The Integration of Food Aid Programmes in Niger‘s Development Policies: the 2004-2005 Food Crisis by Agence Française de Développement

Agence Française de Développement

working paper September 2006

The Integration of Food Aid Programmes in Niger’s Development Policies: the 2004-2005 Food Crisis. Dorothée CHEN and Nicolas MEISEL Agence Française de Développement Research Department In partnership with DIAL

Contact : Nicolas MEISEL (meiseln@afd.fr)

Département de la Recherche Agence Française de Développement 5 rue Roland Barthes Direction de la Stratégie 75012 Paris - France Département de la Recherche www.afd.fr

Contents

Introduction

Food Aid Programmes in 2004-2005: Alignment, Independence, or Contradiction?

1.1

A State-Donor Coordination Mechanism that Was Functional until June 2005

1.2

The Exclusion of NGOs from the Coordination System: A Source of Contradiction and Controversy

1.3

The “CNN Effect” : Did Media Coverage Cause Independant Initiatives to Multiply ?

1.4

In Practice, the Principal Operations Were Coordinated

1.5

Lasting and Improved Coordination

The Compatibility of Food Aid Programmes with the Nigerien Public Authorities’ Development Strategy in Question

2.1

Presidential Interventions: What Rationale?

2.2

Does the Rural Development Strategy Detailed in 2006 Offer Prospects for the Integration of Food Aid Programmes?

Is the Political Authorities’ Rationale Compatible with that of Other Players?

2.3 Conclusion

Appendix 1: Timeline of the 2004-2005 Crisis

Appendix 2 : Harmonisation of the Principal Food Aid Programmes in Niger

Introduction

In Niger, food insecurity is structural: the country has faced

ment. Yet, memories are clear of the cacophony in the

three food crises in less than seven years, the most recent

press, from the mutual accusations of worsening the crisis

of which took place in 2004-2005 (a timeline of the 2004-

by the various parties involved in managing the crisis to the

2005 crisis can be found in Appendix 1). In this context of

contradictory declarations of how serious the crisis was.

repeated food crises, Niger created a formal mechanism to allow, in principle, coordination between the government

The 2004-2005 food crisis was thus doubled by a politico-

and all food aid players in Niger.

institutional crisis that bears witness to the lack of coordination among the various players’ programmes and raises the

Among other things, the country officially has a sectoral

following question: what malfunctions in the planned frame-

strategy (the 2003 Rural Development Strategy) as part of

work for coordination prevented the food security sector

its Poverty Reduction Strategy whose vocation since 2002

programmes from all aligning with Niger’s development

has been to be the exclusive reference for socio-economic

strategy?

development. This sectoral strategy notably contains a “food crisis management” component.

This question shall be answered in two stages: first, an analysis of the coordination—or lack thereof—among the princi-

All emergency food aid programmes in 2004-2005 should

pal food aid programmes (detailed in the tables in Appendix

therefore have in theory aligned themselves with a govern-

2); and second, their alignment with the national sectoral poli-

ment strategy for the country’s socio-economic develop-

cy, in principle part of the poverty reduction strategy.

1. Food Aid Programmes in 2004-2005: Alignment, Independence, or Contradiction?

1.1 A State-Donor Coordination Mechanism that Was Functional until June 2005

An institutional coordination scheme had progressively

For example, when the World Food Programme (WFP) ela-

been set up starting in the 1980s. Until June 2005, it had

borated its Emergency Operation (EMOP), approved in

made it possible to:

February 2005 by the WFP’s executive director and schedu-

=coordinate

all the programmes of the government and of

led to run until October of the same year, it took into account

the primary bi- and multilateral donors present in Niger

the activities of the other donors and the country programme

and active in the food aid sector; and

by the WFP and other United Nations agencies. Among other

=implement

a joint State-donor programme via joint inter-

things, this plan fit into a joint State-donor programme of

vention funds managed by the government and the

intervention that ran from December 2004 to October 2005

donors together.

