Neoliberal Urbanism_Incongruences of the democratic Chilean Housing policy by Nicolas Palominos

Neoliberal Urbanism: Incongruences of the democratic Chilean housing policy

‘...the real power to reorganize urban life ... often lies elsewhere or at least within a broader coalition of forces within which urban government and administration have only a facilitative and coordinating role to play’ (Harvey, 1989) Under this perspective this paper will discuss the incongruences of the Chilean Housing Policy of the last decades which even though its broadly recognized success for its quantitive achievements fails to construct equality and social integration. The first part will present the disconnection between the government discourse and its translation to reality. Then a brief look to neoliberal policies will present the unsatisfactory construction of an uneven urban development of the city. Finally a more depth view on two urban-housing programmes will highlight the difficulties to achieve equality and overcome poverty through city design. The above presented will evidence that if the neoliberal model prevails guiding the Chilean Housing Policy it will continue contributing to generate much more fragmented cities. The damage-repair logic. After 16 years from the recovery of democracy in Chile president Bachelet in her first Mensaje Presidencial (state of the nation address) proposed four huge transformations to reach the Bicentennial1 with a ‘more modern, integrated and developed country2 ’(Bachelet, 2006). The changes were to be in areas that allowed to ‘overcome exclusions and build a society increasingly more comfortable and inclusive’ (Bachelet, 2006). The urban policy which was recognized as one of the main areas of transformations aimed to be oriented towards ‘quality of life and territorial equity.’ (Bachelet, 2006) In the previous 16 years of Concertacion Coalition’s governments the authorities had been determined to overcame the housing deficit that was around 800,000 housing units in 1991 (Ducci, 2000; Jiron, 2010; Ozler, 2011). However, having partially resolved the dwelling deficit and acknowledging the need to focus on the quality rather than quantity for Bachelet’s government ‘now was the time to build better neighborhoods’ (Bachelet, 2006). The minister of the Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo (Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning–MINVU) of that period also recognizes that social integration is one of the main guidances for the MINVU (Poblete, 2008). According to this and the mandate of Bachelet it could be said that the aim of the MINVU amongst others was to repair the urban inequality and social segregation that was generated by previous urban policies and interventions. 1

Chile’s independency was in 1810. Todays presidential periods are of 4 years what makes 2010 the year of the Chilean Bicentennial and the end of Bachelet’s presidency. 2

All the Bachelet’s quotations are translations by the author from the original text of Bachelet’s Mensaje Presidencial 2006 (state of the nation address 2006). 2

Although, as stated by Ozler (2011) the Concertacion’s housing policy has been a continuation of the neoliberal policies established under the dictatorship of Pinochet (Ozler, 2011). As a consequence it could be argued that the flaws from the housing policies of the past were inherited as well. Indeed, when referring to the new urban policy the minister admits the country’s debt with the social damaged territories (Poblete, 2008) As an answer to the need to improve the quality of life of the most disadvantaged the MINVU launched a neighborhood’s improvement programme: Quiero mi Barrio (I Love My Neighborhood). The objective of this urban initiative was to integrally enhance the living conditions of the 200 most deprived neighborhoods which were mainly social housing complexes sponsored by the government over the past thirty years (Castillo, 2010; Jiron, 2010). By the introduction of the programme it was thereby recognized the lasting unawareness from the authorities to resolve the neighborhood-level issues that were generated from previous policies that lacked from a holistic approach to overcome poverty (Jiron, 2010; Ozler, 2011). The focus of attention as it has been expressed before was not on the housing deficit but social integration and equality, while the scale of the neighborhood was the one chosen to intervene between the private realm and the urban context (DIPRES, 2010). The purpose of the programme was ‘to contribute to social cohesion among cities through participatory neighborhood-upgrading processes of neighborhoods that presented urban decline and social vulnerability’ (DIPRES, 2010). Accordingly, the territorial equity and social integration claimed by Bachelet’s government was interpreted as a neighborhood scale programme that promoted social cohesion with citizen’s participation. In this context it could be said that given the nature of democratic government with the Quiero mi Barrio programme the construction of equality could be fulfilled as understood by Penalosa (2011). However, when dealing with decisions about the construction of the city even though the participatory process can guarantee that public good will prevail over private interests, in developing countries it is the role of the government to represent the disadvantaged and uninformed people who are too busy to participate (Penalosa, 2011). Especially in neoliberal growing economies such as the Chilean democracy with high levels of income inequality it should be expected that governmental institutions ‘find ways of promoting inclusion and social justice’ (Penalosa, 2011) representing the disadvantaged. In an analysis of Bachelet’s government Navia (2008) suggests that a participatory democracy could likely be unequal when compared to a representative one and therefore unsuccessful. By having the right to vote citizens are equal, but citizen participation occur according with the tools and resources people have. Therefore since equality among citizens refers to an utopian absolute ‘inevitably, participation is bound to be unequal’ (Navia, 2008)

