A bbrevi Ations 1
A rChives / Libr Aries
BL British Library, London
Bodl. Bodleian Library, Oxford
BoE Bank of England Archive, London
CACC Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge
CUL The University Library, Cambridge
HSBCA HSBC Archive, London
LA Lancashire Archives, Preston
LBA Lloyds Bank Archive, London
LMA London Metropolitan Archive
LRO Liverpool Record Office
MRC Modern Records Centre, Warwick
NARA National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC
NAS National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh
NATO (in references) International Staff, NATO Archives, Brussels
OIOC Oriental and India Office Collections, British Library
RBS Royal Bank of Scotland Archives, Edinburgh
TNA The National Archives, Kew, London
ULL University of London Library
UNIPA United National Independence Archive, Lusaka
G overnment depArtments / their pApers , offi CiAL positions , non - GovernmentAL bodies , offi CiAL initiAtives
AB United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority Papers, TNA
AFT Aid for Trade
AGIP Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli
AIOC Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
AIR Ministry of Air Papers, TNA
ANIC Azienda Nazionale Idrogenazione Combustibili
APAG Atlantic Policy Advisory Group
APOC Anglo-Persian Oil Company
Aski Ausländer Sonderkonten für Inlandszahlungen
ATPs Antarctic Treaty Parties
ATS Antarctic Treaty System
AUS Assistant Under-Secretary (Foreign Office)
BAS British Antarctic Survey
BAT British Antarctic Territory
BDOHP British Diplomatic Oral History Project
BIS Department for Business, Innovation and Skills
BL British Leyland
BOT British Overseas Territory
BOTB British Overseas Trade Board
BP British Petroleum
BSC British Steel Corporation
BT Board of Trade Papers, TNA
BTDO British Trade Development Office
CAB Cabinet Office Papers, TNA
CBI Confederation of British Industry
CCP Common Commercial Policy
CDS Commercial Diplomatic Service
CGT Confédération Général du Travail
CMEA Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CO Colonial Office Papers, TNA
CoCom Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
CPRS Central Policy Review Staff
CRE Commercial Relations and Exports Division (of the Board of Trade)
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DEFE Records of the Ministry of Defence, TNA
DESA Department of Economic and Social Affairs (of the UN)
DO Dominions Office records, TNA
DOI Department of Industry
DoT Department of Overseas Trade
D&RD Development and Research Division, DoT
DSO Defence Sales Organisation, Ministry of Defence
DT Department of Trade
DTI Department of Trade and Industry
ECA Economic Cooperation Administration
ECGD Export Credits Guarantee Department
ECLA Economic Commission for Latin America (of the UN)
EEC European Economic Community
EESD Eastern European and Soviet Department (of the FCO)
EG Department of Energy Papers, TNA
EPC European Political Cooperation
ERP European Recovery Programme
FBI Federation of British Industries
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office (records, TNA)
FID Falkland Islands Dependencies
FO Foreign Office (records, TNA)
FTD Foreign Trade Department (of the Foreign Office)
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HCFAC House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee
HSBC Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank
IAATO International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IMF International Monetary Fund
ITO International Trade Organization
LCC London Chamber of Commerce
MED Middle East Department (of the Foreign Office)
MPLA Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
MUN Papers of the Ministry of Munitions, TNA
NAC North Atlantic Council
NEP New Economic Policy
NPT Non Proliferation Treaty
OAU Organization of African Unity
OD Oil Department (of the FCO)
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEEC Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
ONC Overseas Negotiations Committee
OPD Overseas Policy and Defence Committee (of the British Cabinet)
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPIC Organization of Petroleum Importing Countries
PCI Partito Comminista Italiano (Italian communist party)
PJ Records of Department of Trade and Department of Trade and Industry, TNA
POWE Records created or inherited by the Ministry of Power and of related bodies
PPD Personnel Policy Department (of the FCO)
PREM Records of the Prime Minister’s Office, TNA
PSIUP Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria (Italian Socialist party of Proletarian Unity)
PUS Permanent Under-Secretary
RDA Regional Development Authorities
REPC Reactor Export Policy Committee
RPP Republican People’s Party (Turkey)
T Records of the Treasury, TNA
TPC Turkish Petroleum Company
TRED Trade Relations and Exports Department (of the Foreign Office)
