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DiscourseContextualism DiscourseContextualism AFrameworkforContextualist SemanticsandPragmatics AlexSilk
GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OXDP, UnitedKingdom
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Contents Acknowledgments ix
.Introduction:CR-ExpressionsandDiscourseContextualism
PartI.DiscourseContextualism:AnApplication toEpistemicModals .AccommodationandNegotiationwithContext-SensitiveExpressions
.EpistemicModalsandDiscourseDisagreement
.InsufficientReplies
..TheVarietiesofLinguisticDenial.MetacontextualNegotiation
..EpistemicModalsinaLanguageGame
..Recap
.AccommodationandNegotiationwithParadigmContext-SensitiveExpressions
.AWayForward
.ManagingtheContext:TowardDiscourseContextualism
.DiscourseContextualismI:EpistemicModalsinDiscourse .Componentsand:FromFormalSemanticstoInterpretiveConstraints
.Component:UsingEpistemicModals.TheBasicAccount
.Features
..JustifiedUse
..LocusofDisagreement
..Discourse-OrientedEffects
..ExpressingStatesofMind
..Expressivevs.IntuitivelyContextualistUses
..AnaphoricProperties.ContextualUnderspecification
..Recap
.MoreData:RetractionandEavesdroppers
..Retraction
..EavesdroppersandInter-ConversationalDisagreement
.Aside:PresuppositionandEpistemicModals
..“Assuming”ValuesforVariables?
..PresuppositionandNon-MonotonicUpdates
..APresuppositionofCommonality?
.Truth
.Recap
.DiscourseContextualismII:HowtoEmbedanEpistemicModal
.EmbeddingProblems
..First-OrderStatesofMind
..ObligatoryShifting
..EpistemicContradictions
..Inferences
..FactiveAttitudes
.EmbeddingSolutions
..First-OrderStatesofMind
..ObligatoryShifting
..EpistemicContradictions
..Inferences
..FactiveAttitudes
..Recap
.Aside:ContextualismandRelativistContent
.AChallengeRevisited:EpistemicModalsandParadigmContext-Sensitive Expressions
.Recap
PartII.DiscourseContextualism:Extensions .ExtensionI:DeonticModals
.Introduction
.DeonticModalsinDiscourse
..ContextualismaboutDeonticModals
..AgreeingandDisagreeingwithNormativeLanguage
..ADiscourseContextualistAccount
..Features
..UncertaintyandIndecisioninNormativeInquiry
..Recap
.EmbeddedContextsandNormativeThought
..AttitudesandAttitudeAscriptions
..CR-Contradictions?
.RealismandNormativeTruth
.Recap
.Information-Sensitivity
.ExtensionII:GradableAdjectivesandDegreeVagueness
.Introduction
.GradableAdjectivesinDiscourse
..StandardsandScoreboards
..DiscourseDynamics
..AttitudeAscriptions
..Recap
.VaguenessasContextualIndecision
..TheSorites
..Vagueness,Meaning,andUse
..Logic,Metaphysics,andEpistemologyofVagueness
..VaguenessinLanguageandThought
.Conclusion
..BeyondGradableAdjectives
..Higher-OrderVagueness
..VaguenessandDegreeSemantics
.ExtensionIII:PredicatesofPersonalTasteandEvaluation
.ThreeSourcesofContext-Sensitivity
.MattersofTasteinDiscourseandThought
.VaguenesswithPPTs
.AdjectivesofNormativeandEpistemicEvaluation
.TasteandNormativeEvaluation
.‘Find’and“Subjectivity”
.Recap
Appendix:Taxonomy
Bibliography
Index
Acknowledgments Ibegandevelopingtheideasinthisbookinfall.Inworkingouttheseideas Iwasgreatlyassistedbyparticipantsinvariousworkshopsandconferences.For helpfuldiscussion,thankstoJustinClarke-Doane,KaivonFintel,NickJones,Daniel Rothschild,PaoloSantorio,BernhardSallow,ScottSturgeon,andaudiencesatthe EidynConferenceonNormativityandModalityattheUniversityofEdinburgh,nd LogicandLanguageConferenceattheInstituteofPhilosophy–London,Workshopon SemanticContentandConversationalDynamicsattheUniversityofBarcelona,Yale WorkshopinMetaethicsandPhilosophyofLaw,OxfordMoralPhilosophySeminar, TilburgUniversity,UniversityCollegeLondon,UniversityofBirmingham,University ofGlasgow,andUniversityofLeeds.IamalsogratefultotworeadersforOxford UniversityPressforvaluablefeedbackonapenultimatedraft.Thebookwascompleted underthesupportofanAHRCEarlyCareerResearchGrant.Thankstotheeditor, PeterMomtchiloff,forhispatienceandassistancethroughouttheprocess.
PortionsofChapterappearedinSilk(a).ThankstoTrumanCapote’sliterary executorforpermissiontoincludetheepigraphtoChapter.
It’spuzzlingwork,talkingis.
(Mr.Tulliver,inGeorgeEliot, TheMillontheFloss,bk,Ch.)
Introduction CR-ExpressionsandDiscourseContextualism “Wehavenotmissed,youandI,contextualism:thatmany-splendoredthing”isnot howthemovieends.Butitmighthave.
Animportantfunctionoflanguageistoshareandcoordinateourattitudesin communication.Ininquirywemanageourbeliefsabouthowthingsare,howthey mightbe,andhowpossibilitiesmayhangtogether.Wealsotakeastanceandsocially orientourselvestowardpossibleacts,attitudes,andstatesofaffairs.Weevaluate possibilitiesasdesirable,appropriate,horrible,trivial,permissible,wonderful.We makedemandsandgrantpermissions,emphasizecommonalityandbreedantipathy. Incommunicationweshapeouridentitiesasthinkersandfeelersinasocialworld;we coordinateonwhattobelieve,howtoact,howtofeel,andwhomtobe.
Languageaffordsavarietyofexpressiveresourcesfordoingso.Forinstance,our evaluationof(),totakeanot-quite-momentous(?)example,dependsonwhatour tastesarelike.
()Thisicecreamisdelicious.
()canseemacceptableifyouliketheicecream,butunacceptableifyoudon’t.Inusing ‘delicious’speakerscanexpresstheirexperiencesandcoordinatetheirsensibilities— sometimesinagreement,asin(),sometimesindisagreement,asin().
() Me: Thisicecreamisdelicious.
You: Yeahitis.Let’sgetsomemore.
() Me: Thisicecreamisdelicious.
