Party (!) Politics by INTER ALIA

Public opinion survey on entertainment habits, political extremes, the crisis & political change in contemporary Greece

Project Management - Author: Nikos Papakostas Data Analysts: Maria Maki, Boyka Boneva Research Team Ioannina: Maria Maki (team leader), Argyro Nakou (interviewer), Nandia Katerini (interviewer) Research Team Athens: Georgina Papada (team leader), Maria Margosi (interviewer), Alina Tsigouni (interviewer), Korina Tsigouni (interviewer)

Public opinion survey on entertainment habits, political extremes, the crisis & political change in contemporary Greece

Public opinion survey on entertainment habits, political extremes, the crisis & political change in contemporary Greece Copyright ÂŠ Inter Alia, Civic Action Meeting Point 2014 Party (!) Politics Project Management - Author:

Nikos Papakostas Data Analysts:

Maria Maki, Boyka Boneva Cover & Booklet Design

Revekka Vitsaxaki

38 - 40, Thrasyvoulou str., Chalandri Athens, 15234 T / F: +30 2155 403 503 info@interaliaproject.com www.interaliaproject.com

INTRODUCTION

In a country with as long a tradition in the leisure business as Greece, it is common to categorize and/or to characterize people based on their entertainment habits. This is a process that takes place either consciously or subconsciously and is conventionally believed to indicate a person’s social status and, to one extent or the other, political affiliation. However, in an era of deepening social divisiveness, increasing inequalities and rise of political extremes at both national and European levels it is important to put these images into perspective in order for civic minded individuals to avoid creating more stereotypes than already existing.

Through this research we strive to contribute to the creation of an alternative conceptual framework within which the political and social reality in Greece might be better understood and evaluated. Our aim is to widen the middle-ground in the Greek society through embracing and understanding citizens from all parts of the political spectrum as integral parts of an organic whole. Our main objective is to outline the distance between perceived and actual behavioral patterns and to underline the roles of both the, so called, moderate and radical citizenry in maintaining stereotypes and divisiveness. In this way, we attempt to encapsulate the impact of the crisis on the process of social change and to measure it through the alteration of entertainment habits and political views. The word crisis comes from the Greek word “κρίνω” which means “to judge”; No positive or negative connotation. Starting from this linguistic reality, we thought it is imperative to draw all available lessons by the current predicament and to positively utilize them. We attempted to use this research both as a means and as an end. A means that would help us conceptualize the process of social change in Greece. As an end in introducing more diverse and unconventional research tools for apprehending unprecedented circumstances. The choice of cities was rather incidental; resulting from the origin of the inspirer of the project. However, after she suggested the research she had in mind, we thought it would be a good idea to comparatively examine the case of Athens as well. We suspected there would be some findings related to city size and perception of self and society in each city. And, luckily enough, we were not mistaken…

SOME METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

Note 1: This research was carried out in the period between 20 October and 20 November 2013 in the Greek cities of Athens (city center) and Ioannina. The research used a mixed methodology (qualitative and quantitative) and had a sample of 200 youngsters (100 per region) – aged from 18 to 34 years old. Note 2: We chose youth aged 18-34 as a target group for a number of reasons:

a. The Greek youth has been often given a number of attributes based on opinion polls or straightforward stereotyping: apathetic, prone to extremes, indifferent etc. It is important to critically examine this conventional wisdom and assess the validity of those negative images of the youth. b. There is a widespread perception that the youth has been the primary responsible for the rise of “political extremes” in Greece; c. Youngsters’ entertainment habits are more diverse and therefore (potentially) more indicative of the correlations between entertainment, political extremism, crisis, and political change d. A research on the youth can provide insights regarding the future of the Greek society. The level of political mobilization of youth, their commitment to a political field or a political party can give a snapshot of expected developments. Note 3: Obviously, our methodology suffered from limitations: a. Our specimen is not representative of the Greek society but only for a small part of it. b. Discussing perception and self-identification leaves a lot of room for interpretation of words and signals by the respondent. c. People might not be comfortable sharing their political placement with a stranger or, even if they are not, it is possible that they will try to appear milder.

d. We utilized a simplified scale of left-right. Following a conventional cognitive pattern, we identified the nationalistic-patriotic political space with the right although there is no political reason why a leftist person or a leftist party cannot be nationalist. Note 4: In the cross tabulation analysis that follows, we separated respondents into three groups based on their self-placement in the scale 0 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right). The first category is made by respondents who identify themselves with extremes (answers 1, 2 and 9,10). The second category included respondents who identified themselves as being closer to one end of the political spectrum (answers 3, 4 and 7, 8). Finally, the third category is represented by respondents who place themselves closer to the center (answers 5 and 6). Note 5: Being familiar with the impact of technology and new social media in shaping our perception of politics and society we do not make references to particular political parties that could affect the readers’ political preference and accidentally promote one political party over another in search engines.