TUC Trades Union Congress
UKAHT United Kingdom Antarctic Heritage Trust
UKTI United Kingdom Trade & Investment
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
VSTOL Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing fighter
WFTU World Federation of Trade Unions
WWF World Wildlife Fund
J ourn AL s/ CoLL eCtions of do Cuments / pub LiCAtions
AAPD Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
AHR American Historical Review
AJIL American Journal of International Law
AJPH Australian Journal of Politics and History
ASJ Asian Studies Journal
BHR Business History Review
BIHR Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research
BSB Boundary and Security Briefing
CEH Central European History
CHJ Cambridge Historical Journal
CJH Canadian Journal of History
CoEH Contemporary European History
CQ China Quarterly
CWH Cold War History
D&S Diplomacy & Statecraft
DBFP Documents on British Foreign Policy
DBPO Documents on British Policy Overseas
DH Diplomatic History
EcHR Economic History Review
Econ. The Economist
EHQ European History Quarterly
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States
HJ Historical Journal
HS Historical Studies
HSR Historical Social Research
HT History Today
IA International Affairs
IHR International History Review
IO International Organization
IR Imperial Review
JAfH Journal of African History
JAH Journal of American History
JBS Journal of British Studies
JCH Journal of Contemporary History
JCWS Journal of Cold War Studies
JEH Journal of Economic History
JEIH Journal of European Integration History
JICH Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History
JMIS Journal of Modern Italian Studies
JPA Journal of Public Administration
JSS Journal of Strategic Studies
JTS Journal of Transatlantic Studies
KS Kokusai Seiji
MAS Modern Asian Studies
MEES Middle East Economic Survey
MES Middle Eastern Studies
MI Modern Italy
PIW Petroleum Intelligence Weekly
P&P Past and Present
PR Polar Record
RIS Review of International Studies
TCBH Twentieth Century British History
TJSF The Journal of Social Forces
TRHS Transactions of the Royal Historical Society
TRINA Transactions of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects
TS Turkish Studies n ote
1. Unless otherwise noted, all books are published in London.
L ist of f i G ures
Fig. 7.1 Main exports of the dominions in the 1930 (% of total exports) (Canada Yearbook, 1943–44. Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1932; New Zealand Official yearbook 1933; B. R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Africa, Asia & Oceania 1750–1993 (3rd edition, New York/Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998))
Fig. 7.2 Dominion exports to Britain (% of total) (B. R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: The Americas 1750–1993 (4th edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998); Mitchell, International Historical Statistics: Africa, Asia and Oceania 1750–1993)
Fig. 7.3 Dominion imports from Britain (% of total)
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
John Fisher, Effie Pedaliu, and Richard Smith
On the eve of his departure from office in July 2016, Prime Minister David Cameron declared that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) was now much more commercially minded than it was when he came to power.1 ‘Six years ago’, he said, ‘I gave some very clear instructions to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. To our diplomats and our staff overseas I said: you are also our trade envoys. To our embassies and high commissions I said: you are the shop windows for Britain.’2 Back in 2010 the British Government declared that it intended to lead the country out of recession through an export led recovery, with British foreign policy becoming more commercially focused and British diplomats playing a role in facilitating this export drive.3 One of the FCO’s three foreign policy priorities, along with safeguarding the UK’s national security and supporting British nationals abroad, was to build the UK’s prosperity by increasing exports and investment, opening markets, ensuring access
J. Fisher (*)
University of the West of England, Bristol, UK
E. Pedaliu
London School of Economics, London, UK
R. Smith
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, UK
© The Author(s) 2016
J. Fisher et al. (eds), The Foreign Office, Commerce and British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-46581-8_1
1
to resources and promoting sustainable global growth.4 Many diplomats would say that it was ever thus; that every government invents commercial work when it comes into office. Diplomats have always had an important role in creating markets, both by removing barriers to trade and developing the international rules-based economic system, and also by supporting UK firms through the provision of commercial intelligence. But the target to effectively double the value of the UK’s exports by 2020—to £1 trillion—revealed a scale of ambition not seen since the 1960s and 1970s when worsening balance of payment figures made exports a political priority and a number of high-profile inquiries—Plowden, Duncan and Berrill—pushed trade promotion up the Foreign Office agenda. The trade agenda has been elevated even further with the UK’s decision, in a referendum of 23 June 2016, to leave the European Union (EU). Brexit will bring new opportunities for British trade but also huge challenges, with new trade agreements needed with other countries to replace those lost when the UK eventually leaves the EU, and an even greater emphasis is likely to be placed on government support.
This fresh emphasis on commercial objectives once again brings into focus the relationship between the Foreign Office and commerce. This volume looks at aspects of this question as it considers the interface of British foreign policy and commerce in the twentieth century. The century saw a change in the attitude of Foreign Secretaries and their staff, at home and overseas, towards commercial interests; sometimes willingly, often reluctantly. It saw institutional and structural changes in how economic and commercial work was handled both within the Foreign Office and embassies, and within Whitehall more generally. It saw Britain having to come to terms with a century of industrial and economic decline, relative or otherwise. The century also saw trade and commerce becoming an inseparable element of foreign and security policies, whether dealing with Germany and Japan during the 1930s or the Soviet bloc during the Cold War.
Governments have always acknowledged the importance of trade and commerce to Britain. ‘British policy is British trade’ declared Pitt the Younger.5 In a Commons debate on the consular establishment in 1842 Disraeli argued that any distinction between political and commercial interests ‘was fanciful and arbitrary; incapable of definition, and defying analysis’.6 But the exact limits and nature of assistance rendered by government to British commercial interests overseas are more problematical.
For much of the nineteenth century the Foreign Office took a narrow view of its responsibilities towards British trade and investment. It believed that its primary function was to secure equal opportunities for British trade in the markets of the world rather than assisting individual merchants.7 This reluctance to intervene came partly from the prevailing orthodoxy of the day: the policy of free trade and economic laissez-faire, which deemed that British merchants should be left to prosper by their own skill and initiative. It also stemmed from the fact that the aristocratic diplomatic class had come to consider commercial activity as something beneath their status. This stigma continued even as recruitment opened up to the professional middle classes. Postings where the work was seen as being predominantly commercial in character, rather than political, such as in Latin America, were viewed less as a stepping-stone in a career path than a tombstone.8 A Commercial Department was established in the Foreign Office in 1865 but was underpowered in terms of resources and support and relied heavily on the Board of Trade, the department responsible for commercial policy, for advice.9 In addition, British consuls also had a principal duty to protect and promote British trading interests overseas by ‘fair and proper means’, but the consular service was underpaid and understaffed and its performance varied in different parts of the world. Furthermore, the range of functions consuls were expected to perform grew steadily during the nineteenth century to cover notarial, shipping and state duties.10
The issue of state support became of increasing concern from the 1870s when Britain’s early industrial lead began to wane and manufacturers and traders faced increased competition from other countries. The UK share of world export of manufactures peaked during that decade at around 46 per cent but this fell to 28 per cent by 1913.11 Periodic inquiries saw the diplomatic and consular service face calls for better support to be made available to the commercial community. The Foreign Office began appointing commercial attachés in 1880 and by 1914 there were eight of them, based in Paris, Constantinople, Tokyo, Peking, Frankfurt-on-Main and three in London (covering Austria-Hungary, Italy and Greece, Russia, and Spain and Portugal).12 But their duties were broad and their remits were wide, and they still did not include direct assistance to individual traders.13 A Royal Commission on the Civil Service reported in 1914 and recommended reforming the consular service and making better use of commercial attachés, but these changes were delayed due to the outbreak of the First World War.14