The challenge for governments on how to promote equity through public policy is even more complex because of the ambiguity of the term. Moreover if it is to be done by way of equitable public policies dealing with the social organization of urbanization which desired result is to encourage inclusion and social integration. Burton argues that the reason social justice or social equity is ambiguous is because it have not been defined nor quantified (Burton, 2010). Given this ambiguity and the natural existence of difference amongst citizens, it seems that participatory processes will not necessarily guarantee a fair city. Under the rule of a neoliberal economy nothing but a neoliberal urbanization could be expected. The government of Bachelet continued allowing neoliberal practices in urban matters, even so ideologically her government aimed to promote inclusion and social equity. There has not been an official evaluation of the Quiero mi Barrio programme yet, since it could not be completed before the Bicentennial as it was expected by Bachelet’s government (DIPRES, 2010). However, it could be said that the desired transformations for a more integrated country were unlikely realized. Various of the neighborhoods that were focalized with the Quiero mi Barrio –even new ones sponsored by the Concertacion’s governments, had there origin in urban policies from the past that were based on free market principles established by Pinochet at the beginning of the neoliberal system (Ozler, 2011). Accordingly the prevalent housing policy operated under a ‘damage-repair’ logic, where there was awareness about the negative consequences of the free market policy but even so it continued being applied along with an urban improvement programme that repair the damage produced. The issues above discussed were synthesized by Jimenez ( 2008) which present wether the housing policy has actually sharpened existing social and spatial inequalities or more specifically if current neoliberal housing policies leads to a process of social exclusion through housing. Santiago’s neoliberal experiment ‘In the 1970s, Santiago under General Pinochet was the laboratory for the Chicago School of Economics, experimenting with economic policies which would later be implemented in the United States, the United Kingdom and many other countries.’ (Robles-Duran, 2011) The history of illegal occupations in Chile mainly begun in the 1950s coincidently with the accelerated urbanization experienced by the country in those years (Durand and Pelaez, 1965). The explosive population growth was as well experienced by its capital Santiago (Figure 1). As it could be predictable the ‘spontaneous land invasions did not comply with legal norms and administrative policies, ignored urban planning regulations and rendered master plans obsolete. 4

Figure 1. Urbanization in Chile and Santiago (based on Durand and Pelaez, 1965) Furthermore, most of these invasions were carried out in different parts of the city, not only on the periphery’ (Jiron, 2010). A period of social unrest in the second half of the 60s lead to the conformation of urban social movements that demanded housing only until the dictatorship of Pinochet that established violent control over the spontaneous settlements (Jiron, 2010). In Harvey’s words, Chile and particularly its capital Santiago became ‘fresh field for capitalist accumulation’ (Harvey, 2005 quoted by Robles-Duran, 2011) characterized by an economic vulnerability and a socio-political unsteadiness (Robles-Duran, 2011) that could be related to the social pressure and discontent towards the lack of solution of the housing needs. Between 1970 and 1973 (Allende’s presidential period) the housing demands bursted from around 600,000 units of housing deficit to 800,000 families that participated in temporary land occupations called campamentos (encampments)3, ‘indicating their fragile and paramilitary character’ (Jiron, 2010). By that period Santiago had around 2,5 million inhabitants. The new migrants where informally allocated either in the periphery of the city or in inner-city residual spaces. Around 10% of Santiago’s population accessed urban land either by the form of campamentos or illegal land invasions (Castillo, 2010). During this period the city morphology changed dramatically with not only the informal extension of the city over rural land but also with the appearance of campamentos in different places of the central area. The control over this type of informal urban growth by the military government of Pinochet lead to the development of a new housing policy. Guided by free market principles the new