You: Noway.It’swaytoosweet.
Such discourse-oriented usesoflanguage(letuscallthem)arecommonplace.Howto capturethemisnot.
Oneapproachistotreattheinterpretationof(e.g.)‘delicious’as,insome sense,dependingoncontext.Whether()istrueorfalsecanvaryacrosscontexts,onthisapproach,evenifeverythingelseintheworld—e.g.thefactsabout theicecream’smicrophysicalproperties—remainsfixed. Contextualism treatsthis context-dependenceasadependenceofsemantic(conventional)contentonfeatures ofthecontextofutterance.Weareallcontextualistsaboutpureindexicalswhose
contentsaredeterminedbyspecificlinguisticrules.‘I’,forinstance,invariablyrefersto thespeakerofthecontext.Butnotallexpressionswhoseinterpretationisintuitively sensitivetocontextlendthemselvestosostraightforwardananalysis.TherearePerry’s (:–)intentionalindexicalswhosecontentis,plausibly,determinedinpartby pragmaticfactors,likespeakerintentions.Demonstratives,quantifiers,andeven‘here’ and‘now’likelyfallinthiscamp.Such“impureindexicals”raisemanyquestionsabout howcontextaffectsinterpretation.But,detailsofthesemanticsandmetasemantic aside,weallgrantthatthecontentsoftheseexpressionsdependsinsomesense onfeaturesofthecontextofutterance.Inadditionthereisarangeofexpressions whoseinterpretationisintuitivelysensitivetocontext,butwhicharesuchthatno particularwayofspellingouttheircontext-sensitivityseemscapableofcapturing allourintuitions.Itistheseexpressionsthatarethelocusof—and,dependingon one’staste,toblamefor—recentcontextualism-relativismdebates.Theseexpressions includepredicatesofpersonaltaste,like‘delicious’,aswellasepistemicvocabulary, normativeandevaluativevocabulary,andvaguegradableadjectives,amongothers. Calltheseexpressions‘CR-expressions’.1
ContextualismtreatsCR-expressionsascontext-sensitiveinthesamekindofwayas paradigmcontext-sensitiveexpressions.Assimilatingtheapparentcontext-sensitivity ofCR-expressionstothatofparadigmcontext-sensitiveexpressionsmightseemto affordaninitiallyattractivediagnosisofdiscourse-orienteduseslikethosein()–().Yetseriousobjectionshavebeenraised.AcontextualistaboutaCR-expression mustprovideageneralaccountofwhatinformation,standard,tastes,etc.(depending ontheiteminquestion)issuppliedasafunctionofthecontextofutteranceand figuresinthederivationofsemanticcontent.Therearetwomainclassesofdata thathavebeenthoughtproblematic:first,discoursephenomenainvolvingagreement anddisagreement;second,theinterpretationofCR-expressionsinvariouscomplex linguisticenvironments,suchasinattitudeascriptionsandconditionals.Whichis
1 Theliteratureisvast.Somereferences:
Onpredicatesofpersonaltaste:Wright,Kölbel,Lasersohn,Glanzberg, Nouwen,Stephensonb,c,Stojanovic,Richard,Cappelen&Hawthorne, Egan,Schaffer,MacFarlane.
Onepistemicvocabulary:Price,DeRose,Veltman,Field,,Eganetal. ,Egan,vonFintel&Gillies,,,Stephensonb,c,Wright,Yalcin ,,,Dowell,MacFarlane,,Schaffer,Swansona,a,Braun ,Rothschild,Moss,,Willer,Stalnaker.
Onindicativeconditionals:Veltman,Stephensona,Yalcin,a,c,Gillies, ,Weatherson,MacFarlane,Stalnaker,Moss.
On‘know’:Cohen,DeRose,,Lewis,Hawthorne,Richard,Stanley ,Cappelen&Lepore,MacFarlanea,Chrisman,Ludlow,Blome-Tillmann ,Moss.
Onnormativelanguage:Harman,,Wong,,Dreier,,Gibbard,, Wright,Kölbel,,Brogaardb,Kolodny&MacFarlane,Silkc,b, Yalcina,Velleman,MacFarlane.
Onvaguelanguage:Kamp,Bosch,Raffman,,Soames,Fara,Barker ,Richard,Shapiro,Kennedy,Kölbel,Ludlow.
tosay:CR-expressionsseemhappy(=contextualist-friendly)neitherembeddednor unembedded.ThegeneralconsensusisthatCR-expressions’distinctivediscourse propertiesandembeddingbehaviorcannotbecapturedbyastandardcontextualist semanticsandgeneralpragmaticprinciples.2 Manytheoristsusetheputativelyproblematicdatatomotivaterevisingthecompositionalsemantics(asbyaddingadditional parameterstotheindexorcircumstanceofevaluation)orpostsemantics(asby relativizingthedefinitionoftruth-in-a-contexttoaposited“contextofassessment”). Thoughtheresultingtheoriesdifferintheirdetails,theyagreeindistinguishing thecontext-sensitivityofCR-expressionsfromthatofparadigmcontext-sensitive expressions.Eventhosewhowishtomaintainacontextualistsemanticsoftendoso onlybyresortingtoadhocpragmaticprinciples.
Somereadersmayhavetheimpressionthatthedebatesbetweencontextualistand non-contextualisttheorieshavecometoastandstill.Ifyouweretiredofthesedebates, Iwouldn’tbeunsympathetic.ButIthinkthereisprogresstobemade.
InthisbookIarguethatwecancapturetheseeminglyproblematicdiscoursepropertiesandembeddingbehaviorofCR-expressionswithanordinarystaticcontextualist semanticsalongwithgeneral,independentlymotivatedprinciplesofinterpretation andpragmaticreasoning.Icalltheproposedaccount DiscourseContextualism.My introducingthenewlabelshouldn’tmislead.Theprojectistodevelopastandard,no semanticbellsorpragmaticwhistlescontextualisttheory,andtodefenditagainstsome ofcontextualism’smostpressingobjections.Nonovelsemanticapparatusorpragmatic mechanismsarerequired.
