (see Shrivastava, 1983; Paavola & Hakkaarainen, 2005; Hong & Sullivan, 2009;Brix, 2017) or as “an act of acquiring knowledge” (Cook & Yanow, 1993: 378). More recent studies (e.g., Brix, 2017;Liu, 2018) have brought both terms together in a comprehensive framework. Fragmentation in the literature also regards the distinction between organizational and inter-organizational learning (Beeby & Booth, 2000; Crossan et al., 1995; Holmqvist, 2003).
The fragmentation has always characterized the organizational learning literature. Among the first study on organizational learning is that conducted by Wright (1936). In this study, Wright published his work on the Experience Learning Curve Model, a mathematical model to explain learning in organizations. Wright derived this model as a result of his empirical research in the aviation sector, where he found that organizations learn through the experience they gain by repeating the same tasks. After the initial conceptualization, organizational learning became a field of research in its own right. Apart from learning curves, the literature on organizational learning has been enriched by multiple perspectives over the years. These perspectives include experiential learning (e.g., Kolb & Kolb, 2009), action learning (e.g., Argyris, 1995; Argyris & Schön, 1997), congenital learning (e.g., Bruneel et al., 2010; Huber, 1991), social learning (e.g., Wenger et al., 2002), systems thinking (e.g., Senge, 2006), to
name just a few examples. In the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the literature on organizational learning was populated by diverse contributions. In particular, from the 1980s onwards, there was a relevant increase of contributions on the subject and further incremented from the 1990s onwards. Relevant contributions such as Argyris and Schön’s (1978) distinction between single-and double-loop learning, depending on whether the learning leads to a change in values, strategies or policies; Shrivitava’s organizational learning systems (1983); Levitt & March’s behavioural theory of organizational learning (1988); March’s elaboration on exploration and exploitation in organizational learning (1991); Huber’s literature review (1991), which led to the identification of constructs and processes as well as sub-constructs and subprocesses related to organizational learning; Cook and Yanow’s cultural perspective on organizational learning (1993); Schein’s elaboration on the role of professional sub-cultures in organizational learning (1996) date from this period. This period also saw the development of a multiplicity of models of organizational learning, such as the interpretation system model (Daft & Weick, 1984), the mutual learning model (March, 1991), Nonaka and Hirotaka’s SECI model (1995), the OADI-SMM (Kim, 1993) and the 4I framework (Crossan et al., 1999). These years can be considered to be the golden age for the organizational learning literature.
The beginning of the new century was marked by contributions that aimed to establish order, intended to overcome the conceptual confusion surrounding the term “organizational learning”, to bring together the various contributions and thus consolidate the literature on organizational learning. Currently, topics such as learning in networks and supply chains and global projects, collective and relational approaches to organizational learning and the role of new information technologies have gained relevance in the literature. In general, the current contributions bring an increased awareness of dispersed knowledge and thus of learning processes that take place in intra-and inter-organizational networks. For example, contributions dealing with IT provide insights into how dispersed knowledge from heterogeneous actors can be connected. In this context, Barao et al. (2017) emphasize the role of organizational knowledge architecture in supporting collaboration, socialization, knowledge sharing and coordination of geographically dispersed knowledge to foster the creation of a shared organizational knowledge base. Tortorella et al. (2020) investigated the impact of industry 4.0 technologies on organizational learning and found a positive correlation between the two concepts in an empirical study. Against this background, four chronological stages can be identified in the organizational learning literature (Fig. 3.1).
3.2 Organizational Learning or Individual Learning in Organizations?
Throughout the chronological phases of the development of the literature on organizational learning, particularly from the 1970s to the 1990s, the intertwining of psychology, individual learning and organizational learning has played an important role. Many of the most notable contributions to organizational learning have been influenced by individual learning theories, particularly the cognitive, behavioural, experiential and social approaches. Most of these contributions emphasize the role of the individual in the organizational learning process. One of the most cited quotes in the organizational learning literature is: “All learning takes place in people’s minds” (Simon, 1991: 125). Along the same path, Kim (1993) argues that individual learning is essential to understanding organizational learning and that in the early stages of an organization’s life, organizational learning coincides with individual learning. Only as the organization develops does the difference between the two concepts change (ibid.). The scholar describes organizational learning as individual learning that is transferred to the organization through shared mental models (ibid.). As for Argyris’ (1995) action theory of organizational learning, the behavioural approach has strongly influenced the scholar’s elaboration of organizational learning. As for the role of individuals in such a process, the scholar considers individuals as key to organizational learning and emphasizes a “high degree of interdependence” between individual and organizational learning (Argyris, 1995: 25). This link between individual and organizational learning is also highlighted in the essay “teaching smart people how to learn” (Argyris, 1991), which emphasizes the ability of individuals to connect and work within the organization and with organizational stakeholders. Management, according to the scholar, should guide and integrate the work of skilled employees (ibid.). This interdependence is also extensively documented in the work
Fig. 3.1 Stages of the organizational learning literature (own illustration)
of other scholars. For example, March states that “organizational knowledge and faiths are diffused to individuals (…) simultaneously, the organizational code is adapting to individual beliefs” (March, 1991: 74). Dodgson argues that “individuals are the primary learning entity in firms” (1993: 377). Nonaka states that “new knowledge always begins with the individual” (1998: 26) and coherently argues that the organizational knowledge creation process belongs to the human resource strategy (ibid.).
