FET Policy Brief

Female Engagement Teams: Informing operations today

Dr Hannah West

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Female Engagement Teams (FETs) remain a tactical asset on UN and NATO Human Security operations today. Under the remit of Human Security Advisers, the British Army continues to train Troop Contributing Nations in their implementation, deploying them on the UN missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mali. Since their introduction in Afghanistan, they have become an international model for practising gender perspectives on the ground and satisfying the Women, Peace and Security agenda set out in UNSCR 1325. And yet, there has never been a strategic pause to review their long history and ask the question of why as well as how. Not only this, but FETs provide a case study in Human Security operations, the lessons of which have direct application to Human Security Advisers training and operating today.

The FET mission in Afghanistan was to ‘directly engage Afghan men and women, build trust and influence the Afghan population in order to support the battlespace owner’s intent’ (Land Warfare Centre, 2011, p.2). At an important juncture in the debate surrounding Women in Ground Close Combat (WiGCC), women soldiers were deployed on patrol, wanted there for being women. The seemingly positive rhetoric surrounding the British Army’s decision to introduce them can be attributed to two arguments directed at different audiences. For an internal audience, the British Army employed the argument that they contributed to operational effectiveness bringing military utility in terms of understanding, influencing and intelligencegathering. To an external audience, the British Army justified the introduction of FETs as protecting and empowering Afghan women in the wake of the Taliban’s treatment of women, thus reinforcing political rhetoric and media narratives used to justify the intervention in Afghanistan nearly a decade earlier. On both counts the British Army were visibly reinforcing a message that they welcomed the introduction of FETs. However, this research argues that FETs were set up to fail or ‘invisibly undermined’ by a British Army, uncomfortable with increasing the presence of servicewomen on the ‘front line’ and the threat this posed to the masculine heart of the Armed Forces embodied by the male infanteer. Institutional resistance manifested in giving them unclear objectives and inadequate training and resourcing that put lives at unnecessary risk. Applying a discourse of exceptionalism to a few servicewomen enabled the remainder

POLICY BRIEF

to be dismissed, surrounded by an enduring narrative of incompetence. And yet, in order to attempt to fulfil their assigned roles, female counterinsurgents negotiated to get themselves out on patrol, presenting themselves in ways that downplayed their ‘female engagement’ credentials and foregrounded their military utility as medics and linguists. Driven by the interest of a number of senior officers in their new weapon system, exposure and reporting increased but without understanding and analysis. The British Army have constructed an enduring story of FETs in Afghanistan as a failed concept, at best ‘a good idea that didn’t really work out’. This is not based on their performance because attempts to measure their effect were limited, compounded by insufficient operational record keeping and a failure to retain a repository of these records, resulting in an over-reliance on limited sources. Fundamentally, the employment of FETs by the British Army failed to acknowledge the implications of implementing an operational practice, underpinned by understandings of gender, without looking internally to critique the gendered character of the institution trying to deliver it. This policy brief outlines how FETs were established and employed. The findings are structured in terms of the contrast between their visible welcoming and the ways in which they were invisibly undermined.

1 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (United Nations, 2000)

2 The words of Laura Bush, Hillary Clinton and Cherie Blair were influential in painting a picture of the ‘oppressed Muslim woman’ (Wiegand, 2007, cited by Syed and Ali, p.358, Clinton, 2001), ‘”backward”, “traditional” and expectantly waiting to be saved’ (Manchanda, 2020, p.177), simply ‘someone in need of saving’ (Abu-Lughod, 2002 p.788).

This research forms part of a wider study undertaken at the University of Bath (2017 - 2022) exploring women’s experiences of British counterinsurgency campaigns, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council. The study was given ethics approval by both the University of Bath Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee, and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) Research Ethics Committee, for whom the Sponsor was the Land Warfare Centre (Warfare Branch). Throughout, an open conversation was sustained with both the Land Warfare Centre and the MOD, via the biannual Counterinsurgency Forum and the Human Security Adviser Course.

The findings relating to FETs are based on 36 semi-structured interviews with a cross section of serving, veteran and civilian practitioners, policy makers and commanders. They also draw on media reporting and records obtained by Freedom of Information request including policy papers and lessons identified. Analysis has been augmented by the auto-ethnographic reflections of the author who deployed with the Military Stabilisation Support Group on Operation Herrick 10 in 2009 becoming the lead for ‘female engagement’ in the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and subsequent policy development with the Permanent Joint Headquarters and Land Warfare Centre.

The increasingly gendered rhetoric of political and developmental agendas saw Helmand PRT pursue a ‘women’s affairs’ agenda since at least 2007 (Byers, 2009), enacted through socio-economic initiatives. It was uncoordinated and piecemeal (Byers, 2009) and mirrored on a smaller scale by ad hoc Dutch and British military teams (Byers, 2009). FETs were introduced in Afghanistan by the United States in 2009 and by the British Army in 2010 in response to direction by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Initially, FETs recruited haphazardly from available servicewomen already in country, there followed a transition to recruiting and preparing them in the UK with a rapidly ‘cobbled together’ training package (Rosie Constantine, serving British Army, A-26, 2019). There were numerous instances of them being ill-prepared to be ‘engaging frequently “outside the wire”’, unfamiliar with ‘personal weapons’ and with poor skills that were ‘putting other patrol members at risk’ (Ministry of Defence, 2017, ID-17054). In 2014, FETs were absorbed into the Cultural Adviser role and subsequently repackaged under the remit of the Human Security Advisers.

