Community participation in the Pantanal, Brazil: containment games and learning processes by Agence Française de Développement

Agence Française de Développement

Working Paper

January 2010

Community participation in the Pantanal, Brazil: containment games and learning processes

Olivier Charnoz, Research Department, AFD (charnozo@afd.fr)

Département de la Recherche Agence Française de Développement 5 rue Roland Barthes Direction de la Stratégie 75012 Paris - France Département de la Recherche www.afd.fr

Disclaimer The analysis and conclusions presented in this Working Paper are those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the position of the AFD or its partner institutions.

Publications Director: Jean-Michel SEVERINO Editorial Director: Robert PECCOUD ISSN: 1954 - 3131 Copyright: 1st quarter, 2010

Layout: Laurence WUNDERLE

Contents Abstract

Introduction

The Pantanal: A Battlefield of Discourses and Priorities

1.1

Introducing the region

1.3

“Domestication for development”: the sovereign discourse

1.2 1.4

1.5. 1.6.

“Preserving a global public good”: the international discourse

The pre-eminence of “economic use” over “conservation”

State-led conservation: brilliant laws, hollow enforcement Conclusion

17 21 22

The Changing Definition of Community Participation (CP)

2.2.

CP as private conservation: the view of environmentalist NGOs

2.1. 2.3. 2.4.

State-led CP: consultations for strategic planning

Collaborating with producers: the slow emergence of a new form of CP

23 26

Conclusion: the novelty of the Pantanal Regional Park (PRP) proposal

The PRP Genesis: A Community in Crisis in Search of Allies

3.2.

The ally: a foreign donor with a different management model

3.1. 3.3. 3.4.

The crisis of cattle-ranchers and the will to contain competitors and conservationists

The PRP: a local initiative influenced by foreign experts, criticized by NGOs

Conclusion

“Salvation through Tradition”: the Construction of a Strategic Discourse

4.2.

The narrow delineation of the “traditional community”

4.1. 4.3. 5.

5.1.

31 33 34

The depiction of cattle-ranchers as “protectors” of the Pantanal

Conclusion

Creating Pluralism: The Unintended Consequences of the Preliminary Project

Challenging the landowner association with new ones

The impact of delegitimisation: lowering CP intensity and inclusiveness

Institutional Power at Work

6.2.

Active political capture for unclear agendas

6.4.

Conclusion

5.2. 5.4.

6.1. 6.3.

Fuelling the process: the use of “bait projects” Conclusion

45 50

High CP inclusiveness, scope and intensity: the founding pledge of co-management

Elusive hopes of community repossession: hastening the final collapse

54 57

Contents

The Role of Social Capital and its Impact on CP

7.2.

Individualism and informalism: the institutional ineptitude of most fazendeiros

7.1. 7.3. 7.4.

Symbiotic paternalism: keeping peons away from institutions and collective action

From Loyalty to Voice: renewing the local social capital

Conclusion

Conclusions

References

ÂŠ AFD Working Paper No. 93 â&#x20AC;˘ Community participation in the Pantanal, Brazil - January 2010 4

Abstract

this

paper,

inquire

into

how

“community

away from the landowners, and this disarticulation of

Pantanal Regional Park (PRP), a large-scale participatory

and the PRP’s collapse. Thus, in the PRP context,

participation” (CP) played out in the creation of the

governance eventually led to financial mismanagement

initiative launched in 1998 in the Brazilian portion of the

containment through CP was exercised in multiple and

world’s largest wetland. This paper identifies the strategic

incoherent directions. This paper further explores the

significance of CP for the local landowners, who were

mechanisms that fostered this unsatisfactory result, both

supposed to be in the driver’s seat, and the containment

in the project design and in the nature of the local social

of other emerging actors – such as conservationist NGOs

capital. The author argues, however, that the PRP

and incoming economic actors. Meanwhile, the virtual

experience stimulated a learning process within the local

absence of rural employees (peons) and other local

community that may prove beneficial in the medium-term.

community groups in the PRP process indicated additional

This begs the question whether international donors are

forms of containment that reinforced the socio-political

willing and able to support participatory projects through

status quo of the region. As it turned out, however, the

their (often unavoidable) ups and downs, trials and

PRP project was overtaken by a group of local politicians

missteps – an approach directly opposed to their

in pursuit of unofficial agendas. Power was thus displaced

increasingly results-oriented professional culture.

Introduction

In our most recent Working Paper (Charnoz, 2010), we

participatory governance structure. A park was designated

all accounts - successful manifestations of “community

world – to be managed by a participatory institution, the

analysed one of the world’s most famous and - by virtually participation”

(CP)

the

field

for the Pantanal - the largest freshwater wetland in the

environmental

Instituto do Parque do Pantanal (IPP). With technical and

management: The Soufrière Maritime Management

financial support from France and the European Union, as

Association (SMMA), in St. Lucia. Despite the accolades, a

well as funding from the local Brazilian state of Mato Grosso

close inquiry into this project’s origins, implementation,

do Sul, the PRP was conceived as a voluntary association

social impact and power effects indicated that the CP

of local landowners (fazendeiros) pledging to follow a

process had been transformed into one of social control

common environmental charter. Meanwhile, its managing

alliances (often non-community) and market forces. In

partners to help reinforce the local traditional way of life,

and containment under the direction of interest-group

institution - the IPP - received support from a range of

order to present a more complete picture of what CP is and

thought to be environmentally friendly. Within a few years,

does we also thought it necessary to analyse CP efforts that

however, the IPP experienced growing financial and

have been deemed “less successful”, “unsuccessful” or

management problems leading to the closure of all its

even outright “failures” by the professional community.

operations during the summer 2005. Having had extensive

Such results are not uncommon in the field of development,

financial support from within and outside Brazil, the IPP had

and the label of “failure” can hardly exonerate a given

raised high hopes; therefore, its collapse left deep wounds

procedure from its other impacts. As Ferguson famously

among locals and donors alike.

argued, in the realm of development projects “developers

Fieldwork for this study was undertaken in the summer of

set up projects that often ‘fail in their own terms’ but

2008. Information was difficult to gather as people would

nonetheless have regular and standard effects that can be

not speak openly. Many felt that this author was more of a

identified” (1990, p.18). Whether procedures are successful

police inspector, sent by European donors to enquire about

or not according to their own official criteria may be

“what happened to the money”, rather than a genuine

secondary to an understanding of their deeper nature.

researcher interested in the nature and impact of CP

Following Foucault (1979), Ferguson calls these side-

practices. Three years after the IPP’s 2005 closure, a lot of

effects “instrument-effects” because, although they may be

tension was still in the air, especially since court cases had

officially unintended, they seem to be “instruments of what

been filed against some of the people legally responsible

turns out to be an exercise of power” (Ferguson, p.255).

for the IPP1.

