My deepest gratitude goes to Professor Eva Castro and Daryl Ho for all their time, guidance, and support. You have cared for the thesis as much as I have, allowing the project, but more importantly, myself, to flourish, articulate my thoughts, amplify my voice, and gain greater clarity as a designer. Also to the rest of the Form Axioms team, Kheng Boon and Jacob for further insights, support, and care.
I would also like to thank Benedict Tan. Your frequent inspirations and advice helped distorted, distilled, disoriented my ideas but ultimately pushed the project beyond what I was capable of conceptualising alone.
To my studio mates, Megan, Melvin, Jeff, Michelle, Siaosi, no words can begin to describe the delirium, agony, and boundless laughters in this arduous but most meaningful journey. All I have is gratitude that we could share this chapter of our lives together.
Lastly, to my friends and family for their unwavering support, companionship and belief, for which the thesis would not have been enjoyable, or possibly, even existent. This thesis is as much yours as it is mine.
Dispositions of Oil was an awe-inspiring writing challenge. I say writing because the project was initially rooted in text - narrative building, geopolitical understanding, and multiple manners of theory - more so than it did design. This made me very afraid of it in the beginning. And rightly so because it evolved into a monster of a thesis - too much to be packaged and handled in any reasonable sitting.
I admit that it’s not perfect, neither is it complete in any definitive sense. There are theories and ideas, criminally understudied, which I still gobbled up and employed within the thesis. Unresolved antagonism, unarticulated feelings, unrefined details, are all but unconspicuous. Yet the thesis lies before you with utmost sincerity - a collection of ideas into which I poured all my time and love of the world into.
A quick browse hopes to punch you emotionally without giving you a chance to throw up any intellectual defenses, whereas plunging into the self-annointed, hallowed chambers of the project (of which I don’t expect any of you to do) seeks, in all seriousness, to ignite anger and urgency toward the issue but also optimism from a possible speculative imaginative.
Regardless, I do the thesis an extreme disservice in my feeble attempt at condensing all discourse into this current form that you have in your hands. You will be confused, maybe even frustrated in the course of this document, but I hope that amidst this schizophrenic ocean of words, ideas, and technicalities, you find a small piece of memorabilia to take with you. Enjoy.
To uproot oil’s entrenchment in the global economy and infrastructure, biofuel will need to support current energy demands, meaning the maximization of its production capabilities and output is intuitively what we should prioritize.
However, the climate crisis is the direct derivative of human excessive productivity and consumption. In approaching a new energy system, the seemingly innocuous continuation of current intuitions, where humans are obessesed with control and measurements, only serves to reinforce exhausted paradigms of power entrenchment. With the limit of fossil energy addiction unbounded by the threshold of human greed, a new intuition is needed to prevent the switch to biofuel from being a new but similar addiction.
Thus, the thesis advocates a counterintuition that espouses human and non-human agencies. It starts by outlining a pathway to a post-oil future with an Asian Coalition in the Spratly Islands at the base. Part political opportunism and part architecture assemblage, it expands on the performative and emergent natures of the human-algae relationship, and starts looking for the possibility of collaborative survival in a time of massive uncertainty.
Oil exists as a paradox; its “naturalness” allows us to imagine it alongside primordial elements such as earth, water, air, fire, but its proximity to the synthetic and to complex industrial processes places it simultaneously within the jurisdiction of “an almost paradigmatic artificiality”. (Pendakis, 2017) It is also this permeation of oil into every aspect of human existence, temporality, and life itself (with oil being the very product of death), that it is so powerful. Here, I associate oil with that of a higher being; one which encompasses an entire postmodern phenomenology of simulation; its disappearance would collapse the very infrastructure of humanity.
Oil’s rather “frightening ability to effectively transform itself into almost every conceivable good and service is deeply entangled with the unique and volatile chemical properties of petroleum and other hydrocarbons, which can morph into a seemingly infinite array of other commodities and finished products that bear no resemblance to their original feedstocks.” (Welling, 2020) For these reasons, oil can be termed as the “commodity of commodities.”
Petroculture neatly summarizes the “staggeringly vast and complex array of hydrocarbon-mediated infrastructures and relationships that constitute human life in the developed world.” (Welling, 2020) We may not exactly swim around in petroleum, but as aptly observed by Allan Stoekl, “any extraterrestrial scientists observing us would be right to conclude that we are just as dependent for our survival on hydrocarbons and hydrocarbon-based technologies as laboratory-bound microorganisms are on their growth media.” (Stoekl, 2012)
“its disappearance would collapse the very infrastructure of humanity”
“Oil’s plasticity renders it an arche in the precise sense of an ultimately underlying substance that provides most, if not all objects with the physical conditions of their existence.”
Andrew Pendakis, Being and Oil: How to Run a Pipeline through Heidegger
Edwin Drake drilled the first successful well through rock and produced crude oil. What some call “Drake’s Folly”, was the birth of the modern petroleum industry. It is without a doubt that oil has transformed everyday life in the twentieth century, and only recently have we finally come to terms with the degree to which oil has made us modern - who we are, what we are - shaping our existence.
Attention towards energy has historically been “highly cyclical based on fluctuations in oil prices.” (Solomon & Pasqualetti, 2004) We see during the energy crises of the 1970s that many geographers became experts overnight and were heavily involved in the conversation. Interest staved off when oil prices levelled due to the discovery of new oil sources, which helped stabilise the market. However, recent spikes in the interest of energy are caused by an entwinement of the increase in oil prices, due to international sanctions against Russia, and the worrying consequences of climate change. We are forced to confront energy again; to understand oil’s future as a dominant fuel and feedstock and our reaction towards the concern of a warming planet and the depletion of oil. The claim of the Anthropocene is made and sustained in part through the experience of oil.
Oil speaks to continuing fascination with its potential to transform space, human experience and environmental conditions; and a desire to understand the political projects, economic endeavours and cultural practices with which oil is entwined. The transformation of crude oil into petroleum products through the refining process supports the entire ecosystem of oil’s invisibility. It powers our societies silently and odourlessly, and we need only know how to consume it.
Crude oil is cracked into different hydrocarbon products and their impurities (water, oxygen, sulfur etc) is removed, not just as a means to create the components of contemporary life, but also to remove traces of oil’s origin sites. We do not need to know how it is extracted and produced from its source, or whether it is dirty or harmful to the environment. The ecological, political, and moral filth, extracted from subterranean deposits and burnt in tremendous amounts, is rebranded as a “magical force that is immaterial, perfectly clean, apolitical, virtually omnipotent but harmless, and inexhaustible.” (Bellamy & Diamanti, 2018)
We do not need to how it gets to us as products or energy, except that is not free, but still very much inexpensive. We are highly “disembedded”.
Today’s petroaesthetics revolve around the genres of the apocalyptic and the Gothic. Viewing oil through this lens and framing it as an unnatural monstrosity rather than a naturally occuring substance that human cultures have used for centuries, obscures our relationship and understanding of oil. While it is easier to demonize large corporations and focus on the spectacularly miserable calamities such as oil spills and burning gushers, we unknowingly detach ourselves from the realities of oil, further away from any confrontation with it. We remain asleep, in oblivion or in denial of our own deep enmeshment in petroculture that it becomes extremely difficult to generate any form of social or political will necessary to transition away from oil. This is why oil capital remains as we know it - stuck in a stage that neither capital nor its opponents can think beyond.
“Energy” as mask
The emergent ubiquity of oil as a resource in our everyday world of manufactured commodities and environments, transportation, consumer energy, and synthetic materials may seem strangely bereft of signs and symbols by which to imagine, feel, or think it. This is no less due to the oil industry working hard to establish an “obliviousness to the the world-destroying effects of our dependence” (Welling, 2020), as much as it does producing petroleum. The most effective strategy is replacing the term “Oil” with “Energy” because it shifts public visualisation from “gloppy liquids, poisonous gases, stained beaches, exploding mines, and exploited workers” to the “shimmering, gently pulsing waves of iridescent light that closely resemble the standard computer-generated Hollywood signifiers for magical powers, extraterrestrial forces, and human technologies in the distant future.” (Welling, 2020)
The framing of oil narratives in this manner attempts to do three things. Firstly, it normalizes and justifies the current status quo of oil extraction, fossil fuel burning, and capital flow. Secondly, it nurtures a quasi-religious belief in a mighty and omnipresent higher power that has benevolently granted our current human progress. Thirdly, it establishes this account of oil as the absolute way reality works, which dismisses any opportunity to consider a reality without oil exploitation and externalities. All three contribute to our resignation to the control of an oil-dependent society.
“Visual, kinaesthetic, acoustic (‘hissing’), tactile, olfactory –oil touches us intimately, and everywhere.”Stephanie LeMenager, “The Aesthetics of Petroleum, after Oil!”
Oil is usually not said to be the explicit cause of conflicts. It is rarely admitted or recognised as the main motivator. However, it has always been weaponised due to its valuable and lucrative nature. To be in control of petroleum resources bestows upon the owner a great amount of power.
19141918
World War I
Certain operations were planned specifically to secure oil resources.
Bolivia’s growing need for petroleum to fuel its mining sector and urban centers led the country on a policy of expansion into the Chaco Boreal, a torrid expanse claimed by both Bolivia and
19321935 19671970 19391945
Biafran War World War II
Allied forces targeted Germany’s fuel supplies, assigning high priority to the bombing of oil fields and refineries.
While oil was not the root cause of the conflict, control over its lucrative production in the Niger Delta perpetuated the conflict.
19801988 19901991
Iran-Iraq War Gulf War
Saddam Hussein’s main targets were oil fields and refinery.
The US claims its objective to be the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi forces, but there is an underlying motivator in oil access, prices and profits.
Iraq War
Largely about oil, American invasion of Iraq gave Big Oil access to Iraqi oil, which was previously nationalized and closed to Western companies.
20032011 2004Now
Niger Delta conflict
Civil war between Ijaw ethnic group and Nigerian state. The exploitation of vulnerable groups by the socio-economic elites were enabled by the wealth from oil extraction.
PHOTOGRAPH BY BRUNO BARBEYHurley, K. (1996). The Gothic Body: Sexuality, Materialism, and Degeneration at the Fin de Siècle (Cambridge Studies in NineteenthCentury Literature and Culture). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511519161
Willmott, G. (2017). Oil Tragedy as Modern Genre. In S. Wilson, A. Carlson, & I. Szeman, Petrocultures: Oil, Politics, Culture (p. 191). McGill Queen’s University Press.
Pendakis, A. (2017). Being and Oil: How to Run a Pipeline through Heidegger. In A. C. Sheena Wilson, Petrocultures: Oil, Politics, Culture (p. 382). McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Stoekl, A. (2012). UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND THE GIFT OF THE UNDULATING PEAK. Imaginations: Journal of Cross-Cultural Image Studies, 3(2), 35–45. Retrieved from https://journals.library.ualberta.ca/ imaginations/index.php/imaginations/article/view/27245
Solomon, B. D., & Pasqualetti, M. J. (2004). History of Energy in geographic thought. In C.Cleveland, Encyclopedia of Energy, Vol. 2 (pp. 831-42). San Diego, CA: Elsevier.
B.R. Bellamy, J. Diamanti, “Phantasmagorias of Energy: Toward a Critical Theory of Energy and Economy,” Mediations 31, no. 2 (2018): 1–16.
B.H. Welling, “BEYOND DOOM AND GLOOM IN PETROAESTHETICS: FACING OIL, MAKING ENERGY MATTER,” MediaTropes Vol VII, No 2 (2020): 138–174 doi: 10.33137/mt.v7i2.33675
Beck, C., Rashidbeigi, S., Roelofsen, O., & Speelman, E. (2020). The future is now: How oil and gas companies can decarbonize. McKinsey & Company.
Climate change poses a powerful threat to possibly the most fundamental political concept of our time: the idea of freedom. The warming of our planet forces us to recognize the unstated fact of the Anthropogenic discourse, that we have never been free of non-human constraints; it was always lurking in the shadows. The “freedom of humanity to choose a different way of inhabiting our planet is tacitly assumed absent.” (Crist, 2016) In order to solve the problems that we now face with regards to the energy system, we must hold off attempting superficial ‘technofixes’, and first develop a deeper understanding of what is at stake.
The question asked is a salient one because there is a lot of “controversy about the current energy crisis. Is it about excessive CO2 emissions? Is it about our dependence on finite sources? Is it about increasing negative side effects of energy technologies? Depending on one’s outlook, expectations for transition vary wildly.” (Geerts, 2017) There is no common understanding, much less an agreement, on how to move forward and what to move towards.
Through the investigation of oil and our reliance on it, the thesis focuses on two planetary crisis of our time: climate change and the depletion of energy resources. Both crisis reiterate the fact that contemporary lifestyle cannot continue and humanity has to undergo another alteration - of society, structure, and most importantly, the self.
It is not a game anymore.
The main cause of rising temperatures is the burning of fossil fuels, releasing carbon dioxide, which traps heat in the atmosphere. The oil industry alone produces 9% of all human-made greenhouse gas emissions, and continuous burning of the fuel contributes to 33% of global emissions.” (Beck, Rashidbeigi, Roelofsen, & Speelman, 2020) During the 2015 Paris Agreement, countries committed to “limit the global average temperature rise to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and to aim for 1.5°C.” (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, n.d.) At that point in time, it is estimated that “human activities have caused approximately 1.0°C of global warming above pre-industrial levels, with a likely range of 0.8°C to 1.2°C.” (IPCC,2018) Scientists have said crossing the 1.5°C threshold risks “unleashing far more severe climate change effects on people, wildlife and ecosystems.” (Abnett, 2021)
Fossil capital’s burning away of condensed energy from past eras, previously sequestered in the Earth, catches up with the present in the form of billowing emissions that wrap the planet in a warming blanket. The industrialization of energy also produces a vantage from which to assess the ontological status of energy and its residues.
At present, “human activities emit about 40 gigatons (Gt) of carbon dioxide a year, or 50 Gt of carbon dioxide equivalent,” (IPCC, 2021) a measure that includes other greenhouse gases like methane. “Since the Industrial Revolution, humans have emitted about 2,200 Gt of CO2. Scientists have estimated that releasing another 1,000 Gt CO2 equivalent during this century would raise temperatures by two degrees Celsius—exceeding the target of the Paris Agreement— meaning that 1,000 Gt CO2 is our maximum remaining budget.” (Buck, 2019) A simple division tells us that we are on track to squander our entire carbon budget in the next two decades.
Global consumption of fossil fuels is still rising by more than 1% each year due to the increasing demand for energy. The growth of our economy has also shifted our perception on standards of living and prosperity. What was once considered luxurious in the past, is now seen as a necessity. Oil’s treatment as a traded commodity places it under the jurisdiction of global market forces. A fall in the global supply equals energy being more expensive which will inevitably be passed down to consumers, thus resulting in many people having to live in energy poverty.
According to the Millennium Alliance for Humanity and the Biosphere (MAHB), the world’s oil reserves will run out by 2052, natural gas by 2060 and coal by 2090. Given that fossil fuel makes up 80% of the global energy source, alternative energy sources will have to match that number or we would have to radically rethinking and change the way we live.
Coal, oil and gas form the ‘unholy trinity’ of hydrocarbons that powered industrial growth. While coal remains as the world’s most consumed fuel, it falls short of oil’s latent and hegemonic presence in modernity. This is because the transportation infrastructure of coal is primarily vehicular based (trucks) that are much easier to see and act against. “It is one thing to block trucks dragging coal away from mines and another to identify essential sites in the supply chain of oil. How do you stand in front of a pipeline?” asks Szeman. The absence of chokepoints, unlike coal, renders it difficult for any form of resistance or lobbying from taking place. Oil’s means of travelling exists in restricted and peripheral environmental spaces - usually carefully guarded, but more importantly hidden away undergound or underwater. Oil and gas are thus much more potent in shaping the social, economic, and biophysical existence of contemporary society.
Bibliography
Crist, E. (2016). On the Poverty of Our Nomenclature. In J. W. Moore, Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism (pp. 14-33). Oakland, CA: PM Press. Geerts, R. J. (2017). Philosophical explorations on energy transition. Wageningen School of Social. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (n.d.). The Paris Agreement. Retrieved from UNFCC: https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/theparis-agreement#:~:text=The%20Paris%20Agreement%20is%20a,compared%20to%20 pre%2Dindustrial%20levels.
Beck, C., Rashidbeigi, S., Roelofsen, O., & Speelman, E. (2020). The future is now: How oil and gas companies can decarbonize. McKinsey & Company. IPCC. (2018). SPECIAL REPORT: GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 ºC. IPCC.
Buck, H. J. (2019). After Geoengineering: Climate Tragedy, Repair, and Restoration. London: Verso. Abnett, K. (2021, November 10). Explainer: What’s the difference between 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming? Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/business/cop/whats-differencebetween-15c-2c-global-warming-2021-11-07/
Long histories of colonialism and exploitation have entrenched sever power and wealth disparities between and within countries. Without changing the fundamental structure of today’s global economic order, powerful companies within the financial and energy sector often have the final say in dictating climate action. Any course of climate action that potentially goes against or threaten their interests are usually difficult to pursue.
Climate justice as a concept is agreed upon because it lies at the heart of all contemporary claims of political legitimacy. However, equitable climate strategies (phasing out fossil fuels, transitioning to renewables, etc) are less effective because the result of achieving equity is not only “redistribution of wealth, but also recalibration of global powers.” From the point of view of security establishments (nations, corporations) that are “oriented towards the maintenance of global dominance, this is a greatly feared scenario and the continuance of the status quo is the most desirable outcome.” (Ghosh, 2016)
Despite the fossil fuel crisis placing the entire world in “a life-ordeath predicament, political leaders have so far shown an inability to rise to the challenge. They shrug their shoulders, content to blame anonymous market forces, to the approval of all those who hold that political institutions are terminally sclerotic. There is some truth in this, as today’s politicians seem to have no stomach for decisions that run counter to established business interests.” (Scheer, 2002) Political failure has never been so comfortable.
On 12 December 2015, 196 Parties adopted the Paris Agreement at COP 21. The Paris Agreement is “a landmark in the multilateral climate change process because, for the first time, a binding agreement brings all nations into a common cause to undertake ambitious efforts to combat climate change and adapt to its effects. The goal was to limit global warming to well below 2°C, preferably to 1.5 °C, compared to pre-industrial levels.” (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, n.d.) Although the strategy is focused on reducing greenhouse gas emissions, these strategies do not end fossil fuel production. In fact, the words “fossil” and “fuel” are not even mentioned. “Read the texts, and you’ll be struck by this weird verbal jiu jitsu of documents aimed at ending this thing that they can’t even name.” (Buck, 2021) According to the Climate Action Tracker, none of the countries are currently on track with the 1.5 °C goal set.