ANALYSIS - ATHENS

In General… The basic underlying notion that derived from “Party (!) Politics” research is that in spite of generalized perception about the radicalization of Athenian youth, political divisiveness is a contemporary social phenomenon with no profound origins or ideological roots. Youngsters are not prone to extremes because they do not massively identify with extremist political parties or ideologies; in fact, they do not identify with any party or ideology. The main findings of our research in Athens that can be singled out are the following: • youngsters consider themselves highly politicized • a vast majority of respondents believes that the Greek society is moving towards the extremes 8

• there is a strong accumulation of responses in the “political center” category. The farther from this category, the smaller the sample. • Only 4 respondents fell into our “political extremes” category while none of the interviewees placed themselves in the far extremes. • Athenians do not identify with political parties. Their vote and affiliations are extremely fluid and their views on central contemporary matters regularly contradict to the ones expressed by the political party or space they have electorally supported. • The crisis has a vertical impact on different aspects of Athenians lives, correlating strongly with entertainment habits, political extremes and the process of social change. Finally, another important finding that was derived from the process of collecting opinions was related to the openness of youngsters towards strangers, in this case the interviewers. They were almost universally eager to answer the questionnaire even though the research took place in a weird political time for the country (a time characterized, except from prolonged economic stagnation, by the murder of leftist rapper Pavlos Fyssas and of two members of the Greek nationalist party). Despite usual exaggerations about a youth experiencing “generalized depression”, being closed to themselves or to their groupings and of being prone to extremism or apathy; youngsters were a real delight to talk to.

Athens, Syntagma Square, 1900

In Detail… Politics in Athens • 9 out of 10 Athenian respondents deemed politicization as identical with or necessary for active citizenship. Among the younger part of the research population (18 to 24 years old) only 4% responded that politicization is not a necessary feature of active citizenship. Among the older part, 15% made the same claim. • Less than half of the respondents claimed to be interested or intensely interested in politics. For the most part those respondents came from the younger group. Almost 2/3 of the younger respondents claimed to be interested in politics. Just over 40% of the older respondents shared their attitude. • 73% of Athenians believe that particular political beliefs impact, to one extent on the other, on entertainment habits. Half of those respondents believe that there is a very strong or a strong

correlation between political preferences and entertainment habits. The other half deems this correlation as existent but less concrete. • 35% of older respondents claimed the opposite, that is, that political affiliation is not usually (19%) or never (16%) reflected on a person’s entertainment habits. This response was given by no more than 8% of younger respondents. • No particular divergence was observed between respondents from the “extremes” and the “center” regarding the relation between political beliefs and entertainment habits. 10

This set of findings indicate, first, that Athenians consider themselves highly politically active and mobilized and, second, that they rely almost exclusively on political elites for making a difference. The former is again an encouraging tribute of the Athenian society opposite to the stereotype of an inactive youth. However, the latter shows low levels of confidence in self and society, as well as lack of entrepreneurial attitude and mentality; if not lack of courage and imagination altogether.

• A mere 17% of the respondents from the “center” answered that most of their friends share their political beliefs.

Another finding is related to the political interest of the younger part of the electorate. It appears that respondents aged 18 to 24 are significantly more interested in politics than the older ones. This clearly contrasts the contemporary narrative that political apathy decreases along with age.

• There appear to be no important divergences between younger and older respondents on the particular question.

Political preferences and socialization • 81% of respondents who claimed to be closer to the right-wing extreme answered that most of their friends share their political beliefs. • Just over 40% of the respective respondents of the left wing said that their friends identified with them politically.

• Strikingly, only 1 in 41 respondents of the “center” answered that they did not care about the political beliefs of their friends. This shows that political openness of the particular category does not derive from ignorance or indifference.

• 67% of Athenian respondents answered that political discussions during entertainment have increased in the period of crisis (in the past five years), thus indicating a pattern of increased impact of politics on Athenians everyday lives. At the same time, Athenians are generally skeptical about expressing their political views. • 84% of respondents declared that they need to know a group of people to a reasonable extent before expressing their political views. Among those, older respondents are clearly more open to sharing their opinions. In particular, 20% of the 25-34 respondents said that they express their political opinion regardless of how well they know the company. Strikingly, none (0) of the younger (18-24) respondents claimed that they express their political opinions regardless of the context.