According to Jiron (2010) campamentos were settlements originated from organized land invasions not only in the periphery but also in inner-city but even so lacked of basic services. 5

housing policy gave the private sector the responsibility of the construction of housing, making it a good to be accessed through the market, therefore eliminating the notion of housing as a right (Jiron, 2010). The open housing market sought for low land prices far from the urban center in the already deprived periphery. Furthermore, in a way that emphasize the concept of private property of the imposed neoliberal system, the people with housing needs were forced into the private and formal economic sectors under a credit-subsidy-savings scheme that allowed the ownership of the dwelling. However, as it might be expected the aspirational poor become trapped in unaffordable credits that were financing a good that devalued over time and due to its far location diminish job access all of which contributed to more material deprivation. The government recognized its responsibility with the poor, however it made the private sector the main source of financing through subsidies and credits systems plus the savings obtained from the hard work of the families. (Kusnetzoff, 1987). For Hidalgo (2011) this is the beginning of what he calls the Precariopolis (precarious city) of Santiago which originated from social housing developments that ‘...in its search for cheaper land, creates truly mono-functional, segregated and fragmented areas’ (Hidalgo, 2011). The first housing programme begun in 1975 had as its main purpose the liberation of central zones with commercial value (Kusnetzoff, 1987). This eradication of campamentos simultaneously allowed the ‘social cleansing’ of the affluent areas occupied before the coup d'état. According to Sabatini ‘[t]he government officers of that period argued that the social category of the residents should correlate to the potential value of the land’ (Sabatini, 2000). A peculiar type of extreme ‘gentrification’ (Jacobs, 1961). According to Jiron (2010) the several studies made about the eradications ‘agree that most of the destination areas provided inadequate infrastructure or facilities to welcome the incoming population due to their peripheral location and lack of investment’ (Jiron, 2010). The urban policies that relied on ‘the free play of the market as the principal mechanism for the allocation of land and housing ... accentuated the social and physical segregation of the metropolitan population, and caused a dramatic deterioration in the quality of life for the majority of the population’ (Kusnetzoff, 1987).

Figure 2 Eradication and relocation programmes (1979-1985) (based on Robles-Duran, 2011)

A new transformation in the urban morphology resulted form this housing policies. The allocation of mono-functional and low-income residential areas in the periphery with a reserved area at the center for the development of the central business district relied on longdistance commuting moreover reinforced the socio-spatial segregation and exclusion. At this point is possible to suggest that this was the ‘country’s debt’ with the social damaged territories that the Bachelet’s minister of MINVU acknowledges when referring to the new urban policy. Eradication and upgrading: a damage-repair logic case. The Quiero mi Barrio programme, one of the Bachelet’s emblematic urban policies focused on 87 neighborhoods of Santiago’s metropolitan area. An emblematic case that illustrates the damage-repair logic of this programme is the Villa el Cobre housing complex located in the Penalolen Municipality4 . Villa el Cobre was originally built in 1977 to allocate Copper Mining workers. However, it ended being the settlement for the eradicated families that lived in campamento San Luis in Las Condes –one of the areas with higher land value in Santiago. The families were not able to get their housing solutions within Las Condes Municipality even though there were pressures from the upper class of this area who believed the displacement of the people would diminish their easy access to domestics services such as gardeners, crafts and housekeepers. The freed land in Las Condes formerly belonged to the Estate land banks created in previous administrations. After the eradication by the government the re-appropriated land was offered to the real estate market to stimulate the economy (Sabatini, 2000). Despite the precarious living conditions due to the deficient services and overcrowding the majority of the families of the campamento San Luis where highly organized to share the little access to resources. There was a feeling of belonging and involvement as people shared the commitment of improving their living conditions. But fundamentally there were various levels of bonding to the surrounding city since many had jobs and social networks with other people of Las Condes (Sennet, 2007).5 The abrupt change of habitat 15 km towards the southern periphery of the city originated traumatic consequences (Figure 3). The Villa el Cobre had basic services but lacked of other ‘aspects which create cities, such as existence of other social classes and variety of services and facilities indispensable for the development of urban living’ (Hidalgo, 2011). Apart from this and the general oppressive environment that characterized that period the families weakened

