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ConstitutionalPolicyinMultilevelGovernment TransformationsinGovernance TransformationsinGovernance isamajornewacademicbookseriesfromOxford UniversityPress.Itisdesignedtoaccommodatetheimpressivegrowthofresearchin comparativepolitics,internationalrelations,publicpolicy,federalism,andenvironmentalandurbanstudiesconcernedwiththedispersionofauthorityfromcentral statesuptosupranationalinstitutions,downtosubnationalgovernments,andsidewaystopublic–privatenetworks.Itbringstogetherworkthatsignificantlyadvancesour understandingoftheorganization,causes,andconsequencesofmultilevelandcomplexgovernance.Theseriesisselective,containingannuallyasmallnumberofbooksof exceptionallyhighqualitybyleadingandemergingscholars.
Theseriestargetsmainlysingle-authoredorco-authoredwork,butitispluralisticin termsofdisciplinaryspecialization,researchdesign,method,andgeographicalscope. Casestudiesaswellascomparativestudies,historicalaswellascontemporarystudies, andstudieswithanational,regional,orinternationalfocusareallcentraltoitsaims. Authorsusequalitative,quantitative,formalmodeling,ormixedmethods.Atrade markofthebooksisthattheycombinescholarlyrigorwithreadableproseandan attractiveproductionstyle.
TheseriesiseditedbyLiesbetHoogheandGaryMarksoftheUniversityofNorth Carolina,ChapelHill,andtheVUAmsterdam,andWalterMattlioftheUniversityof Oxford.
With,Without,orAgainsttheState?HowEuropeanRegionsPlaytheBrusselsGame MichaëlTatham
APostfunctionalistTheoryofGovernance(5Volumes) LiesbetHoogheandGaryMarksetal.
DemocratsandAutocrats:PathwaysofSubnationalUndemocratic RegimeContinuitywithinDemocraticCountries AgustinaGiraudy
OrganizationalProgeny:WhyGovernmentsareLosingControlover theProliferatingStructuresofGlobalGovernance TanaJohnson
ConstitutionalPolicyin MultilevelGovernment TheArtofKeepingtheBalance IncooperationwithDominicHeinz,Eike-ChristianHornig, AndreaFischer-Hotzel,JörgKemmerzell, andBettinaPetersohn
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Acknowledgments Thisbooksummarizestheresultsofacomparativeresearchprojecton reformingfederalconstitutions,buthasbeeninspiredbyabroaderresearch agendaondynamicsofmultilevelpoliticalsystems.WhileIhavebeeninterestedinthissubjectmatterforalongtime,theideatostudyprocessesof constitutionalreformandchangeoriginatedwhenIparticipatedasanexpert inacommissiononthe “modernizationoffederalism,” establishedbythe Germanfederalparliamentandthe Bundesrat (2003–4).Ataboutthesame time,Igainedsomeinsightintothe “ConventionontheFutureoftheEU” (alsoknownastheConstitutionalConvention)whenIparticipatedinagroup ofscholarsandhighercivilservantsoftheLandgovernmentinNorthRhineWestphaliadiscussingonmattersoftheConvention.Theexperiencesof thesedifferentprocessesandarrangementstonegotiateconstitutional amendmentsinmultilevelpolitiesle dmetostartasystematicresearchon thisissue,nottheleastwhenIrealiz edthatprocessesofconstitutional changeingeneralandthoseaffectingtheallocationofpowersinfederalor regionalizedstatesinparticularhavenotbeenstudiedextensively.Apart fromcasestudies,researchhastendedtofocusonformalamendment rulesbuthasneglectedtheprocessesofdraftingamendments.Thus, thereappearedtobealackofstudies,especiallycomparativeones,on theinterplaybetweenformalamendm entprocedures,actualconstitutionalreformnegotiations,thecourseofrati fi cation,andthesuccessor failureofconstitutionalreform.Asmyexperiencessuggested,thevarious arrangementsoftheseprocessesarehighlyrelevantforexplainingoutcomes ofconstitutionalchange.Astheycanb edesignedforeachreformproject, understandingprocessesofconstitutionalchangehasnotonlyacademic butalsopracticalrelevance.
TheresearchprojectwasgenerouslyfundedbytheGermanResearchFoundationbetween2008and2011(grantnumberDFG1667/9-1).Thisallowed metopursuemyplanwithagroupofyoungscholars.Duringthethree-year periodoffunding,NathalieBehnke,AndreaFischer-Hotzel,DominicHeinz, Eike-ChristianHornig,JörgKemmerzellandBettinaPetersohncontributed totheproject.Nathaliesupportedmeasa post-docinpreparingandcoordinating
theproject,untilshelefttheteamin2009tobecomeaprofessorattheUniversity ofBochumandthenatKonstanz.Ourcooperationinthe firstyearoftheproject ledtooureditingaspecialissueof Publius:TheJournalofFederalism (2009).The othermembersoftheteamcontributedto theempiricalresearchsummarizedin thisbook.AlthoughIwroteseveralindividualchaptersand finishedthe final manuscript,theyeachcontributedasubstantialshareintherespectivechapters, asindicatedattheappropriateplaces.
Theempiricalworksummarizedinthisbookisbasedonninecountry casestudies.FortheresearchoutsideGermany,wewerefortunatetoreceive expertopinionssubmittedbyanumberofpartnersintheothereightcountries.IowegratitudetoBarbaraBlümel ,ChristophKonrath,PeterBußjäger, HelmutHörtenhuberandJohannesFischer(Austria);NicolasLagasse, Jean-BenoitPileandDaveSinardet(Belgium);Marc-AntoineAdam,Martin Fournier,Anna-MayCholes,GregClarkeandNadiaVerrelli(Canada); PatrickLeLidecandRomainPasquier(France);CarloFusaro,Francesco PalermoandMatteoNicolini(Italy);DieterFreiburghausandGérard Wettstein(Switzerland);CésarColinoandJoséA.Olmeda(Spain);Jonathan BradburyandJamesMitchell(UK).Mostoftheseexpertsmetinaconference weorganizedwiththesupportoftheForumofFederations,theDimitrisTsatsos-InstitutfürEuropäischeVerfassungswissenschaften(DTIEV)atthe UniversityofHagen,andtheBundesratinBerlin.Iwouldliketothank theseinstitutionsfortheirgenerousass istance,inparticularFelixKnüpling fromtheForumandGerdSchmidtandhisteaminBerlinfortheexcellent cooperationinmakingtheconferenceasuccessfuleventandafruitful experienceforallparticipants.IalsoowegratitudetotheDTIEVandits director,PeterBrandt,forprovidinganinterdisciplinaryresearchenvironmentfortheproject,andforhiscontinuedsupportevenafterImovedtothe TechnischeUniversitätDarmstadt.