To this stream on organizational influenced by individual learning can also be counted the theories of experiential and social learning. Both originated conceptually as individual learning theories (on experiential learning see Dewey, 1938; Kolb, 1984 and on social learning see Bandura, 1971) and were then extended to organizational learning. As far as experiential learning is concerned, Kolb & Kolb (2009), for example, have developed the Experiential Learning Cycle which, although not exclusively developed as a model for organizational learning, can, according to the authors, also be applied in organizational contexts. On the other hand, social learning theories form the theoretical basis for communities of practice, a concept that has influenced a stream in the organizational learning literature.
Although many of these works see organizational learning as an organizational process, individuals play the role of “agents”1 (Shrivastava, 1983), “mediators of organizational learning” (Popper & Lipshitz, 2000), in the sense that learning takes place through members of the organization but must also somehow be encoded in the organization. Similarly, Holmqvist argues that organizational practitioners learn “on behalf of the organization” (2003: 98). The focus on routines and ecologies of learning is, according to Levitt and March (1988), what distinguishes organizational learning from individual learning. Similarly, Holmqvist (2003) argues that the formality and the political and organized side of the process are what distinguish individual from organizational learning.
Edmondson and Moingeon (1998), in their categorization of organizational learning research, identify two primary units of analysis in organizational learning research, namely individuals and organization. The matrix presented by the researchers distinguishes four domains (quadrants) depending on the unit of analysis (organization or individual) and the research objective (descriptive and intervention) (Table 3.2). The description attributed to quadrant three, formed by the combination organization and intervention, is “organizational improvement gained through intelligent activity of individual members”. The improvement is organizational, but the process is through individuals. The emphasis is on the intelligent activity of individual members. From this study, it emerged that even when the unit of analysis of organizational learning studies is the organization, the organizational learning process focuses on individuals.
1 This view of individuals as agents of organizational learning is based on individualism as a metatheoretical basis that treats the collective as the results of individual agents (Ritzer & Gindoff, 1992).
Table 3.2 Organizational learning research (Edmondson & Moingeon, 1998: 23)
PRIMARY UNIT OF ANALYSIS
OrganizationIndividuals
Residues
Descriptive research
RESEARCH GOAL
Intervention research
(1) Organizations as residues of past learning
(e.g. Levitt and March, 1988)
Participation
(3) Organizational improvement gained through intelligent activity of individual members
(e.g. Hayes et al., 1988)
Communities
(2) Organizations as collections of individuals who can learn and develop
Accountability
(4) Organizational improvement gained through developing individuals´ mental models
(e.g. Senge, 1990; Argyris, 1993)
The influence of individual learning theories on organizational learning is also reflected in the models of organizational learning. The interpretive system model, for example, is based on several assumptions (Daft & Weick, 1984: 286 f.):
• Organizations are open social systems. Organizational learning consists of processing and interpreting information from the environment. Learning occurs when action is taken.
• Although an organization’s knowledge, behaviours, mental maps, norms and values exist independently from its individuals, organizations do not have mechanisms separate from individuals to set goals, process information or perceive the environment.
• Information interpretation (central for organizational learning in Daft and Weick’s model) occurs at a strategic level.
• Different organizations interpret information from the environment differently.
Daft and Weick’s (1984) model takes a behavioural approach to organizational learning and defines learning as a top-down approach. Although it recognizes that the organization is different from its individuals, it assigns the “task” of learning to a few individuals in the organization (strategic level). Organizational learning (interpretation of environmental information and action) is highly dependent on cognitive individual processes of a few members.
Another relevant model in the literature is the 4I framework by Crossan et al. (1999). This model explains organizational learning as a process that starts with the individual, reaches the group (collective dimension) and finally the organizations. Accordingly, the intuition and interpretations of the individual (the first two I’s in the 4I model) would not be sufficient. The organizational learning process also requires integration (third I) in the group. In this transition, shared understanding is crucial. The process is complete when the organizational level is reached through institutionalization (fourth I). Although Crossan et al.’s model (ibid.) emphasizes the
role of individuals in the learning process, it also aims to distinguish the individual process from the organizational learning process. To distinguish individual from organizational processes, the authors argue that organizational learning is multilevel. This influence of individual learning theories on organizational learning literature can be divided into two main streams (Cook & Yanow, 1993):
1. Scholars that focus on how individuals learn in the context of the organization. 2. Scholars that treat organizations as if they were individuals and use individual learning as model for organizational learning.