During the war the Foreign Office became intimately involved with economic issues through the blockade of the Central Powers, first through the Contraband Department and later the Ministry of Blockade, which was nominally under the control of the Foreign Office and staffed by its personnel.15 Its administrative head was the indefatigable Sir Eyre Crowe, whose father, Sir Joseph Crowe, had been the first commercial attaché. The dislocation of British export trade during the war, increased competition from the USA and fears of a post-war German trade revival meant that the recovery of trade was a matter of urgency. The issue of commercial intelligence, both its collection abroad and its dissemination at home, became of paramount importance too. It was obvious to Crowe, and others, that commercial affairs could no longer be separated from normal diplomatic work as had been the case before the war.16 However, the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade clashed over whether the promotion of commercial interests overseas was part of foreign or commercial policy. The Board of Trade suggested that the consular service and the commercial functions of embassies and legations should be transferred to them, prompting the Foreign Secretary to write to the President of the Board of Trade that the Foreign Office should not be abolished without a hearing.17 Businessmen feared that commercial issues would be too isolated from political concerns if the work was concentrated in the Board of Trade and thought the Foreign Office was best suited to dealing with commercial questions in foreign countries, if the commercial side of the Foreign Office could be developed along more efficient lines.18
In 1917 a committee was appointed to investigate the problem, but the committee split over the question of collating and distributing commercial intelligence. Some of its members wanted the function to be transferred to the Foreign Office on the basis that it was in the national interest that those in charge of foreign affairs were kept in close and constant touch with commercial requirements. Others argued for the status quo, believing that closer co-operation between both departments could overcome the problems of dual control.19 Yet it was this dual system that the business community saw as the worst feature of the old system and the underlying cause of nearly all the inefficiency and the lack of energy they complained of.20 A compromise solution was adopted with the creation of a Department for Overseas Trade (DoT), jointly controlled by the Foreign Office and the Board of Trade, with the remit to improve the promotion of British trade abroad and the dissemination of commercial information at home.21 The Department had an Overseas and a UK Division. The former was subdivided geographically and responsible for administering overseas
services and collating economic and commercial information received; whilst the latter analysed reports from abroad from the point of view of benefiting industries at home. However, instead of unifying and simplifying commercial procedure all three departments simply overlapped.22
Due to the unsettled state of affairs a committee was appointed in 1919, headed by Lord Cave, to determine the future of the system. The committee heard evidence from Sir Auckland Geddes, the President of the Board of Trade, who advocated the creation of a new ‘Ministry of Commerce’ combining both the DoT and the Consular Department with the Board of Trade. Sir Eyre Crowe, who returned from the Peace Conference in Paris specially to give evidence, recommended that the DoT be transferred to the Foreign Office, thus combining foreign trade with foreign policy. Representatives from the Chambers of Commerce and the Federation of British Industries (FBI) expressed the view that separating commercial from political work would be disastrous. Due to its prestige abroad the best policy would be for the Foreign Office to be ‘commercialized’ and to take control of foreign commercial policy. However, the Cave Committee merely confirmed the status quo and recommended that the present system of dual control continue but that a standing committee should be established to facilitate discussion between all three departments. The consular and commercial departments of the Foreign Office should be transferred to the DoT along with the commercial diplomatic service (created in 1918 to replace the commercial attaché service).23
Despite the best of intentions, the post-war reforms served to increase the separation between trade and foreign policy. The Foreign Office became increasingly estranged from commercial work. The DoT now oversaw the commercial diplomatic service (CDS), which operated in foreign countries, and the trade commission service (which had operated in Dominion countries from 1908) although their instructions were issued in the name of the Foreign Secretary and the President of the Board of Trade respectively. Officers in the CDS were recruited from the consular service or business and were attached to British missions. Officers held titles corresponding to those in the Diplomatic Service—commercial counsellors and secretaries—but were described as being ‘of’ rather than ‘in’ the Diplomatic Service,24 reinforcing the impression that trade was on a separate, lower level to political issues. The CDS took responsibility for commercial matters from their colleagues in the Diplomatic Service. To a number of officials in the newly amalgamated Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service this was unfortunate. Years of dealing with blockade issues had seen the Foreign Office work in a ‘sympathetic cooperation
with the responsible managers of overseas trade’ and economic work had proved a ‘satisfying field of activity and a more tangible touch with realities and personalities’ than the old diplomacy.25 Some diplomats jumped ship to continue in this type of work. The first director of the FBI was Roland Nugent, who had worked in the Foreign Trade Department of the Foreign Office. The Overseas department of the FBI was headed by Guy Locock, a career diplomat whose last post had been at the DoT. But there were many others to whom it came as a relief and who were content to return to the conduct of ‘old’ diplomacy. As diplomat Harold Nicolson put it, the new commercial service allowed diplomats to rid themselves ‘of an embarrassing, and sometimes uncongenial, task to which they knew themselves unfitted’.26
Having lost out to the Board of Trade/DoT over commercial diplomacy the Foreign Office also faced competition from an assertive Treasury in the field of financial diplomacy.27 When the Foreign Office tried to show an interest they were rebuffed. In 1929 the Foreign Secretary submitted a paper to Cabinet on the subject of foreign trade and finance which questioned the City of London’s policy of making foreign loans without regard to the interests of foreign trade. However, circulation of the memorandum was stopped, at the insistence of the Treasury, who clearly felt this was an encroachment by amateurs on their policy area.28 This sentiment went both ways and in the Far East it led to an uncomfortable scenario where attempts by the Foreign Office to maintain equidistance between Japan and China were undermined by the Treasury, which was convinced of the need and practicability of securing a rapprochement with Japan. In 1934 the formation of an economic relations section within the Foreign Office reflected its growing need for a firmer grasp on economic issues after having been sidelined from dealing with issues such as war debts, reparations and the gold standard. Victor Wellesley had first called for the establishment of a politico-economic intelligence department in 1931 so that the Foreign Office might better appreciate economic developments on the conduct of foreign affairs. Despite resistance from the Treasury, as previously noted, an economic relations section was established and heads of missions were instructed to increase liaison between their commercial and political staffs and to make renewed efforts to mix with business and financial circles. The resulting intelligence was to be written up in periodic ‘E’ dispatches and processed by political departments.29
By 1936, a process of amalgamating the General, Levant and Far Eastern branches of the Consular Service had been completed. But the
Foreign Office remained resistant to amalgamating consular with diplomatic services, and it rejected calls for more regular promotion from the Consular to the Diplomatic Service. Austen Chamberlain commented in 1925 ‘that the functions of the two services are in many respects quite dissimilar’.30 A general indifference to consular services remained in the Foreign Office and underlying snobberies died hard.31 However, the Second World War spurred changes which saw the end of the DoT and the reuniting of commercial and diplomatic work. A White Paper of 1943 saw the commercial diplomatic service and the consular and diplomatic services amalgamate into one Foreign Service. All future entrants would receive training in economic and commercial affairs as well as languages and history. Every officer would serve in consular, commercial, and diplomatic posts, as well as the Foreign Office, and would have the opportunity to rise to the highest grades.32 In a statement in the Commons, Foreign Office Minister Richard Law noted that: ‘The day has quite clearly gone forever when the diplomat can concern himself solely with those fascinating questions of high policy and leave the bread and butter questions of economics to more vulgar minds.’33 The Board of Trade absorbed the rump of the DoT in 1946 and retained responsibility for the trade commission service operating in Commonwealth countries. This state of affairs continued until 1965 when a new diplomatic service was formed comprising the Foreign Service, the Commonwealth Service and the Trade Commissioner Service.
By the mid-1950s it was estimated that a third of Foreign Office work was preponderantly economic, commercial or financial in character. The Foreign Service was described as ‘the front line of the Board of Trade in foreign lands’ for the purposes of both ‘economic study on the spot and active negotiation’.34 In London an Economic Relations Department in the Foreign Office dealt with general economic questions. Foreign Service officers were told that the help they were being called upon to give to economic and commercial interests abroad was ‘a vital national service’. On the economic side they were expected to report on trade and economic trends, cultivate contacts with foreign government officials, and engage in inter-governmental negotiations on financial, economic and commercial matters. On the trade side they had to give prompt, practical and efficient service to British exporters—namely by putting importers in touch with British exporters; by assisting exporters to assess market possibilities, to find reliable agents and to comply with local regulations; and to protect them against discrimination and bureaucratic delays.