IbegininChapterbyexaminingdiscourseagreementanddisagreement.Ishow thatthedisagreementphenomenathathavebeenthoughtproblematicforcontextualistsaboutCR-expressionscanarisewithparadigmcontext-sensitiveexpressions. ThecasesIprovidemotivateamoreunifiedtreatmentofparadigmcontext-sensitive expressionsandtheexpressionsthathavefiguredinrecentcontextualism-relativism debates.Iclosethischapterbysuggestingwaysthedialecticmayproceed,andIraise correspondingchallengesforrelativismandcontextualism.Thedepthoftheproblem forcontextualismraisedbydisagreementphenomenahasnotbeenadequatelyappreciatedbycontextualists.Thecentralchallengeistoexplainthesystematicdifferencesin linguisticbehaviorbetweenCR-expressions,ontheonehand,andparadigmcontextsensitiveexpressions,ontheother,giventhattheyhavethesamegeneralkindof semantics.Thesubsequentchapterstakeupthetaskofrespondingtovariousinstances ofthisgeneralchallenge.
TakingmycuefromthenewdataIprovide,Imotivateanddevelopanimproved frameworkfordevelopingacontextualistsemanticsandpragmatics,whichIcall DiscourseContextualism.TheaimofDiscourseContextualismistoderivethe distinctivelinguisticbehaviorofagivenCR-expressionfromaparticularcontextualist
2
interpretationofanindependentlymotivatedformalsemantics,alongwithgeneral principlesofinterpretationandpragmaticreasoning.In using CR-expressions, speakerscanexploittheirmutualgrammaticalandworldknowledge,andgeneral pragmaticreasoningskills,tocoordinatetheirattitudesandmanagetheirassumptions aboutthecontextitself.DiscourseContextualismaffordsanindependentlyattractive accountofthemeaningofCR-expressions,theirdistinctiverolesincommunication, andtheroleofcontextintheirinterpretation.ThedevelopmentofDiscourse Contextualisminthisbookshedslightoninterestinggeneralissuesconcerning thevarietiesofcontext-sensitivityinnaturallanguage;thenatureandoriginsof presupposition;theroleofpresuppositionincollaborativeactionanddiscourse;the interactionsbetweencontextandcontentthroughouttheprocessofinterpretation; theinterpretationofcontext-sensitiveexpressionsinembeddedcontexts;therelations amonglogic,semantics,pragmatics,andmetasemantics;theroleoftruthand truth-valueintuitionsinsemantictheorizing;andthesubstantivenormativeand metaphysicalassumptionsofnaturallanguage.
Thestructureoftheremainingchaptersisasfollows.Chapters–developthe DiscourseContextualistframeworkbyapplyingittothecaseofepistemicmodals. Thesechaptersconstitutethecoreofthebook.IarguethatDiscourseContextualismcansuccessfullyrespondtobothcentralclassesofchallengestocontextualist semanticsaboutepistemicmodals.Chapterfocusesoncapturingvariousdiscourse phenomenawithepistemicmodalsinunembeddeduses.Chapterextendsthe accounttocapturevariousembeddingphenomenawithepistemicmodalsinattitude ascriptions,conditionals,andinferences.
Chapters–applytheDiscourseContextualistframeworktoseveralothertypes ofCR-expressions:deonticmodals,vaguegradableadjectives,and(whatIwillcall) evaluationaladjectives,includingpredicatesofpersonaltaste,normativeadjectives, andepistemicadjectives.Theseexpressionsexhibitmanyofthesamekindsof distinctivephenomenamotivatingaDiscourseContextualistaccount.However,we willseeimportantdifferencesamongthem,inbothmeaninganduse.Howtoapply thegeneralDiscourseContextualistframeworkineachcaseisnon-trivial.Theapplicationsinthesechaptersmotivateattractiveaccountsof(e.g.)thesoritesparadoxand information-sensitivity,andprovideperspicuousframeworksforbroadertheorizing aboutvaguenessandnormativityinlanguageandthought.DiscourseContextualist semanticsandpragmaticsprovidethebasisformorecomprehensivephilosophical theories.
Finally,anAppendixlaysoutmypreferredtaxonomyforarangeofinvariantist, contextualist,andrelativistviews.
Myprimaryaimsinthisbookaretwofold.First,mostworkonCR-expressionshas beenpiecemeal,addressedtoaparticularclassofexpressions.3 Proceedinginthisway
3 AnotableexceptionisJohnMacFarlane’swork(seehisforacollectionofapplications).
runstheriskofdrawinghastygeneralizations,missingoutonothers,andproducing atheorythatisill-equippedtocapturethebroaderspectrumofexamples.Itisn’tfor noreasonthatsimilarmoveshavebeenmadeintheliteraturesonepistemicmodals, predicatesofpersonaltaste,gradableadjectives,etc.Theseexpressionsexhibitmanyof thesamedistinctivelinguisticpropertieswhichhaveledtotheseparalleldialectics— hencemyintroducingthelabel‘CR-expression’.However,myuseofthislabelshouldn’t mislead:itdoesn’tpresupposethattheexpressionsultimatelycompriseadistinctive lexicalclass.WeshouldinsistonaunifiedaccountofCR-expressions—or,betterput, anaccountwhichcapturesasmuchcommonalityamongthemasthedataallow.But firstweneedabetterunderstandingofwhatexactlytherelevantdataare.Weneed amoresystematicinvestigationoftherangeofCR-expressions.Acentralaimofthe presentprojectistotakeupsuchaninvestigation.Takingonthismoredemanding goalprovidesarichersetofdataforadjudicatingamongtheories.Thisincludes dataconcerningsimilarities anddifferences amongCR-expressions,aswellasamong context-sensitiveexpressionsmoregenerally.TheinvestigationofCR-expressionsin thisbookcanthusbeseenaspartofthelargerbodyofrecentresearch—notonlyin philosophyoflanguagebutalsovarioussubfieldsoflinguisticsandcomputerscience— onthevarietiesofcontext-sensitivelanguageandtheroleofcontextininterpretation.
Thatsaid,Iwon’tbeabletoconsidereveryconstructionwhichhasbeensubject torecentcontextualism/relativismdebateshere.Forinstance,therearealsoindicativeconditionalsand‘knows’.Theseconnectnaturallywithepistemicmodals,butI won’texaminetheseconnectionshere.AndthoughIconsidercertaincategoriesof epistemic,normative,andvaguelanguage,Iignoreothers.Ileavefurtherapplications andgeneralizationsofthetheaccountsofferedhereforelsewhere.