Duringmyworkonthisproject,Ihadtheopportunitytodiscusswith manyscholars.Itisimpossibletomentionallofthem.Twoofthem,Richard SimeonandRonaldWatts,recentlypassedaway,andIwillrememberour meetings,longtalksandexchangeofopinionsonfederalism.Theinfluence ofFritzW.Scharpfbecomesobviousthroughoutthebook.Moreover, IbenefitedfrommanyinspiringdiscussionswithThomasO.Hueglin.With JörgBroschek,Iworkedontheoriesofinstitutionalchangeandfederaldynamics,andourcooperationculminatedinthevolume FederalDynamics,published in2013byOxfordUniversityPress.Mytheoreticalapproachandempirical knowledgeoncomparativefederalismhasbeenverymuchinfluencedbythese colleagues.
AfterJörghadleftDarmstadttobecomeresearchprofessoratWilfridLaurier UniversityinCanada,JaredSonnicksenjoinedmyteamatDarmstadtand
contributedtothequalityofthisbookwithmanysubstantialcomments. Moreover,JörgKemmerzell,whoismeanwhileinvolvedinotherresearch projects,notonlycommentedthe finalmanuscriptbutalsoparticipatedin theeditorialwork,togetherwithmystudentassistantsFlorianOstertagand NicolasSchrader.Iamgratefulfortheirexcellentandvaluablework.
ArthurBenz
Darmstadt October2015
2.TheoreticalFrameworkandResearchDesign8
2.1.2VarietiesoftheConstitutionalProblemin
2.2ConstitutionalPolicyasMechanismofChange24
2.2.1StateofResearch:TheoriesofConstitutionalChange
2.2.2Mechanisms:ConstitutionalPolicyasJoint
3.ConstitutionalProblemsandReformAgendasinFederaland RegionalizedStates50 (withAndreaFischer-HotzelandBettinaPetersohn)
3.1ProblemsofPerformanceinFederalStates50
3.2ProblemsofIntegrationinFederalStates54
3.3ProblemsofPerformanceinRegionalizedStates58
3.4ProblemsofIntegrationinaRegionalizingState61
3.5ConstitutionalProblemsandPoliticalDynamics63
4.PatternsofConstitutionalPolicyinMultilevelGovernment: CaseStudies67 (withDominicHeinz,Eike-ChristianHornig,Andrea Fischer-Hotzel,andBettinaPetersohn)
4.1IntegratedFederalStatesAddressingPerformanceProblems70
4.1.1Switzerland:TheRenewalofFiscalEqualization
4.1.2Germany:ReformofFederalismIandII(2003–9) 77
4.1.3Austria:TheAustrianConvention(2003–5) 86
4.2FederalStatesConfrontedbyIntegrationProblems92
4.2.1Canada:TheCharlottetownProcess(1990–2) 92
4.2.2Belgium:TheFifthStateReform(1999–2001)
4.2.3Spain:TheThirdRoundofReformofAutonomy Statutes(2004–10) 110
4.3RegionalizedStatesAddressingPerformanceProblems118
4.3.1Italy:TheReformofTitleVoftheConstitution (1997–2001) 118
4.3.2France:DecentralizationActII(2000–4) 125
4.4ARegionalizedStateConfrontedbyIntegrationProblems131
4.4.1GreatBritain:Devolution(1989–2006)
4.4.2DevolutioninScotland
4.4.3DevolutioninWales
4.4.4PatternsofDevolution
5.RatificationandRatificationFailure:TheImpactof AmendmentRules153 (withJörgKemmerzellandBettinaPetersohn)
5.1RulesofConstitutionalAmendmentandVeto-players154
5.2CouplingofConstitutionalNegotiationandRatification156
5.3RatificationProcessesinSelectedCasesofReform160
5.4ImpactofRatificationRules167
5.5Summary174
6.ConstitutionalReformandImplicitChange177
6.1ConstitutionalChangefollowingRatificationFailure:TheCase ofCanada180
6.2IneffectiveConstitutionalNegotiationsandImplicitChange: TheCaseofGermany185
6.3ImplicitConstitutionalChangeandBalanceofPower191 6.4Summary198
7.ExplainingSuccessandFailureofConstitutionalPolicy199
7.1MethodofComparativeAnalysis199
7.2ConditionsofSuccessfulConstitutionalPolicy202
7.2.1ModifiableConditions:TheOrganizationof ConstitutionalReformProcesses 202
7.2.2GivenConditions:ThePoliticalandSituational Context 210
ListofTables 2.1.Differentdirectionsofmultileveldynamics16
2.2.Modesofconstitutionalnegotiations33
2.3.Patternsofconstitutionalchangeandcontinuity45
2.4.Institutionalvariationofselectedmultilevelgovernments46
3.1.Varietiesofconstitutionalproblemsinselectedmultilevelgovernments64
4.1.Outcomesofconstitutionalpolicyintheselectedcases68
4.2.Outcomesofconstitutionalnegotiations68
5.1.Constitutionalveto-playersandarenacoupling159
5.2.Veto-playersinconstitutionalreforms161
5.3.Ratificationrulesinthecasesofconstitutionalreform167
7.1.Organizationalconditionsofconstitutionalpolicy206
7.2.Combinedorganizationalconditionsofconstitutionalnegotiations207
7.3.Institutionalconditionsofregionallydifferentiatedconstitutional negotiations209
7.4.Contextconditionsofconstitutionalpolicy216
7.5.Combinedexternalconditionsofconstitutionalnegotiations216
ListofAbbreviations AC,ACsAutonomousCommunity;AutonomousCommunities
CDU ChristlichDemokratischeUnion (ChristianDemocraticUnion)
CiUConvergènciaiUnió(ConvergenceandUnion,allianceoftwo moderatenationalistpartiesinCatalonia)
COSTA/COREE ConferentievoordeStaatshervorming / Conféréncepourlaréformede l’Etat (IntergovernmentalandInterparliamentaryConferencefor InstitutionalRenewalinBelgium)
CSU ChristlichSozialeUnion (ChristianSocialUnion,Bavarianparty)
ERC EsquerraRepublicanadeCatalunya (LeftistRepublicanPartyof Catalonia)
FDF Fédéralistdémocratesfrancophone (liberalpartyofWallonia)