By the 1960s greater competition in traditional markets and declining competitiveness, coupled with the decline in ‘invisible’ income (due the loss of international investments during the Second World War), brought recurrent balance of payment problems. When the Plowden Committee looked into British representation services overseas in the early 1960s, they were clear that trade work required the greatest emphasis. ‘Economic and commercial work has now assumed a position of fundamental importance,’ the report stated: ‘It must be regarded as a first charge on the resources of the overseas Services.’35 Commercial work, they thought, should attract ‘the brightest and the best’ and all future ambassadors and high commissioners should have served in a commercial capacity and have first-hand knowledge of export promotion and what it entailed.36
The Plowden Committee made an explicit link between an independent foreign policy and a strong economy, and the FCO paid renewed attention to international economic and industrial questions. Members of the Diplomatic Service were seconded to industry, the City, the Treasury and the Bank of England. The Foreign Office was also represented, along with the Board of Trade, on the British National Export Council set up in 1964.37 George Brown, one of the more economically minded Foreign Secretaries (1966–8), complained that the Foreign Office needed an economic department which could stand up to and argue with other economic departments of government on equal terms.38 A number of functional departments were established dealing with trade relations, export promotion, oil, finance, energy and technology to build expertise in these areas. The FCO also acquired a team of economists following the merger with the Commonwealth Office.39 At the end of the 1960s, the Duncan Committee restated Plowden’s message that Britain’s present economic situation meant commercial work was ‘the most urgent task of our overseas representatives’.40 It was suggested that after the maintenance of peace and security the FCO should give precedence to commercial objectives in the day-to-day conduct of relations with other countries. Other aims could not be pursued satisfactorily if the balance of payments problem was not rectified. The Committee recognized that the leading role naturally lay with industry, but stressed that official services had a part to play in increasing Britain’s earnings abroad—‘the urgency of the task is beyond question’.41
In the wake of Plowden and Duncan, state support for British exporters flourished. By the time the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) reviewed
Britain’s overseas representation in 1977, economic work and export promotion across government (which they considered priority functions) accounted for 31 per cent of total net expenditure, against 10 per cent for foreign and defence work.42 Within the FCO the same functions accounted for 30 per cent of the 1975–6 FCO budget.43 The CPRS Report identified as many as 14 government departments with a hand in commercial policy. The Board of Trade and successors retained general responsibility for commerce, industry and overseas trade and in particular commercial relations with other countries; imports and exports; tariffs; industrial development and statistics of trade and industry at home and abroad. The department was subject to many changes in the 1970s but its Commercial Relations and Exports Division (CRE), established in 1949, provided continuity.44 CRE Division 1 dealt with overall commercial policy and its management within international organizations. It worked with the FCO Trade Policy Department on questions of multilateral commercial policy, tariffs and non-tariff barriers. CRE Divisions 2–5 were organized on a geographical basis, managing bilateral negotiations and relations. FCO geographical desks were in regular contact with the relevant CRE divisions, receiving copies of the same telegrams and consulting on replies. Diplomatic staff effectively operated on behalf of CRE overseas in commercial matters.45 Responsibility for export promotion abroad fell to diplomats but at home promotion work was performed by the Export Development and Services Division of the DTI, which acted as the link between industry and FCO posts. It had close contact with the FCO Export Promotion Department.46 Another important player was the Export Credits Guarantee Department (now UK Export Finance), established in 1919 to help re-establish international trade after the First World War by granting credit insurance for British exports. By the early 1970s it was providing credit for around 35 per cent of British exports.47
Plowden’s wish that all future senior members of the Diplomatic Service would have first-hand experience of commercial work was realized in the 1970s when it became part of the career structure for fast-streamers, who consequently went into commercial jobs in increasing numbers.48 Commercial work was no longer seen as a hindrance to career progression. In the mid-1970s, the ambassador in Tehran reckoned that he was spending as much as 80 per cent of his time on commercial work.49 At the top level diplomats were helping large manufacturing companies to secure deals. After decades of protracted negotiations a deal in which the Indian Government agreed to purchase Hawk jets from Britain was finally
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assessment in all cases being the knight’s fee, in its secondary sense of a parcel of land worth twenty pounds a year. Whatever the laity might think of this arrangement, the indignation of the clergy was bitter and deep. The wrong inflicted on them by the scutage of 1156 was as nothing compared with this, which set at naught all ancient precedents of ecclesiastical immunity, and actually wrung from the Church lands even more than from the lay fiefs.[1467] Their wrath however was not directed solely or even chiefly against the king. A large share of the blame was laid at the chancellor’s door; for the scheme had his active support, if it was not actually of his contriving. Its effects on English constitutional developement were for later generations to trace; the men of the time saw, or thought they saw, its disastrous consequences in the after-lives of its originators. In the hour of Thomas’s agony Gilbert Foliot raked up as one of the heaviest charges against him the story of the “sword which his hand had plunged into the bosom of his mother the Church, when he spoiled her of so many thousand marks for the army of Toulouse”;[1468] and his own best and wisest friend, John of Salisbury, who had excused the scutage of 1156, sorrowfully avowed his belief that the scutage of 1159 was the beginning of all Henry’s misdoings against the Church, and that the chancellor’s share in it was the fatal sin which the primate had to expiate so bitterly.[1469]
[1466] “Secundum ejus scutagium assisum pro eodem exercitu Walliæ” [this writer assigns a like object to the scutage of 1156, but in both cases he is contradicted by chronology and contemporary evidence] “reperies in rotulo anni quinti regis ejusdem inferius. Fuitque assisum ad duas marcas pro quolibet feodo, non solum super prælatos, verum tam super ipsos quam super milites suos, secundum numerum feodorum, qui tenuerunt de rege in capite; necnon et super residuos milites singulorum comitatuum in communi.” [Cf. Rob. Torigni as quoted above, p. 459, note 2.] “Intitulaturque illud scutagium, De Dono. Eâ quidem, ut credo, ratione, quod non solum prælati qui tenentur ad servicia militaria sed etiam alii, abbates utpote de Bello et de Salopesbirie et alii, tunc temporis dederunt auxilium ” Alex Swereford (Liber Ruber Scacc ) quoted in Madox, Hist Exchequer, vol i p 626 Gerv Cant (Stubbs), vol i p 167, calls
it a scutage: “Scotagium sive scuagium de Angliâ accepit.” The references to it are in almost every page of the Pipe Roll 5 Hen. II (Pipe Roll Soc ); the most important are collected by Madox, Hist Exch , vol i pp 626, 627 There are also a few notices in the next year; Pipe Roll 6 Hen II (Pipe Roll Soc ), pp 3, 6, 24, 29, 30, 32, 51 There are a few entries of “scutage” by that name from the abbot of Westminster (Pipe Roll 5 Hen II , pp 6, 24, 27; 6 Hen II , pp 11, 24, 28), the bishop of Worcester (5 Hen II , p 24), William of Cardiff (ibid ), the abbot of Evesham (ib p 25), and the earl of Warwick (ib. p. 26). Some of these pay “donum” as well. In reference to this matter some of the Northumbrian tenants-in-chivalry are designated by a title which is somewhat startling in the middle of the twelfth century: the sheriff of Northumberland renders an account “de dono militum et tainorum” (Pipe Roll 5 Hen. II., p. 14). What was the distinction between them?
