Rapporteur Feb 09

Volume 3 • Number 1

Rapporteur F e b r u a ry 2 0 0 9

N e ws l e t t e r

of

The Centre

on

Asia

and

G lo ba l i sat i o n

S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance

Governance of a Globalising World: Whither Asia and the West

Cultivating Social Innovation

Social, environmental, economic well-being of a society

Contesting Indonesia

Democracy, decentralisation, demystified

Security Initiative in Asia Improving energy governance

content

CONTENTS Letter from the Director

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CAG Research

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CAG Events

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Special Feature

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- Conference on - Global Governance CAG Focus

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Team CAG News

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The Centre on Asia and Globalisation (CAG) at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy brings together leading scholars and policymakers to address innovations in governance in a rapidly changing world. In addition to providing a home for world-class researchers, the Centre convenes seminars, conferences and policy dialogues to advance understanding of the shifting political dynamics driving regional and global issues.

Editor Lee Sung Contributors Toby Carroll, Ann Florini Ong Yanchun, Tess del Rosario Durreen Shahnaz, Benjamin Sovacool Yeling Tan Production Bob Associates Design Consultants www.bobassociates.com Illustrations Danny Snell © 2009, The Centre on Asia and Globalisation, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. Rapporteur is published bi-annually.

Printed on recycled paper

Letter from the Director We have dedicated this edition of the newsletter primarily to coverage of the biggest event in the Centre’s short history: the conference on global governance we convened in December 2008. As described in these pages, the conference brought together some of the most outstanding thinkers in the world on the world’s most difficult conundrum: how to govern a CAG Photo globalised world that remains divided into competitive and often mutually suspicious countries.

This conference, and the project it launches, have taken the Centre to a new level. Space doesn’t permit adequate thanks to everyone who made it possible. Team CAG was the core, but we could not have done it on our own.

My profound thanks to Dr Lee Seng Tee, whose visionary support has made the project possible; to the administrative staff of the LKY School for their extensive efforts, to the volunteer rapporteurs whose excellent work made it possible for us to produce a detailed conference report in record time (available at CAG homepage), to my conference co-chair Kishore Mahbubani, and particularly to Lee Sung and Yeling Tan, without whom the conference and the project could not happen. And most especially thanks to all conference participants, for presentations and discussions that have provided a solid foundation for the project.

As the newsletter also shows, we have transitions underway. It’s a great pleasure to welcome to the CAG family Durreen Shahnaz, who is spearheading the new Social Innovation Program. We also warmly welcome our new Business Development Manager, Michele von Rautenkranz and look forward to drawing on her extensive business expertise as we expand our programs. The newest addition to the CAG family, Lee Jun, kindly postponed his arrival in the world until after father Sung completed his work on the conference – Congratulations to Sung and his wife Ch’ng-li.

With this newsletter, we must also, unfortunately, say farewell to Sandra Ng, the Centre’s first Business Development Manager. Sandra’s contributions have been extraordinary. She was the first person to join me at CAG, and for the past two and a half years she has developed all the systems that make it possible for CAG to function, communicate, and prosper (including this newsletter series). Her competence, humor, and dedication will be sorely missed.

Ann Florini Director

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Rapporteur | February 2009

cag research

Cultivating Social Innovation CAG launches Social Innovation Program (SIP) to address social, environmental and economic challenges and well-being of a society.

The world is no longer governed by governments alone but by ever-changing combinations of actors that include the private sectors and civil society groups. Governments are no longer seen as the only entity with answers to social, environmental and economic challenges of a society.

Economic, social and environmental wellbeing increasingly depend on the ability of these three sectors to work together, rather than at cross purposes, to provide innovative solutions to pressing problems.

The Social Innovation Program (SIP) at Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (LKY School) will focus on the social innovation taking place at the intersection of these three sectors. This social innovation ‘space’ is comprised of social enterprises (both forprofit and not-for-profit) that are aiming explicitly to generate positive social impacts by combining various elements and practices of these three sectors. The SIP will be dedicated to the research, study and promotion of such sustainable social enterprises within Asia.

The SIP will seek to advance its goals through three main programs of activity: Social Innovation Research (case studies and

research aimed at developing a social return index), a Social Innovation Fund (or ‘The Innovation Fund’ -- a fund to invest seed and growth capital in social enterprises) and Social Innovation Learning (coursework and hands-on learning for LKY School students).

SIP will work closely with a broad network of partners, including academic institutions, multilateral entities and grass root organisations in order to benefit from the partners’ experience, networks and expertise in the field.

The SIP will reside at the Centre on Asia and Globalisation (CAG) at the LKY School. As the Director of CAG, Ann Florini will oversee the SIP. As the Head of SIP, Durreen Shahnaz will manage the day-to-day operations of the program and report to Ann Florini. Durreen will also lead a group of dedicated individuals in the field of social innovation to spearhead the work of the SIP. CAG

www.lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/CAG

More on SIP including an interview with the program’s Head, Durreen Shahnaz, visit CAG online.

Energy Security in Asia CAG is proud to have been selected to receive a SGD 1,125,000 grant from the prestigious MacArthur Foundation’s Asia Security Initiative to conduct a project on energy security in the region.

Under this grant from the Asia Security Initiative, CAG will explore how energy issues connect many of Asia’s most pressing security problems, such as potential conflicts over the scramble for fossil fuels, the destabilising impact of climate change, and human security needs connected with the provision of electricity and environmental stewardship.

CAG plans to utilise the funds from MacArthur to explore two key research areas: improving energy governance, and creating an energy security index. The first component will focus on issues of cross-border energy governance at all levels. At the global level, relevant issues include the likely spread of nuclear energy across Asia, within the context of the weakening of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the deterioration of the global non-proliferation regime.

Other relevant issues of global energy governance include the obstacles that current trade rules and many bilateral investment treaties pose to transforming existing energy policies; the need to re-think the role of the International Energy Agency given Asia’s new significance in energy markets, the relationship between energy and water policy, and, cutting across all of the above, the need to move quickly to carbon-constrained energy services. Regionally,

the CAG plans to conduct research examining the emerging architecture of ASEAN energy agreements, structures, and networks.

Case studies will focus on hydropower and the Mekong River Commission, and existing and proposed regional power grids. Professor Ann Florini and Senior Research Fellow Tess del Rosario will carry out most of the research for this component The second component will focus on creating an Energy Security Index to explore the potential for developing a rigorous yet user-friendly set of metrics comparing Asian country performances in achieving energy security. This component of the project will focus on how to index, measure, and track progress on energy security from 1980 to 2008 for the ten ASEAN members as well as China, India, Japan, and Korea. The research will work towards the ultimate goal of creating an Energy Security Index, which could be utilised to disseminate information on energy security to policymakers and the public and to identify the best practices relating to energy policy within the region. The research will include extensive travel to collect data from government ministries and energy institutes throughout the world and the hosting of two workshops. CAG Researcher Fellow Benjamin Sovacool will perform most of the research for this component.

Rapporteur | February 2009

CAG

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cag events

Democracy, Decentralisation, Demystified Indonesia heads back to the polls in 2009 – a process that some hope will provide solutions to many of the problems that the country faces. Poverty persists, corruption remains endemic, infrastructure is failing and fuel costs have risen. At the same time, democratisation and decentralisation have fundamentally altered Indonesia’s political process. A great diversity of groups – state and non-state, nationalist, religious, paramilitary and otherwise – are actively jostling for influence and power in determining the future trajectory of the nation. Many are forging new mechanisms and partnerships to further their respective agendas. CAG’s Indonesia series casts the spotlight on this deeply contested process and examines the implications for state-society relations, accountability and democracy.