FDP FreieDemokratischePartei (LiberalDemocraticPartyofGermany)
FPÖ FreiheitlicheParteiÖsterreichs (AustrianLiberalParty)
LibDemsLiberalDemocrats
MR Movementréformateur (liberalpartyofWallonia)
NFA NeugestaltungdesFinanzausgleichsundderAufgabenverteilungzwischen BundundKantonen (Renewalof fiscalequalizationandallocationof powersbetweenthefederationandCantons)
ÖVP ÖsterreichischeVolkspartei (AustrianPeople’sParty)
PP PartidoPopular (SpanishPeople’sParty)
PSC PartitdelsSocialistesdeCatalunya (CatalanSocialistParty)
PSOE PartidoSocialistaObreroEspañol (SocialistWorker’sPartyofSpain)
PSOE-A PartidoSocialistaObreroEspañoldeAndalucía (SocialistWorkers’ Party ofAndalucia)
QCAQualitativeComparativeAnalysis
SCCScottishConstitutionalConvention
SNPScottishNationalistParty
UMP Unionpourunmouvementpopulaire (UnionforaPopularMovement)
VU Volksunie (PeoplesUnion,Flemishnationalistparty)
WLPWelshLabourParty
Introduction Multilevelstructuresofgovernmentsareontherise.Whileinthe firsthalfof thetwentiethcentury,scholarsobservedtheevolutionofcentralized,unitary nationstatesanddeclaredfederalismobsolete(Laski2005[1939]),divisionof powersinmultilevelpoliticalsystems,eitherinafederalorregionalizedstate orinapoliticalunionofstates(liketheEU)hasattractedattentionduringthe secondhalfofthetwentiethcentury.Integrationofstates,federalism,decentralizationandregionalizationhavebecomekeyconceptsandresearchtopics inpoliticalscience(Loughlin2013).Inpoliticaldiscourses,ideasexpressed withtheseconceptsaretakenasguidelinesforcreatinginstitutionsofgood governance.Inreality,processesoftransnationalintegrationandregionalizationofnationstatesreshapedthestructuresatleastofWesterndemocracies (Hooghe,MarksandSchakel2010).
Theseprocesseshavegeneratedavarietyofterritorialorganizationsof governments.Oldtypologiesofstatetheorycouldnolongercovertheemergingforms;newattemptstoadjustconceptscontributedmoretoconfusion thantoclarification.Thesimpledichotomybetweenunitaryandfederalstates hasbeenreplacedbymoredifferentiatedterminologies(Watts2013),more generalconceptslikehybridstates(Loughlin2009),multilevelgovernance (Piattoni2010)orterritorialgovernance(Loughlin2007b).Whilegovernance addressedstructuraldynamicsorpatternsofpolicy-making,thetermhybrid states,althoughmeanttoemphasizerecenttrendsinstatedevelopment, avoidsanyconceptualdistinctionandrespondstovarietywithacatch-all category.Thetermmultilevelgovernmentappliedinthisbookmaynotsolve theseconceptualproblems.However,itallowsustocoverfederalandregionalizedunitarystatesfacingsimilarproblemsofhowtoorganizetheirterritorial structuresandstabilizethebalanceofpowerbetweentiersofgovernment.The conceptreferstopoliticalsystems(i.e.institutionalizedstructuresofapolity), whichdividepowersofgovernment(includinglegislative,executiveand fiscal powers)intoatleasttwolevels.
Allthesepoliticalsystemsareconfrontedwiththeproblemofkeepingthe balancedespitethecontinuouspressureofchangeandinthefaceofongoing shiftsofpower.Stabilizingthisbalanceisfundamentalforthelegitimacyand operationofmultilevelgovernments,andforpreservingtheconstitutional order.Thisproblemhasbeendiscussedinstudiesonfederalism,following WilliamRiker’sassumptionthatfederalsystemsarenecessarilyinstable(Riker 1964).Asitisnotfederalismassuchthatcausesinstability,butthedivisionof powerbetweenterritorialunitsofgovernment,instabilitycanchallenge regionalizedunitarygovernmentsnolessthanfederalgovernments.Under thepressureofregionalistmovementsorconfrontedbyregionalpartiesclaimingtorepresentadistinctnationalcommunityofcitizens,unitarygovernmentscanevenfacemoreinstabilitythanfederalstates.Andinthesecases, federalization,i.e.aconstitutionalchangeoftheterritorialstructureofthe stateleadingtoanextensionofregionalauthorityandautonomyassuchisno solutionifitdoesnotendinastablebalance.Forthisreason,regionalized governmentsorthosethatintroducedelementsoffederalism(federalizing states)shouldbeincludedinresearchonthisissue.Therefore,weregard themasinstancesofmultilevelgovernment.
Thisfundamentalproblemofmultilevelgovernmentinfactconcernstwo basicissuesdiscussedintheliteratureonfederalism.Oneistheproblemof stabilizingabalanceofpowerbetweenlevelsagainstunintended “authority migration” leadingeithertoaconcentrationofpoweratthecentrallevelora fragmentationofpoweramonglowerlevelgovernments.Somescholarshave confirmedWilliamRiker’ssuggestionthatanintegratedpartysystemrather thanaconstitutionprovidesforstability(Filippovetal.2004).Othersemphasizetherelevanceofinstitutionsandconstitutionalrules(Lemco1991), whereasJennaBednarhassuggestedthatacombinationofinteractingmechanismsofcontrol(“safeguards”)canprotectfederalsystemsagainstauthority migration(Bednar2009).Yetmechanismsstabilizingadistributionofpower canhavetwonegativeconsequences.Eithertheycanmakeapoliticalsystem rigidandunabletoadjusttochangingconditions,ortheyinducecountervailingdynamicsagainstdestabilizingtrends,butwiththeriskofsettingoff unintendedprocesses.