The sum charged on the knight’s fee in Normandy was sixty shillings Angevin;[1470] in England it seems to have been two marks. [1471] The proceeds, with those of a similar tax levied upon Henry’s other dominions,[1472] amounted to some hundred and eighty thousand pounds,[1473] with which he hired an immense force of mercenaries.[1474] But his host did not consist of these alone. The great barons of Normandy and England, no less than those of Anjou, Aquitaine and Gascony, were eager to display their prowess under the leadership of such a mighty king. The muster at Poitiers was a brilliant gathering of Henry’s court, headed by the chancellor with a picked band of seven hundred knights of his own personal following, [1475] and by the first vassal of the English Crown, King Malcolm of Scotland,[1476] who came, it seems, to win the spurs which his cousin had refused to grant him twelve months ago, when they met at Carlisle just before Henry left England in June 1158.[1477] The other vassal state was represented by an unnamed Welsh prince; [1478] and the host was further reinforced by several important allies. One of these was Raymond Trencavel, viscount of Béziers and Carcassonne, a baron whom the count of Toulouse had despoiled, and who gladly seized the opportunity of vengeance.[1479] Another
was William of Montpellier.[1480] The most valuable of all was the count of Barcelona, a potentate who ranked on an equality with kings.[1481] His county of Barcelona was simply the province which in Karolingian times had been known as the Spanish March—a strip of land with the Pyrenees for its backbone, which lay between Toulouse, Aragon, Gascony and the Mediterranean sea. It was a fief of the West-Frankish realm; but the facilities which every marchland in some degree possesses for attaching itself to whichever neighbour it may prefer, and so holding the balance between them as to keep itself virtually independent of them all, were specially great in the case of the Spanish March, whose rulers, as masters of the eastern passes of the Pyrenees, held the keys of both Gaul and Spain. During the last half-century they had, like the lords of another marchland, enormously strengthened their position by three politic marriages. Dulcia of Gévaudan, the wife of Raymond-Berengar III. of Barcelona, was heiress not only to her father’s county of Gévaudan, but also, through her mother, to the southern half of Provence, whose northern half fell to the share of Raymond of St.-Gilles. Her dower-lands were settled upon her younger son. He, in his turn, married an heiress, Beatrice of Melgueil, whose county lay between Gévaudan and the sea; and the dominions of the house of St.-Gilles were thus completely cut in twain, and their eastern half surrounded on two sides, by the territories of his son, the present count of Provence, Gévaudan and Melgueil.[1482] The elder son of Dulcia, having succeeded his father as Count Raymond-Berengar IV. of Barcelona, was chosen by the nobles of Aragon to wed their youthful queen Petronilla, the only child of King Ramirez the Monk. He had thus all the power of Aragon at his command, although, clinging with a generous pride to the old title which had come down to him from his fathers, he refused to share his wife’s crown, declaring that the count of Barcelona had no equal in his own degree, and that he would rather be first among counts than last among kings.[1483] A man with such a spirit, added to such territorial advantages, was an ally to be eagerly sought after and carefully secured. Henry therefore invited him to a meeting at Blaye in Gascony, and secured his cooperation against Toulouse on the understanding that the infant
daughter of Raymond and Petronilla should in due time be married to Henry’s son Richard, and that the duchy of Aquitaine should then be ceded to the young couple.[1484]
[1467] Joh. Salisb. Ep. cxlv. (Giles, vol. i. p. 223; Robertson, Becket, vol. v. Ep. cxciv., p. 378).
[1468] Gilb. Foliot, Ep. cxciv. (Giles, vol. i. p. 269; Robertson, Becket, vol. v. Ep. ccxxv., p. 525).
[1469] Joh. Salisb. Ep. cxlv. (Giles, vol. i. pp. 223, 224).
[1470] See above, p. 459, note 2{1465} .
[1471] So says Alex Swereford See above, p 460 note{1466}
[1472] “De aliis vero terris sibi subjectis inauditam similiter censûs fecit exactionem ” Gerv Cant (Stubbs), vol i p 167 Cf above, p. 459, note 2{1465} .
[1473] Gerv. Cant. (Stubbs), vol. i. p. 167. He makes this to be the proceeds of the scutage in England alone, but see Bishop Stubbs’s explanation, Constit. Hist., vol. i. p. 457, note 4, and his remarks in the preface to Gesta Hen. Reg. (“Benedict of Peterborough”), vol. ii. pp. xciv–xcvi.
[1474] Rob. Torigni, a. 1159.
[1475] Will. Fitz-Steph. (Robertson, Becket, vol. iii.), p. 33.
[1476] Gerv. Cant. as above. Rob. Torigni, a. 1159.
[1477] Chron. Mailros, a. 1158.
[1478] “Quidam rex Gualiæ.” Gerv. Cant. as above.
[1479] Will Newb , l ii c 10 (Howlett, vol i p 125) He miscalls him William Trencavel.
[1480] Rob Torigni, a 1159
[1481] “Vir magnus et potens, nec infra reges consistens ” Will Newb as above (p 123)
[1482] On these marriages, etc., see Vic and Vaissète, Hist. du Languedoc, vol. iii.