The latter result indicates that: (in Athens) the younger a person, the more reluctant to express his/her political opinions. However, taking into consideration the higher level of interest in politics of younger respondents it appears that divisiveness is more deep where it needed to be less, that is, among younger people. Also, that while youngsters discuss more about politics, they tend to discuss only with people whose opinions they already know. This could be read as a tendency towards the creation of smaller groupings/communities of people with common beliefs and interest. In a large and chaotic city like Athens, smaller groupings may have more potential in creating a more viable social structure. However, in a more pessimistic reading those responses indicate less openness and less in-depth contact with others. Less contact, in turn, renders youngsters prone to stereotypes and conflict.

• Half of the respondents admitted/declared having refused social contact with others solely due to their political beliefs (no particular divergence between younger and older respondents). This adds to the previous finding about the level of communication between youngsters with different political beliefs: while they allegedly interact with people from different parts of the political spectrum (80% declared that the variety of social and political strata in the place they choose is big or very big) they do not trust them enough for discussing politics with them. This constitutes another strong sign that politics is an important factor in Athenians’ lives that defines not only their stance on sociopolitical issues but also their interpersonal relations. Secondly, it is highly questionable whether the particular form and mentality of political mobilization will have a sustainable impact on the Athenian and Greek society. Politicization based on otherness can lead to more divisiveness than social cohesion especially among the younger generation. • More than 90% of respondents who defined themselves closer to the right extreme of the political spectrum admitted to have denied social interaction with people due to their political beliefs. • Respectively, 63% of the respondents who claimed to be closer to the left wing have refused interaction on political grounds. • Not more than 4% of the respondents believe that the variety of social strata at the place they choose for entertainment is limited. On the contrary, 2/3 of respondents answered that the variety of social strata at the places they choose for entertainment is large (56%) or very large (8%). Among younger respondents the respective percentage reaches 80%. This shows that the formerly existing stereotype about

identification of entertainment habits with social status incrementally disappears. Generally speaking, people, regardless of their economic situation, spend their entertainment time together. This is an encouraging phenomenon given that when people interact in a relaxed environment it is more possible to exchange views with less bias and tension and thus understand the points raised by each side. Nevertheless, when those answers are cross-tabulated with the frequency of rejection of social contacts on political grounds, it becomes clear, first, that youngsters are skeptical about expressing their opinions on politics and, second, that they prefer to not be familiar with the political beliefs of their company. When people reject social contact they do so with individuals who are persistent about expressing their own opinions. In any different case, the majority will avoid receiving information on the political beliefs of others. This, again, indicates low levels of social trust and self-confidence.

• 3% of respondents perceive political beliefs as a definitive factor for entertainment habits of others. This indicates a strong contradiction between perceptions and actual experience as well as the strong impact of stereotypes and otherness. While the answers of most youngsters follow a mainstream pattern, their responses indicate that they perceive themselves as representing a minority of open and civic minded individuals. Entertainment Habits • Over 60% of Athenians respondents think that the most ‘hip’ places in Athens are currently small traditional shops that Greeks usually call “rakadika” or “tsipouradika” due to the primary kind of alcohol they sell, that is, raki or tsipouro – a strong traditional spirit of the Balkan region. This is partly a trend. However, more than 80% of the aggregate of interviewees believe that size (of the entertainment facility) maters and different kinds of small places are fashionable. The most common word that Athenians used for expressing their perceptions on entertainment trends was ‘cost’. There appears to be a strong correlation between entertainment trends and the economic situation of the Greek youth. This is indicative of an externally imposed change of habits that could affect Athenians’ everyday life, their social contacts and, therefore, their tools for construction of perceptions of self and society. Athenians’ entertainment habits have changed both quantitatively - as to the frequency and money spent – and qualitatively. Frequency of going out has decreased by 28.5%, from almost 4 times

a week to 2.84. Money spent per night out has been limited by about 1/5, from 14.4 to 11.78 euro. Group size and consumption has not been significantly altered. All findings point at a more cautious and rational behavior as regards entertainment habits – by all means a positive feature for the Athenian market and society. Spending inconsiderably for entertainment, a characteristic of the Greek society whose partiality mismatched its negative stereotyping power; has practically stopped. On the other hand, shops try harder to keep their customers by requesting less money for the same consumption. Qualitative alterations are even more intriguing. Spending time at smaller and quieter places, such as a “rakadiko”, means to discuss more and to assert social inclusion based on this kind of (verbal) communication. On the contrary, at least for part of the respondents, entertainment in the past took place in louder places like big bars or clubs. In such places, communication was necessarily realized in a more physical way or based on the image rather than on opinions, communication skills etc. This change, apart from an alteration of entertainment habits and money shortage, can possibly indicate an increased need for communication, for sharing concerns and thoughts in order to lighten up psychologically 1. Another possible externality of the particular trend is related to social interaction between youngsters with diverse social status and economic capacity. The large majority of low paid, supported or unemployed youngsters tend to attract the minority of individuals with higher economic capacity. In the past, the opposite was more often the case: large groups of wealthy youngsters attracted the majority who could, in one way or another, follow more costly entertainment activities. In other words, the interaction between groups with diverse economic capacity currently takes place on the (economically) weaker side’s “court” and standards.