(including the critical period before the new harvest) because its vocation was to implement the joint programme’s

With the signature by the State of Niger and the donors of

actions that had not been able to be enacted due to the

the framework agreement on strengthening the national

inadequacies of the joint intervention funds.

scheme to prevent and manage food crises

(2005)1,

the

Until June 2005, the primary food aid programmes were

government and the donors who signed it effectively com-

those of donors and the government, and they were therefo-

mitted to using their food aid in priority to prevent and

re coordinated in the framework of the Scheme. This institu-

manage food crises in the framework of a joint State-donor

tional framework did not, however, include non-governmental

programme, or in coordination with it.

organisations (NGOs) in its coordination mechanisms.

1.2 The Exclusion of NGOs from the Coordination System: A Source of Contradiction and Controversy

The absence of NGOs from the coordination framework

cause of independent—even contradictory—programmes

and their exclusion from all frameworks of dialogue were a

being implemented, and of controversy.

key factor in the implementation of independent pro-

In the spring of 2005, Médecins sans Frontières (MSF)

grammes by these organisations starting in the spring of

France established a link between the exponential growth

2005—programmes that contradicted those of other institu-

in the number of people admitted to its nutritional recovery

tions. The point here is not to designate those responsible

centres and the population’s difficulties obtaining access to

for this lack of coordination, but simply to emphasise the fact that blind spots in the framework of dialogue were a

1 This framework agreement repeated, in fact, a series of "conclusion reports" that had been elaborated from 1998 on and set up a coordination system.

1. Food Aid Programmes in 2004-2005: Alignment, Independence, or Contradiction?

food2. Because the coordination framework was not suffi-

of all those involved in food aid without any controversy

ciently inclusive, the food aid players did not include the

because the estimates of the Nigerien population’s difficulties

results of MSF France’s studies and surveys in their indica-

obtaining food had been revised upwards at the same time by

tors. The NGO’s warnings and the various surveys by

all involved. Based on different indicators, each player, howe-

Epicentre-MSF starting in the spring of 2005 were not taken

ver, established or maintained its own strategy and critical ana-

into account. MSF France therefore implemented—inde-

lysis of the other players’ strategies.

pendently—a free food aid programme for malnourished

MSF France’s call was not heeded by other aid players before

children and their families3. It also issued press releases

the summer of 2005; their programmes did not at that time

calling on all aid players to mobilise, and presenting the

include the free distribution of food aid. Its press releases, on

impact of its activities for malnourished children and their

the other hand, which were increasingly virulent, were relayed

families as dependent on the organisation of free food dis-

by the media, notably the international media. The media

tribution.

attention to the food crisis thus grew progressively in scope

At this stage, a coordinating body could probably have per-

and reached its heights at the end of July/early August 2005,

mitted information exchange so as to adapt the strategies

inciting numerous players to intervene.

1.3 The “CNN Effect” : Did Media Coverage Cause Independant Initiatives to Multiply ?

The media called for food aid players to react. The calls in

Because of cereal supply difficulties in the regional market,

the press were the source of an immediate mobilisation that

the Prime Minister's office issued, among other things, an

took the form of disorganised announcements of new pro-

order for 11,000 tons of sorghum in June 2005 from the

grammes being launched (see Appendix 2.1).

international market without complying with the Scheme's

Thus, the government, who had multiplied independent

procedures. According to these procedures, the modalities

calls for solidarity, established the first new programme

for use of the Scheme's joint funds (see Appendix 2.1)

without consulting its partners. In his general policy decla-

should in fact have been approved by the government and

ration before the National Assembly on 28 May 2005, the

donors together. The latter approved this decision, howe-

Prime Minister launched an "anguished call" to the interna-

ver, in early July: the coordination framework was only

tional community for emergency food assistance. During

punctually bypassed.