The Contesting Indonesia series provides an opportunity for people in the scholarly community and the broader public to listen to and engage with various experts on state and non-state actors and the roles that such actors play. “The series has been a fantastic opportunity for staff and students to listen to and engage with leading scholars and development practitioners working on Indonesia. Aside from the presentations themselves, the very active question and answer sessions accompanying each seminar have played host to some rich discussions and debates around the finer points of Indonesia’s democratisation and decentralisation,” says CAG’s Toby Carroll, the convenor of the series.

In the first half of the seminar series in 2008, scholars from the region shared their insights on political developments since the fall of Suharto in 1998. Using Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a lens, Dr Andrew Rosser, from University of Adelaide, explored the ongoing discussion on whether Indonesia should adopt a voluntary or a mandatory approach to CSR, as well as how these debates reflect broader issues of competing interests in resource distribution and accountability. In an animated session, Associate Professor Vedi Hadiz, from the National University of Singapore, addressed the manner in which the processes of decentralisation and democratisation in

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Toby Carroll and Ian Willson for CAG

Indonesia are shaped by underlying social tensions and conflicts. Dr Ian Wilson, from the Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, rounded off the series for 2008, tracing the development of protection rackets in Jakarta and the interesting roles that these social and political actors play in post-Suharto Indonesia.

The second half of the seminar series began on 22 January with Max Lane, from the National University of Singapore and author of Unfinished Nation: Indonesia Before and After Suharto. Mr Lane spoke on the issue of political parties and campaigning in the lead up to the 2009 elections. Other speakers for 2009 include Scott Guggenheim (AusAID) and Nico Warouw (Gadja Mada University).

Rapporteur | February 2009

CAG

www.lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/CAG

Podcasts of the 2008 series and information on the upcoming 2009 series are available on the Contesting Indonesia site on the CAG homepage.

cag events

Should Southeast Asia Go Nuclear?

The Centre on Asia and Globalisation (CAG) hosted an open public forum “Should Southeast Asia Go Nuclear?” on 7 November 2008. The forum was organised in conjunction with the inaugural International Energy Week, an annual event coordinated by Singapore’s Energy Market Authority. The forum marked a timely discussion of the concerns and controversies surrounding nuclear energy as various countries in Southeast Asia have decided on, or are currently exploring, the nuclear option to cope with their burgeoning energy demands.

The panel speakers, drawing on their expertise in the public sector, energy industry, non-governmental organisation and academic circle respectively, presented the audience with the main challenges nuclear energy poses to the region.

Presenting his personal take on the future of nuclear energy in Southeast Asia, Dr Weerawat Chantanakome, from Thailand’s Ministry of Energy, noted that it would be unlikely for ASEAN as a whole to adopt nuclear energy, even when a number of countries in the region have chosen to do so. Issues of public acceptance, political will and stability are but some of the factors confounding decision-making.

Commenting on the relative advantages of the nuclear option for Japan—including being cheaper and requiring lesser use of land compared to coal and liquefied natural gas—Mr Fumio Murata, from Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy, posited nuclear energy as a viable option for Southeast Asia. Mr Murata also noted that technological improvement has vast potential in advancing nuclear energy as a clean, safe energy option.

Adopting the opposite stand, Mr Tara Buakamsri, from Greenpeace—Southeast Asia, contended that energy efficiency and renewable energy represent better solutions than the nuclear option to meet Southeast Asia’s rising energy demands. He argued that complexities pertaining to radioactive waste management and the enormous financial costs involved in developing the necessary facilities render the nuclear option untenable.

Assistant Professor Gopi Rethinaraj from the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, presented a balanced perspective on nuclear energy’s viability for Southeast Asia. He reiterated that each and every energy option would have an adverse impact on the environment—albeit in varying degrees—hence the selection of the modes of energy ultimately rests on each society’s priorities and values.

The audience participated in a lively exchange with the panel. One participant contended that managing or reducing energy demands, rather than relying on nuclear energy—or any other energy option for the matter—rep-

resented the most effective solution to the current energy crisis. Another participant questioned whether it was morally just for the current generation to benefit from the use of nuclear energy’s potential capacity to meet the energy crunch, while leaving the future generation to cope with nuclear wastes. Concerns of whether ASEAN was equipped with adequate consultative mechanisms to deliberate the region’s future energy landscape were voiced as well. As global energy demand escalates conversations on nuclear energy will continue to ignite lively debates.

Rapporteur | February 2009

CAG

www.lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/CAG Watch videocast of this forum on the CAG homepage.

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special feature

S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance

Governance Of A Globalising World: Whither Asia and the West

Danny Snell for CAG

On 4-6 December 2008, the Centre on Asia and Globalisation (CAG) convened a conference on “Governance of a Globalising World: Whither Asia and the West” to launch the three-year S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance. The conference brought together leading scholars and policymakers from Asia, Europe and North America to explore concepts of global governance and global issue areas where governance is needed but not well provided.

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Rapporteur | February 2009

Special Feature

S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance

Concepts of Global Governance

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ollowing the 4 December 2008 opening dinner keynote session (see page 20-21), on 5 December 2008 the conferees were briefed on the issues raised during the Workshop on Concepts of Global Governance, held on 3-4 December 2008.

The workshop was convened to debate the changing nature of sovereignty and world order, share competing perspectives on global governance, and examine the effectiveness and legitimacy of the multitude of actors and mechanisms involved in managing the world’s most pressing global issues. Participants acknowledged that the current global order is based on a western, US-led liberal international order. Yet with the economic rise of Asia, a shift of power relations within that order may be occurring.

And given the daunting agenda of global-scale threats to human well-being and even survival – climate change, financial instability, nuclear proliferation, probable global pandemics – some argue that more sweeping and systemic change is needed to provide the tools necessary to address these global-scale perils.

One session dealt with the fundamental principle on which world order is now based: sovereignty. Although under international law all states are equal, with sovereign authority within their territories, in practice states vary widely in their capacity to exercise sovereignty and even in how they understand the concept. It is no easy matter to reconcile traditional notions of sovereignty with the growing needs for extensive and intensive cooperation across borders. Global threats cannot be managed without sweeping changes in the domestic practices of many if not most countries.

One participant presented a proposal for a new concept of “responsible sovereignty”, calling on states to take responsibility for the external spillover effects of their domestic actions. One participant noted that there is resistance in countries being asked to accept the burden of responsibility for dealing with global issues without being given the authority to shape the response. At the same time, powerful actors are able to assert authority without giving regard to the consequences in other countries that are impacted. Apart from this tension, a rigorous examination of global governance also has to deal with the disconnects between the distribution of authority and military, political and economic power, between the

authority in international organisations (IOs) and the dispersal of policymaking functions across actors, and between urgent problems requiring global solutions, and the lack of corresponding capacities in states. Finally, tensions between accountability, legitimacy and effectiveness run through all three disconnects.

Participants also discussed the role of democracy in global governance. A proposal for a “Concert of Democracies”, a forum among democratic governments that would provide an additional instrument of global governance, sparked particularly vigorous debate. One participant noted that there is agreement that global governance institutions needs to reflect democratic values,

A rigorous examination of global governance also has to deal with the disconnects between the distribution of authority and military, political and economic power but that each country has to evolve at its own pace, and take a path towards democracy that is suited to its own context. The divide between Asia and the West on this issue is not as great as it seemed.