Therefore,theproblemofbalancingpowersinmultilevelgovernments needstobereframedasanissueofconstitutionalpoliticsandpolicy-making. Consequently,researchonsafeguardshastobecomplementedbyresearchon constitutionalchange.Inordertostabilizeexistingdivisionsofpower betweengovernmentallevels,constitutionalruleshavetobechanged,either inordertoimprovethequalityofgovernanceandtorespondtochangesin society,ortoredresstrendsinauthoritymigrationthatevolveinaproblematicdirectionandthreatentodestabilizeaconstitutionalorder.Multilevel governmentsarenotonlyinstable,theyarealwaysdynamic,anddesigns
aimingatstabilitycanturndynamicsintorigidity.Therefore,inadditionto theresearchonhowtodealwithinstability,theissueishowmultilevel constitutionscanmaintaintheir flexibilitytoadjustandhowtheycanbe changedinordertorestorethebalanceofpower.Itisthissecondaspectofthe constitutionalproblemoffederalormultilevelgovernmentthatisaddressed inthisbook.Incontrasttoscholarswhohavecontributedtotheseresearch fields,weclaimthatthekeytomaintaininga flexiblebalanceofpowerliesin constitutionalpolicy,inprocessesofreviewingandcorrectingdestructive dynamicsofpowerstructuresinmultilevelgovernment.
At firstglance,thisposesaseeminglyparadoxicalargument.Indeed,accordingtomosttheoriesoffederalismandmultilevelgovernance,changinga constitutionisextraordinarilydifficult.Thisstems,forinstance,fromnumerouscompetinginterestsamongunitsofgovernmentsandtheexistenceof manyveto-players.Inparticular,theconceptofthejoint-decisiontrapnow widelyappliedintheliteratureonmultilevelgovernanceimpliesthatconstitutionalchangeisespeciallyunlikelyifitaimsatareallocationofpowers amonglevelsofgovernment(Scharpf1988,2011).Theoriesofinstitutional changesupporttheassumptionthatcomplexpoliticalsystemscanatbestbe changedgradually,andscholarsworkingonfederalismhavesupportedthis view(e.g.Bednar2013).Accordingly,significantmodificationoftheallocationofpowerorresourcesseemstobeunlikely,exceptunderspecifichistoricalcircumstances(“criticaljunctures”)orifstrongleadersorpowerfulchange agentsreducetheimpactofvetoplayers,twonotverypromisingalternatives. Inlinewiththisperspective,researchonchangeinmultilevelgovernmenthas focusedonmainstreamparties,i.e.partiespredominatingpoliticsatthecentrallevel,andtriedtoexplaintheirwillingnesstodecentralizepower.
Theseareimportantcontributionstoresearchondynamicsoffederalismor multilevelgovernment(BenzandBroschek2013a).Yetconstitutionalpolicy andconstitutionalchangeresultfrommultifacetedprocesses,anditisthe interplayofdifferentdimensions,i.e.theinstitutionsandarenasatthedifferent levels,theoverlappingsequencesofagendasetting,negotiationanddecisionmaking,andofformalamendmentandinformalchange,whichdrivesthe dynamicsofconstitutionalpolicy.Therefore,wearguethatcomplexprocesses ratherthansimplepowerstructure(majorityparties,vetopositions,bargaining amongveto-players,strongleadership)promisetoachievethenecessaryinstitutionalstabilityandallowforconstitutionalchange.Welookatthemoreor lessmultidimensionalprocessanditspotentialforchange.Aswewillexplain, specificprocessdesignscanincreasetheprobabilitythatconstitutionalpolicy generatesstabilizingdynamics,whereasothersmaycauserigidityordestabilizingeffects.Wealsoshow,inclearcontrasttoinstitutionalistandactor-centered theoriesprevailinginpoliticalscience,thatcomplexdesignsofconstitutional policyarenecessarytostabilizemultilevelgovernments.
Thisconclusionwillbesupportedinthefollowingchaptersbytheoretical reasoningandcomparativecasestudies.Fromanormativepointofview,this reasoningisinlinewithrequirementsofdemocracy.Inconstitutionalmatters,decisionsneedtobemadebyrules,whichguaranteethatallcitizensand politicalactorscanacceptthem.Inasimilarvein,theconstitutionalprinciple offederalism,whichalsoshouldapplytoregionalizedstates(anddefactoor dejuredoesso),requiresthataconstitutionshouldnotbechangedwithout representativesoflowerleveljurisdictionsbeingabletoparticipate.Therefore, our findingshavepracticalimplicationsbyshowinghowchangingmultilevel structuresisfeasibleinprocessesconformingtostandardsofdemocracy.
Basedonthistheoreticalperspective,thisstudyfocusesonconstitutional changeinmultilevelgovernments.Itintendstoshowunderwhichconditions changeispossibleandcontributestomaintainingorrestoringthebalanceof power,despitethefactthatmanyactorsparticipateinconstitutionalpolicy withdiverseinterestsandtheabilitytoobstructintendedamendments.This particularapproachaddstotheoriesofinstitutionalchange,federaldynamics andmultilevelpoliticsandpolicy-making.Ourapproachisuniqueinlinking thesetheorieswithatheoryofconstitutionalpolicy-makingandsuggestsa newunderstandingofhowcomplexmultilevelsystemswork.
Inourresearchproject,weappliedthetheoreticalperspectivetocompare constitutionalpolicyinfederalandregionalizedgovernmentssystematically. Duringthisproject,westudiedprocessesofconstitutionalreformandchange inninefederalorregionalizeddemocraticgovernments,wherewefound reformsorreformattemptsorintensivepoliticaldiscussionsrelatingtothe territorialstructureofthestateand/ortheverticalorhorizontal(re-)distribution ofpowersbetweenlevelsorunitsofgovernment.Thecasesselectedrepresent statesdifferingintheirconstitutionalframework(establishedfederations, newfederalstatesstillundergoingfederalization,regionalizedstates)and confrontedbydifferentconstitutionalproblems(de fi citsingovernance performanceorproblemswithintegratingdifferentregions).Moreover, theydifferintheoutcomeofreformprocesseswestudiedindetail.Most importantlyinviewofourtheoreticalapproach,theyallrevealdifferent patternsofconstitutionalpolicy.Thusourcomparativestudyconsidered notalimitedsetofvariablesderivedfromatheory,butratherwasdesigned totakeaccountofdifferentconditionsandtodiscovermechanismsof changeorstagnationbytracin gprocessesincasestudies.
Inordertopresentourresearchresults,weorganizedthebookasfollows. Chapter1explainsourfocusandresearchquestionsbymoreextensively introducingtheconstitutionalproblemofmultilevelgovernments.Herewe outlinethebasicdilemmaofinstabilityandrigidityconfrontingconstitutionalpolicyinthesepoliticalsystems.Moreover,webrieflyreviewthesolutions,whichscholarssofarhaveproposedanddiscussed.