the Council of Ministers meeting on 8 June 2005, he

When it revised its intervention budget upwards in the fra-

announced that he would make a personal contribution of 1

mework of the EMOP programme, the WFP announced on

million CFA francs to implement emergency food aid; the

13 July a change of direction without consulting its other

ministers, for their part, promised to donate 500,000 CFA

partners: it adopted an emergency strategy that implied,

francs each, and called on the solidarity of all high-ranking civil

notably, the free distribution of staple foods and abandoned

servants. This call was relayed in the call for national solidarity

the actions that it had committed to implementing in the fra-

by the Minister of the Population and Social Action. The day

mework of the joint government-donor programme.

after these calls for solidarity, national and international aid to

The Presidency intervened to publicly warn against what it

the Nigerien government began to flood in. On 20 June, the Prime Minister set up a national ad hoc committee in charge of receiving, distributing and monitoring the funds provided to the Nigerien government. This committee was made up exclusively of government representatives, civil servants from technical ministries, and Nigerien civil society.

2 MSF France established a direct causal-and-effect link between the decreasing availability of food and the rise in the infant malnutrition rate (measured by anthropomorphic indicators of physical development: height or weight for age) in the regions where the NGO was active. This link was questioned, even contested, by other players who insisted on the chronic nature of the phenomenon and attributed it to cultural factors (such as weaning practices). The debate could not be resolved because information on malnutrition trends over time and the possible causes of malnutrition was lacking. 3

See Appendices.

1. Food Aid Programmes in 2004-2005: Alignment, Independence, or Contradiction?

felt was a “dramatisation” of the crisis orchestrated by the

Affairs, Action contre la faim, Red Cross delegations, etc.)

press, NGOs, and the United Nations. A journalist with the

announced new programmes.

public press was removed from her position as editor-in-

Media pressure therefore provoked a series of announce-

chief following the publication of an article on the food crisis

ments of new programmes independent of each other, but

in the Zinder region.

those in charge did not take the time to consult each other

Thus, the media imperative of emergency response led to

or harmonise their strategies. As for the coordination proce-

the multiplication of initiatives by a growing number of

dures established in the joint State-donor programme, they

players. Several international organisations and NGOs (the

were occasionally bypassed by the government.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian

1.4 In Practice, the Principal Operations Were Coordinated

Despite the independent declarations by various players

tive aid was indeed established jointly within a “Comité de

and the disorganised strategy announcements, collabora-

Suivi et de Gestion de Crise” (crisis monitoring and mana-

tion within the technical services in charge of implementa-

gement committee) set up by the Prime Minister at the

tion, along with a shoring up of coordination mechanisms,

request of donors. The decision to target the beneficiaries

nevertheless made the operational coordination of pro-

of free aid distribution based on a geographical breakdown

grammes possible (see Appendix 2.2).

(prioritising zones according to the severity of the crisis)

Within the framework of their initial coordination Scheme,

was a decision by the Comité de Suivi et de Gestion de

the government and donors officially aligned the strategy of

Crise and particularly by a sub-group including the WFP,

their joint programme on that of the WFP programme during

the Cellule Crises Alimentaires, Nigerien technical services,

the first meeting after the WFP unilaterally changed its stra-

and several NGOs having some experience in targeting.

tegy on 9 August 2005: they acknowledged that “priority

In addition to donors, representatives of the national ad hoc

[must be] given to free distribution”.

committee and NGOs thus participated in the coordination

In practice, contact in the technical institutions was never

mechanisms from this point on.

broken off. Via the action of its contracting authority, the

In the field, the WFP, Scheme, and NGOs went through the

Cellule Crises Alimentaires (CCA, food crisis cell), the

same distribution channels: the local offices of NGOs and

Scheme in fact aligned its strategy on that of the WFP star-

the Nigerien administration, who collaborated more or less

ting in July 2005: the representatives of the WFP office in

closely depending on the department.