The workshop also focused on the national capacity of states and the changing roles of the state. State behaviour has been changing in response to globalisation, with many states now acting like an “intermediary state”, responding to both domestic constituencies and external demands.

The final workshop session examined the enormous range of global governance mechanisms that go beyond standard inter-state cooperation. These include transnational governmental networks, global administrative law, inter-governmental organisations, global action networks, and private sector initiatives. There was also discussion on the value in informal relationship building and creating social value and trust as a foundation for governance, versus governance through formal institutions and rules.

Rapporteur | February 2009

CAG

www.lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/CAG

Full report on the Workshop on Concepts of Global Governance is available on the CAG homepage

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special feature

S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance

Global Governance and the Major Powers

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he next session examined global governance through the lens of geopolitics. The major powers may no longer be the only actors that matter to global governance, but they are still the most influential ones. In keeping with the project’s focus on Asia and the West, panel members addressed the roles of the US, India, China, Japan and Europe.

The US has traditionally seen four major strands of thought in debates about its grand strategy:

• The Bush 43/neoconservative camp - epitomised by advocacy for the War on Terror (now largely worn out, even among its initial proponents); • A return to Great Power politics – a potential “new neoconservative position” that emphasises the “autocratic/democratic” divide between the US on the one hand, and China and Russia on the other; • Realist retrenchment – characterised by John Mearsheimer and Barry Posen, which emphasises offshore balancing, a more retracted American position that cuts back on international alliances and a reduced American global footprint; • Sobered liberal internationalism – the centre of gravity of the new Administration, this strand comprises Wilsonian Liberal Institutionalism with a twist of realism and has a variety of sub groups: (i) liberal progressives like Susan Rice, who are opposed to the Iraq war and conceptualise security in broad terms as encompassing relations with great powers, dealing with failed states, and creating social infrastructure for solving global problems; (ii) liberal hawks like Hillary Clinton, who is likely to emphasise the use of force for good purposes; (iii) realists like Robert Gates, who as a group would provide a counterpoint to liberal institutionalists in the debate on global governance.

Although the intellectual centre of gravity within government will be broadly liberal internationalist in orientation, tensions will exist as they did for previous Administrations. An ambitious agenda is likely. “Renew”, “rebuild”, “reestablish” and “repair” will be watchwords.

On the frontburner will be the Middle East, with a composite strategy of a troop drawdown in Iraq, new commitments in Afghanistan and engagement with Iran.

The Israeli–Palestinian issue is likely to be a central plank, rather than something left to the Administration’s final days, as done by the Bush 43 and Clinton Administra-

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tions. Proliferation and arms control will probably be the single most important security threat for the Administration. Obligations like the Non-Proliferation Treaty will be taken seriously, unlike with previous Administrations.

Global warming will clearly be part of the Administration’s foreign policy package. The ongoing financial crisis provides an opportunity for a new collaborative global economic architecture. The Administration’s overall modus operandi will be to recast and redefine issues to galvanise different coalitions. Multilateralism will be seen as a necessary instrument for the US to rejoin the international community, and will be sold as a search for a new global distribution of duties – a new “burden sharing” where every country has to pull its weight.

There is no formal official position describing India’s orientation towards global governance. There is no necessary anathema, in that no groups disavowed or are embarrassed by associations with the concept, and a broad epistemic and vocabulary base suggests a high degree of comfort with the notion. All three major schools of Indian foreign policy – new Nehruvianism, the globalist strategic school emphasising partnership with the West, and the hyperrealist-hypernationalist school that is very classical in its focus on power and violence at the core of international relations - have thinkers in them that support measures relating to global governance. The idea of global governance is supported by the NehruGandhi legacy of cosmopolitanism. In addition, there is broad recognition that global governance requires cooperation across many sectors, while also requiring India to be hard-headed about stating and defending its national interests. There are several incentives for India to undertake efforts on global governance, beyond the general trend of globalisation: (i) National interest arising out of interdependence, along with the usual attendant caveats of not sacrificing national interests. (ii) The ineluctability of politics, where prestige will drive India to be involved in global governance. It will be in India’s interest to be part of mini-lateral regimes with a small number of high-powered, consequential states. (iii) Political interests, where being part of global governance at small tables will allow India to block off initiatives that are inimical to its interests. (iv) Benefits to political elites of being part of a global political game, which they can tout domestically to garner votes or other benefits.

Rapporteur | February 2009

Special Feature

S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance India will have to develop both new negotiating styles, and fresh internal capacity to deliver at interstate interactions. A key challenge will be capacity, since India only has 600 executive-level officers in its Foreign Service. Indian negotiators, known to be good at stonewalling, suspicious, and cosmological in their approach (preferring to settle principles before details), are also deft, subtle, talkative and argumentative in the tradition described by Amartya Sen. The latter can make them a positive force in global governance negotiations. Potential limitations on India’s capacity for global governance include its general suspicion of the West, deriving from its colonial heritage, and the associated presumption that in global governance, rich and powerful nations should do the running.

Japan does not have a strong political base from which to become more involved with global governance, having gone through several leadership transitions in recent years. Some commentators have argued that it may be capable of leading the region but is not currently, although this may change if a stronger political base emerges after the major General Election in six months. Japan needs such a strong base to deal confidently with external and domestic changes.

There are three major schools of thought among Japanese foreign policy thinkers, calling for: (i) much stronger relations with the US, and which sees the US-Japanese security alliance as key to Japan’s future - the assumption being that with growing powers in the region, the democratic alliance with the US is the only way for Japan to prosper. (ii) stronger emphasis and reliance on the global system, centering on the UN - this would be part of Japan becoming a truly “normal nation”. This position implies keeping some distance from US, and a stronger emphasis on being plugged into the global system by, for instance, sending forces to all relevant activities commissioned by the UN Security Council. (iii) More emphasis on East Asia – as Japan’s trade with East Asia outstrips that with the US, Japan’s economic and social structures are now much more oriented to East Asia, and should shift focus accordingly.

An ideal world for global governance would be an amalgamation of the three schools. The overall system would consist of concentric circles of global governance.

At the core would be the economically advanced liberal democracies. States would have to be circumspect about relying too much on US leadership, given its eroded moral authority after Iraq and the ongoing financial crisis. Within the concentric circles, East Asia should be a focal point. The rise of China and India presents not just opportunities to be managed, but also risks that

must be reduced. For this to happen, stronger governance is needed at various levels. Regional governance needs to comprise multi-layered structures based on functions. Core global governance, led by the US, will constitute a public good. Politically, sub-regional systems like the Six Party Talks can provide structures for cooperation. There can also be more action-oriented cooperation on non-traditional security, including such issues as natural disasters, proliferation, diseases and anti-piracy. Economically, a different sub-regional system can evolve, e.g. a Free Trade Market Agreement among the EAS 16.

China’s involvement in global governance can be described as “passive participation”.