Nonetheless, operational practices involving roles done by or directed at women or men because of their associated social roles as women or men is not new to the British Army. The types of activities being delivered for women by the Helmand PRT in the mid 2000s, under the guise of ‘female engagement’, were not dissimilar to the women’s outreach programmes being led by General Templer’s wife, Lady Peggie Templer, in Malaya in the 1950s. However, this legacy has been written out of the campaign histories (West, 2021). Literature on the subject of FETs, overwhelmingly documents the US experience and, even when authors include the British experience, they still draw heavily on the American teams. Rather than published academic writing, the literature consists predominantly of theses written by female US military postgraduate students or reports written on behalf of the US or UK government and military. Consequently, they concentrate on the question of (operational) ‘effectiveness’ with little ‘independent evaluation’ of FETs, and only a few critical studies. This is reflected in the recommended reading included in this brief.

FINDINGS

Having established the argument that FETs were visibly welcomed by separate narratives for internal and external audience but invisibly undermined in practice, this findings section will detail how they were set up to fail. An inherently patriarchal military culture inhibited the reception of the FETs with various attempts being made to control the narratives surrounding them in order to preserve the sanctity of the ‘front line’ as a male domain.

3 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) ‘are small teams of military and civilian personnel working in Afghanistan’s provinces to provide security for aid works and help humanitarian assistance or reconstruction tasks in areas with ongoing conflict or high levels of insecurity’ (Maley, 2007). Helmand PRT was established in 2004 and handed over to the British in 2006.

4 ISAF was a NATO coalition operating in Afghanistan from 2003-2014 ‘to enable the Afghan government to provide effective security’ (NATO, 2015).

From the onset, insufficient time was invested in understanding the complexity of the cultural dynamics resulting in a series of flawed assumptions which were both convenient and easy to communicate. The ill-defined nature of FETs can be attributed to these flawed assumptions combined with an institutional tension between the objectives of protecting and empowering Afghan women and something more ‘extractive’ whereby Afghan women were a tool of operational utility. The language of British Army Doctrine Note 11/08 on Female Engagement in Afghanistan (the only formal attempt to articulate this policy), evidences this uncertainty by listing their mission, primary objective and four desired endstates which are both ambiguous and difficult to distinguish. The subsequent confusion was compounded by (i) the doctrine often having not been seen by those on the ground who were left unsure about what they were supposed to be doing; (ii) keeping the teams in a constant state of trial which prevented them from being embedded as a routine component of a deploying force; (iii) institutional tensions over the ownership of these new teams.

A few women operating in FETs, or simply women soldiers, were characterised enthusiastically as exceptional and impressive women by male colleagues in order to make their presence acceptable in this male domain of ‘front line’ patrolling. The remaining individuals constituting the FETs were thought of as incompetent, which was largely equated to their soldiering skills – unfit, not strong enough and lacking vital patrolling skillsenabling them to be dismissed. This exceptionalising maintained a veneer of positivity, providing a ready example of success to quote which would allay accusations of being critical of them. This veneer provided a convenient mask enabling the concept to then be undermined by ostracizing them and putting them at risk through inadequate training and support. This notion of incompetency was an attempt to reinforce patriarchal institutional cultures, but fails to acknowledge the inadequacy of their training. Interviewees described setting up additional training on arrival in theatre because ‘they had not done any infantry tactics, they had not done any pistol training, they had not done any language training’, fearing potential corporate negligence or manslaughter (Rachel Stockton, British Army veteran, A-25, 2019). FETs were put at unnecessary risk due to inadequate training and resourcing and it is apparent that the British Army were fortunate that more serious incidents did not transpire.

The exceptional and the incompetent Weapons not warriors

Women in FETs were described by male colleagues as weapon systems, framing them as a tool for male soldiers and using language that talks of women in terms of ‘specifications’ (Civilian Gender Advisor, A-15, 2017). Women’s presence in this male ‘front line’ domain has to be made acceptable to the prevailing patriarchal institutional culture by this construct which has shockingly seen them compared with heavy artillery and ‘military working dogs’ (serving British Army, A-28, 2018). With the new prominence of FETs

5 'FETs can engage Afghan women'; ‘FETs could influence Afghan women’; 'Afghan women are influential'; 'Women will provide useful information' (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, 2014)

6 'To directly engage Afghan men and women, build trust and influence the Afghan population in order to support the battlespace owner's intent' (Land Warfare Centre, 2011, p.2).

7 'To support the improvement of the Security line of development through the building of trust between the Afghan LNs and the ANSF.’ (Land Warfare Centre, 2011, p.2).

8 'Women do not support or enable the insurgency; Women influence families/communities not to support the insurgency; Women influence others to demand basic services from the government; Women influence family and community members to support GIRoA.' (Land Warfare Centre, 2011, p.2).