Canvassingthewiderarrayofdatacanhelpclarifypreciselywhattherelevant challengesfordifferentviewsare,andtherebydelineatebettermotivatedpathsfor thedialectictotake.Thesecondaimofthebookistobeginthetaskofadvancing thedialecticsoconceived.Iwon’tbearguingthatnoalternativecontextualistornoncontextualisttheorycangetthedataright—althoughwaysinwhichtheproposed DiscourseContextualistaccountimprovesuponitsrivalswillbeindicatedaspoints ofcontrastaremadesalient.Myprimaryaimisconstructive.Itistodevelopa contextualisttheorywhichimprovesinoverallempiricalcoverageandexplanatory power,andtobegintoinvestigatethetheory’sprospects.Thisinquirycanhelp delineatetheadvantagesandburdensofcontextualismgoingforwardandprovidea moreappropriatebasisfortheorycomparison.
IwillarguethatDiscourseContextualismmeetsvariouschallengesoftenthought devastatingforcontextualism,anddoessoutilizingonlyindependentlyattested aspectsofconventionalmeaningandgeneralprinciplesofinterpretationandpragmaticreasoning.Thisshouldbeofinteresttotheoristswhoarecompelledbythe thoughtthattheinterpretationofCR-expressionsdepends,insomesense,oncontext,butwhoalsohavereservationsabouttherevisionsintroducedbyrelativist, expressivist,anddynamicaccounts.(Isuspectthatmany(most?)theoristsfallinto
thiscamp.)ThoughIfindsomeofthecommonlycitedreservationstobemisplaced, alternativeaccounts do facenon-trivialburdens—forinstance,fortheinvariantist,to providepositiveevidenceforthinkingthatitispartoftheconventionalmeaningsof CR-expressionsthattheworldofevaluationdeterminesaparticularinformationstate, standard,etc.;fortherelativistandexpressivist,toprovideaccountsofpropositions, assertion,belief,andtruth,andtojustifytherevisionarylogicsoftengeneratedbytheir semantics.Someoftheseburdenshavebeguntobeaddressed,butaccountsareoften admittedlyincomplete.
Insum,DiscourseContextualismpromisesanempiricallyadequateandtheoreticallyattractiveaccountofthemeaninganduseof(atleastsome)CR-expressions.The accountshedslightonmoregeneralfeaturesofmeaningandcommunication,and providesafruitfulframeworkfortheorizingaboutbroaderphilosophicalissues,as inphilosophyoflanguage,metaphysics,normativeandmetanormativetheory,logic, andphilosophyofmind.Ileaveadditionaldevelopmentsandtheorycomparisonsfor futureresearch.
PARTI DiscourseContextualism AnApplicationtoEpistemicModals AccommodationandNegotiation withContext-SensitiveExpressions InotedinChapterthattherearetwocentralclassesofdataoftenthoughtproblematicforcontextualism:dataconcerningthebehaviorofCR-expressionsindiscoursedisagreements,anddataconcerningtheinterpretationofCR-expressionsin variousembeddedcontexts.ThischapterbeginsourinvestigationofCR-expressions indiscoursebyexaminingtheformerclassofdata.ForconcretenessIcouchthe discussionintermsofepistemicmodals,i.e.epistemicusesofmodalverbssuch as‘may’,‘might’,‘must’.OthertypesofCR-expressionswillbeconsideredinlater chapters.
§.presentsastandardversionoftheobjectionfromdiscoursedisagreement— contextualism’s“Achilles’heel”(MacFarlane:),accordingtosome.§. considersseveralstrategiesofreplycommonintheliterature,butarguesthatthey areinsufficient.Thedepthoftheproblemraisedbydisagreementphenomena hasnotbeenadequatelyappreciatedbycontextualists.Asawaytowardamore adequatesolution,§.providesnewdataillustratingthatthesamesortofseemingly problematicdisagreementphenomenafoundwithCR-expressionscanalsoarisewith paradigmcontext-sensitiveexpressions.§.assessesthedialecticalimportofthe casesIprovidefordevelopmentsofcontextualism.§.motivatesadiagnosisofthe broaderspectrumofdiscoursedisagreementexamples.Thiselucidatesthestructure ofamoresuccessfulcontextualistaccount.Developingthisaccountformsthetaskof theremainderofthebook.
.EpistemicModalsandDiscourseDisagreement Epistemicmodalsareinterpreted—insomesensesensetobefurtherspecified—with respecttoabodyofinformation(evidence,beliefs,knowledge,etc.;differencesin whichepistemicrelationisrelevantwon’tmatterinwhatfollows).Sometimesthis bodyofinformationismadelinguisticallyexplicit,likein().
()InviewofSally’sevidence,thebutlermightbethekiller.
Thephrase‘inviewofSally’sevidence’specifiesthatitisSally’sevidencethatfiguresin theinterpretationof‘might’.Roughly,()saysthatSally’sevidenceiscompatiblewith
thebutler’sbeingthekiller.Othertimesnoparticularbodyofinformationisexplicitly specified,likein().
()Thebutlermightbethekiller.
Followingcommonusage,callsentenceslike() bareepistemicmodalsentences;and callepistemicmodalsthatoccurinsuchsentences bareepistemicmodals.Itisbare epistemicmodalsthatwillbethefocusofthefollowingchapters.Unlessotherwise noted,by‘epistemicmodal’Iwillmean“bareepistemicmodal,”andby‘epistemic modalsentence(utterance,assertion,claim)’Iwillmean“bareepistemicmodal sentence(utterance,assertion,claim).”
Ourevaluationsofepistemicmodalsentencesdependonwhatourepistemicstate islike.()canseemacceptableifyoudon’tknowwhetherthebutleristhekiller butunacceptableifyouknowthatheisn’t.Contextualistsandrelativists,incontrast toinvariantists,claimthatthisdependenceofourevaluationofepistemicmodal sentencesonourepistemicstatederivesfromadependenceoftheinterpretationof epistemicmodalsonacontextuallyrelevantbodyofinformation.Theyagreethatthe truthvalueofanepistemicmodalsentencecanvaryacrossparametersofinterpretation(contextsofutterance,circumstancesofevaluation,contextsofassessment)even ifeverythingelseintheworldremainsconstant.
Contextualists claimthatthiscontext-dependence,broadlyconstrued,istobe understoodasadependenceofthesemantic(conventional)contentofanepistemic modalsentenceonfeaturesofthecontextofutterance,thosefeaturesthatdetermine somecontextuallyrelevantbodyofinformation.Contextualismtreats()ascontextsensitiveinthesamekindofwayassentenceswithparadigmcontext-sensitive expressions.Whatinformationisconveyedby()dependsonwhichfemaleismost salientinthediscoursecontext.
()Shewonamedal.