Niger and the Cellule Crises Alimentaires continued to coor-

Despite the multiplication of initiatives and emergency hype

dinate their work, and the Scheme’s joint funds, via the lat-

at the start of the summer of 2005, operational coordination

ter, were also devoted to free distribution.

was maintained and strengthened. Furthermore, the frame-

Finally, an ad hoc coordination body that included NGOs

works for this improved coordination did not disappear

was created on 30 June 2005. The geographic distribution

when the food aid programmes launched during the crisis

of the WFP’s, Scheme’s, government’s, and NGOs’ respec-

came to an end.

1. Food Aid Programmes in 2004-2005 : Alignment, Independence, or Contradiction ?

1.5 Lasting and Improved Coordination

The crisis, which revealed the need for the various food aid

on technical subjects, allow for more effective exchanges than

players to coordinate their actions, had in fact provided the

were possible during the crisis.

occasion to set up frameworks for lasting coordination (see

The analysis of the situation in 2006 was consensual, and the

Appendix 2.3).

first operations implemented were coordinated. It was thus that

For example, the Comité de Suivi et de Gestion de Crise,

the WFP supported, that year, MSF France's nutritional reco-

intended to bring together all those involved in food aid, did

very programmes by participating in the free distribution of food

not disappear as soon as food aid ceased to be distributed.

aid to malnourished children and their families.

It continued to be the favoured coordination framework for

Improving the framework for NGO coordination, extending the

donors and NGOs. Since the interventions ended, this com-

State-donor framework for coordination to new donors, setting

mittee has met monthly, bringing together all the major

up inter-NGO frameworks for coordination… Food aid pro-

international NGOs, including MSF France.

grammes are clearly better coordinated today (2006) than they

The modalities of this coordination have also improved remar-

were before the 2004-2005 crisis.

kably. During the crisis, the Comité de Suivi et de Gestion de

This improved coordination is still, however, vulnerable to the

Crise drew up to over 100 participants. This attendance, which

positions taken by the Presidency, which has continuously

reveals the determination of numerous parties to cooperate,

denounced the interventions of other players. The compatibili-

was nevertheless a hindrance to the effectiveness of the

ty between the strategies of the latter and that of the public

exchanges. Now, only approximately thirty very active NGOs

authorities remains a current question.

participate, and the discussions, which have been re-focused

2. The Compatibility of Food Aid Programmes with the Nigerien Public Authorities’ Development Strategy in Question

2.1 Presidential Interventions: What Rationale?

The interventions of the Nigerien Chief of State and

State’s domestic affairs that a democratically elected power

Government in the post-crisis period followed a different logic

could not tolerate.

than those of players who see emergency aid as one of the

Finally, food aid could be a form of “dependency” incompatible

necessary components of the development policy.

with the spirit of the Presidency’s strategy that was based on

Several types of factors can explain why the Presidency mini-

the development of autonomous capacities and aimed for food

mised the food crisis:

self-sufficiency. This strategy, called the President’s Special

Programme, was never officially presented but the measures

lack of information on the situation in the field, and a lack

of dialogue with the other parties in the Scheme;

taken by the Chief of State during his previous term of office

=a tense political context in 2004-2005 (presidential and legis-

and his declarations following the 2004-2005 crisis echo the

lative elections at the end of 2004, and the year 2005 devo-

“large development projects” of the 1960s and 1970s: ambi-

ted to preparing for the Jeux de la Francophonie) when the

tious infrastructure programmes that were very visible during

President had made handling food and nutrition crises a prio-

his first term of office (1,000 wells, 1,000 schools, 1,000

rity in his previous term of office;

health care centres) and recent announcements of a large irri-

=the

memory of the military coup d’état in 1974 in which

gation programme for his second term of office.

President Tandja had taken part and that had been justified

A specific framework nevertheless emerged in 2006 from the

at the time by the government’s inability to manage the fami-

translation of the 2003 Rural Development Strategy into 14

ne; and

programmes, a framework into which all food aid programmes

=irritation

with what the Presidency saw as interference in the

could integrate themselves in the future.