To pursue this line of enquiry further, we selected as a

This article first provides background information about the

second field study the Pantanal Regional Park (Parque

Pantanal: it shows that the region does not provide easy

Regional do Pantanal, PRP). This initiative was meant to

ground for environmental initiatives, as entrenched

create a large-scale, innovative entity for environmental

Brazilian views on national sovereignty and domestic

management in the heart of South America, with a highly

economic development compete with the increasingly

Some former IPP managers have been accused of tax evasion and other financial mismanagement. There were also rumours of outright corruption and the personal misappropriation of resources. 1

Introduction

accepted view of the Pantanal a “global public good” in

participatory park. Although this pluralisation effort was

Second, this article shows that CP in the Pantanal has

be detrimental to the fazendeiro community. This

need of international attention and conservation efforts.

carried out in the name of CP, we argue that it turned out to

taken on various conflicting meanings over time, from

“fabricated pluralism” – via the swift and rather artificial

simple “State consultations”, to “private conservation” that is

multiplication of small associations – fragmented their

supported by international NGOs, to the idea of “sustainable

influence and opened the way for the political capture of the

use” that accepts local landowners as important and legitimate

PRP later on.

environmental managers. It is only in the context of these

Sixth, the article looks at the deployment of institutional

dynamic tensions that the novelty and strategic meaning of the

power during the core implementation phase, namely the

PRP can be accurately assessed.

development of the PRP from 2002 onwards. Although its

Third, the article explores the genesis of the PRP project

legal framework reflected an ideal CP process, marked by

and its built-in containment strategy. Landowners, the local

high inclusiveness, scope and intensity as well as

state and a foreign donor formed the originating alliance of

cooperation with the local state, the reality turned out to be

form of CP, also involving local producers, was promoted as

made unrestrained interventions and political appointments

the project, against rising conservationist opposition. A new

very different, as a group of local politicians increasingly

a way to contain the growing influence of the power formation2

within the IPP. From the viewpoint of the landowners,

being created by large international NGOs and

originally intended to be “in the driver’s seat”, the

their Brazilian subsidiaries.

inclusiveness, scope and intensity of the CP process

Fourth, the article analyses the founding rationale of the

disappeared almost completely. To their frustration, the

PRP initiative, which portrayed the landowners involved in

governance of the PRP disintegrated, leading to increasing

cattle-ranching as the heart of the traditional pantaneira

financial and technical mismanagement. Eventually, all

community. The way “traditions” were defined and “cattle

PRP operations ceased in July 2005, following a financial

ranching” construed as “environmentally friendly” indicates

collapse that included the non-payment of important taxes.

the successful exertion of structural and productive power

Seventh, and finally, we investigate how the multiple

on the part of the local landowners, supported by the state

containment processes at work in the PRP project have

authorities. Through such framing of the issue, another

affected, and were facilitated by, the social capital (SC)

level of containment was imposed against the lower

levels of the locals. We first argue that the bridging SC of

socioeconomic groups living in the Pantanal, which were

the rural workers is characterised by a symbiotic-

largely excluded from the formation of the PRP – and from

paternalistic relationship with fazendeiros that contributed

its actual governance. We thus show that as in St. Lucia,

to depriving the rural workers of a voice in the PRP process.

containment against various actors.

characterised by a complex mix of individualism,

CP functioned in the PRP project as a mechanism of

We then show that the bonding SC of fazendeiros is

Fifth, we analyse how the mantra of making the local community

democratic

turned

informalism, immediatism and unity that all contributed to

community

their own disempowerment and to the collapse of the PRP.

contributed to disempowering the landowners themselves

participatory project resulted in frustrations and a “Voice”

participation into an instrument of control that in the end

In the end, we propose that the failure of this large

within the PRP. This process started with a four-year

response that gave rise to a collective learning process. In

preliminary project, which preceded the formal creation of

the long run, part of the local social capital appears to have

the Park in 2002. In the preliminary phase, an emphasis

been renewed and enabled to take on more effective

was placed on the need to make the local civil society more

collective actions. In that sense, we suggest that the

plural and increase the number of local organisations, as a

appropriate timeframe for evaluating a CP project may be

first and compulsory step towards the creation of a truly

much longer than usually thought. 2

This concept is defined in section 2.2.5.

The Pantanal: A Battlefield of Discourses and Priorities

This section provides background information on the Pantanal

and

ideologies: one emphasising global biodiversity (the rights

economic use of natural resources over their conservation. It

region, and shows how it has been the focus of two rival

and duties of the international community) and the other

needs).

also

explore

Brazilian

is only within this larger, conflict-ridden context that the

emphasising domestic development (Brazilian sovereignty

1.1

economic

environmental politics and its propensity to favour the

implications of CP in the Pantanal can be correctly assessed.

Introducing the region

The Pantanal is the largest freshwater ecosystem in the

swamplands, lagoons and man-made drainage channels.

England and Scotland combined. Located in the heart of

With an altitude of less than 150 metres, the landscape is

world. With more than 200,000

km2,

it is about the size of

Examples of typical landscapes can be seen in Photo set 2.

South America (Map 1), the Pantanal consists of areas in

virtually flat so that during the rainy season (from October

Brazil, Bolivia and Paraguay (Map 2). Most of its surface (138,000

km2),

to March) up to 80% of the territory is inundated. The water

however, lies within the Brazilian border -

cycle also contributes to the region’s high bio-productivity6.

split between the two local states of Mato Grosso and Mato

As floodwaters expand and recede, aquatic plants and low

(coloured in green in Map 2) surrounded by a higher

forms the basis of numerous food webs and an abundance

Grosso do

Sul3.

The Pantanal is essentially a floodplain

grasslands rapidly grow: this turnover of organic matter

plateau (light brown), which together form the basin of the

of wildlife. Tropical wetlands like the Pantanal are indeed

Upper Paraguay River, fed by a dense network of powerful

the most “bio-productive” ecosystems on earth (in per unit

and connected rivers (cf. Diagram 1).

area) along with rain forests, marine algae beds and coral

The Pantanal attracts a unique mix of life forms. Its central

reefs.

location on the continent makes it a crossroads and a relatively safe haven for species from various surrounding

“biomes”4, notably the Cerrado, the Chaco, the Amazon, and the Atlantic Forest5. It boasts an amazing biodiversity,

including more than 200 species of fish, 80 types of mammals and 2,000 types of plants as well as healthy populations that are rare or threatened in neighbouring

regions – such as giant otters and jaguars. Photo set 1

provides some examples of easily visible wildlife in the

In Portuguese, “mato grosso” means “big forest”.

Biomes are large-scale environmentally coherent regions.

The Cerrado is the savanna forest of the central Brazilian plateau. It extends into the floodplain from the eastern and northern plateaus and provides the principle vegetal species encountered in the Pantanal. Vegetation typical of the Chaco, an arid forest, comes from the western border of the Pantanal in Bolivia and Paraguay. Species from the Amazonian and Atlantic forests extend into the Pantanal from river valleys in the north and south, respectively, and are largely restricted to the dense forests along riverbanks. 5

Pantanal.

Another defining characteristic of the Pantanal is its seasonal rainfall and flooding cycles. Besides forests and

rivers, the region is made up of complex networks of

6 Bio-productivity can be defined as the amount of organic matter produced by living organisms per area per year.

1. The Pantanal: A Battlefield of Discourses and Priorities

Map 1 – The Brazilian Pantanal, at the heart of South America

Source: ANA et al ), .3

1. The Pantanal: A Battlefield of Discourses and Priorities

Map 2.

The Pantanal: a floodplain, surrounded by higher plateaus

Source: ANA et al. (2005), p.13.

ÂŠ AFD Working Paper No. 93 â&#x20AC;˘ Community participation in the Pantanal, Brazil - January 2010 11

1. The Pantanal: A Battlefield of Discourses and Priorities

Diagram 1. Underlying structure of the Pantanal: the Paraguay River and its tributaries Hydrographic network of the Upper Paraguay River basin in Brazil

Source: ANA et al. (2005), p.38.

ÂŠ AFD Working Paper No. 93 â&#x20AC;˘ Community participation in the Pantanal, Brazil - January 2010 12

1. The Pantanal: A Battlefield of Discourses and Priorities

Photo set 1.

Examples of easily visible wildlife in the Pantanal

Photo credit: the author.

ÂŠ AFD Working Paper No. 93 â&#x20AC;˘ Community participation in the Pantanal, Brazil - January 2010 13

1. The Pantanal: A Battlefield of Discourses and Priorities

Photo set 2.

Typical landscapes during the rainy season

Photo credit: the author. Upper left: Earthwatch (2004).

ÂŠ AFD Working Paper No. 93 â&#x20AC;˘ Community participation in the Pantanal, Brazil - January 2010 14

1. The Pantanal: A Battlefield of Discourses and Priorities

Photo set 3.

