Local Government in Palestine by Agence Française de Développement

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FOCALES

Local Government in Palestine

02 October 2010

While the international community and the parties involved in the Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian conflict have focused their attention on the construction of a Palestinian state for nearly two decades, this report examines the system of local government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The anteriority of the municipalities compared to the state combined with an on-going process of territorial fragmentation help make the local level a scale of action of the utmost importance in Palestine. Simultaneously with the process of forming a political center, the Israeli-Palestinian peace agreements have led to a certain â&#x20AC;&#x153;revivalâ&#x20AC;? of municipal institutions. After presenting the political and territorial stakes behind the peace agreements, this report analyses the legal, administrative, financial and political dimensions of the system of local government at work in the Palestinian Territories since the agreements.

Local Government in Palestine Local Government in Palestine

AUTHOR Aude SIGNOLES Lecturer in political science, University of Galatasaray, Turkey signoles @hotmail.com

AUTHOR

Aude SIGNOLES Lecturer in political science, University of Galatasaray, Turkey

FOCALES FOCALES

[ October 2010 ]

Local Government in Palestine Aude SIGNOLES Lecturer in political science, University of Galatasaray, Turkey signoles @hotmail.com

Focales The Focales collection was launched in 2010 by AFD’s Research Department. It aims to give accounts of the field experiences of AFD or its partners (experts, researchers, consultants, practitioners...) in developing countries. The publications in this collection describe practical case studies (projects, experiments, partnerships...) and put them into perspective. They may also present reflection on a sectoral or geographical issue which is always supported by concrete results. They are intended to cover all the sectors and fields of action of AFD. All our publications are available at http://recherche.afd.fr

[ Disclaimer ] The analyses and conclusions presented in this document are the responsibility of the author(s). They do not necessarily reflect the position of Agence Française de Développement or its partner institutions.

Publications Director:

Dov ZERAH Editorial Director:

Robert PECCOUD Photographic credits: AFD Designed and produced by Ferrari /Corporate – Tel.: 33(1) 42 96 05 50 – J. Rouy / Coquelicot Printed in France by: STIN

Foreword This document is part of a program of study launched by the AFD’s research department on how public action is organized within territories. This organization encompasses numerous dimensions — power-sharing on a territorial basis, territorial divisions, local political organization, the relationships between political and administrative spheres, the distribution of responsibilities and resources, etc. Analysis of these processes, which bring multiple dimensions and diverse actors into play, is therefore obligatorily situated at the crossroads of several disciplines, history, sociology, political science, economics. This program’s ambition is to shed light, in successive layers, on the multiple facets involved in the issue. Some of the work is conceptual in nature, such as Notes & Documents N o. 42 “Decentralization: A Few Principles from the Theory of Fiscal Federalism ”. Others are more contextual in nature. The Focales collection is destined to publish these latter. This second issue in the collection examines, within their historical trajectory, the nature of the sociopolitical relationships between the center and the periphery in a context as complex as Palestine.

Réjane HUGOUNENQ Research Department, AFD

Table of Contents

Introduction

1. The Political and Institutional Context

1.1. The Political Context 1.1 .1 . A Mutual Recognition Process 1.1.2. The Establishment of an Authority with Central Powers, the First Steps in the Creation of a State 1.1.3. A Territorial Reorganization Process 1.2. The Logic Behind the Overhaul of the Local Administration System 1.2.1. The Municipal Past: Between the Politicization and Discrediting of Local Elected Officials 1.2.2. The “Revival” of Local Institutions: A Political Priority 1.2.3. Municipalities at the Service of the Future State

13 13 14 15 16 16 18 18

2. The System of Local Government in Palestine

2.1. Legal, Administrative and Financial Aspects 2.1.1. The Various Levels of Decision 2.1.2. The 1997 Law on Local Government 2.1.3. Municipalities’ Financial Resources 2.1.4. The Local Political System 2.2. The Relationships Between Political Centers and the Peripheries 2.2.1. A Strong Propensity for Centralization 2.2.2. The State of Israel: A Major Actor in Local Power

21 21 23 25 30 31 31 32

3. Territorial and Sectoral Reform Projects

Conclusion

Appendices

1 – Territorial Fragmentation Following the Oslo Agreements (1995) 2 – Palestinian Local Political History – A Few Key Dates 3 – Timeline of the Oslo Agreements (1993 – 2000) 4 – “Old” and “New” Palestinian Municipalities According to the Oslo Agreements 5 – Palestinian Municipalities' 27 Areas of Responsibility Under the 1997 Law on Local Government 6 – Palestinian Municipalities’ Financial Resources

45 47 50 51 52 55

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Bibliography

Introduction

Introduction While the international community and the parties involved in the Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian conflict have focused their attention on the construction of a Palestinian state for nearly two decades, the publication of a report on the system of local government at work in the West Bank and Gaza Strip seems a priori ill-timed. However, the history of Palestinian municipalities contributes to the originality and relevance of this subject of study. Created in successive waves starting in the second half of the 19 th century, the municipalities were the only political institutions authorized to exist, at least officially, during the entire duration of the Israeli occupation (1967-1993). In the context of the 1970s and 1980s, and owing to the organization of local elections (in 1972 and again in 1976), they were one of the focal points for the crystallization of the national struggle. Palestinian municipalities are, thus, “longlasting” institutions that pre-existed the Palestinian state, and will be called on to endure, no matter what political form or territorial configuration the Palestinian entity born of the Oslo Agreements may take in the future. The old and “stable” character of Palestinian municipalities is not negligible in a context of high uncertainty and extreme lability of situations. For the population, the municipalities are signs of continuity where the Palestinian Authority, the embryo of central power born of the Israeli-Palestinian peace accords, poses itself everywhere in terms of rupture. Local institutions are the only ones that the inhabitants of the Palestinian Territories know from having experienced and “invested” them during the years of occupation, and thereby the only ones from which they expect a “revival.” The observation was, indeed, one of a vacancy of power at the local level and the poor state of municipal services when Yasser Arafat arrived in the Palestinian Territories. Opinion surveys conducted in the years following the peace agreements show that a major part of the population saw the organization of municipal elections as more of a priority than holding legislative or presidential elections, both of which derive directly from the institutions born of the peace agreements with Israel. It is true that all political factions in Palestine want to participate in municipal elections, including the factions that are opposed to the Oslo Agreements and generally call for general elections to be boycotted.

Introduction

The fragmentation of the territory in connection with the implementation of the peace agreements and the de facto retreat of the population to so-called “autonomous” Palestinian locations also help make the local level a scale of action of the utmost importance in Palestine. More recently, the taking power by mayors and municipal council members from or close to Hamas — a political movement opposed to the peace agreements and not part of the Palestinian national liberation movement — contributed to a (re)politicization of local power. The Islamist victory at the 2005 municipal elections prefigured wide-reaching political changes in the Palestinian Territories and, notably, Fatah’s defeat in the 2006 legislative elections (until then the ruling party) and the loss of its monopoly over management of national affairs.