2.2 Does the Rural Development Strategy Detailed in 2006 Offer Prospects for the Integration of Food Aid Programmes?

In 2005, the only strategic intervention framework was the

the various players' strategies. The process to elaborate a sec-

2003 Rural Development Strategy, which made only one refer-

toral strategy made noteworthy progress in 2005 and 2006.

ence to food aid: "coverage of phytosanitary control must be

The process did not, however, run its course.

completed by public interventions when the risk becomes

ISince its independence, numerous sectoral food security

widespread (pest epidemics, locust invasions, etc.)". The gaps

programmes have been elaborated in this country. Where,

in this intervention framework mortgaged the coordination of

today, the majority of the population still lives in rural areas

2. The Compatibility of Food Aid Programmes with the Nigerien Public Authorities’ Development Strategy in Question

(approximately 80%). These include, to cite only the most

tions that would allow sustainable economic and social devel-

recent: the 1994 Complete Food Security Programme, the

opment guaranteeing the population's food security and sus-

2000 Overall Strategy for Food Security, and the 2003

tainable natural resource management. The strategy's three

National Overall Food Security Programme. These pro-

sub-objectives were to: (i) foster rural populations' access to

grammes were, however, worthless in so much as none

economic opportunities; (ii) prevent risks, improve food securi-

even began to be implemented in the slightest and no one

ty, and sustainably manage natural resources; and (iii) build

referred to them. The 2003 National Overall Food Security

the capacities of public institutions and rural organisations.

Programme was written by the FAO alone and it was never

In compliance with the government's orientations, the Rural

validated by the Nigerien government.

Development Strategy was elaborated in 2003 to give priority

In the Coordination Scheme, the State of Niger and the

to a programme approach that aimed progressively to form a

donors committed to establishing an emergency food assis-

coherent overall framework to define and execute the rural

tance strategy that would have defined public intervention

development policy and its sub-sectoral components.

objectives, the types of possible interventions, the conditions

In 2005-2006, 14 programmes were finally identified within

under which to activate various tools according to the type of

which current and future activities would have to be progres-

crisis and its scope, and the institutional organisation of the

sively integrated. Programme 9, "Reducing Household

interventions. This emergency food assistance strategy should

Vulnerability", contains a "Crisis and Natural Disaster

have enabled all responses to food crises to be coordinated so

Prevention and Management" sub-programme that contains

as to avoid duplicate or conflicting operations. This strategy,

an emergency food assistance strategy in the process of elab-

which was not available in 2005, is currently being elaborated

oration.

within the improved coordination framework and should be

The Rural Development Strategy's 14-programme plan of

included in the rural development strategy.

action was validated by the government in June 2006, the des-

Therefore, during the 2004-2005 crisis, the only strategy of ref-

tiny of the preceding never-applied sectoral strategies and the

erence for food aid was (and still is today) the 2003 Rural

concerns guiding Nigerien policies do not make it possible to

Development Strategy included in the 2002 Poverty

declare with certainty that the announced emergency food

Reduction Strategy. The general objective assigned to the

assistance strategy will be implemented even though it is nec-

Rural Development Strategy was to "reduce the incidence of

essary for the coordination of all future programmes.

rural poverty from 66% to 52% by 2015" by creating the condi-

2.3 Is the Political Authorities’ Rationale Compatible with that of Other Players? The risk that the different logics and objectives of the

independently of the Nigerien authorities that he saw as

national political authorities, donors, and NGOs sponsoring

unacceptable attacks on Niger's sovereignty, announced

large programmes will bring about new coordination

that "the government, as instructed by the President of the

problems has not abated.

Republic […], [had] decided to elaborate an ambitious 5-

At the end of 2005, the Prime Minister and his government

year programme to develop large-scale irrigated farming on

aligned themselves on the positions and development

80,000 hectares of land and an animal resource exploita-

agenda defended by the President. In November 2005, the

tion programme, that would cost a total of approximately

Prime Minister, after flaying the programmes implemented

300 million US dollars"4.

4 This

about-face can be explained by the head of government’s desire to avoid provoking a political crisis the results of which were uncertain: from the same party as the President and sometimes called his heir, he sought to avoid a confrontation that could have resulted in his being excluded from the political arena.