Voting Criteria • Half of the Athenians respondents claimed not to have any party affiliation whatsoever while 46% identifies with political parties in a loose manner. 2/3 of younger respondents stated that they identify loosely with a political party. 50% of older respondents claimed that their vote changes every time. This indicates the absolute disdain of political elites by the respon1

This response was given as an explanation to changed entertainment trends by roughly 20% of respondents

dents that are most affected by the crisis and that currently constitute the most productive part of the society. • Only 4 out of 100 youngsters are committed, steady voters of a party. It is indicative that from the respondents who identify with the political center, almost 60% claimed that their vote changes every time. The responses blank/abstention hardly reached 6%. The answers of the more politically “radical” respondents did not differ in essence from the ones of the “center”. While being less abstract about their vote in relation to the center respondents they too do not feel closely affiliated to any political party. In a country where a corrupt and clientelistic party structure has traditionally fostered unequal access to resources, these findings are encouraging. It indicates that the youth does not trust and, therefore, does not rely on political parties for securing a better future. Political parties, as such, have lost their credibility before the Athenian youth. At the same time, they do not have much to offer in return for political loyalty. Since there are no personal benefits to be gained by steadily supporting a political party, youngsters avoid doing so and use different criteria for making their electoral choice. Nevertheless, when these answers are cross-tabulated with the ones about the importance of politicization for active citizenship – a gloomy picture is sketched. Youngsters seem to be heading

towards a conceptual dead-end since they do not feel confident or apposite to make a difference themselves and have no choice but to rely on (what they claim to be) undependable political elites. Thus, they do not only lack confidence but are also unwilling to admit they have responsibility. This is an underlying shine of apathy; But also of denial. Crisis & Political Change As regards the impact of crisis on the Greek society there is a coherent balance between interviewees who believe that the crisis will have a positive impact and the ones who believe that it will have a negative one. Even among the left-wing which is conceptually opposite to the memorandum policies, no more than 54% believes that the crisis will impact somehow or very negatively. Responses of “towards the extremes” right wingers are even more indicative of controversies between official party-lines and actual opinions.

• 55% answered that the crisis will impact somehow or very positively. This is particularly striking given that cross-tabulations indicate that the bulk of those respondents are supporters of the patriotic-nationalist fraction which is, by default, strongly opposite to the current handling of the crisis. Reasonably enough, almost 60% of the self-reported “center” respondents replied that the crisis will not impact negatively on the Greek society; 40% of those respondents believe that the effect of the crisis will be positive. • Younger respondents are, in general, more pessimistic. Roughly 45% of them believe that the crisis will impact negatively. Among older respondents, that is, the people who are evidently most affected by the crisis, not more than 30% gave the same answer. These findings prove that the respondents are not affected by official party lines and that both their political placement and their ideology are highly fluid.

Graffiti by Banksy

ANALYSIS - IOANNINA

In General… The majority of youngsters from Ioannina are not strongly politicized. In fact, a large part of the respondents, consisting around 1/5 of the overall sample are entirely apathetic and claim to avoid political participation at any level. The remaining 80% does exercise their voting rights but somehow reluctantly. Ioannina respondents do not trust political parties and are highly skeptical about the effectiveness and/or the importance of political participation. However, for Ioannites (the citizens of Ioannina), civic participation is not limited to political action. A large part of the youth chooses to participate on different levels other than official representative procedures. Political institutions are considered distant and, to an important extent, irrelevant for respondents’ everyday life. 20

The survey that was conducted at Ioannina largely confirmed the rise of “political extremes”. However, respondents who identify with the “extremes” do not seem to do things significantly differently from those who claim to belong to the “center” of the political spectrum.

Ioannina, 1913

In general, discussing with youngsters led us to conclude that the reason for being politically inactive is related to the perceived irrelevance of politics to their economic situation. They consider that the solution to economic stagnation will come through individual effort and social solidarity rather than through their participation in politics.

and small coffee shops (also selling alcoholic drinks) are most trendy. The primary reason for that, according to interviewees, is the relative low cost of those places. This is confirmed by the changes in entertainment habits due to the crisis that has affected not only the spending but also the frequency of going out.