Cattle ranching in the Pantanal, with peons at work

Photo credit: the author.

ÂŠ AFD Working Paper No. 93 â&#x20AC;˘ Community participation in the Pantanal, Brazil - January 2010 15

1. The Pantanal: A Battlefield of Discourses and Priorities

1.2

“Preserving a global public good”: the international discourse

The international community has construed the Pantanal as

“biodiversity hotspot” supporting thousands of different

contribution to global biodiversity and climate stability. This

as giant anteaters, armadillos, capybara, the Brazilian tapir,

an object of global significance based on the region’s

species including endangered and flagship” species, such

discourse is advanced by international conventions and

jaguars, capuchin monkeys and the giant black eagle. The

organisations, as well as NGOs operating in Brazil, such as

Pantanal has also been known to provide an essential

the WWF, Conservation International and The Nature

habitat for migratory fish and birds that spend summers in

Conservancy. It has also been adopted by local Brazilian

North America. In virtually all interviews with NGO

NGOs in the State of Mato Grosso do Sul trying to attract

members, the Pantanal’s biodiversity took centre stage.

the attention of federal and international actors. There is no

The World Wildlife Fund officially defined the region as

shortage of reports, articles, policy briefs, press releases

“globally outstanding” in terms of biological distinctiveness,

and websites by environmentalist NGOs, think tanks and

“vulnerable” in terms of conservation, and as a “highest

researchers promoting this way of thinking – which was

priority” for conservation (Olson et al., 1998), an

also heavily represented in all our interviews with NGO staff

assessment often referenced. The Pantanal is also seen by

The global environmentalist view of the Pantanal is

in terms of its contribution to climate stability. Wetlands are

during our fieldwork.

many environmentalists as a significant global public good

grounded in an internationally defined category, that of

indeed important reservoirs of carbon, comprising about

“wetland7”. A treaty for the conservation and sustainable

15% of terrestrial carbon (Patterson, 1999). The Pantanal

use of wetlands was signed in 1971 in the Iranian city of

contributes to the capture of greenhouse gases from the

Ramsar. The so-called Ramsar Convention, however, was

atmosphere and to the liberation of oxygen through

not ratified by Brazil until 1993 following the Earth Summit

photosynthesis.

that took place in Rio de Janeiro one year earlier. UNESCO

Such considerations underscore the idea that the whole of

then declared the Pantanal a “Ramsar Site” and in 2000 a

mankind has a direct stake in the region, a right to see it

“World Biosphere Reserve” and a “World Heritage Site”.

preserved and a duty to make sure this happens. Thus,

Other conventions referring to the Pantanal as an

there is a notion of “global ownership” or “responsibility”, as

internationally important wetland include the World Heritage

several interviewees indicated. As one interviewee put it,

Convention (1972), the Convention on Migratory Species8

representing the views of a local NGO: ”Brazil should not be

(1979), the Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) and

allowed to manage this area alone, especially given what it

the Convention on Climate Change (1992). All of these

is doing here.”

stress the importance of the non-commercial value of

The notion of “global responsibility” emphasises the need

wetlands, like the Pantanal, as ecosystems. They also

for a rather strict type of conservation, a strategic option

contribute to the Pantanal’s inclusion in networks for

adopted a long time ago by various NGOs, such as

international funding, public support and awareness. As a local

Conservation International and others. Among the NGO

NGO staffer indicated: “In Brazil, the Amazon rainforest is like a

community, the sense of urgency is very high. As a volunteer biologist put it: ”One day the world will realise

tree hiding the forest. The Pantanal is behind, although it is almost as important. ”

what it is losing but it will be too late. […] Tears won’t make

biodiversity, and the discourse on Pantanal heavily draws

This approach, however, has given rise to scepticism on the

Wetlands play a key role in the conservation of global

the Pantanal come back.”

upon this fact. The Pantanal is thus commonly defined as a

part of other actors, notably Brazil’s federal authorities.

7 Under the Ramsar Convention, “wetlands” are defined as “areas of marsh, fen, peatland or water, whether natural or artificial, permanent or temporary, with water that is static or flowing, fresh, brackish or salty, including areas of marine water the depth of which at low tide does not exceed six metres” (Article 1). 8 Also

known as the “Bonn Convention”.

1. The Pantanal: A Battlefield of Discourses and Priorities

1.3

“Domestication for development”: the sovereign discourse

Interviews conducted in Brasilia’s federal ministries, public

property”, since the stakes it represents are at least as high

uneasiness among upper management about depiction of

Rejection of the “global public good” discourse, and its

agencies and research centres revealed a deeply rooted

for mankind.

the Pantanal “as a global good needing international

implication for international intervention, is also apparent in

conservation”. Although federal authorities’ environmental

regard to the Pantanal. During interviews in Brasilia, this

awareness of the region has been increasing over the past

view was clearly expressed by high-level civil servants in

15 years, according to most observers and the civil

the following ways: ” All those NGOs that pretend to teach

servants we interviewed, the Brazilian government strongly

us how to deal with [the Pantanal], have they forgotten that

contends that the Pantanal (just like the Amazon rainforest)

Brazil has a sovereign people and a democratic

is a domestic issue, not one that should chiefly or even

government?

largely involve the international community. This view is

- The Pantanal is a Brazilian jewel. [People] should not

linked to the widely held opinion among public managers

worry so much: we care about it.

that economic development is the key domestic priority, and

- International work in the Pantanal is welcome, as long

one which should not be greatly compromised by

as NGOs and others do not forget in what country they

environmental concerns.

are in. ”

Brazilian sensitivity to issues regarding its environmental

As with the Amazon region, however, the issue is not only

immense international attention. Countless NGOs, often

matter of economic development vs. conservation. Since

sovereignty emerged over the years as Amazonia attracted

a matter of sovereignty vs. internationalisation; it is also a

financed by foreign governments, have poured into a region

the mid-1970s, the Pantanal has been an object of attention

given its size and geographical attributes. This dynamic has

plans and projects for making the region an “engine of

that federal and local authorities still find difficult to control,

for federal authorities, which have produced numerous

more than irritated Brazilian authorities. They never seem

development”. Several major programmes have been initiated including the:

to miss an opportunity to make it clear that only the

Inter-municipal

Consortium for the Development of the

between national authorities and foreign NGOs are fodder

Program

for

the

Forms of public paranoia and politicisation also play a role.

Program

for the Development of the Cerrados

American government plans to “internationalise” Amazonia.

National

Brazilian federal and local governments have the legitimacy

Pantanal (CIDEPAN);

to make decisions that affect this region. On-going tensions for the news, as happened during our fieldwork.

(PRODEPAN);

Since 2006, for instance, there have been rumours that the

Development

the

Pantanal

(POLOCENTRO);

Maps showing an “amputated Brazil” and the Amazon

Alcohol Program9 (PROALCOOL);

Development

Program of the Grande Dourados

(PRODEGRAN);

region under an “international mandate” have been

circulating on the Internet. This may have remained a bad

Study

of the Integrated Development of the Upper

commented that Brazil would never accept such an action,

Program

of the Agro-Environmental Development of the

further in 2007 when a federal minister declared that if

National

Environmental Program (PNMA), with its sub-

Paraguay Basin (EDIBAP);

joke had not some Brazilian army officers publicly

thus giving credence to the documents. Tensions increased

State of Mato Grosso (PRODEAGRO);

programme titled “Conservation Plan of the Upper

Amazonia were to become a “global public good” under

Paraguay Basin” (PCBAP) (Junk et al., 2009).

“international ownership”, then the nuclear arsenal of the United States should also be declared an “international

The PROALCOOL programme encouraged the use of ethanol as a fuel substitute and for industrial purposes.