Cook and Yanow (1993) criticize the individual learning perspective on organizational learning, particularly the cognitive and behavioural approaches, both in the case where the focus is on individuals learning in organizations and in the case where individual learning theories are applied to explain organizational learning. The researchers base their criticism on the conceptual difficulties in applying cognitive and behavioural learning approaches to organizational learning. They state that the fundamental conceptual question is not whether individual learning processes take place in organizations and whether this learning has a positive impact on organizational processes. In fact, individuals learn in the organization and this learning can have a positive impact on organizational functioning. It is rather an ontological question related to the nature of organizational learning itself and whether this learning in the organization can be defined as organizational learning and whether organizations learn in the same way as individuals do. Further limitations of defining organizational learning as individual learning in the organization have been highlighted in the literature. For example, Crossan et al. (1995) point out that individual learning in organizations does not mean that the organization learns since, for organizational learning, information should be shared, and common meanings developed. Furthermore, they emphasize that “if organizational learning is important to the cooperative system, it cannot be purely individual. It must affect the co-operative system in significant ways” (Crossan et al., 1995: 347). This view is also supported by further literature. For example, Brix (2017) points out that individual learning in the context of organizations does not necessarily lead to organizational learning. In an empirical study by Tortorella et al. (2020), it was found that individual learning does not have a relevant impact on organizational operational performance, whereas organizationallevel learning does. If individual learning in the context of organizations does not automatically lead to organizational learning and performance improvement, then perspectives that focus on individual learning in organizations are insufficient to explain organizational learning. As for the second criticism (applying individual learning theories to explain organizational learning as if organizations learn like individuals), Crossan et al. (1995) point out the danger of anthropomorphizing, i.e., applying human characteristics such as memory, cognitive systems and behaviours to the inanimate organization.
To overcome such difficulties, Cook and Yanow (1993) argue that organizations should be viewed as cultural rather than cognitive entities and propose the cultural perspective on organizational learning. This approach proposes to view organizations as a collective endeavour and to focus on the collective action of organizational
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BOOK III. GREAT SPEECHES ON GREAT ISSUES.
Speech of James Wilson,
January, 1775, in the Convention for the Province of Pennsylvania,
IN VINDICATION OF THE COLONIES.
“A most daring spirit of resistance and disobedience still prevails in Massachusetts, and has broken forth in fresh violences of a criminal nature. The most proper and effectual methods have been taken to prevent these mischiefs; and the parliament may depend upon a firm resolution to withstand every attempt to weaken or impair the supreme authority of parliament over all the dominions of the crown.”—Speech of the King of Great Britain to Parliament, Nov., 1774.
M . C :—Whence, sir, proceeds all the invidious and illgrounded clamor against the colonists of America? Why are they stigmatized in Britain as licentious and ungovernable? Why is their virtuous opposition to the illegal attempts of their governors, represented under the falsest colors, and placed in the most ungracious point of view? This opposition, when exhibited in its true light, and when viewed, with unjaundiced eyes, from a proper situation, and at a proper distance, stands confessed the lovely offspring of freedom. It breathes the spirit of its parent. Of this ethereal spirit, the whole conduct, and particularly the late conduct, of the colonists has shown them eminently possessed. It has animated and regulated every part of their proceedings. It has been recognized to be genuine, by all those symptoms and effects by which it has been distinguished in other ages and other countries. It has been calm and regular: it has not acted without occasion: it has not acted disproportionably to the occasion. As the attempts, open or secret, to undermine or to destroy it, have been repeated or enforced, in a just degree, its vigilance and its vigor have been exerted to defeat
or to disappoint them. As its exertions have been sufficient for those purposes hitherto, let us hence draw a joyful prognostic, that they will continue sufficient for those purposes hereafter. It is not yet exhausted: it will still operate irresistibly whenever a necessary occasion shall call forth its strength.
Permit me, sir, by appealing, in a few instances, to the spirit and conduct of the colonists, to evince that what I have said of them is just. Did they disclose any uneasiness at the proceedings and claims of the British parliament, before those claims and proceedings afforded a reasonable cause for it? Did they even disclose any uneasiness, when a reasonable cause for it was first given? Our rights were invaded by their regulations of our internal policy. We submitted to them: we were unwilling to oppose them. The spirit of liberty was slow to act. When those invasions were renewed; when the efficacy and malignancy of them were attempted to be redoubled by the stamp act; when chains were formed for us; and preparations were made for riveting them on our limbs, what measures did we pursue? The spirit of liberty found it necessary now to act; but she acted with the calmness and decent dignity suited to her character. Were we rash or seditious? Did we discover want of loyalty to our sovereign? Did we betray want of affection to our brethren in Britain? Let our dutiful and reverential petitions to the throne; let our respectful, though firm, remonstrances to the parliament; let our warm and affectionate addresses to our brethren and (we will still call them) our friends in Great Britain,—let all those, transmitted from every part of the continent, testify the truth. By their testimony let our conduct be tried.