So far, global governance structures have been imposed on China, which has had no role in either creating or maintaining them. The systemic rules, norms and terms of discourse have been formulated by other powers, and China has had no right of language, explanation or refusal. Expectations for a greater Chinese role in global governance have coincided with its emergence as a global player. The “Peaceful Rise” doctrine – the main tenets of which include that China’s rise must be

achieved by integration into existing international systems; that China must adjust to established rules and principles in international affairs; that China must be constructive and conducive to world peace and prosperity; that China must recognise the US role and military presence in Asia; and that China must insulate its domestic political problems from foreign forces on such issues as human rights, freedom and democracy - has been China’s way of coping with these realities and tensions.

China’s key dilemma is balancing external and internal stability. External stability is necessary for growth, but does not always jive well with internal issues, and is often hyped up by the media. China is experiencing increasing difficulty in implementing global governance rules, such as WTO requirements. There will be certain prices to, and constraints

Rapporteur | February 2009

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special feature

S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance

on, China’s Peaceful Rise. It will have to be broadly accommodative in international affairs, especially with the US given the pivotal nature of the Sino-US relationship, but will have to avoid commitment traps. As a status quo power, it will have to accept being supervised. In many situations, it will not be able to criticise others but will be the subject of criticism. While China does not have much cultural soft power – no one wants to “be China” – it does have soft power in the economic system, which makes it fundamentally different from the US. Its soft authoritarian, non-democratic system guarantees policy effectiveness, in much the same way Soviet centralisation facilitated heavy industrial success, with the natural consequence that the collective good is prioritized over individual rights. A greater role for China in multilateralism can be achieved through greater communication, consultation and cooperation.

The European Union (EU)’s power is regional (rather than national), and mostly soft, in that force has been given up as an explicit political instrument. There is a growing desire among Europeans to have influence in world affairs. Historically, Europe’s involvement in global structures has been through mechanisms like NATO and trade, capital and investment links between the US and EU. Major global governance issues with particular resonance for Europe include: (i) Climate Change – since environmental issues can only be tackled globally, the EU sees itself acting as a trendsetter and proponent of ambitious targets. (ii) Health – and, more broadly, social security, with the EU setting examples of how to address difficult and potentially controversial issues, as well as how not to.

Tellingly, compared to the US, most governments in Asia and Africa prefer European systems. (iii) Economic governance – More than the US, Europe has always recognised the importance of a strong state, and prefers a long-term approach to market regulation, unlike the US’ usual preference for shortterm responses.

Europe has a lot in common with Asia, which is also less short-term oriented, and which also believes in the importance of strong institutions and governance. The G-20 will be an important forum where Asians and Europeans can potentially work together. The G-7 might form a caucus but Asian states could also play a strong role. Europe is not intrinsically anti-American, but does aim to exploit the common values among its member states. Europe exemplifies the everyday practice of multilateralism in its rules-based system of pooled sovereignty. This is not easily achieved, and involves numerous meetings, but it broadly works and is a good model that has, in places like Aceh, even helped to solve conflicts in other parts of the world.

Is Asia Free-Riding on Global Governance?

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here was extensive discussion on freeriding by Asia – especially China, Japan

and India – which, some say, benefit much but contribute little to the international system. Other participants noted that earlier

generations, when speaking of the rise of India and China, would have made some reference to the championing of the interests of poorer and underdeveloped parts of world, yet this was not touched on in the opening remarks. They wondered if the rise of Asia can be an occasion for a more inclusive world order, or whether it will lead to an exclusionary hierarchy, especially at a time when less developed countries are speaking from a position of both unity and new-found confidence and strength. Several participants did not agree with the characterisation of Asia as a free-rider and pointed to how China, India and Japan have played constructive roles in the past. Some participants felt that leadership on global governance does not necessarily have to come from a power that is militarily strong. Maintaining order by following rules is also part of leadership, and on this count Asia generates major benefits for the global community. Instead of a “concert of democracies”, as proposed by one speaker at the previous day’s Concepts workshop, it might be possible to think of Asia being at the heart of a “concert of development”. One participant clarified that China, India and Japan are not being castigated as irresponsible states. However, they depend upon the existing global system to prosper, and it is clear that the bulk of the system’s maintenance comes from the US and Europe.

CAG

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Rapporteur | February 2009

CAG

Special Feature

S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance

Governance of Global Issues

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he conference then moved to a focus on selected global issues for which improved governance is clearly essential: health, energy and the economy.

In a plenary session, the chairpersons of the breakout sessions outlined major challenges to global governance in their issue area.

In the area of health governance, the chairperson noted that the financial crisis would have an adverse effect on health care expenditure and official development assistance (ODA), at a time when there are multiple, diverse and inter-sectoral health threats. Although the number of actors in the global health field and the amount of investment in health care and health research has increased dramatically in the last decade or so, it has also resulted in the fragmentation of the field and the lack of coordination among actors. The market cannot be relied on, or not exclusively, to direct funding to the most critical diseases or the most pressing problems in vulnerable countries. Health equity remains elusive, with significant gaps between the developing and the developed world.

Several points were offered for consideration. First, given the complexity of the issue and the multitude of actors in the field, global health governance will have to be a series of balancing acts. A successful framework for global health governance will have to embrace many different issues, groups, agendas and points of view, and therefore would have to define the roles of the different actors in the system and reach consensus on substantive norms and values. Accountability, transparency and effectiveness, as always, will remain indispensable components of governance.

The chairperson of the breakout session on global energy governance began with the observation that the current energy path is not sustainable. Governance is needed in many areas within the global energy system, beginning but not confined to climate change, but also in areas less often discussed, such as geopolitics and security, nuclear

energy, energy investment, bilateral investment treaties, world trade, development, and the impact of energy decisions on other major resources such as water.

The chairperson of the breakout session on global economic governance posed five questions for his group to consider. First, what does global economic governance mean, considering the many areas of international cooperation and the truly global reach of some multinational corporations, and what of the many priorities within this issue area should the group focus on? Second, why has the current governance architecture failed? The group would have to consider different points in the current system, including the Bretton Woods vision and international organisations, the OECD, the BIS, the UN and the Groups (of 8, of 24), all of which have different degrees of representation and legitimacy. Third, if we focus on the major failures of global economic governance today, where would we start? The financial crisis is an obvious place, though the group also has to consider the shift in power to the developing countries. Fourth, given all the above, what way forward for global economic governance? And last but not least, what is the role of Asia in the future of global economic governance?

The participants divided into three breakout sessions, each of which included both issue area specialists and experts in a variety of theoretical approaches to global governance. In this way, the conference pulled together the broad conceptual insights of the Concepts Workshop with an examination of possible specific applications in pressing global issue areas.

CAG

Global Governance: Major Powers’ Incentives Some participants felt that the ongoing global governance crisis is within rather than of the existing global order. Notwithstanding, other forces like radical Islam and protectionism might challenge the order directly, both enabled by the current financial crisis. It is uncertain whether the major powers have any incentives to protect the system from such structural threats. It was also noted that global governance does not necessarily mean governance by major powers, but could also refer to governance of such powers. Major powers’ domestic problems can affect the rest of the world, yet other countries have no vote in their political transitions. A robust global governance system would provide for some international stability in spite of this asymmetry.

Rapporteur | February 2009

CAG

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S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance

Global Health Governance

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he global health governance group began with the observation that the global health governance field is probably the most developed among the three issue areas. For one, there is the World Health Organisation (WHO) as an obvious locus of governance.

For another, the legion of actors, institutional arrangements, financing arrangements, and innovations in the field make it a good illustration of how different forms of power and legitimacy can interact, compete with and replace one another, and the pos- Danny Snell for CAG sibilities for coherence and fragmentation in the field.