Part One

1. The Political and Institutional Context The institutional and political system within which the Palestinian Authority and local governments currently operate is largely the result of the Israeli-Palestinian peace agreements (called the Oslo Agreements) signed in 1993. We therefore feel it useful to review briefly the political and institutional context of Oslo, as well as the conditions under which the Palestinian system of local government was built.

1.1. The Political Context The peace agreements adopted on 13 September 1993 by the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was a major political turning point for Palestinians. [1 ] They entered into a three-fold process of: (i) mutual recognition, (ii) the establishment of an authority with central powers, and (iii) territorial reorganization.

1.1.1. A Mutual Recognition Process On one side, the Israelis agreed to negotiate with the PLO, which they had until then considered to be a “terrorist” organization; on the other side, the PLO acknowledged the existence of the State of Israel within its 1949 borders. Hamas is not part of the PLO. This movement was born in 1987, long after the nationalist organization was formed. Hamas does not consider itself bound by the content of the Oslo Agreements, which it rejected outright. When it came to power in 2006, the question of the new Hamas-majority government’s recognition of the State of Israel was raised by the State of Israel and the members of the Quartet (the United States, Russia, the European Union and the UN). Unanswered, it was placed on the agenda again in June 2007 following the political split between Hamas (which holds the Gaza Strip) and Fatah (which administers the West Bank). It remains unresolved to this day.

[1 ] See Appendix 3.

Part One

1.1.2. The Establishment of an Authority with Central Powers, the First Steps in the Creation of a State The Oslo Agreements gave rise to a new Palestinian political institution: the Palestinian Authority. This was the first experiment in creating a national political center for the Palestinians. In it, they saw the first steps towards the proclamation of their state. The Palestinian Authority was, initially, a temporary institution dependent on the legal regime governing “autonomy.” It holds civil powers over the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (East Jerusalem is excluded from its field of action). It is in charge of forty areas of responsibility meticulously listed in the peace agreements, such as agriculture, trade, employment, water, religious affairs, telecommunications, etc. Local affairs are one of its prerogatives. The areas of activity that were transferred to it had until then been managed by the Israeli military authorities and civil administration. Management of these different spheres of responsibility necessitated the creation of ministries and an administrative apparatus, a Parliament with legislative powers, and the deployment of a police force. All of these new institutions, coupled with the establishment of the first Palestinian government (with Yasser Arafat as President), prefigured state rule. However, the Palestinian Authority does not have the same attributes as a sovereign state. It lacks two attributes of sovereignty in particular: the ability to conduct foreign policy (this is handled by the PLO, which represents all Palestinians on the international scene); and monitoring of security issues and border control, which remain under Israeli responsibility (which explains why the Palestinians do not have an army). The Palestinian Authority’s existence has been extended beyond the transitional period for which it was created. It is now one of the actors with whom Israel and the members of the Quartet envisage the future of the Palestinian Territories. Its reason for being was, however, challenged by certain opinion leaders when the political situation deteriorated during the second Intifada. Since June 2007, two rival governments (one pro-Hamas in Gaza and the other pro-Fatah in the West Bank) have fought for the leadership of the Palestinian Authority: control of the police force and seizure of the financial rent from foreign aid are at the heart of the stakes and rivalries over power.

Part One

1.1.3. A Territorial Reorganization Process When the Oslo Agreements were signed, the two protagonists’ initial objective was to exchange land for peace. The Palestinian and Israelis adopted a gradual method of conflict resolution that initially planned for the withdrawal of the Israeli army from parts of the Occupied Territories and pushed back discussions on issues deemed sensitive such as Jerusalem, refugees, the settlements, security, and even the final determination of borders. However, the movements of the Israeli army between 1994 and 1999, planned in stages, led to smaller territorial withdrawals than the Palestinians had expected. In practice, the implementation of the Oslo Agreements generated a disassociation between spatial control of land, which largely eludes the Palestinians, and rule of the population that, for its part, now depends on the Palestinian Authority. At the heart of the territorial conflict, the West Bank is divided into multiple disconnected, narrow zones with distinct statuses that fluctuate with the state of diplomatic discussions: l Area A of Palestinian autonomy is under the responsibility of the Palestinian Authority for civil affairs and security issues. This area covers the principal large agglomerations. In 1995, Area A represented 3% of the territory and 18% five years later. l

Area B consists of mixed zones in which Palestinian autonomy is partial because the State of Israel maintains control over flows of goods and people. It covers small cities and towns in rural areas. Area B represented 24% of the territory in 1995 and 22% in 2000.

Area C is entirely controlled by the Israelis, for both civilian affairs and security issues. It covers pastoral zones and the Israeli settlements, the so-called ring roads around Palestinian cities and villages reserved for vehicles with Israeli license plates, and Israeli military camps. In 1995, Area C represented 73% of the West Bank, and still accounted for 60% of it five years later.

Beyond this diversity of legal statuses, the West Bank is “splintered” by the presence of Israeli settlements, which have doubled in number in ten years, and by the multiplication of Israeli by-pass roads. The territorial splintering process is also manifest by military roadblocks set up at the entry and exit points for various Palestinian locations. These roadblocks have multiplied (563 in November 2007, 630 in September 2008), making the circulation of goods and people more difficult. Starting in 2002,

Part One

the splintering of the territory was amplified by the erection of walls in and/or around certain Palestinian cities as well as in the very heart of Jerusalem (see the map in Appendix 1). For its part, the Gaza Strip has undergone a process of progressive isolation. Starting in 1993, it was cut off from the rest of the Palestinian Territories by a very strict policy of controlling the entry and exit of goods and people. The Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in August 2005 did not fundamentally change the situation. Of course, the Israeli settlements were destroyed and the land returned to the Palestinians. But the State of Israel has kept control over land, air and sea borders. The policy boycotting the Palestinian Authority, adopted jointly by the State of Israel and the international community following the Islamists’ rise to power in 2006, intensified the situation of isolation (and impoverishment) in the Gaza Strip. The effects of the Israeli blockade have increased since June 2007 and the Hamas’ taking control of the Gaza Strip — all the more so since, simultaneously, in the West Bank, the ostracism of the now pro-Fatah government has disappeared.

1.2. The Logic Behind the Overhaul of the Local Administration System When Yasser Arafat arrived in the Palestinian Territories, it was a time of state building and the centralization of political power. On the local level, the challenge for the new regime was therefore to make the municipalities into institutions at the service of the state to come. While there was initially a consensus on this objective, including among the local elites, tensions rapidly emerged between the Palestinian Authority and the local powers who were facing attempts at political marginalization. It must be said that, during the 1970s and 1980s, the elected officials in the large Palestinian agglomerations had largely compensated for the lack of a state by investing in welfare activities and structuring the debates on the national struggle in the Occupied Territories.