As our proceedings, during the existence and operation of the stamp act, prove fully and incontestably the painful sensations that tortured our breasts from the prospect of disunion with Britain; the peals of joy, which burst forth universally, upon the repeal of that odious statute, loudly proclaim the heartfelt delight produced in us by a reconciliation with her. Unsuspicious, because undesigning, we buried our complaints, and the causes of them, in oblivion, and returned, with eagerness, to our former unreserved confidence. Our connection with our parent country, and the reciprocal blessings resulting from it to her and to us, were the favorite and pleasing topics of our public discourses and our private conversations. Lulled
into delightful security, we dreamed of nothing but increasing fondness and friendship, cemented and strengthened by a kind and perpetual communication of good offices. Soon, however, too soon, were we awakened from the soothing dreams! Our enemies renewed their designs against us, not with less malice, but with more art. Under the plausible pretence of regulating our trade, and, at the same time, of making provision for the administration of justice, and the support of government, in some of the colonies, they pursued their scheme of depriving us of our property without our consent. As the attempts to distress us, and to degrade us to a rank inferior to that of freemen, appeared now to be reduced into a regular system, it became proper, on our part, to form a regular system for counteracting them. We ceased to import goods from Great Britain. Was this measure dictated by selfishness or by licentiousness? Did it not injure ourselves, while it injured the British merchants and manufacturers? Was it inconsistent with the peaceful demeanor of subjects to abstain from making purchases, when our freedom and our safety rendered it necessary for us to abstain from them? A regard for our freedom and our safety was our only motive; for no sooner had the parliament, by repealing part of the revenue laws, inspired us with the flattering hopes, that they had departed from their intentions of oppressing and of taxing us, than we forsook our plan for defeating those intentions, and began to import as formerly. Far from being peevish or captious, we took no public notice even of their declaratory law of dominion over us: our candor led us to consider it as a decent expedient of retreating from the actual exercise of that dominion.
But, alas! the root of bitterness still remained. The duty on tea was reserved to furnish occasion to the ministry for a new effort to enslave and to ruin us; and the East India Company were chosen, and consented to be the detested instruments of ministerial despotism and cruelty. A cargo of their tea arrived at Boston. By a low artifice of the governor, and by the wicked activity of the tools of government, it was rendered impossible to store it up, or to send it back, as was done at other places. A number of persons, unknown, destroyed it.
Let us here make a concession to our enemies: let us suppose, that the transaction deserves all the dark and hideous colors in which
they have painted it: let us even suppose (for our cause admits of an excess of candor) that all their exaggerated accounts of it were confined strictly to the truth: what will follow? Will it follow, that every British colony in America, or even the colony of Massachusetts Bay, or even the town of Boston, in that colony, merits the imputation of being factious and seditious? Let the frequent mobs and riots, that have happened in Great Britain upon much more trivial occasions, shame our calumniators into silence. Will it follow, because the rules of order and regular government were, in that instance, violated by the offenders, that, for this reason, the principles of the constitution, and the maxims of justice, must be violated by their punishment? Will it follow, because those who were guilty could not be known, that, therefore, those who were known not to be guilty must suffer? Will it follow, that even the guilty should be condemned without being heard—that they should be condemned upon partial testimony, upon the representations of their avowed and embittered enemies? Why were they not tried in courts of justice known to their constitution, and by juries of their neighborhood? Their courts and their juries were not, in the case of captain Preston, transported beyond the bounds of justice by their resentment: why, then, should it be presumed, that, in the case of those offenders, they would be prevented from doing justice by their affection? But the colonists, it seems, must be stripped of their judicial, as well as of their legislative powers. They must be bound by a legislature, they must be tried by a jurisdiction, not their own. Their constitutions must be changed: their liberties must be abridged: and those who shall be most infamously active in changing their constitutions and abridging their liberties, must, by an express provision, be exempted from punishment.
I do not exaggerate the matter, sir, when I extend these observations to all the colonists. The parliament meant to extend the effects of their proceedings to all the colonists. The plan, on which their proceedings are formed, extends to them all. From an incident of no very uncommon or atrocious nature, which happened in one colony, in one town in that colony, and in which only a few of the inhabitants of that town took a part, an occasion has been taken by those, who probably intended it, and who certainly prepared the way for it, to impose upon that colony, and to lay a foundation and a precedent for imposing upon all the rest, a system of statutes,
arbitrary, unconstitutional, oppressive, in every view, and in every degree subversive of the rights, and inconsistent with even the name, of freemen.
Were the colonists so blind as not to discern the consequences of these measures? Were they so supinely inactive, as to take no steps for guarding against them? They were not. They ought not to have been so. We saw a breach made in those barriers, which our ancestors, British and American, with so much care, with so much danger, with so much treasure, and with so much blood, had erected, cemented and established for the security of their liberties, and— with filial piety let us mention it—of ours. We saw the attack actually begun upon one part: ought we to have folded our hands in indolence, to have lulled our eyes in slumbers, till the attack was carried on, so as to become irresistible, in every part? Sir, I presume to think not. We were roused; we were alarmed, as we had reason to be. But still our measures have been such as the spirit of liberty and of loyalty directed; not such as the spirit of sedition or of disaffection would pursue. Our counsels have been conducted without rashness and faction: our resolutions have been taken without phrensy or fury.
That the sentiments of every individual concerning that important object, his liberty, might be known and regarded, meetings have been held, and deliberations carried on, in every particular district. That the sentiments of all those individuals might gradually and regularly be collected into a single point, and the conduct of each inspired and directed by the result of the whole united, county committees, provincial conventions, a continental congress, have been appointed, have met and resolved. By this means, a chain— more inestimable, and, while the necessity for it continues, we hope, more indissoluble than one of gold—a chain of freedom has been formed, of which every individual in these colonies, who is willing to preserve the greatest of human blessings, his liberty, has the pleasure of beholding himself a link.