The evidence of the implementation of the programme in Villa el Cobre was taken from the working experience of the author that was in charge of the programme in Penalolen Municpality. 5

Sennett (2007) refers to social inclusion as the recognition of the presence of others. 8

the social capital they had in the campamento in Las Condes and thus the ‘access’ to the city (Jacobs, 1961). As it happened in similar contemporary cases of housing formalization ‘ [m]ost traces of previous lives [were] erased, leaving the inhabitants without a history and the expectation that they [would] start their new lives from scratch (Jiron, 2010). At that time the Penalolen Municipality was a mainly rural area in process of urban consolidation indeed was later a selected spot to relocate poor families during the eradication programme. The result was a sort of Precariopolis as defined by Hidalgo (2011). Of course, no democratic principle could be expected under a dictatorial regime eventually as a result an undemocratic city was being built affecting worthily its more vulnerable citizens (Penalosa, 2011).

Figure 3. Eradication from San Luis to Villa el Cobre in 1977 The overall Villa el Cobre housing complex in Penalolen included XXX units distributed in three-storeys building blocks with that contained XX flats of XX square meters surface. The blocks were arranged in groups without following any morphological pattern which resulted in residual open areas that corresponded to ‘public space’ under the modernist logic. The legal title over the property delivered to the families consisted of an individual ownership over the flat plus a shared ownership over common open spaces and circulations all which lacked of

pavement and street lighting. In terms of urban facilities the distance from the consolidated central area limited the access to educational services, health care and commerce. Despite the improvement in the living conditions of the families due to the provision of basic services, sooner than later the neighborhood started a process of physical and social degradation particularly because of the unsatisfactory size of the dwellings and the further location away form urban facilities. The dynamics of natural growth of the families summed to the persistent housing deficit led to sharing within extended families. This resulted in the informal appropriation of common spaces. In fact most ground floor apartments inevitably grew with informal extensions over the collective space blocking circulations and worsening the environmental conditions. The lack of collective facilities plus the residual characteristic of public space made it difficult to interact socially. Even though the urban conditions improved a little bit in the following years with the creation of a market and a transit route to the city center, there had already been installed a sense of abandonment and hopelessness. This was also reflected in the lost of social capital due to the lack of cooperation networks and mutual trust among neighbors. Additionally, the low social control of the public space left room to the appearance of common social pathologies such as gangs, fights, alcoholism, drug consumption and trafficking on the streets. The result was a highly stigmatized enclave that became even more segregated and impoverished (Caldeira, 2011). Only thirty years after the displacement of the families to Villa el Cobre (Figure 4.) the neighborhood was selected to be intervened with the Quiero mi Barrio programme. The programme was supposed to address the intermediate level urban necessities between the housing and the greater city context that had already surrounded the neighborhood but still remain it detached. The neighborhood was to be understood as the realm were the inhabitants could satisfy their everyday-life requirements of interaction, recreation and provisioning within the immediate context of their dwellings. All these aspects are what Jacobs (1961) calls the life of the city (Jacobs, 1961).