2. The Compatibility of Food Aid Programmes with the Nigerien Public Authorities’ Development Strategy in Question

The Nigerien authorities' own political agendas could, in the

would be mutually contested-to align themselves. If this

case of a new crisis, lead them to adopt positions that contra-

were to happen, the improved coordination system would

dict the analyses issued by the improved coordination system

probably not hold up.

and that are unacceptable for NGOs. Such a confrontation

A crucial point for aid players is therefore to better understand

would put aid players (technical services, international organi-

the political rationales of their partners, notably when it comes

sations, diplomatic offices) in the delicate position of having to

to States that are as fragile as Niger, in order to better target

choose with which stakeholders' logics-whose legitimacy

their interventions and maximise their chances for success.

Conclusion

The 2004-2005 crisis—which saw, under media pressure,

to use the resources channelled by the development indus-

the birth of numerous independent, even contradictory, ini-

try and place these resources more directly at the service of

tiatives—therefore ultimately provided the occasion to shar-

its own political stability.

ply improve the frameworks to coordinate food aid pro-

These seemingly obvious remarks are too rarely formulated

grammes in Niger. While coordination was improved, one

by those whose strategies should be guided by them:

cannot nevertheless speak of alignment with the national

should the players whose objective is to see their aid bene-

strategy because the latter had not been defined at the time

fit the vulnerable populations of “fragile” States go through

of the crisis. The elaboration, in 2006, of a detailed sectoral

channels other than the political authorities? Or, on the

strategy that included an emergency food assistance stra-

contrary, should they concentrate their efforts on building

tegy enables one to envisage, among other things, impro-

the autonomy and capacities of public players?

ved coordination between donors, NGOs, and the political

Finally, if one believes that the choices made by the politi-

authorities. However, this coordination remains fragile and

cal powers in place will ultimately be decisive, whatever

subject to the hazards of political posturing.

their motives, then the current trend of capacity building in

Indeed, doubts remain as to the implementation of this stra-

Nigerien civil society is promising. These players are get-

tegy. The exercise that consists of defining sectoral strate-

ting organised and have been mobilising more frequently in

gies that are validated by all but never applied ends up by

recent months: protests in the spring of 2005 organised by

being a problematic ritual for the very validity of the policies

the “Equité-qualité contre la vie chère” coalition of unions

thus elaborated. In the end, what does this iteration mean

against the application of a VAT on daily consumption

for the Nigerien political power and the donors? What is the

goods that led to the withdrawal of the measure; demons-

real status in the eyes of the various parties of the “national

trations at the University of Niamey in the spring of 2006

policies” thus elaborated?

during which students accused the government of embezz-

In Niger, do the political powers not have the means to

ling their scholarships; the “Journée ville morte” (dead city

apply the development strategies elaborated at the request

day) strike movement, organised on 22 June 2006 by the

of donors (in which case, it would be an as yet unidentified

“Equité-qualité contre la vie chère” coalition of unions follo-

problem of capacities)? Or should one think that applying

wing repeated cries of corruption. If the President, who

development strategies elaborated because of pressure

exercises considerable influence over the country’s political

from donors is not one of the power’s objectives? And if this

class, does not spontaneously acknowledge the popula-

were the case, why would sovereign public powers play at

tion’s food difficulties, perhaps the political authorities will

elaborating policies that are not destined to be implemen-

be led to take the positions of other food aid players better

ted? One can hypothesise that a political power whose

into account under the pressure from these new opposition

internal equilibrium is precarious could very rationally want

forces.