Despite their low levels of politicization, Ioannites consider political beliefs to define the youth entertainment habits to an important extent. The majority of youngsters claimed that the places they choose for entertainment have medium level of variety and that particular political beliefs imply particular entertainment habits.

In Detail…

The society of Ioannina appears to feature a social safety net that limits the level of unpredictability deriving from economic crisis or political tension. This could partly explain the respondents’ relative optimism about the future and the impact of the crisis on the society and mentalities.

• 45% of the respondents from Ioannina claimed that being politicized is not a necessary feature of active citizenship while over 1/4 sees politicization as not a necessary condition at all for being considered an active citizen. In the particular question, there is increased coherence between younger and older respondents.

The entertainment patterns of the Ioannina youth are impressively similar to Athens’. A large majority of respondents consider smaller and more quite places to be more fashionable. In particular, rakadika

Politicization in Ioannina

• Over 40% of the respondents consider themselves not so much (23%) or not at all (18%) politicized.

• Only 20% consider themselves politicized, to one degree or the other. Again, answers of older and younger respondents are highly linear.

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the respondents who place themselves closer to political extremes are somewhat more active than the others. However, the pattern is not as strong as one would expect given that • Roughly 45% of more “radical” respondents consider themselves quite (25%) or very (19%) politicized. Reversely, it is rather striking that • Around 1/3 of (self-reported) of respondents from the same category are not so much or not at all politicized. • Not more than 1 in 5 respondents of the aggregate sample claim to be strongly or very strongly politicized. Voting Pattern • Although youngsters tend not to be very interested in politics, around 80% do exercise their voting right. Their vote largely varies and changes easily. Half the respondents claimed not to have any political affiliation whatsoever and half that they identify with a political party in a very loose

manner. This is the case with both older and younger respondents whose stances are not qualitatively different. The stance of the majority of Ioannites shows maturity and a good understanding of the role of citizens. While they utilize their voting rights they do not particularly rely on its effectiveness. On the contrary, the majority of voters believe that electoral participation is a necessary but inadequate condition for being considered active citizens. It has to be complemented by mobilization at the local level that is considered equally important from an important part of the research sample.

• Radical respondents’ answers regarding voting habits are not significantly different from the rest. Only 2 out of 16 claimed to be steadily supporting a particular party. The vote of the rest is changes easily while 3 out of 16 interviewees from the radical group claimed to be indifferent about politics altogether. Self-reported extremists are as loose about their voting habits as the rest of the respondents. This indicates, to one extent or the other, that radicalism is not the outcome of a particular ideology or of support to a party but rather a result of indignation and frustration. In other words, mobilization on party lines is equally weak throughout the political spectrum. Politics & Socialization • For 46% of respondents, expressing political opinions openly is dependent upon external factors (e.g. group composition). More than 1/4 expresses its opinion freely regardless of the context while 18% claims never to discuss politics. • A striking 46% of younger respondents (18-24) stated that they express their political opinions regardless of the context. Three times less respondents from the “25-34” group gave the same answer. 24

• 37.5% of youngsters who identify with political “extremes” admit to have denied social interaction with others solely due to their political beliefs. The percentage of individuals who have rejected others on political grounds is not dramatically different among people who identify with one side of the political spectrum (29.1%) or even among respondents who place themselves on the “center” (22.2%). • There is no significant divergence between older and younger respondents. However, 10% less individuals from the younger lot said to have denied social interaction due to political beliefs. This is a potential explanation for the increasing willingness of Ioannites to express their political opinions regardless of the company. If most youngsters choose particular joints that are compatible with their political beliefs, the possibility of being exposed to an uncomfortable or confrontational political discussion diminishes. An alternative explanation for the high percentage of respondents who speak freely their political views regardless of the company is that the level of predictability of others’ behavior is higher in small cities like Ioannina. Stronger social ties and behavioral institutions create a social safety net that constrains the application of extremist political beliefs. • 65% of the Ioannina respondents claim that political placement impacts, to one degree or the other, on entertainment habits. In particular, ¼ of respondents believe that political viewpoints define entertainment choices either always (2%) or most of the times (23%). 40% claims that political beliefs sometimes affect entertainment habits. On the contrary, 35% claim that entertainment is rather