Startingfromanaccountofthestateofresearch,Chapter2developsthe theoreticalframeworkthathasguidedourresearchwork.Incontrasttoother theoriesoninstitutionalorconstitutionalchange,ourownapproachemphasizesagendasettingand inparticular negotiationsonamendmentproposalsasmostimportantconditionstobeconsidered.Itsuggestslookingat thewholeprocessofpolicy-making,insteadofeitheragendasetting,ornegotiations,ordecision-makingandvetopower.Moreover,whileexternalconditionslikeeconomiccrises,pressurefrominterestorganizationsorparty politicsarenotneglected,thewayconstitutionalnegotiationsareframed andorganizedisaccentuatedasamostsignificantconditionaffectingthe outcomeofconstitutionalpolicy.Finally,formal(explicit)andinformal (implicit)constitutionalchange(Voigt1999)aretakenascloselylinkedprocessescontributingtothedynamicsofchange.AttheendofChapter2,we presentourresearchdesign,explaintheselectionofcasesandoutlinehow outcomesofconstitutionalpolicycanbecharacterizedandhowtheyare operationalizedfortheempiricalresearch.
Chapter3categorizesthecasesaccordingtovarietiesofthebasicconstitutionalproblemofmultilevelpoliticalsystems.Itshedslightontheparticular conditionsthatgiverisetovariousexpressionsoftheinstability–rigidity dilemmaanddifferentkindsofimbalanceseitherduetoover-centralization orasymmetries,fragmentationorover-decentralization.Problemsofintegrationindividedsocietiesaredistinguishedfromproblemsofineffectivegovernance.Accordingly,wecanidentifydifferentreformagendasinfederaland regionalizedstates.Presumably,constitutionalamendmentismorelikelyto failifintegrationproblemspredominate.Forthesereasons,scholarshave recommendedavoidingambitiousprojectsofconstitutionalreforms(Lerner 2011).However,thecasestudiespresentedinthebookdonotconfirmthe assumptionsjustifyingthisproposal.
Chapter4presentstheresultsoftheempiricalresearch.Theninecase studies,whichincludefederalandre gionalized(federalizing)statesconfrontedbyeitherperformanceorinte grationproblems,arepresentedin shortreports.Thesereportscovertheparticularhistoricalsituationofthe reformprocessunderconsideration,agendasettingandevolutionofthe agenda,constitutionalnegotiations,therati fi cationprocessandtheoutcomeofconstitutionalpolicy.Thechapterendswithacomparativesummaryoftheresults.Thus,successstoriesareidenti fi edanddistinguished fromstoriesoffailureoccurringinstateswhereabalanceofpowercould notbeachievedorwheretheconstitutionbecamemorerigid.Thestudy revealsthatformalconstitutionalamendmentsdonotalwaysrestorethe balanceofamultilevelsystemandthatarejectionofaconstitutional amendmentbillinrati fi cationneednotnecessarilybecharacterizedas failureofconstitutionalpolicy.
Thefollowingchaptersplacethecasestudiesinacomparativeperspective. Chapter5dealswithaparticularissue,whichhasbeendiscussed,inthe literatureoverthelastdecade.Itexaminestherelevanceofamendment rules,i.e.thoserulesrelevantforratificationofanamendmentbill.Yet, whileresearchersfollowingveto-playerstheorycouldnot findanyeffectof amendmentrulesontheoutcomesofconstitutionalreforms,betheydefined asfrequencyofamendmentsorscopeofchange,theresearchpresentedinthe bookdrawsattentiontotheimpactofamendmentrulesonnegotiations. Negotiatorstrytoanticipatepotentialvetoes.However,thisisnotalways possible,anditistheparticularlinkageofnegotiationsandratificationthat makesadifference.
Chapter6addressesanotherparticularaspect.Intheoriesonfederalconstitutions(Livingston1956)andinconstitutionaleconomics(Voigt1999),evolutionofinformalconstitutionalnorms(orimplicitconstitutionalchange) hasbeenemphasizedasamostsignificantmodeofchange.Thisstudyonthe otherhandshowsthatimplicitandexplicitchangeareoftenlinked.Moreover,implicitchangecanbelegitimizedbynegotiatedagreements,provided thattheyarefoundininclusiveconstitutionalnegotiations,evenifratificationfailsduetospecificcircumstances.Ontheotherhand,negotiationscan endwithanineffectivebutnonethelessratifiedcompromise.Inthiscase, implicitchangeofanineffectiveconstitutionalamendmentcansolvesome oftheensuingproblems,butlackingthelegitimacyofanagreementusually invitesfurtherdispute.CasestudiesonCanadaandGermanyillustrateboth patternsofchange.
Byincludingtheaspectsdealtwithinthepreviouschapters,Chapter7 extendstheanalysisandsystematicallycomparesthecasesfollowingthe theorypresentedinChapter2.Moreover,alternativeexplanationsaretaken intoconsideration.Whilethosetheoriesshouldnotbediscardedbasedonour empiricalevidence,theresearchresultssupportthetheorypresentedin Chapter2.Accordingly,successfulconstitutionalchangeinmultilevelsystemsleadingtoastableand flexiblebalanceofpowerisnotonlypossible evenunderdifficultinstitutionalorpoliticalconditions.Theresultsalsoshow thatthedesignofconstitutionalpolicycanimprovetheconditionsforeffectivechange.Chapter8summarizestheresultsoftheresearchanddrawsconclusionsfortheoryoffederalismandmultilevelgovernanceandforfurther researchinthis field.Moreover,itdiscussesthepracticalrelevanceofthe resultspresentedinthepreviouschapterandthetheoreticalreasoning.
Politicalsciencedrawsconclusionsfromtheoreticalreasoningandempiricalstudies.Bothneverfullygrasptherealcomplexityofpoliticalpractice.For thesereasons,itcandiscovermechanismswhichcauseproblemsunderparticularcircumstances,andderiveprinciplesorideasfromobservingcasesof problemsolving.Butsciencealwaysremainsabstract,anditsconclusion
shouldnotbeconfusedwithrecommendationforpolicy-makers.Ourstudy endswithsomegeneralideas,whichwethinkarerelevantforpolitics andgovernmentsconfrontedwiththechallengetomakemultilevelgovernanceworkandstabilizeitsstructures.Nevertheless,politicalscientistsneither candeterminehowpowersshouldbedistributedandorganized,norcanthey sayinwhichparticularprocessesrelevantconstitutionalchangecanbe achieved.Forpoliticalactors, findingastableand flexiblebalanceofpower remainsanart.