Are these measures, sir, the brats of disloyalty, of disaffection? There are miscreants among us, wasps that suck poison from the most salubrious flowers, who tell us they are. They tell us that all those assemblies are unlawful, and unauthorized by our constitutions; and that all their deliberations and resolutions are so
many transgressions of the duty of subjects. The utmost malice brooding over the utmost baseness, and nothing but such a hated commixture, must have hatched this calumny. Do not those men know—would they have others not to know—that it was impossible for the inhabitants of the same province, and for the legislatures of the different provinces, to communicate their sentiments to one another in the modes appointed for such purposes, by their different constitutions? Do not they know—would they have others not to know—that all this was rendered impossible by those very persons, who now, or whose minions now, urge this objection against us? Do not they know—would they have others not to know—that the different assemblies, who could be dissolved by the governors, were in consequence of ministerial mandates, dissolved by them, whenever they attempted to turn their attention to the greatest objects, which, as guardians of the liberty of their constituents, could be presented to their view? The arch enemy of the human race torments them only for those actions to which he has tempted, but to which he has not necessarily obliged them. Those men refine even upon infernal malice: they accuse, they threaten us, (superlative impudence!) for taking those very steps, which we were laid under the disagreeable necessity of taking by themselves, or by those in whose hateful service they are enlisted. But let them know, that our counsels, our deliberations, our resolutions, if not authorized by the forms, because that was rendered impossible by our enemies, are nevertheless authorized by that which weighs much more in the scale of reason—by the spirit of our constitutions. Was the convention of the barons at Runnymede, where the tyranny of John was checked, and magna charta was signed, authorized by the forms of the constitution? Was the convention parliament, that recalled Charles the Second, and restored the monarchy, authorized by the forms of the constitution? Was the convention of lords and commons, that placed king William on the throne, and secured the monarchy and liberty likewise, authorized by the forms of the constitution? I cannot conceal my emotions of pleasure, when I observe, that the objections of our adversaries cannot be urged against us, but in common with those venerable assemblies, whose proceedings formed such an accession to British liberty and British renown.
We can be at no loss in resolving, that the king cannot, by his prerogative, alter the charter or constitution of the colony of Massachusetts Bay. Upon what principle could such an exertion of prerogative be justified? On the acts of parliament? They are already proved to be void. On the discretionary power which the king has of acting where the laws are silent? That power must be subservient to the interest and happiness of those concerning whom it operates. But I go further. Instead of being supported by law, or the principles of prerogative, such an alteration is totally and absolutely repugnant to both. It is contrary to express law. The charter and constitution, we speak of, are confirmed by the only legislative power capable of confirming them; and no other power, but that which can ratify, can destroy. If it is contrary to express law, the consequence is necessary, that it is contrary to the principles of prerogative; for prerogative can operate only when the law is silent.
In no view can this alteration be justified, or so much as excused. It cannot be justified or excused by the acts of parliament; because the authority of parliament does not extend to it; it cannot be justified or excused by the operation of prerogative; because this is none of the cases in which prerogative can operate: it cannot be justified or excused by the legislative authority of the colony; because that authority never has been, and, I presume, never will be given for any such purpose.
If I have proceeded hitherto, as I am persuaded I have, upon safe and sure ground, I can, with great confidence, advance a step farther, and say that all attempts to alter the charter or constitution of that colony, unless by the authority of its own legislature, are violations of its rights, and illegal.
If those attempts are illegal, must not all force, employed to carry them into execution, be force employed against law, and without authority? The conclusion is unavoidable.
Have not British subjects, then, a right to resist such force—force acting without authority—force employed contrary to law—force employed to destroy the very existence of law and of liberty? They have, sir, and this right is secured to them both by the letter and the spirit of the British constitution, by which the measures and the conditions of their obedience are appointed. The British liberties, sir, and the means and the right of defending them, are not the grants of
princes; and of what our princes never granted they surely can never deprive us.
“Id rex potest,” says the law, “quod de jure potest.” The king’s power is a power according to law. His commands, if the authority of lord chief justice Hale may be depended upon, are under the directive power of the law; and consequently invalid, if unlawful. “Commissions,” says my lord Coke, “are legal; and are like the king’s writs; and none are lawful, but such as are allowed by the common law, or warranted by some act of parliament.”
And now, sir, let me appeal to the impartial tribunal of reason and truth; let me appeal to every unprejudiced and judicious observer of the laws of Britain, and of the constitution of the British government; let me appeal, I say, whether the principles on which I argue, or the principles on which alone my arguments can be opposed, are those which ought to be adhered to and acted upon; which of them are most consonant to our laws and liberties; which of them have the strongest, and are likely to have the most effectual tendency to establish and secure the royal power and dignity.