1.2.1. The Municipal Past: Between the Politicization and Discrediting of Local Elected Officials Until 1976, the Israelis sought to delegate management of civil services to locally elected Palestinian figures, betting that the elite that emerged from the voting booths would be satisfied with the organization of the elections and would therefore not be fiercely hostile to them. This was effectively the case for the 1972 municipal elections, although they were boycotted by Yasser Arafat’s PLO, which defended the Palestinians’ national interests on the international scene. The State of Israel then

Part One

aimed to promote a municipal elite that, because of its electoral legitimacy, was sufficiently representative to negotiate a peace agreement with it, independently of Arab countries and in place of the PLO, whose legitimacy to speak for the Palestinian people was progressively acknowledged. The victory of “nationalist” mayors close to the PLO in the 1976 municipal elections marked, however, the failure of this policy of indirect rule of local elites. From this date on, the Israeli policy of promoting a Palestinian leadership other than the PLO remained, but the strategy deployed changed as the electoral option was abandoned. First, the Israeli government acted via appointment, by entrusting rule of the populations in the Territories to figures from the rural world, reputed to be more conservative than the urban elites and therefore less nationalist. Village Leagues were created with this aim, notably in the southern region of Hebron. But this policy did not resonate well with the Palestinian population targeted, and even generated clear hostility (several League leaders were, for instance, assassinated). The Israelis then adopted a tactic of near-systematic frontal attack in regard to the municipal officials elected in 1976: many were asked to resign, stripped of their functions, deported from the Occupied Territories, placed on house arrest, or even imprisoned. In place of nationalist local elected officials, the Israeli military authorities installed managers of their choice — either Palestinians or Israeli civilians or members of the military. Starting in 1985-1986, however, Israel returned to indirect rule of the population by nominating as mayors pro-Jordanian Palestinian figures who were often lacking popular support and democratic legitimacy. The political exploitation to which the municipalities were subject thus progressively led to the population’s mistrust of them, whereas their leaders had managed, in the 1970s, to carry the demands of the national movement within the municipalities. Starting with the first Intifada (1987), the mayors and municipal council members nominated by the Israelis to replace the elected officials of 1976 were asked to resign by the activists of the Uprising. Keeping one’s post was then seen as an act of collaboration with Israel and treachery against the nation. Several resigned following these calls. Several political assassinations were also perpetrated against those who refused to comply. This “witch hunt” atmosphere explains why local political figures still in office when the Oslo Agreements were signed were few in number.

Part One

1.2.2. The “Revival” of Local Institutions: A Political Priority When the Oslo Agreements were signed (1993), the Palestinian local governments were particularly weakened and had lost legitimacy in the eyes of the population because of their exploitation during the occupation period. It was both to overcome the institutional and political “gap” at the local level and turn the page on the inherited political history that the Palestinian Authority deployed a policy of promoting local governments. This was manifest by a series of “decentralization” measures. In practice, it was not a decentralization in the classical sense of the term because no national authority had existed before the creation of the Palestinian Authority. The aim was rather, for the power in the process of forming, to place the institutions that existed before it under its control while ensuring the loyalty of the principal clans and family leaders that served as relays with the population. In other terms, the wager was to unify around the Palestinian Authority and its charismatic leader, Yasser Arafat, a population whose clan-type organization would tend more to fragment and do so against the backdrop of a sharp imbalance of power between the Israelis and Palestinians.

1.2.3. Municipalities at the Service of the Future State In this context, the leaders of the Palestinian Authority assigned a clear role to the local governments: they were supposed to serve as supports for the territorial inscription of the state to come. The municipalities were supposed to contribute to the affirmation of a political center and national identity. Their presence was to help the development of a uniquely Palestinian bureaucratic apparatus. The municipalities also had to “mark” the Palestinian territory claimed. By giving the various human communities, even the smallest, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip a legal status, and by mapping them, the aim was to affirm that they belonged to the nation and counteract Israel’s propensity for continuing to establish settlements. This was especially the case in rural areas. Finally, the leaders of the Palestinian Authority saw local governments as potential motors for development. According to them, municipal services needed to help normalize the population’s living conditions and provide their constituents with the means to take part in economic growth — both locally and nationally. Emphasis was therefore placed on rehabilitating municipal infrastructure and delivering service providers.

Part Two

2. The System of Local Government in Palestine With Yasser Arafatâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s arrival in the Palestinian Territories (in 1994), several legal, institutional and political changes concerned local affairs. They reveal four general priorities for the Palestinian political leaders: l the need to place the system of local government under the control of a political center that was, for the first time, national; l

the need to unify the legal provisions governing municipal action;

the need to coordinate and plan the development projects undertaken at the local level and organize their financing; and

the need to hold municipal elections.

2.1. Legal, Administrative and Financial Aspects 2.1.1. The Various Levels of Decision There are three levels of government in Palestine: the central level, the regional level ( muhafaza ), and the municipal level. At the central level, there is the Ministry of Local Government (MLG), founded in 1994. It is present in every regional capital via its deconcentrated offices. At its creation, its role was above all to provide the system of local government with new legal supervision. However, the creation of a ministry specialized in local affairs revealed the need and urgency, for the leaders of the Palestinian Authority, to make local development issues a priority. This creation contrasted with the years of Israeli occupation during which local affairs, under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior, made reference to security concerns and control of domestic public order. The governorates (or muhafazat ) make up the regional level. They are under the direct supervision of the Ministry of the Interior and are led by directors nominated by the President of the Palestinian Authority. They are characterized by true legal

ÂŠ AFD /October 2010 / Local Government in Palestine

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ambiguity insomuch as no text of law or decree from the Palestinian Authority regulates their activities. In practice, however, the regional governors (muhafiz ) are in charge of the Palestinian police force within their administrative jurisdictions. They are also responsible for coordinating some state services (health, education, transportation, etc.) at the regional level. Management of the conflicting interests or priorities of various deconcentrated services is handled by the Prime Minister’s office. Fourteen governorates (or muhafazat ) were founded in 1995: nine in the West Bank (Nablus, Qalqilya, Tulkarm, Jenin, Jericho, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Hebron and Jerusalem) and five in the Gaza Strip (North Gaza, Gaza City, Deir el-Balah, Khan Yunis and Rafah). They replaced the eight regions set up by the Israeli administration during the occupation. Two regions in the West Bank have, what is more, the status of separate “autonomous district”: they are Tubas and Salfit. These administrative divisions serve as electoral constituencies. The third level of action is situated at the local level. It consists of the municipalities and village councils that are legally under the supervision of the MLG. When Yasser Arafat arrived in the Palestinian Territories (in 1994), there were thirty-one municipalities (twenty-six in the West Bank and five in the Gaza Strip), eighty-six village councils, and 225 localities without legal status. In 1999, there were only 183 localities still without legal status. And, fifteen years later, the official statistics speak of 121 municipalities (ninety-six in the West Bank and twenty-five in the Gaza Strip) and 355 village councils (source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics [PCBS], 2008). Most current municipalities therefore date back to the time of the Oslo Agreements. The municipalities that were created in the context of Oslo are called “new municipalities” and counted separately, which distinguishes them from the “old municipalities” created under the Ottoman era, the British mandate and the Jordanian administration. The “new” municipalities come from either former village councils or localities that until then had not been legally recognized. Both the “new” and “old” municipalities hold the same responsibilities under the law. [2] The village councils, however, have different prerogatives (see below). Several reasons presided over the Palestinian Authority’s policy of intensive municipalization during the first years of its formation. First, the creation of municipalities aimed to fill the institutional and political gap created by Israeli policy during the years of occupation. Second, the aim was also to catch up the “lagging” development of basic infrastructure, also caused by the years of occupation. Finally, this policy was also a response to the population’s strong demand for and expectations of [2] See Appendix 4.