As such, we are now faced with a warmer earth that is set for 6 °C if nothing is done.PHOTOGRAPH FROM COP PARIS
The Tale of Two Net Zero Net Zero has been championed as the goal of our fight against climate change. The term refers to “the balance between the amount of greenhouse gas produced and the amount that is removed from the atmosphere.” (National Grid, n.d.) While it may sound simple and straightforward as a concept, the reality is that it is defined by governments, international organisations, and large corporations in vastly different ways, all to further their own agendas.
There are two possible but very different pathways to achieving the net-zero world, which is used loosely in all climate policies. These discourses lean away from scarcity as an issue towards either model of prosperity or simplicity. The first is a cleaner fossil world, where “companies have invested in systems to capture billions of tons of carbon” (Buck, Ending Fossil Fuels: Why Net Zero is Not Enough, 2021) to offset the greenhouse gas emissions from producing fossil fuels. The second is a near-zero world, where we drastically cut or completely eradicate emissions, meaning huge declines in the use of coal, oil and gas. The “remaining greenhouse gas emissions would arise primarily from difficult to eliminate sources like agriculture and aviation fuel.” (Buck, Ending Fossil Fuels: Why Net Zero is Not Enough, 2021) Only a moderate amount of infrastructure is needed given that negative emissions is much lower in this scenario.
While both scenarios achieve net-zero in accordance to the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) target of Net Zero by 2050, the first accepts and allows high emission volumes which will eventually be sequestered and the total amount of carbon in the atmosphere will remain constant. However, holding these companies responsible and enforcing their need to “finance, arrange, and perform the industrial services of removing all this carbon means they hold tremendous power, because people rely on them for climate stability.” Moreover, there is no stopping the structures of power to go about decarbonizing fossil fuels in a half-hearted manner, which they can claim to be ‘good enough’, and leave us with a “devastating 3°C of warming.” (Buck, Ending Fossil Fuels: Why Net Zero is Not Enough, 2021)
Net zero must be properly defined. It can either be “a temporary state” on the way to a fossil-free future, or exist within “a permanent state” of fossil fuels, “reinterpreted as part of sustainable carbon management.”
(Buck, Ending Fossil Fuels: Why Net Zero is Not Enough, 2021) The degree of vagueness surrounding “Net Zero” allows business and policy makers to conveniently ignore the choice between the two worlds. Moreover “net zero” also does an important job: it slyly draws attention to emissions - distracting us with the task of counting and balancing them when our real focus should be on reducing extraction and production of fossil fuels.
Boundless consumerism seeks to embrace and retain the highenergy practices that developed in the fossil-fuel era, and aims to find sustainable sources and efficiency improvements to continue to power them. Faith in smart management and technological novelty is needed to plug into and generate abundant sustainable energy sources to power our ever-increasing demands. This line of argument falls well within the realms of the ‘Ecomodernist’ movement, which practice optimism towards the ecological basis of society that is often argued as limited. For example, the believe that fossil or renewable energy supplies that society can tap on is practically unlimited, with the most pertinent case being earth’s solar income. Ecological optimism is often combined with technological optimism, which holds that technological developments will outpace depletion of the energy sources that we are currently using.
Globalization and global warming are two narratives connected by the phenomena of modern capitalism and the technology that comes with it. Greenhouse gas emissions, “exclusively increased through the pursuit of industrial and postindustrial forms of modernization and prosperity” (Chakrabarty, 2021), is evidence of that. In fact, no country has ever explicitly rejected this model of growth and development even if they had criticisms of each other.
The history of capitalism is “a relation of capital, power, and nature as an organic whole. It is neither a purely economic nor social system”, but “a historically situated complex of metabolisms and assemblages” (Haraway, 2016) - a multispecies affair. Unfortunately, it is often reduced to just the burning of fossil fuels, which is not the case. It is far greater than that - an entire history of power relations, production, and reproduction premised on the cash nexus. “Those relations enfolded energy sources since the 16th century, allowing for successive waves of global conquest and the worldwide appropriations” (Moore, 2016) of oil, and more broadly, nature itself.
Today, oil sits comfortably in a uniquely sensitive region in the broader body of capital. It is a currency that holds greater symbolic dominance than money itself, having a greater association with power. Those who control it create “an absolute fiefdom” (Schuster, 2017) for themselves.
Despite decades of international recommendations for energy transition and public campaigns against fossil fuel, “85% of the world’s total primary energy consumption still comes from nonrenewable sources.” (Heurtebise, 2020) Resignation to oil’s importance in sustaining the developed world hides a simple fact that the oil economy is a “social-economic construct” (Heurtebise, 2020). Fossil fuel subsidies “still account for 6.8% of the Global Domestic Product (GDP) at $5.9 trillion.” (Perry et al., 2021) These are choices that are made by those in power, which reflect the existence of certain goals in perpetuating the fossil fuel industry - including its material products, social habits, political regimes, and individual expectations. There is too much invested in the oil economy for it to be shut down.
“Money flows toward short term gain, and toward the over-exploitation of unregulated common resources. These tendencies are like the invisible hand of fate, guiding the hero in a Greek tragedy toward his inevitable doom.”
David Archer, The Long Thaw
The biggest flaw associated with the dominant Anthropogenic argument is the belief that its origins stem from humanity as an undifferentiated whole, thus deriving its name from Anthropos. It becomes very convenient as a narrative because it turns away from the “naturalised inequalities, alienation, and violence inscribed in modernity’s strategic relations of power and production.” (Moore, 2016) Not challenging or even thinking about these relations is extremely reductive. The homogenous humanity exists as a mosaic abstraction of human activity across communities and history. This “erasure of capitalism’s historical specificity” and the attendant implication that “capitalist socio-ecological contradictions are the responsibility of all humans” (Moore, 2016) is dangerous as it allows oil companies to shirk some responsibility or operate behind the false rhetoric of public hypocrisy.
The categorisation of the atmosphere as a global common being under threat is in conflict with Earth being an anisotropic plane. The menu of mitigation and adaptation measures for reducing and internalising the cost of climate change varies between places in terms of price, availability, scale. One country selecting a light mitigation menu will mean another will have to make up the difference. How we split the bill based on historical and geographical fairness opens the debate on who polluted more, who is suffering more from energy poverty, and who is most affected by climate change.
Today, “just 100 companies are responsible for 71% of global emissions.” (Griffin, 2017) But because of the atmospheric nature of the problem of oil and its planetary consequences, we are all condensed into a messy series of finger pointing, responsibility shirking, and blatant ignorance and passivity.
“the individualized forms of freedom cherished by those who live in the “global North” are in fact conditioned by an array of barely understood dependencies and coercions”Bergthaller, The Politics of Emancipation and the End of Oil PHOTOGRAPH BY JORGES CABRERA
From the industry’s perspective, “the ideal consumer is one who never sees or thinks about crude oil” (Welling, 2020). This is made possible by oil’s invisibility. Its sources are mainly “hidden from sight, veiled by technology, its workers are hard to mythologize, flowing fluidly and unhindered through pipelines, bypassing concentrations of labor” (Ghosh, 2016). People in the developed world, most of whom live far from the “sacrificial zones” that make their lives possible, would never witness the vast amounts of destruction involved in bringing the myth of oil to life.
With large corporations (Big Oil) at the helm of the oil industry and supply chain, any form of agency that the public had is already emptied out. The net result is thus a “deadlocked public sphere, with the actual exercise of power being granted to the interlocking complex of corporations and institutions of governance.” (Ghosh, 2016) There are currently two reactions to this; either we succumb to political fatalism, where we accept that things are just the way they are, or we actively resist the status quo.
However, resistance is not an active force in itself - it is reactionary and always works against another active force. In the current predicament, the opposing force, assumed to be the perpetuation by large corporations, is fleeting, hard to grasp, and most of the time invisible. So how is any form of resistance possible? Acts of protests, which has now become an integral part of the global political landscape, is fundamentally futile because the public have no way of grasping the real flows of power. They only consume it, not produce it.
B.R. Bellamy, J. Diamanti, “Phantasmagorias of Energy: Toward a Critical Theory of Energy and Economy,” Mediations 31, no. 2 (2018): 1–16.
B.H. Welling, “BEYOND DOOM AND GLOOM IN PETROAESTHETICS: FACING OIL, MAKING ENERGY MATTER,” MediaTropes Vol VII, No 2 (2020): 138–174 doi: 10.33137/mt.v7i2.33675
Perry, I., Black, S., & Vernon, N. (2021, September). Still Not Getting Energy Prices Right: A Global and Country Update of Fossil Fuel Subsidies (No. 2021/236). International Monetary Fund. https:// www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2021/09/23/Still-Not-Getting-Energy-Prices-Right-AGlobal-and-Country-Update-of-Fossil-Fuel-Subsidies-466004
H Bergthaller, ‘Fossil Freedoms: The Politics of Emancipation and the End of Oil’ in UK Heise, J Christensen and M Niemann (eds), The Routledge Companion to the Environmental Humanities (Routledge 2017) 408–16.
Schuster, J. (2017). Where is the Oil in Modernism. In S. Wilson, A. Carlson, & I. Szeman, Petrocultures: Oil, Politics, Culture (p. 385). McGill Queen’s University Press.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (n.d.). The Paris Agreement. Retrieved from UNFCC: https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/theparis-agreement#:~:text=The%20Paris%20Agreement%20is%20a,compared%20to%20 pre%2Dindustrial%20levels.
National Grid. (n.d.). What is net zero? Retrieved from National Grid: https://www.nationalgrid. com/stories/energy-explained/what-is-net-zero#:~:text=Put%20simply%2C%20net%20zero%20 refers,than%20the%20amount%20taken%20away.
Haraway, D. J. (2016). Staying with the Trouble: Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Chthulucene. In J. W. Moore, Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism (pp. 34-76). Oakland, CA: PM Press.
Moore, J. W. (2016). The Rise of Cheap Nature. In J. W. Moore, Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism (pp. 78-115). Oakland, CA: PM Press.
Ghosh, A. (2016). The Great Derangement. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Griffin, P. (2017, July 10). The Carbon Majors Database: CDP Carbon Majors Report 2017. CDP. Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2017/jul/10/100fossil-fuel-companies-investors-responsible-71-global-emissions-cdp-study-climate-change
Over the course of decades following the decolonisation of Asian countries, greenhouse gas-relevant fossil fuel consumption dramatically increased due to upscaling developments by Asian political elites. Moreover, these elites “operated in a world shaped by global connections and disruptions, which in turn, shaped the respective energy regimes of fuel extraction and energy generation” (Huebner, 2022), thus altering the course of their country’s postindependence technological trajectories. Historically, when viewed from the perspective of terrestrial energy transitions, for the most part, Asia’s oceanic spaces remained very much primitive until the late nineteenth century. It is only interrupted by the use of whale oil over terrestrial biomass and subsequently by the much cheaper lamp oil. This was due to Asia’s lack of technology and geographical resources for any major shifts to happen unless imported from outside the continent. More importantly, however, is understanding that Asia has also left out the early period of the global fossil fuel economythe Age of Coal - and rushed to exploitation of offshore oil. We can conclude reasonably that oil has accelerated the energy regimes of Asia by allowing it to transcend through time, it is here in Asia that oil has caused a revolutionary shaping of the continent.
In studies on oceanic development, most processes such as overfishing, overhunting, or other unsustainable practices “did not mark planetary-scale disruptive shifts toward the oceanic Anthropocene in Asia” (Huebner, 2022). Instead, by following the course of decades after the decolonisation of Asian countries in the 1950s, the sudden “synchronicity of terrestrial and oceanic transitions to oil economies, meaning the convergence of the two strictly separate temporalities” (Huebner, 2022), defined the narrative surrounding Asia’s marine spaces as an oceanic Anthropogenic one.
The appropriation of marine space that harboured Asia’s offshore oil fields became an integral oceanic substitution. As most countries and markets were already situated in the transition between biomass, coal, and oil, oceanic ghost acres of offshore oil that became available could replace the high demand for terrestrial fuel sources that countries needed. Post-independent leaders were the “dominant guiding force in appropriating Asian marine spaces and exploiting offshore oil fields” (Huebner, 2022) under governmental economic planning projects.
Despite a diverse post-colonial timeline, the oceanic dimension of the Anthropocene in Southeast Asia is homogenised by these local trajectories of intensifying global offshore oil exploitation. This new state of energy system tied to maritime space connected the otherwise heterogenous group of Asian political elites. Uncoincidentally, there were similar intentions and endeavor motivated by the need to build up energy resilience for economic and security reasons.
PHOTOGRAPH BY IGOR GROSHEV
Asia’s centrality to the Anthropocene and its future pathways rests, in the first instance, upon numbers. Prior to the 1950s, more than 85% of the world’s carbon emissions came from the US and Europe. Over the second half of the 20th century, Asia - especially Chinabegan to take the lead. The rapid and expanding industrialisation in pursuit of economic growth on such a massive scale since the 1950s, play a pivotal role in shaping many aspects of the global economic and energy outlook.
Today, fossil fuel combustion is widely acknowledged as a driver of anthropogenic climate change, with contemporary anxieties about oil reflecting a world in which geo-economic power has shifted towards Asia. “Rising fuel demand, especially for oil, has far outpaced production from within the region” (IEA, 2019) and Asia has become a net importer of fossil fuel. Asia consumes 93.9 million barrels of oil per day. In total, Southeast Asia countries, Chinese Taipei, and China share $3070B import value of petroleum fuel in 2020 (OEC, 2020), with China commanding around half that number.
On the flip side, numbers again explain another critical reason for its centrality. If we consider the location of those, most significantly at threat from climate change, the great majority of potential victims are in Asia. The rapid and expanding Its dual role as protagonist and victim of the climate change story has left the continent trapped in the same dominant mechanism of world economy like everyone else.
Bibliography
Huebner, S. (2022). Asia’s oceanic Anthropocene: How political elites and global offshore oil development moved Asian marine spaces into the new epoch. Journal of Global History, 1-22. IEA. (2019). Southeast Asia Energy Outlook 2019. International Energy Agency. The Observatory of Economic Complexity. (2020). Retrieved from OEC: https://oec.world/en/profile/ country/chn
“The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea. It is located south of China and Taiwan; east of Vietnam; and west and north of the archipelago composed of the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia.” (Schofield, 2016) “These six states have overlapping claims over the South China Sea and its riches.” (Li, et al.) “Controversial complex maritime claims and their geo-political dramas about sea trade, oil reserves, and fish stocks are often the primary focus of global attention” (MAP Office, 2020) in the region. In recent years, it has been the site of “episodic military disputes, particularly concerning the transformation of islands into permanent naval bases; erecting new sea boundaries, instead of effectively managing and protecting maritime space.” (MAP Office, 2020) This has been further complicated by the US involvement in the region, uncomfortable with the rise of a non-Western superpower, China.
Despite many factors, incidents, and analysts pointing at the direction of military conflict, there has been relative peace in the South China Sea (SCS). The SCS conflict has been a successful case of conflict prevention and a transformation from a fragile to a stable peace prior to 2010. However, in the years after, conflicts have manifested in more severe forms and in greater frequency. Perhaps one of the most important factors contributing to this complexity is “the existence of intertwining bilateral and multilateral relationships” (ISEAS, 2022) between Southeast Asian countries, as well as China.
Today, the conflict in the South China Sea (SCS) can be seen through a safeguarding of each claimant’s national interest. Territorial waters, which determine fishing grounds and oil reserves, are the causal factors of all disputes, militarized or not. In terms of energy, the sea has an “estimated 11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas” (EIA, 2019). In terms of fishing, the SCS produces 12% of the global fish stock. Lastly, an estimated “US$3.37 trillion worth of global trade passes through the SCS annually” (China Power, 2017), one-fifth of the global maritime trade. There are no surprises why the conflict has been so prolonged as states refuse to back down from anything less than what they claim to be rightfully theirs. With strong intention and necessity to sustain economic development, and the increasing realization of the need to be self-reliant when it comes to energy, oil is at the epicenter of SCS disputes.
12% of the world’s
stock lies in the SCS.
5.5 billion barrels of crude oil passes through the SCS anually.
US$3.37 trillion worth of global trade passes through the SCS annually.
The South China Sea dispute stems mainly from China’s claim over almost the entire South China Sea. At the heart of its claim is a U-shaped boundary termed the ‘9-dash line’, that Beijing first published in 1947. China’s sweeping claims of sovereignty that infringes the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of other nation states have antagonized those competing claimants. In recent years, China has increased efforts to reclaim land in the Spratly and Paracel Islands, by physically increasing land size or creating new islands. Satellite imagery has shown constructed ports, military installations, and airstrips, thus fully militarizing these artificial islands that China have created. Beijing’s strategy, which predicates upon establishing dominance in the region has resulted in its instability.
The driving factor behind China’s assertive and often belligerent behaviour is its historical perspective and current strategic struggle with the US. Historically, China has been conquered and colonised by Western invaders through the vulnerable underbelly, which is the South China Sea. Today, it perceives Western powers as targeting the area’s resources. Hence, China is taking extreme measures to claim the SCS as a buffer towards potential foreign intrusions.
The South China Sea (SCS) is an area of strategic, political and economic importance to the US, which explains the US motivation in resisting China - upholding the belief of freedom of navigation and in securing of sea line of communication (SLOCs). China’s growing capabilities and determination to defend its interests has alarmed the US and forced action in pushing back against Beijing’s interpretation of international law. The US advocates a “rules-based international order” and China’s maritime claim (9-dash line) based on historical claims goes against that. The US adopts a similar response to Beijing’s increased military activity; by also “stepping up its own military activity and naval presence in the region” (Center for Preventive Action, 2022). In recent years, the number of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) has increased to send a message to China of the US commitment to ensuring free and open access in the South China Sea. The principles are based on the provisions introduced by the United Nation Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which “defines the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of surrounding waters based on exclusive economic zones and continental shelves.” (Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.)
ILLUSTRATED BY CRAIG STEPHENS
The detente between Beijing and Manila is more brittle than we expected. Despite warming relationships between the two countries, China increasing assertiveness and provocation towards the Philippines have been met with strong response. Manila remains strict to safeguard its natural resources, especially regarding natural gas at Reed Bank. It views sharing of their resources with the Chinese as unconstituitional despite desperately needing China’s forebearance to operate in these waters peacefully.
The Scarborough Shoal Incident worsened diplomatic Manila when Philippines dispatched a warship the Scarborough Shoal. China followed up by the fishermen resulting in a two-month standoff. as leverage against the Philippines; imposing imports and suspending tours to the Philippines.
The US stepped in to mediate the situation, their forces until a deal over its ownership complied, China “maintained regular patrols from accessing the waters” (Council on Foreign agreement on withdrawal had been reached regional entities stayed out of “regional affairs”.
diplomatic relations between Beijing and warship to confront Chinese fishing boats in by sending surveillance vessels to protect standoff. China also used trade and tourism imposing stricter regulations on Philippine fruit Philippines.
situation, with both parties agreeing to withdraw ownership could be reached. While Philippines patrols that prevent the Philippine fishermen Foreign Relations, n.d.), claiming that no reached and was open to talks only if nonaffairs”.