1. The Pantanal: A Battlefield of Discourses and Priorities

Some of these programs helped boost the local agro-

UNDP and UNEP), as well as by parts of the Brazilian

and

alarming prognosis.

industrial complex, including cattle ranching and soybean sugarcane

production

the

plateau

government. Box 1 summarises the main points of this

region

surrounding the Pantanal, with noticeable environmental

Today, however, there seems to be a shift in Brazilian

consequences. This resulted in awareness-raising activities

federal policy towards greater recognition of the Global

and sometimes high-profile international campaigns against specific projects - such as the Paraguay-Paraná

Public Good Approach, as exemplified in recent

Hidrovia10,

agreements concluded with France on matters of

which was eventually postponed, although not abandoned.

biodiversity protection. In recent years, federal authorities

While federal and local authorities over the past 40 years

have been increasingly mindful of the concerns of the

have emphasised the economic need to domesticate the

international community. Moreover, a growing number of

Pantanal for the benefit of the nation, environmental groups

international

and others have been denouncing the impact of human

actors

–

for

instance

the

French

Development Agency – for a long time have been

activities. A confrontational discourse - emphasising the

emphasising that it is both possible and necessary for

many human threats to the Pantanal - has thus developed

development and conservation goals to converge, a more

based on concerns shared by NGOs, many environmental

conciliatory approach that has been easing discussions

scientists, a range of international organisations (such as

with Brazil.

Box 1 – Human threats to the Pantanal: a summary of concerns

Below we summarise some of the main concerns regarding the human impact on the Pantanal (Earthwatch 2004; Junk & de Cunha, 2005). The Pantanal is a fragile ecosystem with already high natural stress factors, such as pronounced floods and dry periods, low nutrient levels and fires. Anthropogenic threats are not only global, like climate change, but also local, since the region is being affected by economic growth

inside its borders as well as by side effects from the larger catchment area surrounding the Pantanal, where intensive agriculture is practised. Traditional actors in the region include cattle ranchers, agricultural employees, Indian communities and federal government agencies. Prior

to the 1970s, these actors had a rather limited impact on the Pantanal as they did not have the capacity to cause massive environmental change, such as altering the flood cycle by building dams or affecting water quality via sediment build-up in rivers. However, as economic

development proceeded, new stakeholders emerged along with the industrialisation, from agriculture, modernised cattle ranching, the

transport industry, hydroelectric energy production and mining. Human population increased markedly in the states of Mato Grosso and Mato

Grosso do Sul, which share the Brazilian Pantanal. This was accompanied by a shift towards rapid urban growth in several centres, which affected the area through increased transportation needs and water pollution.

Urbanisation, however, is not the only threat affecting water quality and patterns in the Pantanal. The sources of most rivers that drain into the region are in the surrounding highlands. In these areas, the Brazilian government has been subsidising intensive agricultural operations

since the 1970s, as it did throughout the country, including in Amazonia. In several regions around the Pantanal, large portions of the original

Cerrado forests have been clear-cut and converted to industrial farming operations for soybean, sugar cane, wheat, corn and cotton cultivation. Millions of square kilometres of savannah have been turned into open fields. According to a 2006 report released by Conservation

International (Barcellos Harris, 2006), grazing and agriculture, including the transformation of native pasture to farmland, has destroyed almost 45% of the original vegetation in the Paraguay River basin, which contains the Pantanal. As of 2004, approximately 44% of the area’s original vegetation had been altered, with some districts losing more than 90% of their natural cover.

Consequently, many river and stream banks have been deforested, increasing downstream sedimentation. Because soils in much of the Cerrado region are relatively poor, and because of the need to sustain fertility and fight pests, there has been extensive use of fungicides, pesticides and fertilisers. Since water management practices are not very advanced, this has resulted in extensive agrochemical runoff and Hidrovia is a plan by five countries to convert the Paraguay and Paraná rivers into an industrial shipping channel. 10

1. The Pantanal: A Battlefield of Discourses and Priorities

soil erosion, affecting Pantanal farmers. Local hydrological patterns have been profoundly changed, as witnessed for instance with the São Lourenço river. This has made navigation difficult, and has hindered fish migration as well as traditional cattle-raising. The worst case is the

Rio Taquari basin, where large sections of the channel have degraded or shifted, inundating 11,000 km² of cattle ranges, and causing a sharp decline in fish stocks. The channel and habitat complexity is reduced dramatically, blocking migratory fish routes, altering flood plain/channel interactions, and causing loss of species.

Another issue is mining and mercury pollution. Since the 1980s, gold mining in the lowlands near the city of Pocone (see Map 2) has been releasing mercury into the environment, but superficial gold deposits are now exhausted and mining activities have declined during recent

years. Nevertheless, extractive operations still have the potential to significantly impact the Pantanal. Direct impacts from iron, manganese

and diamond mining in the watershed include destruction of vegetation and habitat, soil erosion and river sedimentation, changes in river-

bed topography and water pollution. Gold mining represents a significant environmental and human health risk in parts of the Pantanal. Large amounts of mercury are being used by miners in order to amalgamate gold particles contained in the mined soil and mud slurry. There are to date several documented cases of significantly elevated mercury levels in native fish and birds, particularly in the northern Pantanal.

Turning to electricity production and its ecological impacts, as of 2008 there were nine hydroelectric power plants with a total capacity of

323MW operating in the Pantanal catchment area. A large hydroelectric facility was recently constructed on the Manso River (220MW), a key tributary of the Cuiaba River, under an initiative by the Brazilian federal and state governments. Changes in hydrology caused by the large Manso River reservoir (387 km2) have begun to affect flora, fauna and also fishers and cattle ranchers inside the Pantanal. In the future, the number of reservoirs may further increase by up to 20 more, with a total capacity of over 1,000MW. It is expected that the cumulative effect of these projected reservoirs will be to strongly modify the region’s hydrological structure (Girard, 2002).

Regarding transportation infrastructure, several large projects were initiated to transport commodities more easily to large metropolitan areas

and seaports. These included three waterway, or “hidrovia” projects: the Araguaia-Tocantins; the Paraguay-Paraná Hidrovia; and the Ferronorte railway. Economic pressure is being applied by agro-businesses and the mining industry outside the Pantanal to canalise the

Paraguay River so that soybeans and minerals can be more cheaply transported to the Atlantic Ocean. The Paraguay-Paraná Hidrovia project, involving Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia, Uruguay and Argentina, is of particular concern. Its goal is to straighten and dredge the upper Rio Paraguay to increase its capacity for barge traffic. It is argued by environmental groups that the project would permanently alter flow patterns

in the region and drain an estimated 50% of the wetlands, causing a collapse of the most productive food networks in the Pantanal. The original project lost funding and was abandoned based on conclusions from an Environmental Impact Study and an effective public

awareness program run by Coalizão Rios Vivos, WWF, Conservation International (CI) and other NGOs. Still, the hidrovia continues to be on the agenda and a series of separate, small-scale hidrovia projects are being initiated along the upper Rio Paraguay.

1.4

The pre-eminence of “economic use” over “conservation”

Environmental politics in Brazil is centred on an on-going

protected-area categories under various levels of Brazilian

debate between “strict conservation” and the “sustainable

governance and divides them into two main categories:

use” of natural resources, as reflected in the country’s laws. Brazil’s first protected park was established in 1937, but it

1. strictly protected areas, in which the preservation of

areas significantly increased, under various legal forms. To

severely restricted; and

was not until the mid-1980s that the number of protected

biodiversity is the central objective and human activities are

bring order to an increasingly complex legal landscape, as

well as to harmonise local legislations, a unified system of

2. sustainable use areas in which biodiversity protection is

2000 under the name of the “National System for Protected

range of economic activities11.

laws for federal, state and municipal parks was adopted in

an important, but not the sole, objective, thus allowing for a

Areas” (SNUC). The SNUC thus regulates and defines

1. The Pantanal: A Battlefield of Discourses and Priorities

Increasingly, it is the local levels of environmental

interviewees, is that the local states are more dependent on

local states has been growing. While federally protected

international NGOs. Also, to promote conservation, such

management that matter most in Brazil, since the role of the

the local economic actors and less sensitive to large

areas dominated during the 1980s, only 52% of the nation’s

NGOs have tended to lobby federal authorities rather than

protected areas are currently federal. The federal

local ones, thinking that federal protection provides more

government has been applying the SNUC legislation in a

reliability and continuity compared with local legislation.

rather balanced way regarding the “conservation vs. sustainable use”

dilemma12.