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participation in local decision-making: in a context of political change, the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip trusted the institutions that they knew (such as the municipalities) more than new institutions (such as the Palestinian Authority’s Ministries). As a result, the demographic criterion usually used to justify the creation of new local governments was not, in this case, decisive. The policy of creating new local governments concerned the West Bank more than the Gaza Strip. This was not so much due to the difference in size between the two territories, but more to the “splintering” of housing in the West Bank and the extreme population density in the Gaza Strip (365.5 inhabitants per sq. km). Gaza City is the most populated agglomeration in the Palestinian Territories (more than 350,000 inhabitants in 1999), far ahead of the two flagship cities in the West Bank, Nablus and Hebron, each of which have more than 150,000 inhabitants (PCBS, 2008). These two West Bank “heavyweights” are rivaled by two other cities in the Gaza Strip, Jabaliya and Khan Yunis. The West Bank has, on the contrary, a very large number of small municipalities (less than 10,000 inhabitants) and village councils, whereas the Gaza Strip has practically none. The localities situated in the Jerusalem governorate (twelve in number) have a unique status: they make up “local councils” rather than “municipalities” or “village councils”. This classification is deliberately political, and is not based on any demographic criteria (some of these localities, such as A-Ram, have approximately 20,000 inhabitants). For the leaders of the Palestinian Authority, this is done to remind everyone that East Jerusalem, annexed by Israel since 1967, is Palestinian. The aim is also to preserve the possibility of later integrating these localities’ land into East Jerusalem, the capital of Palestine.

2.1.2. The 1997 Law on Local Government The law on local government that was passed in 1997 organizes the system of local government. [3] It was written with the aim of unifying the legal framework for local government, insomuch as there were until then several overlapping laws of Ottoman, British, Egyptian and Jordanian inspiration, not to mention the very pervasive Israeli military orders. For the Palestinian leaders, this law was also performative in scope: by its very existence, it unites territories that, in reality, are split into two separate parts and even into multiple micro-elements. Nevertheless, ambiguity reigns as to the decision-making process and possible control exercised by the regulatory authorities (see below). [3] See Appendix 5.

Part Two

The law on local government lists twenty-seven fields of activity under municipal responsibility. Issuing building permits, regulating commerce and industry, urban development and budget approvals are among the most important. Municipalities have the possibility of issuing rulings in these fields of activity. In other words, they are authorized to issue orders or decisions that govern their service activities and specify, for example, animal slaughter conditions in the commune, the opening hours of the municipal market, or even set the fees for household refuse collection. Palestinian legislation also distinguishes between different types of locality according to demographic weight. For instance, it distinguishes between “municipalities” and “village councils,” reusing an old classification inherited from the Ottoman period. The municipalities are local governments as such, with autonomy over decision-making , budgets, personnel management, and with members elected by the population with direct universal suffrage. The village councils are administrative structures that depend on a supervisory ministry and whose purpose is to represent the central power in distant outlying areas. Their directors are nominated. According to the law, this distinction is based on a demographic criterion: in this way, any human ensemble of more than 1,000 inhabitants can make up a municipality. However, in practice, the statutory promotion of localities with small populations is often, for the new regime, a way to proclaim the importance of villages threatened by Israeli colonization (and notably by the extension of a wall); whereas, a contrario , granting the status of “village” to densely populated towns penalizes “rebellious” behavior vis-à-vis the country’s new leaders. In any case, this distinction creates distinct degrees of autonomy in relation to the political center. And, more specifically, it makes small rural localities, located in Areas B and C as defined by the Oslo Agreements, into the advanced arm of the MLG. In addition, the 1997 law created four categories of municipalities: A, B, C and D, based on demographic criteria also. Class A municipalities must have more than 15,000 inhabitants. In reality, only the district capitals belong to this category, regardless of their population. Class B municipalities must have between 10,000 and 15,000 inhabitants: they correspond to the “old municipalities” and/or large agglomerations. Class C municipalities have between 5,000 and 10,000 inhabitants, and class D municipalities between 1,000 and 5,000 inhabitants: both categories refer to localities in rural areas and are often “new municipalities”. Unlike the previous classification, this productive typology does not modulate responsibilities for the various groups of municipalities. It does, however, have a performative effect by displaying a “size” comparison of the various localities.

Part Two

Finally, the 1997 law on local government excludes the twenty-nine refugee camps (twenty-one in the West Bank and eight in the Gaza Strip) from the jurisdiction of the MLG, governorates and municipalities. These areas fall directly under the jurisdiction of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the UN Agency in charge of managing Palestinian refugees. The UNRWA provides free services to the people in the camps — but only in the fields of health and education. Hence, when it comes to the distribution of drinking water and electricity or even household refuse collection in and around the camps, a degree of ambiguity exists in regard to the responsible authorities, which results in a wide variety of situations. In the Gaza Strip where refugee camps are very densely populated and often spill over onto municipal land, these types of services are generally provided by the local governments, after discussion with the UNRWA and the people’s committees in charge of security and the administration of these settlements. In the West Bank, the configuration of and power struggles between refugee camps and municipalities can be highly conflict-ridden (such as in Nablus and, to a lesser extent, Bethlehem) or more peaceful (as in Ramallah – Al Bireh).

2.1.3. Municipalities’ Financial Resources [4] Palestinian municipalities’ direct financial resources are both rare and unstable. This situation is due to the fact that no (or few) local taxes are collected in Palestine. The only existing local tax is an education tax. It makes it possible to finance the construction of schools, purchase books, and renovate school buildings; it does not appear in the municipal accounts but figures in a special account. The municipalities’ financial difficulties are also caused by the fact that they have a hard time building equity, and have low taxation rates as these rates are outdated. Generally speaking, the tax bases are set by law. The municipalities may suggest increasing tax rates, but the final decision is always made by the central power. The municipalities own financial income depends primarily on the payment of taxes and fees in relation to the provision of public goods and services. l The principal source of revenue for Palestinian local governments is the sale of electricity to residents in their communes and, sometimes, to the residents of neighboring territories. In the West Bank, fifty-two out of ninety-six municipalities have access to this source of revenue: they are primarily the municipalities of large cities in the north and south because, in the Middle Region, electricity is provided by a public service concession company, Jedco. In the Gaza Strip,

[4] See Appendix 6.