On January 22, 2013, the Republic of the Philippines instituted arbitral proceedings against the People’s Republic of China under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea over Chinese claims of sovereignty to the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal originating from the April 2012 clashes. China rejected the proceedings, forcing the court and its arbitration to continue without Chinese participation.
On July 12, 2016, the ad-hoc tribunal “invalidated China’s expansive maritime claims” (International Crisis Group, 2021) in the South China Sea and ruled against its rights based on historical claims over maritime areas within the “nine-dash line” stating that it had no legal basis under UNCLOS. Furthermore, the court ruled that “none of the land features fit requirements to generate the 200 nauticalmile exclusive economic zone” (Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.) as the features were artificially constructed through land reclamation. China “neither accepts nor recognizes” the court’s ruling and doubled down on its claims including the construction and militarisation of seven artificial islands in the Spratly Islands.
Among all bilateral issues that make up the complex maze that is the South China Sea dispute, those between Vietnam and China are by far the most serious. The overlapping claims of sea and land areas between the two countries are not only the largest, but they also share more bilateral maritime incidents than with any other claimant states in the South China Sea. Moreover, historical animosity from various conflicts especially the SinoVietnamese War in 1979 have left a general mistrust that belie all Sino-Vietnamese interactions.
Vietnam passed a maritime law entitled the “Law on the Sea”, “asserting its jurisdiction over the disputed Spratly and Paracel Islands.” (Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.) Any foreign naval ships passing through the area are demanded to notify Vietnam naval forces. China responded strongly by announcing the establishment of Sansha City, which “encompassed the Paracel and Spratly Islands and its surrounding waters.” (Liu, 2012)
The China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOC) moved its oil platform near the waters of the disputed Paracel Islands. Vietnam protested the move as an infringement of its sovereignty and dispatched naval vessels to disrupt the rig’s placement and operations. China responded by deploying 40 ships of its own to protect the rig. The collision of several naval vessels caused the conflict to escalate with each side blaming the other for ramming into their ships. Anti-China protests erupted throughout Vietnam, targeting foreign businesses owned by Chinese investors and Chinese workers. This marks the lowest point between China and Vietnam in the SCS dispute.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded on 8 August 1967 by five leaders - the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The aim of the association to promote cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, technical, educational and other fields, and in the promotion of regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter. (ASEAN, n.d.) It slowly grew to include other nations in Southeast Asia.
However, it has been defined more so by its failures since its founding, such as its ineffectiveness at dealing with the ASEAN financial crisis in 1997-98. ASEAN continues to be berated by critics on the continued reliance on the “ASEAN Way” and questions on its relevance have been raised. The “ASEAN Way” is “a working process or style that is informal and personal. Policymakers constantly utilise compromise, consensus, and consultation in the informal decision-making process. It above all prioritises a consensus-based, non-conflictual way of addressing problems.” (Masilamani & Peterson, 2014)
With regards to the South China Sea dispute, many bemoan the lack of resolve by ASEAN especially in face of the global superpower, China. China’s repeated acts of provocations against ASEAN members, most notably Vietnam and the Philippines has created a rift in the organisation due to differing relationships of members between China, and its hegemonic rival, the United States.
Described by Adam Ward, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Director of Studies, as “a set of zero-sum territorial and sovereignty disputes, prosecuted with some vehemence”, the clash over maritime territory and resources is “taking place in the context of power politics and hegemonic rivalry.” (Yang, 2015) Involvement of regional powers such as China, Japan, and the USA, both constrain and enable the dispute; most notable is the rivalry between Washington and Beijing. These fuelling nationalist impulses, militarization, and hegemonic divide, have given rise to greater security dilemmas for ASEAN countries.
On July 13, 2012, for the first time in 45 years, ASEAN failed to issue a communique after the conclusion of its annual meeting in Cambodia. The impasse came due to the disagreement between member states on whether the issue of territorial claims regarding China should be included in the joint statement. The division between ASEAN states involved in the SCS dispute has caused an erosion of ASEAN Centrality. Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia have had disputes with China over contested territories. Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos, being not directly involved in disputes with China, “have more room for strategic maneuvering” (Yang, 2015) to remain in China’s good books while standing, albeit rather passively, in the corner of ASEAN.
What was originally supposed to be an association that held a central position to safeguard the common interest, position, and identity of Southeast Asia, has led to an unsurprising collapse. The lack of common ground due to fragmentation of interests in the South China Sea dispute that is very much ingrained in each country’s national interest and security means ASEAN cannot reach a unanimous position of its own and assert it firmly.
Brunei has historically displayed little interest in regional maritime disputes because it is buffered by its oil wealth. However, the depletion of resources has spurred closer relations with China to secure its economic survival after peak oil. Both countries are engaged in a “strategic cooperative partnership”, even agreeing a plan for joint exploration for oil and gas in disputed areas.
China has been a supporter of successive Cambodian governments since the days of the Khmer Rouge. China provides Cambodia with direct foreign investment and security against Vietnam, whom Cambodia views as an existential threat. Cambodia reciprocates through support in international fora and access to its economic and territorial resources. In 2016, Cambodia blocked a joint statement by the ASEAN member states against China on the South China Sea disputes.
Indonesia’s relations with China have swung between mild indifference and outright hostility in order to protect its maritime interest. However, a more tolerant approach is taken in an effort to avoid open conflict with China over the disputed maritime claims. In recent years, Indonesia has warmed up to China with increasing economic ties and diplomatic relations.
Laos has enjoyed extremely close cooperation with China since the advent of communist rule. years. While cooperation happens on a relatively small scale due to Laos’ limited economic and military capacity, China’s influence in Laos is increasing on all strategic fronts.
China has been a long supporter of successive Myanmar governments. An agreement signed in 1988 opened the way for cross-border trade and military aid. Despite growing anti-Chinese and pro-democracy sentiments among the population, leading to rapprochement with the US, relations with China were not severed. The two countries signed a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership incorporating a memorandum of understanding on military cooperation. Chinese investment also increased, funding infrastructure megaprojects of strategic importance such as the Kyaukphu deep sea port, which would provide China with direct access to the Bay of Bengal. Hence, China is keen to secure relations with the military junta to prevent delays to these projects.
Myanmar Brunei China and Southeast Asia Indonesia Laos CambodiaSuccessive Malaysian governments have been relatively hostile towards China’s economic expansion while remaining relaxed over its territorial expansion in the region. Hence, economic cooperation has oscillated depending on the different political leaders. However, Malaysia have not dismissed collaborative opportunities with China and have suggested to be willing to reach a negotiated settlement with China over their disputes. On the security and defense front, both countries remain distant.
Philippines have always been seen as the US principal ally in Southeast Asia. However, under President Duterte, the Filipino government appears to be playing the US and China against one another to secure a better deal for itself. This trend is projected to continue under President Marcos Jr. as Philippine-China ties are “set to shift to higher gear”.
The Singapore government have been careful in its relations to China. The majority ethnic Chinese population raises concerns of it being seen too close to China and would antagonise both sets of domestic minorities and the large, neighbouring Islamic states of Malaysia and Indonesia. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Vivian Balakrishnan stated that Singapore “is not a vassal state; [and] cannot be bought or intimidated.” This stance applies to the US as well, keeping a friendly but distanced attitude towards both countries - close enough to enjoy economic gains but distant enough to preserve its independence.
As the US scaled back defence cooperation with Thailand after the 2014 coup, Thailand’s military relations with China strengthened considerably. China has become an important source of arms imports for Thailand. While Chinese military equipment is not as technologically advanced as US weapons systems, it is cheaper and sufficient in quality to meet Thailand’s defence requirements in a low threat environment. Thai-China military exercises have expanded in scope and frequency and t he number of Thai officers studying in China has increased since Washington terminated funding for Thai military personnel to study in the US after 2014.
Vietnam is highly dependent on China to support its economic growth, but has not always enjoyed a cosy military relationship with them. The Sino-Vietnam War has left a deep-rooted mistrust that belie all interactions between China and Vietnam, but progress has been made to permit defence, security and border patrol cooperation. Nevertheless, Vietnamese suspicion of China remains high and is very willing to take aggressive enforcement actions to protect its maritime claims against foreign incursions.
Vietnam Philippines Singapore ThailandFor nearly two decades, ASEAN nations and China have met to discuss the implementation of a “code of conduct” for the South China Sea. The goal arose due to ASEAN’s desire to manage rising tensions from disputes between claimants without prompting great-power competition. In 2002, the countries signed the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,” which set the stage for a formal code that was to follow.
However, the code of conduct has yet to be finalised even today. The narrowly crafted declaration gave no indication of any action to seek a resolution regarding the disputes of the SCS, nor any binding terms for parties to adhere to it. There is also a lack of political willingness on any side to make the necessary compromises for the code of conduct to go through. The Chinese are still reaching for a maximalist claim such as the ceasure of all foreign (non-chinese) military activity in the SCS, while ASEAN countries maintain a strict stance on its territorial rights. Most importantly, the code of conduct has no language on fishery management, oil and gas, and demilitarisation, all of which are actual triggers of the conflict.
The code of conduct is used on several levels to contain the conflict and its failure to expedite progress towards peace in the region is accepted as a status quo. For China, the code is used to show that the members of the region can handle matters within it and serves as a deterrent to external, non-direct SCS nations to stay out of SCS affairs. This is especially so when referring to the influence of the US. For the rest of the smaller claimants, the code is an instrument to lengthen discussions on the SCS because there is an unspoken understanding that talking is better than fighting - open war against China is the least ideal scenario. Moreover, having the code of conduct allows matters of the SCS conflict to be compartmentalised. Other relations in the area such as economic partnerships can be discussed and managed separately outside conversations of the code of conduct.
Southeast Asia’s reliance on China cannot be understated. The region’s total trade value with China stands at $572.3 billion dollars in 2020. Since 2010, the region’s exports to China grew at an average annual rate of 10.4% as compared to 12.5% for imports from China. (ASEAN, 2020) China and ASEAN are each other’s top trading partner, further complicating the SCS conflict due to the need for economic alliance in spite of their competing territorial claims.
The use of the code of conduct to compartmentalise the SCS dispute, so as to not affect economic and trade partnerships, demonstrates the economic priorities that China and ASEAN has. Southeast Asia is fundamentally a region hungry for economic development and growth, while China’s strength is also largely dependent on its global economic standing more so than any other factor. Moreover, the resources that are contested such as fishing grounds, oil, and shipping routes are all pawns within a larger economic chess game. Hence, an economic vector is needed as the potential panacea to the SCS conflict.
Malaysia 89.92 Singapore 96.89
Vietnam 153.18 Thailand 80.60
Chinese Taipei 164.46 Philippines 47.33
Indonesia 73.17 Brunei 1.77
Cambodia 9.52 Myanmar 16.81 Laos 3.10 SCS Claimants Non-Claimants
Total trade value with China (Billion)
Weissmann, M. (2010). THE SOUTH CHINA SEA CONFLICT AND SINO-ASEAN RELATIONS: A STUDY IN CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE BUILDING. Asian Perspective, 34(3), 35–69. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42704721
Masilamani, Logan; Peterson, Jimmy (15 October 2014). “The “ASEAN Way”: The Structural Underpinnings of Constructive Engagement”. Foreign Policy Journal. Archived from the original on 13 May 2015. Retrieved 12 May 2015.
ASEAN. (2020). ASEAN-China Economic Relation. Retrieved from ASEAN: https://asean. org/our-communities/economic-community/integration-with-global-economy/asean-chinaeconomic-relation/
ASEAN. (n.d.). ASEAN Aims. Retrieved from Association of Southeast Asian Nations: https:// asean.org/what-we-do/
International Crisis Group. (2021). Competing Visions of International Order in the South China Sea. International Crisis Group.
Council on Foreign Relations. (n.d.). China’s Maritime Disputes 1895-2020. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/timeline/chinas-maritime-disputes
Liu, J. (2012, June 24). China announces creating Sansha city. Retrieved from ChinaBeijing: https://archive.ph/20130414113012/http://www.chinabeijing.org/china-announces-creatingsansha-city/#selection-1187.0-1187.36
Yang, A. H. (2015). The South China Sea Arbitration and Its Implications for ASEAN Centrality. In S. Lee, & H. E. Lee, Asian Yearbook of International Law: Volume 21 (pp. 83-95). Brill. Li, S. D., Economy, E. C., Haass, R., Kurlantzick, J., Smith, S. A., & Tay, S. (n.d.). China’s Maritime Disputes. Council on Foreign Relations.
MAP Office. (2020, May). The South China Sea Monument. Retrieved from e-flux Architecture: https://www.e-flux.com/architecture/at-the-border/325758/the-south-china-sea-monument/ Schofield, C. (2016). Untangling a Complex Web: Understanding Competing Maritime Claims in the South China Sea. In I. Storey, & C. Y. Lin, The South China Sea Dispute: Navigating Diplomatic and Strategic Tensions. ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute
“The future isn’t cast into one inevitable course. On the contrary, we could cause the sixth great mass extinction event in Earth’s history, or we could create a prosperous civilization, sustainable over the long haul. Either is possible starting from now.”
Kim Stanley Robinson
Patel and Moore points to a host of re-wording in their vision of “reparative ecology.” They believe that there is “great promise that humans - and what humans become - can thrive with the rest of the planet after the Capitolocene”. (Patel & Moore, 2018)
Their strategies are based on terminologies such as recognition, reparation, redistribution, reimagination, and recreation of the new global structure and mechanism, but they warn against restoration. Restoration of the environment after humans have damaged it is a flawed and backward-looking concept. To move forward is to focus on “redistributing care, land, and work so that everyone has a chance to contribute to the improvement of their lives and to that of the ecology around them can undo the violence of abstraction that capitalism makes us perform every day.” (Patel & Moore, 2018)
The world is currently faced with a climate and ecological emergency. It is paramount to consider a socially just re-structuring of the world that we are soon forced to inhabit. Governments nowadays are expected to take on the management of ecosystems as one of their primary assignments. Since the early 2000s, several national and international institutions have published a series of measures to tackle the lack of ecological agency: Green New Deals (GND). GND proposals call for public policy to address climate change along with achieving other social aims like job creation and reducing economic inequality. However, many of the GNDs proposed “differ substantially from each other in scope, scale, enforcement, and the socioeconomic paradigm” (Vinuesa, Gankevich, & Shevlyakov, 2020) where they operate. A new GND is desperately needed.
What is needed to be done has never been clearer. To have any chance against a warming planet are the immediate transition away from fossil fuel to alternative energy sources and the removal of carbon from the atmosphere. If we are to achieve the goal to limit Earth’s warming to 1.5 degrees, it will require a counterforce equivalent to the “geological” force that humans have exerted on the planet. The thesis calls for a new GND that focuses on new infrastructures, governance and ecosystems of a carbon care economy.
What is needed to be done has never been clearer...
The two broad solutions that are necessary for us to have any chance against a warming planet are the immediate transition away from fossil fuel to alternative energy sources and the removal of carbon from the atmosphere. All other ways of inhabiting our planet are tacitly assumed absent.
Stronger climate action movement, resistance and disinvestment campaigns, led in particular by indigenous activists and young people, have been instrumental in creating the sense of fossil fuel as an immoral and dangerous investment. With greater delegitimisation of fossil fuels, we see an implicit sense of panic by fossil fuel companies that the demand for fossil fuel is peaking. However, moving forward the reality of post-oil can only go so far with bottom up delegitimisation. The dominant thought still optimistically assumes the energy transition from oil to post-oil as something that will happen naturally, guided by the government. With new, superior alternatives, fossil fuel would fade into obsolescence. This overlooks the social and cultural transition necessary in accompanying the technological shift - a shift that is “unnatural” by nature. This can only be done through a strict top-down planning of phaseout - a set of broad goals that are translatable into concrete steps that can be managed and enforced globally. “Natural” market forces will not do the trick.
A lack of understanding of the politics of oil allows for a good deal of “fantasy and illusion” elsewhere about a “decline in fossil fuel use and possible arrival of an all-renewable energy future in just a few decades. The truth of the matter is this: on the global scale, oil constitutes the one energy source with no alternatives.” (Montgomery, 2018) Current energy alternatives such as solar, wind and hydropower are reliant on the environment beyond our control. What is necessary is a firm energy alternative, where the switch can be switched on whenever we require it.
Despite rapid growth in the renewables industry, they still remain a small margin in the global energy source. Fossil fuels still “provide more than 84% of our primary energy.” (Rapier, 2020) This is made worse when we consider that over half of global oil productions and reserves are owned by national oil companies. They are fully or majority-owned by the state, most of which provide a substantial amount of governmental income. The transition away from fossil fuels will change our current lifestyles, and we have to embrace or withstand it.
There is no pathway in the IPCC reports that sees humanity limit the warming of the planet to 1.5 to 2 degrees without actively taking carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere. Climate change is a problem of carbon stocks, not carbon flows. Climate modeler John Sterman and educator Linda Booth Sweeney use the analogy of the earth system as a bathtub that is filling up. “Reducing the flow of water into the bathtub isn’t going to fix our problem unless we’re actually draining it, too.” (Sterman & Sweeney, 2000)
We would not stop the warming of the planet and climate change even if we were to stop carbon dioxide emissions today. Once we release the carbon dioxide stored in the fossil fuels we burn, “it accumulates in and moves amongst the atmosphere, the oceans, the land, and the plants and animals of the biosphere.” (Rood, 2014) As the oceans heat up more slowly than the atmosphere, the effects of sea level rise due to the melting artic is only delayed. Moreover, the “released carbon dioxide will remain in the atmosphere for thousands of years” (Rood, 2014), only returning to geological formations after many millennia. For example, through the formation of calcium carbonate – limestone – as marine organisms’ shells settle to the bottom of the ocean. But on time spans relevant to humans, once released, the carbon dioxide is in our environment essentially forever. It does not go away, unless we, ourselves, remove it.
The math
It is predicted that 10GtCO2 will need to be removed annually from the atmosphere by 2050, with increased removal capacity up to 20GtCO2 per year by 2100. Given that “an acre of algae can capture about 2.7 tons/day of carbon dioxide.” (Benemann, et al., 2002) The calculations show us that 41064 km2 of algae is required to meet global sequestration rates. This is only if algae is relied upon as the sole means of carbon sequestration, which will not be the case as other carbon sink such as forests, other terrestrial plants, and planktons in the oceans, will also contribute to the removal of carbon from the atmosphere.