InacontextwhereAnnaismostsalient,()communicatesthatAnnawonamedal; butinacontextwhereBettyismostsalient,()communicatesthatBettywonamedal. Likewise,accordingtocontextualism,inacontextwhereAnnette’sinformation iA isrelevant,()communicates(roughly)that iA iscompatiblewiththebutler’sbeing thekiller;butinacontextwhereBen’sinformation i B isrelevant,()communicates (roughly)that iB iscompatiblewiththebutler’sbeingthekiller.What()conventionallycommunicates,andwhetheritistrueorfalse,dependsonwhatinformationis relevantinthediscoursecontext.1
1 Iwillusetermslike‘conversation’,‘discourse’,‘utterance’,etc.broadly,soastoincludeusesoflanguage intextsandinindividualdeliberation,andnotsimplyinspokendialogue.ForthemomentIglossover differencesbetweensentences-in-contextandutterances,andbetweentruthconditionsandinformation conventionallyconveyed.Wewillreturntotheimportanceofthesedistinctionsinthefollowingchapters (seeesp.§§.,.).Fornow,mytalkaboutthesemanticpropertiesofutterancescanbeunderstoodasshort fortalkaboutthesemanticpropertiesofthesentencesutteredinthecontextsofthoseutterances.Following Yalcin,theremaybereasonstoavoidusing‘(semantic)content’asalabelforacompositionalsemantic
Contextualismtreatsaparticularbodyofinformationdeterminedbythecontext ofutteranceasfiguringinthetruthconditionsofanepistemicmodalsentence.So,to giveaproperaccountofthemeaningsofepistemicmodalsincontext,thecontextualist mustprovideageneralaccountofwhatbodyofinformationissuppliedasafunction ofthecontextofutteranceandfiguresinderivingsemanticcontent.Theputative problemisthattheredoesn’tseemtobeanywayofspecifyingthecontextuallyrelevant informationthatexplainsboth(a)howwe’reinapositiontomaketheepistemic modalclaimsthatweseemlicensedinmaking(callitthe justifiedusecondition),and (b)howwecanreasonablydisagreewithoneanother’sepistemicmodalclaims(callit the disagreementcondition).2
Supposeaclasstestiscomingup.Aliceisunsurewhenitis,soshedecidestoask Bert.Thefollowingdialogueensues:
() Alice: Whenisthetest?
Bert: I’mnotsure.ThetestmaybeonMonday.
Alice: No,thetestcan’tbeonMonday.Theteachernevergivestestsrightafter theweekend.Itmustbelaterintheweek.
Whatbodyorbodiesofinformationshouldthecontextualistsayfiguresinthecontents ofBert’suseofepistemic‘may’andAlice’suseofepistemic‘can’t’and‘must’?
Suppose,first,thatBert’sutteranceof()isjustabouthisowninformation.
()ThetestmaybeonMonday.
AssumingBertisinapositiontomakeaclaimabouthisepistemicstate,thiscaptures howBertisjustifiedinmakinghisepistemicmodalutterance.Butitbecomesunclear
valueincontext.Myuseof‘content’forthistypeofsemanticobjectmakesnoassumptionsaboutitspotential broadertheoreticalrole.SeealsotheAppendix.
By‘contextualism’Iwillmean“UtteranceContextualism”inthesenseoftheAppendix—alsocalled ‘indexicalrelativism’(Wright,Kölbel,Dreier),‘revisionism’(Kölbel),and ‘indexicalcontextualism’(MacFarlaneb).Toa firstapproximation,by‘relativism’Imeantheview thatnoparticularbodyofinformationfiguresinthesemanticcontentofanepistemicmodalsentence,and thatepistemicmodalsentencesincontext(ortokenepistemicmodalutterances)canhavedifferenttruth valuesrelativetodifferentassessorsinthesameworld.Icharacterizeamoreprecisetypologyofviewsin theAppendix(seealso§§.,.).SeeCh.n.forreferences.
Intheliteratureonpragmaticenrichment,‘contextualism’referstotheviewthatcontextaffectsasserted contentinwaysthatgobeyondsupplyingvaluesforfreevariablesandothersemanticallycontext-sensitive materialinthesyntax(e.g.Recanati,,Bach,Sperber&Wilson,Travis, Bezuidenhout,Carston,Soames;seeStanleyfortheclassiccritique).Sincesuch viewswouldassimilatethecontext-sensitivityofCR-expressionstoanallegedradicallygeneralcontextsensitivityinlanguage,Iwon’tbeconsideringtheminthisbook(cf.alsoLudlow).Iuse‘contextualism’ torefertothemorecircumscribedviewdescribedinthemaintext.
2 Fordiscussionofthisstyleofobjectioninthebroaderliterature,seee.g.Gibbard,,Wright ,,,Kölbel,,DeRose,Richard,,,Eganetal., Lasersohn,Stanley,Egan,,Glanzberg,MacFarlanea,,, Stephensonb,vonFintel&Gillies,Dreier,Swansona,Yablo,Stalnaker .Forprescientearlydiscussioninthecaseofnormativelanguage,seeMoore:ch.,Stevenson ,a.
howAlicecanreasonablydisagreewithhim.Anditbecomesunclearhowinuttering ()AliceisdisagreeingwithBert,giventhattheyaremakingclaimsabouttheir respectiveinformation.
()No,thetestcan’tbeonMonday.
Let m bethepropositionthatthetestisMonday.AliceandBertcanagreeabout whether m iscompatiblewiththeirrespectiveinformationstateswhiledisagreeing withwhatoneanothersays.Alice’slinguisticdenialin()isfelicitous,whereas B’sin ()isnot.
() A: InviewofBert’sevidence,thetestmaybeonMonday.
B: #No,inviewofAlice’sevidence,thetestcan’tbeonMonday.
Thisputspressureontheclaimthat()and()explicitlyspecifythesemanticcontents of()and(),respectively.
()InviewofBert’sevidence,thetestmaybeonMonday.
()InviewofAlice’sevidence,thetestcan’tbeonMonday.
Supposeinsteadthatwetreatepistemicmodalclaimsasclaimsaboutthepooled informationofarelevantgroup.ThenwecancapturehowAliceandBertmakeinconsistentclaims.ButitbecomesunclearhowBertisinapositiontomakeaclaimabout whetherthetestmaybeonMonday,which,intuitively,heis.Itcanbeappropriatefor Berttoutter()evenifhedoesn’tknowwhetherAliceisuncertainabout m
Insum,theobjectionfromdisagreementisthatifwetreatepistemicmodal utterancesasaboutthespeaker’sinformation(“speakercontextualism”),wecapture thejustifieduseconditionbutleavethedisagreementconditionunexplained;but ifwetreatepistemicmodalutterancesasaboutthepooledinformationofalarger group(“groupcontextualism”),wecapturethedisagreementconditionbutleavethe justifieduseunexplained.Thereseemstobenogeneralwayofspecifyingwhatbodyof informationisrelevantasafunctionofcontextthatcapturesallourintuitions.Inusing epistemicmodalsspeakersexpresstheirstatesofmindandmanagewhichpossibilities aretreatedaslive.Acontextualistsemanticsseemsill-suitedtocapturethis.Orsothe objectiongoes.