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electricity is not, strictly speaking, a municipal responsibility, but rather the responsibility of a private company. Overall, electricity-related financial income accounts for more than 40% of revenue in the West Bank. For instance, in 2007, the revenue collected by electricity-distributing municipalities amounted to 510,1 45,000 new Israeli shekels (NIS), of which 191,804,000 NIS are linked to the payment of electricity bills alone. In addition, one-third of municipal revenues overall belong to municipalities that supply electric energy (510,1 45,000 NIS out of 1,535,302,000 NIS). The municipalities buy their electricity from the Israeli monopoly electric company, Israel Electric Corporation (IEC), except in Jericho. But they do not always have the means (or do not always show a desire) to pay their bills. In this case, the IEC does not cut off energy deliveries. Instead, it has the Israeli authorities deduct the unpaid amounts from the sums paid to the Palestinian Authority for the value added tax (VAT) and customs tariffs. In the West Bank, 80% of non-payment comes from the late payments of seven municipalities, including Nablus and Hebron. This situation generates inequalities between local governments. The Palestinian Authority has not yet managed to recover the full amount that the municipalities owe the IEC. It nevertheless attempts to replenish its coffers by blocking the transfers of funds to the municipalities that it is supposed to make under the 1997 law. These practices — the contracting municipalities not paying IEC electricity bills — are old. They date back to the time of the first Intifada during which calls to boycott local taxes were launched by the PLO and when fiscal nationalism was seen as an act of resistance against the oppression. Starting with the Oslo Agreements, the continuation of these practices — criticized by the Authority — has made it possible, no more no less, for the municipalities to turn a contribution in kind (electricity) into monetary income through resale operations. It is very often exactly the same for municipal funds related to water distribution. l

Palestinian municipalities’ second largest source of revenue is made up of income from building permits . In the “new municipalities ”, this is even the largest source of financial revenues. These resources are haphazard because they are tied to the economic context which is itself heavily dependant on the political situation. These resources dropped off significantly in the context of the second Intifada. l

The municipalities also collect a range of fees for household waste, sewers, parking , markets, slaughterhouses, etc. When it comes to household waste collection, for example, a 1998 decree by the Palestinian Authority stipulates

Part Two

that the monthly fee is two to six Jordanian dinars (JOD) for private parties (depending on the number of rooms inhabited), ten JOD for small shops, and 100 JOD for large industrialists. l The municipalitiesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; other revenues are fiscal in nature : taxes on commercial and industrial activities (business taxes, billboards, etc.), property, fuel and automobile traffic. Each of these taxes accounts for approximately 5% of municipal income in the West Bank. It may be indirect revenue for municipalities, which comes from government fund transfers (the subsidy mechanism does not exist). The income derived from them is, however, minimal and their payment is both irregular and relatively arbitrary. In 1999, for instance, government fund transfers contributed 15% of municipal budgets (source: United Nations Development Programme [UNDP]). The main taxes are:

- The property tax , which is governed by old legal texts: in the West Bank, it comes from a 1954 Jordanian law; in the Gaza Strip, from a 1940 Egyptian law. In the West Bank, property taxes are collected by the Ministry of Finance for the municipalities. The income from the tax is then allocated to the originating local governments, minus 10% of the sums collected to cover collection costs. The tax base is set by law, and the municipalities are not able to intervene in the process: it is 17% for real estate, and 10% for land. In the Gaza Strip, collection is the responsibility of the local governments alone, and they are in this way autonomous when it comes to setting their taxation rates. Until 2007, the property tax was collected in only the twenty-five oldest municipalities. On this date, the Ministry of Finance extended the principle of this tax to the new municipalities and began work reevaluating the taxable base. This led to a non-negligible increase in municipal revenues related to this tax. In 2008, the income from property taxes actually collected amounted to 64,668,000 NIS (out of the 75,384,000 NIS that the Ministry should normally have collected), or a collection rate of 85%.

- B usiness taxes : in the West Bank, the tax rates also date from the 1954 Jordanian law. They have never been adjusted since. - Transportation taxes: They are collected according to a formula that splits them first between the West Bank (one third) and the Gaza Strip (two thirds), and then between the municipalities themselves according to population and, in part, the discretion of the current government. This financial resource makes up 45% of municipalitiesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; indirect resources.

ÂŠ AFD /October 2010 / Local Government in Palestine

Part Two

Since the start of the second Intifada (September 2000), the financial situation of most municipalities has worsened a little more. Debt is the rule. There are differences from one locality to another, however: some cities have been less affected than others by the deterioration of the political situation, or are even in a quite comfortable situation because they have a solidly-implanted merchant middle-class (Nablus), processing industries or small local crafts industries (Hebron), a border post (Jericho) or even a large market fair (Dura). The situation of extreme poverty in Palestinian local governments makes them extremely dependent on the provision of outside funds. In the years following the Oslo Agreements, international aid thus provided 90% of the municipalitiesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; and village councilsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; investment budgets. The funds are allocated primarily to construction projects and heavy infrastructure rehabilitation projects (water, electricity, roads). The World Bank and the European Union are the two main donors in urban areas. For its part, the UNDP is active mainly in rural areas. The municipalities are also heavily dependent on bilateral technical aid (from the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, etc.).

ÂŠ AFD /October 2010 / Local Government in Palestine

Part Two

Table

1. Breakdown of Palestinian municipalities’ spending, 2006-2007

Sector of activity

% of total budget (2006)

% of total budget (2007)

Administrative, legal and financial affairs

31.8

32.2

Health

21.1

22.9

32.8

33.8

Fire prevention

2.7

2.9

Education

0.5

1.1

Culture and heritage

4.8

2.6

Social affairs

0.2

Settlement development

0.1

0.2

Other

6.0

4.1

TOTAL

100

Public works

Source: Municipal Development Lending Fund (MDLF), 2009

Table

2. Breakdown of municipalities’ direct revenues other than taxes related to the distribution of public services, 2006-2007

Sector concerned

% of total revenue in 2006

% of total revenue in 2007

Local income tax

33.7

33.9

Property tax

18.1

14.3

Business tax

15.6

19.6

66.3

66.1

Revenues related to cultural services and markets

Taxes on building permits

26.8

23.2

Revenue related to the rental of public goods

9.7

Other (not identified)

100

TOTAL Source: MDLF, 2009

Part Two

2.1.4. The Local Political System The formation of municipal staff in Palestine traditionally responds to two major stakes: first, ensuring the representation of families ( hamayil ) in municipal bodies; and second the creation, preservation or strengthening of patronage networks for the competing actors in a system where proximity to the political center guarantees financial income, the attainment of micro-agreements in the case of power struggles, and sometimes, a degree of social prestige. For all that, partisan belonging is not a negligible variable in electoral competition. Until the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004, no municipal elections were held. From 1996 to 1999, the mayors and municipal council members were appointed directly by the President of the Palestinian Authority after negotiations with the representatives of the large “families” ( hamayil ) in the various localities. These negotiations were often long and conflict-ridden, especially in the large agglomerations. This led the clan leaders to themselves oust the candidates reputed to be close to the opposition parties (whether on the left or Islamists). It also led the Palestinian leadership to push aside members of the government party (Fatah) that were too rebellious or fervent, and for whom a seat as local “elected” official could have served as a stage from which to express their dissentions and protests. In the eyes of the population, this appointment policy made most mayors look like government “puppets”. Mahmoud Abbas’ election to the head of the Palestinian Authority in January 2005 resulted in a greater degree of democratization for Palestinian institutions. In fact, as soon as he took power, municipal elections were held (except in Hebron and Gaza City) that both confirmed the clan-like organization of local power and established Hamas’ “entry into politics ”. Candidates from the Islamist movement put on a very good showing everywhere. In the large agglomerations in the West Bank as in the Gaza Strip, they often obtained an absolute majority of seats. Hamas capitalized on the crisis of the Palestinian national project tied to the failure of the Oslo Agreements and on the accompanying territorial disillusions. It also benefited from accusations of corruption, whether proven or not, levied against the Palestinian Authority. Hamas’ social actions also explain the movement’s leaders’ strong popularity and the local support they received. Finally, the military actions undertaken since the start of the second Intifada by the Hamas’ armed groups, and especially the State of Israel’s targeted eliminations of the movement’s major players, shored up its popularity ratings.