2 TheoreticalFrameworkandResearchDesign Studiesonmultilevelgovernanceandcomparativefederalismhavedealt extensivelywithissuesofeffectivenessandlegitimacy.Theyalsohave describedthereconfigurationofstructuresandongoingprocessesofintegrationanddisintegration.Basedonthisresearch,thischapterexplainsour researchquestionandpresentsthetheoreticalframeworkoftheempirical study.Westartbyclarifyingthebasicconstitutionalproblemeachdemocratic governmentwithdivisionofpowersbetweenlevelsisconfrontedwith,and explicatehowthisgeneralproblem findsexpressionindifferentfederal andregionalizedstates.Thecoreofourframeworkconsistsofananalytical modelofamultidimensionalprocessofconstitutionalpolicy.Weappliedthis concepttocompareprocessesidentifiedinthecasestudies.Itisbasedon theassumptionthatthecomplexityoftheconstitutionalproblemandof multilevelgovernmentshastobereflectedinpatternsofconstitutional policy-making,andsuccessorfailuredependstoaconsiderableextenton particulararrangementsandlinkagesofdifferentarenasofpolicy-making. Finally,wespellouthowwedistinguishsuccessorfailureofconstitutional policyanddescribethedesignofourempiricalresearch.
2.1TheConstitutionalProblemofMultilevelGovernment 2.1.1
BalancingPower EnablingChange Whereasthedivisionofpowerbetweentheexecutive,parliamentandcourts canbedefinedbyabstractfunctions,thedivisionofpowersbetweenlevelsof governmentreferstoparticulartasks.Forthisreason,federalismnecessarily impliesconstitutionalism,andthisalsoappliestoregionalizedstates.Inthe exceptionalcaseamongWesternstates,theUK,whereforhistoricalreasons nowrittenconstitutionexists,devolution,likeEuropeanintegration,was establishedbyasetoflawsthataretobeconsideredaselementsofaconstitutionalorder.Hence,ruleoflawisadecisivepreconditionofmultilevel
governance,justastheexistenceofaconstitutionhasalwaysbeenconceived asabasicfeatureoffederalismandapreconditionofitsstabilityandoperation (HueglinandFenna2006:43).Fromanotherangle,divisionofpowersamong levelsofgovernmentscanbeconsideredasecondsourceofconstitutionalism beyondtheideaofdividingpowersbetweenstateandprivatecitizensinafree society.Consequently,constitutionalismmeanwhilehas “traveled” tointernationalpolitics,whichisparticularlyexemplifiedbytheEuropeanUnion.
Asessentialastheyare,constitutionalrulesofmultilevelgovernments generategenuineproblemsforgovernanceanddemocracy.Theserulesshould definethepowersofcentralandregionalorlocalgovernmentsincludingtheir relationsandthenecessary fiscalresourcesinawaywhichisconsidered appropriatetoconformtoexpectationsofcitizens.Powersareinbalanceif theyfulfilthisrequirementandaslongastheyarenotdeemedinappropriate orcontestedbylegitimatemeans.Whatbalanceofpowermeansdependson publicopinions,politicaljudgmentsandcollectivedecisionsontherespective constitutionalrulesandnorms.Sinceopinionsandjudgmentsaboutthe appropriatedistributionofpowerarein flux,balanceinthiscontextdoes notimplyastaticequilibrium,butamovingtarget.
Fromthisfollowsasecondproblem.Beingapreconditionfortheoperation ofagovernment,constitutionsingeneralneedtobeprotectedagainstrulers seekingtochangethelawtotheiradvantage.Accordingtothenormative theoryoffederalism,constitutionshaveto fixthe “federalbargain” (Riker 1964),i.e.thebasiccompromisesonthedistributionofpowerandonrulesof operation.Ontheotherhand,therearereasonstopostulatethatthose constitutionalrulesdeterminingthedivisionofpowerbetweenlevelsof governmentneedtobehighly flexibleinordertoallowthesystemtoadapt tochangingcircumstances.Thus,rigidityand flexibilityturnoutasconflictingrequirements.
Onereasonfortheinherentconflictbetweenconstitutionalrigidityand flexibilitystemsfromtheambiguityofconstitutionalnormsandrulesin multilevelsystems.Hererulesareoftenformulatedinamannerthatthey holddisputesinabeyance.Regardingtheallocationofpowersbetweenlevels ofgovernment,normativetheoriesprovidecriteria,thoseemphasizingeffectivenessof “scaling” aswellasthosereferringtotheinterestsofcommunities inpreservingtheiridentity(HoogheandMarks2009).Butgiventhepolitical implicationsofdecisionsoncentralizationanddecentralizationordifferent waystoseparateorsharepowers,theireffectsonthewaypoliciesaremade, theparticularstructurecanalwaysbecontested(Treisman2007).Thejustificationofparticularruleseitheremphasizesnon-discriminationbetweenterritoriesorreferstodistinctnessofparticularterritories.Moreover,therelative weightofthecriteriasuggestedinnormativetheoriesdependsonsocial andeconomicdevelopmentsorchangesinpolicyconcepts,ifnewpolitical
coalitionsgaininfluence.Therefore,decisionsondecentralizationorcentralizationandtherespectiveconstitutionallawusuallyremainambivalent.The sameappliesforconstitutionaldecisionsdeterminingthedegreeofautonomy ofregionalgovernmentsbetweensharedruleandself-rule.Autonomyenables groupstopursuetheirparticulargoals,whilelimitingpossibilitiestodealwith commonproblemsofthewholecommunityofcitizensandincreasingthe challengesforcoordinationbetweenjurisdictionsandlevels.Sharedrule,on theotherhand,increasestransactioncostsinpolicy-making,dependingon theparticularpatternofmultilevelgovernance.Italsoconstrainsgovernments’ abilitytopursuethewilloftheircitizens,whileautonomymayhave a “demos-enabling” effect(Stepan1999).Beyondthat,democraticfederations andregionalizedgovernmentsimplyanormativeconflictexpressedina “continualtensionbetweenpersonsandplaces” (Kincaid2002:134).The principleofequalityofcitizensvestedwithindividualrightstendstorequire uniformdecisionsandsupportscentralizationofpower.Butdemocracyalso requiresconsideringparticularconcernsofterritoriallyorganizedgroups.