Figure 4. Villa el Cobre showing low-quality public spaces and deterioration The programme considered a holistic view of poverty acknowledging the deep negative effects over the population caused by physical and social segregation that originated with the eradication. Accordingly, there was a huge challenge to bring life to city were there was ‘no city’ but instead a Precariopolis. The preliminary diagnostics showed that spacial segregation and the low-quality provision of social services where the main cause of the neighborhood’s degradation. The programme’s operative model aiming to provide a multi-disciplinary approach considered a physical improvement plan along with a social plan. Within the physical component the selected works should focused on the recuperation of green areas, circulations, neighborhood facilities and complementary public works. Whereas the social aspect of the intervention was supposed to ‘strengthen the social fabric and improve the levels of social integration, promoting the participation of the neighborhoods’ around the recuperation of the public space (DIPRES, 2000). The goal was to finish the process of upgrading by the end of Bachelet’s presidential period, what concretely meant less than 3 years. This implied a main struggle because first it was necessary to recuperate the trust of people on the government what was extremely difficult after 30 years of abandonment. Furthermore, even though the budget was considerable high for the Chilean standards (around USD 1 million for the 400 families approximated) less than 10% was spent in the social component what clearly demonstrates that translating into practice the emphasis of the programme was on the built works rather than in the recomposition of the social fabric. At the end the desired involvement of the people on the decision-making could not be truly done due to the differing timings between the physical and social objectives. In sum the innovative integral approach of the programme could not reach the expectations to relate the social and physical aspects of the upgrading of the neighborhood and stood far from the participatory process that could lead to the envisioned social cohesion. Given the rush of the implementation, it could be argued that instead of focusing on the quality of the interventions —that certainly required more than the given time— the aim was to inaugurate works (quantity) in order to obtain political dividends. Its also opportune to ask if the country’s debt with Villa el Cobre was paid with the launching of Quiero mi Barrio programme?, or if is it the Quiero mi Barrio enough to recuperate and 11

improve the existent stock of social housing? (Rodriguez & Sugranyes, 2004) or under Jacobs (1961) conception of streets is it possible to cure the lack of public space if some of the deprived neighborhoods, such as Villa el Cobre do not even have streets?(Penalosa, 2011) The neoliberal approach continues damaging While the Quiero mi Barrio programme was being implemented the ‘future’ Quiero mi Barrio neighborhoods were being built sponsored by the government through the continuation of the market housing policy. It is true that during the Concertacion’s governments the housing deficit was still an issue and that the provision of units with basic supplies and legal title to poor families was a way to improve their living conditions (Ozler, 2011). However, the housing solutions done under the logics of neoliberal urbanization were generating social costs in short and long term that evidence that finally the cure ends up being worse than the disease. This is what scholars call the dark side of a successful housing policy (Ducci, 2000). One of the mayor obstacles for the improvement and innovation of the Chilean housing policy is that it is trapped in a captive market. There is almost no risk for the private entrepreneurs; the government assigns the poor people with ‘subsidies for the purchase of housing in the private market’ (Ozler, 2011) and there is very little competition because there are few developers capable of building the annual quotas. Furthermore, this leads to no incentive for innovation in the building technology of the units which ends up with low-quality solutions. There is neither a critic of the architectural design of the housing complexes nor the units (Rodriguez & Sugranyes, 2004). In sum the public expense in social housing is extremely inefficient as the neighborhoods become deteriorated and the value of the produced houses decreases. In Santiago, between 1984 and 2004, the housing subsidy allowed the construction of more than 200,000 social housing units with low-quality design and without the possibility of extensions and improvements. (see fig...) Half of them have a similar configuration to that of Villa el Cobre in Penalolen; tiny flats in three-stories blocks with residual space in between (Rodriguez & Sugranyes, 2004). As it was mentioned the housing deficit could be successfully faced, even at a rate similar to the one experienced by European countries after World War II; annual construction of 10 units over 1,000 inhabitants (Rodriguez & Sugranyes, 2004). However, the deficit as it had been shown still remains in the quality of the solutions provided. The efforts made by the Chilean governments to tackle down inequality and overcome poverty with the provision of housing requires a review since the results shows that the beneficiaries are unsatisfied and seem even more poor and excluded. Amongst Chilean scholars the families that had already been ‘benefited’ with this kind of housing solution are called ‘los con techo’ (people with roof) (Rodriguez & Sugranyes, 2004), referring to people that obtained a formal shelter but were immersed in poverty due to the low-quality of the solution. In this 12