Are we deficient in loyalty to his majesty? Let our conduct convict, for it will fully convict, the insinuation that we are, of falsehood. Our loyalty has always appeared in the true form of loyalty; in obeying our sovereign according to law; let those, who would require it in any other form, know, that we call the persons who execute his commands, when contrary to law, disloyal and traitors. Are we enemies to the power of the crown? No, sir, we are its best friends: this friendship prompts us to wish, that the power of the crown may be firmly established on the most solid basis: but we know, that the constitution alone will perpetuate the former, and securely uphold the latter. Are our principles irreverent to majesty? They are quite the reverse: we ascribe to it perfection almost divine. We say, that the king can do no wrong: we say, that to do wrong is the property, not of power, but of weakness. We feel oppression, and will oppose it; but we know, for our constitution tells us, that oppression can never spring from the throne. We must, therefore, search elsewhere for its source: our infallible guide will direct us to it. Our constitution tells us, that all oppression springs from the ministers of the throne. The attributes of perfection, ascribed to the king, are, neither by the
constitution, nor in fact, communicable to his ministers. They may do wrong; they have often done wrong; they have been often punished for doing wrong.
Here we may discern the true cause of all the impudent clamor and unsupported accusations of the ministers and of their minions, that have been raised and made against the conduct of the Americans. Those ministers and minions are sensible, that the opposition is directed, not against his majesty, but against them; because they have abused his majesty’s confidence, brought discredit upon his government, and derogated from his justice. They see the public vengeance collected in dark clouds around them: their consciences tell them, that it should be hurled, like a thunderbolt, at their guilty heads. Appalled with guilt and fear, they skulk behind the throne. Is it disrespectful to drag them into public view, and make a distinction between them and his majesty, under whose venerable name they daringly attempt to shelter their crimes? Nothing can more effectually contribute to establish his majesty on the throne, and to secure to him the affections of his people, than this distinction. By it we are taught to consider all the blessings of government as flowing from the throne; and to consider every instance of oppression as proceeding, which, in truth, is oftenest the case, from the ministers.
If, now, it is true, that all force employed for the purposes so often mentioned, is force unwarranted by any act of parliament; unsupported by any principle of the common law; unauthorized by any commission from the crown; that, instead of being employed for the support of the constitution and his majesty’s government, it must be employed for the support of oppression and ministerial tyranny; if all this is true (and I flatter myself it appears to be true), can any one hesitate to say, that to resist such force is lawful; and that both the letter and the spirit of the British constitution justify such resistance? Resistance, both by the letter and the spirit of the British constitution, may be carried further, when necessity requires it, than I have carried it. Many examples in the English history might be adduced, and many authorities of the greatest weight might be brought to show, that when the king, forgetting his character and his dignity, has stepped forth, and openly avowed and taken a part in such iniquitous conduct as has been described; in such cases, indeed, the distinction above mentioned, wisely made by the constitution for
the security of the crown, could not be applied; because the crown had unconstitutionally rendered the application of it impossible. What has been the consequence? The distinction between him and his ministers has been lost; but they have not been raised to his situation: he has sunk to theirs.
Speech of Patrick Henry,
March 23, 1775, in the Convention of Delegates of Virginia, On the following resolutions, introduced by himself:
“Resolved, That a well regulated militia, composed of gentlemen and yeomen, is the natural strength and only security of a free government; that such a militia in this colony, would forever render it unnecessary for the mother country to keep among us, for the purpose of our defence, any standing army of mercenary soldiers, always subversive of the quiet, and dangerous to the liberties of the people, and would obviate the pretext of taxing us for their support.
“That the establishment of such a militia is, at this time, peculiarly necessary, by the state of our laws for the protection and defence of the country, some of which are already expired, and others will shortly be so; and that the known remissness of government in calling us together in legislative capacity, renders it too insecure, in this time of danger and distress, to rely, that opportunity will be given of renewing them, in general assembly, or making any provision to secure our inestimable rights and liberties from those further violations with which they are threatened:
“Resolved, therefore, That this colony be immediately put into a state of defence, and that be a committee to prepare a plan for imbodying, arming and disciplining such a number of men as may be sufficient for that purpose.”
M . P :—No man thinks more highly than I do of the patriotism, as well as abilities, of the very worthy gentlemen who have just addressed the house. But different men often see the same subject in different lights; and, therefore, I hope it will not be thought disrespectful to those gentlemen, if, entertaining, as I do, opinions of a character very opposite to theirs, I shall speak forth my
sentiments freely and without reserve. This is no time for ceremony. The question before the house is one of awful moment to this country. For my own part, I consider it as nothing less than a question of freedom or slavery; and in proportion to the magnitude of the subject ought to be the freedom of the debate. It is only in this way that we can hope to arrive at truth, and fulfil the great responsibility which we hold to God and our country. Should I keep back my opinions at such a time, through fear of giving offence, I should consider myself as guilty of treason towards my country, and of an act of disloyalty towards the Majesty of Heaven, which I revere above all earthly kings.
Mr. President, it is natural to man to indulge in the illusions of hope. We are apt to shut our eyes against a painful truth, and listen to the song of that siren, till he transforms us into beasts. Is this the part of wise men, engaged in a great and arduous struggle for liberty? Are we disposed to be of the number of those, who, having eyes, see not, and, having ears, hear not, the things which so nearly concern their temporal salvation? For my part, whatever anguish of spirit it may cost, I am willing to know the whole truth; to know the worst, and to provide for it.