Appendix 1:

Timeline of the 2004-2005 Crisis

Date

Event

October-November 2004

the 2004-2005 crop year is evaluated

November 2004

a State-donor programme of action is elaborated by the Cellule Crises Alimentaires

December 2004

presidential and legislative elections

December-January 2005

the WFP’s EMOP Programme is elaborated

4 January 2005

a 19% VAT is adopted on staple goods

15 January 2005

the “Equité-égalité contre la vie chère” (equity-equality against expensive life) coalition is created

April-May 2005

Epicentre-MSF France conducts nutritional surveys

26 April 2005

MSF France issues its first alarming press release

26 April 2005

the VAT on staple goods is suppressed

29 April 2005

a journalist is sanctioned for the publication of an article on the food crisis in the Sahel Dimanche newspaper

28 May 2005

the Prime Minister calls for international aid

8 June 2005

the Prime Minister calls for national aid

Early June 2005

MSF France sets up a food aid programme to support its nutritional recovery programme

9 June 2005

an MSF France press release criticizes the measures taken by the other players

9 June 2005

the Ministry of the Population and Social Action calls for national aid

20 June 2005

a national ad hoc committee is created

28 June 2005

an MSF France press release again criticizes the measures taken by the other players

30 June 2005

the Comité de Suivi et de Gestion de Crise is created

13 July 2005

the WFP revises its EMOP budget and changes its strategy

July-August 2005

WFP and State-donor programmes are coordinated via cooperation between WFP Niger and the Cellule Crises Alimentaires

9 August 2005

the State-donor programme is officially aligned on the WFP strategy

Early August 2005

repeated presidential interventions downplay the situation

August-September 2005

the free distribution by the primary programmes are geographically coordinated

October 2005

Launching of an external evaluation of the coordination Scheme

November 2005

the WFP conducts its “After Action Review”

Appendix 2 : Harmonisation of the Principal Food Aid Programmes in Niger Appendix 2.1. Stratégies

Other programmes Strategies Taken into Account ?

Schedule

Distribution of free food aid to malnourished children and their families

No. Calls for a change in strategies

Start: spring 2005. End not scheduled. Ultimately ends at the end of the preharvest period in 2005

Evaluation of the vulnerability of populations mainly based on deficits in cereal production

Sale of cereal at moderate prices, labour-intensive activities, development of cereal banks

the government’s and donors’

December 2004 – 2005 harvest. Revised in the summer of 2005.

Attenuate vulnerable populations’ difficulties obtaining food

Revision of the WFP’s strategy

Free distribution of food aid to vulnerable populations

the government’s and donors’

Summer 2005 - the end of the pre-harvest period in 2005.

Elaborated by country office, in collaboration with the other members of the Scheme - validated by headquarters

Attenuate vulnerable populations’ difficulties btaining food

Evaluation of the vulnerability of populations mainly based on deficits in cereal production

Sale of cereal at moderate prices, labour-intensive activities, development of cereal banks

the government's and the other donors'

December 2004 - 2005 harvest. Revised in the summer of 2005

Revised EMOP

Elaborated by the WFP country office validated by headquarters

Attenuate vulnerable populations’ difficulties obtaining food

Media alert

Free distribution of food aid to vulnerable populations

No. Unilateral revision.

Summer 2005. End not scheduled. Ultimately ends at the end of the preharvest period.

Government ad hoc programme to manage direct aid and free distribution

National ad hoc committee set up by the Prime Minister's office immediately following the inflow of aid

Attenuate difficltie obtaining food

Inflow of private and public donations to the Nigerien government following the media alert and calls for solidarity by members of government

Free distribution of food aid

Summer 2005. End not scheduled. Ultimately ends at the end of the preharvest period.

Presidential interventions

Involve the Presidency exclusively

Stop criticism of public management of the food crisis

Media alert

Inaction and minimisation of the crisis

Interventions contradict government policy.