9 Interviewees described how ‘there was never one set sort of definition of it’ (serving British Army, A-8, 2016); the ‘aim of it wasn’t clear’ (serving British Army, A-1, 2016); ‘I wasn’t really sure what I was supposed to be doing in terms of female engagement’ (Anna Crossley, British Army veteran, A-24, 2019); ‘I don’t think any of it was particularly defined and I don’t think that they had any set outcomes from it’ (Royal Air Force veteran, A-22, 2019); ‘it grew and changed throughout my training and as I deployed’ (serving British Army, A-10, 2016).

as a weapon system, came considerable pressure for positive reporting from those in command. It became commonplace to report any interaction with women and to send reports merely to satisfy the need to say something about the latest ‘fad’ without it having any discernible meaning or utility (serving British Army, A-2, 2016, serving British Army policymaker, A-11, 2016). This reporting pressure contributed to the veneer of positivity and forced the pace of the policy, arguably deploying inadequately supported and underprepared teams, who were in no position to identify any tangible measures of effect, only reinforcing the failure it was set up for. The associated pressure for source material, to support training and justify success, led to the inclusion of meaningless and unreferenced claims or unsubstantiated research and a reliance on vignettes and anecdotes taken from interviews or operational military reports and has further undermined the record of this work.

Negotiating participation

Female soldiers allocated to FET roles were dependent on the units they were assigned to in order to get out on the ground: they needed a patrol to join to give them the security bubble they required to do their job. Interviewees experiences of being accepted by these ‘front line’ units were not consistent and influenced by many factors, not least whether or not the FET had been assigned to the unit prior to deployment, the soldiering capabilities of the particular individuals involved, the leadership of the unit and the type of tour the unit were experiencing. Whilst some talked of ‘an open door’ (British Army veteran, A-18, 2019) or being ‘well received’ (Rosie Constantine, serving British Army, A-26, 2019) others referred to ‘scepticism’ or them being perceived as ‘a waste of space’ (serving British Army, A-23, 2019). These attitudes suggest that male soldiers felt uncomfortable or uncertain about women operating on patrol with them and reacted in different ways, sometimes with hostility, denying them access to patrols, and, at other times, by trying to understand and reconcile their presence. Numerous interviewees reported being in some way ostracized by their units who had control over their movement. However, female soldiers found ways of negotiating their participation by proving their utility beyond their FET role, through their additional skills and qualifications as medics, linguists, searching and counter-IED (serving British Army, A-10, 2016, serving British Army, A-8, 2016). Such attitudes mask deeper institutional problems with reconciling a patriarchal institutional culture with changing policies relating to the presence of women on the ‘front line’.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UK MOD, UN DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND NATO COMMITTEE ON GENDER PERSPECTIVES

1. FET Concept Evaluation

To revisit the concept of FETs through a comprehensive review of doctrine and training that acknowledged the long historical precedence of such initiatives and is informed by the findings of this report and accompanying lessons held by the Land Warfare Centre. It is recommended that this review include former members of FETs to provide expert input. The review should include but not be limited to:

• Defence Lessons Identified Management System (Lessons Team, Land Warfare Centre)

• Human Security Doctrine - Land Domain (Warfare Branch, Land Warfare Centre)

• (Defence Centre for Doctrine and Concepts)

• Human Security Adviser’s Course Training Needs Analysis (UK MOD Human Security Team)

10 Consistent with observations by Azerbaijani-Moghaddam (2014).

11 Consistent with observations by Azerbaijani-Moghaddam (2014).

12 Consistent with observations by Azerbaijani-Moghaddam (2014).

13 Notably, the over-reliance on a single paper by Pottinger, Jilani and Russo (2009).

It is recommended that the review consider the following questions and input conclusions/further questions to the standing NATO/UN committees:

• What do we mean by an engagement team?

• What is the purpose of an engagement team (and how should this be articulated doctrinally)?

• Why are engagement teams being pursued?

• What has been learnt about operating FETs over the last 13 years?

• Where is knowledge about operating FETs held?

• What are the differences between British and NATO/UN implementation of engagement teams?

2. Knowledge Exchange

It is recommended that the Women, Peace and Security Knowledge Exchange Network is reinvigorated by the UK MOD Human Security Team to facilitate the bringing together of academics, practitioners and policy-makers into dialogue which does not seek consensus but recognises the mutual benefits of critical exchange. This forum is recommended to include former FET members and Human Security Advisers as well as representation from standing NATO/UN committees. The forum is recommended to provide input into a shared digital resource repository (accessible to all forum members) relating female engagement, alongside other gender and WPS policies and research currently being developed for alumni of the UK MOD Human Security Adviser Course.

AUTHOR DETAILS

Dr Hannah West is currently an ESRC Postdoctoral Fellow at Cardiff University and a Guest Researcher at Newcastle University. Her research interests lie in gendered knowledge production about war as a form of military power and exposing the forgotten war labour of women through creative methods. She is Founder and Co-Chair of the Defence Research Network (defenceresnet.org).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to thank all of those who were interviewed as part of this study as well as Dr Oliver Walton and Dr Megan Bastick for their feedback on earlier drafts of this paper.