Nature-based solutions focus on conserving and increasing greenhouse gas sinks through terrestrial ecosystem stewardship and landuse change mitigation methods. While they offer attractive options for carbon sequestration, they have a limited capacity to absorb our carbon waste. The main carbon sink of our planets is the ocean, which absorbs 50% of carbon dioxide. Once the maximum capacity is reached, negative impacts such as ocean acidification will arise. Hence, the only strategy would be to plant new carbon sinks in the form of forests and other woodland areas, further adding greater strain to landuse management. A carbon sink that is long lasting, thermodynamically stable, environmentally benign and big enough to hold at least 1,000 Gt of CO 2 is needed.
Direct air capture (DAC) technologies absorb carbon dioxide directly from the atmosphere and aim to utilise the captured carbon dioxide. The carbon capture process is independent of source and location, making DAC suitable for deployment in areas that do not compete for productive landuse. The captured carbon can then be transported and permanently stored elsewhere in deep geological formations, used in food processing or combined with hydrogen to produce synthetic fuels.
Biomass, more specifically algae, both terrestrial or aquatic species, can be employed as a renewable energy source. “Relative to alternative energy sources, the aquatic biomass represents the strategy that is most ready to be executed on a large scale without any economic or environmental penalty.” (Aresta etal. 2005) Endowed with unique adaptability to grow in diverse habitats, either marine or freshwaters, many of them have been researched in their usage as food, animal feed, bio-fertilizer, and aquaculture. In view of the increasing global oil demand alongside depleting oil reserves, development of innovative techniques using algae as a novel biomass source have received a great deal of attention too. Using the natural process of photosynthesis, carbon dioxide is absorbed and converted into chemical energy. Carbon is stored in the plants until it undergoes respiration or combustion.
The dominant mode of global organisation has been exposed to have fatal shortcomings. We see this especially so in the persistent failure of international organisations and governments to mitigate climate change. There is now a need to reimagine new modes of intervention towards social, economic and political recomposition that complements our current planetary dilemmas.
Ever since 2008, China has gained greater confidence in asserting itself on the global level. The collapse of the housing bubble that caused the 2008 financial crisis in the United States, is compared to itself hosting the Olympic games in all its granduer. That disparity between China and the West led to a hypothesis that maybe the current dominant model that came from Euro-Atlantic geopolitical culture is not the right one, at least not anymore. China views this as a window of opportunity and is contesting this dominant model with its own vision of world order. Under the rubric of “community of common destiny” described by Xi Jinping, China is already attempting to write a new regional order embodied in its foreign policy and international strategy like The Belt and Road Initiative, warming relations with Russia, and greater assertiveness in Asia.
When President Trump’s decided to withdraw the United States from the Paris Climate Change Agreement in June 2017, he was “heavily criticized by China, who restated its commitment to meet its pledged emissions reduction objectives.” (Chiu, 2017) The U.S. government’s retreat from clean energy commitments under the Trump administration left a global leadership vacuum that the Biden administration have had to catch up. Moreover, China has actively restricted support for overseas fossil fuel plants, - its actions engendering further economic and political support from the international community for China’s leadership in the sector.
China is “genuinely interested” in leading the world in one particular sector: “deployment and investment in renewable energy.” China is already leading in renewable energy production figures. It is “currently the world’s largest producer of wind and solar energy, and the largest domestic and outbound investor in renewable energy.” It is clear that China has the “political incentive, economic capability, and moral consensus needed to lead the global renewable energy sector.” (Chiu, 2017)
The dramatic sprint of crude oil above $100/bbl is prompting Asian importers to “rethink supply strategy as well as their fiscal roadmap, which could result in an aggressive recourse to strategic reserves, changes to fuel subsidies and taxes, and a much bigger push toward new energy alternative.” (Mohanty & Vahn, 2022) If China can rally Asia and facilitate the movement away from oil, it will no doubt gain tremendous influence within the region.
The political landscape of China and the necessity for a centrally driven effort of this Great Leap Forward narrows the candidates who can lead such an endeavor. Looking at state owned institutions, the military presents itself as most suitable. With the economic “unification” of Asia under China to chart a new path for energy, past militaristic resources that were used to assert their claims in the South China Sea can be liberated from that duty. Future work will be tethered to the very material processes of climate change mitigation and adaptation, necessary to scale up to the amount of carbon emissions and keep global warming to a viable limit. The military can now take on a new primary security assignment - climate protection - as the new labor force of continental scale.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the largest employer in China and second largest in the world, with 2.3 million employees in its payroll, behind the United States Department of Defense. The PLA has always had a significant role in the shaping and implementing China’s foreign policies. Its role has increased significantly in the past two decades such as “conducting high-level exchanges, functional exchanges, technical cooperation, arms sales, military assistance programs, arms control negotiations, and peacekeeping operations.” It will likely become even more so as China further develops its military capabilities and “cast a broader shadow over the Asia-Pacific region.” (Allen, 2001)
The PLA is already engaged in actions of disaster relief, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations, many which are directly or indirectly related to climate change. Although the People’s Liberation Army has been “largely silent” (Corbett & Singer, 2022) about the warming of the planet, the changing climate will eventually “force China’s military to reckon with a new security environment” (Corbett & Singer, 2022). However, the presence of the military, or rather, postmilitary agents, in their territorial waters will still impose a certain level of threat and significant worry to China’s partner countries.
“Since completing the construction of its artificial island outposts in the Spratly Islands in 2016, China has shifted its focus toward asserting control over peacetime activity across the South China Sea. A key component of this shift has been the expansion of China’s maritime militia—a force of vessels ostensibly engaged in commercial fishing but which in fact operate alongside Chinese law enforcement and military to achieve Chinese political objectives in disputed waters. Apart from professional militia - uniformed crew operating vessels constructed with military features, such as weapons storage facilities, large and powerful civilian fishing vessels are also recruited and renovated or purpose-built as Spratly Backbone Fishing Vessels (SBFV).” (Poling, Mallory, & Pretat, 2021)
These maritime militia are key players in the SCS conflict due to their undefined categorisation and China’s non-military motivation. Firstly, these militia operate under the guise of fishermen and are notionally civilian (non-military personnel). There is a degree of deniability that Beijing can hide behind by claiming that is not escalating to open conflict because it has not deployed its military. Methods employed by the militia include bullying, intimidation and sheer numbers, all of which free China from the use of open force. Beijing’s hope is that the persistent pressure can convince the region that it is not worth contesting against China. Secondly, China’s goal in the SCS is not primarily militaristic; wanting to control it during peacetime. To do that, the PLA cannot have a constant presence in SCS waters and thus the maritime militia is an alternative to control the disputed waters.
In 2021, the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative presented a report with methodology of identifying “122 confirmed militia vessels and 52 more potential ships, highly likely to be militia. Remote sensing data indicates that roughly 300 militia vessels operate in the Spratly Islands every day.” (Poling, Mallory, & Pretat, 2021)
The vagueness in terms of military status that the maritime militia possess can be seen as an opportunity. Given the development of closer economic partnership in the South China Sea, this militia force can be redirected to fill in the roles of the pioneer carbon care work force. This removes the need for the PLA to actively involve themselves within the territorial waters of other states that can be seen as a threat or infringement of their sovereignty.
Patel, R., & Moore, J. W. (2018). A History of the World in Seven Cheap Things. University of Calfornia Press.
Rapier, R. (2020). Fossil Fuels Still Supply 84 Percent Of World Energy — And Other Eye Openers From BP’s Annual Review. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2020/06/20/bp-review-newhighs-in-global-energy-consumption-and-carbon-emissions-in2019/?sh=5419b3fe66a1
Chiu, D. (2017). The East Is Green: China’s Global Leadership in Renewable Energy. New Perspectives in Foreign Policy Issue 13.
Mohanty, S., & Vahn, G. P. (2022, February 10). Asia rethinks oil supply, fiscal strategy as crude races toward $100/b. Retrieved from S&P Global: https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/ en/market-insights/latest-news/energy-transition/021022-asiarethinks-oil-supply-fiscal-strategy-as-crude-races-toward-100b
“Algae are photosynthetic organisms that grow in a range of aquatic habitats, including lakes, pounds, rivers, oceans, and even wastewater. They can tolerate a wide range of temperatures, salinities, and pH values; different light intensities; and conditions in reservoirs or deserts and can grow alone or in symbiosis with other organisms.” (Khan, Shin, & Kim, 2018) They can be broadly categorized by their colour (red, brown, green) and classified by size as microalgae or macroalgae. Macroalgae are “large aquatic photosynthetic plant-like organisms that are visible to our naked eye.” They are commonly referred to as seaweeds. Meanwhile, microalgae are “small aquatic photosynthetic plant-like organisms that are visible only under the microscope.” (Samanthi, 2020)
The “content of carbohydrates in macroalgae varies widely among species and cultivar, and species selection can lead to evolution of strains having extremely high amounts of carbohydrate that can be utilized as an inventive bioethanol feedstock.” (Renganathan, Yaakob, & Takriff, 2013) Marine macroalgae are “nutritionally very wealthy, being claimed as a great source of complex polysaccharides, minerals, proteins and vitamins, as well as several phycochemicals. Nowadays, amongst all three types of macroalgae brown algae are the most consumed species (66.5%), followed by red (33%) and green (5%) algae.” (Afonso, Catarino, Silva, & Cardoso, 2019) However, macroalgae are cultivated primarily for food consumption or turned into products rather than biofuel.
Algal biomass contains three main components: carbohydrates, proteins, and lipids/natural oils, as well as other essential minerals and vitamins. Given that “the bulk of the natural oil made by microalgae is in the form of tricylglycerol, microalgae are usually the exclusive focus in the algae-to-biodiesel arena.” (Farm Energy, 2019) “Triacylglycerols are preferred over phospholipids or glycolipids for biofuel production due to their higher percentage of fatty acids and their lack of phosphorous and sulfur.” (MacDougall, McNichol, McGinn, O’Leary, & Melanson, 2011)
In addition to biodiesel, microalgae can also be used to generate energy in several other ways. Most biomass from algae can also be burned similar to wood or anaerobically digested to produce methane biogas to generate heat and electricity. Some algal species can produce hydrogen gas under specialized growth conditions. Algal biomass can also be treated by pyrolysis to generate crude bio-oil.
Bioenergy currently accounts for about 7% of global energy consumption and could rise to 18.7% by 2050. The IEA highlights bioenergy as a low-carbon energy source that could be a possible alternative to natural gas. The technology — which thermally or biochemically converts biomass to produce heat, electricity or fuel — has been around for decades and is now seeing renewed and increasing interest. This is only being heightened by the current energy crisis.
Compared to the other energy sources, there is the potential for biofuel feedstock to tackle both the replacement of depleting oil resources and contribute to the removal of carbon in the atmosphere. Biomass Carbon Removal and Storage (BiCRS) is “a range of processes that use plants and algae to remove carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere and store that CO2 underground or in long-lived products.” (Sandalow, Aines, Friedmann, McCormick, & Sanchez, 2021) The biomass can then be converted into biofuel through various processes.
However, in the energy industry, Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS), a subset of BiCRS, is more commonly mentioned. While BiCRS emphasises on carbon removal from the atmosphere, BECCS focuses on the energy production side of things. However, this puts a wrong emphasis on the production of bioenergy because climate action will not work if carbon removal is not included. When the function of bioenergy production is combined with carbon capture and storage (CCS), the removal of carbon from the atmosphere instead of the production of energy will often take precedent as the most valuable part of the process. This is why BECCS as a term is seen more frequently in climate action literature and policies because proposals need to appeal to large energy companies that it can be business as usual.
Generation 01
Made from sugar-starch feedstocks and edible oil feedstocks, which are generally converted into bioethanol and biodiesel, respectively.
Generation 02
Includes lignocellulosic biomass or woody crops, agricultural residues or waste, as well as dedicated non-food energy crops grown on marginal land unsuitable for food production.
Generation 1 biofuel feedstock did not gain traction because it competed directly with food crop. It was much more sensible to consume the food crop and rely on oil to provide the energy needed.
BECCS in model simulations is assumed to rely on Generation 2 energy crops, which include nonfood plants. These advanced fuel crops often contain more energy, and they can grow on “marginal” land. Some of them are “cellulosic” biofuels, meaning combustibles can be produced from cellulose, the fiber of the plant. However, the lignin in the cell walls, which helps the plants to stand, have to be broken down using a thermochemical process (extreme temperatures, high pressures) or biochemically, with enzymes. But these enzymes are quite expensive. It is therefore very hard to produce these fuels cheaply. Compared to the cheap cost of fossil fuels, they are less economically viable.
Experimentation with Generation 3 biofuels have seen an increase in parallel with the urgent race for a more sustainable energy source. Referring to algae, both micro and macro, they have a rich genetic diversity that can be selected from based on different conditions and they’re also twice as efficient at using sunlight as many other crops, and up to half of their biomass is lipids. Crop contamination can also be corrected in a matter of days. Based on productivity per unit area, algae constitute one of the most effective raw materials that could be exploited for the biofuel production.
The aspiration is Generation 4 biofuels; genomically prepared microorganisms and genetically engineered feedstock that serve the purpose of energy production. This is done through improving photosynthesis, either by increasing light-gathering capacity or by extending the range of the light spectrum the organism can utilize; improving carbon fixation; or increasing oil content. OR synthetic biology, engineering microbes to produce biofuels without feedstock—going straight from microbes to fuel.
Includes any biofuel designed or tailored for higher efficiency, such as low-lignin trees. It is usually referring to algae which has higher yields and is versatile.
Genetically modified biofuel feedstock to achieve higher sunlight capturing capabilities and fuel production.
Source: GENIALG Project
Biofuel is the only alternative energy source, apart from oil, that can be used directly to produce fuels for transportation. This makes them favourable among the renewable energy sources available.
In principle, microalgae can be used to produce several different types of biofuel: biodiesel from algal oil (Amaro, Guedes, & Malcata, 2011), bioethanol produced in the dark by anaerobic fermentation (Bigelow et al., 2014), hydrogen generated photobiologically (Zhang et al., 2012) and biomethane (also known as biogas) produced via the anaerobic digestion of algal biomass (Frigon et al., 2013). Furthermore, all of these biofuels can be produced in the same process: the residue from oil extraction remaining after biodiesel production can be further processed into ethanol, hydrogen, or methane (Mata, Martins, & Caetano, 2010; Singh & Gu, 2010).
The status of research in the field of algal biofuel can be determined by analysing trends of peer-reviewed papers and patent disclosures. Research in the field has only recently started to emerge as trends show increasing but little number of research documents. The Chinese Government has started to promote scientific and technology-led sustainable green development, introducing policies which provides tremendous prospects for microalgal biofuel technology. However, the development of relevant technologies is also tied to the international economic environment. The historically low crude oil prices worldwide in recent years have posed a challenge to the development of relatively high-cost microalgal biofuels.
Research on microalgae is primarily focused on the study of optimal growth conditions, stimulus for higher growth rates, and bioengineering an algae strand with high lipid or carbohydrate yield. All these are centered around the idea of biofuel production to satisfy current energy demands. It is also vital to research or develop algae strands with greater carbon absorption and storage capacity.
Closed systems allow for a greater degree of control. Conditions such as water temperature, pH level, and nutrient amount can be precisely maintained and regulated at optimal levels for algae growth. However, closed systems are highly expensive, require a lot of maintenance and are limited much more by size. They are also not completely immune from contaminant issues and are quickly overrun.
There are two broad types of closed system: photobioreactor and traditional bioreactor. Photobioreactors are commonly used for photoautotrophic algae strains while traditional bioreactors are used for heterotrophic algae - those that do not require sunlight.
Open pond systems allow for greater volumes of algae to be produced, while being at higher risk for contamination from unwanted algae species or bacteria than closed reactors.
“However, these extra risks can be easily mitigated with the right precaution and equipment. Pond covers can prevent the entrance of any fresh water or airborne particulates until the algae has fully colonized the water. Keeping water at the right salinity and pH level is often enough to keep the environment unfriendly to unwanted colonizers. In the event of contamination, it can be treated directly to maintain the right balance of growth.” (BTL Liners, n.d.)
There are several methods employed in kelp or seaweed farming. The main difference would be the depth in which the farms operate at. Seedlings are tied to floating cultivation lines anchored to the bottom of the seabed of around 7m.
Seaweed farming is a relatively low-technology process but with high labour requirement. There have been “attempts to introduce high technology to cultivate detached plants but none have yet to gain commercial viability.” (Crawford, 2002) There has been considerable discussion as to how “seaweeds can be cultivated in the open ocean, facilitated by artificial upwelling and substrate, as a means to regenerate decimated fish populations and contribute to carbon sequestration at depths of 1km and below.” (Flannery, 2017)
Cell density is an important factor in the large-scale production and application of microalgae. Cultivation methods thus play a big role in determining the cost of microalgal utilization. While most algal species are autotrophic, meaning they have the ability to photosynthesize, other species are capable of various degrees and modes of heterotrophy and mixotrophy.
Autotrophic cultivation method is the simplest way in microalgae cultivation and hence the most common algae cultivation method in the biofuel production industry. Photoautotrophic microalgal cells use light as the energy source and assimilate carbon dioxide as its carbon source. This cultivation method is the cheapest and produces light-induced high value-added products, but it suffers from a low growth rate with low biomass and lipid content. Heterotrophic cultivation method operates in the absence of light. Heterotrophic cultures use organic compounds such as glucose, glycerol, and acetate, as both its energy source and carbon source. Compared to autotrophic cultures, they exhibit higher rates of cell growth, biomass content and lipids accumulation. “However, “the small number of available heterotrophic algal species and their potential contamination by bacteria limit the application of this mode of cultivation”. (Giordano & Wang, 2018) Various research have focused on the usage of alternative carbon sources as glucose demands a high cost, and optimizing the culture medium or conditions to increase biomass and lipid yields.
Mixotrophic cultivation method involves the simultaneous assimilation of CO2 and organic carbon, as “both respiratory and photosynthetic metabolisms operate concurrently”. (Lee, 2007) It is a hybrid method that tries to capture the benefits of both autotrophy and heterotrophy.
Under mixotrophic cultivation conditions, microalgae not only grow heterotrophically using organic carbon, increasing their growth rate and improving biomass and lipid accumulation, but they also consume CO2 and produce oxygen through photosynthesis (Abe, Imamaki, & Hirano, 2002), making overall CO2 emissions lower under mixotrophic compared to heterotrophic cultivation. Moreover, mixtrophy also preserve valuable pigments and photosynthesis carotenoids that would not be present in heterotrophic cultures.