The weakness of the WHO in the past has led to the emergence of a multitude of non-state actors. While new actors have brought new ideas and innovations to the global health field, the fragmentation of the field has led to problems of coordination, accountability and transparency, and even concerns with legitimacy. What are the bases of legitimacy in a system where non-state actors have more resources than the WHO, even though they are accountable only to their own constituents and not to the global health community as a whole? Possibly as a reaction to the fragmentation of the field and the shift of power to non-state actors, the last eight years or so has seen renewed interest by member states in the WHO and in “hard” regulations like the International Health Regulations and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. The WHO has taken on a new and more relevant role as a platform for countries to put forward their issues and interests.

The group discussed the role of Asia and the developing world within the global health field. Asia has been an active player in the WHO, and Asian countries like Thailand and Indonesia are beginning to take leadership roles on specific projects such as intellectual property and virus sharing issues. However, most of the extensive literature on global health governance and the majority of the non-state actors in the field comes from the North rather than the South.

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The group discussed some tensions between governance and effectiveness. While effectiveness in achieving health outcomes is one component of governance, it is not obvious to all what would constitute effective global governance. For example, global health actors have been successful in getting its issues and priorities into other governance mechanisms, such as the G-8 agenda and the UN General Assembly discussions. But how effective have the multitude of actors and institutions and initiatives been?

More generally, there is a tension between the short-term results of a programme and the longer-term sustainability of the local health system. Global health governance breaks down if local health systems are not able to deliver interventions to the people who need them.

Global health governance can also offer lesson for global governance in general. The discussion touched on the concept of responsible sovereignty, for example, and the need to hold states to responsibilities they have voluntarily accepted, such as the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR). Some participants suggested that the role of sovereignty in global health governance might also bear further study, especially in the concept and practice of sovereignty by Asian countries. Although states are unwilling to yield sovereignty in principle, they can be flexible in practice where their interests are concerned. Experiences in global health governance can have an impact on state behaviour in other fields and global governance in general, with states first learning to cooperate and pool

Rapporteur | February 2009

Special Feature

S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance sovereignty in functional agencies like the WHO. The group agreed on the importance of a mapping exercise to map institutions, programmes and initiatives, analyse the constraints and contribution of non-state actors, and highlight the role of Asia in this field. The

group also decided on a review of the literature, to highlight gaps in global health governance that have not been addressed, including the interrelationships between the global governance and the global health governance agendas.

CAG

Global Energy Governance

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articipants in the breakout session on Global En- terms of humanity’s relationship with the natural world. ergy Governance discussed the key energy- and However, the group agreed that energy was the means climate-related challenges facing the world today. to an end, and hence it was more productive to think in The anticipated 45 percent growth in world energy terms of the management and provision of energy servdemand from 2007 to 2030, coupled with inadequate ices, rather than in terms of energy supplies and sources.

With this in mind, participants remarked that the investment in energy infrastructure, could result in rising energy prices, while climate change will be exacerbated by field of global energy governance is limited, with little the continued predominance of fossil fuels, in particular existing scholarship. There is hence a need to establish coal. Meanwhile, a large proportion of the world’s popu- an analytical framework for global energy governance.

Several participants remarked that a single overarching lation does not have access to basic energy services.

The group assessed that the existing patchwork of en- “world energy organisation” would not necessarily be ergy institutions and national energy policies could not the optimal institutional instrument for global energy adequately address these challenges. The International governance, given the multitude of stakeholders and the Energy Agency (IEA) and Organization of the Petroleum fundamental differences between energy producers and Exporting Countries (OPEC) represent only specific consumers. This notwithstanding, the group agreed on groups of countries, while the International Atomic En- the need for energy governance in several areas: geopoergy Agency (IAEA) is faced with tight funding and dimin- litical and supply security; negative externalities (such as ishing support for the existing international non-prolif- climate change); constraining the weapons proliferation eration regime. G8 attention to energy matters is usually potential of nuclear energy; energy trade and investment; motivated by the onset of rising oil prices. The World energy and human development; and linkages with other Bank’s energy funding still overwhelmingly supports fossil fuels, and its efforts to develop clean energy mechanisms have been met with suspicion from both developing countries and NGOs. Some participants noted that different conceptualisations of energy would provide varying perspectives on energy issues, and on global energy governance. For instance, energy can be viewed primarily as an economic commodity, a strategic asset, a basic human right, or in Danny Snell for CAG

Rapporteur | February 2009

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S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance

resources such as water. The various types of governance gaps, as well as the levels of energy governance – policy, technical and coordinating – should also be examined, as should the role of non-state actors such as Global Action Networks and energy firms. One participant thought that global energy governance could provide stakeholders with a “balance of value” through “package deals” that would cover a range of related issues including climate change, trade and investment, intellectual property rights, energy efficiency and nuclear non-proliferation.

Participants then discussed a work plan and deliverables for the Study Group on Global Energy Governance.

It was decided that the Study Group would focus on energy governance, rather than energy challenges. Research

and analysis could be undertaken through short thinkpieces dealing with aspects, or “slices”, of the issues, and the linkages between different “slices” should be explored.

A mapping exercise was also important to better understand existing energy institutions, actors and stakeholders. Several participants noted that to facilitate substantive policy changes, the programme should focus on providing credible policy advice and involve national governments early through executive education, conferences or secondments. It would also be useful to conduct research on the national energy policies of major countries, and to examine how deficiencies and challenges at the national level could translate into barriers to, or opportunities for, improved global governance.

CAG

Global Economic Governance

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he working group began by exploring how to narrow down its agenda, given that the issue of Global Economic Governance covers a wide range of potential areas, including financial governance, broader institutional issues, trade and developmental aid architecture. The group agreed that it would be useful to incorporate analyses of the political pressures faced by organisations and their responses. Participants agreed that the focus should be on the global governance aspects of the issues, rather than how to generate solutions to specific global economic problems.

Macrofinancial governance was identified as the “big issue” that has triggered current attention on global economics.

One participant suggested including “Global Public Economics”, since financing responses to such issues as health, energy and climate challenges would require increasing global cooperation, over and above the more familiar issue of aid/assistance.

The focus would be on the financing structures, rather than the issues themselves.

The importance of structural issues was also raised, particularly after the G-20 leaders’ meeting. Several participants felt that while trade is an important issue, the working group should not plan on exploring the enormous complexities inherent in trade agreements, whether at the multilateral level or the spaghetti-bowl phenomenon of regional trade agreements, although these provide useful exam-

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ples of regulatory complexity. Nevertheless, the group agreed that it needs to keep an open mind – if significant trade issues come to the fore subsequently, the work programme would need to accommodate them.

Participants felt that the group’s analytical approach to governance would have to move beyond the perspective of national governments and political structures; finance and economics now transcends these concepts and has globalised in ways that surprised analysts. Words like “organisation”, “institutions” and “architecture” imply a degree of physicality that is both too narrow and too formal. A more neutral term like “arrangements” would allow for the possibility of including informal processes and non-physical as-

Rapporteur | February 2009

Danny Snell for CAG

Special Feature

S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance pects. The group agreed that such possibilities are implicit in their discussion and subsumed in terms like “networks”.

Several participants felt that many responses would come from individual sovereign governments rather than global or multilateral institutions, which make the responses of the US, China, Japan and EU important.