Part Two

The municipal teams elected in 2005 rapidly became targets of the Israeli military authorities, who imprisoned many of their members. The “hunt” for Hamas mayors and municipal council members was stepped up after the Islamists’ victory in the 2006 legislative elections and, even further, after Hamas’ military “coup” in the Gaza Strip in June 2007. Today, very few municipalities are fully staffed. What is more, in a very large number of cases, the arrest campaigns have altered the political balance of power that emerged from the voting booths. In the field, the elected officials who have stayed in office attempt to work together, beyond their partisan belonging, to overcome the political boycott of them by the international community. However, against a backdrop of no prospects for fair negotiations with Israel, and terms of office coming to an end without a guarantee of new elections being held, discouragement is strong everywhere.

2.2. The Relationships Between Political Centers and the Peripheries 2.2.1. A Strong Propensity for Centralization The 1997 law organizes a degree of autonomy for the municipalities in many areas. Despite this, the MLG’s supervision is far from absent. The MLG has controlling power a priori over numerous fields of municipal activity. Notably, it must grant final approval to the budgets of local political institutions, municipal decrees and borrowing, the delegation of public service contracts lasting more than three years, and changes to local taxes and levies. When it comes to fiscal matters, the 1997 law grants the central power a high degree of control over local governments. Thus, the municipalities are unable to unilaterally modify the amount of their taxes or the fee scales for their services. Any change in prices or fees must be approved by the central authorities. In addition, the municipalities are not allowed to decide to create additional taxes or set taxation levels on their own. To do so, they must obtain prior authorization from their supervisory ministry. Finally, Palestinian law grants municipalities certain jurisdictional powers while specifying which fields of action remain the ministry’s responsibility. For instance, one of the Palestinian political center’s roles is to harmonize administrative procedures and “ways of doing things” across municipalities in two areas: finance and personnel management. Concretely, the MLG is responsible for uniformizing the presentation of municipal bookkeeping and audit proposals, calls for tender formulations, and budget preparations. These efforts to harmonize local regulations were greatly

Part Two

encouraged by international donors. In the same way, the MLG must set pay scales, hiring methods, disciplinary rules, and promotion criteria. However, the ministry often oversteps these legal responsibilities. To do so, it takes advantage of numerous gray areas created by the law on local government. Indeed, this law establishes Palestinian mayors’ prerogatives and fields of action without explicitly regulating their relationship with the central powers. Nor does it determine the powers and responsibilities of the district governors (muhafiz ) or the nature and character of the relationships between mayors and municipal council members. Absent from the law on local life, the governorates are therefore still governed by Jordanian law from a strictly legal standpoint. Their role in civil affairs is not very clear and depends heavily on each governor’s personality and political stature. Sometimes in competition with municipal teams, sometimes nearly absent from local power struggles, the governorates are currently still lacking any consistency with the rest of the municipal system. These different legislative gaps are the source of many power struggles that allow the presidency (no matter who holds office) to set itself up as referee of local interests and priorities.

2.2.2. The State of Israel: A Major Actor in Local Power The Palestinian Authority is not the only one who supervises Palestinian municipalities’ activities. Under the terms of the Oslo Agreements, municipalities are also controlled by the State of Israel. The interim agreement of 1995 also limits their activities in several ways. First, it bars the Palestinian municipalities from expanding their borders into Area C as defined by the Oslo Agreements — which is a considerable constraint for them insomuch as they are theoretically in charge of regional planning. It also prevents them from envisaging building near settlements, military outposts, and the roads serving them. Second, the 1995 agreement forbids them from putting an end to the commercial contracts between them and the Israeli companies in charge of supplying the population with water and electricity. Beyond this, the fragmentation of the territory created by the Oslo process tends to reduce the amount of land available to the municipalities for development. Autonomous Palestinian cities, located in Area A, like the villages, classed in Area B, are almost always surrounded by Area C controlled by the State of Israel, which corresponds to cultivated or fallow lands and plots left vacant for future development projects. There are even plots classed as Area C within municipal boundaries because the zoning in the Oslo Agreements does not necessarily match the functional divisions of local governments. In any case, this means that local development projects envisaged on available land must receive Israeli authorization before they

Part Two

can be implemented. Yet, permit to build (school or clinics), dig wells, or even install sewer lines is granted very sparingly by the State of Israel after long and costly administrative procedures. In this way, Palestinian local governments in theory responsible for urban planning cannot independently set their own development policies. This is particularly true for local governments in rural areas. Another implication of this territorial fragmentation is that the Palestinian Authority and, a fortiori , the municipalities are unable to enforce the rule of law in all inhabited areas. Indeed, the Palestinian police are not authorized to intervene in Area C and, in Area B, can only intervene after requesting permission from the Israeli army. This last procedure makes all emergency intervention impossible. It also requires mayors and municipal council members to request permission from Tzahal to enforce the law (and their decrees) within the borders of their own administrative jurisdictions. This situation helps intensify inequalities in the “ability to do” between cities and villages, and more specifically, between “old” and “new” municipalities. Indeed, it is easier to conduct investment projects in “autonomous” Area A than in the other parts of the national territory. Donors have clearly understood this and largely invest in the district capitals, neglecting the small localities that may, what is more, lack certain human capabilities.

Part Three

3. Territorial and Sectoral Reform Projects l The first plans to reform the system of local government emerged in 1998-1999. They aimed to create sectoral structures to manage public services at a level other than municipal. The Palestinian Authority simultaneously promoted two tools (utilities and Joint Service) with this aim in the sectors where initial investment costs and amortization costs are particularly expensive, such as water and electricity.