(27%) or completely (8%) irrelevant to political beliefs. The distribution of respondents based on the political beliefs is rather random. • 6 out of 10 youngsters from Ioannina claimed that political discussions during entertainment have increased either significantly (32%) or somewhat (28%) as a result of the crisis. Reversely, 12% responded that the frequency of political discussions during entertainment has decreased after the eruption of the crisis. While politics appear to be a rather important aspect of Ioannites life and entertainment routine, the application of particular political beliefs is somewhat abstract in behavioral terms. In other words, “radicals” are not perceived to be socializing in a qualitatively different manner than others citizens. This leads youngsters to express political views more freely and reject individuals due to their political viewpoints less often. The latter could be partly related to the fact that citizens in smaller societies acquire (either willingly or indirectly) more and more diverse information about their fellow citizens and might, thus, be more reluctant to push judgments solely on political grounds. Entertainment Habits • 2/3 of responding youth claimed that “tsipouradika” are preferred by youngsters while 35% believes bars are most fashionable. In both cases, the main explanation for the respective trend was related

to the low cost (5-10 euro). As far as the impact of the crisis on entertainment habits is concerned, youngsters claimed that it has been strong both on the frequency of going out and on spending. Despite the manifold differences between youngsters from Ioannina and Athens, entertainment habits in the two cities are practically identical. For that reason, Ioannites’ responses are not going to be presented in detail at this point. However, it should be noted that, as it was the case with Athenian respondents, Ioannites claimed that the cost of entertainment is the primary factor they take into consideration when making their choices. Both cost of entertainment (per night out) and the frequency of going out have decreased by about ¼. Ioannites, as Athenians, massively choose smaller joints for entertainment and communicate verbally (either about politics or not) more than in the past when entertainment for an important part of respondents took place in louder places that fostered more physical communication. • Interestingly, a relatively large part of the apolitical respondents prefer more costly entertainment (e.g. clubs). Crisis & Political Change 26

• 45% of the Ioannina respondents looks at the future with optimism and believes that the crisis will affect the Greek society in a positive (42%) or a very positive manner. Opinions between younger and older respondents are practically identical. • The most optimist respondents claimed that the crisis will lead the society to mobilize, will rearrange people’s goals and expectations, and will change their mentality, thus leading to a more rational, less consumption-based lifestyle. Also they believe that, radicalism and/or unrealistic ideologies and their supporters will be marginalized from politics, thus leading the society closer to political maturity. • The more cautious optimists claimed that: - The crisis constitutes an opportunity for a fresh start - People will draw lessons from the crisis and will reexamine their needs and priorities - Social solidarity will be enhanced. • 1/4 of the Ioannites views the post-crisis period with pessimism. They foresee that the positive lessons as regards the rationalization of the life-style and their role in society will be short-lived. Due to severe austerity measures the living standards will collapse. The social welfare and the investment in education and healthcare will further decrease. Poverty, unemployment, immigration and social exclusion will intensify the occurrence of violence (fear, insecurity). This will result in the enhancement of nationalist ideology that will intensify social conflict and disintegration.

Finally, almost 1/5 of the Ioannina respondents see the future and the repercussions of the crisis with uncertainty. Those respondents believe that the result of the crisis will depend on its handling. Sustainable development and growth are dependent on the readiness of the society to change its mentality and the respective practices. Otherwise, social change will be temporary and the progress will quickly be reversed after the crisis subsides.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ATHENS – IOANNINA

In General…

The comparative analysis between the largest Greek city (Athens - 5.5 million inhabitants) and the 7th largest city (Ioannina - 112.000 inhabitants) indicate an unexpectedly large diversity of political stances and perceptions within Greece. Obviously, this is related to an important extent to city size. Inhabitants of large cities like Athens with no culture of administrative decentralization are more likely to opt for representative practices of democratic participation because civic initiatives are believed to be difficult to organize and realize. Reversely, political participation gives access to citizens to policy making (even indirectly) who get the opportunity to express their opinion. On the contrary, citizens of smaller cities, appear to believe that political participation is not only optional but, in many cases, useless. Some reasons for that could be comparative administrative decentralization, limitations of access to governmental structures, and better communication between citizens that enable small-scale civic action. Thus, while a first conclusion of this research would be that Ioannites are less politicized than Athenians, on a second reading, it is highly questionable whether Athenians’ alleged political mobilization is a more fruitful way of civic participation. Except from widespread trust in representative democratic institutions, it could also indicate lack of confidence in self and society, lack of social entrepreneurial attitude, over-reliance on political elites, and self-victimization. In Detail… Respondents from Ioannina perceive their role as citizens very differently from Athenians. • 37% of Ioannites believe that politicization is a ‘not necessary’ (19%) or ‘unnecessary’ (18%) feature of active citizenship. The respective percentage for Athenian respondents is 9%. • Most strikingly, 47% of Athenians aged 18 to 24 deem politicization identical to active citizenship. In Ioannina, the respective percentage does not exceed 10%. A similar, yet more modest, pattern is observed in older respondents (26% and 10% respectively).

Question: How necessary important is politicization for active citizenship?