Across Brazil there have been substantial differences in

Local states, meanwhile, have

how the “conservation vs. economic use” debate has

been de-emphasising conservation, so much so that they

manifested itself13. In the Pantanal, strict protection applies

total area under strict conservation. Instead, they have

merely reflects the quasi-absence of any conservation

are currently responsible for a mere 17% percent of the

to 100% of protected areas, but this impressive figure

created protected areas for sustainable use, establishing

policy in the region. Until 1999, only two small areas in the

around 300 such sites as for 2008, 70% of which are

region had received official protection: the Pantanal

defined as “environmental protection areas” (APAs), a

National Park, encompassing 550 square miles of wetland;

SNUC category often criticised by NGOs for “its misleading

and the Taiama Ecological Station, covering 43 square

name”, as one interviewee explained: ”APAs are not really

miles. Both located in state of Mato Grosso, these areas comprise merely 0.6% of the whole Pantanal, with the rest

protected areas; they are more like a mechanism for land-

privately owned by cattle ranchers and other economic

use management (…). They constrain human activities with

actors. Thus, for a very long time, less than 1% of the

some plans or zoning systems, with some small areas set

world’s largest wetland had been set aside for strict

aside for strict protection(…) But this mechanism brings

conservation. The local states of Mato Grosso and Mato

little added value in the field because the small sites that

Grosso do Sul, where the Pantanal lies, are indeed

are set aside for strict protection are usually spaces that

profoundly influenced by the mantra of unrestricted

cannot be put into use anyway.”

development. They had shown little sensitivity to

Why has the federal approach to environmental protection

environmental concerns until a range of civil actors began

relied more on “full conservation” but not the state-level

to apply pressure.

protections? One possible explanation, provided by several

11 The first category of strictly protected areas overlaps with standard categories I to III as defined by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). These are the most restrictive areas when it comes to excluding human activities. In Brazil, they include “national parks”, “biological reserves”, “ecological stations”, “natural monuments” and “wildlife refuges”. National parks are the largest strictly protected areas and allow for education, recreation, and scientific research. Biological reserves are generally smaller and closed to the public except for environmental education. Ecological stations place a clear emphasis upon research. The second category of protected areas for sustainable use allows for different levels of human activity and overlaps with IUCN categories IV to VI. Less exclusionary regarding human activities, such areas include “national forests”, “environmental protection areas” (APAs), “areas of relevant ecological interest”, “extractive reserves”, “fauna reserves”, “sustainable development reserves” and “private natural heritage reserves” (RPPN).

Of almost 300 federal protected areas in Brazil, 58% are dedicated to sustainable use and 42% to full conservation.

13 Sustainable-use policies apply to more areas in the Atlantic Forest (74%), Caatinga (72%) and coastal and marine areas (74%). In the Amazon, there is a rough balance between strict protection (49% strictly protected areas) and sustainable use (51%). These percentages are based on the number of areas, not their size.

1. The Pantanal: A Battlefield of Discourses and Priorities

1.5. State-led conservation: brilliant laws, hollow enforcement

Beyond protected areas, the other key aspect of Brazilian

governmental and civil society organisations. Authorities in

legislation on paper” – as several of the civil servants

and gaps in regulatory coverage, resulting in a detrimental

environmental policy is its enormous amount of “excellent interviewed put it –

both states are also weakened by a range of exemptions

which nonetheless bears little

“patchwork” of environmental regulation.

relevance to actual practice. The Pantanal is no exception,

To be sure, there is no lack of federal and state structures

range of interviews in the region and the federal capital.

agency responsible for enforcement of environmental laws

as explains Wade (1999), and this was confirmed by a

for implementation and enforcement. Since 2000, the public

Article 225 of the Brazilian Constitution defines the

is the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and

Pantanal as one of several natural areas considered part of

Renewable Resources (IBAMA)14, under the authority of

the national patrimony. With more 120 active environmental

the Ministry of the Environment. IBAMA is also responsible

laws, the Pantanal is a well-protected and monitored area,

for monitoring the implementation of the Brazilian system of

in theory. Top-down conservation regulations include

conservation (SNUC). Meanwhile, at the state level, there is

provisions requiring environmental-impact assessments,

a variety of institutional actors tracking the implementation

public review and comments, protection of wildlife, controls

on effluents and fertilisers, etc. Federal law requires landowners

preserve

native

vegetation

federal

and

local

legislations.

Environmental

management in Mato Grosso do Sul, for instance, is the

along

responsibility of the State Secretariat of the Environment

embankments via the so-called “permanent reserves”. They

(SEMA), created in 1991, and of its technical arm in the

must also retain a certain percentage of their property in its

Pantanal region, the Instituto do Meio Ambiente Pantanal

natural state (the so-called “legal reserve”) without

(IMAP). The State Forestry Police are also meant to play a

introducing any activity other than research or regulated

role in controlling poaching, notably through car checks.

ecotourism. However, it is the local state that determines

Such laws and institutions potentially provide good

reserve”. In Mato Grosso do Sul, the State requires that

backed by strong political will and adequate financial

what percentage of land comes under the rule of “legal

protection for the Pantanal’s natural spaces but only if

20% be protected, while in Mato Grosso, where the other

means, which as of 2008 still arguably did not exist.

half of the Pantanal lies, 35% is the rule. This may seem

Interviews with civil servants in Brasilia provided a blunt

significant, but in the Amazon region by comparison

account of what is actually occurring in practice. To say the

landowners must protect up to 80% of their property.

least, implementation is a daunting task in the Pantanal,

In theory, top-down regulation is rather extensive in the

due to the lack of human and material resources, relative to

Pantanal, but the story is quite different when it comes to

the vast size of the region to be monitored. The Pantanal

implementation. To start with, regulatory authority for the

National Park in Mato Grosso, for instance, covers 138,000

Pantanal is geographically split between the states of Mato

hectares is extremely remote, has very little infrastructure

split among the environmental agencies in those states, the

monitoring impossible. As for monitoring how the fazendas

Grosso and Mato Grosso do Sul. It is also jurisdictionally

and few operating funds, making complete and continuous

federal environmental agencies and the state governments.

are implementing environmental rules, the common

The relative inability of institutions with different mandates

thinking in federal ministries and agencies seems to be that,

and constituencies to develop an integrated approach has

as one civil servant put it: ”Regardless of what we do here,

been harming conservation in the Pantanal for years, as

Pantanal’s landowners are kings in their kingdoms.”

was stressed by most of our interviewees in both

14 Until 1989, federal parks and reserves were created by the Brazilian Forest Development Institute (IBDF) and the Special Secretariat for the Environment (SEMA). In 1989, SEMA and IBDF were united to form the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA).