Some participants cautioned against spending too much time analysing civil society groups, many of which were activists and advocates of narrowly defined interests and not representative or accountable. Others felt, however, that attention to civil society would be worthwhile – if the term is taken as understood in most of the world, and not taken as including only radical or mischievous NGOs. There are numerous examples of associations of citizens engaging in meaningful activities outside political processes, who are quite distinct from more vociferous groups.

Substantial rich analysis would be missed if civil society is left out of the group’s agenda.

Some participants observed that governance exerted through non-state actors often involves self-regulation through standard-setting credit rating agencies, which is based on a form of “might is right” philosophy, since standards are defined by larger rating agencies. The group could consider the values it wants to see in global markets, and develop means to influence norms in such a way that self-regulation occurs in a more positive manner. Several participants thought that considering normative issues like equity might open a Pandora’s Box as other issues like trade, poverty and development would also have to be included. If the values debate is taken too far, the group’s final recommendations would end up being phrased in very anodyne, general language that attempts to reconcile the differences. While a standalone discussion on values was possible, the group should not pretend afterwards that it had reached any consensus.

The group’s consensus was to focus on two broad issues: (A) Global macrofinancial issues and (B) the public economics of global financing. For each issue, a five-part agenda was agreed upon: (i) Identify the main challenges confronting global governance – this work will not dwell on technical policy debate details, but what the two areas imply for the inherent priorities and difficulties of global governance.

The group will move beyond the state perspective, and also include views of non-state stakeholders. (ii) Map out existing arrangements and architecture – this will include informal networks and mechanisms outside states like new stakeholders and private financing.

This analysis will include both formal and informal institutions: are the institutions themselves failing, or are constituent actors? Are the key difficulties mainly in regulating or managing markets? Are there possibilities for pooled incentives? Are there possible “new” finance issues that can be posed at the international level? (iii) Assess key issues / constraints / deficiencies – this

will include such issues as: What challenges exist for legitimacy and effectiveness of global economic institutions? How do differences in values and norms affect the potential and scope of cooperation? What mechanisms exist to deal with challenges like interinstitutional diversity and potential conflict/overlap, representativeness and accountability? (iv) How to break inter- and intra-institutional deadlocks and learn from experiences in other parts of the world. (v) Bring in Asian perspectives in delineating the systemic implications, potential complementarities and tensions among global economic players. This should include the possibility that Asian regional governance frameworks might be exposed to be a sham; in which case the group could examine why and explore alternatives. Several participants expressed concern over essentialised terms like ‘Asian’ and ‘Western’.

Institutions and frameworks need to be good, credible, trusted and make sense, whether they have the label “Asian” or otherwise. The group needed to avoid being overly triumphalist or preoccupied with easy labels, but focus on generating more enduring options.

CAG

Wrap-up Session Each of the three breakout groups – on Economics, Health and Energy – delivered their reports and proposed work plans to the main conference. Participants affirmed the continuing salience (and evolving nature) of state actions. However, simple informal cooperation between states appears insufficient to address the urgent collective challenges facing us today. The group hence noted the need to harness the mechanisms, tools and ideas of global governance, and to study further how to apply these to specific issue areas such as finance and economics, health and energy. The role of Asia in this context was unclear, due to the relative lack of global leadership by major Asian countries on various issues, despite these countries’ growing economic and geopolitical clout.

CAG

The next steps

The S.T. Lee Project will build on the substantive discussions of this conference to: (a) refine the research agenda on global health governance, global energy governance and global economic governance; (b) establish and formalise the chairmanship and membership of the Study Groups in each of these areas; (c) plan individual workshops focused on each of these global governance areas; and (d) commission research papers based on the research agenda for each issue group.

CAG

For more information on the S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance, contact Lee Sung at slee@nus.edu.sg

Rapporteur | February 2009

www.lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/CAG

Full report on the 2008 S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance conference, including the agenda and a list of participants are available on the CAG homepage.

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S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance

Will the 21st century be the Asian Century?

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he conference culminated on 6 December with a taping of a BBC World Debate, where its host Nik Gowing moderated a debate on “Will the 21st Century be the Asian Century?”. The debate was later televised internationally on 28 December 2008.

The debate addressed issues such as how far is Asia now challenging the West’s economic and political supremacy, would this implies an irresistible shift of the power from the West to Asia and if so, what are the implications.

The leading the debate included Kishore Mahbubani, Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy; Huang Jing, Visiting Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy; Pratap Bhanu Mehta, President and CEO of the Centre for Policy Research; John Ikenberry, Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University; and Constanze Stelzenmüller, Director of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

CAG

www.lkyspp.nus.edu.sg

Watch videocast of the debate on the LKYSPP homepage.

Nik Gowing, host of BBC World Debate.

CAG Photo

CAG Photo

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Rapporteur | February 2009

Special Feature

S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance

Thinking beyond silos Kishore Mahbubani

W

hat do you get when you assemble a few dozen leading experts on global governance at a conference in Singapore? You get a remarkable degree of consensus that the world has changed. And an equally remarkable degree of consensus that all our notions on global governance have to be adapted to deal with a whole new world.

Of course, when you get an assem- be easy to the many new global chalbly of great minds, you do get interest- lenges that we face. However, there ing disagreements. John Ikenberry of was a strong consensus that the world Princeton received some grief for pro- needs to come together, possibly in inmoting the idea of Concert of Democ- novative ways, to tackle the rising new racies. I got roundly thrashed by the global challenges.

Three areas received special participants of China, India and Japan for suggesting that Asian countries had attention. The financial crisis was been “free riders” on the liberal inter- clearly at the forefront of everyone’s national system designed by the USA attention. Virtually everyone agreed and the EU in 1945. Jan Aart Scholte that this enormous financial crisis bravely pushed the idea that we need demonstrated clearly how interto move beyond global governance to connected we had become. It had discussing global government. But few also shown the inability of global souls wanted to join him in venturing institutions, like the IMF and the World Bank, and national regulatory into such bold territory.

At the conference, we also received institutions, like the Fed and SEC, interesting insights on how different to handle such challenges. In the global actors viewed the challenges of area of health, Dr. Tikki Pang clearly global governance. The Bush administration had undermined multilateralism but there was a lot of hope that the incoming Obama administration would do the opposite. The EU had offered useful global leadership in areas like global warming and “soft power”.

China had responded positively to Bob Zoellick’s call to become a “responsible described the scope and magnitude stakeholder” in the global order. Indeed, of the problems that the world faced.

China favoured greater global stabil- So far, the responses have come ity to enable its peaceful rise. However, from a variety of institutions, from China would be wary of any increased the WHO to the Gates Foundation. global governance that intruded into Greater global coordination is clearits internal affairs. India too was happy ly needed in this area. In the field of to encourage greater global governance energy, by contrast, no single global but there remained a residue of distrust institution has been developed to adof the West as a result of its colonial dress this problem comprehensively, experience. Japan continued to believe even though it is a major concern for that American leadership was critical policymakers all over the world.

Another valuable insight that surto developing global governance.

In short, the rich variety of experts faced at the meeting was that none of brought out the full complexity of the these global problems can be solved in subject of global governance. The dis- “silos”. In the real world, policymakers cussions showed that solutions will not have to make tradeoffs. For example,

CAG Photo

Kishore Mahbubani, Dean of Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy.

None of these global problems can be solved in “silos”. In the real world, policymakers have to make tradeoffs

Rapporteur | February 2009

how much attention can policymakers make to climate change challenges when there is a major economic crisis?