Utilities are not the responsibility of the MLG but of national agencies (such as the Water Authority and the Energy Authority) which serve as ministries. Their prerogatives are not outlined by the law but set by presidential decree. Utilities are conceived as public service concessions involving the entry of the private sector (with international calls for tender) into the accounts management and general management of local public services. They are carried by the World Bank. The argument of economic efficiency justifies their establishment in the eyes of the central power. The Palestinian territory is divided into four large regions: the Gaza Strip, the North region (with the governorates of Nablus, Jenin, Qalqilya and Tulkarm, and the autonomous districts of Tubas and Salfit), the South region (which contains the governorates of Bethlehem and Hebron) and the Middle region (associating the governorates of Ramallah, Jericho and Jerusalem). The Joint Service Councils (JSCs) also aim to lower the operating and management costs of local public services and improve economic efficiency. Unlike utilities, JSCs fall directly under the responsibility of the MLG and are governed by the law on local life. They are carried by the UNDP. Such structures advocate inter-commune cooperation. The elected municipal officials, notably those in the large cities of the West Bank, were violently opposed to these reform plans. They saw in them an attempt to centralize power, a reduction in their methods of action, and a threat to their financial income. The worsening of the political situation, starting in September 2000, put these plans â&#x20AC;&#x153;on holdâ&#x20AC;? in any case, and reminded the political leaders of the importance of the municipal scale of action in conflict situations and in the absence of a true state.

ÂŠ AFD /October 2010 / Local Government in Palestine

Part Three

When Mahmoud Abbas took power, these two tools for public action were once again promoted by the Palestinian Authority. But their content was clarified. First, the utilities would henceforth concern only large municipalities, while the JSCs became Joint Councils for Services, Planning and Development (JCSPDs) and emerged as the favored development tools for rural areas. In addition, the reform of the water sector and the reform of the electricity sector now differed in concept: the former no longer (as) openly promoted the privatization of public services, while the latter remained relatively unchanged. The protests of the elected officials in large cities were undoubtedly listened to in part here; furthermore, the political uncertainty probably discouraged potential foreign investors. l

Since 2004-2005, the other major component of local government reform deals with reducing the number of municipalities. Two arguments are offered: economic rationalization and the modernization of management. The idea retained is to advance in stages, setting up JCSPDs and promoting inter-commune cooperation before, ultimately, overcoming the reluctance to work together and merging municipalities. But this accounting objective had not failed to generate resistance. The merger of municipalities raises power-sharing issues as well as identity issues, which are especially thorny in Palestine.

Simultaneously, the Palestinian Authority is attempting to reduce the number of governorates (from sixteen to four: Middle, South and North West Bank, and the Gaza Strip). This reform, announced several times, has little chance of happening given the political opposition it generates and its inconsistency with the (extremely fragmented) territorial reality in the West Bank. It is nevertheless conceived in parallel with the reform of water and electricity distribution services that aims to replace the municipalities in their role of supplier with specialized regional agencies.

ÂŠ AFD /October 2010 / Local Government in Palestine

Conclusion

Conclusion Since June 2007, two rival governments cohabitate in Palestine, one — pro-Hamas — in the Gaza Strip and the other — pro-Fatah — in the West Bank. It is the first time that internal political tensions within Palestine have led to a territorial division. This situation, which could turn out to be structural, is accompanied by attempts to centralize power and set up “police” regimes on both sides. Everywhere, it is becoming more difficult and more risky to express discontent than before; political objectors are threatened; intimidation and individual pressure in the workplace are constantly rising; and fear is spreading, including within family units. The recent attempts to reform the territorial and administrative organization in the West Bank should be viewed in this framework. For President Abbas’ government, the challenge is to get around the local institutions heavily invested by Hamas. For instance, the local zakat committees (charitable associations that operate with Islamic charity donations) were disbanded without any discussion, and the distribution of social aid was transferred to the governorates. The plans to modify the size of local governments, and even organize water and electricity distribution services on the regional level, must also be seen as attempts by the central government to create new systems so as to avoid relying on the “hostile” existing systems that are predominantly pro-Hamas. In such a context, it becomes very difficult for any outside donors to intervene when every reform program is first and above all viewed by the opponents to the regime as actions aiming to weaken their own bases and capacities for political action.

Appendices

Appendix 1. Territorial Fragmentation Following the Oslo Agreements (1995)

Janin Tulkarm Qalqilia Nablus

Ramallah Jericho Bethlehem

Hebron

Area A Area B 0

20 km

Area C

50 km

Israeli settlements

Source: DEBIE, F. and S. FOUET (2001), La paix en miettes. Israël et Palestine (1993-2000), PUF, pp. 187-188, Paris.

Appendices

Summary of the Area A, B and C Percentages Decided in Each Redeployment Accord 1995 Oslo II Area A

Area B

26%

Area C

72%

1998 Wye River Area A

9.1 %

Area B

20.9%

Area C

70.0%

1999 Sharm el-Sheikh Area A

17.2%

Area B

23.8%

Area C

59.0%

Source: DEBIE, F. and S. FOUET (2001), La paix en miettes. Israël et Palestine (1993-2000), PUF, p. 187-188, Paris.

Appendix 2. Palestinian Local Political History – A Few Key Dates Ottoman Period (mid 19 th century) 1863-1886 Municipalization policy. Eight cities in the Ottoman Empire located in the current West Bank receive municipal status: Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarm, Hebron, Ramallah and Beit Jala. 1864 Creation of the wilaya, the highest Ottoman administrative division. 1877 Creation of the “ municipality ” institution (baladiyya).

British Mandate (1920-1922/1947-1948) 1921 Creation of local councils 1934 Law on municipalities.

Jordanian Period in the West Bank and Egyptian Period in the Gaza Strip (1948-1967) 1949 Jordan sets up a military administration in the West Bank. One year later, it is replaced by a civilian administration. Egypt places a military governor in the Gaza Strip. 1951-1955 Three village councils are raised to municipalities: Qalqilia, Al Bireh and Jericho. 1955 Jordanian law on municipalities. 1955-1967 Municipalization policy. Fourteen cities are promoted to the rank of municipality: Yaabad, Salfit, Tubas, Beit Sahour, Deir Dibwan, Arraba, Qabatiya, Halhul, Dura, Bir Zeit, Beitunia, Bani Zeid, Silwad and Beit Rima. 1964-1965 Administrative and territorial reorganization of the Hashemite Kingdom (including the West Bank).

Appendices

Israeli Occupation of the Palestinian Territories (1967-1993) 1967 Eight large districts are created and placed under military command: Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarm, Qalqilia, Jericho, Ramallah, Bethlehem and Hebron. 1972 Municipal elections: Palestinian candidates close to the Hashemite power are elected. 1975 Israeli proposal of an autonomy plan for the West Bank. 1973 Creation of the Palestinian National Front, a structure to coordinate resistance actions, that organizes popular mobilization against the Israeli autonomy plan. The Front is run by Bassam Chaaka, mayor of Nablus, and Karim Khalaf, mayor of Ramallah. Israel “outlaws” it in 1979. 1976 Municipal elections: victory for pro-PLO “nationalist” mayors. 1977 Yatta is promoted to the rank of municipality. 1978 Creation of the National Orientation Committee with, again, Bassam Chaaka and Karim Khalaf leading and coordinating the domestic resistance activities. The Committee organizes opposition to the Israeli “Camp David” plan. Israel declares the Committee “illegal” in 1982. 1979 Camp David Peace Plan: autonomy plan for the West Bank. 1978-1984 Israel encourages the formation of Village Leagues with the aim of promoting Palestinian leaders from rural areas, as an alternative to the PLO. The attempt fails; the Leagues are officially disbanded in March 1984. 1982-1985 Israeli policy of intimidation of Palestinian officials elected in 1976: targeted eliminations, forced expulsions from the territory, administrative detentions, residential custody, death threats. The Israeli government nominates Palestinians close to Hashemite milieus in the municipalities or military/civil Israelis. 1987 First Intifada: the National Unified Command calls on sitting mayors and municipal council members to resign; some resistors are assassinated. Formation of local people’s committees in the large Palestinian cities in place of the municipalities.