1. The Pantanal: A Battlefield of Discourses and Priorities

Moreover, in areas around the Pantanal, like the Cerrado,

suggested by several interviewees in Mato Grosso do Sul.

so much so that both permanent and legal reserve rules are

enforcement that NGOs in the 1990s tried to promote the

the local state encourages intensive exploitation of the land,

It is thus against a backdrop of low protection and low

frequently violated. There are also frequent corruption

notion that the Pantanal needs far better protection.

issues regarding the environmental inspectors, as was

1.6. Conclusion

The novelty and significance of the Pantanal Regional Park

tend to claim that the Pantanal belongs to mankind as a

background debates that have resulted in perennial

resulted in wonderfully protective laws that are not enforced

for Brazilian environmental management.

has strictly enforced public conservation rules).

can only be accurately perceived while bearing in mind the

whole. In the Pantanal, these conflicting views have

conflicts among the various actors involved and their vision

and cover only a small surface (less than 3% of the area

The first debate, reviewed in this section, concerns who has

The second major debate that played out during the

the right and duty to oversee the destiny of the Pantanal. As

creation of the Pantanal Regional Park is explored in the

with other world wonders of comparable significance, the

next section. It concerns the definition of community

Pantanal is the object of competing discourses. While

participation (CP) and the power formations that can

federal authorities conceive of the Pantanal primarily as a

develop when specific types of CP processes are put into

Brazilian property that should be dedicated to domestic

practice.

development, others - such as environmentalist NGOs -

ÂŠ AFD Working Paper No. 93 â&#x20AC;˘ Community participation in the Pantanal, Brazil - January 2010 22

2. The Changing Definition of Community Participation (CP)

As the previous section showed, it is within a

collaborative approach to environmental management,

development vs. those emphasising conservation — that a

programmes involved increased power-sharing between

confrontational atmosphere – the champions of sovereign

inclusive of local producers: this new generation of CP

discourse about participation emerged in the Pantanal.

the leading NGOs and local producers, still, however, within

Here, we analyse the evolution of that CP discourse and

NGO-defined schemes. While the global discourse on

how it affected the balance of power in environmental

community participation had long accepted this third view of

management.

CP, it came about very slowly, and recently, in the Pantanal.

At first, the CP discourse in the Pantanal generated state-

However, a new balance of power was to emerge in the

led community consultations through various and extensive

model used to establish the Pantanal Regional Park. This

planning exercises bearing in practice little effect but

model, based on legal concepts imported from France,

providing the state with a primary role. CP then came to

gave local producers increased decision-making power and

embody rigorous private conservation efforts, providing

consequently generated a lot of distrust on the part of many

NGOs with a key role in supporting and directing the private

environmentalists.

initiatives. CP then changed again to slowly embody a more

2.1. State-led CP: consultations for strategic planning

Ironically, the ineffective state-led conservation of the

essentially “led nowhere”, as many interviewees declared.

enforcement) is paralleled by the long-standing practice of

Organization of American States (OAS) and the United

Pantanal

(based

exemplary

laws

but

elusive

As early as 1978, the government of Brazil together with the

“consultative CP” throughout the region, within large and

Nations Development Program (UNDP) conducted a three-

recurring development-planning exercises. Thus, not only

year planning process titled “Plan for the Integrated

was the Pantanal at the forefront of top-down planning in

Development of the Upper Paraguay River Basin”

Brazil, but also at the forefront of CP planning in the very

(EDIBAP). This exercise resulted in a series of

early years of CP awareness and promotion. The Pantanal

economic development proposals for the Pantanal region,

is indeed famous for its range of large strategic-planning

based on the principles of environmental conservation,

processes involving an incredibly large number of actors in

ecological balance, and the rational use of land. The

state-of-the-art consultative mechanisms. In a sense, the

subsequent strategy recommended specific actions to

region has been an astonishing “playground” for the CP

address social problems and assess the impact of several

discourse – as it evolved over time from being a top-down

proposed development projects on the water system of the

approach to one focused on consultative practices. None of

Paraguay River Basin in Brazil. It included flood-control

these exercises, however, ever produced much more than

measures through the construction of reservoirs at several

volumes of reports and recommendations that have

locations, which would also serve to improve river

2. The Changing Definition of Community Participation (CP)

navigation without significantly changing water behaviour

involvement of over 4,500 participants. The main output of

proposal, but little action followed.

the needs of government authorities, decision-makers and

downstream. Many hopes were raised by this massive

this work is a 300-page report that will (it is hoped) “serve

In 1991, Brazil’s federal government launched a vast

others with an interest in the sustainable development” of

participatory undertaking leading to the creation of the

the Pantanal.

Upper Paraguay River Basin Conservation Plan (PCBAP).

Still, the consultation process did not end there. In 2007, the

Conducted by the government of Brazil and the World

European Union financed a new massive participatory

Bank, this plan relied on an environmental zoning approach

analysis of the Pantanal and its challenges, based on major

to delineate general and site-specific guidelines for the

scientific input and stakeholder consultations. Called the

conservation, rehabilitation and preservation of degraded

INREP (Institutions and Research for the Pantanal) the

lands. The PCBAP proposed the creation of a real-time

project led to several dozen public meetings, a range of

flood-warning system designed to prevent negative impacts

new scientific studies and a series of reports meant to

in urban and rural areas. Again, almost none of the

define a “research agenda to support policy institutions,

recommendations were implemented.

legal frameworks and social action” in the Pantanal. The

In 1996, the Brazilian government requested technical and

results of the project have been presented in Brazil,

financial assistance from the Global Environment Fund

Paraguay and to the European Commission in Brussels,

(GEF) in order to prepare an integrated management

but the local people and organisations of the Pantanal have

program for the entire basin based on the guidelines of the

yet to see any results.

PCBAB. From 1994 to 2004, 44 studies and a variety of

Interviews carried out in 2008 made it clear that these often-

demonstration projects were carried out, resulting in a new

redundant consultative exercises, generally led by external

Strategic Action Program for the Integrated Management of

(and often foreign) facilitators, are producing few results.

the Pantanal and the Upper Paraguay River Basin. More

They have exhausted the patience and hopes of many of

than 250 federal, state, and municipal organisations,

the stakeholders we interviewed. There was a sense of

NGOs, private companies, international institutions, and

disillusionment in many of their comments, be it among

organisations from other countries were directly or indirectly

scientists, policy makers, NGO representatives or

involved in project activities, mainly through participation in

fazendeiros. One even described the Pantanal as “the

a series of public events. The work thus entailed the

Bermuda Triangle of participatory planning”.

2.2. CP as private conservation: the view of environmentalist NGOs

In the early 1990s, international NGOs started to lobby

organized in 1998 by Conservation International and a host

conservation of the Pantanal. They promoted the idea of

the Fundaçao Biodiversitas. Gathering together over 200

Brazil’s federal and local governments for stronger

of local organisations, such as the University of Brasilia and

“total reserves” both through the creation of additional

scientists, it identified a series of corridors and core areas

national parks, as well as more “private reserves” owned by

for biodiversity protection and eventually engendered

NGOs, philanthropists or fazendeiros. NGOs partnered with

governmental action. Between 2001 and 2004, the state of

scientific organisations to lobby authorities through

Mato Grosso do Sul declared five new protected areas

technical advice and proposals. Most notably, a conference

covering 140,000 ha15. The federal government, for its part,

on the Pantanal and the neighbouring Cerrado was

created the Bodoquena National Park covering over 76,000

15 This included the Pantanal do Rio Negro State park (78,300 ha), the Nascetttes do Taquari State Park (35,000 ha), two rivers - the Rio Formoso in Bonito and the Rio Cênico das Rotas Moncoeilas (a linear protected area along the Rio Coxim) - and a parkway reserve along Highway MS184.

2. The Changing Definition of Community Participation (CP)

ha, also in Mato Grosso do Sul. On the whole, however,

and the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS). Their

public conservation in the Brazilian Pantanal, since less

different.

these lobbying successes did not change the landscape of

strategies have been evolving over time and are slightly

than 2.5% of its surface area is under such protection.