However, when cross tabulated with the answer about political mobilization and active citizenship, it turns out that lower level of participation in political procedures in Ioannina does not necessarily indicate lack of citizenship awareness. It shows a lower level of trust and interest in representative democratic practices.

Question: Taking into consideration all the times that you have voted, which of the following statements describes your criteria better?

â&#x20AC;˘ More than 40% of the respondents from Ioannina are not interested in politics (22% not much and 19% not at all). The respective percentage for Athens is 17% while only 2% of the respondents claimed to be fully uninterested about politics. The most significant divergence is among the younger group. 62% of Athenians in that age group stated to be politicized while less than 20% of the Ioannina lot gave the same answer.

Question: How interested are you in politics?

â&#x20AC;˘ Habitual no-vote or blank-vote among Ioannina respondents exceeds 20% (blank 10%, no vote 12%). In Athens the same answer was given by 6% (2% and 4% respondents respectively).

â&#x20AC;˘ Despite the manifold differences between youngsters from Ioannina and Athens, entertainment habits in the two cities are practically identical. This indicates the vertical impact of the crisis as the definitive parameter in both cases. Cost of entertainment and decreasing economic capacity appears to be an inelastic factor that unites the otherwise highly diverse societies of Ioannina and Athens.

Question: Do political affiliations necessitate particular entertainment habits?

Question: Do your friends share your political beliefs?

• Entertainment habits are believed to say a lot about a person in both Athens and Ioannina. Almost 70% in both cases claim that political beliefs are reflected on entertainment habits. In the case of Athens this comes in stark contrast with the responses on the variety of social strata in the places respondents choose for entertainment which they claim to be large or very large. It appears that while the answers of most youngsters follow a mainstream pattern, their responses indicate that they perceive themselves as representing a minority of open and civic minded individuals. On the contrary, responses of Ioannites are much more coherent: political opinions necessitate particular entertainment habits and, for that reason, the variety of social strata in most cases is medium or limited.

• When asked about the political placement of their friends, 27% of respondents from Ioannina answered that they don’t care about their friends’ political opinions. Among Athenians no more than 6 people out of 100 gave the same answer. Roughly twice more Athenian respondents answered that most of their friends share their political beliefs in comparison to Ioannites.

Question: Have you denied social interaction with a person solely due to their political beliefs?

Question: How well do you need to know a group of people for expressing openly your political opinion?

As regards the impact of political placement/opinion on social interaction again the findings are importantly different:

• Slightly more than ¼ of the respondents from Ioannina declared to have refused social interaction with individuals solely because of their political views. The respective percentage for Athens is almost 50%. Older respondents from Ioannina are the most open group. Just over 20% claimed to have denied social interaction due to political beliefs. The respective percentage in Athens is close to 50%. Also, the response “I don’t care about others’ political views” was given three times more often by Ioannites than Athenians. • 11% more Ioannites than Athenians answered that they feel free to express their political opinions regardless of how well they know the group of people they refer to (26%). This is contrary to conventional wisdom that people in small societies are more cautious when expressing political or personal opinions because there is an important possibility of being labeled and gossiped against. More than 80% of Athenian youngsters answered that expressing their opinions depends on the context and the company. Not more than 55% of Ioannites gave the same answer. Yet, this difference is partly counterbalanced by the fact that 18% of respondents from Ioannina claimed not to discuss politics at all. The respective percentage for Athens was only 3%. • Even more strikingly, 44% of Ioannina respondents from the younger group claimed that they express their political opinions regardless of the context. The respective percentage in Athens is 0%.

Why is a smaller society more open to discussing politics rather than a larger one? It is partially related to the importance and hopes that people place on official politics and politicians. Ioannites appear to be much less interested in other peoples’ views while politics in general seem to be a much less important aspect in the everyday lives of a large part of the society. Therefore, talking openly about politics would not characterize a person as much as talking about, say, homosexuality. There is also the element of fear. Athenians seem to be much more affected by the generalized rhetoric about the rise of extremes. They feel helpless in front of that. On the contrary, in the case of Ioannina a lot of respondents might feel that there is a social web that will avert extremist practices.

Question: The frequency of political discussions during entertainment in comparison to five years ago has…

Question: How large is the variety of social strata (e.g. education, political affiliation, economic situation) at the place you choose for entertainment more often? • Political discussions during entertainment have increased in both cities. Interestingly enough, despite the highly diverse level of politicization of the selected societies, the percentages in both cases as regards the increase in frequency of political discussions is very similar (66% in Athens – 61% in Ioannina).

Question: How will the crisis impact on the Greek society?

Another important finding is related to the perceived long-term impact of the crisis: • Almost half of the Athenian respondents stated that the variety of social strata (e.g. in economic or educational terms) at the places they choose for entertainment is large or very large. At Ioannina less than 1/3 gave the same answer while 40% opted for the choice “medium variety”.