Microalgae biomass production and utilization for biofuel generation face major limitation at the larger scale due to its “energy-intensive processes and high operational expenses.” (Shifa M.R. Shaikh, 2021) Among these processes, a significant bottleneck to large-scale microalgae production and utilization is the harvesting and dewatering process. Harvesting serves two purposes. Firstly, it concentrates microalgae in dilute cultures in preparation for biofuel production. Secondly, it recovers large quantities of water to be reused. Common methods for harvesting microalgal biomass include centrifugation, filtration, sedimentation and flocculation. Harvesting techniques can be employed independently or as a hybrid to optimise the process. However, while these harvesting techniques have been extensively studied, there is no single universal harvesting method for all algal species and applications, that are technically and economically viable. (Shifa M.R. Shaikh, 2021)
Physical harvesting techniques have high recoveries of microalgae biomass that are mostly uncontaminated, thus “suitable for extracting high-value products”. Unfortunately, the technique is “marred by high operational costs, high energy demand and long durations for harvesting.” (Shifa M.R. Shaikh, 2021) Physical harvesting techniques include gravity sedimentation, filtration, centrifugation, flotation, electro-coagulation and magnetic flocculation processes.
A gravity sedimentation system is employed for “microalgae that have naturally high sedimentation rates.” In general, the “capital and operation costs are low, and if the strain has poor sedimentation properties, a flocculation agent (see chemical harvesting) can be used.” (Z. Wen, 2011)
Filtration involves passing microalgal cells through a suitable membrane, depending on the algae, under high pressure. The end product is a thick paste of algal biomass. “The process can range from simple screens and microstrainers, to complex vacuum or pressure filtration system.” (Z. Wen, 2011) The main limitation of filtration is plugging, where contaminants have latched onto the filter and entered the algae solution.
Centrifugation relies on “mechanical gravitational forces that allow for efficient harvesting of suspended cells within a short time.” (Tiron, Bumbac, Manea, Stefanescu, & Lazar, 2017) However, its superiority in terms of efficiency over natural gravity sedimentation comes at a cost of being energy intensive and expensive. Hence, given current technological standards, it is “only recommended for high-value algal products in food and pharmaceuticals.” (Tiron, Bumbac, Manea, Stefanescu, & Lazar, 2017)
Gravitational
Before After Filtration Centrifugation
Chemical harvesting techniques “introduce chemical additives into microalgae suspensions to induce aggregation.” (Shifa M.R. Shaikh, 2021) In terms of energy demand, operational costs, potential environmental-friendliness, and high efficiencies in algae concentration, these techniques are more suitable than physical techniques.
“Flocculation is a chemically based separation process that requires less energy than centrifugation and ultrafiltration.” (Wang, Ma, & Yan, 2016) In flocculation, cationic flocculant that possess a positive charge, neutralize the negative changes of a microalgal cell surface, forming larger aggregates. When particles cluster together, the settling rate increases and the clusters settle due to gravitational forces. The algae can then be separated via conventional separation methods.
The choice of flocculant depends on the targeted products of microalgae biomass, and the discovery of a highly efficient and costeffective flocculant has remained a challenge. Inorganic flocculants include polyvalent cations such as Aluminium sulfate, Ferric sulfate, and Iron (III) chloride have high production cost, shorter-shelf life and biomass contamination. Various natural and synthetic organic flocculants such as Chitosan, cationic starches, modified tannins, and polyacrylamides, have been designed to improve efficiency. However, they have adverse effects on harvested biomass and are non-biodegradable. Synthetic polyacrylamide that possess a “high molecular weight and high charge density are more efficient in harvesting microalgae.” (Shifa M.R. Shaikh, 2021) This is because the “bridging and sweeping reactions between the polymetric flocculants and algae cells form larger sized flocs” (Lee, Robinson, & Chong, 2014) compared to charge neutralization with conventional inorganic chemicals.
Many of the biomass to bio-oil process requires a dry biomass and thus water has to be fully separated from the algal biomass. Physical and chemical harvesting methods involve some form of dewatering processes to separate water from algal cells, but further drying is needed to remove water completely. However, some biomass to biooil conversion, namely the various forms of hydrothermal liquefaction can work with a high moisture feedstock.
“After separation and concentration, microalgal biomass has a high water content” (Neves, Demarco, Tribuzi, 2019), presenting high perishability, hence like many other food products, drying methods are conducted to stabilize the biomass for easy transport, storage and longer shelf life.
Many microalgae biomass drying methods in literature are related to the stabilization of biomass for oil extraction. These includes “rotary drying, solar drying, cross-flow and vacuum shelf drying and flash drying.” (Neves, Demarco, Tribuzi, 2019) While processing cost and energy requirements are important consideration in selecting a suitable drying method, the potential of degradation on functional and nutritional components due to the drying process is important as well.
The spray drying process involves the atomization of algae slurry into droplets by spraying, followed by the rapid evaporation of the sprayed droplets into solid powder by hot air at a certain temperature and pressure. Spray drying is highly recommended for drying high-value products from algae as it possesses the ability to generate biomass of high yield and quality.
Freeze drying works by freezing the material, then reducing the pressure and adding heat to allow the frozen water to sublimatechanging directly from the solid state to the gaseous state without turning into a liquid. Freeze drying occurs in 3 phases: freezing, sublimation, and adsorption.
In the freezing phase, the algae slurry is cooled below its triple point to ensure sublimation, rather than melting, will occur. In the sublimation phase, the pressure is lowered and heat is added to the frozen algae. The use of a vacuum speeds up sublimation but overall, sublimation is a slow process as too much heat can alter the structure of the algae. 95% of water is removed in this phase. The final phase is the adsorption phase. In this phase, the ionically-bound water molecules are removed by raising the temperature higher than in sublimation to break the bonds between the algae and water molecules.
However, frreze drying is a very expensive process.
Biomass Slurry
Dried Biomass Freeze Chamber
Condenser Refrigeration Plant
Vacuum Pump
Biomass is heated rapidly at high temperatures (500°C–700°C) in an oxygen-free environment. The heat breaks down biomass into pyrolysis vapor, gas, and char. Once the char is removed, the vapors are cooled and condensed into a liquid “bio-crude” oil. Fast
follows a slightly similar process; however, biomass is exposed to a higher temperature range (>700°C) with some oxygen present to produce synthesis gas (or syngas)—a mixture that consists mostly of
Low-temperature deconstruction typically makes use of biological catalysts called enzymes or chemicals to breakdown feedstocks into intermediates. First, biomass undergoes a pretreatment step that opens up the physical structure of plant and algae cell walls, making sugar polymers like cellulose and hemicellulose more accessible. These polymers are then broken down enzymatically or chemically into simple sugar building blocks during a process known as hydrolysis.
Biochar is a charcoal-like substance that is created through thermochemical decomposition of biomass, usually through the process of pyrolysis. Broadly, organic waste such as wood chips and agricultural byproducts are burnt in the presence of little to no oxygen to produce biochar.
The biochar that is produced has the “ability to store carbon in a stable form, preventing CO2 from leaking back into the atmosphere.” (CLEAR Center, 2019) By burning decaying plant matter, the biochar stabilizes the decaying matter and the accompanying carbon dioxide that is released. Currently, biochar is used as a method to enrich soil to improve food crop production and food security. Therefore, pyrolysis of algae not only produce the necessary bio-oil to be converted to bio-fuel but also return biochar as a convenient carbon storage byproduct.
However, there are two potential pitfalls surrounding biochar as a viable carbon storage option. The first concerns itself with the treatment of biochar as another source of fuel as it is a carbon rich material. The high growth and turnover rate of algae presents an attractive opportunity for a steady supply of biochar to be produced. Although there is a possibility that biochar can be the alternative to coal, which could potentially offset the negative externalities of coal such as mining, burning biochar and releasing the carbon back into the atmosphere goes against the very intention of the transition to algae.
Biochar can be grounded in a grinder and then rolled and passed through a sieve to obtain ground biochar. It can then be processed by blending with a binder to produce biochar pellets. Common usage of biochar pellets are energy production, soil conditioning, and liming agents. The compactness of the pellets “increases its mechanical strength, durability, and density.” (Abdullah & Wu, 2009)
Biochar Biochar Pellets
The highly oxygenated compounds found in biomass and bio-oil creates several undesirable properties that need to be eliminated. Undesirable properties include “low energy density, instability that leads to polymerization, high viscosity, and high corrosivity” (Attia, Farag, & Chaouki, 2020) that hinders storage and transportation processes. Thus, bio-oil needs to be upgraded prior to any application, with a focus on deoxygenation techniques. Upgrading of biofuel returns conventional transport fuel such as diesel, gasoline, kerosene, methane or LPG.
There are two types of bio-oil upgrading in practice: physical and chemical upgrading. Physical upgrading involves adding water and solvent into the bio-oil to lower and control its viscosity. Biochar and other solid contents can be removed through hot gas filtration.
“Hydrotreating is a reductive deoxygenation method of triglycerides in oils at high hydrogen pressures (50–100 bar) and moderate temperatures” (Siddiki & Touchy, 2020) using supported metal catalysts. Its main purpose is to remove impurities such as sulfur, nitrogen, oxygen, olefins, and metals from intermediate streams, before being refined into a finished product. The process is very similar to the hydrotreatment of crude oil.
Zeolite cracking involves the cracking of bio-oil over porous solid zeolite-based catalyst at ambient pressure. The orderly network of pores between silicon, aluminum and oxygen atoms, and acidity between the pores, give Zeolite its shape selectivity and acid strength to break down large molecules and allow the desired hydrocarbon molecules such as gasoline and diesel to pass through. There are different types of zeolite-based catalyst with different molecular lattice structure.
However, the size and shape of the micropores are a fundamental determining factor in the process of cracking. If the pores are too small, longer chain hydrocarbon molecules cannot fit through the openings and undergo cracking, resulting in wastage. Moreover, the feed molecules that have cracked into valuable products have difficulty escaping the zeolite through the narrow micropores and often crack into even smaller but undesirable byproducts like light gases. If the pores are too large, there is potentially less cracking of hydrocarbons as the molecules pass right through the highway.
Recent development in molecular highway technology has created a hybrid of mezzo and micropores within the latticework of the zeolite catalyst. The structure allows the feed molecules to easily access the lattice highways to undergo cracking into the desireable bio-products and also to quickly exit the zeolite crystal before it breaks down even more.
Algae only require a few essentials to grow: water, sunlight, carbon dioxide, and nutrients like nitrogen and phosphorus. Each essentials consists of optimal conditions that help promote algae growth: water temperature, water salinity, pH of water, water flow and velocity, nitrogen concentration, phosphorus concentration, carbon dioxide concentration, water turbidity which affects sunlight penetration, and sunlight intensity. Along the coast of Southeast Asian territorial waters hosts the most optimal conditions of temperature, salinity and nutrients.
Studying conditions that support algae growth, optimal algae hotspots can be identified for China to begin its algae operations. Each grid square was given a score based on the three mappings previously to determine the locations that boasted the best algae cultivation conditions. Each grid square is 500x500m.
The hype around algae biofuel has faced intractable problems that have led to its eventual disappointment and loss in popularity. While algae possess the ability to survive diverse and more extreme habitats than other terrestrial or oceanic botany, it is a false believe that algae cultivation can happen anywhere with sunlight.
Efficiency in lipid extraction, maintaining optimal growth conditions in open ponds, immense volumes of water, CO₂ and fertiliser required to allow the algae to photosynthesise fast enough at large scales, all contribute to the difficulty of algae gaining traction. Moreover, as the demand of almost every other energy source is linked to the fluctuation in oil prices, the major oil price decline in 2008 and 2014, hindered biofuel attractiveness as an alternative. Thus, many companies have pivoted towards business models of higher-value, low-volume algae products such as dietary supplements, food additives, animal feed and cosmetics.
Despite the spatial productivity of algae compared to other terrestrial plants, their production is still more expensive due to high initial investment and production cost. The largest limiting agent in the production of algae is the resource intensive maintenance of optimal environment for productive algae growth, either through human labour or machinery investment. Depending on the growth and harvest cycle of the algal species, constant attention has to be given in the operations of the algae farm. Specialised machinery will be relied upon to maintain biofuel operations at an efficient level.
PHOTOGRAPH BY JON NAZCA
Shifa M.R. Shaikh, Mohammad K. Hassan, Mustafa.S. Nasser, Sami Sayadi, Ahmad I. Ayesh, Vivek Vasagar, A comprehensive review on harvesting of microalgae using Polyacrylamide-Based Flocculants: Potentials and challenges, Separation and Purification Technology, Volume 277, 2021, 119508, ISSN 1383-5866, https://doi.org/10.1016/j. seppur.2021.119508. (https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/ pii/S1383586621012168)
Doukeh, R., Bombos, D., Bombos, M. et al. Catalytic hydrotreating of bio-oil and evaluation of main noxious emissions of gaseous phase. Sci Rep 11, 6176 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-85244-z
Aresta, M., Dibenedetto, A., and Barberio, G. (2005). “Utilization of macro-algae for enhanced CO2fixation and biofuels production: development of a computing software for an LCA study,” Fuel Processing Technology 86, 1679-1693. Lorenzo J.M., Agregán R., Munekata P.E.S., Franco D., Carballo J., ¸Sahin S., Lacomba R., Barba F.J. Proximate Composition and Nutritional Value of three macroalgae: Ascophyllum nodosum, Fucus vesiculosus and Bifurcaria bifurcata. Mar. Drugs. 2017;15:360. doi: 10.3390/md15110360.
Amaro, H. M., Guedes, A. C., & Malcata, F. X. (2011). Advances and perspectives in using microalgae to produce biodiesel. Applied Energy, 88(10), 3402–3410. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2010.12.014
Bigelow, T. A., Xu, J., Stessman, D. J., Yao, L., Spalding, M. H., & Wang, T. (2014). Lysis of Chlamydomonas reinhardtii by high-intensity focused ultrasound as a function of exposure time. Ultrasonics Sonochemistry, 21(3), 1258–1264. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.ultsonch.2013.11.014
Zhang, Y., Fan, X., Yang, Z., Wang, H., Yang, D., & Guo, R. (2012). Characterization of H2 photoproduction by a new marine green alga, Platymonas helgolandica var. tsingtaoensis. Applied Energy, 92, 38–43. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2011.09.044
Frigon, J.-C., Matteau-Lebrun, F., Hamani Abdou, R., McGinn, P. J., O’Leary, S. J. B., & Guiot, S. R. (2013). Screening microalgae strains for their productivity in methane following anaerobic digestion. Applied Energy, 108, 100–107. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2013.02.051
Mata, T. M., Martins, A. A., & Caetano, N. S. (2010). Microalgae for biodiesel production and other applications: A review. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 14(1), 217–232. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. rser.2009.07.020
Shifa M.R. Shaikh, M. K. (2021). A comprehensive review on harvesting of microalgae using Polyacrylamide-Based Flocculants: Potentials and challenges. Separation and Purification Technology, Volume 277.
Z. Wen, J. L. (2011). 3.11 - Biofuel From Microalgae. Comprehensive Biotechnology (Third Edition), 140-146.
Wang, W., Ma, W., & Yan, H. (2016). Global Dynamics of Modeling Flocculation of Microorganism. Applied Sciences, 221.
Afonso, N. C., Catarino, M. D., Silva, A. M., & Cardoso, S. M. (2019). Brown Macroalgae as Valuable Food Ingredients. Antioxidants, 365.
Renganathan, R., Yaakob, Z., & Takriff, M. S. (2013). Potential of Micro and Macro Algae for Biofuel Production: A Brief Review. BioResources 9, 1606-1633.
Lee, C., Robinson, J., & Chong, M. (2014). A review on application of flocculants in wastewater treatment. Process Safety and Environmental Protection, Volume 92, Issue 6, 489-508. de Farias Neves, F., Demarco, M., & Tribuzi, G. (2019). Drying and Quality of Microalgal Powders for Human Alimentation. In (Ed.), Microalgae - From Physiology to Application. IntechOpen. https:// doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.89324
Giordano, M., & Wang, Q. (2018). Microalgae for industrial purposes. In S. Vaz Jr. (Ed.), Biomass and green chemistry: Building a renewable pathway (pp. 133–167). Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing. Abe, K., Imamaki, A., & Hirano, M. (2002). Removal of nitrate, nitrite, ammonium and phosphate ions from water by the aerial microalga Trentepohlia aurea. Journal of Applied Phycology, 14(2), 129–134. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1019599216554
Abdullah, H., & Wu, H. (2009). Biochar as a Fuel: 1. Properties and Grindability of Biochars Produced from the Pyrolysis of Mallee Wood under Slow-Heating Conditions. Energy Fuels, 23, 8, 4174-4181.
Benemann, J. R., Van Olst, J. C., Massingill, M. J., Carlberg, J. A., Weissman, J. C., & Brune, D. E. (2002). The Controlled Eutrophication Process: Using Microalgae for CO2 Utilization and Agricultural Fertilizer Recycling. Greenhouse Gas Control Technologies - 6th International Conference, 1433-1438.
In the 1902 unfinished novel, The Future of New China, Kong describes that stages leading up to China’s global dominance. The stages are: preparation, autonomy of various districts, unification of all of China, building things and producing goods, competing with other countries, and finally becoming the global superpower. In a way, this intended science fiction is no longer science fiction and we see that China is currently at the fifth stage.
The emergence of digital technologies make possible the accurate depiction of Sinofuturism in an increasingly globalised space, where in the past, Chinese science fiction writers find themselves having to respond, cater and grapple with stereotypes of the west just to be legible to an international readership. Chinese Science fiction today such as international sensation The Three-Body Problem to anonymously published digital short story Olympic Dream, communicates China’s emerging role in the global world order and how leaders might act in the face of geopolitical uncertainty that threatens its current position.
The Three-Body Problem, by Liu Cixin, outlines an “inter-planetary relations” called the Dark Forest Theory - where self-preservation and elimination of potential enemies are the only universal values in an environment of expansion and resource scarcity. Two strategies are offered: either attempt to eliminateany potential rivals, or intentional isolationism and even the retarding of development to remain invisible to more powerful actors. However, Li leaves hope of a possible third strategy, that the harsh nature of the intergalactic world will compel players to collaborate instead of engaging in mutual destruction.
The global landscape cannot avoid China’s imprint and a consideration for a future-oriented temporality should replace previous ancientcontemporary discourses in the study of China. China’s consolidation into a superpower, its massive urbanisation and successes in science and technology points to the undeniable futurism of China. Sinofuturism operates on a denial of coevalness, it has gone beyond current necessity of engagement with modernity and allows for the provocative speculation of possible future configurations of various Chinese historical, cultural, and societal aspects. It juxtaposes “technological developments and traditional customs, global trends and local phenomena, political systems and material forces” (Seta, 2020) in a way that defers it from participation with either orientalism or contemporariness alone. However, while it is the temporal domain of the future that becomes most relevant and effective for us to construct a more liveable shared world, we must inevitably also confront both China’s historical past and contemporary present and its implications on the future.