How does one trade long-term challenges over short-term political imperatives? In short, the first meeting of the S. T. Lee Project on Global Governance brought out the full complexity of the global governance challenges we face.

This is clearly a project whose time has come. The Centre on Asia and Globalisation should be congratulated for launching this timely initiative.

CAG

Kishore Mahbubani, is Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.

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In Conversation

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rofessor Tommy Koh is AmbassadorAt-Large at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, Chairman of the Institute of Policy Studies at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy and the National Heritage Board. In this interview with Rapporteur, Professor Koh shares his views on key trends in global governance, how should Southeast Asia be more engaged in global governance, what to expect from Obama Administration and finally the EU’s role in global governance

Q A

What are your assessments of the key trends shaping global governance?

The first key trend is the speed, breadth and depth of globalization. We have become inter-connected and, to varying degrees, interdependent. What happens in one part of the world will have an impact on other parts of the world. The current global financial and economic crisis started in Wall Street and in the US, but, it spread very quickly, across the Atlantic, to Europe, and then to the rest of the world. So, because of globalization, an American crisis has become a global crisis. The second key trend is that many of our global challenges cannot be solved by any single country, no matter how powerful, or by a group of like-minded countries. They can only be solved by all the countries of the world, working together.

Take global warming and climate change as an example.

It is a problem which cannot be solved by the US alone or by a group of like-minded States comprising the US, Europe and Japan. It can only be solved by a new international consensus, supported by all the countries of the world, including China and India. The third key trend is the growing deficit between the world’s need for global governance and the inadequacies of the status quo. I am glad that the LKY School has launched the ST Lee Project to address this problem.

Q

How is global governance conceived in Southeast Asia and what role can this region play in global governance?

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CAG Photo

Tommy Koh, Ambassador-At-Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore.

A

Southeast Asia is one of the most globalized regions of the world. It is a region which does not reject globalization but welcomes it. It seeks to harness the opportunities presented by the bright side of globalization and to cope with the challenges released by the dark side. The region plays a positive and pro-active role in global governance through its regional organization, ASEAN, and through other regional organizations, such as, ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN+3, the East Asia Summit and through such inter-regional forums as APEC, the AsiaEurope Meeting, Forum of East Asia and Latin-America and the Asia-Middle East Dialogue. ASEAN also plays an active role at the global level, at the UN, WTO, WHO, IMO, ICAO, UNEP, etc. ASEAN is aware of the deficit in global governance. It will work cooperatively with other regions of the world to reduce and, if possible, erase that deficit.

Q A

What contributions can Asia make to global governance?

Asia is a major beneficiary of globalization. Asia is also a region of growing prosperity. Asia must,

Rapporteur | February 2009

Special Feature

S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance therefore, behave as a responsible stakeholder and not as a free rider. What does “responsibility” mean? First, it means that Asia should be generous in sharing its wealth, knowledge, expertise and experience with other less developed regions of the world. Japan’s generous ODA is a laudable example. The current efforts by China and India to help Africa develop its infrastructure is another example. Second, Asia should shoulder a larger burden in helping the world to maintain international peace and security, such as, in peace-keeping missions. Third, Asia should contribute leadership and intellectual capital to global governance. It is not enough for Asia to contribute money, eg “cheque book diplomacy” or provide “arms and legs”, eg sending troops to UN peace-keeping missions. We must also provide the world with Asian leadership and Asian ideas.

Q A

What role would you like the US to play in global governance in our multi-polar world?

I think the Obama Administration would probably agree that we no longer live in a unipolar world. The world has become increasingly multi-polar. It is, however, also true that not all the poles are equally powerful. The US is, in every respect, the most powerful country in the world. Whether you love or hate the US, you will probably agree that the US is the indispensable leader of the world.

Few enterprises will succeed without the participation and support of the US. My vision is for the US to return to its historic role of world leader. My hope is that the US will seek to translate its overwhelming power into moral leadership; that the US will lead but not dictate; that it will respect international law and international institu-

tions; and that it will resort to the use of force only as the last resort. The US leads best when it leads by example.

Q A

What is your view on Europe’s role in global governance?

Europe suffers from a bad press in Asia. There is inadequate appreciation in Asia of the miracle which the EU represents. One only has to compare Europe in the two halves of the 20th Century to understand my point. The EU is an expanding oasis of peace and prosperity in Europe. Europe is not a fortress but is open to the world. When drafting the ASEAN Charter in 2007, my colleagues and I often looked to the EU for inspiration. Europe has an important leadership role in all aspects of global governance and not just in setting new norms. Let me give some examples of the kind of leadership which we would like to see more of. The former President of Finland, Maarti Ahtisaari, brought peace to Aceh. The EU and ASEAN provided observers to oversee the process of disarmament and reconciliation.

Another European, Pascal Lamy, is head of the WTO and is driving the desperate quest for a successful conclusion to the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The EU took the initiative to propose the convening of the G20 Summit, in Washington, in September 2008, to address the global financial and economic crisis.

The EU also took the initiative to convince the UN Security Council to authorize the use of naval power to combat the Somali pirates preying on ships off the Gulf of Aden. I therefore believe that Europe has played and will continue to play a constructive leadership role in global governance.

CAG

CAG Photo

Rapporteur | February 2009

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Global Governance and the New US Administration

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he 2008 S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance conference was opened by a keynote address on “Global Governance and the New US Administration” by Strobe Talbott, President of the Brookings Institution, and a response by George Yeo, Singapore's Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Summary of Strobe Talbott’s keynote address Mr Talbott highlighted that the century that has just begun is neither Asian nor American; it is a global century. And the United States has an inescapable responsibility to work with the global community in building a more effective system of governance. This challenge is not new. Over the past millennia, humankind has been engaged in a “Great Experiment” – an ongoing attempt to figure out how a world made up of many nations can govern itself peacefully. In the 21st century, this attempt at global governance involves building an international system that is able not just to take advantage of the opportunities of an increasingly interdependent world, but that can also manage its multiple problems, from

nuclear proliferation to poverty and pandemics, climate change and financial meltdown.

Mr Talbott also emphasised that the great challenge for the world is how to deal with all these urgent global crises simultaneously and coherently. It requires minimising the extent to which those efforts will compete with one another, and maximising the extent to which the means adopted to carry out one task will actually help carry out others. For example, efforts to reduce carbon emissions through nuclear power cannot be advanced without proper safeguards on proliferation. The global governance challenge also requires fully utilising the range of governance approaches at our disposal, from inter-governmental organisations to networks across states, to partnerships involving civil

(from left: Huang Jing, Visiting Professor, LKYSPP; Ann Florini, Director, CAG; Lee Seng Tee, Lee Foundation; Wang Gung Wu, Chairman, LKYSPP; and Kishore Mahbubani, Dean, LKYSPP).

CAG Photo

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Rapporteur | February 2009

Special Feature

S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance society and the private sector. Third, we need to decide on a set of mutually comprehensible and accepted rules on which to base the world order. That agreement will require American leadership in the best sense – neither unilateralist nor isolationist, but using persuasion, mediation and networking to advance humanity’s common interests.

Summary of George Yeo’s response Minister Yeo stressed the need to put human beings at the heart of global governance. While globalisation has bound all of humanity together, we are still separated by deep historical and cultural differences. The rules and standards set through globalisation, are profoundly American, but have allowed us to communicate and cooperate across our differences. There is no substitute for American leadership in the world and in setting the rules for globalisation. However, problems arise when American efforts to spread its ideals become excessive.