Anotherreasonfavoringconstitutional flexibilityconcernstheinevitable tensionsbetweentherequirementsofconstitutionalgovernmentandofeffectiveanddemocraticgovernanceinamultilevelsystem.Althoughthesetensions varydependingontheparticularfeaturesofagovernment,theycannotberuled outbyinstitutionaldesign.Intheory,theterritorialorganizationofastate, constitutionalism,democracyandgoodgovernancecanbejustifiedasideal principlesofgovernment;inreality,theycombinetoamultidimensionalpolity institutionalizingconflictingrequirements.Divisionofpowersbetweenlevelsof governmentandconstitutionalrulesconstrainthesovereigntyofthepeopleor parliaments;effectivepolicycoordinationbetweenlevelscanstrengthenthe executiveagainstparliaments,butiscomplicatedduetoaccountabilityofthe executive.Democraticprocessesatthedifferentlevelscancauseconflicts,which mayweakentheconstitutionalrulesonadivisionofpowers.Moreover,theneed tosettletheseconflictscancausetensionsbetweenconstitutionalcourtsand democraticpolitics.Therefore,multilevelgovernmentsrevealahigh “contradictorypotentialofinstitutions” (Onoma2010:65).
Theconsequencesofthesenormativeambiguitiesandinevitabletensions havebeenspelledoutintheoriesunderliningthenotoriousinstabilityof federalism(Lemco1991).Theyhavepointedoutdifferentmechanismsand sourcesbringingforthunintendedchangesthatthreatenthebalanceof power.Accordingly,instabilityisusuallycausedby “authoritymigration” duetoattemptsbypoliticalactorsatthecentralandlowerlevelstoincrease theirpowerandexploitambiguitiesandconflicts.Itresultsfromchanging socio-economicconditions,whichaffectpowerstructuresandthelegitimacy ofclaimstomaintainorextendpowers.Itmayalsobepromptedbychanges
inthedefinitionofpublicpoliciesinfluencingtheweightingofreasonsfora particularmultilevelstructure.
Themechanismofauthoritymigrationhasbeenemphasizedinrational choicemodelsoffederalism(Riker1964).Accordingly,thestructureofa federalsystemresultsfrombargainingamonggovernmentalactorswho conveneonbindingrulesinordertosolvecollectivechoicedilemmasand toenableeffectivegovernance,butwhoarealsointerestedinextending theirpower.Duetothesemixedmotivesofactors,federalsystemsare subjecttoanongoingpowergamebetweenlevelsofgovernmentand thusareinherentlyinstable.Forsimilarreasons,actor-centeredtheoriesof multilevelgovernancehighlightthedynamicsofstructures(Hoogheand Marks2001;Marks1996).
Society-centeredtheoriesoffederalism(Friedrich1968;Livingston 1967)eitherfocusonthein fl uenceofsocialgroupsandeconomic developmentonthedistributionofpowersortheyregardinstitutions asanexpressionofsocietalnorms.Inbothvariants,itissocialchange thatexplainsdynamicsoffederalsystems.Whileeconomicdevelopmentsaffectinginterestsandresourcesofterritorialunitscausecontinuous,butinthelongertermsignifi cantchanges,socialvaluesand normssupportthepersistenceofst ructuresandpatternsofpolicymaking.Fromthisperspective,instabilityemergesifsocietiesaredividedbyextremeeconomicdisparitiesorculturalcleavages,inparticular ifminoritiesfeeloppressedbycentraloruniformpolicies(HeinemannGrüder2002).Buttheverticaldimensionofthedistributionofpower canalsobecomeunstable,forinstanceifintensemobilityofactors acrosstheterritorialboundariescausesexternaleffectsofdecentralized governance,ifcitizensexpressincreasingordecreasingloyaltiesto regionalcommunities,orifthepoliticalstructuringofcollectiveinterestsinasocietychanges,whichinparticular fi ndsexpressioninthe territorialdimensionofthepartysystem(Benz2013).
Fromapolicy-scienceperspective,multilevelgovernmentishighly dynamicduetofunctionaltensionsbetweenunityanddiversity.Territorialscopesoftasksassignedtothedifferentlevelsoftenchangeinprocesses of “rescaling” oftasks(Brenner2004)orwhennewpoliciesaresetonthe agendaofcentralorregionalgovernments.The fiscalbalance,too,isin constant flux.Regionalcommunitiesdemandingautonomyorfairredistributionofresourcestendtomobilizecountervailingpoweragainstthe centralgovernmentresponsiblefor fiscalequalization.Centralgovernmentsoftentrytoshifttheburdenofpublicinvestmentsandservicesto lowerlevels.
Dependingontheterritorialorganizationofgovernments,thesedynamics ofthebalanceofpowerleadeithertowardsover-centralizationortowards disintegration,andbothdevelopmentscanendinthedissolutionofapoliticalsystem.Thisconstitutionalproblemhasextensivelybeendiscussedin literatureonfederalism,andscholarshavesuggesteddifferentsolutions. Rationalchoicetheorists,whoassumethatactorsareinclinedtoextend theirpower,haveexpressedtheirskepticismthatconstitutionalrulescan guaranteestabilityofafederalorder.Instead,theyrelyonapartysystem integratedacrosslevels(Filippovetal.2004;Riker1964)oroncoalitions formedbyregionsinordertodefendtheirclaimsagainstacentralgovernment (DeFigueiredoandWeingast2005).Thisway,aninstitutionalequilibriumof countervailingforcesshouldemerge “wherebyformalrulesandindividual motivesgenerallyandovertimeremaininagreement” (Filippovetal.2004:13). Butshapingafederalsystemaccordingtothesesuggestionsrequiresconstitutionalchange.Attheendoftheircompellinganalysis,Filippov,Ordeshook andShvetsova(2004:226–94)argueforanappropriateinstitutionaldesign, particularlyforrulesguaranteeingregionalandlocalautonomyandanelectoralsystemsupportinganintegratedpartysystemtoevolve.Apparently, successfulconstitutionalpolicyisnecessaryinordertostabilizefederalism. However,thedesignprinciplesleadingtoaverticalintegrationofaparty systemmakeconstitutionaldesigndifficult.Thesestructuresofpoliciesare, asillustratedbycasesofGermanorAustrianfederalism,oneofthecausesof constitutionalrigidity.Inafederalsystemwithanintegratedpartysystem, constitutionalchangerequiresanagreementofgovernmentsfromdifferent levelswhicharelikelytoadheretocompetingparties.Whilesuchaconstellationindeedguaranteesstability,itmightbecometoorigidinviewofthe needtoadjustthefederalbalancetochangesinsociety.