Techno-Orientalism
In a way, Sinofuturism responds to science fiction as much as science fiction is built upon Sinofuturistic ideals. Through fiction, the trilogy
presents the three possible narratives that was adopted against the Trisolarians - extraterrestrial beings that plans to invade Earth, which mirrors China’s historical narratives. One must either attack (aggression), hide (isolation), or ally with others (collaboration).
China has historically adopted a defensive foreign policy compared to offensive ones in dealing with possible external threats. Establishing a secure government from foreign incursion as seen from the construction of the Great Wall instead of actively seeking an expansionist agenda by conquering other lands is the embodiment of such a insular and isolationist policy. In the anarchic realist universe of Liu Cixin’s novels, the only way a civilization can survive is by masking their location and ambitions. Unfortunately, China is currently one of the countries with the strongest influence in almost all spheres and a strategy of hiding is not available to it anymore. China cannot shy away from its relationships with the rest of the world, be it benign or malignant. The historical trauma of the Century of Humiliation, when Western powers and Japan intervened and subjugated China, was a rude awakening that forced China into a global system defined by competition between great powers. Similarly in the novel, civilisations are forced to engage in the ruthless battlefield and adopting a pacifist stance does little in dealing with incursive bullying and attacks from aggressive powers. However, the roles are reversed with China boasting the world’s second largest military, second largest economy, and a strong authoritarian central government. It is easy for China to flex its muscle to get what it wants and its military and economic might also acts as an effective deterrent. Unfortunately, China’s increasing military buildup and regional presence in the South China Sea has not gotten it anywhere except a state of tension with many other nations.
In President Xi Jinping’s 2014 address titled, “Carry Forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence To Build a Better World Through Win-Win Cooperation”. Xi reiterates the original five principles that were predicated on mutual respect of independent growth between nascent Asian countries, and adds an additional six principles that emphasises collective effort and collaboration. These additional prinicples are an idealised hope for Great Power geopolitics in Asia, responding to the multipolar and integrated 21st century world.
However, the question that looms throughout The Three Body Problem is the same as that raised by the Five Principles: can different civilizations actually work together, or does nature tend towards conflict and destruction? While the answer remains elusive both in science fiction and reality, Lawrence Lek summarises it well in his video essay that: “sinofuturism does not care about a dramatically better future as long as it survives.” Survival is the true fundamental “hard-lined principle.” Failure to collaborate in favour of the other two strategies (attack or hide) poses a much greater risk to the survival of China and people rather put faith in a tiny profit margin than uncertain futures; there is no morality or “values” where there is no time.
The consortium is the pie in which China must share to win influence over the region. It does not have to be equal, just that Southeast Asian countries should be given a stake in the consortium to firstly, establish cordial relationships between countries in the region, thus affording China an identity within the ASEAN member, secondly, to justify China’s presence in the South China Sea, and thirdly, to garner support against Western criticism of its growing influence. Collaboration becomes the way forward for China’s agenda of regionalism and global influence, as well as ASEAN countries’ goal of development and global voice. China will have to put faith in its regional collaborative approach. Regardless of possible conflict and destruction, it is important that we continue chiselling, to pick away at the power of self-interest.
Five Principles:
Sovereignty and territorial integrity | Mutual nonaggression |Non-interference in each other’s internal affairs | Equality and mutual benefit | Peaceful coexistence
Additional Principles: Sovereign equality | Common security | Common development | Win-win cooperation | Inclusiveness and mutual learning | Fairness and justice
The concept of sovereignty prevents interference from other states while also providing legitimations of laws within the nation-state, and makes the state the only political formation that can legitimately enact violence within its borders and against other sovereign nations. This model of sovereignty creates a world of borders based on the dichotomy of “the inside” versus “the outside.” It is within this definition of sovereignty that China is granted the necessary legitimacy to enact its control. However, given the omnipresent nature of our climate crisis, anthropocentric sovereignty “begins to be delinked explicitly from territory” (Bishop, 2021) and gets tied to increasing volume and velocity of flows of goods, information, capital, natural resources, and people that comes with it. The establishment of a global carbon care economy challenges the core principle of sovereignty.
Firstly, the climate crisis does not distinguish its effects on the planet. Climate calamaties of varying scales, types, and intensity affect all species and people, thus calling for the need to change our uncoordinated and divided approaches towards climate change that still exists within anthropocentric definitions. Secondly, the establishment of a global carbon care economy removes traditional practices of boundaries, where the consortium becomes the equivalent of a transnational organisation that can even generate its own sovereignty. The original nationality of the new citizens are less important. Instead, the consortium’s operational requirements, such as research team and occupation, will define the identities of these new subjects. This generates new hybrid subjects that are have fluid identities that change in parallel to their movement within the consortium; across teams, communities, and job scope.
“The establishment of a global carbon care economy challenges the core principle of sovereignty.”
While China’s success is the product of its strong authoritarian state model of social control and regulation, the same strategy cannot be applied to the consortium. Firstly, a strong regional cooperation consists of Southeast Asian countries having a stake in the carbon care economy. Complete authority over the algae cultivation and biofuel production will be seen as another act of aggressive territorialisation, which will deteriorate relations back to its original hostile state. Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that constant negotiations between ASEAN states and China will have to be carried out to deal with the asymmetries of power and equity.
Secondly, the climate crisis is a super wicked problem that has no central authority responsible for creating or resolving it. Even those seeking solutions for it are complicit in its making. By giving in to the desire to control, the fluidity of ideas, expertise, and research becomes extremely viscous. This hinders the development of more efficient algae strands. Moreover, a top down organisational structure will translate spatially into a system that does not have the fluidity to react to changes. Each country gets an equivalent return on their contribution of human capital as well as the research progress achieved in terms of algae bioengineering. There becomes a tendency for researchers and workers to segregate themselves across nationalities for ease of communication and quickly seek out a community among one’s own countrymen. This prevents proper collaboration between the labour force of different nationalities, potentially escalating into international competition where each country operates independently and withholds ideas, expertise, and research from each other, all to compete for dominance over the consortium.
Therefore, the work force of the consortium will need to be managed as a collective and identities will have to be redefined. Carbon care employment becomes the instrument that mobilizes labor into a collective and collaborative effort - beyond national and party interests. This new condition of coordination and agreement towards shared goals of climate management subverts traditional forms of control in exchange for renewed agency. The multinational labor force shed their differing identities to become citizens of the consortium.
is excellent.”Mao Ze Dong
The risky situation - the product of global warming, oil’s entrenchment, political failure, and South China Sea conflict, makes our moment an eminently political one. The situation is decidely not excellent, and that’s why one has to act. However, the uncontrollable interplay of global complexity is not solved by a magical formula that we can apply and expect things to work out. Fortunately, amidst the catastrophic climate risk, oil’s invisibility, and South China Sea context holds the potential of disposition that can be reversed from its original means of control, to a resistance against oil. China is given an opportunity: an opportunity to move beyond oil, establish a new regional order, and to rewrite a new global narrative.
China’s political structure gives it a crucial advantage in this resistance against oil. Projects are mostly state-led and not subjected to the constraints and expectations of investors, who expect quarterly validation in numbers and capital. China has the ability to make long term investments, meaning investments that can span decades into the future, and can embark on these projects with more confidence. This puts China in the position to stand against oil, and direct state investments into more sustainable alternatives. However, the biggest deterrence to China’s political agenda is the resistance of Southeast Asian countries - due to their suspicion of China against their national security and interests.
Methods
In Extrastatecraft, Easterling identifies the potential of disposition within infrastructural space that can be reversed from its original means of control, to a resistance. She encourages that of the “unorthodox auxiliary, which entertains techniques” that are “less heroic, less automatically oppositional, more effective, and sneakier—techniques like gossip, rumor, gift-giving, compliance, mimicry, comedy, remote control, meaninglessness, misdirection, distraction, hacking, or entrepreneurialism.” (Easterling, 2016) David shall not kill Goliath, but rather seek to take advantage of Goliath, to identify the little bits of exploitable “code” in the entire system of oil, where fresh territories for political action can be revealed.
Similarly, claims for sustainable social development based on the extraction and export of oil, are met with a skepticism borne of the bitter experience of countries like Iraq or Nigeria. However, it is precisely by acting on this disposition, through a poison pill strategy, that China can open a pathway forward.
“Why kill the giant when it can be put to work, and when it’s great size, like a multiplier, can amplify that work?”Keller Easterling, Extrastatecraft
With an increasing awareness of the need to be self-reliant when it comes to energy, Southeast asian countries have adopted a firmer stance on issues of oil and energy. This can be seen from the majority of recent SCS conflict revolving around the transgression of territorial waters by survey ships, harassment of oil rigs, and standoffs between forces of countries. Oil has a firm grip on the politics in the SCS, and it is through oil that China can make headway in its regional ambitions.
The fiction speculates that China rolls out a massive wave of economic agreements with Southeast Asian countries to kickstart a cooperative agenda. It will provide the funds, technology, and expertise, in helping Southeast asian countries develop their oil infrastructures in the SCS to exploit the resources of their territorial waters thus addressing their worries of energy resilience. In return, China is granted joint ownership to a portion of the country’s territorial waters to develop its own infrastructure. The addiction to oil and the foreign direct investment from China presents Southeast Asian leaders with an offer too good to resist. Southeast asia is still predominantly an oil importer and the opportunity to become less reliant and more selfsufficient leads to the acceptance by countries of this poison pill.
The poison pill strategy is China’s attempt to build closer relationships with Southeast Asian countries through economic means, establish its greater reliance on China, and bargain for pseudo-legitimacy and territory in disputed waters to kickstart its biofuel operations.
Algae is a potent candidate that can both sequester and store carbon, as well as provide an alternative fuel source. The coast of Southeast Asian territorial waters hosts the most optimal conditions of temperature, salinity and nutrients, which coincide to form potential algae cultivation hotspots and determine the beginning of China’s post-oil narrative.
In response to the oil vacuum, China makes its move in the global hegemonic chess game. While each country realises that they can only be reliant on themselves for energy. It sees the window to establish a new world order. Behind the smile of Xi Jinping, China announces its new Five Year Plan: the monumental leap forward.
China proposes a Sino-Asia Economic Partnership with the countries of Southeast Asia. Under the partnership, China offers funding for oil infrastructures to extract oil so that countries can be more self-reliant, in exchange for a portion of their territorial waters, where China can set up its own operations: algae farms.
The Poison Pill
Many countries implemented economic sanctions against Russia. However, these countries have long depended on oil and gas from Russia, which is one of the world’s top exporters of fossil fuels, supplying 10% of global petroleum production. But with those exports now politically toxic, they are scrambling to find other ways to meet their energy needs.
Oil prices skyrocket to $120 per barrel and many Asian countries are either forced to feel the financial sting, or the burn of the energy shortage.
In 2021 and early 2022, there was a major Russian military build-up around Ukraine’s borders. On 24 February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine.
Many countries implemented economic sanctions against Russia. However, these countries have long depended on oil and gas from Russia, which is one of the world’s top exporters of fossil fuels, supplying 10% of global petroleum production. But with those exports now politically toxic, they are scrambling to find other ways to meet their energy needs.
Russia-Ukriane War Economic SanctionsAs the world scrambled to build new oil energy infrastructures both terrestrial and oceanic, economically viable oil reserves are depleted. The world enters another energy crisis. China now has a valuable bargaining chip in the form of a new energy source, giving it immense power.
Interested to get a cut out of China’s global biofuel production, Southeast Asian countries offer labour as capital investments. On one hand, climate delegates in the form of researchers, scientists, architects, climatologists, algae farmers, are sent to maintain and grow the MAGIC.
On the other, communities of Southeast Asia seeking a better life are welcome to contribute as labour force that sustains the operation of algae growth and biofuel production.
New Work Order Oil accelerationWith an established biofuel infrastructure in the region, China calls for the centralisation of the satellite algae farms near Fiery Cross Island, its military base in the Spratlys
The warming up of relations between Beijing and the respective Southeast Asian governments allow China to move away from active harassment using their maritime militia in the South China Sea. Instead, the paramilitary and military force of the South China Sea is a labor force that it can tapped on. Through reskilling, the militia is converted into a new labor force that will oversee the beginning of the new carbon care infrastructure.
First Labour Force Marine Algae Integrated Consortium (MAGIC)
The narrative presents a realistic and sound pathway for China to assert its dominance in the global energy market. The pathway is not naive in believing that ASEAN would unconditionally ally itself with China given the ongoing geopolitical climate and the opportunity to play different global powers to their advantage. Instead, operating on some level of deceit and clandestine will guarantee a more successful outcome.
China sets up its biofuel infrastructure in the territorial waters of Southeast Asian countries. In the early stages, the focus is on large scale cultivation. Economies of scale and operational scalability are tested here to ensure maximum algae growth productivity. The other countries increase their oil infrastructures and cluster size. The produced bio-oil is upgraded and refined in these new infrastuctures, further cementing China’s relationship with Southeast Asia.
Burmese territorial waters are assumed to be the first site of Chinese intervention. China’s ongoing infrastructure megaprojects such as the Kyaukphu deep sea port, which would provide China with direct access to the Bay of Bengal, is of immense strategic importence. Hence, China is keen to secure relations quickly with the military junta to prevent delays to these projects.
Biochar Storage
Microalgae Cultivation Microalgae Harvesting Crude Bio-oil Production Transportation Militia
China fully establishes its oceanic biofuel infrastructure. Biofuel can be shipped from the algae satellites directly. China is the first country to completely transit to clean biofuel to power its economy. As the world sees the effects of accelerated oil extraction, Southeast Asian countries start buying biofuel from China. China prepares for its centralisation of biofuel production and the emergence of a new carbon sequestration market..
“one merely expresses wishes and defines some version of justice, equality, peace. That’s all easy. What’s hard is imagining any plausible way of getting from here to there.”
Kim Stanley Robinson
The Spratly Islands is an archipelago that lies off the coasts of the Philippines, Malaysia, and Southern Vietnam. Composed of islands, islets, cays, and more than 100 reefs, the islands contain less than 2km2 of naturally occurring land area, spread over an area of more than 425,000 km2. Despite its small land mass, the archipelago has complicated the governance and economics of the SCS conflict due to its close proximity to strategic shipping lanes. “The islands also offer rich fishing grounds and may contain significant oil and natural gas reserves” (Owen & Schofield, 2012) (although this is not proven), which make establishing international boundaries important to the claimants.
Spratly Islands
Paracel Islands
China Chinese Taipei
Vietnam Malaysia Malaysia
Philippines Brunei
Mischief Reef China
Subi Reef China
Itu Aba Island Chinese Taipei Johnson Reef China Loaita Island Philippines Flat Island Philippines Mariveles Reef Malaysia
Investigator Shoal Malaysia Collins Reef Vietnam East London Reef Vietnam South Reef Vietnam Alison Reef Vietnam Discovery Great Reef Vietnam
Barque Canada Reef Vietnam
Pigeon Reef Vietnam Ladd Reef Vietnam Cornwallis South Reef Vietnam
Ardasier Reef Malaysia Erica Reef Malaysia Grierson Reef Vietnam
Sand Cay Vietnam Pearson Reef Vietnam Central London Reef Vietnam Amboyna Cay Vietnam
Namyit Island Vietnam Nanshan Island Philippines Hughes Reef China
Thitu Island Philippines Swallow Reef Malaysia
Curateron Reef China West York Island Philippines
Fiery Cross Reef China West London Reef Vietnam
The unsettled sovereignty of the SCS has provided a theater for several “creative” territorialization strategies, including tourism, administrative rezoning, and land reclamation. Each state attempting to build a case to justify their claim by using an arsenal of spatial tools that brings agency to the built form. China is at the front of this. Since March 2018, “China has continued to construct military and industrial outposts on the artificial islands that it has built.” (Center for Preventive Action, 2022) This is accompanied by the fortification of its military naval presence in the region, all of which seek to legitimise its claim over the area. At the time of this thesis, China has already fully militarised three islands - Fiery Cross Island, Mischief Reef, and Subi Reef – “armed with anti-ship and anti-air missile systems, laser and jamming equipment, and fighter jets.” (EurAsian Times, 2022) However, according to the law of the sea, “[the artificial structures] do not possess the legal status of natural islands and have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of the maritime zones such as the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf.”
Occupied by: China
Legal Status: Rock
GPS: 9° 32’ 45” N, 112° 53’ 15” E
Total area of reclamation: 274 hectares
Fiery Cross Reef was occupied by China in early 1988 despite immediate opposition from Vietnam. In 2014, China commenced reclamation activity in the area and it has been converted into an artificial island of 274 hectares. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, it is “the most advanced of China’s bases” in the South China Sea’s disputed areas, with “12 hardened shelters with retractable roofs for mobile missile launchers already completed. The airbase can accommodate 24 combat aircraft and four larger planes, and a 3,125m runway.” (AMTI, 2017)
Occupied by: China
Legal Status: Low-tide elevation
GPS: 10° 55’ 25” N, 114° 5’ 5” E
Total area of reclamation: 395 hectares
During 2014, China started reclaiming land at Subi Reef, developing it into an island of 395 hectares. Subi Reef is the largest of China’s man-made outposts in the Spratlys. It includes a military base, a large harbour, and an airstrip of about 3,000m.
Occupied by: China
Legal Status: Low-tide elevation
GPS: 09° 54’ 00” N, 115° 32’ 00” E
Total area of reclamation: 558 hectares
“Mischief Reef is a low-tide elevation located in the Spratly Islands. China first took possession of the feature in 1994.” (AMTI, Mischief Reef, n.d.) In the mid-2010s, China created a large artificial island on the atoll, with reclaimed land covering 558 hectares. The island included a “2,644m runway and associated airfield, anti-aircraft weapons and a CIWS missile defense system.” (AMTI, Updates: China’s Big Three near completion, 2017) The reef was also the subject of the 2016 tribunal ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration as it was well within the Philippines’ EEZ and traditional fishing grounds.
After successful development and implementation of large scale biofuel production hubs, the satellites that operated along the coastlines of China’s partner territories will need to be centralised into a singular operational infrastructure: the Marine Algae Integrated Consortium (MAGIC). The location that fulfills all 6 requirements can be found at the very heart of the South China Sea conflict: the Spratly Islands. Comparing the 3 major chinese-controlled islands are ideal starting locations, Fiery Cross Island presents itself as the most ideal.
Shipping Routes
VietnamMalaysia
China Philippines
Shortest Path to Ports Brunei
Chinese Taipei Unclaimed
Algae Optimal Conditions
Subi Fiery Cross Reef (永暑礁)
Mischief Reef (美济礁)
Subi Reef(渚碧礁)
“Societies and economic processes that influence them are deeply interconnected with ecosystem management.” (Vinuesa, Gankevich, & Shevlyakov, 2020) Therefore, the success of this project hinges on the careful management of the transition to a post-oil regime that does not completely destabilise current social security and economy, even as infrastructure radically changes.