[1483] Will. Newb., l. ii. c. 10 (Howlett, vol. i. pp. 123–125). Raymond’s speech, and the whole story of Raymond, Ramirez and Petronilla, as given in this chapter, form a charming romance, whose main facts are fully borne out by the more prosaic version of Rob Torigni, a 1159
[1484] Rob Torigni, a 1159
A last attempt to avert the coming struggle was made early in June; the two kings met near the Norman border, but again without any result.[1485] Immediately after midsummer, therefore, Henry and his host set out from Poitiers and marched down to Périgueux. There, in “the Bishop’s Meadow,” Henry knighted his Scottish cousin, and Malcolm in his turn bestowed the same honour upon thirty noble youths of his suite.[1486] The expedition then advanced straight into the enemy’s country. The first place taken was Cahors; its dependent territory was speedily overrun;[1487] and while in the south Raymond Trencavel was winning back the castles of which the other Raymond had despoiled him, Henry led his main force towards the city of Toulouse itself.[1488] Count and people saw the net closing round them; they had seen it drawing near for months past, and one and all —bishop, nobles and citizens—had been writing passionate appeals to the king of France, imploring him, if not for the love of his sister, at least for the honour of his crown, to come and save one of its fairest jewels from the greedy grasp of the Angevin.[1489] Louis wavered till it was all but too late; he was evidently, and naturally, most unwilling to quarrel with the king of England. He began to move southward, but apparently without any definite aim; and it was not till after another fruitless conference with Henry in the beginning of July[1490] that he at last, for very shame, answered his brother-in-law’s appeal by throwing himself into Toulouse almost alone, as if to encourage its defenders by his presence, but without giving them any substantial aid.[1491] Perhaps he foresaw the result. Henry, on the point of laying siege to the city, paused when he heard that his overlord was within
it. Dread of Louis’s military capacity he could have none; personal reverence for him he could have just as little. But he reverenced in a fellow-king the dignity of kingship; he reverenced in his own overlord the right to that feudal obedience which he exacted from his own vassals. He took counsel with his barons; they agreed with him that the siege should be postponed till Louis was out of the city—a decision which was equivalent to giving it up altogether.[1492] The soldiers grumbled loudly, and the chancellor loudest of all. Thomas had now completely “put off the deacon,” and flung himself with all his might into the pursuit of arms. His knights were the flower of the host, foremost in every fight, the bravest of the brave; and the life and soul of all their valour was the chancellor himself.[1493] The prospect of retreat filled him with dismay. He protested that Louis had forfeited his claim to Henry’s obedience by breaking his compact with him and joining his enemies, and he entreated his master to seize the opportunity of capturing Toulouse, city, count, king and all, before reinforcements could arrive.[1494] Henry however turned a deaf ear to his impetuous friend. Accompanied by the king of Scots and all his host, he retreated towards his own dominions just as a body of French troops were entering Toulouse.[1495]
[1485] Contin Becc a 1159 (Delisle, Rob Torigni, vol ii p 172)
[1486] Geoff Vigeois, l i c 58 (Labbe, Nova Biblioth , vol ii p 310) The Chron Mailros, a 1159, says Malcolm was knighted at Tours on the way back from Toulouse; Geoff Vigeois implies that it was on the way out
[1487] Will Fitz-Steph (Robertson, Becket, vol iii ), p 34 Rob Torigni, a 1159 Cf Will Newb , l ii c 10 (Howlett, vol i p 126), who however has got the sequence of events wrong
[1488] Will Newb as above
[1489] Letters of Peter archbishop of Narbonne: Hermengard viscountess of Narbonne:—“commune consilium urbis Tolosæ et suburbii”— Epp xxxiii , xxxiv , ccccxiv , Duchesne, Hist Franc Scriptt., vol. iv. pp. 574, 575, 713. The archbishop curiously
describes the threatening invader as “Dux Normanniæ.” The citizens make a pitiful appeal; the viscountess makes a spirited one, and wishes the king “Karoli regis magnanimitatem ”
[1490] Contin. Becc. a. 1159 (Delisle, Rob. Torigni, vol. ii. pp. 173, 174)
[1491] Will. Fitz-Steph. (Robertson, Becket, vol. iii.), p. 33. Will. Newb., l. ii. c. 10 (Howlett, vol. i. p. 125).
[1492] Will. Fitz-Steph. (Robertson, Becket, vol. iii.), p. 33, Geoff Vigeois, l i c 58 (Labbe, Nova Biblioth , vol ii p 310), Will Newb , l ii c 10 (Howlett, vol i p 125), the Draco Norm , l i c 12, vv 437–464 (ib vol ii pp 608, 609), and R Diceto (Stubbs), vol i p 303, attribute the retreat to Henry’s reverence for his overlord; Gerv Cant (Stubbs), vol i p 167, seems to look upon it as a measure of necessity; but considering that Louis had brought almost nothing but himself to Raymond’s aid, one does not see what necessity there could be in the case. The Draco alone mentions Henry’s consultation with the barons unless there is some allusion to it in the words of Will. FitzSteph., who describes Henry as “vanâ superstitione et reverentiâ tentus consilio aliorum.”
[1493] The English archdeacon’s unclerical doings in this war were however quite eclipsed by those of the archbishop of Bordeaux. See a letter from the citizens of Toulouse to King Louis; Ep. ccccxxv., Duchesne, Hist. Franc. Scriptt., vol. iv. p. 718.
[1494] Will. Fitz-Steph. (Robertson, Becket, vol. iii.), p. 34.
[1495] Ibid.
He had, however, conquered the greater part of the county,[1496] and had no intention of abandoning his conquests; but the task of protecting them against Raymond and Louis together, without the support of Henry’s own presence, was a responsibility which all his great barons declined. Two faithful ministers accepted the duty: Thomas the chancellor and Henry of Essex the constable.[1497] Thomas fixed his head-quarters at Cahors;[1498] thence, with the
constable’s aid, he undertook to hold the country by means of his own personal followers,[1499] backed by Raymond of Barcelona, Trencavel, and William of Montpellier.[1500] He ruled with a high hand, putting down by proscription and even with the sword every attempt at a rising against Henry’s authority storming towns and burning manors without mercy in his master’s service;[1501] in helm and hauberk he rode forth at the head of his troops to the capture of three castles which had hitherto been considered impregnable.[1502] Henry’s “superstition” (as it was called by a follower of Thomas)[1503] about bearing arms against his overlord applied only to a personal encounter in circumstances of special delicacy; he had no scruples in making war upon Louis indirectly, as he had done more than once before, and was now doing not only through Thomas but also at the opposite end of France. The English and Scottish kings had retired from Toulouse to Limoges, where they arrived about Michaelmas. [1504] Meanwhile Count Theobald of Blois, now an ally of Henry, was despatched by him “to disquiet the realm of France”—that is, doubtless, to make a diversion which should draw off the attention of the French from Toulouse and leave a clear field to the operations of Thomas. The French king’s brothers, Henry, bishop of Beauvais, and Robert, count of Dreux, retaliated by attacking the Norman frontier with fire and sword.[1505] Thomas, having chased away the enemies across the Garonne and secured the obedience of the conquered territory, hurried northward to join his sovereign, whom he apparently followed into Normandy. There he undertook the defence of the frontier Besides his seven hundred picked knights, he maintained at his own cost for the space of forty days twelve hundred paid horsemen and four thousand foot in his master’s service against the king of France on the marches between Gisors, Trie and Courcelles; he not only headed his troops in person, but also met in single combat a valiant French knight of Trie, Engelram by name; and the layman went down before the lance of the warlike archdeacon, who carried off his opponent’s destrier as the trophy of his victory.[1506] The king himself marched into the Beauvaisis, stormed Gerberoi, and harried the surrounding country till he gained a valuable assistant in Count Simon of Montfort, who surrendered to him all his
French possessions, including the castles of Montfort, Rochefort and Epernon. As these places lay directly in the way from Paris to Etampes and Orléans, Louis found himself completely cut off from the southern part of his domain, and was compelled to ask for a truce. It was made in December, to last till the octave of Pentecost. [1507] Henry’s wife had now joined him; they kept Christmas together at Falaise,[1508] and Henry used the interval of tranquillity to make some reforms in the Norman judicature.[1509] When the truce expired the two kings made a treaty of peace,[1510] negotiated as usual by the indefatigable chancellor;[1511] the betrothal of little Henry and Margaret was confirmed, and the Vexin was settled upon the infant couple. As for the Aquitanian quarrel, Louis formally restored to Henry all the rights and holdings of the count of Poitou, except Toulouse itself; Henry and Raymond making a truce for a year, during which both were to keep their present possessions, and complete freedom of action was left to their respective allies.[1512]
[1496] Will. Fitz-Steph. (Robertson, Becket, vol. iii.), p. 34. Rob. Torigni, a. 1159.
[1497] Will. Fitz-Steph. (Robertson, Becket, vol. iii.), p. 34.
[1498] Rob. Torigni, a. 1159.
[1499] Will. Fitz-Steph. as above.
[1500] Rob. Torigni, a. 1159.
[1501] E. Grim (Robertson, Becket, vol. ii.), p. 365. Herb. Bosh. (ib. vol. iii.), pp. 175, 176.
[1502] Will. Fitz-Steph. (ibid.), p. 34.
[1503] Ib. p. 33. See above, p. 465, note 1{1485} .
[1504] Geoff. Vigeois, l. i. c. 58 (Labbe, Nova Biblioth., vol. ii. p. 310).
[1505] Rob. Torigni, a. 1159.
[1506] Will. Fitz-Steph. (Robertson, Becket, vol. iii.), pp. 34, 35.
[1507] Rob. Torigni, a. 1159.
[1508] Rob. Torigni, a. 1160.
[1509] Contin. Becc. a. 1160 (Delisle, Rob. Torigni, vol. ii. p. 180).
[1510] Rob. Torigni, a. 1160.
[1511] Will. Newb., l. ii. c. 24 (Howlett, vol. i. p. 159).
[1512] The treaty is printed in Lyttelton’s Hen. II., vol. iv. pp. 173, 174. It has no date; we have to get that from Rob. Torigni May 1160. The terms of the treaty are summarized by Rog. Howden (Stubbs), vol. i. p. 218, who places it a year too late. He also introduces a second betrothal, between Richard and Adela, the second daughter of Louis and Constance. But the treaty printed by Lyttelton says nothing of this; and if it be the treaty mentioned by Rob Torigni the clause is impossible, for Adela was not born till the autumn of 1160
This imperfect settlement, as far as Toulouse was concerned, advanced no further towards completion during the next thirteen years. Henry’s expedition could hardly be called a success; and whatever advantage he had gained over Raymond was dearly purchased at the cost of a quarrel with Louis. There can be little doubt that Henry had fallen into a trap; Louis had misled him into lighting the torch of war, and then turned against him in such a way as to cast upon him the blame of the subsequent conflagration. The elements of strife between the two kings could hardly have failed to burst sooner or later into a blaze; the question was whose hand should kindle it. In spite of Henry’s Angevin wariness, Louis had contrived to shift upon him the fatal responsibility; and for the rest of his life the fire went smouldering on, breaking out at intervals in various directions, smothered now and then for a moment, but never thoroughly quenched; consuming the plans and hopes of its involuntary originator, while the real incendiary sheltered himself to the last behind his mask of injured innocence.
For six months all was quiet. In October the two kings held another meeting; the treaty was ratified, and little Henry, who had lately come over from England with his mother, was made to do homage to Louis for the duchy of Normandy.[1513] About the same time the queen of France died, leaving to her husband another infant daughter.[1514] Disappointed for the fourth time in his hopes of a son, Louis in his impatience set decency at defiance; before Constance had been a fortnight in her grave he married a third wife, Adela of Blois, daughter of Theobald the Great, and sister of the two young counts who were betrothed to the king’s own elder daughters.[1515] His subjects, sharing his anxiety for an heir, easily forgave his unseemly haste and welcomed the new queen, who in birth, mind and person was all that could be desired.[1516] It would, however, have been scarcely possible to find a choice more irritating to Henry of Anjou. On either side of the sea, the house of Blois seemed to be always in some way or other crossing his path; in their lives or in their deaths, they were perpetually giving him trouble. At that very time the death of Stephen’s last surviving son, Earl William of Warren,[1517] had led to a quarrel between the king and his dearest friend. William was childless, and the sole heir to his county of Boulogne was his sister Mary, abbess of Romsey. This lady was now brought out of her convent to be married by Papal dispensation to Matthew, second son of the count of Flanders.[1518] The scheme, devised by King Henry, [1519] was strongly opposed by the bridegroom’s father,[1520] and also by Henry’s own chancellor. Thomas, somewhat unexpectedly perhaps, started up as a vindicator of monastic discipline, remonstrated vehemently against the marriage of a nun, and used all his influence at Rome to hinder the dispensation; he gained, however, nothing save the enmity of Matthew, and a foretaste of that kingly wrath[1521] which was to burst upon him with all its fury three years later. Even without allowing for Henry’s probable frame of mind in consequence of this affair, the French king’s triple alliance with the hereditary rivals of the Angevin house would naturally appear to him in the light of a provocation and a menace. The chancellor seems to have made his peace by suggesting an answer to it.
[1513] Rob. Torigni, a. 1160.
[1514] Ibid. R. Diceto (Stubbs), vol. i. p. 303. Hist. Ludov. (Duchesne, Hist. Franc. Scriptt., vol. iv.), p. 415. Constance died on October 4; Lamb. Waterloo, Rer. Gall. Scriptt., vol. xiii. p. 517.
[1515] R. Diceto (Stubbs), vol. i. p. 303. Cf. Gerv. Cant. (Stubbs), vol. i. p. 167, and Rob. Torigni, a. 1160. Adela was crowned at Paris with her husband on S. Brice’s day (November 13); Hist Ludov (Duchesne, Hist Franc Scriptt , vol iv ), p 416
[1516] Hist Ludov as above
[1517] He died in October 1159, on the way home from Toulouse; Rob Torigni, ad ann
[1518] Rob. Torigni, a. 1160. Lamb. Waterloo (Rer. Gall. Scriptt , vol xiii ), p 517 According to Matthew Paris, Hist Angl (Madden), vol i p 314, the marriage took place in 1161
[1519] Herb Bosh (Robertson, Becket, vol iii ), p 328
[1520] Lamb. Waterloo as above.
[1521] Herb. Bosh. as above. Mat. Paris, Hist. Angl. (Madden), vol. i. pp. 314, 315.