Growing criticism starting with the start of media coverage

Programmes

Elaboration Process

Objectives

Trigger

Activities

Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) France Food distribution

Born of interactions between the local and country offices and headquarters

Support MSF’s children’s nutritional recovery programme

Increase in the incidence of malnutrition

Initial Joint State-Donor programme

Elaborated by the Cellule Crise Alimentaire (CCA) – validated by the onors and the government together

Attenuate vulnerable populations’ difficulties obtaining food

Revised Joint StateDonor programme

Elaborated by the CCA – validated by the donors and the government together

Initial EMOP (the WFP’s Emergency Operation)

Appendix 2.2. Operational and Financial Structure/Implementation

Programmes

MSF France Food Distribution

Initial Joint State-Donor Programme

Revised Joint StateDonor Programme

Initial EMOP

Revised EMOP

Government ad hoc programme to manage direct aid and free distribution Presidential

Implement ing Body

Contracting Authority

Sources of Funding

MSF France

Private donations

Governmen t and donors together

Cellule Crises Alimentaires

Donors

Governmen t and donors together

Cellule Crises Alimentaires

Donors

WFP

Advances: WFP/EU/Sweden immediate intervention account; donors' contributions

WFP

Advances: WFP/EU/Sweden immediate intervention account; donors' ontributions

National ad hoc committee

Bilateral donations and private domestic donations

State

Funding Coordination MSF France

Financing Sequence

Key Financing Constraints

Operators

Formal MonitoringAssessment Procedure

Needs assessment Request that donors authorise the reallocation of aid destined for tsunami victims

Funds available. No major constraints.

Staff of MSF France's nutritional recovery centres

No procedure formally planned. Assessed by an outside consultant in the spring of 2006. Assessment not public.

Government and donors together

Needs assessment by the Cellule Crise Alimentaire - Call for contributions by the government and donors

Echo among donors ; risks of delay and freezing in disbursements of the Treasury

Regional and sub-regional committees primarily, and NGOs

In conformity with the Scheme's procedures, outside assessment at the joint request of the government and donors. In progress.

In theory: Government and donors together. Procedure bypassed by the Prime Minister's office in June 2005

Needs assessment by the Cellule Crise Alimentaire - Call for contributions by the government and donors

Late but massive response Following triggered off by media attention

Regional and sub-regional committees primarily, and NGOs

In conformity with the Scheme's procedures, outside assessment at the joint request of the government and donors. In progress.

Needs assessment Call for contributions by donors and headquarters

Echo among headquarters and donors

Regional and sub-regional committees primarily, and NGOs

External assessment of WFP Niger at the request of the regional office

Needs assessment Call for contributions by donors and headquarters

Following media attention, rapid echo. No major constraints.

NGOs primarily, and regional and sub-regional committees

External assessment of WFP Niger at the request of the regional office

Call for solidarity by politicians Immediate inflow of direct aid to the Nigerien government

Following media attention, rapid echo. No major constraints.

Regional and sub-regional committees, and private networks

WFP

Ad hoc committee

Appendix 2.3. Operational and Financial Structure / Coordination

Represented on the Prime Minister's Comité de Gestion et de Suivi de Crise (created in June 2005)

Represented in the State-Donor Coordination Body

Duplicates or Complements Other Programmes

OCHA : No. UNICEF Thematic Groups: Yes

Yes

Geographic complementarity

No UN coordination mechanisms at the time

Inexistent

Yes

Geographic complementarity with donors' and the State's independent programmes

OCHA: Yes. UNICEF Thematic Groups: No

Yes

Geographic complementarity with NGOs', donors' and the State's independent programmes

No UN coordination mechanisms at the time

Inexistent

Yes

Integrated in the Joint StateDonor Programme's strategy

OCHA: Yes. UNICEF Thematic Groups: No (but consultation with UN agencies outside the thematic groups)

Yes

Geographic complementarity

OCHA: No. UNICEF Thematic Groups: No (the Nigerien Public Ministry of Health represents the public authorities there)

Yes

Geographic complementarity

Neither: contradiction

Programmes

Represented in United Nations Coordination Bodies (starting in summer 2005)

MSF France Food Distribution

Initial Joint State-Donor Programme

Revised Joint State-Donor Programme

Initial EMOP (WFP)

Revised EMOP (WFP)

Government ad hoc programme to manage direct aid and free distribution

Presidential interventions

OCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs