Global-is-Asia Digital Magazine 2021-2022

About Global- is-Asian

Global-is-Asian is the flagship digital platform of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (LKYSPP). With content backed by research and grounded in practitioners’ experiences, we shape global thinking and steer meaningful conversations on policy issues and international affairs affecting Asia and the world.

THE

TEAM

KANTI PRASAD BAJPAI

Vice Dean (Research and Development) and Wilmar Professor of Asian Studies, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, NUS

MONICA KHOO Associate Director, Thought Leadership and Strategic Communications, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, NUS

ALAN HO Assistant Manager, Thought Leadership and Strategic Communications, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, NUS

Building Back Better with Trampolines

ASIA AT A CROSSROADS

India and China Differences Run Deep

The “Dual-Commitment Problem” in China’s Economic Development: The Case of Local Government Debt

Reversing Demographic Decline

A Zero-COVID-19 Strategy Has Worked in China, But Will it Work Elsewhere?

Taking that Squid Game Quiz? Ad Tech is Watching You

ASIA THINKER SERIES

Food Technologies: Necessary, Unique or Challenging?

Beyond Vaccines: Asia’s Uneven Recovery –What Does the Future Hold?

Beyond Vaccines: Asia’s Food and Water Future

Building Back Better with Trampolines

Before the pandemic ends is when we need to debate how the world should look afterwards. Many “build back better” proposals are in circulation. In studying them, we need to focus on two ideas: first, resilience; second, social cohesion.

As argued in The Resilient Society, a wonderful book launched at this month’s Singapore Fintech Festival, resilience is the ability to bounce back. It is a feature of systems that show elasticity.

Resilience is, therefore, distinct from being strong and robust, and different again from being aware of or capable of dealing with risk.

When a society is only robust, it confronts any external force with its internal strength. The Covid-19 pandemic is such an external force, but one that quickly showed it could overwhelm even the strongest of nations; robustness here did not help.

Even combining robustness and risk aversion, and seeking to guard against rare black-swan events, would not have helped. Through mutation, the coronavirus showed how it could overcome even the most closely constructed and far-ranging of avoidance measures. Everyone, no matter how risk averse in minimising his own exposure, was quickly drawn into the pandemic’s circle of effect.

By most expert accounts, Covid-19 is just one of a sequence of large threats to humanity. This coronavirus got through. Others are already on the way. The message from this experience should be: “You can run, but you cannot hide. Resistance is futile.”

Resilience to shocks

Resilience, however, can help. Let known and unknown shocks hit — we will bounce back.

In economics, we think of a pandemic shock as an exogenous disturbance: It emerged from outside the normal operation of the system.

In today’s world, however, other large recent shocks have emerged from within; that is, they are endogenous. The global climate crisis today powerfully affects business operations, livelihoods and relations across nations.

But the climate crisis is not an exogenous disturbance. Instead, it emerged from everyday human activity normalised since the Industrial Revolution.

Geopolitical rivalry now profoundly affects technological advance, trade relations and the global supply chain, cultural and people-to-people ties, and education and scholarship.

Geopolitical rivalry is a large disturbance but an endogenous one: Today’s US-China tensions come from a potent combination of China’s economic success in the era of hyperglobalisation together with a growing musculature in its dealings with the rest of the world, and America’s perception of the challenge to its hegemonic position from a fast-rising challenger great power.

Featured Faculty

Danny Quah Dean and Li Ka Shing Professor in Economics

Resilience, however, can help. Let known and unknown shocks hit — we will bounce back.

Social cohesion

The breakdown of social cohesion is real all around the world. By the 2010s, global unrest - whether measured in strikes and demonstrations or in media accounts of social discord - had exploded to four times what it had been just 30 years earlier.

In the historical arc, this increase is concentrated in sporadic short bursts, but when it occurs, there is rarely fallback to earlier levels.

Social cohesion is when people in society do not undermine or cheat but instead work with and help one another.

One possible way to achieve social cohesion might be through providing a sense of trust and community to the group. But trust can also lead to moral hazard and free-riding: “If you really trusted me, you would not be looking over my shoulder all the time.”

Thus, a sense of belonging in the group is neither necessary nor sufficient for individual members to cooperate and help one another.

In research by the Social Mobility Foundation at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, we are exploring if what matters instead is

that everyone sees they are engaged in a positive-sum game, where raising others lifts oneself.

When social cohesion deteriorates and populists agitate on nationalistic, racist or xenophobic agendas, this impacts domestic politics and distracts policymakers from taking on important global challenges.

Such domestic unrest is almost never due to an exogenous disturbance, but emerges endogenously from shortcomings within that society itself. Deterioration of social cohesion too, therefore, is an endogenous disturbance.

The consequential effects of social cohesion cannot be over-estimated. The United States is the world’s largest economy, has the world’s strongest military and runs excellent hospitals.

Yet, in early 2020 as its divisive leader Donald Trump degraded America’s ability to have its people come together, the country’s responses to the pandemic resulted in death rates exceeding 1,500 per million, even as Singapore, China, New Zealand and other countries kept Covid-19 fatalities to under five per million.

Today, despite its far greater access to vaccines than many poorer nations, America remains the polity with the world’s highest cumulative number of infections and deaths from Covid-19, ahead even of India, which has a larger population, or Indonesia, which has far lower per capita income, than the US.

“If you really trusted me, you would not be looking over my shoulder all the time.”

Professor Danny Quah

Bouncing back

Looking ahead for possible postpandemic social models, resilience and cohesion need to be central. Systems need to show elasticity. To that end, I suggest a metaphor for how we can build back better: the trampoline.

The Resilient Society mentions “trampoline” once in passing; the word does not appear in the index. Singaporeans will remember that moment at the 2015 St Gallen Symposium when then Deputy Prime Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam was asked if Singapore believed in a social safety net, and he replied: “I believe in the notion of a trampoline.” The metaphor has been used since to evaluate specific policy proposals in Singapore.

More than just specifics, however, the trampoline provides the best conceptual model for both resilience and social cohesion, while simultaneously capturing both exogenous and endogenous disturbances.

Resilience is the elasticity and springiness in society that allows bouncing back from a shock. The trampoline is all about bounce-back.

Social cohesion is when different sections of the community cooperate and collaborate. So, too, the trampoline’s different componentsthe taut fabric, the steel frame, and the edge rings and coiled springs holding together support and bounce mat - all have to work together, or the entire structure fails.

If a micro-tear appears in the fabric and is not quickly repaired, the entire bounce mat can rend apart as shocks continue to test the system. So too with social cohesion: Small misunderstandings must not be allowed to fester or they will grow.

Next, you cannot draw a trampoline too tight or it will break, and you cannot draw it too loose or the user will break. Society cannot operate when it is stretched to hyperefficiency or pounded into robustness, as it will not withstand an external shock. But at the same time, society cannot be flabby as it will not hold together and advance.

Third, as with global supply chains or ordinary physical chains, the part that is least strong for trampolines needs the greatest support. The entire national or global system is only as strong as the weakest link.

Fourth, a trampoline needs to be kept in regular use. Having societies unchallenged for too long ossifies the O-rings around the edges of the trampoline. A string of small crises is to be welcomed, and provides valuable stress-testing. Successfully dealing with small shocks prepares society for the big disturbances.

Fifth, modelling ourselves on a trampoline changes how societies perceive inequality. Rigid egalitarianism demands high maintenance, and is not resilient.

Instead, what is resilient is the dynamic fluidity when every part of society is able to bounce back after being hit by bad shocks, such as disease or employment dislocation.

To go higher, one needs to take chances, and not be risk averse and sit quietly. Social mobility is what gives people hope so that on that upward trajectory, they see their children and their children’s children continuing to experience improvement in well-being. Even those currently deprived feel society continues to have space for them and they are not permanently excluded. Hope powers the positivesum game.

Finally, a trampoline is not a Formula One race car. The resilient structure is not built for speed. Do not expect societies to operate at frenetic, breakneck pace if what you want is something that is going to bounce back better when it hits a bump on the road.

As the world seeks its post-pandemic equilibrium and tries to build back better, the model of a trampoline can help provide both resilience and social cohesion.

This article was first published in The Straits Times on 17 November 2021

Finally, a trampoline is not a Formula One race car. The resilient structure is not built for speed. Do not expect societies to operate at frenetic, breakneck pace if what you want is something that is going to bounce back better when it hits a bump on the road.

India and China Differences Run Deep

China and India, two Asian countries with the largest populations in the world, 1.4 and 1.3 billion people respectively, constitute 40 per cent of the world’s population. Both have been colonised by European powers and are still considered developing nations by the United Nations. They have tried to manage their differences, have cooperated on global issues, and have built a robust economic relationship, but they remain rivals, and in 2020 their troops were involved in a fracas in the Himalayan borderlands. Why are the two stubbornly

odds?

Wilmar

Are Not

Dean

of Asian Studies, Kanti

He lays out

terms of what he calls the 4Ps:

Featured Faculty

Kanti Prasad Bajpai Vice Dean (Research and Development)

Wilmar Professor

Continuous border dispute

When it comes to territorial issues (Perimeters), there have been many disputes and disagreements. The ongoing disputes are over tracts of land in Ladakh/Aksai Chin in India’s northwest and in Arunachal Pradesh in India’s northeast. Also an issue is Tibet, an autonomous region in China, that is important for both countries for various reasons including security. From India’s perspective, a more autonomous Tibet could limit the Chinese troop presence along the border. On the other hand, China sees Tibet as vital for border security with India. “There have been two cycles of cooperation over the border and Tibet [from 1949 to 1962 and from 1963 to the present] that ended in conflict,” recalls Prof Bajpai.

Since 2013, disputes have occurred in five locations in the borderlands: at Depsang, Chumar, Burtse, Doklam, and Galwan. “All of these disputes are related to infrastructure developments on the other side of the border that both parties didn’t like.”

Always on opposite sides

Since 1949, India and China have never been on the same side in international politics. For instance, during the Cold War, India aligned itself with the Soviet Union, whereas China aligned itself

with the Soviet Union and the US, the two superpowers at that time. On the other hand, India and China were never aligned with each other against the other two powers. After the Cold War, their alignments drifted to the point where India has much more cooperation with the US and China is closer to post-Soviet Russia.

“This pattern of partnerships has meant that Delhi and Beijing have no history of strategic collaboration to balance against their negative perceptions of each other and their conflicts in the perimeters,” says Prof Bajpai. He adds that if they had been on the same side, they would have been in a better position to reassure each other when disputes and conflicts occurred.

A widening gap

“Back in the 1960s to the late 1970s, both countries were on equal footing in economic terms and perhaps comprehensive national power, but today this is no longer the case,” notes Prof. Bajpai. China’s economy is at least five times the size of India’s; there are also asymmetries of military and soft power (the latter being the ability to persuade and attract other nations to one’s cause). It’s safe to say therefore China has the decisive advantage in power terms.

The asymmetry of power can be seen in the 2020 Lowy Asia Power Index that measures the ability of 26 nations to influence the Asia region. China is ranked 2nd behind the US. Meanwhile, India is regarded as a middle power, ranking 4th. A key area of soft power mentioned by Prof. Bajpai is the tourism sector. China attracts many times more tourists than India. “A Chinese friend who’s an admirer of India’s cultural and natural riches used to say to me that India has terrible infrastructure, and it focuses more on domestic tourism rather than attracting foreigners,” says Prof Bajpai.

Overall, China’s development is years ahead of India. The consequence of this is that from a position of strength, China does not see why it should offer India any concessions in their disputes. For its part, India realises that it is behind China, so it is unwilling to make concessions that could be seen as surrendering to its rival. As a result, the two countries rarely agree on anything. Prof. Bajpai argues that “It would take an almost civilizational change in India for it to reduce the power gap and to shift the standing and perceptions of both countries to a more equal one.”

“Back in the 1960s to the late 1970s, both countries were on equal footing in economic terms and perhaps comprehensive national power, but today this is no longer the case.”

Kanti Prasad Bajpai

The “Dual-Commitment Problem” in China’s Economic Development: The Case of Local Government Debt

While President Xi is resolutely holding onto his signature dynamic zero-COVID-19 policy, other party leaders are pulling as many policy strings as they can to resuscitate the faltering Chinese economy. They are lowering the five-year loan prime rate, renewing support for platform companies, easing overseas listing rules, and reassuring the world that China’s reform and opening up isn’t over but will continue to expand. But alongside China’s Sisyphean fight against COVID-19 lies its real Achilles heel: mounting Local government debt (LGD).

It is little known that for many years, Beijing has been purposely quiet about the risks of LGD, even though many China analysts and observers have been sounding the alarm for a long time. Only beginning in 2017 did the party’s Central Leading Group on Finance and Economic Affairs and the state media begin to label LGD as a threat to the economy, sounding alarm bells by calling it a “gray rhino.” Why the long reticence?

In a recent article published in the China Journal, we explored this puzzle with publicly available data, government documents, and personal memoirs and found that the LGD problem was, in a way, by design. For a long time, the center chose to keep its eyes closed to the problem, as it was the outcome of a “grand bargain” between the center and localities in the mid-1990s. “[Total revenue and total spending are your [i.e., local

governments’] own secret. I only care about how much the center is getting,” said Zhu Rongji, China’s then vice premier and the architect of many key reforms.

To compensate for local losses after a set of centralising economic reforms in the 1990s — especially the 1994 tax reform, which sharply reduced local shares of budgetary revenue — Beijing gave localities brand new tools and unprecedented fiscal autonomy to promote economic development. The institutional seeds of LGD were sown. Deeply intertwined, these seeds grew together and fed into each other. Two of them are particularly worth highlighting, as they continue to matter tremendously in Chinese political economy: the local state banks and local government financing vehicles.

To solicit local support for fiscal recentralisation in 1994, Beijing used

bank charters as a bargaining chip. Since then, the number of local financial institutions in China has proliferated exponentially, reaching well over 2,000. These smaller institutions are either directly owned or controlled by local governments, thus their “statist” nature. To survive and thrive in a market already dominated by the several gargantuan central state-owned banks, these small players innovated, providing a tremendous impetus to the rise of shadow banking in China1

Whether the local state banks prosper or perish will be a harbinger for the Chinese economy as a whole. At the epicentre of the recent well-known Evergrande crisis was a local state bank that used to provide the real estate company with substantial financial support through related lending.

With the Chinese economy presently hobbled, some local state banks have begun to crumble. The recent deposit freeze at three village banks in Henan is one such bad sign. Systematic central bailout is increasingly foreseeable down the road.

What does the rise of the local state banks have to do with local government debt? After all, Chinese law prohibits local governments from borrowing from any bank. Herein lies the genius of local governments: they created middlemen, local government financing vehicles2. These vehicles operated as investment corporations for local governments and were put in charge of infrastructure development such as roads, ports, hospitals, schools, industrial parks, and so on, especially projects that were mandated but unfunded by the upperlevel governments, to borrow from banks. And Beijing acquiesced. These corporations played an especially important role during the 2008 global financial crisis, as localities engaged in a borrowing binge to contribute to

Beijing’s stimulus package: at least half of the lending was from the local state banks, as it was much easier and faster to receive funds from them than from the large state-owned ones.

However, at approximately the same time that the global financial crisis stimulus loans were coming due, and the localities were allowed to issue municipal corporate bonds, Beijing began to tighten fiscal discipline, resorting to more direct measures to tamp down and regulate local debt. Departing from its earlier grand bargain with the localities, the center began to aggressively limit local debt and mandate more transparency in local government fiscal actions.

Beijing also tried to reduce debt by disciplining local government officials. In recent years, the center incorporated a “debt” component into cadre evaluation criteria. Local officials would be evaluated based on how well they solved debt problems, including those left by their predecessors, and were to be punished for blindly raising debt. While new debt might have decreased temporarily, it soon came back, particularly once COVID-19 hit.

As the zero COVID-19 policy brings China’s economic center to a standstill, Beijing is again demanding that localities increase spending to stimulate the economy, while keeping the astronomically stringent COVID-19 policy intact across the country.

Yet, Beijing’s “spend more money” directive to local governments cuts against its own recent commitment to rein in LGD. It’s only a matter of time before the debt issue resurges forcefully as the country juggles between growth promotion and COVID-19 elimination.

But here is the punchline: Local government debt in China is not a local problem. It’s an institutional

malaise. The Chinese state faces a dilemma that, in essence, is a “dualcommitment problem.” Growth without mounting debt requires the central state to simultaneously commit to respecting its local agents’ access to and control over the fiscal fruits of local development, while exercising credible fiscal discipline over precisely the same set of local agents that the center seeks to incentivise. Can this dual-commitment problem ever be solved under China’s current political structure?

1 In China, “shadow banking” describes essentially traditional banking activities disguised in other forms that try to evade central regulations., another source of systematic economic risk.

2 These vehicles operated as investment corporations for local governments and were put in charge of infrastructure development such as roads, ports, hospitals, schools, industrial parks, and so on, especially projects that were mandated but unfunded by the upper-level governments.

To survive and thrive in a market already dominated by the several gargantuan central state-owned banks, these small players innovated, providing a tremendous impetus to the rise of shadow banking in China

As the zero COVID-19 policy brings China’s economic center to a standstill, Beijing is again demanding that localities increase spending to stimulate the economy, while keeping the astronomically stringent COVID-19 policy intact across the country.

Reversing Demographic Decline

Faculty

Tan Poh Lin Assistant Professor

Globally, fertility is on the decline. While a total fertility rate below the replacement level of 2.1 is now the norm for advanced economies, the very lowest rates are found in Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, and higher-income Chinese cities, including Shanghai and Hong Kong SAR. As a result, in the absence of immigration, this region is set to experience the most rapid population aging and decline.

In the case of Singapore, the government has grappled with the relentless downward trend in fertility since the 1980s. After a public campaign and limited programs failed to produce results, a package of pronatalist incentives was introduced in 2001 and enhanced over the years. Currently, the package includes paid maternity leave, childcare subsidies, tax relief and rebates, one-time cash gifts, and grants for companies that implement flexible work arrangements. Despite these efforts, the fertility rate deteriorated from 1.41 in 2001 to a precarious 1.16 in 2018. What can we learn from Singapore?

Lesson one: Address the rising age at childbearing

The mean age of childbearing has increased by approximately one year a decade among Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries, according to calculations by Oxford University’s Melinda Mills and colleagues (Mills and others 2011).1

In Singapore, changes in the age composition of women giving birth have been especially dramatic. Women ages 20–24 are now as likely to give birth as women ages 40–44 and far less likely than women ages 35–39. Moreover, unlike in a number of European countries, the steep decline in fertility among women in their 20s has not been offset by higher birth rates among women in their 30s. Instead of merely being delayed, these missing babies have vanished permanently.

The rising age at childbearing is the lowest-hanging fruit from a policy perspective. It is far easier to help couples who are already married and desire at least two children to achieve their fertility goals, than to attempt to match singles in the marriage market or persuade couples who do not want more children to change their minds. While the two child- family ideal continues to hold in Singapore, the phenomenon of higher ages at parenthood reduces the probability that families will achieve it, because of either unforeseen changes in

circumstances such as divorce, health, or income shocks, or reduced ability to conceive and carry a child to term. The Singaporean policy approach aims to create a more conducive environment for marriage and fertility for all groups— in particular to help married women reconcile labour participation with motherhood. However, few if any of the instruments are designed specifically to allow women to become mothers at peak childbearing ages, either to stem the decline among women in their 20s or to boost fertility rates among women in their early 30s. As a result, the lack of age sensitivity represents a lost opportunity to cater to the most receptive group of prospective parents.

Lesson two: Reproductive technologies are not a panacea

One reason for older childbearing in advanced economies is the public’s misplaced faith in reproductive technologies’ effectiveness. According to Judith Daniluk and colleagues at the University of British Columbia, common fertility myths include the belief that good health and in vitro fertilization (IVF) can offset the effects of age-related infertility (Daniluk, Koert, and Cheung 2012).2

Few people are aware that IVF poses health risks to women or that delayed childbearing can lead to more complications during pregnancy or birth and more birth defects. Men and women thus tend to underestimate the risks associated with delaying marriage and childbearing.

As part of the package of pronatalist incentives, the Singaporean government subsidises up to 75 per cent of assisted reproductive technology treatment costs for qualifying married couples and allows them to tap into their medical accounts under the national savings program to pay for the procedures. Singapore’s fertility experience suggests that access to IVF and other reproductive technologies is not sufficient to ensure that older women have enough babies to compensate for fertility decline among younger women. Japan, another excellent example, has the world’s highest percentage of babies born through IVF (about 5 per cent), as well as one of the lowest fertility rates.

Lesson three: Household production cannot be fully outsourced

Singapore’s low fertility also demonstrates the limitations of formal sector provision of childcare and housework. Peter McDonald at

the Australian National University argues that even though women have more educational and labour market opportunities than ever, gender inequality at home, which places the burden of caring for children and household chores on women, results in very high opportunity costs of childbearing and hence very low fertility (McDonald 2006).

Singapore provides insight into this issue because of the unusually robust range of options its formal sector provides. The government is heavily involved in the provision of low-cost and high-quality formal childcare. Working mothers receive childcare subsidies of S$300 a month for formal childcare; lower-income families receive more. Moreover, unlike in most other advanced economies, families can (and many do) hire relatively low-cost domestic workers from neighbouring Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines. Hence, it is relatively easy for women to outsource childcare and housework in Singapore. Singapore’s low fertility rates suggest that formal sector provision cannot substitute for parents’ spending quality time with children. While access to excellent childcare options and domestic workers may help, institutional support—parental leave and flexible work arrangements that allow families to spend more time together— is needed as well.

Lesson four: Acknowledge human capital’s true cost

It is no coincidence that Japan, Singapore, and other very low fertility countries also tend to score very well in human capital rankings, from Program for International Student Assessment tests to the new World Bank Human Capital Index. Economists have long noted a trade-off between quantity and “quality” of children (in terms of resources devoted per child). My co-authors and I argue (Tan, Morgan, and Zagheni 2016)4 that the East Asian institutional emphasis on early life achievements increases returns from investing in children’s human capital, which means more children, more expense. The other side of the coin is the serious consequences of being less successful than others, both for parents and their children. Local surveys suggest that a large proportion of singles wish to be married someday but choose to pursue educational or career success over dating.

The majority of married couples have children, but most stop at one or two, owing to high education related expenses and the desire to invest

more in each child. Couples who might otherwise want children voice concern over the ethics of a stressful childhood and upbringing or worry that they would lack the energy or ability to help their children compete effectively. Singapore’s human capital success story, which has propelled it to the top of international rankings, thus comes at a cost to its people’s willingness and ability to build families. The inability to raise the fertility rate is hence not so much a testimony to ineffective pronatalist policies as to the overwhelming success of an economic and social system that heavily rewards achievement and penalizes lack of ambition. Tackling the fertility rate may therefore require confronting some of the weaknesses of the underlying system, which means not only addressing demographic challenges, but also potentially helping build social cohesion or healthy cultural attitudes toward risk taking.

At the end of this year’s Forbes Global CEO Conference, Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong noted that with help from immigration, a fertility of rate of 1.3–1.4 may be enough to meet the country’s needs (Yong 2019).5

As long as there is tension between human capital and fertility, raising birth rates in Singapore to replacement levels will take more than just policy updates and patches. However, a mix of age-sensitive policies and enhancements of pronatalist incentives may push fertility to a more modest target of 1.4. Singapore has little time to lose: as the population ages, fewer and fewer couples will be of childbearing age, and a higher fertility rate will deliver less bang for the buck. It’s now or never.

This article was first published in International Monetary Fund Finance & Development (F&D) for March 2020

1 Mills, Melinda, Ronald R. Rindfuss, Peter McDonald, and Egbert te Velde. 2011. “Why Do People Postpone Parenthood? Reasons and Social Policy Incentives.” Human Reproduction 17 (6): 848–60.

2 Daniluk, J. C., E. Koert, and A. Cheung. 2012. “Childless Women’s Knowledge of Fertility and Assisted Human Reproduction: Identifying the Gaps.” Fertility and Sterility 9 7 (2): 420–26.

3 McDonald, Peter. 2006. “Low Fertility and the State: The Efficacy of Policy.” Population and Development Review 32 (3): 485–510.

4 Tan, Poh Lin, S. Philip Morgan, and Emilio Zagheni. 2016. “Examining the Link between Education Costs and Lowest-Low Fertility.” Population Research and Policy Review 35 (5):327–50.

5 Yong, Nicholas. 2019. “We Must Make Enough of Our Own Babies to Secure Singapore’s Future: Lee Hsien Loong.” Yahoo News Singapore, 17 October.

Between Elimination and Suppression: Singapore’s Agility in the COVID-19 Pandemic

Mohnish Kedia Second year doctoral student at LKYSPP

The Social Inclusion Project (SIP) is LKYSPP’s research programme dedicated to analysing the role of public policies in creating an open, diverse and inclusive society, where people have opportunities for participation. Its activities aim to influence policy development, promote policy literacy and enable engagement.

Elimination and suppression

On 28 March 2022, Shanghai went into one of the strictest lockdowns China has seen in the last two years. Non-essential businesses were shut, mass testing was announced, and people were not allowed to leave their homes. China’s model of complete elimination and its attitude of zero tolerance against COVID-19 had

attracted admiration in the early days of the pandemic. However, observers now ask if such an approach is still applicable. Singapore’s experience might provide an answer.

In an article published in The BMJ, Michael Baker and colleagues succinctly summarised the primary COVID-19 management strategies available to governments as either ‘elimination’ or ‘suppression’. The elimination strategy involves a quick escalation of stringent measures to end community transmission. In contrast, the suppression strategy aims to contain individual outbreaks through flexible, targeted interventions.

Singapore’s ability to switch between these two strategies, depending on the prevailing conditions, has been ts strength.

Tactical actions

In the beginning when Singapore reported its first case on 23 January 2020, the government’s approach was incremental.

Travel restrictions and quarantine orders, for instance, were progressively imposed over many

months and were eased when required, depending on global pandemic conditions. A blanket ban or quarantine requirement was not imposed despite the uncertainty surrounding the science behind the virus.

It was only in April 2020 when the virus surged in the migrant worker dormitories and a more dangerous delta variant was confirmed that the government imposed a nationwide lockdown.

Being a small open economy, Singapore’s appetite to bear a complete travel ban and lockdown is much lower than, say, China, which has a large domestic market. Therefore, its two-month lockdown, known locally as the Circuit Breaker, was implemented only once as its elimination strategy. It was accompanied and succeeded by the strict implementation of nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) when knowledge about transmission and fatality was lacking. From April 2020, masks were compulsory in public spaces. Social distancing, regular testing and group size caps were imposed throughout the pandemic. Some interventions such as group size restrictions were calibrated in phases.

After June 2020, as transmission slowed down and daily case counts fell, the approach returned to suppression. For instance, a complete closure of all schools was not implemented again from July 2020. Only schools with confirmed cases or suspected clusters were required to close for brief periods. Travel restrictions were also eased with the launch of dedicated travel bubbles with partnering countries.

In 2021, as vaccines became available and the vaccination rate increased, the restrictions were further relaxed. Initially, reciprocal green lanes and air travel passes were provided for business and official travel. Later, new vaccine travel lanes allowed seamless travel with minimal testing requirements. Domestically, testing and tracing regimes remained strict and regular but quarantine and closures were more targeted. Vaccine availability and take-up were closely monitored, and they impacted Singapore’s stance towards pandemic management.

Watch, learn and switch Singapore avoided marrying itself to one single strategy and switched

between the two as needed. Interventions were delivered by a strong public healthcare sector and competent political leadership.

With vigilant monitoring of infections, Singapore was able to constrain the cumulative death rate per million individuals to 155, as compared to 611 in Denmark and 1,538 in Sweden. Among its Asian neighbours, Singapore’s case fatality rate, which is the number of confirmed deaths among confirmed cases, has been the lowest: 0.29 compared to 0.9, 1.6, and 4.7 for South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, respectively. Nevertheless, the definitions of COVID-19 deaths vary. Taiwan, for example, regards the death of any patient with COVID-19 as a COVID-19 fatality count, in contrast to Singapore’s approach of counting only those who are killed by COVID-19.

Singapore’s fiscal policy has also cushioned its economic downturn. The GDP contracted by 5.4 per cent in 2020 but expanded by 7.2 per cent in 2021. The Consumer Price Index grew by 3 per cent between 2019 and 2020 but inflation slowed down to 0.9 per cent between 2020 and 2021. Though there was a decline in exports from S$533 billion in 2019 to S$516 billion in

2020, it bounced back at S$614 billion in 2021. The resident unemployment rate increased to an all-time high of 4.8 per cent in September 2020 but fell back to 3.4 per cent by September 2021. The overall unemployment rate remained below 3 per cent in 2021. But unemployment may yet be a daunting issue once the temporary job support schemes expire.

The lesson from Singapore is that pandemic management requires systemic agility. Policymakers must respond to local conditions such as domestic market size and healthcare system resilience, as well as global pandemic developments such as new variants and vaccine availability. Singapore’s strength in governance lies in its agility in managing crises like the pandemic. The Singapore model proves the point that experts have long insisted; allegiance to a one-size-fits-all strategy does not solve problems.

Taking that Squid Game Quiz?

Ad Tech is Watching You

When we complete a seemingly innocuous Squid Game quiz to find out which character in the popular TV show we are closest to, we are also giving up more data that can be used to profile us.

When our friends also do the quiz and we interact with their results, we are giving up data about our relationships with like-minded people who enjoy the same content and are likely to be influenced by similar ads.

This targeting is what is known as surveillance advertising.

This is the practice of extensively tracking and profiling individuals and groups, and “microtargeting” ads at them based on their behavioural history, relationships and identity, according to Accountable Tech, a non-government organisation.

Global concern about the dangers of surveillance advertising is growing.

The most compelling argument against surveillance advertising is that it enables the marketing of harmful products and services to children and young people. Back in 2017, Facebook reportedly told advertisers that it could monitor posts to determine when young people are feeling “insecure” and “worthless”. In the Facebook Files recently released by the Wall Street Journal, researchers inside Instagram found the app to be harmful to the mental health of teenagers, especially girls.

Here in Singapore, surveillance advertising is not explicitly prohibited under existing laws.

How is it used?

Surveillance advertising is built on the immense volumes of data that Big Tech companies collect about their users ranging from geolocation to inferred interests based on matching online and offline data sets.

Being able to track user activity across platforms and services allows tech companies to create very detailed user profiles. Ads can then be hyperpersonalised and microtargeted at specific users at specific times.

Featured

Chew

In traditional advertising, ads are placed in a predetermined medium and for a fixed period of time, for example by buying ad space in a home and decor magazine in order to reach homeowners.

Surveillance advertising is different in that the ads follow the consumers. In fact, using profiled information, Ad Tech companies can tailor ads and attempt to target consumers when they are deemed to be most susceptible to behaving or reacting to the messaging in certain ways.

Countering the dangers

The European Union is proposing a Digital Services Act to protect the fundamental rights of users and create a safer digital space.

In the United States, there is a new coalition of organisations pushing for a ban on surveillance advertising on the grounds that selling hyperpersonalised ads is an unfair method of competition.

Advocates for banning surveillance advertising also argue that the practice infringes privacy and data protection, funds misinformation, and promotes harm to children, among others.

In Singapore, experts have highlighted the risks of data misuse that can lead to a loss of trust in digital technologies. Case in point, a study by Okta, a company that provides user authentication login solutions, showed that Asian consumers are most likely to lose trust in brands that intentionally misuse or sell their personal data. Following a data breach, consumers may also permanently stop using the digital services and delete the apps.

The call to protect children and adolescents from global harmful advertising has also been sounded

by a United Nations report, A Future For The World’s Children?. It points to how advertisers bombard children and adolescents with ads on social media to promote harmful products, from fast food to tobacco and alcohol. Data on children obtained from electronic games is also being sold to global tech giants.

The report’s lead author, Professor Anthony Costello, argues that “children have the right not to be bombarded every day on their phones with advertisements or to have their data stolen”.

Another critical problem of surveillance advertising is that data flows are invisible to the consumers. Already, not many consumers know about the global ecosystem of data firms that are trading their data from various websites and apps. It is impossible for individuals to know who has their data, how their data is being transferred or who is analysing their data. They would also not know when they have been targeted with hyperpersonalised ads or why they were shown an ad.

The ad placement processes are fully automated. Data is fed into systems in which algorithms decide where an ad is placed.

Advertisers and the owners of the websites often do not know where the ads are being placed - only the Ad Tech companies know. This lack of control can lead to brand damage if the ads are displayed next to disinformation or other problematic content.

Protecting Singapore consumers

The advertising industry in Singapore is self-regulated and the Advertising Standards Authority of Singapore (ASAS) advises the Consumer Association of Singapore on matters related to marketing on social media.

While the Guidelines on Interactive Marketing Communication and Social Media issued by the ASAS in August 2016 list provisions for the protection of children’s personal information, they are silent on surveillance advertising.

The topic of behavioural targeting is mentioned in the advisory guidelines on the Personal Data Protection Act for selected topics, which state that where behavioural targeting involves the collection and use of personal data, the individual’s consent is required.

It is not known if either of these guidelines are enforced on the surveillance advertising that is occurring in Singapore.

Increasing transparency, accountability

New legislation to curb surveillance

advertising that has been proposed by other countries ranges from imposing greater transparency requirements to an outright ban.

The EU’s draft Digital Services Act in its current form will impose requirements to disclose information about ads, such as the identity of the advertiser and the criteria used to determine the display of the ad, including if it is based on profiling.

In the US, the Ban Surveillance Advertising Coalition is advocating a rule to “prohibit businesses from sharing user data, for the purposes of advertising, to any business line, website, advertising technology, or tracker other than the business or service with which a user intentionally interacts”.

It is uncertain how legislation will evolve but locally, the relevant government agencies such as the Ministry of Trade and Industry and the Personal Data Protection Commission should study the digital advertising ecosystem to understand the implications for Singapore consumers. The French data protection authority CNIL is studying this in its research lab. And while policymakers go through the due processes, advertisers and website or app owners can already adopt some best practices.

One alternative to surveillance advertising is to buy contextual advertising, which allows advertisers to place ads where the consumers had already indicated interest in the content (such as ads for cooking classes on a recipes page).

Website and app owners can also use an Ad Choices icon that users can click on to learn why they are seeing an ador to opt out of the ads. Research has found that just having this Ad Choices icon on a website can foster digital trust.

Another best practice is to justify the data collection. Twitter, for instance, lets users know that it uses the information shared to show more relevant content and it also gives the user transparency and control of that information.

Growing awareness and concern about surveillance advertising will come with the recent Facebook whistle-blower incident.

Marketers need to rein themselves in before the legislation and public backlash catch up with them.

Aggressively placing creepy ads for Squid Game Halloween costumes after consumers have just completed a social media quiz is just going to turn consumers away in the long run and corrode the trust that consumers have in digital marketing.

Food Technologies: Necessary, Unique or Challenging?

In this Asia Thinker Series, Li Ka Shing Professor in Public Management and Director, Institute for Environment and Sustainability, Benjamin William Cashore, at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (LKYSPP) of NUS, chairs an important discussion with guest experts Dr Rosa Rolle, Senior Enterprise Development Officer from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO); Ms Poh Bee Ling, Director, Agri-technology and Food Innovation Department, Urban Food Solutions Division, from the Singapore Food Agency (SFA); and Assistant Professor Sonia Akter from LKYSPP on whether food technologies hold the answers to the global food security challenges of our time.

A growing world population, supply chain disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, geopolitical tensions, as well as the global repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine war – the world has experienced concerns over food security more profoundly in just these recent years.

Beyond addressing the shorter-term stop-gap measures through policy and global coordination, thought leaders, policymakers and scientists are also accelerating developments in food technology in an attempt to futureproof this critical issue.

Discussing initiatives in food technology to tackle food insecurity.

William Cashore

Assistant Professor Sonia Akter

According to Asst Prof Akter, the poor who spend most of their income on food purchases can be most disproportionately affected.

“Food protectionism is when major food exporting countries impose restrictions to protect own nation’s supply, which can be a complete ban or a quota. It is a strategy used by governments to protect local consumers to mitigate against local price hikes,” she recaps. Singapore was hit by protectionism policies thrice: during the 2007-08 food price crisis, then during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, and again this year (2022), arising from the war between Russia and Ukraine.

Ms Poh Bee Ling

In Singapore, food security is a matter of national security. Ms Poh Bee Ling from the SFA explains, “As a small city-state with limited resources, Singapore’s food supply has always faced challenges such as global food supply fluctuations as we import more than 90% of our food.”

Sonia Akter Assistant Professor

“On one hand, increasing global population and incomes place pressure on food demand; on the other, urbanisation competes with agriculture for land and other agricultural resources. This is exacerbated by climate change which increases the frequency of extreme weather phenomena which adversely impacts production yields. Adding to this uncertainty, food safety risks are increasing, and food supply chains are getting more complex,” elaborates Ms Poh. To strengthen Singapore’s food security against this backdrop, SFA, Singapore’s lead agency for food related matters, adopts a multi-pronged strategy.

Dr Rosa Rolle

The channels forward must also evolve with the times. “Until the end of the 20th century, the food processing industry’s focus was on lowering the cost of food, with little attention to address sustainability issues,” explains Dr Rolle, “today, however, consumption patterns and agriculture systems are contributing to high rates of food loss and waste.”

Guest

In this light, working towards food security requires “[the] need to design, or re-design, technologies to become more energy efficient, to reduce cost of food production – such as simple re-designing of tunnels, using solar energy to dry foods, as what is employed in Pakistan” holds due merit.

“Another targeted approach is to look at the sustainability of the energy resources used – such as switching from carbon-based to

energy as solar, hydroelectric or turbine to generate electricity,” she elaborates.

Beyond Vaccines: Asia’s Uneven Recovery – What Does the Future Hold?

Asia continues to experience uneven economic recovery in 2021 as countries battle new waves of infection amid a race to roll out vaccines. Fast approaching the end of a second year of COVID, can the largest continent rise above risks and challenges to regain its footing?

In the Asia Thinker Series (Beyond Vaccines), moderated by Associate Professor and Assistant Dean (Research) Alfred Wu at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Dr Park Cyn-Young, Director for Regional Cooperation and Integration, Economic Research and Regional Cooperation Department at the Asian Development Bank, Professor in Practice Bert Hofman, Director (East Asian Institute), and Associate Professor in Practice Terence Ho discuss the challenges, risks and opportunities and economic outlook in the post-vaccination phase.

Featured Faculty

Dr Cyn-Young Park

While the vaccination rollout has been making progress with about 60 per cent of ASEAN population, according to Dr Cyn-Young Park, Director for Regional Cooperation and Integration, Economic Research and Regional Cooperation Department at the Asian Development Bank, the region’s economic outlook is still tilted to the downside.

“The pandemic continues to present risks to the region, especially from the changes in the nature of the pandemic in the recent months. These continue to pose new challenges and perhaps even a threat to its overall rebound,” she added.But ripping the band-aid off quickly by hastening the vaccination rollout and re-opening may do a disfavour to many countries at this stage as well.

Research Areas:

• Central-local fiscal relations

• Corruption and governance

• Public sector reform

• Social protection in Greater China

Bert Hofman

“Challenges such as prolonged COVID-19 with slower than expected vaccine rollout combined with the waning effectiveness of the vaccine, alongside the emergence of new variants, could hamper economic recovery as we have already seen in the past year.”

Professor Bert Hofman

China’s recovery from COVID has been very fast according to Professor Bert Hofman at the LKYSPP (also a Director of East Asian Institute of NUS). In fact, it was the only large country in the world that showed positive growth in 2020. The recovery has been export and investment driven, but has been running out of steam lately, in part because of challenges in global supply hamper export growth, and in part because domestic consumption is still held back by China’s tight COVID controls.

Mr Hofman has extensive experience in advising governments around the region on a wide range of development issues, and he has published on fiscal policy, debt issues, and China’s and Indonesia’s recent economic history.

Terence Ho

Associate Professor in Practice

As international tensions with China grows, reducing the reliance on trade and choosing an internal source of circulation to manage the risks that come from possible global supply chain seems prudent.

“China’s application to the CPTPP suggests the authorities continue to pursue reforms. The “gold standard” trade agreement would require reforms in state enterprise, intellectual property rights, industrial policy, and subsidy policy.”

China’ appetite for these reforms, Prof Hofman adds, should become clear in the run-up the the 20th party congress of the Communist Party, which takes place by late 2022.

Associate Professor in Practice Terence Ho

“The full costs of climate mitigation and adaptation have yet to be factored in.”

Research Areas:

• Economic and manpower policy

• Fiscal policy

• Public sector management and organisation

• Social security, inequality and social mobility

Guest Expert

Dr Park Cyn-Young

Director for Regional Cooperation and Integration, Economic Research and Regional Cooperation Department at the Asian Development Bank

He says there is also one other significant challenge ahead for Asia. “Inflation is a growing concern. Firstly, the huge fiscal and monetary stimulus sent asset prices skyrocketing from mid-2020 - whether in property or equities. This has fuelled wealth inequality in many parts of the world, including Asia. With recovery in demand, there is now general price inflation precipitated by supply disruptions such as factory closures, labour shortages, energy blackouts and bottlenecks at ports. The prices of freight, semiconductor chips and energy have shot up, in turn pushing up the cost of finished goods as well.”

This poses a dilemma for monetary policy. “Is the inflation spike transient or likely to persist? There is a risk that tighter monetary policy tightening could derail economic recovery, but standing pat could allow inflationary expectations to become entrenched and force a sharper tightening down the road. Observers have already flagged the risks of stagflation.”

Assoc Prof Ho says that policymakers in Singapore and across the world have their work cut out for them

“I see the challenges as how we can make economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and inclusive… Meeting these challenges, will depend on the quality of governance within countries, as well as effective regional and multilateral cooperation.”

Alfred Wu

Assistant Dean (Research), Associate Professor

Director (East Asian Institute) and Professor in Practice

Beyond Vaccines: Asia’s Food and Water Future

Deep dive into Asia’s biggest challenges and possibilities for food and water security.

In the second part of the Asia Thinker Series (Beyond Vaccines) on 30 challenges faced in the post-COVID world, moderator Benjamin Cashore, Director, Institute for Environment and Sustainability, and Li Ka Shing Professor in Public Management at Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (LKYSPP), NUS, navigates a conversation with guest experts – Dr Thomas Panella, Director of Environment, Natural Resources and Agriculture Division (East Asia Department) of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Dr Máximo Torero, Chief Economist, Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations, Professor Paul Teng, Adjunct Senior Fellow, at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU, and Assistant Professor Sreeja Nair, at LKYSPP – on the challenges and possibilities of Asia’s food and water security in the near future.

In the face of rapid climate change, a shaky global political stage and a world beset by an ongoing pandemic, the future of Asia’s food and water security for every nation in the region is increasingly pressing. Ensuring a forward resilience and sustainability now without succumbing to the onestep-forward-and-two-back dance wrought by an uneven pandemic response is crucial.

Quite a lot, it turns out. Moose consume vegetation, triggering carbon loss from the ecosystem. And the way they forage triggers other biological processes, which further amplifies the impact. According to one study, failing to take this into account could lead policymakers to overestimate the ability of boreal forests to store carbon by 40per cent–60 per cent.

More hunting licenses could help to control the moose population, and would mean the forests would lock up more carbon. And because various industries are likely to emerge around moose hunting, the political cost of reversing the policy would immediately be quite high.

It might seem like a convoluted way to do something about climate change, but it’s an example of a more innovative policy framework for approaching global problems.

Director of Institute for Environment and Sustainability and Li Ka Shing Professor in Public Management, Benjamin Cashore at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, thinks new approaches are needed to deal with climate change, a challenge he categorises as a “super wicked problem”

According to him, the four defining characteristics of what makes a “super wicked problem” include:

1) Time is running out to solve the problem

2) There is no central authority

3) Those seeking to end the problem are also causing it, and

4) Policies discount the future irrationally based on scientific evidence.

In Integrating policy and ecology systems to achieve path dependent climate solutions, a paper he co-authored in Environmental Science and Policy, he argued that policymakers have become too cosseted by standard cost-benefit analyses, and as such, they are missing opportunities to make a difference. Additionally, in another study, he established that most policy analyses are preoccupied with seeking balance and coming up with a solution that benefits all society as a whole.

As such, the current approach to policy problems is too simplistic and does not deliver the best results. It has undermined the discovery and application of targeted policy tools that can ameliorate unique problems, which is especially significant for a problem as global and fragmented as climate change.

“It’s time for us to embrace complexity as a society to solve our problems,” he said.

Featured Faculty Benjamin William Cashore

Li Ka Shing Professor in Public Management and Director, Institute for Environment and Sustainability

It’s time for us to embrace complexity as a society to solve our problems

Steering path dependence

Specifically, Professor Cashore wants policymakers to embrace path dependence, which is the idea that the range of available policy options tends to be limited by the decisions that have been made before it (and that certain decisions made today will limit policy options tomorrow).

“Most of the things we do in life, even our own ways of seeing the world, are the result of path dependent choices. The religions we have, the schools we go to, the constitutions that control us, the rules that we abide by. So most things are path dependent. By recognising path dependent outcomes, instead of being affected by them inadvertently, maybe we can steer them instead,” he said.

By making use of path dependence, policymakers might be able to come up with policies that are easy to implement, but hard to reverse once they’re in place. A provincial government in Canada, for example, might be reluctant to reverse a policy on hunting licenses for moose because the tourism businesses that spring up around them could make such a move politically costly.

One successful example mentioned by Prof Cashore in his lecture “Managing COVID-19-19 as a Super Wicked Problem: Lessons From, and for the Climate Crisis” is Germany’s feed-in tariff programme, where the government subsidised the solar panels to homeowners over 20 years. In turn, homeowners will get paid at retail price over the excess energy that is not used. Over time, it has been adopted by most Germans and resulted in lower carbon footprints and lower prices for solar panels globally. This method has been adopted in 130 jurisdictions worldwide.

Prof Cashore acknowledges that using path dependence in policy has its risks, too. For example, how can anyone know ahead of time what policies will lead to path dependence? And if the policy idea actually turns out to be harmful, then its irreversibility would be a problem.

A policy designed to take advantage of path dependence shouldn’t be based on a mere guess, but “discernible, plausible logic about why it might unleash path dependent processes”, said Prof Cashore.

Furthermore, he thinks that policies that make use of path dependence should always be directed towards specific goals. In the case of climate change, a policymaker should be able to explain how a path dependent policy will help to limit climate change to less than 2 degrees.

“We didn’t say this was the answer. We said, in that paper, ‘This is the kind of thing that happens when you apply this framework.’ So, we think there’s a lot more generation of innovative ideas around policy levers that can emerge,” he said.

“Discernible, plausible logic”

“We didn’t say this was the answer. We said, in that paper, ‘This is the kind of thing that happens when you apply this framework.’ So, we think there’s a lot more generation of innovative ideas around policy levers that can emerge”

One of many tools

Prof Cashore emphasises that this is only one possible set of tools for approaching policy. The goal is for policymakers to consider a broader set of options rather than abandon existing ones.

It is still important to push for major political goals, such as a global agreement to limit carbon emissions or for local renewable energy targets. One example is the Paris Climate Accord, where 195 signatories worldwide agreed to keep global warming below 2 degrees Celsius. But that’s not the only way to make a difference.

“We’re not saying it’s a better way, per se, what we’re saying is that there are a lot of ways we can address the climate crisis,” he said.

Global action towards climate change and COVID-19

The other ‘super wicked’ problem that Professor Cashore mentioned is the COVID-19pandemic that still put most countries in crisis mode until today. He said that COVID-19 proves the importance of global cooperation more than ever before. “Not only is it important to reduce conflict and promote trade, but it also gives us a

common purpose in addressing these two ‘super-wicked’ problems.”

In addressing these problems, he explained the importance of having “Thermostatic Global Institutions” where governments can implement swift policy changes and maintain them in society. “Look at the COVID-19 numbers in the US and Singapore, for instance. There’s a stark contrast because of policy. In Singapore, there are these ‘police’ that remind you how to interact socially. Meanwhile, in the US, a mask is not even mandatory,” he explained.

The same institutions are also applicable to climate change through the Paris Climate Accord. “With cooperation, governments worldwide can assist each other to achieve their commitments, identify promising climate-friendly policy levers, and create innovative low carbon pathways,” said Prof Cashore. These actions are in every country’s longterm interests.

Yes, having advocacy towards these issues is essential, but it’s crucial to keep in mind that having a policy design is equally important, if not more. As Prof Cashore echoed, “It’s insufficient to only advocate for effective global policies; we also need to spend much more time on their design.”

“With cooperation, governments worldwide can assist each other to achieve their commitments, identify promising climate-friendly policy levers, and create innovative low carbon pathways”

The Future of Finance: Central Banking Policy in a Post COVID-19 Era

Featured Faculty Ramkishen S. Rajan Yong Pung How Professor

Until the global financial crisis (GFC) hit in 2008, central banks in the 1990s and early 2000s were lauded for successfully taming inflation and anchoring inflationary expectations in a period now referred to as the “Great Moderation”. Barring the occasional financial turbulence emanating from peripheral economies, central banks had zeroed in on the strategy for preserving price stability through the adoption of narrow inflation-targeting frameworks.

However, the GFC brought about a notable change in central banking playbooks as their focus shifted towards ensuring adequate liquidity in the face of a financial market meltdown. Thus, began a prolonged period of ultra-loose and unconventional monetary policy. This policy stance, initially specific to some major advanced economies, expanded to many emerging economies during the COVID-19 crisis as central banks worldwide tried to prevent a morphing of the health crisis into an outright economic depression.

As the world enters a post-pandemic era, central banks are confronted with the re-emergence of some old challenges, coupled with a host of brand-new ones, a few of which we outline below.

Return of the inflation bogeyman

The most pressing and immediate issue facing central banks in a post COVID-19 world is the dramatic rise in inflation currently unfolding across both advanced

and emerging economies. This acceleration in inflation has been due to a combination of both supply-side and demand-side factors, including substantial amounts of stimulus rolled out during COVID-19, pandemicinduced supply chain disruptions, the Russia-Ukraine geopolitical confrontation leading to food and energy price surges, and a general tightening of labour markets.

Even as the official numbers continued to break multi-decade highs, central banks, especially in advanced economies, were culpable in misdiagnosing inflation as being transitory and not responding to these pressures in an adequate or timely manner.

This rising tide of inflation necessitates that central banks go back to the drawing board and refocus their efforts towards containing price pressures and reanchoring inflationary expectations. The challenge is to manage the monetary tightening without triggering debt defaults as higher interest rates will raise debt servicing costs globally and exacerbate the growing post-pandemic debt vulnerabilities in some countries.

Tackling climate risks

The unpredictable nature of climate change along with its potential to unleash massive capital destruction globally was on display in Europe which suffered relentlessly under prolonged heatwaves and droughts, as well as in the case of the recent floods in Pakistan which has ravaged entire communities and public infrastructure.

The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has described climate change as a “green swan risk” which has the potential to precipitate the “next systemic financial crisis”. Climate risks could arise both from the financial impact of extreme-weather events and global warming on firms’ balance sheets, called physical risks, and the massive shift/downgrade in asset valuations of high-carbon sectors during the decarbonisation process, referred to as transition risks.

In this context, a growing number of central banks have undertaken prudential and regulatory policies to mitigate against the financial stability implications of the transition pathway, such as mandating climate risk disclosures from firms, preparing a taxonomy to clearly delineate between “green” and “brown” activities, and developing new toolkits to better forecast the exposure and impact of climate change both on individual financial institutions and the broader financial system.

Other than the widely documented impact of climate change on financial stability, central banks also need to simultaneously contend with higher inflation attributable to the decarbonisation process in an alreadyhigh inflationary environment. This so-called “greenflation” has arisen due to a surge in demand for inputs required to scale up renewable energy infrastructure such as cobalt, lithium, nickel, and rare earth metals, and increases upside risks to mediumterm inflation projections even if other sources of inflation abate over time.

Managing risks and rewards from fintech and Digibanks

The rise of fintech has portended significant benefits for financial inclusion and financial development, facilitating more inclusive growth. The first wave of fintech firms also unleashed massive innovative potential in the banking sector, fostering competition with legacy banks and forcing incumbents to step up on the delivery of consumer services and products.

The second wave of financial innovation has witnessed the advent of digital banks – operated as standalone digital entities backed either by fintech firms and established brick-and-mortar banks, or large transnational multi-sector conglomerates, colloquially referred to as “Big Techs”.

The multi-nation and multi-sector exposure of these entities raises interconnectedness and the spill over of risks from any one business arm to others, particularly as their business model is built on the leverage and network effects created by operating in several sectors. Further, their transnational nature could be a source of region-wide contagion.

Central banks and financial regulators are playing catch-up in developing specific rules to manage the risks arising from Big Techs’ different activities while also tackling nonfinancial concerns pertaining to market competition/monopoly, consumer privacy and data usage. In addition, greater regional/ international coordination among central banks is needed to tackle the transboundary risks emanating from Big Techs’ multi-nation exposure.

Responding to the rapid rise of crypto assets and DeFi

Central banks have conventionally been regarded as the “guardians of money”, being the sole issuers of currency, i.e., legal tender. However, the advent of crypto assets (popularly termed cryptocurrencies) poses new and unique challenges for central

banks. While there are thousands of such assets currently in the market, a handful such as Bitcoin, Ether and a host of “stablecoins” constitute much of the aggregate market capitalisation.

Some commentators have highlighted how the rise of private crypto assets could weaken the transmission channels of monetary policy by causing currency substitution away from legal tender. Although their acute volatility, including the crash of supposedly “stable” coins (most notably, Terra), has been a painful lesson to retail investors, their impact on the broader financial system has been limited to date. Nonetheless, with the rise of exposure of institutional investors and asset managers to these assets, crypto markets could become a new source of systemic risk to financial stability, particularly given their increasing synchronisation with other risky assets such as equities.

Another related source of systemic risk is the rise of DeFi (Decentralised Finance) which is a new form of intermediation in crypto markets, likened to a “crypto version of Wall Street” by the New York Times. DeFi is being increasingly harnessed by fintech firms and has raised leverage in crypto transactions by multiple times. The absence of adequate regulation coupled with anonymity in these transactions/activities is of concern on several fronts, including consumer protection, anti-money laundering (AML) measures and financial integrity, as is the stability of crypto exchanges themselves.

Central banks and regulators are trying to ward off coming crypto storms by bringing them within the regulatory perimeter without stifling innovation in this area of rapid digital transformation.

From Great Moderation to Great Volatility?

Although it would be altogether premature and harsh to proclaim that central banking itself is now in crisis, the Golden age of central banking may have ended, with fears that a period of Great Moderation is now paving the way for a period of Great Volatility. The global monetary system has become far more complex and turbulent as financial markets have become hyperconnected. Central banks today need to contend with the dual challenge of preventing the entrenchment of higher inflationary pressures whilst actively identifying and monitoring excessive risks to the financial system arising from new sources

Peace Tech: How Technology Can Manage and Prevent Conflict

Technology’s “dark side” gets a lot of attention. The challenge, according to Vice Dean for Executive Education and Associate Professor in Practice Francesco Mancini at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, is to look “at the better angels of our technology to strengthen what it can do to foster peace and social cohesion and to bridge divides”.

Yet he’s quick to point out that “we’re not naive. We know what is happening and how societies’ social fabric can even be torn apart by some of these technologies”.

How technology has created and exacerbated conflict

The mere fact that technology gives us access to a huge amount of information poses its own set of problems. Information pollution creeps into the deluge of information from countless sources and makes it difficult to determine what is objective and true. The term ‘fake news’ was recently added to our vernacular, after the US elections drew focus to the fact that there was so much misinformation being spread around on social media. With so many media outlets available at our fingertips, it becomes difficult to determine which one to trust and how to avoid being drawn into falsehoods.

The spread of misinformation or one-sided information can also serve as a catalyst for conflict. In Sri Lanka for example, incendiary posts on Facebook fuelled anti-Muslim sentiments in the country which led to riots that left three people dead. Similarly, in Myanmar, a number of Facebook users spread hate speech against the Rohingya community on the platform, contributing to the widespread violence and thousands of deaths.

Technology has also played a devastating role in warfare. Automated weapons for example, have been introduced into conflict situations under the reasoning that they reduce the loss of human life. However, there are several ethical implications of using automated weapons, such as whether removing the aspect of human judgment makes killing, in fact, easier. It also diminishes the responsibility of being directly involved in the violence.

The promise of Peace Tech

What constitutes Peace Tech? It is a movement to use technology which includes but is not limited to, mobile phones, digital applications and social media, to help reduce conflict and foster peace.

Firstly, it helps to build communities. Technology provides the tools to help leaders better tackle critical issues. However, there may be a gap in knowledge and skills to actually utilise these resources. Peace Tech in particular focuses on ease of access to allow governments, activists, journalists and even students, to empower and strengthen their communities.

Professor Mancini states that especially in a multi-racial and multi-religious context, technology gives people tools to create dialogues among parties, collecting data to improve the way we engage with others.

Peace Tech can also help to stop the spread of misinformation. Una Hakika, for example, is a project that seeks to moderate misinformation in Kenya, where there has been an increased spread of inaccurate or entirely fabricated information through channels such as WhatsApp. Una Hakika allows subscribers to report rumours so that they can be verified. This is especially important in an area where people may only have access to limited or biased sources.

Secondly, it allows people to share their stories. In Southeast Asia for example, many governments have significant control over media outlets and access to information. In Myanmar, the ongoing coup has seen the military imposing a complete internet blackout in order to hinder citizens from protesting. Yet, because citizens are still managing to circumvent these measures and post on social media, the rest of the world can remain informed about what is occurring and in turn, place pressure on the military.

In December 2015, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) began a yearlong project to support the political transition in the Central African Republic with global non-Profit, Build Up. They asked participating citizens to express their views on security and peace in the region through art, either by drawing, writing or making music.

In reaching out to these communities, technology tools such as cameras are an effective way to get these citizens excited to participate in sharing their stories with photos and videos. That’s why a partnership with InsightShare was formed to run participatory video and photography workshops. The resulting participation can be seen through Build Up’s YouTube channel.

Additionally, Build Up also worked with the Dinka-Misseriya Joint Border Peace Committee to reinvigorate cross-border economic ties, restore and improve relationships, and address divisions between the Sudan-South Sudan Border. With a participatory video initiative, young men and women can act as peace actors — sharing their experiences with conflict and their perspectives on peace or security.