BeforeproceedingIwouldliketomakeseveralclarificatoryremarksonthescopeof thepresentdiscussionofagreementanddisagreement.First,followingtheconsensus Iassumethatthereisadisagreementbetweenthespeakersindialoguessuchas (),andmoreoverthatthereissomeaspectofthedisagreementthatneedstobe explainedbyalinguistictheory.Thisisn’ttosaythatalinguistictheoryneedstogivea generalphilosophicalaccountofthenatureofdisagreement.Wewon’tbeattempting toprovideanysuchthing.Ofcoursenotalldisagreementsareverballyexpressed inlinguisticexchanges.(Inter-conversationaldisagreementswillbeconsideredin §...)Butforourpurposeswecanfocusonacertaindiscoursephenomenon:
the licensingofexpressionsoflinguisticdenial (inEnglish,‘no’,‘nope’,‘nu-uh’,etc.) indiscoursessuchas().Theseexpressionssignalthespeaker’sdiscoursemoveof rejecting(denying,objectingto)someaspectofthepreviousutterance.Notallcases inwhichspeakersintuitivelydisagreecanbemarkedinthisway. B’s“disagreementin attitude”with A in()couldn’ttypicallybesignaledwithalinguisticdenial.
() A: IlikeMexicanfood.
B: #No,Idon’t.IlikeThai.
Ourtaskistogeneratearepresentationofdiscourseslike()thatcorrectlypredicts thefelicityofexpressionsoflinguisticdenialandthediscoursemovestheymark.
Second,incallingdiscourseslike()‘disagreements’Iamnotmakinganytheoreticalassumptionsaboutatwhatlevelthedisagreementoughttobeexplained.Myusage iscompatiblewithsemanticorpragmaticexplanations.Acommonwaytoexplain whylinguisticdenialislicensedistopositthatthesemanticorassertedcontentsofthe speakers’utterancesareincompatible.Indeed,suchaviewwasimplicitinthestandard worryforspeakercontextualismdescribedabove.However,nosuchspecificaccount ofdisagreementisbuiltintothedatatobeexplained.Alternativeexplanationsare possible,atleastinprinciple(and,Iwillargue,not merely inprinciple).
Third,manyauthorshaveexpressedtheintuitionthatdiscoursedisagreementslike ()areinsomesense“faultless.”SayingthatAliceandBertdisagreedoesn’titself implythatoneofthemmustbemakingacognitivemistake.Yetnothinginour characterizationoftheobjectiontocontextualism,orinthediscussiontofollow, requirestakingastandonthisissueonewayortheother.3
.InsufficientReplies Theepicyclesfromhereareinvolved.Iwillsparethereadermanyofthedetails(see n.).FornowIsimplywouldliketoconsidertwopossiblelinesofreply.Imention thesespecificallybecauseIthinkthereissomethingimportantlyrightaboutthem, thoughtheyareinsufficientlyexplanatoryastheystand.Thepositivecontextualist accounttobedevelopedinthisbookcanbeunderstoodasattemptingtocapturethe intuitionsdrivingtheseresponsesinamorerigorous,explanatoryway.
..TheVarietiesofLinguisticDenial.MetacontextualNegotiation
Acommoncontextualiststrategyistotrytoexplaindisagreementphenomenapragmatically,intermsofnon-conventionalaspectsoftheuseofepistemicmodals.Many contextualistsnotethatdenialscantargetvariousnon-truth-conditionalaspectsof
3 Forgeneraldiscussionofthenotionoffaultlessdisagreementanditsrole(forbetterorworse)in contextualism-relativismdebates,seee.g.Wright,Kölbel,,MacFarlanea,, vonFintel&Gillies,Richard,Cappelen&Hawthorne,Dreier.
discoursecontextualism
utterances—e.g.presuppositions,implicatures,aspectsoflinguisticform,salientor topicalpropositions,ornon-linguisticchangesintheconversationalsituation.4 B’s denialin()targetsapresuppositionof A’sutterance,and B’sdenialin()targets ascalarimplicature.
() A: ThekingofFrancewasattheawardsceremony.
B: No,thereisnokingofFrance.
() A: Sallywontwomedals.
B: No,shewonthree.
So,thespeakercontextualistmightsaythatthepropositiontargetedbyBert’sdenialin ()isn’tAlice’s“autobiographicalreport”—thesemanticcontentofherutterance—but rather“thepropositionthathewouldhaveassertedbyutteringthesamesentence” (Björnsson&Finlay:).Onemightsaythateventhough,semantically,Bert’s utterancein()justmakesaclaimabouthisowninformation,theprimaryimplication heintendstoconveyisapragmaticallyrelatedpropositiontowhichAlice is licensed inobjecting.(Wecanbracketwhattypeofimplicationthismightbe,e.g.implicature, presupposition,etc.)OnecandidateisanimplicationthatAlice’sinformationstate oughttobeasBert’sis.Itisthisimplication,thereplycontinues,whichisfelicitously targetedbyAlice’sdenial.Inuttering()and(),AliceandBert“pragmatically advocate”(Plunkett&Sundella)fortheirrespectiveinformation.
Contextualistshavebeenrighttoemphasizethatincompatibilityofconventionally assertedcontentisn’tnecessaryfordiscoursedisagreement.Iamsympatheticwiththe informalimpressionthatindialogueslike()theinterlocutorsaredisagreeingabout whatsortofcontexttobein—specifically,aboutwhatpossibilitiestotreataslivein theconversation.Intuitively,AliceandBertaredisagreeing,notaboutwhetherthe test’sbeingMondayiscompatiblewithsuch-and-suchbodyofinformation,butrather aboutwhattheoperativebodyofinformationistobe.Simplynotingthis,however,is insufficient.Thequestionisn’twhethersuch“metacontextual”or“discourse-oriented” negotiationsare possible.Thechallengeistoexplain whytheyaresosystematic with epistemicmodals,giventhatacontextualistsemanticsiscorrect.Theforceofthis challengehasgoneunderappreciatedbycontextualists.5
Theabovecontextualistreplyturnsonpositingthattheimplicationssystematically targetedbylinguisticdenials—andaffirmations,forthatmatter—indiscourseswith
4 FordiscussionseeLasersohn:–;vonFintel&Gillies:–;Dietz:–; Björnsson&Finlay:–;Sundell:–;Plunkett&Sundella:–,b:–.Forgeneraldiscussionoflinguisticdenial,seeHorn,vanderSandt,Geurtsa,Carston ,vanLeusen.
