Solving the haze riddle
The Big Ideas of Mr Lee Kuan Yew
Upside Down
ISSUE #18 • Jul–Sep 2013
Despite being important, interesting, and widelyresearched, there is as yet no accepted general theory of collective action. In an upcoming book, Assistant Professor Eduardo Araral, winner of the 2013 Elinor Ostrom Award on Collective Governance of the Commons, points to a promising direction – the place of contracting cost in understanding the level of, and reasons for, cooperative action. costs – cost of agreeing, monitoring, enforcement, and making credible commitments – are low, we will observe the emergence, survival, dominance and stability of a population of what are “conditional co-operators”. This is an “if-then”, rational, self-interested model – cooperation is therefore less likely if contracting costs are perceived to be high. This model is a 3G model of collective action, and hence one step forward towards a general theory. THE BIG IDEA
Towards a More General Theory of Collective Action by Alisha Gill
T
he standard top-down solution to collective action problems talks about an effective legal system that enforces contracts and regulations. The standard bottom-up solution is mutual trust. Araral, however, argues that a large number of cooperative actions are left unexplained by these two models. Instead, these actions
are better understood as the bilateral efforts of parties who think that they can achieve mutual benefits if they can devise cost-effective contracting mechanisms. Hence, the world of rational egoists can make room for what appears to be unselfish acts, by looking at their beliefs about contracting costs. If contracting
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First and Second Generation Models The first-generation theories – Prisoner’s Dilemma, Public Goods Dilemma, and Tragedy of the Commons – have been helpful in modelling the fundamental structure of collective action problems. The models, however, make unrealistic assumptions – namely, that agents cannot communicate, and when they can, talk is cheap; formal and informal institutions or norms, such as reciprocity, are inconsequential; the rational egoist is the only type of agent, and self-interested agents can only act in the collective interest if there are few of... p continued on page 3
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