Appendices

1988 July: Jordan announces the severance of its administrative ties to the West Bank. The Hashemite Kingdom thus officially renounced all territorial and political claims to this part of the Palestinian territory.

Opening of a Peace Process – 13 September 1993, Signing of the Oslo Agreements 1994 Arrival of Yasser Arafat in the Territories. Establishment of the Palestinian Authority. May: creation of the MLG. Saeb Erekat is its minister. 1995 July: 14 governorates are created (9 in the West Bank and 5 in the Gaza Strip). The Palestinian Authority begins a policy of municipalization. In 5 years, more than sixty locations are promoted to the rank of municipality. There are 368 village councils. 1996 January: Palestinian elections in the “autonomy” and formation of the Palestinian Legislative Council. December: the Parliament passes the law on municipal elections. 1997 July: municipal elections officially delayed. September: the law on local life passed. 1998-2000 Process of “negotiated” appointment of mayors and municipal council members in Palestinian cities and villages.

Appendix 3. Timeline of the Oslo Agreements (1993-2000) Date

Reference – Event

13 September 1993 Oslo I

Letters of Mutual Recognition Declaration of Principles (DOP)

4 May 1994

“Gaza-Jericho First” agreement: outlines the Israeli army’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the city of Jericho

August 1994

Paris Protocol on Economic Relations

28 September 1995 Oslo II

Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement: outlines the withdrawal from the principal agglomerations in the West Bank (except East Jerusalem and Hebron)

17 January 1997

Protocol on the city of Hebron: outlines the division of the city into two zones (H-1 and H-2)

23 October 1998 Wye I

Wye River Memorandum: outlines a timeline for Israeli redeployments in the West Bank

4 May 1999

End (scheduled) of the interim period

5 September 1999 Wye II

Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum Renegotiated version of the Wye River agreements

8 November 1999

Start of negotiations on the permanent status

11/25 July 2000

Aborted Camp David II negotiations

Source: according to a table of the timeline of negotiations, agreements and redeployments produced by Sylvie Fouet and Franck Debié; see DEBIE, F. and S. FOUET (2001), La paix en miettes. Israël et Palestine (1993-2000), PUF, Coll. Géographies, Paris.

Appendix 4. “Old” and “New” Palestinian Municipalities According to the Oslo Agreements Districts

West Bank Jerusalem Ramallah Jericho Bethlehem Hebron Nablus Jenin Tulkarm Qalqilia Tubas Salfit Gaza Strip TOTAL

Old municipalities

New municipalities

Total

26 1 7 1 3 4 1 4 2 1 1 1

61 8 8 1 6 9 8 6 6 4 0 5

87 9 15 2 9 13 9 10 8 5 1 6

103

Source: according to documents communicated by the ARD expertise bureau.

Appendix 5. Palestinian Municipalitiesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; 27 Areas of Responsibility Under the 1997 Law on Local Life By-law clause

1. Town & street planning

2. Buildings and construction permits

3. Water supply

4. Power supply

5. Sewage

6. Public markets

7. Crafts and industry

description

Economic category

Town planning Street planning and maintenance l Building permits, property fencing

Control building construction Building construction standards and location regulations

Supply water to residents l Specify distribution standards l Set prices for water l Protect water sources l

Supply electricity to residents l Set prices within ministry limits

Provide sewerage systems l Manage public lavatories

Establish public markets Regulate activities and produce l Regulate merchandise outside markets l

Regulate, control, monitor crafts and industries l Specify locations l Control hazardous industries

Mostly regulatory Public toll services l Planning non-toll services

Mostly regulatory Public toll services

Skills needed

Other agencies involved l

Local impact

Basic municipal engineering and planning

Public toll good Regulatory l Financial management l

l l

Public toll good Financial management

Public toll goods but with high externalities

Service charges possible; public toll good l Regulatory

l l

Regulatory Non-toll public services

ÂŠ AFD /October 2010 / Local Government in Palestine

Local impact of supplies to users l Wider impact on water source protection l Regional economies of scale possible with networked system l

Regional networks are the norm for power systems l Some local power generation

l l

Local networks Regional impact through river pollution and control

Local impact but market may service a wider area

Mostly local Some economic impact an a wider scale

Water engineering skills

High technical skills for maintenance l Financial management skills

Palestinian Water Authority has regulatory responsibility for water services

Financial management skills

MLG Center has responsibility for Town Planning

Basic municipal engineering skills Inspection skills

Source: document communicated by the ARD expertise bureau.

Local/ regional

Sewerage engineering skills needed for construction; O&M needs basic skills

Israeli Energy Authority Palestinian Energy Authority

Palestinian Water Authority

Skills in public place management

Skills in environmental management in industrial sectors

Ministry of Industry

Appendices

By-law clause

Description

Public health monitoring

10. Public stores

11.

Precautions against floods, fires, natural disasters

13.

Sea and land transport

Other agencies involved l

Local impact

Implement solid waste collection and disposal systems for houses, streets, public facilities

Ensure public health and prevent epidemics l Implement sanitary systems l Regulate slaughter houses l Public health inspectors for food l Set up hospitals, health clinics

Monitor and oversee behaviour of public storage facilities l Specify fees l

Establish and manage parks, swimming pools, etc.

Implement precautions against floods (not a big problem) l Implement precautions against fires l Monitor hazardous materials

Sports and cultural institutions

14.

Skills needed

Public parks

12.

Local/ regional

Hygiene

Economic category

Set up and manage sports and cultural facilities

Set up and regulate public transport stops l Monitor sea transport

Non-toll Public services but with high externalities l Merit goods or services

Non-toll public services with high externalities l Merit goods or services l Regulation of private facilities l Monitor performance of food industry l Health centers and hospitals are both fee and non-fee paying with high externalities Monitor and regulation l Non-toll public service

Non-toll public services l Fee-paying for swimming pools l Merit goods or services l

Non-toll public services

Non-toll public services l Merit goods or services l Charges for some sports facilities

Non-toll public services

Local, but could share services widely l Waste dumps may have regional impact

Mostly local impact l Health system part of national system

Skills in solid waste management

Public health management and inspection skills l Medical and healthcare skills

Ministry of Environment

Skills in public place management

Skills in fire prevention and management

Skills in public facilities management

Skills in public transport management

Palestininian Water Authority l Ministry of Energy

Ministry of Tourism

Ministry of Transport

Source: document communicated by the ARD expertise bureau.

ÂŠ AFD /October 2010 / Local Government in Palestine

Annexes

By-law clause

15.

Appendices

Description

Peddlers, vendors and hawkers

16.

Weights and scales

17.