5 SeeCappelen,Björnsson&Finlay,Sundell,Huvenes,Plunkett&Sundell a,b,Finlaya,b,Stalnaker:chs.– (cf.Recanati:–,Schaffer:);see alson..Forappealstothisfunctionofepistemicmodalsinmanagingthesetoflivepossibilitiesin argumentsfornon-contextualisttheories,seeesp.Richard,,Swansonb,a;seealso Price,Veltman,Portnera,Stephensonb,Yalcin,,a,MacFarlane ,Swansona,Yablo.
epistemicmodalsareimplicationsotherthantheutterances’semanticcontents. However,surprisinglylittleattentionhasbeengiventowhatspecificmechanisms areresponsibleforthis,orhowthesemechanismsarelinguisticallyconstrained(see n.)—i.e.how(dis)agreementphenomenacanbederivedfromthespecificsemantic contents,generalconversationalprinciples,andgeneralfeaturesofcontextsofuse. Thisraisesthequestion,first,whythealleged(non-semantic)implicationsfollowso systematically.Whenanutteranceof‘φ ’systematicallytriggersthespecificimplication that ψ ,wetypicallyexpectthisimplicationtobederivablefromsomeaspectofthe conventionalmeaningof‘φ ’(perhapsalongwithgeneralfeaturesofcontextsofuse). Itisunclearwhichaspectthiswouldbewithepistemicmodals,giventhattheymake ordinarydescriptiveclaimsabouttheinformationofthespeakerorarelevantgroup. ‘I’mhungry’doesn’t(systematically)triggeranimplicationthattheaddresseeought tobehungry.
Second,itispuzzlingwhytheputativeimplicationsassociatedwithepistemicmodal utterancesshouldbespecifically normative innature.Accordingtocontextualism, epistemicmodalsentenceshaveordinaryrepresentationalcontents;theyhaveamindto-worlddirectionoffit.Evenifwefindexamplesofordinarydescriptiveclaims sometimeshavingnormativeimplications—consider‘It’scoldinhere’ ‘Youshould shutthewindow’—it’snotasiftheysystematicallycarrythoseparticularnormative implicationsacrossuses.Why,then,shoulddescriptiveclaimsaboutone’sinformation systematicallycommunicatenormativeclaimsaboutwhatinformationtoaccept?
Simplyappealingtolinguisticallyunconstrainedpragmaticmechanisms obscuresthecontrastsbetweenepistemicmodalsandparadigmcontext-sensitive expressions(moreonwhichshortly).Whenspeakersuseparadigmcontext-sensitive expressionswithdifferentintendedassertedcontents,thenormisn’tdisagreement, buttalkingpast.Denialslike B’sin()–()aretypicallyinfelicitous.
() A: I’mhungry.
B: #No,I’mnothungry.
() A: Thatisacutebaby.[saiddemonstrating b]
B: #No,thatisn’tacuteababy.[saiddemonstrating b ]
‘I’mhungry’doesn’tsystematicallytriggeranimplicationthattheaddresseeoughtto behungry.‘That[demonstrating b]isacutebaby’doesn’tsystematicallytriggeran implicationthattheaddresseeoughttobedemonstrating b.Oneisleftwonderingwhy theassumedpragmaticmechanismswhichlicenselinguisticdenialswithepistemic modalscouldn’t(andsystematicallydon’t)alsoapplywithparadigmcontext-sensitive expressions.Whywouldthesemanticcontentsofepistemicmodalutterances,unlike otherutterances,typicallynothavemainpointstatus?Why,withepistemicmodals, wouldspeakerssystematicallyassertpropositionstheydon’thavea“fundamental interest”in(Finlayb:;cf.a:–,–,–)?Thedistinctiveness ofepistemicmodals’behaviorindiscoursestillneedstobeexplained.
discoursecontextualism
..EpistemicModalsinaLanguageGame
ThissectiondescribesacontextualistresponseinspiredbyKeithDeRose’s(,) “SingleScoreboardSemantics,”whichisitselfinspiredbyDavidLewis’s(b)notion ofthe“score”ofaconversation(cf.Zeevat).
Inhisseminal“ScorekeepinginaLanguageGame”DavidLewisproposedthata conversationalcontextanditsevolutionovertimecanbemodeledonanalogywith asportsgame.Therearefactsaboutaconversationthatbearontheinterpretation andfelicityofutterances,factswhicharethemselvesaffectedbyutterancesandother changesinthecontext.Thesefactscanberepresentedbyanabstractstructure,or “scoreboard,”whichincludesvariouscontextualparameters.Justassectionsona scoreboardchangeasthegameprogresses,contextualparameterstakeondifferent valuesoverthecourseoftheconversation.Changesintheseparametervaluescanbe usedtomodeltheevolutionoftheconversation.
Oneimportantcomponentoftheconversationalscoreisthe commonground roughly,thesetofpropositionsthattheconversationalparticipantstakeforgranted forthepurposesoftheconversation(Stalnaker,,Clark).Arelated notionisthe contextset,thesetofpossibleworldsinwhichallthepropositionsinthe commongroundaretrue.Thisrepresentsthe“livepossibilities”intheconversation, thepossibilitiesamongwhichtheparticipantsintendtodistinguish.Includingthe commongroundinthescorecapturesacrucialgoalofconversation:toshareinformation,tofigureouthowtheworldis.Wewinnowdownthecontextsetasweshare informationandsettleonamorecompletepictureoftheworld.
Interpretationisoftenajointproject.Thispointisnicelyhighlightedbythe scoreboardmodel.Thougheachconversationalparticipantmayhaveaparticular viewofwhatoughttobeacceptedintheconversation,thereis,atanypointin thediscourse,asinglescoreboardthatrepresentstheinformationthatistreatedas relevantintheconversation.Anotimplausiblemoveistotreatepistemicmodalsas interpretedwithrespecttothisdiscourse-levelbodyofinformation.Bracketingforthe momenthowthiscontext-sensitivityisencodedinthesyntaxandsemantics,wemight representthetruth-conditionalcontentsofBert’sandAlice’srespectiveutterances asin(),where CG isthecommongroundand m isthepropositionthatthetest isMonday.