In 2009, Angélica Navarro Llanos, a Bolivian climate negotiator delivered a blistering address at the UN Climate Summit. She called for the need for “a massive mobilization larger than any in history...a Marshall Plan for the Earth.” The mobilisation refers to financial and technological transfer on unprecedented scales, “getting technology onto the ground in every country to ensure we reduce emissions without compromising and even raising people’s quality of life.” (quoted in Klein 2014, 5)
It means “reskilling and reorienting an entire workforce towards new means, creating a whole economy based on investment and developing the necessary technologies for the post-oil sector.”
The carbon care work force cannot comprise solely of the military. Climate action is not a mono-dimensional problem that can be resolved with the brute manpower of the military, and will require diverse expertise to execute its continental ambitions. A huge number of experts are needed to support the Marine Algae Integrated Consortium (MAGIC) such as engineers, biologists, physicists, climatologies, architects, economists, and other relevant roles. They will form the vanguard of a new continental scale resistance against planetary warming and its consequences.
The thesis starts with the role of the maritime militia as the pioneering carbon care task force in setting up and managing the satellite algae farms. However, a carbon care economy that can satisfy the carbon sequestration and energy production demand will require the establishment of an institution with the capacity to intervene, regulate, and coordinate all parties involved. MAGIC will look to Southeast Asia to provide this human capital.
After the establishment of MAGIC, countries can contribute labour as capital investments in exchange for a share of the biofuel produced and carbon offsets from the algaic carbon sequestration. MAGIC welcomes people with relevant skillsets to help run and maintain the carbon care center. It is important to identify the nature of new work and the matchmaking of labour to these new job openings.
“Future work needs to be tethered to the very material processes of climate change mitigation and adaptation.”Terra-Collor Work
Southeast Asians’ appreciation of China’s significant influence in the region is accompanied by their profound anxiety over China’s ability to constrain their countries’ sovereignty and foreign policy choices. It is obvious that China’s military is plays a huge part in this anxiety, being significantly larger and stronger than all Southeast Asian military, with its number rivaling their combined total. While the employment of Chinese military as part of the initial task force that operates within the territorial waters of Southeast Asian countries seem to be apt, it will be faced with resistance and viewed as another act of assertion over the carbon care infrastructure and South China Sea. The military will thus only remain as a first-phase labour force. MAGIC will then demilitarise following the establishment of infrastructure.
To further increase operational productivity and research more efficient fourth generation algae strands, the consortium will require a team of specialists with expert knowledge on algae farming.
Southeast Asian countries can invest in the new carbon care economy through human capital such as researchers, engineers, specialists, and architects to help expand the capacity of the consortium against the climate crisis. In return, these countries would get a cut of the biofuel depending on their capital contributions.
The consortium is in need of labour to help support the research clusters. It welcomes migrants in search of a better life; one of dignified work, stability, and contributes to saving the planet. Migrants can come with their families to start a new life or as indivduals in search of employment.
Through upskilling and training, those with a narrow skillset can be redeployed as field researchers and assistance to support to works of the various research labs, as well as to ensure the smooth operations of the consortium.
Montgomery, S. L. (2018, August 7). Oil, History, and the South China Sea: A Dangerous Mix. Retrieved from Global Policy: https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/07/08/2018/oilhistory-and-south-china-sea-dangerous-mix
Easterling, K. (2014). Extrastatecraft: The power of infrastructure space. Szeman, I & Whiteman, M. 2004. “Future Politics: An Interview with Kim Stanley Robinson,” Science Fiction Studies 312. Angélica Navarro Llanos, “Climate Debt: The Basis of a Fair and Effective Solution to Climate Change” (presentation, Technical Briefing on Historical Responsibility, Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bonn, Germany, June 4, 2009), quoted in Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate (Toronto, ON: Simon & Schuster, 2014), 5. Owen, N., & Schofield, C. (2012). Disputed South China Sea hydrocarbons in perspective. Marine Policy, Volume 36, No 3, 809-822.
Center for Preventive Action. (2022, May 4). Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea. Retrieved from Global Conflict Tracker: https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/territorialdisputes-south-china-sea
EurAsian Times. (2022, June 10). China’s ‘Most Exported’ Aircraft — Meet PLAAF’s J-7 Fighter Jet That Crashed In Central Hubei Province Yesterday. Retrieved from The EurAsian Times: https:// eurasiantimes.com/page/2/?m=advertisingbusiness
AMTI. (2017, June 29). Updates: China’s Big Three near completion. Retrieved from Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative: https://amti.csis.org/chinas-big-three-near-completion/
AMTI. (n.d.). Mischief Reef. Retrieved from Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative: https://amti. csis.org/mischief-reef/?lang=zh-h
A discrete frame structure is employed as a structural component that connects the entire consortium, but also to allow for the flexible appendage and removal of programmatic components that create the functional and productive spaces. This is to respond to the different algae requirements, volatile oceanic conditions, and ensures a system of resource and power equity.
Three types of frame modules are used - straight, L-shaped (90deg), V-shaped (45deg). Three categories of connection rules are defined to govern the aggregation and also ensure that the connectivity within the architecture assemblage is achieved. Through the specification of connection rules and component ratios, the desired spatial arrangement can be achieved.
Straight L-shaped
V-shaped
The production section is aggregated by prioritising horizontal linear connections of the biofuel production process. Half stacking connections were used over full-stacking ones due to the redundancy of completely adjacent parts. By opening up more void spaces using half-stacking connections, it accommodates inter-system pathways.
The inhabitation aggregation shares equal ratios of connection. End-to-end connections give rise to branching for future expansion, while the stacking connections densify clusters according to research progress.
The research aggregation consists of more rotational connections to create vertical elements for upward growth. End to end connections are defined to be more frequent to maximize the area for appendage of research labs onto the frame structure.
The project employs Wasp, a non-deterministic aggregation algortihm that prioritises adjacency while ensuring anti-collision between parts. The iterations for each separate programmatic zones were generated with different component ratios and connection rules depending on the spatial aggregation required. The aggregation of parts, however, were done in a stochastic manner.
Each iteration is then assessed on 4 key metrics: density, vertical cores, void spaces, and circulation. These post indexical studies ensure that the iterations chosen support the operations of the algae cultivation and biofuel production. Each sector: production, research, and living apply have different priorities depending on what is required and thus weightage with regards to the 4 metrics. This affects the score multiplier for each metric when tabulating the overall score for each iteration. The final iteration of the consortium is a combination of the productive band, 2 research clusters, and 3 housing clusters.
Housing Cluster Research Cluster 01
The conversion of algae into biofuel or other algal products requires specialised infrastructure at each stage. The study of current infrastructure (machinery and equipment) with regards to their scale, function, and components will reveal potential subtle relationships and inform the design for the new algae infrastructure.
As each stage in the production of biofuel offers different pathways that affect the product, cost of operation, and equipment needed, several components have to be omitted from the new system to maintain efficiency as well as cater to the needs of the site.
Exisiting machinery have been deconstructed and their parts studied. New machine typologies will have to be reimagined to be accommodated within the new frame structure. The following designs are speculative in terms of form but remain true to the actual components required by biomass to biofuel process.
Open water ponds are favoured to capitalise on the optimal oceanic conditions for algae cultivation. The algae floats on the sea surface in the day to undergo photosynthesis; absorbing carbon dioxide and nutrients for growth. At night, they are prevented from sinking by fine nets to prevent algae loss. An algae harvester conveys the algae from the ocean surface, through a large-object filter and into the delivery tube.
Filtration method is used to extract the algae biomass from seawater. Centrifugation requires high amounts of energy to separate algae from water, while gravitational sedimentation requires vertical dimensions that does not fit the form of the horizontal frame structure. The design considers future flocculation methods if a cost effective flocculant can be researched. At the end of the process, seawater is drained and the algae is collected as slurry.
Redeisgned Machinery
While all three processes are able to reap biochar, pyrolysis offers the greatest degree of product control, where time and temperature can vary the proportions of biochar, biofuel, and syngas. Biofuel and Syngas continue along the production system to be upgraded while biochar is separated and distributed. Biochar is first employed as a nutrient source for food production while the excess is sunken into the ocean where the stored carbon remains trapped, similar to a geological formation.
There is no alternative to biofuel refinement and thus zeolite cracking and hydrotreatment must be employed. This is to convert biofuel into the necessary fuel products that contemporary society is accustomed to getting from oil. The end products are then distributed to power the consortium while the rest of it goes to ports to be shipped.
In preparation for the scenario where energy demand is not reduced, the conversion of global energy use from fossil fuel to biofuel will need to account and replace current energy consumption. This sets up the parameters and constraints around which the biofuel production is organised. The existing biofuel infrastructural bands are concentrated around algae hotspots that territorialise Fiery Cross Reef and serve as anchors for future infrastructure to grow.
The production sector exists as bands of individual production lines that were initially developed at the algae satellites in the coastal regions of Southeast Asia.
These individual bands are consolidated in the new consortium of Fiery Cross Island. New bands are also created to meet the production demands of early phases.
A parallel system is introduced to connect the multiple bands together. The switch from a serial to parallel arrangement allows for non-singular pathways to emerge through the sharing of machines and the prevention of system failure should one part of any band fail to work.
As production increases to meet global energy demands, the productive bands no longer have to be duplicated as a full linear system but segments of the production line can be shifted or appended where necessary.
Production bands consolidate themselves in locations with most optimal algae cultivation conditions. Minimal housing units are built to accomodate the maritime militia if housing on Fiery Cross Island is not sufficient.
Production bands focus on densifying and branching out towards key shipping routes in the South China Sea.
Ports are established at end points. The different production bands start to connect to generate alternative pathways to overcome production failure. Research and housing units begin to densify as the labour force arrives.
The different production bands connect to form a tissue around Fiery Cross Island. Research and housing clusters arrange themselves around the tissue, negotiating for algae cultivation zones to support research test sites and aquaculture spots
Carbon care employment becomes the instrument that mobilizes labor into a collective and collaborative effort - beyond national and party interests. This new condition of coordination and agreement towards shared goals of climate management subverts traditional forms of control in exchange for renewed agency. Through research, the multinational labor force shed their differing identities to become citizens of the consortium.
Each research cluster is made up of a series of test labs and offices, which all work towards the research of a specific algae strand.
Similar algae strands are organised closer together for opportunity to share resources and collaborate.
With greater success, research expands upwards into research towers.
The towers spread outwards to connect to other towers to form a collaborative research network of potential productive algae strands.
When research reaches a dead end, the research cluster is dissolved to make way for new clusters, and their resources diverted elsewhere.
These housing clusters change in proportion to the rhythms of their research development - densifying when more manpower is needed, and dissolving as they are appointed to other research labs elsewhere in the architectural assemblage. As the housing is provided for by China, it is instituitionalised and basic programmes are expressed in the architecture. However, the small possessions of the inhabitants defines the character of the space. The housing unit is thus an intersection between top down and bottom up agency.
76 sqm Double Volume
Housing unit A caters to small families or people who are planning a longer stay at the consortium (>1y). The module offers a larger bedroom space that can accomodate couples and their young children. It also has a small balcony for personal hobbies such as gardening, or just a platform to view the ocean and the consortium.
36 sqm
Single Volume
Housing unit B caters to individuals or couples that plan to stay at the consortium for a much shorter duration (<1y). This apply to mainly climate delegates that are at the consortium solely for research purposes or to provide temporary assistance to the labs. Inside it is a modest living, dining, and resting space.
The workers of each research cluster live in a housing cluster that is of closest proximity to it. This is reduce the distance from the worker’s living quarters to their place of work. Allocation based on research cluster also facilitates social interaction beyond the workplace.
As the research cluster densifies, so does its accompanying housing cluster. Housing clusters branch outward more than upwards to keep the inhabitants close to the ocean surface.
Expansion ends up enclosing pockets of ocean space for localised recreational and utility programmes that require the ocean surface. Collaboration between adjacent reserach clusters see housing branch out to connect as well.
Housing clusters of greater density begin to develop their own sustenance through aquaculture and water treatment. They will also produce excess to support other smaller clusters.
Amongst the housing clusters are commons that support living within the consortium. Different modules provide different spaces and programmes to facilitate cross interaction between inhabitants. The commons play an integral role in building relationships between the inhabitants of different nationalities beyond research employment.
concentrated nearer to the ocean level to create larger communal gathering hubs
fitted between housing modules to provide social spaces at close proximity
96 sqm
Gathering units are the largest among the four commons typology. These modules serve as anchors for dedicated commons zones which other modules will congregate around. They are dedicated to hosting larger groups of people for communal programmes such as community kitchen, meetings, or celebrations.
Balcony units are most commonly found among housing units. Their purpose is to break the repetition of housing units and allow light into the corridor on both sides of the frame. The module does not have any dedicated function and offers a vacant space for the residents to curate and inhabit.
48 sqm 48 sqm
Free units are found all around the consortium and do not have a predetermined programmatic function. They can accomodate an array of utility and recreational purpose such as laundry area, community greenhouse, wastewater treatment, hydroponics, etc. Depending on the required conditions of the activity, the free unit offers both open air and enclosed options.
“how true for the history of the planet’s conquest against which no nonhuman can direct a flood of grievances that might strike a humbling note into the human soul”Jason W. Moore, Anthropocene or Capitalocene
Nature as we claim it to be, is a self-regulating system. Regardless of what we do to it - be it the extraction of resources or release of greenhouse gases - nature carries on. Environmental catastrophe, ecological disruption, the extinction of human beings are all just chapters in nature’s long narrative. It is permanent, we are temporary. However, the biggest flaw in our understanding of nature is not that we must save it, but that we assume nature to have a steady rhythmic pattern that it regulates itself to, eventually falling back to a state of balance and harmony. It is simply overly optimistic to think that climate change resistant efforts: decarbonising, changing our lifestyles, clean energy, engaging in solar radiation management, that nature will eventually settle down and a new steady pattern will emerge for us to occupy. That is not to say that efforts to delay or stop the transition to a less habitable world is futile, but that we must not be naive and rely on the belief that it will stabilise into a world just a few degrees warmer than what we are experiencing now. Because we don’t know how the fragile “balance” of the planet really functions, we live in a mode of reaction to the unknown unknowns to come.
Regardless of motivations; be it guilt or narcissism, contemporary frameworks of the anthropocene reduce the situation to a human centric one, where it becomes an isolated issue that is caused by, affects, and must be solved by humans alone. This, however, is too simplistic of a belief system, attributing too much credit to ourselves. In Staying with the Trouble, Haraway describes the Chthulucene, a focus on multi-species activism, in opposition to anthropocentrism. It is cognisant that the current epoch is not centered around the human race - a narcissitic mindset and tendency of the anthropocenic eraand forces us to confront our own superiority standpoint to “make kin” with the biological “critters” or other-than-human agents.
By attributing the ecological disasters of late capitalism to the geological epoch of humanity, we risk reification of capitalism into something ahistorically innate to human nature - without possibility of change and recourse. Even if humans assume responsibility for many environmental problems, which we rightly should, we should relinquish the notion that our solutions are most effective in saving the planet. Without a comprehensive understanding of the environment, our good intentions of pulling the strings of the catastrophe might backfire for many other non-human agents. Moreover, what is most desireable for us may not necessarily be desireable to others and it would be selfish to disregard this fact.
Problem“Why does one have to save people to be considered a hero? Why is saving other species considered insignificant? Who gave humans such high honors? No, humans do not need saving. They’re already living much better than they deserve.”
Liu Cixin, The Three-Body Problem
“Every era puts invisible shackles on those who have lived through it, and I can only dance in my chains.”
Liu Cixin, The Three-Body
It is neccessary to address these misconceptions in the strategies of the consortium, either through spatial or agent organisation. Firstly, the violability of the environment necessitates an intelligent infrastructure that operates on a positive feedback loop so that actions and intentions with respect to the Anthropocene can be continuously improvised, deconstructed and reconstituted. Through consistent sensing and monitoring of environmental conditions, we can better make decisions to counter them. Secondly, consideration has to be given for non-human agency and desires to influence the decisions made regarding the consortium.
There is a specter that haunts the way we approach climate resistance and that specter is the denial of the human-non-human coexistence that are now dependent on the byproducts of nested catastrophe. Instead, the human race is eager to assume guilt for threats to our environment to reassure ourselves that we are in control. By assuming guilt, it deceptively reassures us into a false sense of hope, that we can actively save ourselves and change our fate if we just change the way we live. That is not to say that we should engage in nihilism, or wallow in depression and shame at our complicity in the destructive force of anthropogenic climate change. Perhaps this self-deception is what is needed. We should continuously deny and resist the idea that we are merely impotent observers who can only sit and watch our fate unfold.
Humans still fight to distinguish themselves from non-humans and develop better methods of control instead of challenging anthropocenic rights to sovereignty. Human anxiety and tension towards the nonhuman as we try to separate ourselves, only results in violence. In Morton’s Dark Ecology, this resistance against the non-human is something that we have to walk past and work our way towards a “sweet darkness”. First we must acknowledge that our survival is not centered around the individual or the human species. Next, we must recognise the “multichromati[sm]” of actual ecologies that have cycles of different possible combinations and learn to embrace the “uncanniness” of the other (non-humans). Only after “becom[ing] familiar with the stranger...such that the strangeness is cancelled out,” or “becom[ing] acclimated to the strangeness of the stranger” (Morton, 2016) can we overcome our anthropogenic ecological trauma and arrive at sweet darkness
Tim Morton, Dark Ecology“The human is decisively deracinated from its pampered, ostensibly privileged place set apart from all other beings.”
The interminable debate between humanity and nature is an outdated one, and the thesis rejects the uncritical acceptance of a messianic figure, humans, that saves the human race and the rest of the planet.
Unlike the eco-fable, the earthly salvation of “peace between humans and other-than-humans” is no longer available. The horrifying double of nature and human that sat at the center of humanity’s relation to the world is already ruptured and decomposed. The double metamorphosises and emerges in the form of the unnatural and abhuman. The new condition denies us the opportunity of reconciliation within the safety of the conventional fable that would grant us a miraculous and happy ending.
Unnatural: The ecosystem that we rely on and live off - nature, is now an artificial one - a world of oil. It manifests itself all objects and environments; transforming space, human experience and environmental conditions.
Abhuman: Not surprisingly, humanity has also been undermined. Having “adapted” to this new artificial landscape, it is almost unimaginable to live in a world without oil. The door to the past is shut; we are much too self-altered to exist in a pre-oil world. From the natural to the artificial, our ontology has transformed to the abhuman - “not-quite-human subjects, characterized by its morphic variability, continually in danger of becoming not-itself, becoming other.” (Hurley, 1996)
Only by rejecting a pure-earth utopia can we gain freedom from illusions that shackles us to the human-nature axis and move onto a plane. The time for a truly “utopian” moment is here - a moment derived from disenchantment rather than false miracles. Within the climax of this longstanding binary is a neutral space where the opposing terms meet. It is a space that affords neither a happy ending nor an unceasing tension. What it offers is simply a radical negativity that nullifies the spectres of the past in allegiance to the ambiguity that the future holds.