context it would be useful to consider Penalosa’s claim that ‘[i]nequality and exclusion can be even more painful than poverty, but the way we create and organize cities may be a powerful instrument in constructing equality and social justice’ (Penalosa, 2011) A smart strategy upstream ‘We are experiencing an era where the rights of private property and profit surpass any other kind of rights, where the capitalist economic model leave little steering space for the governments.’ (Harvey, 2008) Using the little steering space identified by Harvey (2008) the Elemental housing solution successfully address the challenge to provide units remain in the inner-city and even gain value over time. Under the same neoliberal housing policy the Elemental designers further developed the commission of the provision of a dwelling by transforming the problem. Instead of providing a completed small unit in the outskirts of the city were the lower price allowed its location, they thought of designing a semi-completed unit able to expand over time and located in the center of the city. The solution constitutes a challenge to inexistent land policies that democratic governments are supposed to implement to promote equality and integration according to Penalosa (2011). The problem arises from the desire of residents of campamentos to remain in their actual settlements in the inner-city instead of being eradicated to the periphery. Naturally they have identified the location as its more valuable social capital (Jacobs, 1961). As a matter of fact, studies done by the MINVU show that the majority of the people that received a housing solution provided under the market housing policy want to return to the campamento and leave their housing in search of better location (Rodriguez & Sugranyes, 2004).

Figure 5. Quinta Monroy in different phases. The situation was similar to that of the residents of Villa el Cobre, amongst others, who formerly lived in campamentos in a central area of the city. As it was presented only after 30 years 13

in a logic of damage-repair they were able to receive investment of publics resources through the intervention of the Quiero mi Barrio programme. The Elemental team recognized that social housing that was being provided under the ‘damage-repair’ logic devalued over time therefore it was looked at as an expense rather than as an investment. They acknowledged as well that it is highly probable that for a poor Chilean family the housing one-off subsidy they receive from the state would be the biggest aid they will ever receive to overcome their economical situation so it is at least desirable that it kept its value over time. The ‘damage-repair’ logic is proven inefficient and ineffective since it is extremely difficult if not impossible to provide with urban infrastructure and public space to those deprived areas of social housing that are already consolidated such as the Precariopolis (Penalosa, 2011; Hidalgo, 2011). If the aim of housing policies is to help poor families to overcome poverty it is even more crucial to provide the benefit acknowledging the economical importance of the access to the city (Jacobs, 1961). The problem, as it has been shown is that MINVU has mainly been doing housing policies ignoring the urban effects (Rodriguez & Sugranyes, 2004). For Powers (2010) understanding of social justice, new settlements outside cities cannot go on being funded (Power, 2007) The case of Quinta Monroy designed by Elemental is an exception in the Chilean social housing framework. During 30 years several families illegally occupied a small site located in the central area of Iquique (the capital of a mining region of Chile). Just like the campamento San Luis in Las Condes, and most of the illegal occupation that happened in Chile, the families lived in precarious shelters without sanitation (Greene, 2011). Additionally, this precarious settlement was affecting the development of the surrounding central area. The aim of the project was to provide a housing solution for every family under the subsidy set out by the MINVU. The subsidy amounted to USD 7,500 which had to pay for the land, the infrastructure and the housing unit. For that amount of money the private building industry offered just a 30 square meter unit eventually located in low-price land in the periphery of the city. The solution, however demonstrated the viability of settling families in inner-city locations under the constraints of existing housing policies with a holistic understanding of poverty. First, a highdensity solution permitted to pay for the well-located site so to remain in the city. Second, the unit considered a physical space to accommodate the family growth (second generations) since it had been proven a key aspect for young poor families to remain attached to their family networks until they enough resources to live by themselves. Additionally, the units were laid around a common semipublic courtyard shared by 20 families that encouraged social relations amongst neighbors (Jacobs, 1961) Finally, the design considered a structure that facilitated an orderly expansion of the units up to the double of its core surface that originally had size standards of a middle-income house instead of the typical tight solution of social houses (Low, 2011). 14

Overall, this kind of solution not only address the provision of a formalized dwelling but also demonstrates that by acknowledging the human right to the city (Harvey, the right to the city) housing policies can contribute to construct equality (Penalosa, 2011). Under this lens it is useful to visualize what would have been the destiny of the families of campamento San Luis if their right to the city would have been acknowledged and settled in Las Condes instead of being displaced. The power to reorganize urban life Urban inequality essentially consists of an uneven right to the city. It is true that investment in the city is an equalizer that can promote inclusion and social justice. However, governments that rely on that strategy surrender to the market forces agenda. In contemporary processes of urbanization the provision of housing as a mean to overcome poverty can only be effective if it is accompanied by the production of city, doing otherwise is contributing to the spatial manifestation of social disparity and exclusion and therefore to the perpetuation of urban inequality.

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