I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided; and that is the lamp of experience. I know of no way of judging of the future but by the past. And judging by the past, I wish to know what there has been in the conduct of the British ministry for the last ten years, to justify those hopes with which gentlemen have been pleased to solace themselves and the house? Is it that insidious smile with which our petition has been lately received? Trust it not, sir; it will prove a snare to your feet. Suffer not yourselves to be betrayed with a kiss. Ask yourselves how this gracious reception of our petition comports with those warlike preparations which cover our waters and darken our land. Are fleets and armies necessary to a work of love and reconciliation? Have we shown ourselves so unwilling to be reconciled, that force must be called in to win back our love? Let us not deceive ourselves, sir. These are the implements of war and subjugation; the last arguments to which kings resort. I ask gentlemen, sir, what means this martial array, if its purpose be not to force us to submission? Can gentlemen assign any other possible motive for it? Has Great Britain any enemy, in this quarter of the
world, to call for all this accumulation of navies and armies? No, sir, she has none. They are meant for us: they can be meant for no other. They are sent over to bind and rivet upon us those chains, which the British ministry have been so long forging. And what have we to oppose to them? Shall we try argument? Sir, we have been trying that for the last ten years. Have we any thing new to offer upon the subject? Nothing. We have held the subject up in every light of which it is capable; but it has been all in vain. Shall we resort to entreaty and humble supplication? What terms shall we find, which have not been already exhausted? Let us not, I beseech you, sir, deceive ourselves longer. Sir, we have done every thing that could be done, to avert the storm which is now coming on. We have petitioned; we have remonstrated; we have supplicated; we have prostrated ourselves before the throne, and have implored its interposition to arrest the tyrannical hands of the ministry and parliament. Our petitions have been slighted; our remonstrances have produced additional violence and insult; our supplications have been disregarded; and we have been spurned, with contempt, from the foot of the throne! In vain, after these things, may we indulge the fond hope of peace and reconciliation. There is no longer any room for hope. If we wish to be free—if we mean to preserve inviolate those inestimable privileges for which we have been so long contending—if we mean not basely to abandon the noble struggle in which we have been so long engaged, and which we have pledged ourselves never to abandon, until the glorious object of our contest shall be obtained— we must fight! I repeat it, sir, we must fight! An appeal to arms and to the God of Hosts is all that is left us!
They tell us, sir, that we are weak; unable to cope with so formidable an adversary. But when shall we be stronger? Will it be the next week, or the next year? Will it be when we are totally disarmed, and when a British guard shall be stationed in every house? Shall we gather strength by irresolution and inaction? Shall we acquire the means of effectual resistance, by lying supinely on our backs, and hugging the delusive phantom of hope, until our enemies shall have bound us hand and foot? Sir, we are not weak, if we make a proper use of those means which the God of nature hath placed in our power. Three millions of people, armed in the holy cause of liberty, and in such a country as that which we possess, are invincible by any force which our enemy can send against us. Besides, sir, we
shall not fight our battles alone. There is a just God who presides over the destinies of nations, and who will raise up friends to fight our battles for us. The battle, sir, is not to the strong alone; it is to the vigilant, the active, the brave. Besides, sir, we have no election. If we were base enough to desire it, it is now too late to retire from the contest. There is no retreat, but in submission and slavery! Our chains are forged! Their clanking may be heard on the plains of Boston! The war is inevitable—and let it come! I repeat it, sir, let it come.
It is in vain, sir, to extenuate the matter. Gentlemen may cry, Peace, peace—but there is no peace. The war is actually begun! The next gale, that sweeps from the north, will bring to our ears the clash of resounding arms! Our brethren are already in the field! Why stand we here idle? What is it that gentlemen wish? What would they have? Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give me liberty, or give me death!
Supposed Speech of John Adams in favor of the Declaration of Independence.
As given by Daniel Webster.
Sink or swim, live or die, survive or perish, I give my hand and my heart to this vote. It is true, indeed, that in the beginning we aimed not at independence. But there’s a divinity which shapes our ends. The injustice of England has driven us to arms; and, blinded to her own interest for our good, she has obstinately persisted, till independence is now within our grasp. We have but to reach forth to it, and it is ours.
Why then should we defer the declaration? Is any man so weak as now to hope for a reconciliation with England, which shall leave either safety to the country and its liberties, or safety to his own life and his own honor? Are not you, sir, who sit in that chair, is not he, our venerable colleague near you, are you not both already the proscribed and predestined objects of punishment and of vengeance? Cut off from all hope of royal clemency, what are you, what can you be, while the power of England remains, but outlaws?
If we postpone independence, do we mean to carry on, or to give up the war? Do we mean to submit to the measures of parliament, Boston port bill and all? Do we mean to submit, and consent that we ourselves shall be ground to powder, and our country and its rights trodden down in the dust? I know we do not mean to submit. We never shall submit.
Do we intend to violate that most solemn obligation ever entered into by men, that plighting, before God, of our sacred honor to Washington, when putting him forth to incur the dangers of war, as well as the political hazards of the times, we promised to adhere to him, in every extremity, with our fortunes and our lives? I know there is not a man here, who would not rather see a general conflagration sweep over the land, or an earthquake sink it, than one jot or tittle of that plighted faith fall to the ground.
For myself, having, twelve months ago, in this place, moved you that George Washington be appointed commander of the forces, raised or to be raised, for defence of American liberty, may my right hand forget her cunning, and my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth, if I hesitate or waver in the support I give him. The war, then,
must go on. We must fight it through. And if the war must go on, why put off longer the declaration of independence? That measure will strengthen us. It will give us character abroad.