With the original matrix removed, it allows space for non-unitary political imminence, each grounded on their own epistomology and perspective. Its objective remains to prevent any form of taxonomisation of the posthuman ontology such that it settles onto a single tendency. The posthuman environment is a singularity that accomodates permanently partial identities and contradictory standpoints that exist in reactionary rhythms of dissensus and consensus so that it is not undermined by a single telos that assumes the whole. In place of the eco-fable, a new image of utopia emerges: born out of disturbance, and existing within a constant state of negotiation.
“This time, then once more I think, then perhaps a last time, then I think it’ll be over, with that world too. Premonition of the last but one but one. All grows dim. […] I’ll manage this time, then perhaps once more, then perhaps a last time, then nothing more.”
Samuel Beckett, Molloy
“A planetary perspective divert our attention away from the human to the interdependencies of non-human and more-than-human agents, materialities, the climate, and broader economic and political environments. Worldwide integration is an ongoing dynamic process involving the entire environment, in which humanity is only one actor. Humans are interdependent with microbes and other non-human beings, they are embedded within the complex coproductions of economies and ecologies.” This evokes the necessity of Stacy Alaimo’s notion of trans-corporeality “in which the human is always intermeshed with the more-than-human world” and which “underlines the extent to which the substance of the human is ultimately inseparable from the environment.” Only through the denial of any “a priori ontological assumption of human superiority” (Taylor, 2011) can we overcome the rationalizing premises that estranged humans from these nonhuman others.
Agency is not a property of individual entities but an affective relationship between them. The treatment of humans of the algae, the non-human agent, is that of a produce that puts the algae in a position of servitude to the goals of biofuel feedstock and decarbonisation. However, we must recognise that agency goes both ways and the relationship between human and non-human is a co-constructed one. That is to say while humans act intentionally toward the algae, the algae are equally active players that can defy, exploit, or benefit from human schemes. Both participants alike enroll each other into an ongoing program of action that leads toward a specific outcome. By examining the relationship of the consortium through the lens of new materialism, we focus on the performative and emergent natures of the human-algae relationship, and start looking for the possibility of collaborative survival in a time of massive uncertainty. How can such non-human agency be mobilized?
The concept of Futurism uses technology as the basis of freedom. It’s critical optimism about technology sees the future as the means to subvert the institution of the present, using a magical narrative based on technology that is specific to the cultural, political, and geographical context of the region. It must be acknowledged that the indisputable capacity of the human race is the ability to create technology, which has given humans exponential power and unfair advantage over nonhuman life that allows us to curate the planet to our desires and create artificial environments to suit our inhabitation conditions.
In the case of Sinofuturism, the creation of the consortium and carbon care infrastructure is also a product of such human intentions of self-preservation in the face of climate change. However, the use of technology is not just a means of change for humans but also a tool for non-human empowerment. The consortium also unexpectedly becomes a conduit to which algae can access and exploit human as their technology. One of the obvious prerequisites of the carbon care economy is the propogation of algae and human technology guarantee optimal conditions for which the algae can grow and multiply. This condition transform algae from just a feedstock for human energy ambitions into a medium to generate new ecologies. The custodial care of the algae sets up the foundation for new ecologies to breed in the South China Sea; acting as a steady and constant energy base for aquatic food chains.
Donaldson and Kymlicka use the concept of dependent agency to suggest that individuals who cannot speak will make their views known in other ways to those who are willing to listen. This in turn allows us to see historically subordinated beings as subjective individuals rather than objective groups, who can participate in shaping and sustaining larger cooperative schemes. The tricky part comes in giving them a voice in a literal sense as with the algae. How can we allow the algae to enact its will such that humans can act on it?
The versatility and robustness of the algae system becomes the portfolio for global carbon removal and decarbonisation. However, algal objective of self-preservation and thus continuous proliferation comes with its own risks if left unchecked and regulated. The violatility of ocean conditions might bring about instances of nutrient spikes resulting in harmful algal blooms. Eutrophication and the eventual decomposition severely reduces the oxygen level in the water due to respiration of bacteria. Low oxygen levels leave waters unable to support aquatic life. Moreover, carbon which was previously sequestered is released again, and the excess carbon dioxide causes ocean acidification where certain aquatic life cannot survive in low pH seawater.
An objective function of maximum productive output of algae as biofuel feedstock becomes our unbecoming. To maximise algae growth is to regulate and maintain optimal conditions for algae to continuously proliferate. However, the rapid rate of algae growth needs to be balanced by an equally robust system to prevent excessive algal bloom. A reliance on the algae-biofuel operation to cap algae population will require the production process to run at a level where algae population remains under the breaking point of eutrophication, possibly continuously without stopping. Moreover, all carbon absorbed by the algae cannot be converted and stored in the form of biochar due to the productive limitations of the system. Hence, the employment of algae and the new energy ecosystem is not fully perfect.
While the biofuel production exists as a fully functional and profitable economy, the algae can be incorporated into an integrated multitrophic aquaculture to address the excess quantites of algae. The labour force of the consortium requires a source of food. Aquaculture is the most obvious food source available for the inhabitants, which can open up new aquaculture markets that are built upon the current algae cultivation economy. The integration of trophic levels above the algae not only keeps quantities in the algae fields in check in a sustainable manner, but also serve as a system that can provide food for the inhabitants of the consortium. Moreover, the introduction of a multi-trophic system breeds new productive ecologies that were previously absent, transient or dormant in the South China Sea. In addition, rapid declination of fish in the SCS given that future world aquatic food can be mostly supplied from aquaculture, thus reducing the demand on wild fisheries.
China’s historical practices can inform modern modes of operation by extrapolating historic rural intelligence and embedding it within contemporary contexts and technologies. By investigating forms of rurality, a new rurality can be constructed and fully integrated into the consortium’s modes of production. Here, the vernacular modus operandi of agriculture and aquaculture is adapted and appended to the new carbon care economy.
Private ownership of land is banned in China. Under China’s current Household Responsibility System (HRS), which was introduced in the late 1970s and early 1980s, all rural land is owned by rural collectives that were set up in the 1950s during the Great Leap Forward. Ownership remains ostensibly with rural collectives who allocate contract rights for parcels of farmland to eligible households. With ownership bounded tightly to the village rather than belonging to the farmers themselves, farmers cannot buy, sell or rent plots to create economically viable larger tracts, or use the land as collateral for loans, limiting their ability to raise capital. Thus, the average farm size in China was only 0.96 acres (0.39 Ha) per household, some of which are scattered into several separate plots.
However, a change in government policies in 1984 has made it possible for farmland rights to be transferred or subleased to other farmers. Today, many farmers are choosing to lease out their farmland to other farmers and get employment elsewhere while earning a rental income from their farms. Farmers who rent more plots from the local government and other farmers can amass larger plots to reap the economies of scale. Overall, this has boosted farm income and productivity.
Simple models involving the mono-integration of fish-cum-animal husbandry, fish-cum-poultry, or fish-cum-crops are disappearing in China, except in small-scale individual farms. In rural parts of China, organisms from different trophic levels with complementary ecosystem functions are employed to form a complex ecosystem and complete food chain in close proximity. They utilise local natural resources and integrates a full system development. The system is useful for poor small farmers who have very small land holding for crop production and a few heads of livestock to diversify production of food, exploit underutilised resources, and attain economic selfsufficiency.
In this integrated farming system, nothing is wasted as the byproduct from one system is used as input for others. One species’ uneaten feed and wastes, nutrients and by-products is recaptured and converted into fertilizer, feed and energy for other crops, making the agriculture practise more sustainable based on a number of potential environmental benefits. A variety of other produce such as fish, meat, eggs, can be produced in complement to the original plant crop. This increases output, reduces prohibitive costs, and even opens up more employment opportunity than a monoculture or even polyculture farm.
With regards to the consortium, it is difficult to imagine China making a decision to grant individuals, or even collectives, full rights over their land because such a decision relinquishes central control over a fundamental means of production. Luckily, the new markets avoid conventional land parcellation due to their existence on the oceanic terrain. There is no land to parcel or own. Moreover, the volatile ocean conditions and the discrete nature of the architecture assemblage change the conditions of the site such that there is no permanence in terms of value.
Beyond the economic value of gerrymeandering Fiery Cross Reef, to fully realise the partnership between herself and Southeast Asia, China will need to come to terms with an energy governance that is beyond producer-consumer terms. Energy governance will have to be nested in economic-ecological planning that account for non-linear relationships or trophic cascades that affect entire ecosystems. Hence, tenureship of new markets that arise from, around, or within biofuel production will have to be shared with the new citizens.
The pathways and strategies leading up to the formation of the consortium is only half the story. It represents an ecstatic moment in time when oil is phased out and replaced by biofuel. The big evil has been eradicated (in Southeast Asia at least). However, the situation begs the post-revolution question - what happens next, after this victory over oil, when daily life has to resume and the consortium sustained? How would daily life be (re)organised?
Spaces for common ground are ever diminishing, mirroring the ongoing enclosure of physical public space, and this is happening at a time when multiple intersecting crises mean that global solidarity and international cooperation are more needed than ever. The cooperation brought about by the consortium is possibly the antidote for ASEAN’s fragility. Southeast Asian countries’ stake in the consortium provides a concrete and common ground for the region to operate on. The result is a supranational organisation, similar to the European Union (EU) only in structure, but not in legacy, which can establish ASEAN’s seat at the global table.
It is necessary for the consortium to distinguish itself from the EU and its former ASEAN shadow to avoid the old crticism of internal divisions and incompetence. Productivity and operations of the carbon care economy will be the consortium’s greatest interest, and to enable this, a new form of governance.
China’s administrative system, which follows the principle of dual rule (双重领导) , presents a template model that can align the incentives of autonomy and central goals of the consortium. The Chinese central government adopted a quasi-feudalist political system called the tiao-kuai (条块)system, where tiao represents a vertical line of authority and kuai represents a horizontal level of authority. The political system was a combination of two parallel sets of administrative structures to reap the benefits of both centralisation and decentralisation. A centralised (vertical top-down) government is necessary for the state to consolidate political control and resource extraction, while a decentralised (horizontal) form of governance was needed for economic development and management of public affairs.
In this model, the central government (tiao) retains direct authority over the appointments of many subnational official. These subnational officials of lower level are given substantial autonomy to carry out and even make policies in service of broad state goals. The decentralisation (kuai) of the govenrnment levels benefits in term of flexibility to adapt to local conditions where they diverge substantially, thus enhancing policy effectiveness and to ensure central and local interest align. However, it is to be noted that the dual administrative system never existed equally but was dominated by either the tiao or kuai-governance depending on the political leader and their agenda of the time.
The model offers a template which the consortium can adopt during its formative years. Each of the algae strand research is supported by its own research team and facilities and can be considered an entity in the kuai-governance. The conditions and research approach for each algae strand is dissimilar to others and will thus operate independently from one another. All research is governed under the central notion of the consortium - the global carbon care administrative, and will operate under the tiao-governance. The goals of the consortium are dictated by the expectations of the biofuel and carbon sequestration markets, and will define the broader “state” goals that will influence the algae research.
The climate crisis is the direct derivative of human excessive productivity and consumption. The seemingly innocuous continuation of current intuitions of control to approach this new energy system, only serves to reinforce exhausted paradigms of power entrenchment. With the limit of fossil energy addiction unbounded by the threshold of human greed, how can we prevent the switch to biofuel from being a new but similar addiction?
Bruno Latour’s argument becomes relevant here. He claims that modern humans, learning from Victor Frankenstein’s disastrous rejection of his creature, must teach themselves to “love [their] monsters,” meaning that we must stop pretending that we can emancipate ourselves from the material world and, instead, start caring for the unintended and often hated by-products of modernity’s dreams of emancipation. Likewise, algae biofuel will inevitably become our new monster, but we can choose to fully maximise the potential of this monster. We need energy and we need algae.
Thus, within the infrastructural space of the architecture assemblage is the potential for new performative human-algae relationships to emerge and new ecologies to form. Apart from just biofuel production, algae and the by-products of this new market, such as biochar, can be employed in wastewater treatment, aquaculture, and food production, that help sustain the human population out in the high seas.
Microalgae culture offers an interesting step for wastewater treatments, because they provide a tertiary biotreatment coupled with the production of potentially valuable biomass, which can be used for several purposes discussed in previous chapters. Microalgae cultures offer an elegant solution to tertiary and quandary treatments by producing oxygen that allows aerobic bacteria to breakdown organic contaminants in the water and taking up excess nitrogen and phosphorus in the process for their growth. Moreover, their capacity to remove heavy metals, as well as some toxic organic compounds, does not lead to secondary pollution. It is done by directly introducing wastewater as the medium in which algae is cultivated and can be integrated into current algae cultivation system within the consortium.
Wastewater Treatment
The absence of large area that can accomodate soil based food production means the consortium turns to other techniques like hydroponics or aeroponics. In each case, constant attention towards growth conditions such as pH and nutrient density ratio is required. The biochar produced as by-product during pyrolysis can be employed within food production systems within the consortium. Biochar can be converted into pellets or even grounded into fine sediment and used as a nutrient source for crop stock. By mixing the biochar sediment with clean water and other essential salts, a hydroponic solution is created which can supply nutrients such as nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P), potassium (K), and other trace elements required by crops to grow.
Algal biomass or algae extracts can be used as food ingredients, which are rich in proteins, soluble fibers and polysaccharides, lipids and polyunsaturated fatty acids, pigments, vitamins, and minerals. Not only can algae become a food product, it also supports the aquaculture system that cultivates other food stock like fishes and crustacean.
China is the world’s largest producer of both captured and cultured aquatic products, accounting for “19.2% of global marine capture fishery production and 61.5% of global aquaculture production”.
(FAO, 2018) What started out with the monoculture of finfish, shrimp and seaweed in the 1950s, to polyculture and co-culture systems of fish with shellfish and seaweeds from 1980 to 2000, is now a circular approach in the form of a multi-trophic system. The increased interest in nearshore aquaculture systems which operate on these multitrophic practices have developed into complicated structural networks unique to local conditions.
While the scope of integration in an integrated fish farm can vary greatly depending on aquaculture structure, economic conditions, and farmers’ preferences, farmers generally combine fed aquaculture species with inorganic extractive aquaculture species and organic extractive aquaculture species to take advantage of synergistic interactions among species while bio-mitigation takes place. Extractive species use the organic and inorganic materials and byproducts from the other species for their own growth. Moreover, integrated fish farming can fully utilize the water surface, underwater body, the pond silt, and the land area around it, which minimises large areas as a prerequisite to increase the food available for human consumption.
The development of a diversified economy depends on the harmonious interaction between socio-economic conditions, agricultural production, and regional environmental conditions.
In the new system of aquaculture, three new organisms - carp, oyster, sea cucumber - are introduced into the ecosystem to capitalise on the abundant of algae in the South China Sea. The new productive ecologies not only support the community within the consortium but also becomes a secondary market that supports the global shift away from captured to cultured aquaculture.
Algae becomes more than just a feedstock for biofuel within the artificial processes of man but also has its place within a natural system of self-sustaining propagation.
Plankton Oyster Carp Sea CucumberInorganic Nutrients
eaten by eaten by consume eaten by eaten by Inorganic Nutrients
Fish Organic
Integrated Multi-Trophic Aquaculture
Primary producers refer to algae and aquatic plant species. They transform inorganic nutrients that come from the finfish or extractive feeders into organic biomass. This provides them with the nutrients to grow. Most integrated systems have seaweed in this role.
Finfish exist as the main aquaculture organism with the highest commercial value. They feed on several of the organisms below their trophic level and produce the inorganic and organic nutrients that are essential to these organisms.
Filter feeders sieve fine organic particles such as microalgae, plankton, and fine matter particles from the water column. They generally refer to shellfish. In the consortium, oyster farms are used.
Tilapia
Skipjack Tuna
Seaweed Microalgae
Oysters Mussels
Sea Cucumber
Sea Urchin
With the original matrix of anthropocentric sovereignty removed, the climax of this long standing anxiety and tension is a new governance where humans and non-humans meet. The consortium, in its entirety, is the manifestation of such a space, appointed as arbitrator between the human and algae, where the flexibility of its discrete nature negotiates their agencies. Nature is allowed to be in its reaction to contingencies and opportunities.
A counterintuitive approach against human tendency to control conditions and circumstances is adopted. We begin to accept steps backward to allow a place for non-humans at the table. In this scenario, degrowth is accepted to give nature its agency, and the architecture reacts to these rhythms.
Contingency: Contamination of algae within the consortium.
Degrowth caused by the contamination means excess resources and components detach and move to other zones.
Allowing contamination to continue rather than using chemical treatment to correct it.
Contamination is contained due to the segmentation of algae cultivation zones. It stabilises naturally.
Action: Human control Diverting manpower to disperse or remove the algae immediately.
Contingency: Algae bloom caused by excessive nutrients and warming ocean temperatures.
Outcome: Resource strain
Compromise other parts of the consortium due to neglect.
Action: Negotiation
Understanding the breaking point and prevents that limit from being exceeded. Algae is allowed free rein below that threshold.
Action: Nonhuman wildness
Allowing the algae bloom to proliferate and
Outcome: Cross-species remediation
Proliferation of algae within limits creates new algae sources that can support new infrastructures.
Outcome: System failure Eutrophication leads to uninhabitable dead zones.
“And do you know what ‘the world’ is to me? Shall I show it to you in my mirror? This world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end; a firm, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller, that does not expend itself but only transforms itself.”
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power
Like all thesis should be, the project is not finished. In fact, it will never be finished. What started out as an investigation of oil within the South China Sea context, unravelled many questions that sought to be answered within the course of my project. Unfortunately, new questions were exponentially born from old questions until I arrived at a state that was too complicated for it to be called a project anymore.
The complexity of the topic has stumped me on countless occasions, more so than I wish to admit, but more so, I am in denial of my own possible incompetence towards an actually straightforward design problem. I shall call the end state a crossroad rather than a design; pointing in multiple directions that one could possibly pursue further but must also be cruelly aware that there is no circling back to the others within reasonable time. And thus I hope I have done the project reasonable justice, which is the most comfort that I can afford myself.
Is the thesis fully developed? No. Is the thesis any good? Well, maybe. The response to the thesis has been so excitingly divided. There are those who attempted to embrace the totality of the ideas (not the project, I dare not claim credit for the sublimity that people experience) that I tried to grapple, and there are those who remain staunch skeptics of the proposal. While I leave that up to you to decide, I must insert a cautionary note that unless one can understand that there is no ending to the project, they will always be utterly disappointed. Ah, isn’t that the beauty of a thesis?