CI’s worldwide strategy has evolved, but not very much

This is why, to stimulate conservation, the NGOs

when it comes to the Pantanal. CI acknowledges on its

simultaneously promoted efforts to create new privately

website that while its traditional strategic focus had been

protected areas, taking advantage of the rather progressive

“strict conservation”, it prides itself for having been an early

Brazilian legislation that facilitated the establishment of

proponent (in 1987) of conservation that is based on

Reservas Particulares do Patrimônio Natural (RPPNs). In

sustainable development and the participation of local

Pantanal, a total of 13 such reserves exist to date, covering

stakeholders (Conservation International, 2009). However,

204,255 ha – an additional 1.5% of the region.

in the Pantanal, CI has been working much less with

The concept of privately owned nature reserves dates back

economic actors per se, than pushing for more public and

to 19th century Europe, notably England – which had large

private reserves within “corridors”17.

reserves in colonies such as Kenya, Namibia or Botswana.

TNC has followed a rather similar path. Created in 1951, it

Launched by a 1990 decree, the Brazilian program was

is another important conservation organisation working

made into law by Congress in 2000. Since then, federal and

around the world. In Pantanal, it initially helped a partner

state authorities have administered RPPN with apparent

foundation (Ecotropica) purchase 60,000 hectares on the

enthusiasm because otherwise they would have to appropriate

land,

indemnify

owners

and

border of the Pantanal National Park in order to convert

finance

them into private preserves. Since the end of the 1990s, it

management of the areas. With RPPNs, the burden of

has also been helping local institutions to assess, manage

conservation falls on the private landowner rather than on

and monitor the Pantanal National Park. More recently, the

public finances. Various environmental groups help landowners to create

RPPNs16,

Conservancy has established a partnership with UNESCO,

especially when their lands

WWF and the Brazilian environmental agency, IBAMA, for

are located near existing public natural reserves. Owners

the conservation of the Natural World Heritage Sites in the

who create such reserves benefit from property tax

Pantanal.

exemptions, but land-use is restricted to ecotourism and

CI and TNC are thus very much conservation-oriented and

irrevocable protection, which means that the land cannot be

private landowners interested in strict conservation.

research activities. The area decreed is also under

focus on a limited type of CP: namely, collaboration with

de-classified later on.

Meanwhile, other large NGOs have been a bit more

In the Pantanal arena, several international NGOs have

focused (but not exclusively) on the sustainable use side of

been influential during the past decade and quite active,

the equation – although still within a restricted CP

such as Conservation International (CI), the World Wildlife

framework — as we shall see shortly.

Fund for Nature (WWF), The Nature Conservancy (TNC)

16 To be defined as a RPPN, an area must have features relevant to protecting biodiversity or be a place where environmental recovery would preserve threatened ecosystems.

17 Under the corridor approach, large areas such as national parks are linked by corridors of smaller reserves to allow species to roam over a wider area, which in turn encourages greater genetic diversity.

2. The Changing Definition of Community Participation (CP)

2.3. Collaborating with producers: the slow emergence of a new form of CP

While CI and TNC have strongly favoured strict

doctors and dentists, receive updates on the jaguar project

emphasis on the need to involve local economic actors.

pantaneiro lifestyle and attend to workers’ health needs in

conservation in the Pantanal, others have placed a bit more

and discuss conservation. The intent is to value the

Since more than 97% of the region is owned by cattle

return for their conservation efforts.

ranchers, the expansion of the conservation system

It is the WWF, however, that has gone the furthest in terms

arguably depends on their cooperation through new forms

of working with local producers. After having provided

of participation. As for the creation of private reserves, it can

support to various isolated conservation projects, in 1998 it

only be – or so it seems – a limited phenomenon.

launched a more ambitious programme under the name

The World Conservation Society (WCS) is one of the first

“Pantanal Forever”. Still active today, the latter purses both

NGOs in the Pantanal to start working directly with cattle

conservation and development objectives. On the

ranchers, seeking to better integrate development and

conservation side, it contributes to the creation of protected

wildlife conservation through applied research. Since the

areas, as well as the conservation of the Arara-azul grande

end of the 1990s, WCS has been trying to engage and train

- a large blue parrot species (cf. Photo set 1). On the

ranchers on wildlife conflict management. In particular,

“sustainable

jaguar attacks on livestock often lead to ranchers killing

jaguars. The WCS runs a research program focused on decreasing

predatory

attacks

cattle

and

production”

side,

working

with

fisherwomen’s groups for the development of local arts and

crafts. It provides some aid to cattle ranchers willing to

the

adopt lower impact activities, including ecotourism, and

implementation of new prevention techniques at several

since 2002 the WWF has also been working on promoting

partnering ranches. WCS also provides recommendations

organic beef by helping ranchers become certified by the

on cattle ranching and ecotourism development. In this

Instituto Biodinâmico (IBD).

endeavour, it is working with UNIDERP, a local university,

Working with local producers thus increasingly appears to

towards developing environmental and socio-economic

be the new focus of CP in the Pantanal and the way forward

indicators to help monitor ranches.

for NGOs. These, however, have been implementing rather

Slowly moving away from its strict conservation policy, CI

soft versions of CP, namely, projects that are largely

has also been trying to work more with cattle ranchers. In

partnership with the Jaguar Conservation Fund (a Brazilian

owned”: they merely provide producers with some

NGO) and a local university (UFMS), CI developed a

incentives to modify their activities. Such endeavours are

compensation plan for ranchers who have lost cattle to

still a long way from “community-driven” projects, in which

jaguars on 11 adjacent properties. In return, fazendeiros

local CP is fundamental at all levels.

signed an agreement to cease killing jaguars on these

Thus, creation of the Pantanal Regional Park was a novel

properties, thus adding 150,000 hectares of safe jaguar

undertaking for the local NGOs and the local environmental

habitat. In addition, the project supports a social program

managers. It stimulated hopes that the local pantaneira

whereby free medical and dental assistance, as well as

community would itself be provided with the capacity and

some environmental education, are provided to ranch

the financial means to develop its own conservation

workers. Around 150 people are thus invited to participate

programmes, rather than having to join projects led by

in three outreach efforts per year. Workers are seen by

international NGOs.

2. The Changing Definition of Community Participation (CP)

2.4. Conclusion: the novelty of the Pantanal Regional Park (PRP) proposal

In this section, we showed that the concept of CP in the

as a community, enhancing their collective decision-making

the on going tension between approaches focused on

However, an integrated, community-led Regional Park

Pantanal has taken various forms over the years, reflecting conservation

versus

the

sustainable

use

power in various environmental and socioeconomic areas.

the

raised eyebrows within the NGO community, since local

environment. During the 1990s, large environmental NGOs

landowners (fazendeiros) were not seen as good stewards

operating in the Pantanal adopted the global mantra of

of the environment, much to the contrary. Providing the

participation, but implemented very weak versions of it â&#x20AC;&#x201C;

landowners with more power and financial means was seen

namely, the participation of individual landowners in private

by many environmentalists as a useless, and even

conservation projects, and NGO projects that provided

dangerous, move. It is thus against a pre-existing coalition

various ranches (fazendas) some incentive to modify

of large environmentalist NGOs that a much bolder CP

certain productive practices. In this context, the proposal to

project developed in the Pantanal, the genesis of which we

create a community-managed regional park was impressive

now explore.

and unprecedented; it would directly involve cattle ranchers

ÂŠ AFD Working Paper No. 93 â&#x20AC;˘ Community participation in the Pantanal, Brazil - January 2010 27

3. The PRP Genesis: A Community in Crisis in Search of Allies

The proposal to create a Pantanal Regional Park (PRP)

conservationist forces emphasising the “global public good”

participatory discourse. It involved the creation of a large-

development”. Thus, the initial impetus for the PRP project

aspect of the Pantanal far more than its “domestic

represented a fundamental move forward in the region’s

came from two key local interest groups attempting to

scale participatory park, based on the voluntary cooperation

regain the initiative against new regional actors with

of the private landowners, whose economic activities would

growing influence.

be supported, rather than forbidden. The core and official

Meanwhile, the objective of double containment, at the root

inspiration was to “give the driver’s seat to the locals themselves”18,

so they could design their preferred

of the initiative, soon became aligned with the objectives of

making the locals subject to ready-made schemes devised

and designer of the actual PRP project. This actor was the

economic, social and environmental projects, rather than

another actor, which eventually became the main supporter

by non-community actors, such as international NGOs.