The nations will then treat with us, which they never can do while we acknowledge ourselves subjects, in arms against our sovereign. Nay, I maintain that England, herself, will sooner treat for peace with us on the footing of independence, than consent, by repealing her acts, to acknowledge that her whole conduct toward us has been a course of injustice and oppression. Her pride will be less wounded by submitting to that course of things which now predestinates our independence, than by yielding the points in controversy to her rebellious subjects. The former she would regard as the result of fortune; the latter she would feel as her own deep disgrace. Why then, why then, sir, do we not as soon as possible change this from a civil to a national war? And since we must fight it through, why not put ourselves in a state to enjoy all the benefits of victory, if we gain the victory?
If we fail, it can be no worse for us. But we shall not fail. The cause will raise up armies; the cause will create navies. The people, the people, if we are true to them, will carry us, and will carry themselves, gloriously, through this struggle. I care not how fickle other people have been found. I know the people of these colonies, and I know that resistance to British aggression is deep and settled in their hearts and cannot be eradicated. Every colony, indeed, has expressed its willingness to follow, if we but take the lead. Sir, the declaration will inspire the people with increased courage. Instead of a long and bloody war for restoration of privileges, for redress of grievances, for chartered immunities, held under a British king, set before them the glorious object of entire independence, and it will breathe into them anew the breath of life.
Read this declaration at the head of the army; every sword will be drawn from its scabbard, and the solemn vow uttered to maintain it, or to perish on the bed of honor. Publish it from the pulpit; religion will approve it, and the love of religious liberty will cling round it, resolved to stand with it, or fall with it. Send it to the public halls; proclaim it there; let them hear it, who heard the first roar of the enemy’s cannon; let them see it, who saw their brothers and their
sons fall on the field of Bunker hill, and in the streets of Lexington and Concord, and the very walls will cry out in its support.
Sir, I know the uncertainty of human affairs, but I see, I see clearly through this day’s business. You and I, indeed, may rue it. We may not live to the time when this declaration shall be made good. We may die; die, colonists; die, slaves; die, it may be, ignominiously and on the scaffold. Be it so. Be it so. If it be the pleasure of Heaven that my country shall require the poor offering of my life, the victim shall be ready, at the appointed hour of sacrifice, come when that hour may. But while I do live, let me have a country, or at least the hope of a country, and that a free country.
But whatever may be our fate, be assured, be assured, that this declaration will stand. It may cost treasure, and it may cost blood; but it will stand, and it will richly compensate for both. Through the thick gloom of the present, I see the brightness of the future, as the sun in heaven. We shall make this a glorious, an immortal day. When we are in our graves, our children will honor it. They will celebrate it with thanksgiving, with festivity, with bonfires and illuminations. On its annual return they will shed tears, copious, gushing tears, not of subjection and slavery, not of agony and distress, but of exultation, of gratitude, and of joy.
Sir, before God, I believe the hour is come. My judgment approves this measure, and my whole heart is in it. All that I have, and all that I am, and all that I hope, in this life, I am now ready here to stake upon it; and I leave off as I begun, that live or die, survive or perish, I am for the declaration. It is my living sentiment, and by the blessing of God it shall be my dying sentiment; independence now; and INDEPENDENCE FOR EVER.
Speech of Patrick Henry,
On the expediency of adopting the Federal Constitution delivered in the convention of Virginia, June 24, 1788.[78] Enunciating views which have ever since been accepted by the Democratic party.
M . C :—The proposal of ratification is premature. The importance of the subject requires the most mature deliberation. The honorable member must forgive me for declaring my dissent from it, because, if I understand it rightly, it admits that the new system is defective, and most capitally; for, immediately after the proposed ratification, there comes a declaration, that the paper before you is not intended to violate any of these three great rights—the liberty of religion, liberty of the press, and the trial by jury. What is the inference, when you enumerate the rights which you are to enjoy? That those not enumerated are relinquished. There are only three things to be retained—religion, freedom of the press, and jury trial. Will not the ratification carry every thing, without excepting these three things? Will not all the world pronounce, that we intended to give up all the rest? Every thing it speaks of, by way of rights, is comprised in these three things. Your subsequent amendments only go to these three amendments. I feel myself distressed, because the necessity of securing our personal rights seems not to have pervaded the minds of men; for many other valuable things are omitted. For instance: general warrants, by which an officer may search suspected places without evidence of the commission of a fact, or seize any person without evidence of his crime, ought to be prohibited. As these are admitted, any man may be seized; any property may be taken, in the most arbitrary manner, without any evidence or reason. Every thing, the most sacred, may be searched and ransacked by the strong hand of power. We have infinitely more reason to dread general warrants here, than they have in England; because there, if a person be confined, liberty may be quickly obtained by the writ of habeas corpus. But here, a man living many hundred miles from the judges may rot in prison before he can get that writ.
Another most fatal omission is, with respect to standing armies. In your bill of rights of Virginia, they are said to be dangerous to liberty; and it tells you, that the proper defence of a free state consists in militia; and so I might go on to ten or eleven things of immense