• 1/3 of the respondents from Ioannina believe that the medium and long term effect of the crisis on the Greek society will be negative while 44% thinks it is going to be positive. Here it must be noted that Ioannina is one of the municipalities with the highest youth unemployment rates in Europe. In

Athens, where the situation is statistically less dramatic, half the respondents think the crisis will have a negative impact and 30% a positive one. While older respondentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; answers did not significantly differ, almost twice as many respondents from the younger group in Ioannina believe that the crisis will impact positively in comparison to Athenians. A possible explanation for the relative pessimism of Athenian youngsters could be that the crisis has mainly affected the middle class, thus, the more populous the middle class the more the social impact of the crisis. On the contrary, Ioannina depends more on primary production. Moreover, burdens of everyday life are probably lightened by informal economy and transactions. Finally, social relationships tend to be stronger and less abstract in Ioannina while economic support from friends and family is generally a more viable prospect.

The belief that the crisis has moved the Greek youth towards the extremes is almost universal: â&#x20AC;˘ 9 out of 10 respondents from both Ioannina and Athens in spite of their other - multiple and widespread- differences, agree with the particular argument. While the results about the tendency of the Greek youth towards the extremes are practically identical, researchers in Athens came across only a small number of respondents (6) from the radical group. This was not the case at Ioannina where the radical lot was made up by 15 individuals. This could indicate that the Athenian society is more vulnerable to stereotypes or that Athenians encounter behaviors with increased stereotypical power (e.g. incidents of political violence) more often.

Question: Has the crisis moved the Greek society towards the extremes or the center?

CONCLUSIONS

The Party (!) Politics research indicates that entertainment habits constitute an efficient parameter for approaching the process of social change in both conceptual and methodological terms. They can signify the impact of transitional periods on populations’ psychology, modes of socializing, perceptions of self and society. On the other hand, indicators related to leisure time are important for diversifying research tools and for gathering tangible and useable data. Leisure time can show a lot about both individuals and societies. More relaxed environments can bring forward better or worse qualities because stereotypes become more obvious when isolated from the daily routine, political necessities or socioeconomic divergences. When politics becomes a central topic of peoples’ discussion during entertainment, it means that it is an important aspect of their everyday lives. Also, it shows that communication on more neutral topics that generally bonds people are not the norm and that divisiveness is easier to prevail. 40

Greece during the crisis constitutes an ideal case study that highlights the importance of entertainment habits both as means and an end. First, because the country has a long tradition in the leisure business and, thus, sociopolitical developments definitely impact strongly on the relevant trends. Second, entertainment habits are very diverse, thus providing a large pool of responses. Third, because the current crisis has had a vertical sociopolitical impact whose universality and prevalence we can measure through the particular research. Different cities foster very different behavioral and conceptual patterns about the crisis, political extremes, and the process of social change. The research showed a pattern of increased fear and otherness in Athens and an importantly milder pattern in Ioannina. This comes on a stark contrast to the fact that responses of self-reported radicalism were given three times more often in Ioannina. It appears that less fear leads to more openness. More openness leads to more rhetorical extremism but to less behavioral radicalism. As regards politicization there are quantitative commonalities as well as equally important qualitative divergences. Youngsters massively do not trust political elites. However, their stance for dealing with this lack of trust is highly diverse. While the Athenian youth is (allegedly) willing to confront elites in the latter’s own field, that is, through representative practices, Ioannina youth is ready to by-pass them through local initiatives and collaboration.

While youngsters’ perceptions about the increasing rise of extremes were almost universal, actual responses point elsewhere. Youth, especially in Athens, identifies the rise of extremes with the rise of extremism. However, while the latter necessitates strong and immediate action, the former calls for the opposite: soft skills, patience and sympathy. Athenians appear to be defensive and overly fearful of “extremes” thus creating a plethora of stereotypes that often do not correspond to their actual experience or to social realities. Besides, claims about widespread radicalism of the youth, not only create a misleading picture that generates equally irrelevant policies and enables political manipulation; but also leads to shallow and unimaginative politicization through the dim paths of fear and otherness. All these, bring forward an underlying finding of the research: most generalizations about the sociopolitical trends in Greece are rather unsustainable and that a closer examination of manifold regional specificities are essential. Finally, another universal finding of the research is that crisis has had a massive impact on every one of the aspects that were analyzed (entertainment habits, political extremes, the crisis and social change). The main reason is that it has changed perceptions of self and society. These primarily impact on psychology, an underlying factor for the overcoming of the current social, political, and economic predicaments.