Otherscholarshaveemphasizedthecapacityoffederalsystemstoadjust and findadynamicequilibrium(Landau1973).This flexibilityshouldbe achievedbycountervailingsafeguardsandtheopportunitiesforexperimental policies(Bednar2009;Nicolaïdis2001).Furthermore,areinterpretationof constitutionalruleslegitimizedbyconstitutionalcourtshasbeensaidto allowforincrementalchange(Galligan2008).Accordingly,scholarshave regardedconstitutionsasincompletecontracts(Héritier2007:46)andconcludedthatanyallocationofpowersandrulesofintergovernmentalrelations needtobecontinuouslyrenegotiated.However,abalanceofpowerdoesnot necessarilyemergeasaresult.Thetechnicalterminologyofsystemtheory introducedbyLandauconcealsmechanismsof “error-controlanderrorcorrection” (Landau1973:181)aspoliticalprocesses.Whatisdefinedasanerror andhowitmustbecorrectedisanissueofpoliticaldecision-makingandraises theproblemoflegitimacy.Therefore,while flexibilitybycontinuousrenegotiationsorreinterpretationsmayallowforadjustment,wehavetotakeinto
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total of 300,000 poods of which not less than one half is sent to Orenburg, the trade realising about 1,000,000 roubles. Hitherto little has been attempted. With the assistance of the railway a speedy expansion of the trade is assured—the interests of the fishing population and the general welfare of the river traffic having been advanced through the construction of a harbour upon the gulf of Sari Cheganak, in connection with the railway and only 5 versts distant. Aral sea, the station at this point, is 790 versts from Orenburg.
The fourth and last division, from Kazalinsk to Tashkent, runs along the valley of the Syr Daria. It is fully supplied with good water and possesses a larger population than either the second or the third sections. In it the line traverses the following districts of the Syr Daria province:
District. Area. Population.
The Perovski district notwithstanding the good qualities of its soil produces very little corn; its chief population consists of nomadic Kirghiz who together own 990,000 head of cattle, the export cattle trade for the district amounting to 2,000,000 roubles annually. Small tracts of wheat and millet are cultivated here and there with the aid of tchigirs, native watering-pumps. The water is brought up from the river by means of a wheel, along the rim of which are fixed earthenware jugs or cylindrical vessels of sheet iron. These vessels raise the water to the height of the bank, whence it is very readily distributed. The best corn-lands are situated in the Djulek subdistrict; but the primitive methods of agriculture existing amongst the nomads, in conjunction with the deficiencies in the irrigation system, explain at once the lack of cereal development in these areas.
Perovski was taken by Count Perovski on July 28, 1853, and in honour of the occasion by Imperial order the fortress was renamed Fort Perovski. Close to the town there is a memorial to the Russian soldiers who fell during that engagement.
The present population comprises: Males
The town contains:
Private houses 600
Orthodox church 1
Synagogue 1
Mosques 5
Schools 3
Military hospital 1
together with district administrative offices similar to those established at Kazalinsk. The water-supply is drawn from the Syr Daria by means of wells. There are no hotels. The town revenue is only 12,350 roubles; although the importation of various goods from Russia into the Perovski district represents an annual sum of 2,900,000 roubles. With the advent of the Central Asian railway the commercial importance of Perovski, once a point through which caravans destined for Orenburg or Tashkent passed, waned. Now its trade is dependent upon the numerous Tartars and Ural Cossacks who have settled there. The place is unhealthy, and the settlement is affected by the malaria arising from the marshes which surround it. In spring and summer the lagoons swarm with myriads of mosquitoes and horse-flies; so great is the plague that the Kirghiz together with their flocks and herds after wintering along the Syr Daria beat a hurried retreat into the steppe, driven off by the tiresome insects. Many months elapse before the nomads return; it is not until the cold weather has set in that they appear in any numbers. Quite close to Perovski there are two immigrant villages— Alexandrovski and Novo Astrakhanski—erected in 1895, where the inhabitants are occupied with cattle-farming and the sale of hay in winter time to the Kirghiz. The district possesses nothing save a pastoral population and a small settlement of 200 souls at Djulek. This place, formerly a fortress founded in 1861 and now half destroyed by the floods of the Syr Daria, contains the administrative offices of the commissioner of the section, with a postal and telegraphic bureau and a native school. To the south of Djulek there is Skobelevski, another small village founded by immigrants in 1895 and containing some fifty-six houses. It is watered by the Tchilli arik. Skobelevski is rapidly developing into a trade-mart, the source of its good fortune being contained in the advantageous position which it
fills in the steppe. Throughout this region, plots of land with a good quality soil and well watered have been granted to colonists.
The Chimkent district similarly possesses a rich and fertile soil, derived in the main from its network of irrigating canals. Its population is more numerous than other adjacent settlements and it supports altogether seventeen immigrant villages with a population of 5135. Chimkent contains in itself all the features necessary to the development of a wide belt of agriculture; but at the present time the most extensive tracts of wheat land are along the systems of the Aris, Aksu, Badam, Buraldai, Burdjar, Tchayan and Bugun rivers. In the valley of the Arisi, along the middle reaches, there are rice-fields; and in the country round Chimkent the cotton industry has begun to develop. Experiments are being tried in the cultivation of beetroot as the soil and climatic conditions of the district are especially favourable to its growth. The present quality of the Chimkent beetroot is not inferior to that grown in the Kharkoff Government; so that Chimkent may well become, in the near future, the centre of a sugar-producing industry not only for Turkestan but for the whole of Central Asia, which so far has imported its sugar exclusively from European Russia.
The district town of Chimkent, formerly a Khokand fortress taken by the Russian forces under the command of General Chernaieff September 22, 1864, lies upon the eastern side of the railway. Its population comprises:
There are in the Russian Quarter. Native Quarter.
16 Government offices similar to those in other towns are also found. The town revenue is 11,760 roubles.
The trade returns of the Chimkent district amount to 5,000,000 roubles.
Hides
Lard
Butter
Wheat
Santonin
3,000,000 roubles
2,000,000 roubles
Through Chimkent passes a road from Tashkent to Verni. In the northern part of the district the line runs close to the ruins of the ancient town of Sauran and the fortress of Vani Kurgan, from where it proceeds to Turkestan. This was occupied in 1864 by the Russian forces under the command of General Verevkin.
Turkestan is situated 40 versts to the east of the right bank of the Syr Daria, at a height of 102 sagenes above sea level. It is watered by canals diverted from springs and small rivers which flow from the southern slopes of the Kara mountains. The combined population of the place comprises:
The outward appearance of the town is extremely handsome. There is much vegetation, many wide streets and large open spaces.