One of Henry’s great desires was to recover the Vexin, which at his father’s suggestion he had ceded to Louis in 1151 as the price of the investiture of Normandy. By the last treaty between the two kings it had been settled that this territory should form the dowry of little Margaret; her father was to retain possession of it, and to place its chief fortresses in the custody of the Knights Templars, for the next three years, until she should be wedded to young Henry with the consent of Holy Church; whenever that should take place, Henry’s father was to receive back the Vexin. In other words, the dowry was not to be paid till the bride was married; and there was evidently a tacit understanding, at any rate on the French side, that this was not to be for three years at least.[1522] Later in the summer two cardinallegates visited France and Normandy on business connected with a recent Papal election.[1523] Henry, apparently at the instigation of
Thomas,[1524] persuaded them to solemnize the marriage of the two children on November 2 at Neubourg.[1525] The written conditions of the treaty were fulfilled to the letter—the babes were wedded with the consent of Holy Church, represented by the Pope’s own legates; and the castles of the Vexin were at once made over to Henry by the Templars,[1526] three of whom were present at the wedding.[1527] Louis found himself thoroughly outwitted. His first step was to banish the three Templars, who were cordially received by Henry;[1528] his next was to concert with the brothers of his new queen a plan of retaliation in Anjou. The house of Blois naturally resented a curtailment of the possessions of the crown which they now hoped one day to see worn by a prince of their own blood. Louis and Theobald accordingly set to work to fortify Chaumont, a castle which Gelduin of Saumur had long ago planted on the bank of the Loire as a special thorn in the side of the Angevin counts. Henry flew to the spot, put king and count to flight, besieged and took the castle of Chaumont together with thirty-five picked knights and eighty men-atarms whom Theobald had sent to reinforce its garrison; he then fortified Fréteval and Amboise, and, secure from all further molestation, went to keep Christmas with Eleanor in his native city of Le Mans.[1529]
[1522] Will. Newb., l. ii. c. 24 (Howlett, vol. i. p. 159), distinctly states that the children were not to be married till they were of a fit age; and such was no doubt the intention of Louis; but it was by no means expressed in the treaty: “Totum remanens Wilcassini” [i.e. all except three of its fiefs which were specially reserved to Henry] “regi Francie; hoc modo, quod ipse illud remanens dedit et concessit maritagium cum filiâ suâ filio regis Anglie habendum. Et eum unde seisiendum ab Assumptione B. Marie proximâ post pacem factam in tres annos, et si infra hunc terminum filia regis Francie filio regis Anglie desponsata fuerit, assensu et consensu Sancte Ecclesie, tunc erit rex Anglie seysitus de toto Wilcassino, et de castellis Wilcassini, ad opus filii sui ” Treaty in Lyttelton, Hen II , vol iv p 173 The question turned on the construing of “tunc ” Louis intended it to mean “then, when the three years are expired, if the children shall be wedded”; Henry and his friends the Templars made it mean
“then, when the children are wedded, whether the three years are expired or not.”
[1523] Gilb. Foliot, Ep. cxlviii. (Giles, vol. i. p. 197). Of their business we shall see more later.
[1524] This must surely be the meaning of Herb. Bosh. (Robertson, Becket, vol. iii.), p. 175: “Quam industrie munitiones quinque munitissimas, in Franciæ et Normanniæ sitas confinio, domino suo regi, ad cujus tamen jus ab antiquo spectare dignoscebantur, a rege Francorum per matrimonium, sine ferro, sine gladio, absque lanceâ, absque pugnâ, in omni regum dilectione et pace revocaverit, Gizortium scilicet, castrum munitissimum, et alia quatuor ” Cf Thomas Saga (Magnusson), vol i p 57, which seems however to refer rather to the drawingup of the treaty.
[1525] R Diceto (Stubbs), vol i p 304 Cf Gerv Cant (Stubbs), vol. i. p. 168, Rog. Howden (Stubbs), vol. i. p. 218, and Rob. Torigni, a. 1160.
[1526] Rog. Howden and Rob. Torigni, as above. Will. Newb., l. ii. c. 24 (Howlett, vol. i. p. 159).
[1527] Roger of Pirou, Tostig of S. Omer and Richard of Hastings; Rog. Howden as above.
[1528] Ibid.
[1529] Rob. Torigni, a. 1160.
A year of peace followed: Henry spent the greater part of it in Normandy, garrisoning the castles of the duchy, strengthening its newly-recovered border-fortresses, providing for the restoration of the old royal strongholds and the erection of new ones in all parts of his dominions, and superintending the repair of his palace at Rouen, the making of a park at Quévilly, and the foundation of an hospital for lepers at Caen.[1530] The chancellor was still at his side, and had lately, as a crowning mark of his confidence, been intrusted with the entire charge of his eldest son. Thomas received the child into his own household, to educate him with the other boys of noble birth
who came to learn courtly manners and knightly prowess in that excellent school; he playfully called him his adoptive son, and treated him as such in every respect.[1531] Little Henry was now in his seventh year, and his father was already anxious to secure his succession to the throne. The conditional homage which he had received as an infant was, as Henry knew by personal experience, a very insufficient security. Indeed, the results of every attempt to regulate the descent of the crown since the Norman conquest tended to prove that the succession of the heir could be really secured by nothing short of his actual recognition and coronation as king during his father’s life-time. This was now becoming an established practice in France and Germany. In England, where the older constitutional theory of national election to the throne had never died out, such a step had never been attempted but once; and that attempt, made by Stephen in behalf of his son Eustace, had ended in signal failure. Discouraging as the precedent was, however, Henry had made up his mind to follow it; and in the spring of 1162 he sent his boy over sea and called upon the barons of England to do him homage and fealty, as a preliminary to his coronation as king. [1532]
[1530] Rob. Torigni, a. 1161.
[1531] Will. Fitz-Steph. (Robertson, Becket, vol. iii.), p. 22. Herb. Bosh. (ibid.), pp. 176, 177.
[1532] E. Grim (ib. vol. ii.), p. 366. Anon. I. (ib. vol. iv.), p. 13.
A matter so important and so delicate could be intrusted to no one but the chancellor. He managed it, like everything else that he took in hand, with a calm facility which astonished every one. He brought the child to England, presented him to the bishops and barons of the realm in a great council summoned for the purpose,[1533] knelt at his feet and swore to be his faithful subject in all things, reserving only the fealty due to the elder king so long as he lived and reigned;[1534] the whole assembly followed his example, and thus a measure
which it was believed that Henry’s personal presence would hardly have availed to carry through without disturbance was accomplished at once and without a word of protest,[1535] save from the little king himself, who with childish imperiousness, it is said, refused to admit any reservation in the oath of his adoptive father.[1536] Henry probably intended that the boy’s recognition as heir to the crown should be speedily followed by his coronation.[1537] This, however, was a rite which could only be performed by the primate of all England; and the chair of S. Augustine was vacant. Once again it was to Thomas that Henry looked for aid; but this time he looked in vain. Thomas had done his last act in the service of his royal friend. The year which had passed away since Archbishop Theobald’s death had been, on both sides of the sea, a year of almost ominous tranquillity. It was in truth the forerunner of a storm which was to shatter Henry’s peace and to cost Thomas his life.
[1533] Anon. I. (Robertson, Becket, vol. iv.), p. 13. R. Diceto (Stubbs), vol. i. p. 306.
[1534] R. Diceto as above.
[1535] Anon. I. (Robertson, Becket, vol. iv.), p. 13.
[1536] Mat. Paris, Hist. Angl. (Madden), vol. i. p. 316.
[1537] Such an intention is distinctly stated by E. Grim (Robertson, Becket, vol ii ), p 366: “filio suo, jam tunc coronando in regem.”