Thirdly, Peace Tech allows for data to be collected to implement solutions to protect people in conflict areas. Early examples were apps developed in Syria to crowdsource information to inform citizens about possible missile strikes. More recently, companies such as Ushahidi provide platforms that allow people to rapidly collect, manage and analyse information from their communities. This also keeps people on the ground informed of potential danger occurring in real time.

The challenges of adopting Peace Tech Privacy remains a huge concern. For example, if the personal information of human rights activists, journalists or politicians falls into the wrong hands, their lives could be placed in danger. Personal data could also be misappropriated by malicious parties to incite tension and destroy social cohesion.

Secondly, big data could give authoritarian governments even more power. This was the initial concern of the public when contract tracing apps and apps that track movement were rolled out in response to the COVID-19-19 pandemic. In the hands of an oppressive regime, such data would allow governments to track the movements of the public, giving them greater surveillance powers and overall control.

There are also challenges in ensuring that Peace Tech initiatives can actually be implemented effectively. As Professor Mancini points out, these initiatives tend to be small, piecemeal projects. In order for them to have any sort of impact, they need to be scaled up. He explains that one of the main issues is that thinking about these problems tends to be an afterthought for most technology designers.

He explains, in companies there are usually people working on safety and security policies, but they tend to only be brought into the picture when there is a problem. Instead, he says, companies should “Bring these people up in the value chain. These people should work with the designers.” If they aren’t brought in at the design stage, the conversation on peacebuilding does not happen.

However, Professor Mancini points out that organisations such as Build Up are already using a multi-faceted approach to encourage peacebuilding. Although it may take a while for their efforts to achieve the scale they require, these initiatives are already making important and necessary steps in reducing divides and fostering peace.

Featured Faculty Lee Zeewan Assistant Professor

The COVID-19 pandemic may have been the catalyst to one of the worst job crises and according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report findings, the worst since the Great Depression. But besides the endemic state of COVID-19, employability and job markets need urgent future-proofing.

Assistant Professor Lee Zeewan discusses the necessary fronts.

Future-proofing Employment and Jobs in a World of Complexities

COVID-19 Effects

The Great Resignation is no longer a trend but an occurrence. A term that had to be coined in May 2021. In the United States, mass departures started with almost three per cent of the nation’s labour force quitting their jobs in September 2021 (4.3 million in Sept, 24 million March-Sept.) according to the US Bureau of Labour Statistics.

As according to one of the largest surveys of the global workforce, the PwC’s Global Workforce Hopes and Fears Survey of more than 52,000 workers in 44 countries and territories, revealed that one in five workers plan to quit their jobs in 2022.

Concurring on the findings, Assistant Professor Lee Zeewan points out an important fact. “The very puzzle of the Great Resignation,” she notes, “is that people keep quitting despite the availability of jobs and the employers’ offering higher wages.”

While in China, the nation experienced the rise of the ‘lie flat’ movement where workers protest against the 9am-to-9pm work schedules.1 –one phenomenon that also serves as a warning of impending labour stagnation. Border lockdowns and travel and tourism standstill eventually showed up in resignation rates highest for hospitality or services industries that required face-to-face contact with co-workers and customers2

Personal versus Professional

Though government initiatives and financial assistance to provide support towards the COVID-19-affected times, does not quite address other underlying factors that play a major

impact towards resignations.

According to Assistant Professor Lee Zeewan, there needs to be a lot more thought in how to design “futureready” jobs. For one, employees have more reason than ever before to re-evaluate the meaning of work. Recruiters have also observed a gradual swing from renumeration package and financial security to health, mental well-being and safety. To retain essential workforce on the frontline, employers have put in more support and policies for those who are at a higher risk. And address their direct concerns such as preventing work burnout and measures to prevent endangering loved ones because of daily exposure. But can we move beyond reactive to proactive?

For one, work features that were traditionally overlooked now have more attention: How important are interactions between co-workers? Does a physical office space improve work morale? How can we curb the ongoing wave of resignations and its effects?

Acclimatising to Remote Work Culture

At the start of COVID-19, employers and employees grappled with the inevitable hurdles in remote work arrangements. Two years later, employers now face a vastly different mindset shift.

The ‘work-from-anywhere’ may just be what it takes to retain workers and attract new ones, especially given that over 70 per cent want flexible work options to continue participating in the labour force.3 This also calls for inculcating a stronger sense of trust between employee and employer in

that way encouraging a culture that better fosters new ideas through hybrid collaborations and networking.

According to an OECD report, digitalisation can increase resilience and preserve capacity in the face of stringent restrictions to physical interaction. The report’s observations included the need to make digital service provision more inclusive going forward and to ensure further efforts are made so that all individuals have the skills and access to technology to benefit from these services. In Singapore for example, almost half of employed citizens were working remotely in 2021.4

More incentives to promote IT skills upgrades in the workforce and digitising small businesses and operations.

The OECD report also found that in the countries it examined, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States, a marked changing nature of work due to COVID-19 containment measures led to an increase in the share of job postings that highlighted “working from home” as a required condition. A clear indicator that not only is the average workspace no longer confined to an office but the mindset as well.

Unpacking Workers’ Needs

Employers now need to aspire to foster a healthier work environment by providing support and outreach that is aimed at workers’ mental and physical well-being through actively reconnecting with employees on remote operation.5

Given this fundamental shift on the view of ‘work’, conventional incentives—raising monetary rewards and in-kind benefits—must be revisited as well. While introducing new management tactics such as, a push for employers to better understand firms’ retention risks by conducting exit-interviews to identify push factors and stay-interviews to identify what keeps employees.6

A significant proportion of the global workforce surveyed reported less satisfaction with their job than those who are working in hybrid or fully remote work settings, 50 per cent compared to 63 per cent. Noting as well, they are “far less likely than others to say they find their job fulfilling, believe that their team cares about their well-being, think that they’re fairly rewarded financially, or feel they can be creative in their work,” according to the report.

But employment policies cannot stop short on landing well-being alone when one regards another growing employment concern the world now has.

Preparing for an Ageing Workforce

According to Mr Joseph Chamie, a former director of the United Nations Population Division, is currently an independent consulting demographer, by 2050, 90 countries will have an ageing population.

Some 20 countries, particularly more developed countries, he adds, would need to navigate uncharted demographic territory of population decline and rapid ageing; these include Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Poland and Spain. This number could nearly triple by mid-century, and expected newcomers to population decline will soon include China, Germany, Russia and South Korea.

In Singapore, the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) buoyed its efforts to make workplaces more age-friendly, such as by redesigning jobs, providing more part-time re-employment opportunities and helping senior workers upskill and reskill to support businesses to raise the employability, among Singapore residents aged 65 and over. In June 2022, an announcement of the Jobs Growth Incentive extension will continue to provide support that can help employers hire mature job seekers aged 40 and above who have been unemployed for at least six months, as well as people with disabilities or former offenders.

Systemic resiliency

Continual labour market volatilities nevertheless can worsen the fiscal burden of government to provide sufficient social safety-nets alongside persistent health threats that prolonged COVID-19 poses.

Finding new strategies to enhance systemic structure and workforce resource can begin with a focus at fitting employability and employee needs to move beyond the challenges COVID-19 has ultimately left countries with Policymakers, agencies and employers have an uphill task. But the strides made through the accumulative experience and outcomes from not just COVID-19 can mean better informed policies through research from adaptation to implementation; and that all important resiliency we need.

1 Bloomberg,” From the Great Resignation to Laying Flat- Workers are opting out”, Bloomberg https://www.bloomberg.com/ news/features/2021-12-07/why-people-arequitting-jobs-and-protesting-work-life-fromthe-u-s-to-china

2 Microsoft Worklab,” The Next Great Disruption Is Hybrid Work—Are We Ready?” Mircosoft https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/ worklab/work-trend-index/hybrid-work

3 Microsoft Worklab.” The Next Great Disruption Is Hybrid Work—Are We Ready?” Microsoft, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/ worklab/work-trend-index/hybrid-work

4 Ministry of Manpower, Singapore “Impact of COVID-19-19: Remote Working in Singapore”, MOM https://stats.mom.gov.sg/Pages/Impactof-COVID-19-19-Remote-Working-in-Singapore. aspx

5 Ashley Stahl,” 5 Lasting Changes To Expect In The Workplace Post-COVID-19” Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ ashleystahl/2021/02/01/5-lasting-changesto-expect-in-the-workplace-post-COVID19/?sh=1ae1cad4213d

6 Microsoft Worklab,” The Next Great Disruption Is Hybrid Work—Are We Ready?’, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/worklab/ work-trend-index/hybrid-work

Accountability for Climate Catastrophe

Scientific evidence can now link specific weather disasters to human-induced climate change. This connection should finally dispel the misconception that nature’s wrath alone is to blame for these disasters, and make it possible to hold industries and governments that are hooked on fossil fuels accountable for their actions.

Faculty Vinod Thomas

Professor

Climate data clearly show that highcarbon energy is responsible for the atmospheric shifts that cause more extreme floods, droughts, and wildfires. But much of the global public has yet to connect these disasters to climate change – much less recognise the role of big polluters in causing them. Media reporting on disasters also does not highlight the strong connection between these events and global warming. For example, an analysis by the newsmonitoring organisation Media Matters revealed that cable news in the United States largely ignored the role of climate change when covering last year’s wildfires along the West Coast.

Scientific research directly linking smoking to cancer played a major role in changing public opinion about

tobacco use. Something similar must happen to encourage meaningful action to combat climate change.

The growing body of evidence making the connection between global warming and natural disasters is becoming harder to ignore. According to the World Weather Attribution initiative, a global collaboration of climate scientists, climate change made this summer’s floods in Belgium and Germany significantly more likely to occur. The initiative also determined that the heatwaves in the Pacific Northwest and Siberia would have been “almost impossible” without human-caused climate change.

Like the tobacco companies that sought to hide the data connecting tobacco use and cancer, big polluters are doing their best to inject doubt into the science on global warming.

