Unraveling turkey v1 1 by INTER ALIA

Title: Unraveling Turkey. A Collective Volume on Contemporary Turkish Politics and Society Collective Volume No. 1 Writers: GizemAlioglu-Ă&#x2021;akmak, EsraDogan, Alba Cicala,StamatisLaskaris, Nicholas Rossis, NikolaosPapakostas&NikolaosPasamitros Editors: NikolaosPapakostas, NikolaosPasamitros Cover Design: AngelosPasamitros, Original Concept: Alex Michas, IroAthanasiou Copyright ÂŠInter Alia, Civic Action Meeting Point 2013 ISBN-798-618-80847-0-4

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This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Inter Alia, Civic Action Meeting Point. Inter Alia, Civic Action Meeting Point has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. All opinions expressed in the present publication only imprint views of the writers and not of the institutions they are affiliated with or of Inter Alia, Civic Action Meeting Point.

Contents

Unraveling Turkey - Introduction

GIZEM ÇAKMAK - Disentangling Motives for Public Mobilization andGovernmental Responses to the Recent Protest Movement in Turkey

ESRA DOGAN – The Gezi Protest in Turkey: Emerging Pluralism or Deepening Polarization?

ALBA CICALA - “Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’s Accession Bid

STAMATIS LASKARIS - Action-Reaction or Inaction? Assessing Turkey’s Involvement in the Syrian Conflict

NICHOLAS ROSSIS - The Ambivalence between Islamism and Secularism in Turkey: Trick or Treat?

NIKOS PAPAKOSTAS & NIKOS PASAMITROS - Protests, Spheres of Social Interaction and the Future of the Turkish Civic Society

ÂŠ Inter Alia, Civic Action Meeting Point, August 2013

Unraveling Turkey A Collective Volume on Contemporary Turkish Politics and Society

Inter Alia - Civic Action Meeting Point, proudly presents its first collective volume of policy and research papers focusing on diverse aspects of contemporary Turkey. The choice of subject and the timing of the publication are not so much related to the recent protest movement and the international attention it raised to the country, as one would probably think. It is derived from our perception of Turkey as a country that has been on the crossroad between East and West and the respective value systems- for far too long both politically and socially. Our view of Turkey somewhat resembles the Seljuk motifs that lie on the cover of this collective volume: charming and multifaceted; unique and complicated. The recent protests only came as a confirmation of these characteristics which are largely derived from the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s unfulfilled relationship with the West and the uneven role that Turkey aspires in the East. Thus, our objective was to address the underlying issue of Turkeyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s political and cultural orientation through analyzing the basic contemporary challenges facing the country. The present collection provides a multidimensional and multilevel analysis of potentials and threats regarding the maintenance of peace and the social and political modernization both domestically and regionally. Our aim is to utilize the existing momentum of social change in Turkey and contribute to the ongoing debate on the future of the country, the region, and the world by presenting and promoting original, long-term, and sustainable perspectives. The final product that follows bears little resemblance to our initial concept of publishing a couple of analyses regarding social developments in Turkey. Following one of the conceptual starting points of Inter Alia, Civic Action Meeting Point, that is, to optimally utilize peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s skills and energy as an alternative to material resource constraints, this collection grew both in size and in expectations. The participation of well-respected scholars who jumped on board as soon as the idea was forwarded gives us faith in our aspiration to

build on people’s willingness to offer, and fills us with hope about the future. We thank them all sincerely. The collection consists of sixarticles (research papers and policy analyses) that focus on both national and international challenges facing contemporary Turkey:  DrGizemAlioglou-Cakmak, assistant professor at the University of Yeditepe, Turkey, analyses the impetus and the political processes leading up to the escalation of public protest and political crisis.  EsraDogan, PhD Candidate at the Panteion University of Athens, using personal interviews and the discourse on social media platforms, attempts to depict the short and medium-term impact of the Gezi protests on the Turkish society.  Alba Cicala, PhD candidate at the University of Sienna, Italy/ research associate at Inter Alia C.A.M.P., presents her recent research paper titled “Friend request sent. EU Identity and Turkey’s Accession Bid”. Tracing the contours of a wide concept – that of European identity, the Turkish issue is seen through the eyes of the European public, with a view to disentangle the reasons of mass’ reactions vis-à-vis such a sensitive and long-standing issue.  StamatisLaskaris,

peace

conflict

researcher

(MSc

Uppsala

University), examines Turkey’s deviation from its foreign policy doctrine regarding the Syrian conflict and analyzes the conceptual incompatibility of the, so called, “Davutoglu doctrine” to the regional stakes and balance of power.  Dr Nicholas Rossis, PhD in Middle-Eastern and Islamic studies and research associate at the University of Durham, writes about the everlasting nexus between secularism and Islamism in the Turkish society and explores the role of potential inhibitors that do not allow to Turkey to glide into one of the two sides of the same coin.  Nikos Papakostas, head of the Analysis and Research Departments at Inter Alia – C.A.M.P and Nikos Pasamitros, PhD Candidate at Panteion University and project coordinator at Inter Alia – C.A.M.P., present preliminary, conceptual conclusions on the future of the civil society in Turkey and beyond.

Finally, two opinions about the recent events in Turkey and the political personality of RecepTayyipErdoğan by Nikos Karavasilis(BA graduate in International

and

European

Studies,

University

Piraeus)and

BurakKahraman(Musician & Film Producer, MA in Composing for Film and TV program, Kingston University's), are posted on the students’ corner (www.interaliaproject.com/students.html),

and

our

blog

(www.interaliaproject.blogspot.gr) thus opening the floor for discussion.

Enjoy the reading. All comments are welcome!

Sincerely, Nikos Papakostas Nikos Pasamitros Inter Alia Editorial Team Athens, September 10, 2013

Unraveling Turkey – Collective Volume on Turkish Politics & Society

GIZEM ÇAKMAK

Disentangling Motives for Public Mobilization and Governmental Responses to the Recent Protest Movement in Turkey Abstract:In late May 2013, protests raised against the plans to replace Gezi Park with the replica of Ottoman Barracks. In the wake of the events, it was just a small protest - about a hundred protesters on passive resistance, intending to protect the Gezi Park. The brutal police intervention attracted further reaction from different segments of the society and the numbers of protesters were multiplied day by day. The people, who were organized through the social media, came together in order to demonstrateagainst the government and the disproportional use of force towards the peaceful protesters. Gezi resistance had a complex background of motivations and therefore focusing on simplified causes would lead to failure of an accurate explanation of the phenomenon. In order to understand the motivation of the masses the profile of protesters should be analyzed first. This study aims to examine the reasons for the resistance.Analyzing such a new and intense social phenomenon requires taking some steps back because it is too early to present facts about the political and social impacts or long term effects. However, accurate assessments can be made on the nature of the resistance which could be improved by and set grounds for further research. GizemÇakmakis an assistant professor at Yeditepe University, Turkey

Introduction and Context In late May 2013, protests raised against the Turkish government’s plans to replace Gezi Park with the replica of the Ottoman Barracks. The, so called, new Project was to builda shopping mall andluxury residences in the form of 19th century Ottoman Barracks. When the Project was first announced, the NGOs, professional chambers and experts from the field of construction (architects, mechanics etc.) opposed the initiative. However, the Prime Minister insisted that the project is put into practice in spite of those reactions. In the wake of the events, it was just a small protest intending to protect the Gezi Park which is located in the heart of the city and is the only green space of the area. About a hundred young demonstrators were on passive resistance at the park and slept in tents they had set there in order to prevent the destruction of the park. At about 5:00 a.m. the police were commanded to remove the activists from the park;they entered the area, moved the protesters by force and set the tents on fire. The brutal police intervention attracted further reaction from different segments of the society and the number of

Motives for the recent public mobilization and governmental responses

protesters was multiplied day by day. The people, who were organized through the social media, gradually formed a sizeable and dynamic resistance movement against the government that reacted to the disproportionate use of force towards the peacefuldemonstrators. Gezi resistance had a complex background of motivations and political orientations ranging from secular Kemalists and environmentalists to nationalists and hardcore leftists. Therefore, focusing on simplified causes would lead to failure of an accurate explanation of the phenomenon. In order to understand the motivation of the masses the profile of protesters should be analyzed first. This study aims to examine the reasons for the resistance rather than focus on the course of events and possible political and social outcomes. Analyzing such a new and intense social phenomenon requires taking some steps and distance. It is too early to present facts about the political and social impacts or long term effects. However, accurate assessments can be made on the nature of the resistance which could be improved by and set grounds for further research.

Data and Statistics Academics from Bilgi University issued an online survey addressing the demonstrators while the protests were at their peak. 3000 people were asked questions about their reasons for being in the streets, their political leanings, and how they identifying themselves. Contrary to Prime Minister R. T. Erdoğan’s claims, 70 % of the protesters did not feel close to any political organization or party. Despite these facts, Erdoğan accused Republican People’s Party (main opposition) for provoking the demonstrations and masses against the government. Also, some other AKP officials claimed that the resistance was a scenario designed to set grounds for a military intervention. The demographic outcomes of the survey indicated that 39.6 % of the protesters were between 19-25 years old, 24 % was between 26-30 years old. So, it can be safely stated that they were mostly young people with no

Motives for the recent public mobilization and governmental responses

significant political involvement. According to another poll carried out by Konda, the average age of the demonstrators was 28 years old. This means that most of them were born after 1980 military intervention. This generation is called “Generation Y" who are more civic-minded, with high degree of selfesteem, open to change, tolerant to severalty, flexible and with a strong sense of community (Strauss & Howe 2000).Most significantly since 1980, a systematic

de-politicization

process

the

youth

has

taken

place

simultaneously by the state and the family. By using instruments such as schools and the media, the state aimed “to prevent young people from engaging in politics outside the state’s defined ideological scope” (Alemdaroglu, 2013)1. Also, they had been advised by their families to stay away from politics and focus on their careers, schools or professions which are more worth pursuing. This process created political apathy and a generation indifferent to political events that regarded politics as a time consuming, worthless, unproductive activity. Trust for politicians remained low while the military has consistently been regarded as the most trustworthy institution until today. According to the Bilgi Survey, 53,76 % of those young protesters had never been involved in mass demonstration before, and only 15 % of the protesters felt sympathy towards a political party. This Picture brings a question to mind: What factors motivated those young people to pour into the streets in Turkey? According to the survey, 92,4 % of the protesters were motivated by the authoritarian attitude of Prime Minister Erdoğan. Also, 91,3 % indicated that the brutal police intervention led them to participate in the “resistance”. 91.1% of the participants mentioned that they reacted because their democratic rights were being violated by the government. 84.2 % of the people were motivated by the self-censorship of the mainstream media in the name of their broader economic interests, while only 56.2 of the participants were motivated by mere environmental concerns. Despite the claims of the Prime Minister, only 7.7 % of the protesters were mobilized by a political movement or organization (Ynetnews, 24 July 2013).Most of these young

All cited internet sources were last accessed on August 1 st 2013

Motives for the recent public mobilization and governmental responses

people identify themselves as “libertarian” (81.2 %). 64.5 % of the participants perceive themselves as “secular” and 54.5 % as "apolitical". After giving brief information about the profile of protesters, the remaining part of this article aims to examine the reasons and the motivation behind the protest. Some writers tend to explain the discontent by only focusing on “Secular – Islamist” debate in Turkey. However, this approach fails to include the other significant factors which are worth evaluating.

Neo-liberal policies and the limitation of the public space According to Dardot and Laval (2009), neo-liberalism constitutes a notion that is not constrained to the economy. It involves all the institutions and the relationships between people, and has an impact on the practices and life style of individuals. The main norm of this approach is “competition", and it is a life style in which people interact with each other as companies and institutions. Global competition leads states and its institutions to function as profit seeking companies. The nature of neo-liberalism is negatively associated to the nature of democracy as the notion of democracy is being downgraded to the mere conduct of periodical elections. Also, it renders controlling and monitoring of government activities very difficult (Basaran, 2012).Despite the fact that neoliberalism requires minimal government intervention, some scholars claim that, the social and the political actions taken in line with the neoliberal project usually involves an increase in intervention (Jessop, 2002). During the AKP rule, Turkey became one of the fastest growing and the 18th largest economy in the world. The government has been committed to a fully-fledged neo-liberal economic policy which requires privatization and trade liberalization. Privatization is not a new phenomenon in Turkey. Neo-liberal economic policies were initiated by TurgutÖzal in the post-military rule and imposed by the successive governments. However, the privatization attempts skyrocketed during the AKP government. According to Tansel (2013), “the

Motives for the recent public mobilization and governmental responses

amount of privatization was around 380 million dollars before 2003, has risen to 6 billion dollars during Erdoğan’s three terms in office”. Banks, oil refineries, factories, bridges, and public assets havebeen privatized rapidly. According to Onaran and Giamali (2013), “neoliberal policies which increasingly commercialized public services, created areas of rent for large corporations, and eroded the living standards and security of a significant part of the working people.” There was a long process of accumulation of discontent andGezi Park resistance was the insurrection of a new generation, which had been brought up by the conservative neoliberal authoritarian AKP regime for more than a decade. The urban renewal project imposed by the government resulted in the construction boom and turned the country into a huge construction yard. Shopping malls were built in every neighborhood, and the traditional districts were replaced by luxury residences. Some historical buildings in the İstiklal Street (the most popular historical Pedestrian Street of Istanbul) were converted into shopping malls; an old famous cinema and pastry shop were forcibly demolished in spite of small-scale protests. When it came to the Gezi incident, by protecting the last green area in the heart of the city, the protesters aimed to confront the state-driven privatization of public spaces and arbitrary treatment of the government with its authoritarian form of neoliberalism. According to Igsiz (2013), “AKP officials actually appear to be approaching Turkey as a product, or more accurately, as a “brand name” to be protected.” As a byproduct of its neo-liberal stance, the AKP aims to make the name of Turkey one of the most valuable brands in the world, thus attracting more foreign investments in Turkey. Hence, Gezi Park resistance was regarded as an attempt to diminish the brand value of Turkey and the protesters had to be silenced to protect the image of the country.

Increasing Authoritarianism

Motives for the recent public mobilization and governmental responses

A famous quote of Michel Foucault summarizes the relationship between authoritarianism and resistance as follows, “Where there is power, there is resistance.” The AKP came to power in Turkey in the general elections of 2002, and in the last general elections held on June 12, 2011, the AKP further increased its share of the popular vote to 49.8% thus securing 327 parliamentary seats to form a third-consecutive majority government. According to Vick (2013), “party’s first victory in 2002 was a populist triumph that hoisted Turkish politics from the sterile province of the elites and empowered by the heartland’s devout Muslims. Reinforced by successive electoral victories Erdoğan defanged the Turkish military, along the way a new cult of personality formed around the premier.” This long period of premiership can be regarded as “the transformation of Erdoğan from a populist to an authoritarian leader”. Turkey has the largest number of journalists in detention in the world, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, which reports that at least 49 journalists were imprisoned in 2012 (Daily News, 29/7/2012). The detained journalists were accused to be affiliated with illegal organizations, and their imprisonment was never directly based on their writings. Also the generals who were accused for plotting a coup were sent to prison and were subject to extremely long judicial processes. Military officials, soldiers, academicians, artists, authors were arrested for supposedly being the member of terrorist organization “Ergenekon” which allegedly aimed to topple the ruling government. Long detention periods in this prosecution were criticized by international human right organizations and NGO’s (Among others Amnesty International, 2013). The potential opposition leaders or figures which challenged the government policies were associated with Ergenekon case, thus creating a climate of fear to the public.

Moreover, most of the TV channels, radios, and newspapers are owned by companies with business activities in different fields. Thus, some journalists and anchormen who dared to openly criticize Erdoğan were fired by the

Motives for the recent public mobilization and governmental responses

media bosses whosupported the government in order to protect their business interests. As a result, while mainstream media become increasingly progovernment, the alternative media struggle to survive. During the Gezi Park resistance,

the

mainstream

media

were

self-censored

and

avoided

broadcasting the social unrest and the clashes in the street. The famous news channel CNN Turk was broadcasting a documentary on penguins during the most violent days of the protests. Since then, the penguins became the symbol of censorship in Turkey.

The number of students under arrest is also very high. A recent report prepared by the Solidarity with Arrested Students Platform (2012) says that there are currently 771 students in prison in Turkey. While most of the students were accused for making propaganda of illegal organizations, there are some students who were imprisoned because of advocating free education by carrying banners. Also, wearing a scarf called poshu was regarded as a symbol of terrorist organization and a reason for detention. Erdoğan with his patriarchal discourse also interferes in people’s life style and their choices. By enacting the role of father in the family,the Prime Minister attempted to micromanage the life styles of the Turkish citizens. According to Korkman and Açıkgöz (2013), Erdoğan embodies a very particular masculine political persona. With an aggressive, uncompromising, and domineering “personality,” he aspires to act as every citizen’s father, brother, and husband.” In several occasions Erdoğan claimed that each family must have at least three children, prohibited the sale of alcohol after 10 pm., attempted to ban abortion, and declared that he aims to create a religious, healthy generation. He stated that, “we do not want to see our youth walking about high and drunk in the streets.” He went even further and said, “Go home and drink there,” addressing alcohol consumers (Baydar, 2013).Also, there was an attempt to ban kissing in public which was regarded as an immoral act by the conservative government.

Motives for the recent public mobilization and governmental responses

The language of “order” and the attempts to limit everyday life made people feel threatened as to their freedoms due to blunt interference to their personal space. The discontent exploded with the Gezi Park resistance which can be named as “Enough is enough” movement. Especially, the “generation Y” who are highly attached to their personal freedoms felt degraded, restricted and ignored.

The Uncompromising Stance ofErdoğan The Gezi Park resistance started as a passive protest to save the trees from destruction. However, the violence that was communicated through the social media and the use of excessive and disproportional force by the police led more people to join the resistance. Enormous amounts of tear gas and water cannons were used in order to push back the protesters. One police officer and five demonstrators died in the unrest, hundreds of people were injured and 12 people lost their eye-sight. Clouds of tear gas even affected the people in their homes and the animals in the streets. The Prime Minister advocated that “police’s patience had been tested with all sorts of “provocations.” He was justifying the acts of police by comparing with the Western counterparts: “We have responded with huge democratic patience to street incidents that took place in our cities in the last two months. Western police couldn’t do it,” he said, adding that the police’s attitude towards citizens in Western countries was "much more backward" compared to that of the Turkish police2. Erdoğan rejected all criticism about the police violence and claimed that those allegations were the product of a dark propaganda which aims to defame the Turkish police.

http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/pm-erdogan-says-turkish-police-subject-of-constantdark-propaganda-during-gezi-protests.aspx?pageID=238&nID=51367&NewsCatID=338 2

Motives for the recent public mobilization and governmental responses

Erdoğan demonstrated a hard line stance and uncompromising discourse during the resistance. He referred to the protesters as a small group of “looters”, “vandals”, “drunken” who were destroying public property, fighting against the state, damaging the country’s international image. There were widespread calls to start a dialogue with the protesters but rather than seeking compromise, Erdoğan preferred to preserve his tough stance and language. He answered criticisms by stating, “If my reaction is considered too tough, then I'm sorry. I am TayyipErdoğan, and I can't change that". The Prime Minister’s unwillingness to compromise led resistance to spread to other cities beyond Istanbul, again with increasing numbers of protesters day by day. Erdoğan warned the protesters by stating "we remained patient, we are still patient but there's a limit to our patience". He also stated that he was having a hard time keeping at home the 50 % of the population who voted for him. He was calling the protesters terrorists and marginal groups and also accused the famous hotels in Taksim of protecting and harboring terrorist groups. He continued to blame the foreign powers and the provocateurs and warned the protesters not to be the part of the game against Turkey. It can be stated that that the hard line stance of the Prime Minister inflamed the tension among the country. Prime Minister ignored the protesters message that regardless of their electoral preferences their voices and demands ought not to be disregarded.

Concluding Remarks Gezi Park protest constituted social uprising of ordinary people who wanted to protect their rights and space. Moreover, people manifested their demand for having a say in the decisions related to their personal lives. Gezi Park protesters had different backgrounds and motivations. However, some factors are more significant than others when the reasons of the protests are considered. The neoliberal policies imposed by the Erdoğan government which resulted in the high level of privatization and urban development left people “propertyless” and limited the public space. Nevertheless, it should be

Motives for the recent public mobilization and governmental responses

noted that this is the common problem of neoliberal nation-states to which Turkey can be regarded as a good example. The authoritarian stance of the Prime Minister also played a significant role in inflaming the discontent. His way of doing politics with a highly masculine discourse and paternalist approach disturbed the people who wanted to protect their rights and space. In other words, people dislikePrime Minister’s acting like an authoritarian father who gives orders and says what to do and what not to do. In that context, the culture of fear towards authority has apparently risen during the past decade of PM Erdoğan’s premiership.

Also, people criticized the government’s exploitation of the judicial system to suppress and pressure the opposition and other probable threats to their rule. The

arbitrary

appointments

the

party

sympathizers

into

the

significant positions in state institutions, and the capture of all forms of state apparatus makes the power of the government more apparent. Although arbitrary appointments and the usage of state apparatus are not new phenomena in Turkish politics it should be noted that duringthe rule of AKP they became more widespread and alarming.

The brutal police intervention was another factor that mobilized people3. Using police force to consolidate state power is also not a new invention. However, in the particular context, protesters it arguably catalyzed the resistance. Demonstrators were regarded as the state’s worst enemy and the peaceful demonstrators were even associated with the opponent forces in the battle of Gallipoli 1915 by the police. Moreover, the discourse of the Prime Minister provoked people and increased the number of protesters. His wordings threatened the people who already felt insecure because of the authoritarian tendencies of Erdoğan. The protesters criticized the Prime Minister for his ambition for saying the last

Rather indicatively, a father who joined the resistance was asked his reason to be there. The answer was clear and short “I want my daughter not to breath gas in future, therefore I’m continuously breathing gas now”. 3

Motives for the recent public mobilization and governmental responses

word on any issue, and his attempts to divide the society as “Erdoğan supporters and the minority.”

Almost half of the voters in Turkey voted for AKPand its liberal and democratization promises. He succeeded to get support from different segments of the Turkish society, but now there are people who are frustrated from his authoritarian rule and polarization of the society by using uncompromising discourse. Finally, comparing the Gezi Park protest with the Arab Spring seems to be another misinterpretation of the phenomenon. Since the wake of the protests several commentaries especially in the international media suggest that there are similarities and even links between the Gezi protests and the Arab Spring. This seems to be a weak argument since the political systems and social structures of the two phenomena are not similar. Despite the fact that the Prime Minister has transformed into a more authoritarian leader in his third term, it is not accurate to call him a “dictator” since he came to power through free elections and still holds the support of significant portion of Turkish society. His political weakness lies in downgrading democracy to the periodic conduct of elections and ignoring the demands coming from the people. While Arab Spring is a process of democratization which intends to establish free elections, Gezi Park protest poses a demand to improve the quality of democracy in Turkey, with particular contributions of a growing network of NGOs, utilization of social media and solidarity among diverse segments ofthe society, posing a rather promising picture for the future of democracy.

Basic References AlemdarogluAyça (18 June 2013). From Cynicism to Protest: Reflections on Youth and

Politics

Turkey.

Retrieved

from

http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/contributors/147150 Amnesty International (2013).Turkey: Decriminalize Decent – Time to Deliver on the Right of Freedom of Expression, Amnesty International Publications, London

Motives for the recent public mobilization and governmental responses BaydarYav. (1 June 2013). Erdoğan Remains Defiant as Instanbul Protest Widens, ALMONITOR.

Retrieved

from:

http://www.al-

monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/06/istanbul-protests-Erdoğan-defiantturkey.html#ixzz2aZFZmAF6 Daily News (29 July 2012) Number of Arrested Students ‘on the Rise’ in Turkey. Retrieved from: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/number-of-arrested-studentson-the-rise-in-turkey.aspx?pageID=238&nid=24337 Dardot, P & Laval Ch. (2009). La Nouvelle Raison du Monde: Essaisur la sociéténéolibérale, Revue du MAUSS permanente, 4 février 2009 Iğsız As. (2013). Brand Turkey and the Gezi Protests. Authoritarianism, Law and Neoliberalism, Dars – Jadaliyya. Retrieved from http://dars.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/12939/brand-turkey-and-the-geziprotests_authoritarianis Jessop B. (2002). Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Urban Governance: A State Theoretical Perspective, Antipode, Vol. 34 (3), pp. 452-472. Retrieved from: http://www.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/research/publications/papers/jessop-liberalismneoliberalism.pdf Kurtulus, Z &Aciksoz, S. C (22 July 2013). Erdoğan’s Masculinity and the Language of the

Gezi

Resistance.

Retrieved

from

http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/12367/Erdoğan%E2%80%99s-masculinityand-the-language-of-the-gezi Onaran Oz. &Giamali, An. (2013). Authoritarian Neo-liberalism Hits a Wall in Turkey, New Left Project. Retrieved from: http://www.newleftproject.org/index.php/site/article_comments/authoritarian_neoli beralism_hits_a_wall_in_turkey Tansel, C. B. (2013). The Gezi Occupation: Confronting Authoritarian Neo-liberalism, From the Desk Drawer. Retrieved from http://adamdavidmorton.com/2013/06/thegezi-park-occupation-confronting-authoritarian-neoliberalism/ Vick K. (24 June 2013).Erdoğan’s Paradox: Turkish Leader Struggles between Authoritarianism and Democracy, Time World. Retrieved from:http://world.time.com/2013/06/24/Erdoğans-paradox-turkish-leader-strugglesbetween-authoritarianism-and-democracy/ William Strauss, Neil Howe (2000). Millennials Rising: The Next Great Generation. New York, NY: Vintage. pp. 213–237. ISBN 0-375-70719-0.

Motives for the recent public mobilization and governmental responses Ynetnews (24 July 2013). Turkish Media Struggle with Lawsuits, Government Oppression. Retrieved from: http://t24.com.tr/haber/gezi-parki-direniscileriyle-yapilan-ankettencikan-ilginc-sonuclar/231335

ÂŠ Inter Alia, Civic Action Meeting Point, August 2013

Unraveling Turkey â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Collective Volume on Turkish Politics & Society

ESRA DOGAN

The Gezi Protest in Turkey: Emerging Pluralism or Deepening Polarization? Abstract:This article aims to unravel the nature of the Gezi Protests` consequential imprints on the Turkish society and to offer certain preliminary assumptions regarding the change in relationships between various societal segments in line with the discussions of increased pluralism and/or polarization. The key findings ultimately suggest that the Gezi resistance movement on one hand has advocated the spirit of `pluralism` and `tolerance`, and on the other, has brought to the surface dangerous signs of deepening polarization within society. This hazardous situation has been incited both by the marginalizing and divisive discourse of Prime Minister Erdogan, and by the polarizing rhetoric of a number of Gezi supporters and its opponents, which is by and large spread through the channels of social media. EsraDoganis a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science and History at Panteion University, Athens.

Introduction Not far from memory, only a few months ago1, the eyes of the world had centered on a tiny little park in the heart of Istanbul, the largest and most cosmopolitan city of Turkey. Since then, Turkey has been gripped by the country`s biggest political uprising in the post-1980 [coup] period, the socalled `GeziParki protests`, drawing great concerns from those who follow the developments in Turkey closely and bringing to the surface suspicions over the consolidation of the democracy in the country. Needless to say, the Gezi protests` and their possible consequences for the future of the country have been largely contested by international and domestic political circles. Many have questioned what kind of impacts the protests would engender considering the existing political system and whether the Gezi resistance would turn into a lasting political movement. Some have claimed that the protests were far from successful due to their failure to produce any material outcomes in the political structure of Turkey (for instance: Bilgin, July 2013; Kanbolat, June 10, 2013). It is in fact true that from the Gezi incidents there has emerged neither any political movement nor any political leader so far and the Prime Minister RecepTayyipErdogan and his party, Justice and Development Party (AKP), still enjoys a substantial base of popular support. Hence, from the outset, it may seem like not much has changed in Turkey, yet, in reality such an outlook is trapped in a very narrow perspective missing the big picture. It is indeed palpable that the Gezi Protests have generated 1

Editorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; note: the collective volume which includes the present paper was published in September 2013.

EsraDogan

significant impact on the society in Turkey, above all, over the relationships between various societal segments composing it, as well as their interaction with the state and the government. Particularly, it is frequently noted that the Gezi Park protests have created an environment of plurality, advocating tolerance and understanding. Yet, there are also concerns that after the protests society in Turkey is being more and more polarized, harboring prejudice and hatred among the ones holding opposing views on the matter. Although it is indeed too early to shed a clear light on the nature and extent the influence the Gezi protests impacted with regards to the course of social transformation in Turkey, it is still possible to offer particular preliminary assumptions regarding the discussions of increased pluralism and/or polarization of the society in line with the consequential imprints of these protests. Gezi: The Signs of Emerging Pluralism in Turkey In the recent protests in Turkey, the participants comprised a very diverse group, cutting along ideological, class, gender, ethnic and religious lines. There were liberals, feminists, leftists, nationalists, traditional Kemalists, conservatives, anti-capitalist Muslims and those ordinary citizens who were not fitting into any substantial categorization. Among these `categorically obscure` citizens were doctors, bankers, lawyers, journalists, engineers, civil society activists, actors, musicians, politicians, high-school and university students, housewives, the unemployed and street children etc. Indeed, the recent protests brought together certain groups and segments of Turkish society, which would have been considered beyond imagination only a few months ago. It was unanticipated for many to witness that the fans of rival Turkish football teams were standing shoulder to shoulder, posing to the cameras with their uniforms on. What was even more surprising was that the representatives of the Kurdish parties and the members of the left-wing nationalist youth organization, Turkish Youth Unity, were sharing a camping area and protesting together. As ElifSafak (June 21, 2013), a prominent Turkish woman author, noted: "Suddenly a Kurdish nationalist was helping a Turkish nationalist escape from police; a conservative sang side by side with a leftist; an Alevi shared a platform with a devout Sunni. Women were at the forefront: mostly young, but also middle-aged; there were students, professionals and housewives; some covered their heads, but most didnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t." Similarly, a Gezi protestor who attended the protests in Ankara told me that she found a chance to interact with

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various people. "Some even belonged to those ideological or social groups whom I had never considered talking with before," she said.2 It is also remarkable to underscore at this point that Erdogan`s marginalizing rhetoric has undeniably been a facilitating factor in the creation of a collective identity among the Gezi protestors. Particularly, the term `capulcu` (roughly translated as `looters`) used by Erdogan to describe the protestors was humorously adopted by the street demonstrators and online activists in a collective manner and became a `term` of ùnifying identity` for the protestors despite their visible differences. After someone sprayed on a wall in Taksim 'Everyday I`m Chapulling`,3 a video clip with the same motto hit the internet.4 Since then, it has become very popular among the internet users of the Gezi supporters to share messages such as Ì am a capulcu, as well.`,Ì have chapulled today`, Ì will be chapulling soon` , `Keep calm and be a capulcu` etc. One of Turkey’s leading businessmen CemBoyner, head of Boyner Holding (June 5, 2013), supported the movement by holding a banner, reading: “I’m neither rightist, nor leftist. I’m a capulcu.” The protestors in Gezi Park, and in the parks in several other cities, established tented camps with numerous makeshift facilities ranging from food centers to libraries. Hence, the park occupations soon turned into `social gathering areas’ where people from different backgrounds came together to share ideas, music, artwork, as well as tangible products, such as books and food. As a well-known Turkish director, Cagan Irmak, stated in a television program in CNN; “Kids there read books, played guitars and sang. They met and loved each other." Although the protestors have represented differing opinions and views regarding a variety of issues in Turkey, they could still succeed to experience a `community` life in small public areas, promoting the recognition and acceptance of differences. The protestors have called this political coalescence and social sensitivity based on ùnity albeit differences` as `the Gezi spirit`. One of the most striking examples of this emerging spirit of tolerance and pluralism has been the recognition and the respect that the LGBT community has gained among the participants of the Gezi protests. Belonging to a community facing great prejudice and oppression, they have not only found a chance to communicate 2

Author`s Note: This interview and the other interviews and/or dialogues noted in this article are held in August 2013 through phone or skype (with two exceptions being face-to-face dialogues in Athens) 3 Chapulling: The protesters created an English verb, that is derived from the Turkish word `capulcu`, with a rough meaning of `fighting for rights` and `resisting pressure`. 4 The abovementioned video can be watched from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jNsUHvxRp_A.

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with those who harbored prejudice against them, but also have acquired considerable support for their grievances. Consequently, with the involvement of the Gezi Park demonstrators, the LGBT pride parade on the 30th of June in Istanbul succeeded in attracting almost a hundred thousand people, making this pride parade the biggest one held in Turkey so far. One might also argue that with the Gezi resistance movement certain prejudices experienced by the Kurdish and Turkish constituencies of society have begun to shatter. After a military shooting on the 28th of June that killed an 18-year old protestor, MedeniYildirim, during the demonstrations against the building of a new military police station in the Kurdish town of Lice, thousands of people, many carrying Turkish flags and some being Turkish nationalist strong-holds, marched and shouted slogans in cities of Istanbul, Ankara and Adana in support of Kurdish grievances. Undoubtedly, these `Resist Lice` protests underlying the fraternity of Turkish and Kurdish people, has had a symbolic meaning that is difficult to underestimate. Moreover, the Gezi Park movement has created an atmosphere of public dialogue and open exchange, which is vitally important in a society where the fear of oppression stands in the way of expressing contrasting opinions. After the occupation in Gezi Park was dispersed by the police on the 15-16 of June, people have started to gather in other public parks of Istanbul, as well as of other cities, like Izmir, Ankara, Mersin etc. and have organized public forums in order to discuss the resistance and the recent developments in Turkey. These `agora style` public forums, with volunteering speakers taking turns to express their ideas, have resembled a new quest for the reconsideration of democracy in Turkey based on the celebration of diversities. Additionally significant, the Gezi protests have revealed that a new type of activism has been born among young and educated people, mainly from urban middle class. These young activists, referred to by some as 'the internet generation', are those who were largely perceived `apolitical` before the protests due to their non-involvement in political activities. According to a survey conducted by EsraErcanBilgic and ZehraKafkasli (in T24 June 4, 2013), two academics from Istanbul Bilgi University, between June 3 and 4 in Gezi Park, more than half of the respondents (63.6%) were between the ages of 19 and 30 and the majority of the protestors (70 %) said that they did not feel close to any political party. The young Gezi protestors, who feel themselves alienated from the existing political structure, have defined themselves as `libertarians' in favor of individual liberties, human rights and freedom of thought and expression. These young people are indeed the ones who can

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embrace Alevi, Christian and Jewish traditions, Kurdish culture and the LBGT grievances, even if they do not belong to any of these oppressed minority groups (Schubel, July 9, 2013). The notion of `pluralism` generated among this youth has no complete reflection in the mainstream politics so far, yet, it gives important signals for the emergence of new political values celebrating tolerance and freedom for every individual. In light of the abovementioned facts, it is apparent that the Gezi resistance movement has paved the way for the questioning of the quality of democracy in Turkey, nourishing the spirit of `pluralism` as a force countering the political power of majoritarianism and the threat of authoritarianism. However, how successfully these emerging values of tolerance and diversity have been internalized in Turkish society is yet questionable. In fact, some political circles have approached the vision of 'pluralist unity ' of the Gezi Park protests with great suspicion, claiming that the àlliance` of the protestors is guided by their anti-government sentiments and so is bound to remain 'artificial'. In retrospect, the fact that the protestors have had an anti-government stance does not override the existence of an increasing tolerance and integration among various segments of the population. Given that Turkish society is extremely diverse, such promotion of `pluralism` at the societal level must be regarded a very positive development. Still, following the Gezi protests, the situation in Turkey has not been as bright as one would hope, since the threat of deepened `polarization` among two opposing camps of the Gezi resistance has emerged. Gezi vs. AKP: The Dangers of Polarization in Turkey The Gezi resistance movement has allowed people from different groups and backgrounds to form an àlliance`, not organized around a political party or a leader, but pivoted around a set of ideas such as resistance to perceived àuthoritarian majoritarianism` and a fight for greater freedom. However, this àlliance` of protestors has been far from representative of the entire population in Turkey. In fact, there has been a considerably large segment within society, typically the AKP supporters, who have displayed discontent towards the Gezi protests and the protestors. These opposing stances towards the movement indeed have begun to define someone`s belonging to one of the two particular groups, one of the Gezi protestors, on the one hand, and one of the Gezi opponents - roughly meaning the AKP supporters- on the other. The divisions between these two

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groupings have further been deepened, as both sides utilized the rhetoric of `being victimized' in the design of their `self-images`. Consequently, even though the Gezi resistance movement has advocated the rhetoric of `pluralism` and `tolerance`, it has also brought to the surface dangerous signs of rising polarization within society. This perilous situation has been triggered both by the autocratic and divisive discourse of Prime Minister Erdogan and by the polarizing rhetoric of a number of Gezi supporters and its opponents, which is by and large spread through the channels of social media. Since the beginning of the Gezi protests, Prime Minister Erdogan has taken a tough stance towards the protestors. In his party's parliamentary group meeting on the 11th of June, he asked: "Were we supposed to kneel before them?" and then added: "They can call me harsh, but this TayyipErdogan will not change (Binhbaum, June 12, 2013)." Although he claimed in the same speech that AKP had been "the party of the 100 percent," his statements were far from being conciliatory. He assertively argued that the Gezi movement was nothing, but an international conspiracy against Turkey and the protestors were pawns in a wider game. Such claims have been also supported by the governmentsided media. For example, a YeniSafak newspaper columnist, BercanTutar wrote that "Gezi Project is a project beyond Turkey," claiming that behind the protests are those who are willing to prevent Turkey`s development (Tutar, July 30, 2013). As such, Erdogan, getting the support of his party and certain media organs, has chosen to equate the Gezi protestors with terrorists and vandals, if not merely the figureheads of them. His accusing and uncompromising attitude has undeniably generated a more deepened feeling of alienation among the protestors, who have felt that their voices were unheard and their demands largely ignored. Furthermore, Erdogan has tried to appeal to his own supporters by igniting religious sentiments while portraying the Gezi protestors as `anti-Islamists" with no respect for religion. In particular, he has adamantly argued that the protestors in Istanbul consumed alcoholic beverage in a mosque in Dolmabahce, albeit the fact that the mosque`s muezzin denied this allegation (Cumhuriyet June 26, 2013). In speeches during his counter rallies he also noted that the protestors treated some women wearing headscarves disrespectfully. Playing the religious victimhood card, Erdogan indeed attempted to represent the Gezi protests as a conflict between two ideological camps based on religion. As a political scientist, Vernon Schubel, correctly depicts though, "while many of the protestors have been critical of what they see as the AKP`s desire to force its own vision of Islam on the rest of the populace, these

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protests have been mainly about authoritarianism, not religion." (Schubel, July 9, 2013) It is also noteworthy to underline here that a group of people calling themselves `anti-capitalist Muslims` were among the participants of the protests, criticizing the perceived autocratic attitude of the government and its neo-liberal policies (Akyol July 17, 2013). Undeniably, Erdogan`s stance has neither embraced the plurality of society in Turkey nor has it been constructive in compromising with the demands of the protestors and calming down the events. He instead has kept referring to his electoral power, reminding of the hegemony of the majority in the Turkish parliamentarian system. For instance, in his interview with the press on June 2nd, he claimed that his party AKP had the right to make the decision for Gezi Park, saying "We are a party which perceived 21.5 million votes. Almost 50 percent. Aren`t we supposed to have the final say?" Such discourse of Erdogan certainly has been perceived by many as only being willing to pander to his own electorates and thus failing to embrace those who do not vote for him. Incrementally, but noticeably, Erdogan`s dismissive rhetoric towards the protests has marginalized the situation, deepening the polarization between the supporters of the Gezi protests and the AKP supporters. In particular, it seems that his portrayal of the protestors as vandals, terrorists, anti-Islamists and extremists has been well accepted and substantially backed by some of his supporters. To remind, upon Erdogan`s arrival to Istanbul airport on the 7th of June, thousands of people chanted that they were ready to "smash the protests" in Taksim, shouting fierce slogans like "Taksim, do not tire our patience," and "The hands targeting the police shall be broken". Although it is very difficult to generalize at this point, it seems that a very common attitude among the AKP`s bases towards the protestors has been disapproving and/or accusing. A number of young AKP supporters that I interviewed told me that they have disapproved of the way that the protestors have chosen to show their discontent. They have claimed that the protestors have damaged the public areas and have provoked the police, creating an atmosphere of `chaos` in Turkey. Such views have been more fiercely displayed by the online users of AKP bases, who have attempted to distribute their ideas through social media. In social networking sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, one can frequently read the comments of numerous people criticizing the Gezi protests as unlawful and condemning the protestors to be extremists, if not violent provocateurs. Such statements, in fact, have been very much in line with Erdogan`s discourse over the Gezi incidents.

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Indeed, the general belief among the AKP supporters is that the Gezi protests are less about freedoms, but more about their intentions to topple the government in an undemocratic way. An AKP supporter I recently talked with said `I do not believe in the sincerity of the Gezi protestors. They claim they want freedom for everyone, but then, where were all these masses when girls wearing headscarves were not allowed to enter their universities? They just want to bring down the most successful Prime Minister in Turkish history." One can also read in social networking sites such statements claiming that when today`s AKP bases had faced many attacks on their religious views, particularly after the 28th of February 1998 [so-called post-modern coup], they had sought their demands through democratic elections.In a BBC interview, another AKP supporter, C. Ozdemir, expressed a similar stance: "They [meaning the Gezi protestors] say Erdogan is getting too involved in people's lives. They can't produce specific examples of this, other than saying he told people to have three kids...What they really want is for the prime minister to resign...Why don't the protesters go and form a new party and run against the governing party?"(BBC News Europe June 13, 2013) Being aware of his electoral supremacy, Prime Minister Erdogan has also frequently noted that the protestors should look for their rights in the ballot boxes, not in the streets. On the other hand, the supporters of the Gezi Park protests have felt themselves neglected by Erdogan`s government, seeing that the election results have been dividing the country in half, as AKP voters and non-AKP voters and believing that only the former has enjoyed the government's attention . They have complained that not only the government, but the AKP supporters have been failing to understand their aspirations, as well as their demands for greater freedom. A young GeziParki protestor in Istanbul said to me: "I wish rather than believing in the media that is under the domination of government and labeling people accordingly, these AKP supporters had sought the truth themselves. In Gezi Park was the democracy that Turkey needed and they failed to see that." In a similar manner, a placard in Gezi Park called the AKP supporters to act indulgently, stating::"the `other` one out of every two in my country, my dear brother, my other half, I call out to you. My resistance is not to you, but to the one who ignores me believing in the power of your vote. I do not want you to think like me, I just want you to think" (Haber Arti Turk, June 7, 2013).This message was highly circulated around social media by those online activists who wanted to draw attention to the need of empathy and support from the AKP electorates.

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However, notable is the fact that not all the Gezi supporters have advocated mutual understanding and tolerance towards the AKP supporters. There have been those protestors and online activists who have taken a tough stance towards the ones backing Erdogan and the Turkish riot police, which they have considered `enemy` figures. Three months ago, I met someone`s facebook status that read, "Those who still justify this attack [meaning the riot police`s attack on the protestors] and claim that the police and the prime minister are right, I call you to resign from humanity." Within the last three months, a great number of similar messages were spread through Facebook and Twitter by those who believed that the AKP electorates were acting ignorant, if not inhumane. A Gezi demonstrator that I had randomly met in Athens pointed to this widely shared perception of the protestors: "They [meaning the AKP supporters] are either illiterate people who are easily manipulated by the government or are certain profiteers pursuing their own ends or interests." In fact, the perceived illiteracy and ignorance of AKP supporters have been objects of derision among a group of Gezi supporters. For instance, the speeches of certain people who have been interviewed in a counter rally of AKP in Kazlicesme on the 17th of June have become sources of laughter for those online Gezi activists who have shared videos on YouTube and messages in social media in a mocking and demeaning manner. Without a doubt, such heavy criticisms and mockeries towards the AKP electorates have reinforced the divisions between the opposing sides, making numerous people more opposed to the protestors` standpoints. In a BBC interview, an AKP supporter and an academic, Z. Goktas, denounced the Gezi protestors, saying "The protestors are failing democracy, not advancing it. They are condemning anyone who disagrees with them and actively brand pro-European voters ignorant and bigoted." (BBC News Europe June 13, 2013) At this point, one might easily recognize the possible negative consequences of the social media networks that have become very important platforms for sharing information and ideas. Given that the mainstream media with its alleged political allegiances with the government has not been regarded a trustworthy source of information by many in Turkey, social media has been the main tool to ignite the collective action of the protestors during the recent incidents. Unfortunately though, as abovementioned examples have displayed, social media has been vulnerable to extremist attitudes, exaggerated sentiments and marginal ideas harbored by opposite approaches regarding the Gezi protests. Consequently, social networking sites have been effective instruments for those on each extreme who have wished to exchange provocative writings and to escalate issues nourishing further prejudice and

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separation in the society. Nevertheless, blaming social media for the unrest and polarization in the country and calling it `a menace`, like Prime Minister Erdogan has done, is not a feasible solution for mitigating the tensions and overcoming the hostilities within society in Turkey. As, the columnist and a TV figure, TahaAkyol correctly pointed out in a television programme in CNN Turk, "There are many who spread hatred and lies through social media, but there are as many ordinary citizens who express their sentiments and views through it. Social media is the voice of pluralism. If we accept modernity and democracy, we have to accept social media." (Katik, June 4, 2013) Certainly, there is also an undeniable populace who neither has been able to identify themselves with the Gezi protestors, nor has associated themselves with the anti-Gezi stance of the government and its supporters. As such, a young Turkish man I interviewed frankly complained about the ongoing situation in Turkey: "People around me are expecting me to take a side, yet I do not believe I have to. I am trying to understand both sides, and in my opinion they both have certain arguments which are justifiable and unjustifiable." Similarly, Murat Mentes, a columnist known for his conservative stance and his close attitude towards the AKP, wrote in his column that following his relatively sympathizing comments for the protestors he has gained the hatred of both the supporters of the government and of the Gezi protestors. Mentes noted that "I believe not only me, but many of us have been lost in an endless Purgatory." (Mentes, July 26, 2013) Concluding Remarks It is difficult to deny that the Gezi Protests of June 2013 have left a significant imprint on Turkish history. Although the eruption of such unprecedented, spontaneous and large protests has not posed a real threat to the reign of Erdogan and his government, it has signaled a visible transformation in society, particularly in the relationships between various societal segments and in their interaction with the state and the government. To remind though, the recent incidents` concrete implications for the country will be only revealed in the long term and this present analysis did not offer more than preliminary presumptions. Additionally, it has not been possible to make precise generalizations on the subject, given the lack of adequate data on hand. Still, based on some preliminary observations, this article has represented both the conspicuous signs of increasing pluralism and tolerance among certain societal segments in Turkey and of deepening polarization among certain others.

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To summarize, on one hand, it has been indeed very fascinating to witness in Turkey that large numbers of people from different tracks of life have come together developing a common cause against what they have perceived as the growing authoritarianism of Erdogan and his government. Undeniably, the heterogeneous nature of the Gezi protests and the protestors` quest for greater freedom for everyone testify that a growing consciousness of pluralism has surfaced in Turkey. Yet, it is also true that the `unity` of the Gezi protestors is mainly guided by their anti-government sentiments, thus rendering the extent and scope of `cooperation` and `integration' of these protesting actors from various societal segments questionable. It is, thus, so far unclear if the political values promoting tolerance and diversity will be able to be successfully carried out by today`s protestors in the long term and will be consolidated in the wider country. On the other hand, with the Gezi protests have surfaced perilous signs of rising polarization among the two opposing camps of the movement, the Gezi supporters and the AKP supporters. Noticeable is the fact that both the AKP supporters and the Gezi supporters feel and portray themselves victimized and somehow oppressed. The former group members recognize themselves as the victims of the 28th of February memorandum process that have attacked their certain religious freedoms. Moreover, there is a wide perception among them that the Gezi protests have been a supplementary attack on their elected prime minister, as well as on their conservative values. The latter group claims that their life styles and individual freedoms have been frequently assaulted either by the acts or the discourses of Erdogan`s government. They accuse the government for being excluded in the political decision-making processes and for being subject to disproportionate police force in their peaceful protests. The repeated use of `we` and `they` by both of the opposing sides of the Gezi movement has been indicative of the creation and consolidation of divisive and exclusive images of 'Self' versus 'Other' within the society. The polarizing rhetoric has been reinforced and widely spread in the social media, in particular, by those who have taken more extreme standpoints on the matter and by those who have wished to manipulate the existing ruptures in the society. More importantly, Erdogan`s uncompromising and potentially conflict-ridden stance has driven a wedge between AKP supporters and the rest of Turkey, engendering great risks of polarization in the country. Turkey is indeed a country full of contrasts and differences. True, the elimination of prejudices and overwhelming political sensitivities that create deep cleavages among its population is not easy and in reality needs

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substantial time. However, the `spirit` of pluralism advocated by Gezi can be a primary tool to transform Turkey into a more consolidated democracy, bringing certain issues considered `taboos` into public forum. Surely, the lion`s share of responsibility for building compromise among the multiple political stakeholders and for bridging the divisions at different levels of society rests at this moment on Erdogan and his government. It is in fact extremely significant that Erdogan abandons his polarizing discourse and divisive policies and, rather, comprehends the message delivered by the Gezi protests that the pluralist perspective of democracy must be adopted. No doubt, Turkey will continue to pass through some troublous times. Not only has it witnessed one of the biggest civil unrests in its history which left the country dangerously polarized, but it has also found itself in an awkward position with the ongoing civil wars in Syria and Egypt. The conflicts in the Middle East, which have carved up the regions` societies between diverse ideologies and political loyalties, should indeed be considered as a warning for Turkey of the horrific consequences of deep polarization within its society and its political spectrum. To put it differently, the recent developments inside and outside Turkey, indicate that that a culture of tolerance must be preserved in its society, and consensus-building must be encouraged in its body politics. To what extent this is understood by the Turkish government and internalized by its society, will determine the level of stability and democratic development in the country in the future. Basic References "Erdogan`inhedefindeki muezzin ifadeverdi,"(2013, June, 26) ,Cumhuriyet. Retrieved from http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/?hn=425042 [in Turkish] "GeziParkidireniscileriyleyapilanankettencikansonuclar...", (2013, June, 4), T24, http://t24.com.tr/haber/gezi-parki-direniscileriyle-yapilan-ankettencikan-ilginc-sonuclar/231335 â&#x20AC;&#x153;CapulculardanYuzdeElliyeDavetVar," (2013, June, 7) Haber Arti Turk, http://haberartiturk.com/Haber/capulculardan-yuzde-elliye-davet-var.html [jn Turkish] â&#x20AC;&#x153;CemBoyner`inPankarti: Capulcuyum, capulcu!", (2013, June, 5). Radikal. Retrieved from http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/cem_boynerin_pankarti_capulcuyum_cap ulcu-1136338 {in Turkish]

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â&#x20AC;&#x153;Turkish voices back Erdogan against protests", (2013, June, 13) BBC News Europe. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-22861286 Akyol, M. (2013, July, 17) " Why Turkey Has Anti-Capitalist Muslims" AlMonitor Turkey Pulse. Retrieved from http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/07/turkey-anti-capitalist-muslims-gezisocial-justice-activism.html Bilgin, F. (2013, July) "Turkey: Politics of the Gezi Protests", Rethink Brief 01. PDF retrieved from http://www.rethinkinstitute.org/files/Bilgin%20%20Gezi%20Protests.pdf. Birnbaum, M. (2013, June, 12) "Erdogan`s crackdown pushes protesters out of Istanbul square", The Washington Post. Retrieved online from http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-12/world/39908381_1_protesterstaksim-square-ottoman-era-barracks Kanbolat, H. (2013, June, 10) "Political analysis of Gezi Park protests: What will be their impact on election outcomes?", Today`s Zaman. Retrieved from http://www.todayszaman.com/columnists-317887-political-analysis-of-gezipark-protests-what-will-be-their-impact-on-election-outcomes.html Katik, M. (2013, June, 4) "Turks deprived of TV turn to Twitter for protest news," BBC News Europe. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldeurope-22756884 Mentes, M. (2013, July, 26) "UcsuzbucaksizbirAraf`ta," ,YeniSafak. Retrieved from http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/Murat_Mentes/ucsuz-bucaksiz-birarafta/38749 [in Turkish] Safak, E. (2013, June, 21) "What stories do Turkey`s Protests Tell," Bloomberg. Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-21/what-stories-doturkey-s-protests-tell-.html Schubel, V. (2013, July, 9), " VernonSchubel on Pluralism vs. Majoritarian-ism and the Future of Democracy in Turkey After Gezi Park " Islamicommentary, Retrieved from http://islamicommentary.org/2013/07/vernon-schubelpluralism-vs-majoritarian-ism-the-future-of-democracy-in-turkey-after-gezipark/

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Tutar, B. (2013, July, 30), "Erdogan`aniyebu Kadar ofkeliler?"YeniSafak. Retrieved online from http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/BercanTutar/erdogananiye-bu-kadar-ofkeliler/38812 [in Turkish]

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Unraveling Turkey – Collective Volume on Turkish Politics & Society

ALBA CICALA

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’s Accession Bid Abstract: Departingfromconsideration about the multidimensionality ofthe“identity”notion – especially when associatedwiththequalification“European”,thispaperaimstoaddressastillunderresearchedareaofpublic opinion.Infact, in spiteof numerousstudiesconductedonpublicsupportforEuropeanintegrationandits determinants,little researchhasbeensofarcarriedoutaboutEuropeancitizens’attitudestowardscandidate countries– particularlyTurkey.Tracingthecontoursof the various paths mass support may follow,Turkey’stroubled accession bid wouldbe seenthroughthe eyesoftheEuropeanpublic,withaview todisentanglethe reasonsofmass’reactionsvis-àvissuchasensitive andlong-standingissue.Adoptingasimple statistical researchdesign, particularexpectationsaboutthemultifacetednatureofEuropeanidentityandattitudestowardsit would be tested.Further–inatimewhen“Turkey” seemstohavebeencutofftheEUpoliticalagenda,thispaperaimstoputthe matterback tothefore,in order tounderstandthistopic’sspecificimplicationsfor thedevelopmentofaEuropeandemos.In truth,a morecarefulunderstandingofEurope’sambivalence,refractedthroughitsmanifoldidentities,liesat the crossroadsofcompetingEuropeanpolitical projectsandsocio-economicprocesses. Alba Cicala is a PhDCandidate ofSiena(alba.cicala@unisi.it)

Comparativeand

EuropeanPolitics–University

Introduction and Theoreticalframework WhatisEurope?Geographically,Europe couldbeconsideredasthesharpandinhomogeneousendof

the

Eurasianlandmass.Sincenoconsensusisfoundoverwhere

thispart

actuallybegins,the

plainact

ofcallingitacontinentcouldbe

evenconsideredasasortof“abuseoflanguage”. Nonetheless– eversincetheEuropeanUnion(EU)wasborn,theterritoryoftheEUhasbecome synonymouswiththecontestedword“Europe”.Moreover,successiveEUenlarge mentshaveledto theinclusionofstateswhicharemoredifferentiatedamongstthemselves,bothfro mageographical andaculturalviewpoint. Accordingtothe TreatyofRome,astatemustbeEuropeaninordertojointheUnion:infact,article 237

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

of this treaty states 1that “any European State may apply to become a member of

the

Community.

Thelatterprovisionlogicallyimpliesatleasttwostraightforwardconclusions:(1)a nystatewhich findsitselfindoubtofitsEuropeanidentitycanestablishalegalrightto ness”byjoining

“EuropeantheEU;(2)

onceastatehasbecomememberoftheEU,thereisasortof“silentassent”among memberstates,whichcometorecognizesomekindofasimilar–ifnotcommon– courseinhistory,

anintertwinedpastanda

definitewilltodevelopacommonfuture;inconcreteterms,afeelingof “commonheritage” originatesfromtheEUmembership. Inspiteofthisclaim,however,thementionedtreatyandsubsequentEUtreatieshav edeliberately avoideddefiningtheterm“European”.Toallintents andpurposes– while

itisgenerallyaccepted

that

enlargementisafiniteprocess–the

exactlimitsofEuropeassuchhaveremainedquiteambiguous. Relatedtothiscircumstance– forwhatTurkeyisconcerned,oneofthemainpointsuponwhichthe focusofattentionhasbeenlocatediswhetherthis countryactuallysharestheabovementioned European“commonheritage”. Asamatteroffact,the

identityissueappearsevenmore

crucialwhendealingwiththe

case

ofTurkey

andRussia.Bythe

whileRussiahasnorealinterestinjoiningtheEUforthetime

way–

beingshown,

TurkeyhasinsteadbeenanassociateEUmembersince1963,labelingfullmembersh ipasa“foreign

policypriority”.Therefore,thedebateonTurkey’s“European-

ness”asaprerequisite

forenteringthe

EuropeanUnionsoonbecameacrucialquestion,withspecialregardtotherelateddi sputedquestion oftheexistenceofareal“Europeanidentity”.ConcerningTurkishEUaccessionbid, thematterwas settled at an EUSummit held in Helsinki (December 1999), when Turkey was accepted as a legitimatecandidatecountry.

Fulltextavailableathttp://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/r ometreaty2.pdf 1

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

Assome

scholarspointout(Arvanitopoulos

andKeridis2011),“HelsinkishiftedthequestionfromessentialistconsiderationsofTurkey’ s“European-ness”tofunctionalistconsiderationsofTurkey’spreparedness. Atthattime,theEuropeanleaders,inoppositiontoEuropeanpublicopinion,agree dthatTurkeyisa

European

nation–

nodifferentthanothercandidatecountries,atleastaccordingtotheTreatyof Rome.Forthesereasons,itseemsthatTurkey'scandidacyliesattheverycoreofEuro pe'sidentity

politics,andthisissueappearsalsoasakey-

elementforthedefinitionoftheEuropeanidentity concept. Although identityper se stems from the conceptual world of ideas, it entails proved

material

consequencesanddistinctpoliticalresults,whereforeitsmeaningcouldbedefined ashistorically

constructed

andsociallyconditioned.Inparticular,actors’perceptionsof“self”,“other”andthei r “operationalcontext”arealsoproductsofsocialinteraction(CheckelandKatzenstei n2009).Some strandsoftheconstructivisttheory,forinstance,enquireintotheroleofideas,theim pactofshared

beliefs,the

effectsofdominantdiscourses

andtheprocessesofcommunicativeactionintheformation of identities (RisseKappen 1996).Thence, the contemporaryconstruction ofsymbols,norms, perceptions andbeliefsystemsbecome crucialtothestudyofEuropeanidentity (Christiansen1997). Further, a full understanding

of Europe’s ambivalent

concept lies at the junction of competing European political projects andsocial processes

(Checkeland

Katzenstein2009):

indeed,

the

processes

constructing a EU identity and a “European identity”overlap.Various forms of

politicizationarere-definingandexpandingthese

intersections,involvinganumberofdifferent actors and processes.In particular, bureaucrats

crafting

aEurope

focusedon

Brussels,

and

academics

theorizinganewkindofEuropeanallegiance,playakey-role inthisdiscourse. Besides– atamomentinwhichEuropehasbeendramaticallytransformedbothbytheadditio

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

nal

processesofenlargementandthe

re-

emergenceofreligiousandcivilizationissues,whosecontrasting pointstendtobecomesharperandbitterintimesofeconomicandsocialcrisis– competingvisions arelikelytoemergeofwhatitmeanstobeEuropean,particularlyinsensitivecontext ssuchasthose involvingTurkey’stroubledEUaccessionpath. Fromahistoricalviewpoint,Europeanidentityisdeeplyrootedinnationalexperie nce–andisquite likelytoremainsointhefuture,eveniftheinstitutionsoftheEuropeanUnionwereto berelatively

unaffectedbythe

exigenciesofnationalistactivism(CheckelandKatzenstein2009).Startingfrom thisoutlook,collectiveidentitiesare saidtobeformedinthepublicsphere:recentempiricalresearch findings(Pausch2011)leadtotheconclusionthattheabsenceofaEuropeanpublics pherepoints directlytothelackofacollectiveEuropeanidentity.Questioningthefunctionandth esenseofa Europeanpublicsphereisessential,totheextentthatsomescholarsconsideridentit y-buildingasits main function (Risse2003). The concept of Europe could naturally be thought of as a politically-charged concept, which consequentlyfindspersistentcontestation:Europe–asaspatialtemporalimaginedcommunity–is delineatedthroughverydiversepoliticalandideologicalprojects.Moreover,schol arshavebecome awareoftheconstructed,imaginarynatureofcollectiveidentities(Anderson1990). Eachnotionof

Europehasarelativelywide

spectrumofothers,andthence

variousformsofinclusionandexclusion, knownnotionofafortressEurope,tothe

fromthewellcommunityunderthe

so-called“rule

oflaw”, andaEuropewithrelativelyopenborders(CheckelandKatzenstein2009). WithspecificregardtoTurkey,thedebateoveritsprospectiveaccessiontotheEUha srevealedthat timesconstricts

theexistingEuropeanself-understanding— theexternalborders

toa

whichat political-

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

normativebasisbymeansoftheexclusiveculturalnotionofidentity– hasbeenputinto question.IncontrasttothediscourseuponEasternEuropeanexpansion,inwhichac onsensusonthe “reunificationofEurope”generallyprevailed,inthecaseofTurkey,onthecontrary, identityhasbeen usedinanexclusivesense, inordertodenyits“European-ness”– anditsentranceintotheEU.

Accordingtothe

viewstillpredominating,Turkeyisnotseentobesharingthe historicalrootsthatthe restof

theEUhasincommon.Thence,itisseenasa

politically,culturallyandhistoricallyother. Turkey’s“otherness”isessentiallyderivedfromthedichotomybetweenIslamandChristendom– whichremainsthemajorculturaldifferencebetweentheEUandTurkey.Asamatte roffact,the concerns about Turkey generallystemfroma narrowperception of this

countryas

apoor

and

populousIslamicnationwitheconomic,

social,culturalandpoliticalproblemsrelatedtoadoptingand effectivelyinternalizingthe

valuesof

theEuropeanstatesystem(Canan-

Sokullu2011b). Inthepast,somescholars(Huntington1993)claimedthattheidentificationofEurop ewithWestern Christendom provides a clear criterion for the admission of new

members

the

western

SomepoliticiansevenclaimedthattheEUbordersof

shared

organizations. values,cultureand

identitywouldbebreachedbyTurkishmembership.Onthecontrary,thereareother actorswhodo

notsharethisskepticview,astheformerUKPrime

MinisterTonyBlair–whosuggested,more

constructively,that

TurkishmembershipwouldaddtoEurope’smulticulturalassets,andthatthe inclusionofaMuslimcountry wouldfacilitatetherapprochementbetweenWesternandEastern civilizations(Canan-Sokullu2011a). Relatedtothis,whileearlypublicopinionresearchassumedthatEuropeanidentity was

anelementof

moregeneralattitudestowardsEuropeanintegration–

somethingclosetothenotionof“support”– laterresearchacknowledgedtheimportanceofdistinguishingEuropeanintegratio

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

nasentailingmore complexconceptualizations,mostlydealingwiththestructureofthebeliefsystemt hatcitizenshold towardsEurope(Sanderset al.2012). In a harsh time for theEU – both from political and economical standpoints, precisely

when

identitarianissuesseemtobe

politicalagenda,leavingroomformoreconcrete

somehow“cutoff”

the

mattersofinternalcohesion–

orevensurvival,thepresentpapermaintainstheusefulnessofamore

in-

depthanalysisof thedeterminantsofEuropeanpublicopinion’sattitudeswhendealingwithan issuesuchasTurkishuneasypathtowards accession. Therationalethatinspiresthisstudyistwofold:first,the beliefthatbehindcontroversialpointssuch astheTurkishoneishiddentheessenceandfoundationofmanyEU“historymaking”decisions– thencespeciallyinthecurrentcriticalcontextitmaybeimportanttobringtheissuea gaintolight;

secondly,thepaperwouldaddmuch-

neededempiricalevidencestotheliteratureaboutthedynamics ofpublicattitudestowardcandidatecountries(Canan-Sokullu2011a)– asanessentialelementfor understandingthefutureoftheEU. Followingrecentliterature(Sandersetal.2012)andconsidering thehugeamountofstudiespublishedonpublicopinionandEuropeanintegration,i tseemsrightto state that the importance of the public opinion in shaping the features

and

pace

European

integrationisbroadlyrecognized.Furthermore,withtheevergrowingimpactoftheEUonboththe citizensofthememberstatesandthecandidatecountries,onecanarguethattherele vanceofmass opinionisgrowinginparallel. Thereareobviouslyseveralalternativewaysofthinkingaboutthisissue:inthiscase, thefocuson

“identity”

callsuponamoreextensive

concept–

whichembracestheidentitarianquestionaspartofa biggerpicture.Followingotherscholars(CottaandIsernia2009;Sandersetal.2012), theconception

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

of“Europeancitizenship”istackled,asbeingconstitutedbythreecoreelements 2:(1 )identity–

conceivedasasenseofbelongingtowardsEurope;(2)representation–

theextenttowhichpeople perceivetheEUasarepresentativeoftheireconomicandpoliticalinterests;(3)scope ofgovernance

–

theextenttowhichpeoplebelievetheEUshouldbetheprimarydecisionmakerincrucialpolicy- areas. Asitisclearfromtheaforementionedtheoreticalhints,theattentionherewillbefocu sedonthefirst ofthoseelements:infact,Europeanidentityisactuallynotasstraightforwardasaco ncepttodefine,

especiallywhenit

tothepointthat,

comesto

empiricallymeasure

especiallyafterthefailureofthe

it– so-

called“Constitutionaltreaty” andthesubsequententryintoforceoftheLisbontrea 3

ty 4,thelatter hasbecomethecentreofanintense politicizationandcontroversy– juxtaposing“cosmopolitan”and

“national/populist”declinationsof

identityprojects(CheckelandKatzenstein2009;Sandersetal. 2012). Intheremainderofthepaper,identityishypothesizedtobeconceptually

distinct

andcausally antecedentto“support”(Sandersetal.2012).Intheendeavortoadequatelymeasure thedimensions relevanttoanappraisalofpublicattitudestowardsthecontested of Turkey’s

accession

bid,

threespecificpathswouldbeinvestigated,followingrecentliteratureonthetopic(C anan-Sokullu 2011b): AutilitarianapproachincalculatingtheperceivedcostsandbenefitsofEUen largementwith

Turkey.

c o s t /benefit

Fundamentaldatumpointforbetterunderstandingtheissue:Behabib2002;theseriesofbooksrece ntlypublishedbyOxfordUniversitypress, edited by MaurizioCottaand PierangeloIsernia (http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/category/academic/series/politics/intune.do#.UbHjQ_nOuSo) 3Famously sunk afterthenegativeoutcomeoftheFrenchand Dutch referendarespectively held on 29thofMay2005 and threedayslater. 4whichentered intoforceon1 stofDecember2009,cfr.http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm 2

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

c a l c u l a t io n s a f f e c t Eur o pea n p u b l ic o p i n io n o nT u r k e y ’ s EU membership?Itisknownthatutilitariantheoriesconsiderindividualsasratio nalactorswho

principallycalculatecosts

andbenefitswhenmakingdecisions.Inaddition,thisapproach assumes that the material gains stemming fromthe EU membership areclear and that individuals possess adequate information about their prospective gains and losses (Ruiz JimenezandTorreblanca2007;Canan-Sokullu2011b). -

Identityrelatedapproach.DoEuropeansconsiderTurkey’sculturalandreligiousvalue stobe

compatible

withthose

basedtheoriesmaintainthata

oftheEU?Identityreasoningbasedonly

onutilitarianconsiderationsislimited,sinceeconomiccalculationsarenoteno ughtodefine anindividual’sattitudetowardsa complex issue. Instead, peopletendto

develop

social

identitiesandmakedistinctionsbetweentheirgroup(“ingroup”)andoutsider s(“outgroup”) onthebasisofsharedcharacteristics,suchascultural,historicalandreligioustr aits.Studies

suggestthat–duetoa

individualstendtopreserveinter-group skepticism and hostility

senseof“we-feeling”–

distinctiveness,

and

develop

towards outsiders (Casanova 2006; Canan-

Sokullu2011b). -

Threat-perceptionapproach.BorrowingfromthreatbasedexplanationsonEUenlargement, thepuzzlehereiswhethernegativeattitudestowardsTurkey’sEUcandidacya resomehow based on fears ofan

influxof“other-ness” into

Acomprehensivethreat-based

Europe.

approachtothe

problemofEUenlargementhasbeenrecentlyputforwardbysomeobservers (MatonyteandMorkevicius underlyingassumptionisthathistoricallythe

2009):the EUwas

createdfirstlytoavoidinternalandexternalthreatsthatEuropefaced.Howeve r,ithastobe addedthatthereiscurrentlynosatisfactorytypologyof“threatsconfrontingEur ope”,nora

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

conceptualconsensusonthecontent,formoragentsofthethreatsposed(Cana n-Sokull

2011b).Inthe

presentpaper,anenlargement-relatedthreat-

perceptionapproachisdeveloped,

asitwouldbebetterclarifiedinthe

hypothesesstatedbelow. Inlight

oftheargumentsreviewed,atentativeassessment

ofEuropeanpublicattitudestowards Turkish uneasy EU iter, with its farreaching and long-standing matters, would be done. As anticipated,the analysiswouldrelyononeofthedatasetsstemmingfromthe“IntUne”Project 5, whichcarried out two waves of mass and elitesurveys in18 countries, in2007

and2009.

particular,WaveII(publicopinion)datasetincludes

representativesamplesof

thegeneralpopulation

in16EuropeanUnionMemberStates ,and1non-EuropeanUnionMember 6

State7

(Cotta et al. 2009).

Thefollowingtablesummarizesthehypothesesformulatedinlightofthetheoretic alframework

and

onthebasisoftheavailabledata.Priortothat,hereisspecifiedthedependentvariabl eselectedto

graspthefavorabilitytowardsTurkishEUmembershipand

carryouttheanalysis:

“IntegratedandUnited:AQuestforCitizenshipinan EverCloserEurope”:theprojectlastedfouryears(2005-2009)anditisoneofthemostrecent andambitiousresearchattemptstoempiricallystudyhowcitizenshipischanginginEurope.Cfr.w ww.intune.it;Sandersetal. 2012. 6Austria,Belgium,Bulgaria,Denmark,Estonia,France, Germany,Greece, Hungary,Italy,Poland,Portugal,SlovakiaRepublic,Slovenia,Spain, andtheUnited Kingdom 7Serbia 5

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

Generally

speaking,doyouthink

thatthe

Turkey’smembershipintheEuropeanUnionwould be agood/badthing?

H1:themoreEU membershipis consideredherald of benefits, the more mass’ attitude towards Turkishaccessionbidwouldbefavorable



H1_Itemsrelated

Countrycost/benefit+Turkeycost/b enefit+ Personalcost/benefit= UTILITARIANINDEX9

 UTILITARIANAPPROACH.  H2_Itemsrelated: H2:themore citizenswould connecttheir understandingof“beingEuropean”,toafa vorable attitudetowardsa“deepening- Personal EUfeeling; widening”process of European Nationality;Enlargement; Unification; integration, the more they will EUvalues (q14_1-6)10 supportTurkishaccessionbid  IDENTITY-RELATEDAPPROACH H3: AstheEU integrationprocessproceeds,itis likelythattheEuropeanspacewould progressively know less culturaland realboundaries.Themore citizensfeeltheseoutcomesas“threats”,t hemore is likely tohave Turkish accession disapproved.



H3_Itemsrelated:

Security threat + Economic threat + Cultural threat= THREATINDEX

bid

 THREAT-PERCEPTIONAPPROACH Table1.Notethelinkbetweeneachhypothesisandtheapproachesmentioned in thebriefliteraturereview.

Inadditiontothe

independentvariables

listed,anumberofcovariateswerealsoadded,inorder

above controlforindividual-

levelattitudinalanddemographicfactors11.

Question wordingand variablecodingsarereportedintheAppendix Theconstruction oftheindexes(“utilitarian”and“threat”)isavailableintheAppendix. 10FromtheseriesofquestionsEU values_1/9 Iretained only thosewhichtheoretically seemed morestrictlyrelatedto identitarianquestions,pleasesee thecodebookformoreclarityon thepoint(Cottaetal.2009,seethe references) 11Age;Education;Left-Right self-positioning;Religiousaffiliation.Forquestion wordingand variablecoding,pleasesee theAppendix 9

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

The dependent variable has been dichotomously recoded in order to run a logistic regression analysis12.

Empiricalanalysis Priortologit,

anexploratory

factoranalysiswouldbeperformed,atleastforwhattheitemsrelatingto H2areconcerned,withaviewtoreducethenumberofexplanatoryvariables,whilef ortheother

covariates–considerablylessinthefirstplace

constructingindexesseemedamoreadequate

option.

–

Practicallyspeaking,

onlythevariablesrelatingtoH2resultedsuitableforfactoranalysis,asthe otherswere

not

adequateduetothefactthat

theyhave

beennot

administeredtothe whole sample. ThisisthemainreasonwhyfactoranalysiswasrunonlyfortheH2relateditems.Notwithstanding thispracticality,however,theothervariableswerefewer,thereforeasimplerindex wasconsidered enough fromadescriptive viewpoint. Factoranalysisreferstoavarietyofstatisticaltechniqueswhosecommonobjective istorepresenta

setofvariablesintermsofa

smallernumberofhypotheticalvariables.Inthepresentpaper,asalready

said,

exploratoryfactoranalysisisunderstoodasanexpedientmeansforpossibledatar eduction.In

fact,therelationshipsamongmeasuredvariableswouldbe

investigated,inordertodeterminewhether theserelationshipscanbeusedtobesummarizedinasmallernumberoflatentconst ructs. As

ofrenownamongpunditsandpractitioners(Field2005),factoranalysis

assumes thatthe observed (measured) variables are linear combinations of some

underlying

source

variables

(or

factors).Underlyingfactorsaresmallerinnumberthanthenumberofobservedvari ables,andare

responsible

for

the

co-variation

Theanalysisisrun on STATA12.

among

the

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

observedvariables.Factor Analysis exploitsthe correspondencebetweenthe systemofunderlyingfactorsandthesystemofobservedvariablesto

arrive

atconclusionsaboutthe factors.Factoranalysisisthereforenotanaiminitselfbutananalytic tool13employedin

combinationwithanothermethod–logistic

regression,whichwouldconstitutethe de factoexplanatorypartof theanalysis 14.

Factoranalysisactuallyexplorestherelationshipsamongobservedvariables,check ingwhetherthese relationshipscanbecondensedinlatentvariables.Inthiscase,avarimaxorthogonalr otationhasbeen performed:ittypicallymaximizesthevarianceofthesquaredpattern/structurecoef ficientswithin

factors.Orthogonalrotationassumesunderlyingfactortobe

independent(e.g.nocommonvariation).

Kaisernormalizationisalsoapplied:the

rowsofloadingsare rescaledtohavenorm1before rotation andthenunscaledafter rotation. Variables Factor 1 Personal EU -0.02 feeling Nationality 0.35 Enlargement 0.03 Unification 0.00 EU values_1 0.71 EU values_2 0.41 EU values_3 0.76 EU values_4 0.77 EU values_5 0.15 EU values_6 0.32

Factor 2 0.41

Factor 3 0.33

Uniqueness 0.71

-0.54 0.05 -0.12 -0.11 0.55 0.29 0.28 0.69 0.71

-0.15 0.82 -0.80 0.08 0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.06

0.54 0.32 0.33 0.46 0.52 0.33 0.32 0.49 0.37

Table 2.Rotatedfactor loadings(patternmatrix)anduniquevariances

Otherwise,confirmatory factoranalysismethodwould havebeen considered.The latterdirectly testsspecific hypotheses,aswellasthefitofthefactors obtained(seeField2005 forareview) 14Animportantdetailinfactoranalysisisthefactthattheobservedindependentvariablesarenotthef ocus ofinterestbuttheirintercorrelationsare(Thompson2004;Jacobsetal.2004).Thematrixofassociation,aswellasothertablesy ieldedwhenperformingfactoranalysis,arenot shown in thepaper.Thence,datasetand do-fileare availableuponrequestfromtheauthor. 13

46 Variable

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

Table2shows

andunderlinesthe

wayeachvariable

loadsuponthefactorsyieldedwiththeanalysis– withaviewtocomputetheindependentvariablestobeusedinthelogitregressionm odel.Inorderto dothis thereare manymethodswhichmaybe considered(e.g.the regressionmethod,for a review of the variousmethods seeField2005),however the

downsidesofcarryingoutone

ofthese

methods

are

notjustfew.Forinstance,thescorescancorrelatewithfactorotherthantheoneonwh ichtheyare

based,butalso

withotherfactorscoresfromadifferentorthogonalfactors.Ofcourse,statisticians havedesignedsolutionsandcorrections15tothesedrawbacks,buttheyalsosuggest anothernaïve 16option:creatingindexesoutofeachclusterofvariables.Forexample, variable“Enlargement”alone clearlyappearstodefineonefactor,whereastwoclustersofvariablesseemtodefine theremaining factors–asitisclearwhenlookingattable2. Thosegroupsthencouldbeaggregatedtocreatenewvariableswhich– thankstotheexploratory factoranalysisperformed–aremeaningfulsummariesof the relevantitems.Asfollowing,thenewly createdvariablesfinallyseemagood choicetomake: -

Factor1ismostlydefinedbyNationality,EUvalues_1,

EUvalues_3and

EUvalues_4 17:keepinginmindeachitem’stheoreticalmeaning,anewvariablen amed“EUbreadth”has been created18 -

Factor2ismostlydefinedbyPersonalEUfeeling, EUvalues_2, EUvalues_5and

Forinstance,theBartlett methodortheAnderson-Rubinmethod– easilycomputedbySTATA.Inthepresentpaperthoseadjustmentsareavoidedsincetheybearothe rdifferentproblemswiththem(moreonthepointreadingField2005).Further,theaimofthisexplor atoryanalysisis–assaid– toshrinkthenumberofexplanatoryitemsselected:thoseindexesappeartomakesensebecausethe y stemfromaprioranalysissuchasthefactorrunabove,and bring lesstechnicalissuesin comparison to theregression scores. 16Asitisarguedin oneoftheSTATAtrainingsoffered onlineby Princeton:http://dss.princeton.edu/training/Factor.pdf 17q21 hasbeen dropped sincefactoranalysisshowedthatthevariabledoesreallydefinenoneofthefactors 18Thenewly created variablesareenclosed intheAppendix. 15

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

EU values_6:thenewvariable“Europeanness” hasbeen created19. Factor3ismostlydefinedbyEnlargement.Therefore,aconvenientrecoding ofthealready existingitemsuffices. Thosenewitems– togetherwiththesimplerindexescreatedbyaggregatingthevariablesconcerning hypotheses1and2(seetable1)wouldconstitutetheexplanatoryvariableagainstw hichthelogitregressionmodelis run. Priortothe

secondstageoftheanalysis,though,asummarytable

seemsnecessary,inordertobeas

clearaspossibleafteralltherecodings

andindexes produced. DV:Generallyspeaking,doyouthinkthat theTurkey’s membership intheEuropeanUnionwouldbe...? (recodedasadichotomousvariable:(1)goodthing; (0)bad/neutral) Hypotheses H1: The more EU membership is considered herald of benefits,themoremass’ attitudetowards Turkish accession bidwouldbe favorable –and viceversa

IndependentVariables andexpected directionslookingattheDV 

Utilitarian Index (Country cost/benefit +Turkey cost/benefit+Personal cost/benefit) Turkishmembershipwouldbea (1)Benefit;(2)Cost 

H2:Themore citizenswouldconnecttheir understandingof“beingEuropean”to afavorable attitude towards a “deepening-widening” process of European integration, the morethey will supportTurkishaccessionbid– andviceversa.

negativerelationshipexpected

 EU_breadth(Nationality+ EUvalues_1-3-4): dummyvariabletaking thevalue(0) “less inclusivenotionofEU”;(1) “moreinclusive notionof EU” 

favor towards enlargement (q. 15 rec): a new variable equal to “enlargement” (q. 15) recoded as a dummy (0) Against enlargement; (1) Favor towards enlargement)  positive relationship expected

“European-ness”asatheoreticalconcepthasbeen already clarifiedabovewhendiscussing the literature. 19

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

H3:AstheEU integrationprocessproceeds,itis likelythatthe Europeanspace wouldprogressively knowless culturalandrealboundaries.Themore citizensfeeltheseoutcomesas“threats”,th emore islikelyto have Turkishaccessionbiddisapproved.



Threatindex ( Securitythreat+Economic threat+Cultural threat) enlargementand circulationofpeople/ideas shouldbeconsidered…(1) Averyserious threat;(2)Asomewhatseriousthreat;(3)Not averyseriousthreat;(4)Notathreatat all. 

positive relationship expected

Table 3.summarytable:expecteddirectionsofthe independentvariables

Stage 2:Logitregression

Asafinalproductofalltherecapitulatedpreliminarysteps,thefollowingtableillust ratesthemain

findingsof

thelogitregressionanalysis.Asitisnoticeable,Nagelkerker-squaredisthemeasure displayedfor indicatingthegoodnessoffitofthemodel:ithasbeenpreferredtoothers20sinceit conceivesthe

r-squaredcalculationasanimprovementfromnullmodeltofitted

model rather than as “explained variability”. Z (StandardErrors)

Coeff. Utilitarianindex EU breadth European-ness

-2.833** (.228) .085 (.385)

-12.39 0.22

.688* (.318)

2.16

Favortowardsenlarge ment

1.323** (.232)

5.68

Threatindex

.189 (.128)

1.47

Constant

3.209* (1.54)

2.07

Nagelkerke R-squared

R2=0.54

Moreon thepoint:http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/general/Psuedo_RSquareds.htm 20

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

N= 782 p<0.05, **p <0.01

Table 4.Logit regressionestimates;dependentvariable:favorability towardsTurkish prospectiveEUmembership

Hypothesestestingandfinaldiscussion Theanalysisperformedshowsthatutilitarianconsiderationsactuallyaccountforv ariationinpublic membership.As

attitudes

towardsthepossibilityofanEUTurkish

expected,therelationship

negativeandsignificant.Thus,

hypothesisH1shouldbeaccepted. AsfarasH2isconcerned,

instead,

mixedconclusionscouldbedrawn:inparticular,whilethe variablesabout“European-ness”and“favortowardsenlargement”are significantandintheexpected direction,theoneherelabeled“EUbreadth”is Whatdoesthismean?Ifonelooksatthe

not.

theoreticalmeaningofthe

itemscomposingeachindex,theinterpretationoftheseresultsappears clearer:“Europeanness”inthepresentworkhasbeenconceptuallylinkedtoquestionnaireelements enquiringasortof“individualdimension”,a“feeling”:beingEuropeanasaday-todaypractice

(PersonalEU

feeling),somethingdealingwiththerespectofEUlawsandinstitutions(EUvalues_5) andwiththerespectofacommonEuropeantradition(EUvalues_2). notionsseemtoget

along

These

withamoreinclusiveviewoftheconceptof

Europeanidentity–whichultimatelyalsomatchesa favorableattitudetowardsadeepening–wideningprocessofEuropeanintegration (Enlargement recoded q. 15 rec). On the contrary, the variable which does not show significance (“EU breadth”)

linked

questionnaireitemsinvolvingaconceptionof“beingEuropean”whichissensibly more

connectedto

jussoliissues(beingborninEurope:

EUvalues_3;havingEuropeanparents:

EUvalues_4):those

notionsseemmoreamenable toavisionoffortressEurope,suchastheonedepictedwhenreviewing Controlvariablesarenot shown in table8sincetheyallresulted notsignificant.Pleaserefertothedo.file. 21

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

theliterature:innuce,

sortof“apprehension”causedbypossibleriskscomingfromoutsidethe “community”,embracingapursuitofsafetyandpreservationofeconomicandsoci alstability.Onthe

basisofthosearguments,thence,H2shall

beacceptedbutsomespecificationsshouldbeadded, especiallyasfarasthedefinitionof“beingEuropean”isconcerned. The point here isthat–especiallyin recentyears–European identity has become intensely

politicized,totheextentthattwocompetingvisionsof“EU

identityprojects”have

cometolight:one

outward-looking

and

cosmopolitan andasecondmoreinward-looking, national-populist European project focused on economic and cultural challenges posed by the infamous Polish plumbersandIslamicheadscarves(CheckelandKatzenstein2009).Althoughthismay beasortof simplification,itisfairlyreasonabletoconnectthesecondhypothesisherestatedtot heopen-minded

viewentailedinthe

theprojectsmentioned.Inturn,thelatteristhence

firstof assumedtooriginatea

positiveevaluationoftheTurkishissueonbehalfofthepublic.Inthisacceptation,on eshould acceptH2andrejectthenullhypothesis. Lastly,the

indexgraspingthe

perceptionofrealorsymbolicthreats,intermsofmass’attitudesvis-àvistheperspectiveofanenhancedcirculationofpeopleandideasasaconsequenceo f“moreEU

integration”,is

shouldberejected.

notsignificantintheanalysis–whereforeH3

This

notwithstanding,

fairenoughtorememberthat–asaforesaid–

itappears thereiscurrentlyno

commonlyacceptedclassificationof“threats”perceptions.Furthermore,therecog nizedproblemof

self-

reportinginsurveydatahastobetakenintoconsideration:itmaybepossiblethat– whendirectly

asked–publicisnotsokeenondeclaringtobe

subject

toanykindof“threat”,bethatrealor symbolic.Hence,itisadvisabletotaketheresultaboutH3withcarefulcaution,perh apsleavingto

futureresearchthetaskofshadinglightonthepoint–bymaking

clearerassumptionsonwhat “threat” means.

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

For

w h a t the

control

variablesareconcerned,theirlackofsignificanceisrathersurprising: particularly in thecase of

religious affiliation,previousfindings(Canan-Sokullu2011a)

found empiricalconfirmation. Asafinalpoint,thepresentpapersoughttoproduce

astudyonmasspublic’s

conceptionofEuropean identityanditslinkwiththeirpositiononTurkishprospectiveEUaccession.Thego alwasgivingan

insightwhich

was

aswide-

rangingaspossible,approachingthepuzzlefromdifferentanglesand graspingdistinctdimensionscomposingthe multifacetedconceptofEuropeanidentity. ThegeneralimplicationofthepresentpaperisthatEuropeansseemtobegraduallyc omingtoterms with a sense of “self” displaying broader ranges of values than

was

thepast.

Utilitarian

calculationsactinconcert

withotherfactors,inparticularwhenconfrontingcomplex

dynamics

connectedtowhathasbeenlabeled“Turcoscepticism”,asopposedto“Turcoenthusiasm”(Canan- Sokullu2011a). Inanutshell,theTurkishcaseseemedtheidealcasestudyforpavingthewaytomore in-depth

research

onthemultiplicity

Thehypothesesputforward

ofEuropeanidentities.

inthepaper

–

alongsidethetheoreticalbackdropsuggested– shouldbeconsideredasapreliminarysteptowardsa greaterunderstandingofthespecificitiesunderlyingTurkey’sbidforEUmembers hip,

asamatterstill

callingforanontologicalinquiryintothenatureof

theEuropeanUnion(Kylstad2010). Ahugequestionmarkhasbeenputtothe Europeanizationofidentities

conventionalwisdomthatthe isanuncontested–

oreven“irrelevant”process,whencomparedtomorestrictusensueconomicand politicalissues.Nowadaysmorethanever,Europeanidentityshouldbeconceivedl essasummaryof

whatwethinkwe

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

knowandmoreofaroadmapforfuturescholarship(CheckelandKatzenstein

2009),

atthecrossroadsofpublic opinionandEuropeanstudies. BasicReferences Anderson,B.(1990),ImaginedCommunities,London:Verso. Arikan,G.(2012),AttitudesTowardstheEuropeanUnioninTurkey:TheRoleofPerceivedThreats andBenefits, Perceptions,Autumn,vol.XVII,number3,pp.81-103. Arvanitopoulos,C.andKeridis,D.(2011),TurkeyandtheIdentityofEurope,HarvardInternati onal

Review.Retrieved

from

http://hir.harvard.edu/turkey-and-the-identity-of-

europe?page=0,2 Benhabib,S.(2002),Politicaltheoryandpoliticalmembershipinachangingworld,inI.Katzelsona ndH.V.Milner(eds.),Politicalscience:thestateofthediscipline,NewYorkandLondon:W.W. Norton,404-32. Canan-Sokullu, E.Ş.(2011a), ItalianPublic Opinion on Turkey’s EU Accession: UtilitarianCalculations,IdentitarianEvaluationsorPerceivedThreats?,Perceptions,Spring,V ol.XVI,number1, pp.47-70. CananSokullu,E.Ş.(2011b),TurcoscepticismandThreatPerception:EuropeanPublicandEliteOpinion onTurkey'sProtractedEUMembership,SouthEuropeanSocietyandPolitics,16:3,483-497. Casanova,J.(2006),TheLong,DifficultandTortuousJourneyofTurkeyintoEuropeandtheDilem masofEuropeanCivilization, Constellations,vol.13, no.2,pp.234-47 Checkel,J.andKatzenstein,P.(2009),(eds.)EuropeanIdentity,Cambridge,CambridgeUniv ersity Press. Christiansen,T.(1997),ReconstructingEuropeanSpace:FromTerritorialPoliticstoMultilevel Governance,inK.‐E.Jorgensen(ed.),ReflectiveApproachestoEuropeanGovernance,Basingsto ke: Macmillan. Cotta,M.andIsernia,P.(2009),CitizenshipintheEuropeanpolity:QuestionsandExplorations,i n

Moury,C.andDe

Sousa,L.(eds),Institutionalchallengesinpost-

constitutionalEurope,Londonand NewYork:Routledge,71-94.

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

Cotta,M.,Isernia,P.andBellucci,P.(2009),IntUneMassSurveyWave2.ICPSR34272-v2.Ann Arbor,MI:Inter-universityConsortium

forPoliticalandSocialResearch[distributor],2013-04-

22. doi:10.3886/ICPSR34272.v2 Field,A.(2005),DiscoveringStatisticsUsingSPSS,London:SagePublication,Chapte r15. Huntington,S. P.,(1993), The clashofcivilisations?, ForeignAffairs,vol.72, no.3,pp.22–50. Jacobs,J.,Kuper,G. CrisesinAsia:Amultivariatelogitapproach,

andLestano,A.(2004),Currency EconWPA,No.0409005,

seriesInternationalFinance,1-28. Retrieved from https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1866/939/a1.1g1054.pdf?seq uence=1 Kim,J.andMueller,C.(1978),IntroductiontoFactorAnalysis.WhatItIsandHowtoDoIt,Thous andOaks:SagePublications. Kylstad,I.(2010),TurkeyandtheEU:A‘new’Europeanidentityinthemaking?,LEQSPaperNo. 27, October. Kleinbaum,D.G.,Kupper,L.andMullerK.E.(1988),AppliedRegressionAnalysisandOtherM ultivariate Methods, SecondEdition,PWS-KENT PublishingCompany,Boston. Matonyte,I.andMorkevicius,V.(2009),ThreatPerceptionandEuropeanIdentityBuilding:The Caseof

ElitesinBelgium,Germany,LithuaniaandPoland,Europe-AsiaStudies,Vol.61,No.6,

August,p.968. Pausch,M.(2011),TheEuropeanUnion:FromSchumpeterianDemocracytoaEuropeanPublicSp here?,Alternatives–TurkishJournalofInternationalRelations,Vol.10,no.1, Spring. Risse‐Kappen,T.(1996), Explainingthe Nature of the Beast: International Relations andComparative Policy Analysis MeettheEU,Journalof CommonMarketStudies34(1). Ruiz-Jimenez,A.andTorreblanca,I.(2007),EuropeanPublicOpinionandTurkey’saccession– making senseofargumentsforandagainst,EuropeanPolicyInstitutesNetwork,WorkingPaper no.16/May.

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

Sanders,D.,Bellucci,P.Toka,G.andTorcal,M.(2012),TheEuropeanizationofnationalpolities? Citizenshipandsupportinapost-enlargementunion,OxfordUniversityPress Thompson,B.(2004),ExploratoryandConfirmatoryFactorAnalysis:UnderstandingConceptsa ndApplications,AmericanPsychologicalAssociation.

Appendix–questionwordingandvariable codings DependentVariable:  q7cGenerallyspeaking,doyouthinkthattheTurkey’smembershipintheEuropeanUnion wouldbe...? (Recodedasa dichotomousvariable:(1)goodthing;(0)bad/neutral) 1Agoodthing 2Abadthing 3Neithergoodnorbad 4DK 5Refusal IndependentVariables and relatedhypotheses: 1) H1:themoreEUmembershipisconsideredheraldofbenefits,themoremass’attitudeto wardsTurkish accession bidwouldbe favorable –andvice versa. Accordingtotheutilitarianmodelofpublicopinion,therearetwolevelsofcalculations: -

atthe macro-economiclevel,utilitarianismsuggeststhatcitizens’attitudestowardthe EUand

enlargementarebasedonhowsupranationaleconomicpolicies

atthe

EUlevelaffectnational economic conditions -

atthe

microlevel,egocentric

utilitarianismconcentrateson

calculationsofpersonaleconomic andfinancialcostsandbenefitsasadeterminantofsupportforenlargement(CananSokullu 2011;Arikan2012) Herearethepertainingitems:

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

 q8aCountrycost/benefit Takingeverythingintoconsideration,wouldyousaythat(OURCOUNTRY)hasonbala nce benefitedornotfrombeingamemberofthe EuropeanUnion?[MACRO-LEVEL] 1Hasbenefited 2Hasnotbenefited 3DK 4Refusal  q8cTurkey cost/benefit Takingeverythingintoconsideration,wouldyousaythatTurkeywouldonbalancebenefit or notfrombeingamemberofthe EuropeanUnion?[MACRO-LEVEL] 1 Wouldbenefit 2 Wouldnotbenefit 3DK 4Refusal  q9cPersonalcost/benefit Andwhataboutofpeoplelikeyou?Wouldpeoplelikeyouonbalancebenefitornotfrom Turkey’sEUmembership?[MICRO-LEVEL]

1 Wouldbenefit 2 Wouldnotbenefit 3DK 4Refusal Asonecouldeasilynotice,thevariablesabove mentionedareidenticallycoded.Thence,thecreation themisdeemedmoreconvenient,as following:  “utilitarian_index”: 1“Benefit”,ifq8a/c orq9c =1 2“Cost”,ifq8a/c orq9c =2

ofanindexforsummarizingallof

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

2) H2:themorecitizenswouldconnecttheirunderstandingof“beingEuropean”,as wellas

“European-ness”,toafavorableattitudetowardsa“deepening-

widening”processof

European

integration,

the

they

willsupportTurkish accession bid–andvice versa. Pertaining items:  q10PersonalEUfeeling HowmuchdoesbeingaEuropeanhavetodowithhowyoufeel aboutyourselfinyourdayto daylife? 1Agreatdeal 2Somewhat 3Notverymuch 4Not atall 5DK

 q12Nationality Doyousee yourselfas…? 1 (NATIONALITY)only 2 (NATIONALITY)andEuropean 3Europeanand(NATIONALITY) 4Europeanonly 5None of theabove 6DK 7Refusal  q15Enlargement Pleasetellmewhetheryouare

infavouroragainsttheenlargementofthe

EuropeanUnionto includenewcountries.

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

1Verymuchinfavour 2Somewhatinfavour 3Somewhatagainst 4Verymuchagainst 5DK 6Refusal  q21Unification SomesayEuropeanunificationhas

alreadygonetoo

Otherssayitshouldbestrengthened.

far. Whatis

youropinion?Pleaseindicateyourviewsusinga10-point-scale.Onthisscale,'0' meansunification"has

alreadygonetoo

far"and'10'meansit"shouldbestrengthened".What numberonthisscalebestdescribesyourposition? 1 (0)Gonetoo far 2 (1) 3 (2) 4 (3) 5 (4) 6 (5) 7 (6) 8 (7) 9 (8) 10 (9) 11 (10)Strengthen 12Refusal 13DK

 q14EUvalues AndforbeingEuropean,howimportantdoyouthinkeachof thefollowingis…? (one

ofeachistobe

understoodasaseparatevariabletotake

intoaccount)

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

1TobeaChristian 2ToshareEuropean culturaltraditions 3TobeborninEurope 4TohaveEuropeanparents 5TorespectEuropeanUnion’slaws andinstitutions 6To feelEuropean Possible answersto EUvalues_1/EUvalues_6: 1Veryimportant 2Somewhatimportant 3Notveryimportant 4Not atallimportant 5DK 6Refusal

*Newvariablescreated asa resultofexploratoryfactor analysis: EU_breadth:dummyvariabletakingthevalue0“lessinclusivenotionofEU”;1“more inclusive notionofEU”

Europeanness: dummy variable taking the value 0 “low feeling of European-ness”; 1 “higherfeelingofEuropea n-ness”; “favor_towards_enlargement equaltoq15(enlargement)recoded

=q15rec:anewvariable asadummy

(0.

Againstenlargement;1.Favortowardsenlargement)

3) H3:AstheEUintegrationprocessproceeds,itislikelythattheEuropeanspacewou ld

progressively

knowlessculturalandrealboundaries.

The

morecitizensfeeltheseoutcomes as“threats”,the more islikely tohave Turkish

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

accession biddisapproved.

Pertainingitems:  q29a Securitythreat Nowadays,people,moneyandideastravelacrossnationalboundariesveryquick ly.Because ofthis,anumberof(NATIONALITY)believethecountrynowfacesseriousthreats toour nationalsecurity[ed.:interpretedasbotha“real”anda“symbolic”threat].Whatdoyou think?Is this…?  q29bEconomic threat Nowadays,people,moneyandideastravelacrossnationalboundariesveryquick ly.Because ofthis,anumberof(NATIONALITY)believethecountrynowfacesseriousthreats toour

economicwell-beingandjobs[ed.:interpretedasa

“real”threat].Whatdoyouthink? Isthis…?  q29cCulturalthreat Nowadays,people,moneyandideastravelacrossnationalboundariesveryquick ly.Because ofthis,anumberof(NATIONALITY)believethecountrynowfacesseriousthreats toour

culturalvalues

andwayoflife[ed.:interpretedasa“symbolic”threat].Whatdoyouthink?Is this…? 1Averyseriousthreat 2Asomewhatseriousthreat 3Nota veryseriousthreat 4Nota threatatall 5DK 6Refusal Asonecouldeasilynotice,thevariablesabovementionedareidenticallycoded.Thence,th ecreation

ofanindexforsummarizingallof

themisdeemedmoreconvenient,as

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

following:  “threat_index”: 1Averyseriousthreat,ifq29a/c=1 2Asomewhatseriousthreatifq29a/c=2 3Nota veryseriousthreatifq29a/c=3 4Nota threatatallifq29a/c =4 Control variables:  d2aAge Agecategoriesbasedontheyearofbirth 118-24 225-34 335-44 445-54 555-64 665+ 7Refusal 8DK  d3Education Whichof thefollowingbestdescribesyourlevelofeducation ? (recodedinsuchawaythat:(1)loweducationlevel:from1to4;(2)medium/higheducatio nlevel:from5to7) 1Didnotgotoschool 2Completedprimary(elementary)education 3Completedbasic secondary education(middleschool) 4Completedsecondary educationwithvocationalqualifications 5Completedsecondary educationwithA-levelqualifications 6College, universityorotherdegree

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

7Stillastudent 8Otherqualification 9Refusal

 q20Left-Rightself-placement Inpoliticspeoplesometimestalkof"left"and"right".Wherewouldyouplaceyours elfona

scalefrom0to10where'0'means"the

left"and'10'means"theright",and'5'means"neither leftnorright"? 1(0)Left 2(1) 3(2) 4(3) 5(4) 6(5) 7(6) 8(7) 9(8) 10(9) 11(10) Right 12Refusal 13DK  d7Religion Whatisyourreligion,ordon'tyou have one? (forthepurposes ofthe analysis,itmightbe enoughtohave the variable recodedasfollowing:(1)Christian;(-1) Muslim;(0)others) 1Catholic 2Orthodox 3Protestant 4OtherChristian 5Jewish 6Muslim 7Sikh

“Friend Request Sent”: EU Identity and Turkey’sAccession Bid

8Buddhist 9Hindu 10Atheist\Nonbeliever\ Agnostic 11Other 12DK 13Refusal

Unraveling Turkey – Collective Volume on Turkish Politics & Society

STAMATIS LASKARIS

Action-Reaction or Inaction? Assessing Turkey’s Involvement in the Syrian Conflict Abstract:The Syrian civil war constitutes one of the bloodiest and intense conflicts in the last two decades. It has received great international attention and both sides to the conflict are recipients of political, economic and military support. Turkey actuated by the NeoOttomanism ideology has been actively engaged in the Syrian conflict as it seeks to promote its interests in the region and influence the post-Assad regime. So far, the success of the policy was limited because of the changing conditions of the conflict and the involvement of other countries that consider having stakes in Syria. Therefore, Ankara had to alter its approach in order to maximize its profits, yet this resulted to move away from the assumptions of neoOttomanism. StamatisLaskarisis a Peace and Conflict Researcher, M.Sc. Uppsala University

Introductionand Context After the end of the Cold War there was a significant increase in intrastate conflicts at the expense of interstate ones. According to Uppsala Conflict Data Program there are twenty-three ongoing intrastate armed conflicts and only one interstate (2013a). The case of Syria largely falls into this context and is considered one of the bloodiest and intense fighting in the last two decades (Pillay, Jul. 16, 2013). As part of the so called “Arab Spring”, the protests began on March 15, 2011 demanding the resignation of President Assad, the release of political prisoners, the abolishment of the emergency law that was in effect for 48 years, and the implementation of political and economic reforms. The authorities’ crackdown on protesters resulted in several arrests and deaths. Hastily, the military was deployed to suppress the uprising but met the resistance of the opposition that had been armed after looting military depots and organized in the Free Syrian Army. Hence, the revolution evolved soon to a civil war and atrocities escalated (Ajami, 2012). The conflict has a great impact both to the country and its neighboring states; the estimated casualties during the Syrian civil war are estimated to be 92,901, among them many civilians; the number of Internally Displaced Persons has reached 2,000,000 and the number of refugees that have fled the country recently exceeded 1,500,000 (UNHCR, 2011-2013) with Turkey and Jordan

Turkey’s implication in Syria: Action-Reaction or Inaction?

being the main recipient countries. While human rights abuses are taking place, the international community has not made any progress to deal with the situation. No consensus has been reached in the United Nations Security Council by the international community, and the permanent members remain divided on how to respond to the crisis.

Analysis According to theories about the causes and regional dimensions of internal conflicts (Brown, 1996), a foreign government by engaging in a civil war aims to fulfill its political economic or ideological ambitions, and attempts to affect the events that are taking place inside the country in such way that will promote its own interests regarding the state and its vicinity. This theoretical assumption accurately describes the situation in Syria. The Syrian civil war has received significant international attention not only due of the great number of victims but also because many states consider having stakes in the region, thus attempting to influence the outcome of the conflict. Of all the countries involved in the situation, this text will discuss Turkey’s involvement that is deemed the most important. Specifically, the relationship between Turkey and Syria prior to the conflict will be presented, Ankara's engagement in the ongoing crisis will be analyzed in the light of NeoOttomanism, and a hypothesis on how it might evolve in the future will be made. In order to understand the Turkish approach to the conflict it is useful to mention the basic points of Neo-Ottomanism, which is the dominant ideology of the Turkish political

elite.

Neo-Ottomanism

is based

on what

AhmetDavutoglu, Turkey’s foreign minister, calls “strategic depth” and “zeroproblem with neighbors” that regards Turkey as a great power that has dismissed its ties with the immediate neighborhood due to its orientation to the West. It favors secularism inside the country and an active foreign policy through the exertion of soft power (political, economic and cultural) in regions that previously were part of the Ottoman Empire (Davutoglu, 2010) where Turkey is considered to have national interests. Hence, it seeks to normalize

Turkey’s implication in Syria: Action-Reaction or Inaction?

the country’s relations with all neighboring states moving away from a security approach that had produced significant problems in the past, and embrace the Islamic World with which it considers to assimilate to a certain extent (Taspinar, 2012:128-130). Prior to the outbreak of the Syrian conflict the Turkish-Syrian relationship was characterized by cooperation despite some points of friction that were gradually overcome. The construction of several dams in Turkey for the regulation of Euphrates and Tigris rivers that significantly reduced the Syrian waters supplies, was settled through an agreement on water sources reached in 2008 (Today’s Zaman; March 12, 2008); the territorial dispute over the Hatay province that was annexed by Turkey and never recognized by Damascus, was sidelined in 2005 by Assad as a minor importance issue that created problems in Syria’s relations with Turkey (Soner, April 4, 2013) 1; and, the Syrian support to the PKK insurgency against Turkey was overcome when Damascus ceased its support to PKK and expelled its leader (Aykan, 1999). The Turkish-Syrian relations since 2004 have significantly improved as the data suggest; a free-trade agreement and a pact for joint military exercises were signed in 2004 and 2009 respectively, and were followed by an increase in bilateral tradeand high-level meetings (Gavin, 2009). The Syrian uprising constitutes a major challenge for both the continuation of the relationship and the Turkish policy followed in the Syrian case that requires alterations in order to respond to the new conditions. The stability of Syria and the prevention of a sectarian spillover became the priority of the Turkish policy makers who wanted to limit the possible impact from a weakening Syrian state on its regional goals. That explains Ankara’s initial approach to the Syrian revolt that requested from Damascus to proceed with political and economic reforms and inaugurate a constructive dialogue between the government and protesters for resolving the crisis, on which Assad initially agreed (BBC, August 9, 2011).

It should be noted that its settlement is still pending and it re-emerged after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. 1

Turkey’s implication in Syria: Action-Reaction or Inaction?

Yet, Damascus had no intention to proceed with reforms and responded with a security crackdown that further escalated the situation and soon passed the threshold of high2 intensity conflict. This marked a turning point in the Turkish approach for a regime change policy (BBC, November 15, 2011; Today’sZaman, December 4, 2011). It offered support to the Syrian opposition, permitted elements to cross its borders and hosted defectors of the Syrian armed forces. Ankara was aiming to exert pressure on Assad so that he would eventually be forced decide to negotiate and terminate the conflict (Balci, 2012). Turkey, along with other states concerned with the Syrian conflict, formed the group called “Friends of Syria” in February, 2012 in order to secure regime change. However, Turkey’s failure in its primary goal to persuade key-actors of the conference for a military intervention left Ankara isolated (Yilmaz, 2013). The situation changed somewhat when the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Arab League adopted a more active stance towards the Free Syrian Army, the main armed opposition group. Thereafter, Ankara was engaged in diplomatic efforts, the “Regional Quartet” (Reuters,September 11, 2012) and a Russian plan (Hurriyet, December 7, 2012) to influence a political resolution to the conflict but with little success. Yet, Ankara suffered another blow when Washington heavily criticized its actions as fuelling the conflict and for making the region more unstable (The Turkish news, May 14, 2013), which led itto turn to Qatar and increase its aid towards the insurgents. Despite the fact that Turkey became an indirect party to the Syrian conflict since it is pursuing the overthrow of the incumbents, the government argues that this is in line with its “zero-problems” policy as stability has not been achieved while the Assad regime remains intact (Turkish MFA, 2013). The ongoing conflict requires a Turkish response that cannot easily fit in the “zeroproblems” doctrine. Ankara has to deal with the growing number of refugees

At least 1000 battle-related deaths in one calendar year (UCDPb, 2013)

Turkey’s implication in Syria: Action-Reaction or Inaction?

that is crossing its borders,3and the fact that territories close to the TurkishSyrian borders are under control of armed groups linked to PKK, despite the recent ceasefire agreement. Moreover, the choices made by the Turkish leadership are exposed to its domestic constituencies’ scrutiny that question whether they are in line with/beneficial for the country’s interests in the region or not (Couvas, 2012; Anadolu Agency, May 14, 2013). While Turkey’s policy towards the Syrian conflict, as described above, can be characterized as a pragmatic one, yet it faced moments of political miscalculations. Due to the assumption that the Assad regime would soon fall, the Turkish government supported the promotion of reforms and an orderly transition of power that would keep the Syrian state intact and avoid further regional instability. This indicates that Turkey had overestimated its own capacity to influence the developments inside Syria. Also, Ankara had overestimated the ability of the Assad regime to remain in power and to bounce back the insurgency when decided to support the opposition. Hence, the weaknesses of the “zero-problems with neighbors” policy became apparent when Turkey decided to employ coercive means along with soft power to achieve its goals and lacked the capacity to act as mediator in regional conflicts. The best case scenario for Turkey in Syria would be a democratic regime that could bring the country back to stability (Davutoglu, 2012:10). The Turkish government would like to see a moderate Islamist party in power, preferably Sunni in creed, which could revive the cooperation between the two states. However, one factor that is likely to have a negative impact on the relationship in the post-conflict period and may curtail its regional ambitions is the presence of other actors which are involved in the situation in Syria and actively seek to influence the situation in accordance with their interests. More specifically, the political, economic and material support that the Gulf States offer to the Syrian opposition increases the likelihood that they will be able to The UNHCR calculates the number of refugees that fled to Turkey to around 400,000 as of June, 2013 http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224 3

Turkey’s implication in Syria: Action-Reaction or Inaction?

exert more influence on the post-Assad regime, thus Syria would slip off the Turkish sphere. Additionally, the rivalry between the U.S. and E.U. on the one side and Russia and China on the other limits Ankara’s ability to employ a policy that would allow Turkey to promote its interests and succeed on its regional goals. All these further complicate the situation in Syria and challenge the Turkish policy in the region.

Conclusions In conclusion, there is a mismatch between ideology and reality. Turkey is in harsh competition with other regional actors that all seek to influence the Syrian conflict to their advantage. Hence, it is reasonable for Ankara to alter its approach in order to fit better in the new conditions and maximize its profits. Yet, this mismatch revealed a flaw in the Neo-Ottomanism ideology regarding its main assumption that Turkey has the capacity to shape its proximity according to its interests. This is an oversimplification of reality that fails to take into account that there may be other factors which might affect a situation, and subsequently have an impact on the policy pursued by Turkey, which, as it turned out, has not yielded any significant results. Accordingly, the current situation in the Middle East and North Africa region, which becomes more and more unstable, questions the sustainability of the policy and makes it more likely that the doctrine will become less viable. Thus, one might expect another alteration of the Turkish regional policy to take place in the near future. Lastly, the effectiveness of the Turkish approach cannot be evaluated only by its success or failure, but also by its impact on promoting peace and stability in the region. So far, despite Ankara's aspirations, it has largely failed in that regard. It tried to mediate for the resolution of low intensity conflicts without much success, since many of these conflicts rekindled or remained active. All these suggest that Turkey’s position in the regional and international system is far from what the so-called Davutoglu doctrine envisions.

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(2011, November 15). Turkey steps up pressure on Syria. BBC. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15745199 (2011-2013). UNHCR - Syria.UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Retrieved July 23, 2013, from http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home (2013a, May 14). Turkey’s Syria policies are criticized as Erdoğan prepares to meet with Obama – The Washington Post. The Turkish News. Retrieved July 25, 2013, from http://www.turkishnews.com/en/content/2013/05/14/turkeys-syria-policies-arecriticized-as-Erdoğan-prepares-to-meet-with-obama-the-washington-post/ (2013b, May 14). Erdoğan defends Syria policy. Anadolu Agency. Retrieved July 25, 2013, from http://www.aa.com.tr/en/news/178916--Erdoğan-defends-syria-policy (2013, July 19). Opening remarks by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights NaviPillay at a news conference at the end of her mission to Colombia.OHCHR. Retrieved July 25, 2013,

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Turkey’s implication in Syria: Action-Reaction or Inaction?

Unraveling Turkey – Collective Volume on Turkish Politics & Society NICHOLAS ROSSIS

The Ambivalence between Islamism and Secularism in Turkey: Trick or Treat? Abstract: The article investigates the emerging confrontation of Islamism and secularism in Turkey in the light of the protests in Taksim square. The link between the protests and the Islamism – secularism debate is in all probability superficial as there are more deep rooted factors leading to the turmoil. The author explores the role of potential inhibitors that do not allow Turkey to glide into one of the two sides of the same coin, as the debate is actually propelled by the political rhetoric and disorientated by the overanalyses of the academia and the media. The inhibitors do not actually prevent social or political polarization; however they could manifest the inclination that the ambivalence between Islamism and secularism in Turkey has. DrNicholas Rossis holds a PhD in Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies and is a research associate at the University of Durham

Introduction Turkey has reached once again an indiscernible crossroad. It seems that yet another identity crisis is looming for the Turkish elites and society. The phenomenal protests in Taksim Square sparked widespread concerns regarding the future of Turkey. Will Turkey slide into a spiral of Islamic reformations and lose the constitutionally vested secular character of the state? Is yet another coup d’état on the way to re-establish the fading secular characteristics in the country? Or the society will cast the deciding vote and restore the previous superficial balance of Islamism and secularism under the current democratic norms? The situation in Turkey is seemingly fragile and the disparity between Islamism and secularism is constantly on the fore, but this is probably not the problem; to project a linear relationship between the protests against the government and the collision of Islamism and secularism would be an inadequate oversimplification of the contemporary dilemmas in Turkey. The predicaments of the current challenges perhaps are transcendental towards religion or the secular character of Turkey as they are pegged to more tangible issues (Naeem, 2013) like the violation of human rights, authoritarian practices, police violence and illegal detentions, impunity,

Secularism vs. Islamism: Trick or Treat

media bias, (Nerantzaki, 2013), as well as political corruption, unemployment and poor living standards. Also the media and the academia ostentatiously indulge on referring to the significance of Islamism and secularism on the contemporary debates, inflating the reactions, especially from the West. Apart from those aforementioned challenges though, there are additional inhibitors that prevent a clear full-scale predilection towards Islamism or secularism like the role of women, the European aspirations and the regional conflicts. Religion back in the 1920s was deemed as anachronistic by the founding fathers of the Turkish Republic, after the severe secularization process that also abolished the Sultanate and the implementation of Sharia (Ochsenwald & Fisher, 2003). Since then the relationship of the state and religion has been completely separated and the state has undergone immense and rapid modernization processes, while the society sluggishly absorbed the developments over a significant period of time. Probably in some parts of Turkey are still trying to absorb it. Nevertheless, the astonishing process of secularisation of Turkey was not superimposed on top of pre-existing Islamic values, but we may acknowledge -by rephrasing Göle’s (1997) deductions- that it has been fully incorporated into all the sociological practices crafting a turkified hybrid of Islamism and secularism. For this very reason, any potential shift impinging on the asymmetrical yet balanced attitudes of Islamism and secularism in Turkey is alarming, not only for the adjacent countries, but for the entire international stage and of course the Turkish social web, as it may threaten the political and economic status quo. But that is not the case.

An exaggerated version of the truth For Göle(1997), Islamism in Turkey is very different to the conventional and stereotypical practices as they are observed in other Muslim countries due to the fact that it has emerged through the processes of secularised education and the urbanization and modernisation of society. For this reason modern Islamists in Turkey reprimand both secularists and traditionalists. Islamism in

Secularism vs. Islamism: Trick or Treat

Turkish politics is more than often just for show. As George W. Bush was seeking for the Christian vote, similarly in Turkey Islamism is occasionally used for canvassing purposes. No one, of course, disputes how devout Muslim for example Abdullah Gül could be, but despite his Islamic background is a keen adherent of Turkey’s accession to the EU (Eshel, 2007). Nevertheless this is not hypocritical or controversial at all, as some may suggest. On the contrary it is another remarkable example of Turkey’s political continuum and consistency over crucial diplomatic and foreign affairs issues that drive on independently of the governmental propensities and figures in power. Besides, in order to maintain the seemingly delicate control, a head-on confrontation with the top brass –the guardians of the secular state- should be avoided and a more flexible approach should be adopted as any democratically elected leader would tend to do (ibid). Or at least, do so until the circumstances favour drastic measures as in the case of Ergenekon. The lay-it-on-thick analysis of the empty political rhetoric of manifold Turkish politicians on behalf of the media and the academia is partly responsible for the resurgence of the debate regarding whether the secular system in Turkey is endangered by the augmenting conservatism in the country. It is more than obvious that certain occurrences have alarming features for the future of the secular state in Turkey, but those happenstances -like blasphemy accusations or pro-religion law reformations- are not less common in countries like Greece or France for example. Especially for the Western media the fact that something Islamic is potentially on the rise immediately pertains to the sphere of the odious. The clashes between the two notions are very real indeed, but the impact and the extent are often purposefully exorbitant. TuranKayaoğlu(2012) suggests that, while Erdoğan often exhausts himself in rhetorical contradictions, the percentage of people who want a religious state had actually plummeted from 25% in 1996 to 9% in 2006. Islamism and secularism function in a similar manner like any opposition would do in any given country. When an Islamist government like the AKP is incumbent it undoubtedly carries along attributes from its core principles but

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until now there is no profound restructuring process -yet- towards a really Islamic state. And it will probably never be as there are too much at stake. Islamism is not a sign of regression for Turkey, but could be an expression of social discontent on behalf of the society and exploitation of a vacant political momentum on behalf of the elites. Although, Turkish Islamism is -and it will probably remain- far and away from unyielding theocratic manifestations as observed in Iran or Saudi Arabia.

The Inhibitors The inhibitors function as moderators of Islamism in Turkey. Apart from the constitutional limitations imposed on Turkish Islamism, some of which have been lifted by the Erdoğan administration, there are too many factors that set boundaries on the Islamic ascend in Turkey. One of them is women. According to Göle(1997, p. 51) “the penetration of secularism in daily life is best illustrated by women's physical and social visibility”. He continues that “participation of women in public life as citizens and as civil servants, and their socialization with men, defined the modem secular way of life and indicated a shift away from a form of social organization framed by Islam”. Women are an integral part of the of production process, they represent a huge amount of the workforce and despite some parochial and anachronistic social tendencies that remain vivid in Turkish society women are pretty much capable of being as emancipated as they wish to be, at least in the urban environments. The situation is irreversible now and only with extensive social consent could be reduced once again. Neither the government nor the society desires such regression, at least in such sweeping manner that could affect economic activity and social involvement. It is easy to descry that the Islamist – secularist debate is mostly based on the language of the politicians and not in actuality, as Turkish women fear their rights are being infringed even though they are seemingly free to wear and do whatever they want (Finoshina, 2013). Another inhibitor is the European accession. The dream for a proper European accession seems by the day more and more distant. Turkey has undergone manifold structural reformations to match the prerequisites of the

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membership negotiations but always something comes up to postpone or delay it. However, based on the remote possibility that the tides will turn for Turkey, the country maintains or lethargically pushes forward the requested restructuring. The need for another choice of belonging or the vague promise for a better tomorrow and all the other potential political and economic gains for the governments keep the spirits high that one day all the hard work shall be rewarded properly. Fractions of the ruling elites and some parts of the society, especially in the Eastern provinces, who realised that this is a very distant possibility are frustrated or annoyed and have redeployed their energy and effort to something more tangible and rewarding like Islamism (Guvenc, 1998), while others realised that the EU could be superfluous and outmoded as Turkey projected remarkable resilience towards the financial crisis (Rafizadeh, 2013). Therefore the carrot and stick of the EU dream is simultaneously responsible for an Islamic revival as well as for being the catalyst for European normative convergence. An additional inhibitor is the regional conflicts and disputes ranging from the Greek insular shelf disputes and the Cyprus issue in the West and from the Syrian border tensions to the emerging complexities of the Kurdish deal with Assad and the fragile situation in Iraq in the East. Turkey at the moment has way too much on her plate domestically, regionally and internationally. Turkey can best promote U.S. and Western interests by becoming a stable and cohesive country, with a preferably predictable Western orientation (Norton, 2002). At the same time the AKP persists to be pro-western and is a key adherent of an attempted NATO intervention in Syria, further inflaming emotions among secularists who expect the establishment of a typical Islamist government in Turkey (Staggenborg, 2013). NATO apparently needs Turkey, as it can be a proxy -not only for operations on Syrian soil- but at the entire region. Turkey on the other handalso needs NATO for the manifold regional challenges that it faces with the current focus on valuable assistance for suppressing the potential emergence of a Kurdish state in north Syria either by direct Iraq-like intervention, which seems improbable at the moment or by arming the Free Syrian Army or any others agents who can convey the task. Moreover Turkeyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s alienation from the EUâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s security structures serves to

ÂŠ Inter Alia, Civic Action Meeting Point, August 2013

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underscore NATO’s uniqueness and most importantly NATO’s agenda is pretty much aligned with the priorities of Turkish foreign policy.However in order to achieve this evolving relationship, at least the US, should feel reassured that Turkey will not suddenly become an Islamic republic (Ülgen, 2013). Until now, the leadership of the AKP is rather reassuring.

And the winner is.... Turkey has multiple personalities. In theory secularism was far more acute than a British or a Greek national could grasp, as in their respective countries secularism has way less intense institutional penetration; however in practice Turkish Islamism is extensive, potent but rather reserved and prudent. It is as if there are two Turkeys. One Turkey attempts to set foot on the West, by trying to institutionally converge with the EU and by amending the Constitution to accept the superiority of international laws over domestic, or by pursuing more intensive involvement in NATO and other regional security and defence initiatives. While another Turkey, the country with the most mosques in the world opens up towards the Arab world endeavouring to be established as regional power. Erdoğan now even tweets in Arabic and he still has many Arab fans despite the fact that his popularity has slightly depleted after the events in Egypt and due to his attitude in the Taksim events (Macdonald & Amara, 2013).This particular “bipolarity” can be also viewed in the daily life. Someone may observe young people in their jeans aimlessly hanging out in a Starbucks, and simultaneously someone may also notice people rushing towards a mosque during the call to prayer. Turkey strangely has a constitutionally stricter secular background than the US or France, thus some additional religion into the mix will not affect the balance (Kuru, 2008). Kuru(2007, p. 150) in another article continues that “the pro-Islamic conservatives, such as the Gülen movement and the AK Party, try to promote a new passive secularist ideology, which allows public visibility of religion”. More to the point, secularism and Islamism are increasingly becoming more liberal in their temperament, meaning they no longer represent a threat to one another (Akyol, 2012) also due to the fact that Islamism as a political movement challenges the secular state, while the

Secularism vs. Islamism: Trick or Treat

secularization process has shaped the identities and practices of the Islamist actors (Göle, 1997, p. 48). Besides, if someone exclusively observes the institutional and legal reforms will notice that the AKP1 government shares very much in common with the early Turkish republic (Akyol, 2012). Unfortunately, if someone looks beyond that prism will notice the violence, the injustice and the corruption. Nevertheless, this situation is rather distant from the clichéd outlook of Islamism as visibility of the religion -theoretically at least- does not necessarily undermine the democratic norms of the country. In Greece for example, which is a member of the European Union, the Orthodox Church could effectively dictate or influence foreign policy or the imams of the Muslim minority in the north have recognised judicial jurisdiction by the state, and yet it is perceived as normal practice and the democratic norms are unaffected. The predicaments in Turkey must not be connected to the rise or not of Islamist affinities. At the end of the day corruption, impunity, and authoritarian tendencies could stem from any strictly secular government. Thus is Islamism in Turkey just a ruse? Is it a device that influences circumstances? Or is it a real menace to the constitutionally embedded secularism which threatens the social cohesion and foundations of the Turkish state? The research has shown that some degree of conservative reforms have indeed taken place (headscarf in Universities, ban of drinks in public spaces, religious education) but the bulk of the Islamist and secularist ambivalence still remains imprinted to the expectations of the Turkish political elites, the Turkish society and the international stage. It seems that the fear of Islamism is mostly smouldering in emotions, feelings, anticipations and the provocative rhetoric on behalf of the AKP and the CHP2.Fanatics and polarization exist everywhere and that makes the perils very real but in this perspective Turkey is not unique at all. Of course, the circumstances might change overnight and one of the 3 scenarios mentioned in the beginning could actually come to 1 2

Justice and Development Party of Turkey led by Prime Minister RecepTayyipErdogan Republican Peoples’ Party led by Kemal Kilicdaroglu

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fruition. However, the real problem at the moment is not the unremitting ambivalence between Islamism and secularism, as Turkey proves that is able to move forward unobstructed. Also it seems that there is still plenty of space for Turkey to waver between the two concepts. Indeed, Turkey still has enough social and political buffers to offset a small potential susceptibility towards Islamism. Nonetheless, the criticism should not focus on Erdoğan’s predisposition to Islamism but on Erdoğan’s predisposition of becoming the Putin equivalent of Turkey. Turkey -under Erdoğan- projected an unprecedented growth rate but currently has more imprisoned journalists than China and Iran combined (Hasan, 2012). It is widely believed that Erdoğan favours a presidential system with boosted constitutional powers (Dabestani, Sevinclidir, & Erol, 2012), while other reports also mention that Erdoğan plans to emulate the Russian leader's switch from prime minister to president and thereby become the longest-serving leader in Turkish history (Hasan, 2012). In any case, the Islamic revival as long as it lingers in this hybrid fashion does not constitute an obstacle for the economy and the society. Turkey’s worries would be onerous if the country slides into an authoritarian and semi-dictatorial oppressive spiral. Then nobody will care if Turkey is more secular or more Islamic.

Basic References Akyol, T. (2012, April 17). Why both Islamists ans Secularists are winning battles for Turkey's

soul.

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http://www.worldcrunch.com/world-affairs/why-both-islamists-and-secularists-arewinning-battles-for-turkey-s-soul/c1s5086/ Dabestani, A., Sevinclidir, P., & Erol, E. (2012, October 24). Is Turkey's secular system in

danger?

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http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-20028295 Eshel, D. (2007, May 16). Myths and Realities of Turkey's Hidden Islamist Agenda. Retrieved

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update.com/analysis/analysis_160507_Turkey.htm

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Secularism vs. Islamism: Trick or Treat Finoshina, M. (2013, April 13). Turkey fears of Islamic challenge to secular state. Retrieved July 29, 2013, from Russia Today: http://rt.com/news/islam-challengessecular-turkey-861/ Göle, N. (1997). Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-Elites. Middle East Journal, 51 (1), 46-58. Guvenc, B. (1998). Secular Trends and Turkish Identity. Journal of International Affairs, 2 (4). Hasan, M. (2012, July 21). Al Jazeera. Retrieved July 30, 2013, from The Turkish paradox: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/07/201272011283765829.html Kayaoğlu, T. (2012, April 12). Secularism in Turkey: Stronger than ever? Retrieved July 29,

2013,

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Zaman:

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secularism-in-turkey-stronger-than-ever-by-turan-kayaoglu*.html Kuru, A. (2007). Changing Perspectives on Islamism and Secularism in Turkey: The Gulen Movement and the AK Party. In I. Yilmaz, Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement (pp. 140-151). London: Leeds Metropolitan University Press. Kuru, A. (2008). Secularism in Turkey: Myths and Realities. Insight Turkey, 10 (3), 101110. Macdonald, A., & Amara, T. (2013, June 12). Erdoğan: from 'rock star' to mixed reviews from

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http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/12/us-turkey-protests-arabsidUSBRE95B17L20130612 Naeem, R. (2013, June 9). Turkish Spring, Iranian Winter? (Sustainable Development Television) Retrieved July 29, 2013, from Sustainable Development Policy Institute: http://www.sdpi.tv/play/show.php?cat=rc&id=466 Nerantzaki, E. (2013, July 22). Gezi movement: What can it mean for Turkey? Retrieved July

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Secularism vs. Islamism: Trick or Treat Norton, S. (2002). Resolving Cyprus: The Future of Secular Turkey. Retrieved July 30, 2013, from Wilson Center: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/resolvingcyprus-the-future-secular-turkey Ochsenwald, W., & Fisher, S. (2003). The Middle East: A History. New York: McGrawHill. Rafizadeh, M. (2013, July 6). Turkey: The Struggle Between Secularism and "Moderate Islamism".

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Unraveling Turkey – Collective Volume on Turkish Politics & Society

NIKOS PAPAKOSTAS & NIKOS PASAMITROS

Protests, Fields of Social Interaction and the Future of the Turkish Civic Society Abstract: Turkey is a country that has been on the crossroad between East and West for too long. The basic question we aim at answering is whether the particular position is a viable one. In that context, we view recent/ongoing protests and turbulence that followed as a manifestation of pre-existing predicaments rather than a cause for new ones. This short paper has two basic objectives: on the one hand, we strive to provide sustainable and tangible notions regarding the potential impact of the recent/current events on the balance of power within the Turkish society. On the other hand, to utilize the other six articles of the present collection in order to reach preliminary conclusions on the future of Turkey, in general, and the country’s civil society, in particular. Nikos Papakostasis the Head of Research & Analysis Departments at Inter Alia, Civic Action Meeting Point Nikos Pasamitros, is a PhD candidate at Panteion University and Project Coordinator at Inter Alia – Civic Action Meeting Point

Introduction and Context Throughout the past few years, Turkey constituted an international focal point for an assortment of reasons. In the field of international relations and foreign affairs, Turkey held an active and often regulatory role in the region as in the case of the Syrian conflict and the “first wave” riots1 in Egypt. Also, it raised intense international attention due to its confrontational relationship with Israel. In the field of the economy, the case of Turkey was widely debated upon due to its rapid growth and outgoingness with scholars arguing for and against the viability of its aspired role as a regional economic “superpower”. As regards the country’s internal affairs, the massive crackdown of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (primarily) against the Army due to an alleged plot for his toppling, caused an international sensation. Recently the spotlight was turned to Turkey due to the“Gezi resistance” movementand the violent response of the government that 1

With the term “first wave” riots we refer to the social movement that forced former President Hosni Mubarak out of office in 2011. We refer as “second wave” riots to the ongoing unrest that broke out due to the refusal of transitional President Morsi to leave office in July 2013 between his supporters and opponents.

The future of the Turkish civil society

opened a debate on the social viability of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s cultural imprint and plan for the country. All these processes might have overlapped as to their impact and to have collectively put together a new set of dynamics involving Turkey and its international role. However, in essence, they simply highlighted deep and profound social divergences, well known to most people who take interest in the country. While these discrepancies along with the repulsive forces they generate might be the outcome of charismatic leadership, its origins most probably lay elsewhere. In an international framework not friendly to personcentered governance, the country’s unfulfilled relationship with the West and the uneven role it aspires to in the East has led to important development and cultural divergences throughout the country. These divergences outline the inconsequent and abrupt process of Westernization that loses steam along with the enhancement of Prime Minister’s confidence that his vision for the country could be accomplished. The question of secularism versus Islamism as Nicholas Rossis handsomely indicates in this volume constitutes a simplified version of the truth. It is a handy but false nexus subject to manipulation to the end of social mobilization. This largely occurs because it is a highly charged cultural (yet, not political) issue for the Turkish society. Given that most things in politics, and in life, tend to fulfill themselves, the question that rises is what would constitute a real discourse for the Turkish society? And what would it take for a change in the existing discourse?

Theoretical Framework Before the election of R. T. Erdoğan to the premiership in Turkey, the political elite, the Army, and, to one extent or the other, the religious elites (Figure II) antagonized for the primary role in the Turkish society based on their mobilization capacity. While not being in a position, in this particular context, to discuss the desirability of the implication of non-elected institutions such as the military or religious elites in the sphere of social interaction, it is true that

The future of the Turkish civil society

they divided the social space and created mutual checks and balances. However, opposite to the process of development as it will be described in the next paragraphs, the existing elites were not complemented by the emergence of new forces such as independent media or a vibrant civil society. On the contrary, they were marginalized by the uneven prevalence of the political elite; and, yet, of a political elite almost monopolized by a single personality. Here, a word of theory is deemed necessary. According to some of the basic principles of sociological theory (e.g. Durkheim, 1893; Parsons 1937), humans have the intrinsic need to create groups in which they feel safe. Safety derives from the gradual formation of collective conscience (culture) that renders other group members’ actions predictable. The in-group offers physical and psychological security from external threats (Frank and Melville 1998). At the same time, collective conscience renders humans prone to particularism as their need for safety and the ties they progressively create with other group members overcome their potential moral considerations/constraints. In less developed societies, safety derives from the group’s size; the larger the group, the safer the member. In turn, these large groups have the tendency to create elites which are considered essential for maintaining order; the larger the group, the stronger the elites (here, we will refer to that notion of power distance between the elites and the public as relative preeminence). The elites have the habit to embed their relative preeminence that increases the majority’s dependence on them. During the process of social evolution social/cultural groups tend to become smaller2. Their relationship with each other gradually stops being defined by an external authority (e.g. state) in a punitive manner, and is derived by social automatizations for resolving their conflicts based on shared principles/moral considerations (Figure I). For that reason, while crises and conflicts unavoidably emerge, at least in a West-centered context, they tend to lose in

The reason for that is arguably the specialization of labour and the principle of comparative advantage. However, going into that discussion would be rather out-of-context here.

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frequency and intensity along with social evolution and the opening of the markets (Parsons, 1937). Figure I: Open Access Governance Order â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Randomness of Interaction

Relig. Elite

Econ. Elite

Media Civil Society

Military

Judiciary

There is no single point in time that transition from particularistic order towards universalism3 occurs. However, there are particular turning points that, based on the evolution of the respective society, can change incentives and sources of approbation for both elites and constituencies and gradually move societies and regimes closer to the principle of universalism. Governance regimes can be broadly categorized based on governmentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; relationship with the public as accessible and inaccessible. In the case of the former, access to state resources is equal for all citizens and distribution of resources is made in a fair and impartial way. Reversely, inaccessible regimes are built upon particularistic order, that is, access to state resources based on

Another term borrowed by North, Weingast and Wallis (2009). See bibliography section.

ÂŠ Inter Alia, Civic Action Meeting Point, August 2013

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individuals’ closeness to existing elites (North, Weingast& Wallis, 2009; Mungiu-Pippidi et. al., 2012). People, who consider themselves unable or inapposite to challenge the existing order, concentrate around these powerful centers for representing their interests (Rothstein & Eek, 2005). At their end, elites utilize popular support in order to maintain their relative preeminence (Weber, 1922-1968; North, Weingast& Wallis, 2009). Along with the opening of markets and the transition to democracy4, traditional elites (political, religious, military) are concentrated in the political arena (what North, Weingast, and Wallis refer to as competitive particularism) as the easiest way for maintaining their advantageous position (North, Weingast& Wallis, 2009). Going back to the case of Turkey, R. T. Erdoğan’s, personifying the political elite, gradually acquired a disproportional part of the sphere of social interaction, thus, necessitating all other potential factors of influence to orbit around him (Figure III). In nature, smaller objects are attracted by bigger ones and revolve around them. In social equilibria based on competitive particularism the political system takes up a disproportional part of public life and constraints mobility of other social factors (figure III). It, thus, embeds its advantageous position while none of the social factors has the ability to approach to challenge existing elites, because they cannot stop orbiting around them (through the prevalence of particularistic order in the civil society, media, and the economy).

At least in a West-centered context

The future of the Turkish civil society

Figure II: pre-ErdoÄ&#x;an â&#x20AC;&#x201C; traditional social organization

Political Elite

Military

Religious Elite

According to the typology put forward by Alina Mungiu-Pippidiet. al, (2012, 2013), the prevalence of social equilibria that are based on particularism can be measured as: the resources available to elites minus the normative constraints set through collective action. In the contemporary globalized environment, resources can be categorized as5: power discretion (regulation, red tape, privatization laws) and material resources (public jobs and spending, preferential concessions and regulation). Normative constraints stand for behavioral principles that define collective action.

The particular notions of resources and constraints have been introduced in Mungiu Pippidi, Al. et al. (2012). See bibliography section. 5

ÂŠ Inter Alia, Civic Action Meeting Point, August 2013

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Figure III: Current Situation: Particularistic Governance Domineered by the Political Personality of P.M. Erdoğan

Legisl ative

Medi a

Judici ary

Political Elite centered around the political personality of R. T. Erdogan

Execu tive

Rel. Elite

Milita ry

Busin ess Civil Societ y

This approach finds very good application in the case of Turkey. The Prime Minister, through almost completely deconstructing the Army hierarchy, and increasing dependence of other factors, namely the religious elites 6, the civil society, the business sector, the media, and the judiciary on himself and his party drastically decreased potential sources of opposition7. In that way, the 6

The fact that R. T. Erdogan is considered to be a leader of religious origins has not increased the capacity of the religious elites to affect decision making. On the contrary, religious elites derive their legitimacy from Erdogan’s personality thus negatively affecting their independent mobilization capacity. 7In an ever clearer declaration of this fact, the Prime Minister stated: “Turkish future is only defined by the people and the ballot, not the media, not the social media, not the terrorists at

The future of the Turkish civil society

R. T. Erdoğan has concentrated resources and their allocation discretion and has drastically constrained the mobilization capacity and collective action potential from the remaining elites in the Turkish society through his intimidating personality and authoritarian attitude.

Gezi Resistance and its Added Value As it was analyzed by Gizem Alioglu-Cakmak in this volume, the recent/ongoing protests in Turkey constitute to an important extent a prototype movement. Its shared features with other social protests throughout the globe are primarily derived by the mode of mobilization, that is, the organization through the social media. This is indeed an important and universal difference of “new” social movements with manifold externalities related to the quality and the process of social change. However, on the one hand, this issue cannot be properly addressed in this particular context and, on the other, Turkey has nothing really new to offer in that discussion. Other characteristics of the movement such as its primary agenda, its repertoire, its social geography or the opportunity and repression sequence do not distinctly concur with other contemporary movements. This is yet another externality of the ambiguous placement of Turkey between East and West and the sociopolitical realities that come with it. However, there are features that characterize the particular movement more than others. A definitive difference of the Gezi movement is that the primary agenda of demonstrators was not directly related to shortage of resources but to the political personality of the Prime Minister and the popular projections/responses to it (see the paper by Gizem Cakmak in this volume). While in the cases of Northern Africa and the Middle East authoritarian leadership played an important role in unraveling popular indignation, it is highly questionable whether they would mobilize the public if it wasn’t for deteriorating living standards, unemployment or massive social inequalities.

the squares, and neither does the capital”. Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nAGx_Npu_7I

The future of the Turkish civil society

A (political) personality is not necessarily static and predictable. A great number of Taksim protestors were mobilized by the realization that the society they live in is in fact less developed than they had left themselves think judging by economic growth and (for an important segment of the population) raising living standards. Thus, it could be argued that the Gezi protest disillusioned people and set the framework for reflecting on their society. This could probably lead a large part of protesters to reconsider social values and possibly alter them. Moreover, as it is successfully indicated in Esra Dogan’s article, the recent protest could carry increased importance for the Turkish society in the medium and long term as it mobilized an important, formerly politically inactive, part of the society, particularly among the youth. As it has been commonly discussed by social movement analysts (for instance Mc Adam, 1967; Crossley, 2005) protesters cherish the moments they spent struggling for a joint cause and pursue their repetition. In that way, a larger and more assertive core of the civil society is gradually formed that sets the pace for social mobilization. On the other hand, through interacting in a context of social movements, protesters have the chance to familiarize with notions such as liberalism, socialism, representation, or more significantly, how such abstractions may be interpreted in terms of one’s own life history and social experience (Bamyeh, 2011). Based on people’s tendency to find interest to what they can understand and, thereof, succeed in (the concept of cognitive liberation introduced by Mc Adam, 1967), it is rather possible that the particular protest be rendered a starting point for a better informed and more involved civil society.

Concluding Remarks – Prospects and Pitfalls Turkey has recently attracted a growing volume of international attention for its activity at domestic, regional, and international level. However, as it has often been suggested “no news is good news”. After being on a fast growing

The future of the Turkish civil society

track for quite some time, Turkey seems to have lost steam. The reason for that is the fatigue of the Erdoğan government to proceed with reforms that would settle the secular part/half of the Turkish society. PM Erdoğan, gradually losing in confidence and momentum, retrieves to the old and safe way of populism and divisiveness. In a country where his own charismatic personality has carved the dividing lines, it is rather easy to deepen them. However, it is rather probable that Erdoğan has already overplayed his hand. Despite the fact that his unyieldingly strong-handed stance has, thus far, maintained cohesiveness at elite level, it is far from certain that this will go on indefinitely provided that public discontent persists. This is largely related to the PM’s capacity to continue mobilizing his “own 50%”, as he likes referring to his electoral supporters. While the secular 50% are increasingly opposing Erdoğan’s rule due to conceptual differences, Erdoğan has maintained his electoral force due to a combination of economic policy effectiveness and the support of Muslim populations. Nonetheless, in this particular conjuncture, it appears that the effort to create an apolitical audience that subdues civic action or moral considerations to macroeconomic factors or partisanship and narrow group interest is rapidly decreasing. In that context, it is important to note that protesters stance in the recent events seem to have put people before their moral and sociopolitical obligations. The international momentum of social protest that was initiated in Egypt in 2011 and the movements that sprung throughout the globe has led to the increase in confidence of the civil society and the middle class. Normative constraints put before the Turkish political elites will most probably multiply as long as the current momentum – both domestically and internationally persists and the Prime Minister continues with his divisive rhetoric and initiatives. The increasing visibility and internationalization of protest movements through social media have rendered forceful reaction on behalf of governments extremely risky and politically costly. The recent/ongoing

The future of the Turkish civil society

events can importantly affect both the way Erdoğan perceives his role and the public and it is essential that the currently uneven sphere social interaction is reshuffled. If not, a further escalation is not out of the question. And, in these tense and complicated times for the region, this is certainly what one would wish for the country. Basic References Bamyeh, M. (2011).Anarchist, Liberal and Authoritarian Enlightenments – Notes from the Arab Spring, The New Significance. Retrieved from: http://www.thenewsignificance.com/2011/08/01/mohammed-bamyeh-anarchistliberal-and-authoritarian-enlightenments-notes-from-the-arab-spring/ Crossley, N. (2005). Making Sense of Social Movements, Open University Press, Philadelphia Durkheim, Em. (1893): Division of Labor in Society, Trans. Lewis A. Coser. New York: Free Press, 1997 Frank, Jerome D. & Melville, Andrei Y. (1988): The Image of the Enemy and the Process of Change. In AnatoliiAndreevich Gromyko and Martin E. Hellman (Eds.), Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking. Palo Alto, California: Beyond War Foundation Jenkings, G. and Glandermans, B. (eds.),(2005).The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements, University College London Press, UK McAdam, D. (1986). Recruitment to High Risk Activism: the Case of Freedom Summer, American Journal of Sociology, 92(1):64-90 MungiuPippidi, Al. et al. (2012): Contextual Choices at Fighting Corruption: Lessons Learnt, European Research Center for Anti-Corruption and State Building, Working Paper No. 30, Berlin; MungiuPippidi, Al. et al. (2013). The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Controlling Corruption in the European Union, Advanced Policy Paper for Discussion in the European Parliament, European Research Center for Anti-Corruption and State Building, Berlin

The future of the Turkish civil society North, D. C. & Wallis J.J. &Weingast B.R. (2009): Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History, New York, Cambridge University Press Parsons, T. (1937): The Structure of Social Action,publ. McGraw Hill Polleta, F. (2011). Maybe you are better off not holding hands and singing we shall overcome, Mobilizing Ideas. http://mobilizingideas.wordpress.com. Accessed on June 1st 2012 Rothstein, B. &Teorell J. (2008): What Is Quality of Government? A Theory of Impartial Government Institutions, Governance, 21(2): 165-19 Weber, M. (1922-1968): Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, vols. 1â&#x20AC;&#x201C;3, G. Roth and C. Wittich (eds.), New York: Bedminster Press

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