()a. CG iscompatiblewith m
b. CG isincompatiblewith m
So,since CG figuresinthecontentsofbothAlice’sandBert’sutterances,Alicedenies whatBertsays(cf.DeRose:).
Thisisatidyreply,perhapstootidy.Thescoreboardmodelisjustthat—amodel.It mustbegivenaninterpretation.Onacontextualistinterpretationofthescoreboard model,thevalueofthecommongroundparameterhelpsdeterminethesemantic
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will write wish (thing) if and not wish (thing) if yes matakeda all-the-same minaasin finish sena that ngau my ia word, ngau my nel name. ⸺
“I say, I tell you about what I want. What do you say, you want to come with me? Best thing you come along with me. What do you think about it? If you got something to answer back, then you let me know ’Spose you want to come with me, let me know, then I know; ’spose you don’t, you let me know, so I know. Best thing you come with me. My name . ”
The answer might be—
“All right, I come along you” or “No, I no want to come along you.”
Another proposal is a copy of an original letter which happened to fall into my hands and which I still possess. It was from a Murray Islander named Kimel, who was then in Mabuiag offering marriage to Anuni, a Mabuiag girl.
Unfortunately I did not see her reply; but I know she received this letter, and I have no reason to believe my possession of it hindered the course of true love from running smoothly.
It is interesting to note that Kimel, being a Murray Islander, followed his tribal custom of the man proposing marriage.
Januare 1, 1899.
Peike This Anuni Anuni (is) kara my jiawali writing marim to you mama you neur a girl kaka I makiriam young man nakö[2] (?) ma you kari me lag like nakö (?) Ad God emeret formerly
detagem made Adamu Adam a and Eba Eve kosker woman a and kimiar man mokakalam same way
kaka I mari you lag like nakö (?) ma you kari me lag like nakö (?) ma you nole not geum afraid
kak nothing makiria young man abkoreb suitable marim for you ma you kari me abkoreb suit.
Ad God emeret formerly detagem made kosker woman abkoreb suitable ko for kimiar man nagiri possessing kimiar man abkoreb suitable ko for kosker woman nagiri possessing kaka I mari you laglag like nako what mer word karim for me ma you kari me umele know kaka I nole not mokakalam like nerut some other le men kaka I dorge work le man. peike This kara my mer word marim to you. Sina The end. Kara My nei name.
Cimell Mabuiag.
“January 1, 1899.
“This, Anuni, is my letter to you. You are a girl, I am a young man. Do you like me? God formerly made Adam and Eve a similar man and woman. I like you, do you like me? Don’t be afraid at all of a young man suitable for you. You suit me. God formerly made woman suitable for having a man, and man suitable for having a woman. I like you. What message for me? You know me. I am not like some men, I am a man of work. This is my message to you. The end. My name
“Cimell “Mabuiag.”
STAR MYTHS Most, perhaps all, peoples recognise certain groups of stars, or constellations, about which they tell stories. As a rule these myths of origin are not particularly instructive, except for the sidelight they cast on the people who originated them.
The constellations themselves have a very definite and practical value, as they constitute the universal sidereal almanack, by means of which the majority of primitive peoples regulate their farming operations or their festivals.
The Torres Straits islanders are no exception to this general rule, and I offer the following three myths as examples of this kind of traditional literature.
The Murray Islanders recognise a large constellation which does not coincide with any one of those mapped by our astronomers, though the canoe corresponds to part of our Scorpio.
A man named Tagai, with uplifted and outstretched hands bearing a spear, is supposed to stand upon a canoe, which is represented by the bowed row of stars that forms the scorpion’s tail. Below the front end of the canoe is a single star, the anchor of the canoe, and near its other end is a red star that represents a man named Kareg. A cluster of stars is called Usiam, and another linear constellation is named Seg.
Tagai is an important constellation, not only as an indication of the approach of certain seasons, but also for navigation purposes. For example, I was told, “Usiam he mĕk [that is, “sign” or “mark”] for new yams.” “Seg he mĕk next kind of yam.” When Usiam is some way from the horizon at sundown, men say, “Close up new yam time,” and when it is at the horizon at sunset, “Yam time he come.”
“Tagai he mĕk for turtle season. Two hand he come first; all turtle go to islands to leeward (to the west), and they (the natives) ‘kaikai’ (eat) turtle first. By-and-by face belong Tagai he come up; Dauarle (the inhabitants of Dauar and of the southern end of Murray Island) get turtle, and then all the rest of Murray Island.”
In sailing by night from Erub (Darnley Island) to Mer (Murray Island) they steer for the left hand of Tagai, “right hand he stop outside Mer.”
The following is the reputed origin of the constellation. I give it in my informant’s own words:—
THE ORIGIN OF THE TAGAI CONSTELLATION “One man, Tagai, he got a canoe. Tagai he stop in forehead (the bow or front end of the canoe) and look out and spear fish. Kareg he stop in stern. Plenty men crew.
“They go over reef; Kareg he pole canoe. Tagai he spear fish. Sun hot on reef, all men thirsty, and steal water in canoe belong captain.
“Tagai say, ‘Why you no pole canoe good? I no spear fish.’ By-and-by he say, ‘Where water-bamboo?’ He take bamboo and shake it; it empty. ‘Who drink water?’
“Men no talk.
“Tagai get wild. He get one rope and make fast round neck of six men and chuck into sea. He put name to them, ‘All you fellow “Usiam.”’
“Tagai take two wooden skewers and call other men in canoe, and kill plenty, and stick the skewers through their necks and chuck them in the sea, and call them ‘Seg.’
“Kareg he live.
“Tagai tell Kareg, ‘You stop; you no steal my water, you push canoe all time.’
“Man stop in sky all the time.
“Tagai, Kareg, and canoe stop in one place, Usiam stop in another place, and Seg stop in another place.”
The next story, which was told to me in Mabuiag in 1888, refers to two constellations, one of which, a Dorgai, a sort of bogey, is followed by a cluster of stars named Bu, but which we call Delphin, or the dolphin, and certainly this cluster has a closer resemblance to the large Fusus or Triton shell (bu) than to a dolphin. The Dorgai corresponds to the star known to us as Altair, but which they call gamu (the body), and the adjoining stars on each side, which they name getal (the arms).