Minister Yeo elaborated on the importance of the relationship between China and the United States, which is the most critical relationship undergirding the management of today’s global challenges. China, with its incredible history and sophisticated civilisation, does not change so quickly or easily. Even today, under Communist rule, the principles of Confucius are returning into the public discourse of China’s leaders, through such concepts as the ‘harmonious society’. It is important to understand the uniqueness of China’s worldview. The Chinese see globalisation with China at the centre, and their relationships with other countries on an individual basis. In stark contrast with the American worldview, China is not comfortable with a view of the world that involves complex networks with multiple nodes. The United States also tends to downplay tradition, and its culture is deeply imbued with the spirit of the founding fathers, reflecting the determination to create human society afresh. As a result, the United States tends to have a missionary spirit unlike the Chinese, who do not seek to convert others.

Minister Yeo also highlighted the need to understand and respect Islam as a challenge to the world. There are many aspects to Islam which combine to represent a great civilisation, and many of these components are CAG Photo

CAG Photo

George Yeo, Singapore’s Minister for Foreign Affairs.

imbued with great humanity, as well as with principles that make sense for the modern world. Without a greater perspective that takes into account these various dimensions of Islam, and greater respect between Muslims and non-Muslims, we will not be able to move forward.

In conclusion, Minister Yeo reiterated that while the world is bound together by a set of rules and systems that is essentially American, the basic building blocks of global governance must include respect for the diversity of human beings and the differences between countries, tribes and cultures.

CAG

www.cagcorridorchat.blogspot.com Strobe Talbott, President, Brookings Institution.

Full transcript and videocast of George Yeo’s speech is available on the CAG blog – CORRIDOR CHAT.

Rapporteur | February 2009

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CAG Focus

Upcoming Events Contesting Indonesia series: “The Indonesian 2009 Election: Labour’s (Dis)Identification from Party Politics”

Date

12 March 2009

Venue

Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Date

4-6 March 2009

Venue

Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy

Date

TBC

Venue

TBC

Speaker: Nico Warouw, Gadjah Mada Univerisity

Transparency Workshop in partnership with The Asia Foundation S.T. Lee Project on Global Governance Workshop on Global Energy Governance

Selected Publications Global Governance and Energy Ann Florini Centre on Asia and Globalisation Working Paper Series, Working Paper 001.

September 2008 Contested Regionalism in Southeast Asia: the Politics of the trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline Project Toby Carroll and Benjamin Sovacool Centre on Asia and Globalisation Working Paper Series, Working Paper 002.

September 2008 Regionalism, Governance and the ADB: A Foucauldian Perspective Teresita Cruz-del Rosario Centre on Asia and Globalisation Working Paper Series, Working Paper 003.

September 2008 Contextualising Corporate Social Responsibility in Singapore Melissa Ong Centre on Asia and Globalisation Working Paper Series, Working Paper 004 September 2008 The Problem with the ‘Portfolio Approach’ in American Energy Policy Benjamin Sovacool Policy Sciences 41(3) (September, 2008), pp.

245-261.

September 2008 Attempting Illiberalism: The World Bank and the Embedding of Neoliberal Governance in the Philippines

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Toby Carroll Wil Hout and Richard Robison (eds), Governance and the Depoliticisation of Development (Routledge).

November 2009 Resolving the Impasse in American Energy Policy: The Case for a Transformational R&D Strategy at the U.S. Department of Energy Benjamin K. Sovacool Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 13(2) pp. 346-361.

February 2009

Op Eds Who Will Run The World Ann Florini Project Syndicate November 2008.

The Costs of Failing Infrastructure: Tallying Up Disasters Benjamin Sovacool Energy Biz Insider 5(5), pp. 32-33 September/October 2008 The Shrine and the Airport: Contested Spaces in Manila and Bangkok Teresita Cruz-del Rosario Global Nation 19 December, 2008 Two Old Presidents and Barack Obama Teresita Cruz-del Rosario Global Nation 26 January, 2009 Witnessing a Movement Durreen Shahnaz The Daily Star 23 January 2009

Rapporteur | February 2009

Media Interviews Climate Change and Nuclear Power Benjamin Sovacool Nature Magazine September 8, 2008 Pre-US Election Analysis Ann Florini Focus, Channel 8, MediaCorp, Singapore 11 September 2008 & 30 October 2008 Low Oil Prices and Investments in Clean Energy Benjamin Sovacool Asia Business Report with Rico Hizon, BBC World November 4, 2008 Post-US Election Analysis Ann Florini Insight, ChannelNewsAsia, Singapore 13 November, 2008 Renewable Energy in New Zealand Benjamin Sovacool Sunrise Show, New Zealand TV3’ December 10, 2008 Promoting Small-Scale Renewable Electricity in New Zealand Benjamin Sovacool Nine to Noon Show with Kathryn Ryan December 11, 2008 The Legacy of President George Bush Ann Florini Insight, ChannelNewsAsia, Sinagpore 15 January 2009

Team CAG News

New Faces at CAG

Durreen Shahnaz

Michele von Rautenkranz

Saleena Saleem

Head, Social Innovation Program & Adjunct Associate Professor sppv137@nus.edu.sg

Business Development Manager mvrautenkranz@nus.edu.sg

Research Assistant ssleem@nus.edu.sg

Durreen Shahnaz is the Head of Social Innovation Program and Adjunct Associate Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (LKY School) at the National University of Singapore.

She has been a change maker throughout her career which has spanned both the private and social sectors. In the private sector, Durreen led regional operations for these media companies – Reader’s Digest, Hearst magazine and Asia City Publishing. She also had a banking stint at Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch. In the public sector, Durreen worked at Grameen Bank (Bangladesh) and World Bank.

Durreen also has a track record as a successful social entrepreneur. She founded, ran and sold a socially conscious, for-profit business called oneNest in New York.

Durreen holds a BA from Smith College (double major in Economics and Government); and a joint graduate degree - MBA from the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania (Finance) and MA from the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University (International Economics and International Relations).

Michele von Rautenkranz has experience in the banking, non-profit and education industries. She has managed multimillion dollar corporate client relationships for international banks in New York City and has led volunteer groups while living in Europe.

As general manager of the American Association of Singapore, Michele led an organization that produces events and provides services for a constituency of 15,000 Americans in Singapore. She established a representative office for the Thunderbird School of Global Management in Singapore and contributed to the school’s strategic planning for recruiting, alumni relations and executive education.

Michele currently serves as a member of the American Association of Singapore's Board of Directors and is co-chairman of the professional business women’s group Prime Time’ golf group.

She has an MBA in Global Management from the Thunderbird School of Global Management, a BA in International Business and German and a BS in Finance from Florida State University.

Saleena Saleem joins NUS after spending over a decade in Boston, Massachusetts. Prior to her appointment at NUS, Saleena had worked in the education and transportation consulting sectors.

She had also previously worked at Harvard University, the United Nations and the Boston Globe on internships.

Saleena holds a Masters in Political Science from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where she had researched the effects of a free press on ethnic-conflict prone societies. She also holds a Masters in Business and Economics Journalism and a Bachelors in Molecular Biology and Biochemistry, both from Boston University.

Her academic interests include energy global governance and climate change; democratization; and media-state dynamics.

Rapporteur | February 2009

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