The oil industry has known about its contribution to greenhouse-gas emissions since the 1970s, but has downplayed the repercussions. Major oil companies have spent millions of dollars in the European Union and the US to mislead the public about the climate impact of burning fossil fuels. Meanwhile, the global incidence of climate-related disasters has risen sharply since the 1970s. There has not been a similar increase in natural disasters that are not influenced by climate change, like earthquakes and volcanic eruptions.

Many governments contribute to the problem through politically popular fossil-fuel subsidies, which

the International Monetary Fund estimates amount to US$5 trillion per year. In 2019 and 2020, governments spent 20 per cent more on financing fossil-fuel projects than they did on reducing emissions. China is the largest public financier of coal-fired power plants globally, and Japan and the US are close behind. In 2020, the nine major multilateral development banks, including the World Bank and the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, together provided US$3 billion for fossil-fuel projects.

This financing continues even though the danger global warming poses to the environment and the economy has been recognised for decades. In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and former US Vice President Al Gore won the Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts to raise awareness about “man-made climate change.” And economist William D. Nordhaus won a Nobel Prize in 2018 for “integrating climate change into long-run macroeconomic analysis.” But that work seriously understated the need for climate action, because it did not recognize exponential damages, tipping points, and the irreversibility of certain losses.

Overall, mainstream economics has not factored in the daunting challenge posed by climate change. The discipline’s leading scholarly journals rarely publish research on environmental and climate constraints on economic growth and wellbeing. A 2019 review found that the Quarterly Journal of Economics had not published any articles on climate change and the quantitative journal Econometrica had published only two. Economists either have been largely silent on the issue or have applauded growth even when it is based on burning fossil fuels.

Climate scientists have done their part to sound the alarm about global warming, but we have yet to see sufficient action to address the issue. The evidence connecting climate change to weather disasters creates an opening to engage the public, demand accountability from industries and governments, and take decisive steps toward mitigation.

This article was first published in Project Syndicate on 18 October 2021.

The growing body of evidence making the connection between global warming and natural disasters is becoming harder to ignore.

What Americans (really) Think About Chemical Weapons

Featured Faculty Jonathan A. Chu Assistant Professor

The norm against the use of chemical weapons has not had a good decade. The Syrian government has repeatedly used chemical weapons against its own people, and the Russian government has used deadly nerve agents to poison political opponents around the world. But at least the norm is strong in democracies like the United States—right? On the surface, it does appear to be strong. For example, the US Army recently announced that it has almost completed destruction of the United States’ chemical weapons stockpile ahead of a September 2023 deadline set by the Chemical Weapons Convention. But public actions like these may mask waning private commitment to the non-use norm.

One of the primary ways to measure the strength of norms among the general public –– like norms in support of democracy––is to directly ask people about their attitudes in surveys or polls. The problem with this approach is that sometimes people conceal their true beliefs when asked directly. People are particularly likely to hide opinions that might be embarrassing or unpopular. For instance, sexist and racist Americans often lie about their beliefs on directquestion surveys.

In a new peer-reviewed study, we show that a significant proportion of the American public also hides their private support for chemical weapons use. Specifically, we demonstrate that about 15 percent of the US public is privately willing to use chemical weapons in war but will conceal their true beliefs when asked directly in a conventional survey question. About 10 percent publicly support the use of chemical weapons. Therefore, in total, about a quarter of the US public either privately or publicly supports using chemical weapons in war. We uncovered these hidden preferences using a list experiment, a polling technique designed to ethically elicit truthful responses about sensitive topics. Although a strong majority of Americans currently reject the use of chemical weapons, which is heartening, this majority could erode in response to a security shock like 9/11, which might increase the military utility of chemical weapons use. Moreover, while our studies asked about general support for using chemical weapons in war, approval might be even higher if proposed against specific people that some Americans perceive as out-groups, like Muslims or non-white people.

Public support for norms matters. Research shows that mass attitudes can impact government policy and serve as a stopgap—preventing counter-normative actions from leading to broader norm erosion. Even though people who conceal their true beliefs are undetectable in the kinds of traditional, direct-question polls that political decision-makers tend to care about, they can still impact public policy. For example, secret ballots allow people to anonymously express their preferences in elections. Sexist Americans may vote against female candidates, and supporters of torture might vote for pro-torture candidates. Consequently, the surprisingly high percentage of Americans who support chemical warfare could back a future US president who advocates for using chemical weapons.

And norms can change. This process by which a norm dies often occurs in the wake of security shocks. Just as 9/11 motivated the Bush administration to erode the anti-torture norm, a future security shock could prompt the US to violate its commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Insincere norm-holding is not just restricted to members of the public: it also applies to political leaders. For example, even though Syrian President Bashar al-Assad authorized the use of chemical weapons against his own people and thus privately opposes the norm against the use of chemical weapons, he has publicly supported the norm. In one interview, Assad claimed, “Even if we have [chemical weapons], we wouldn’t use them… We wouldn’t have the will, because morally this is not acceptable.”

In another, Bashar al-Assad said, “[The use of chemical weapons] is despicable. It is a crime.”

Claiming fidelity to widely held norms, even in the wake of clear violations, can provide tangible benefits to leaders. Despite strong evidence that the Russian government attempted to poison Alexei Navalny, a political opponent of Vladimir Putin, Russian leaders denied the attack took place and Putin explicitly supported the norm against the use of chemical weapons in public. As a result, half of

Russians are sceptical that Navalny was actually poisoned.

Although insincere norm-holding can erode the robustness of norms, it is still preferable to not agree with the norm at all, both privately and publicly. This dynamic was on display in World War I, where over ninety thousand people were killed and one million were injured by the use of poison gas. Germany was the first to use lethal chemical weapons on a large scale during the war. Instead of denying chemical weapons use, they readily admitted to it and actually argued poison gas was more humane than other types of weapons. The fact that many people who privately support the use of chemical weapons today feel the need to publicly oppose these weapons suggests that the norm is (thankfully) stronger than it was during World War I.

Nonetheless, the fact that 25 per cent of Americans support using chemical weapons in war means the norm is less entrenched than previously thought. While recent efforts to uphold and strengthen the chemical weapons norm have mostly focused on countries like Syria and Russia, activists and policymakers should also devote resources to strengthening this norm in the United States. Furthermore, when measuring the strength of other norms, the limitations of traditional, directquestion polling should be taken into account. This is especially the case in an era when norms surrounding democracy, nuclear weapons, and landmines are being challenged around the world. People’s tendency to conceal unpopular beliefs means that seemingly strong norms may actually be quite brittle under the surface.

This article was first published in Political Violence at a Glance on 2 March 2022. It was co-written with Christopher Blair, Assistant Professor of Politics at Princeton University and Joshua A. Schwartz, Grand Strategy, Security, and Statecraft fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in the Harvard Kennedy School. 37

U.S.-Singapore Relations at 55: Our Shared Past and Future

The United States and Singapore’s shared history has built a strong foundation for a secure, prosperous, and innovative shared future. Through various economic partnerships, defense and security agreements, and people-to-people ties forged over the last fifty-five years, the relationship between both countries continues to grow from strength to strength. The enduring partnership has brought prosperity and stability not only to both countries, but to the wider Indo-Pacific region. The discussions include an overview, security ties, economic ties and people-to-people ties.

Hosted by Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and U.S. Embassy Singapore

The Next STEP Global Conference 2021

Where leaders meet to advance Solutions To Economic Problems (STEP)

The Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) and the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (LKYSPP) at the National University of Singapore launched the Next STEP Global Conference on November 1 to 2 2021. The first in a series of annual global dialogues where leaders meet to advance Solutions To Economic Problems (STEP) confronting human well-being arising from economic instability, insecurity, and exclusion. Next STEP is an actionable exchange—generating effective and sustainable solutions through convening and engaging those within and outside government in the design of future policies and market structures. We will channel the results of these conversations into the policy agendas of national governments and international institutions.

Three virtual sessions at the November 2021 conference focused on (1) Supply chains in a world of conflict and COVID-19, (2) Economic policymaking in a Big Data, Big Tech global economy, and (3) Is it possible for humanity to cooperate in delivering global public goods?

Join us for the November 2022 annual global conference. More details at: https://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/newsevents/events/all-events.

Singapore’s water demand: How well has Singapore managed its water demand?

Clean water is essential to our daily lives. How has Singapore fare in providing clean water to its nation?

And with the effects of climate change, are we able to continue to secure clean water for the nation, and to get our nation’s awareness in water conservation?

We speak to Associate Professor Leong Ching to find out more.

Featured Faculty

Leong Ching

Singapore’s food supply: Is Singapore at risk for food security?

As a small nation, Singapore is highly dependent on food imports. With COVID-19 disrupting food supply chains and threatening food security, what can Singapore do to sustain its food supply for its nation?

Can alternative protein or technology be the solution?

We speak to Assistant Professor Sonia Akter to gather some insights

Featured Faculty Sonia Akter Assistant Professor

Watch our Video Resources

Meet our new professors!

Meet Ashutosh, Jonathan, Lawrence, Sreeja and Yu Haoour new professors at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy. Find out what are their research focus areas, why they love LKYSPP and their personal interests.

Ashutosh Dinesh Thakur Assistant Professor

Jonathan Art Chu Assistant Professor

Lawrence Jin Assistant Professor

Sreeja Nair Assistant Professor

Yuhao Ba Assistant Professor

Why I’m passionate about international relations?

An international relations class during his first year of college changed Professor Khong Yuen Foong’s life completely. Ever since then, Prof Khong had been studying and researching on international relations, and found his mission in life -- to get to the bottom of what makes nations - especially the great powers - and human beings, tick.

Find out more about Prof Khong’s passion in international relations, on his winning of the highly competitive and prestigious Social Science Research Council (SSRC) grant, and what are his recent works and research plans.

Khong Yuen Foong

Ka Shing Professor in Political Science

Provost (Student Life), NUS and Associate Professor, LKYSPP

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