French government, encompassing various organisations

Here, we track the role of CP in the genesis of the Pantanal

such as the French embassy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Regional Park, its originating agents (initiators, supporters

the French Fund for the Global Environment and several

and designers) as well as the strategic meaning of the

public research and technical organisations. These foreign

initiative and the configuration of interests that underpinned

actors had a model of environmental management to offer,

it. We show that the key initiators were a group of high-

namely the model of “regional parks”. Based on

profile landowners involved in cattle-ranching and

cooperation between the State and local producers, this

concerned about the rising influence of conservationists

model was developed in France at the end of the 1960s and

NGOs, as well as economic competitors. Pantanal’s

had already been exported to many countries. The will to

traditional landowners saw the need for a collective

export French expertise and exert a conceptual influence in

response to the rising number of incoming actors that in the

the Pantanal, a nature area of global significance,

name of the environment threatened their economic

converged with the desire of the local landowners and the

sustainability and the legitimacy of their very presence in

local government to create a new initiative that could shift

the region.

the balance of power between the conservationists and the

Other initiators of the PRP project were a federal senator

producers.

and the local state of Mato Grosso do Sul. These political

On the basis of this convergence of interests, the PRP

actors were responding to the anxieties of the large

project was developed, and it secured significant domestic

landowners, an important rural constituency. They were

and international funding, including from the European

also happy to help contain the influence of the

Union as solicited by French experts.

18 As

one interviewee put it.

3. The PRP Genesis: A Community in Crisis in Search of Allies

3.1. The crisis of cattle-ranchers and the will to contain competitors and conservationists

At the root of the PRP initiative is an economic and

on relatively small plots of land. A large grazing area is

landowners of the wetland, mostly involved in cattle-

flooded. Properties that are too small can easily collapse

legitimacy crisis experienced by the long-established

needed, since during the wet season most of the land is

ranching. They increasingly regard two kinds of actors as a

and run out of operating space during just one year of

direct threat to their continued presence in the region. First

extreme flooding. The high waters often prevent animals

are the economic competitors of traditional cattle-ranching:

from lying down to rest: some eventually die of exhaustion,

the farmers in the plateaus that surround the Pantanal

even when sufficient feed is available. While ranchers with

enjoy much higher productivity. But competitors are also

large properties and herds can afford some losses, small

found directly within the wetland. An increasing number of

ranchers are almost inevitably ruined. The size and number

newcomers – well-capitalised and not part of the traditional

of ranches in the Pantanal are thus key variables in

pantaneira community – are buying bankrupt properties

understand this community’s history. Wilcox (1992)

(fazendas) and importing more intensive modes of

provides essential historical data on this issue.

production.

Towards the end of the 19th century, only a few large and

The second threat to the traditional fazendeiros are the

scattered ranches existed in the Pantanal, thus the impact

conservationist NGOs (internationally supported and

of human activity was very low. During the first half of the

funded) that are applying a “bell jar approach” to

20th century, however, cattle ranching developed steadily19,

conservation, based on shaming the cattle-ranchers for

even though it was not until the 1960s that the local

their negative environmental impact. As we have seen,

diseases that prevented horse-rearing in the Pantanal were

several large NGOs have been pushing a strict view of

overcome. The greater availability of horses and an

biodiversity protection in the region, challenging the very

increasing number of immigrants, often with local family

legitimacy of the ranchers.

connections, spurred growth. While the 1920 Brazilian census showed around 100 ranches throughout the

Pantanal and about 700,000 head of cattle, in the early

The economic crisis: smaller properties and falling

1970s there were more than 3,500 ranches with over five

beef prices mean more competition

The roots of the productivity crisis in Pantanal cattle

million head of cattle.

ranching reach far back into the history of this community.

Ranches that used to be relatively large became gradually

The average size of the properties has been decreasing

subdivided as families grew and immigrants settled20.

over time, and it is now often below the threshold of

Today, an ever-increasing number of ranches are below the

economic viability. This downsizing as been caused by an

threshold size of economic viability, around 7,000 ha,

tradition of dividing an inheritance equally among the male

being sold to farmers from outside the region; they arrive

increase in population and immigration, as well as the

according to our interviewees. Consequently, many are

heirs.

with more capital and intensive techniques for increasing

Indeed, the environmental and geographical conditions of

land productivity – but they are arguably also doing more

the region make it extremely difficult and risky to raise cattle

harm to the environment. The process of selling to 19 Nhecolândia, one of the Pantanal’s major sub-regions, is a good example of this evolution. At the start of the 20th century, it was settled by no more than a dozen families, raising about 100,000 head of cattle. By 1920, there were already more than 80 ranches with nearly 200,000 animals. By the mid-1950s, ranches totalled over 100, with a human population of 6,000.

At the end of the 19th century, the largest properties in the Pantanal ranged between 100,000 and 400,000 hectares, while one ranch extended over 1 million hectares. By the 1920s, more than half still had more than 100,000 hectares each. By the 1950s, however, ranches varied only between 8,000 and 65,000 hectares. By the 1970s, 70% of all properties in the Pantanal had between 1,000 and 10,000 hectares, while no more than 11% (around 400 properties) were still over 10,000 hectares.

3. The PRP Genesis: A Community in Crisis in Search of Allies

outsiders is bitterly resented by long-standing landowning

article highlighted the enduring mistrust that exists between

do not have the capital resources and a more economically

working together has only slowly and very recently

families, who still form the bulk of the landowners but who

NGOs and fazendeiros in the Pantanal region: the notion of

aggressive mindset. Interviews with fazendeiros underlined

emerged, while the stricter conservationist view still

this feeling of “threat” with comments such as: ”

dominates the operations of large NGOs – notably the practice of buying and fencing off lands through private

- I don’t know of a single fazendeiro [in Pantanal] who is

conservation projects.

happy with the new guys, although more and more have

All this means that landowners feel threatened by

to sell their lands to them.

conservationist NGOs, a feeling that was even stronger 15

- The [newer fazendeiros], they do not know anything

years ago, at the time of the genesis of the PRP project.

about us, about our history, about the Pantanal and they

Interviews carried out in 2008 still reflected this tension,

don’t want to respect the way we have been living with

despite the increasing number of NGO projects carried out

the Pantanal for generations.

in a more cooperative spirit. Several NGOs still openly

- [They] should not be here but the law of the market is

battle against the idea that cattle rearing is a viable long-

king. It is all very sad.

term option for the Pantanal. In 2006, for instance,

- How do you want us to compete with people who have several times the capital we have? ”

Conservation International released a report (Barcellos

Cattle ranchers of the Pantanal have also been affected by

Harris, 2006) that claimed that deforestation due to

the volatility of meat prices on world markets. The original

increased grazing and agriculture had already destroyed

wealth of the industry was based on the export of salted

17% of the native vegetation of the Pantanal (25,000 km ). 2

and dried meat, which saw price increases up until World

It was argued that continued deforestation at the current

techniques decreased the demand for preserved meat

disappear in 45 years21. Such analyses feed the mistrust

War II. This business declined when refrigeration

rate would cause all the region’s original vegetation to

(Junk & de Cunha, 2005). After a difficult post-war period,

between NGOs and landowners. Many of the latter openly

cattle producers enjoyed two decades of continuous price

fear that NGOs will in the long run… ”[…] invade the

increases that came to an abrupt end at the start of the

Pantanal and kick [them] out. ”

1970s, when a steep price drop occurred (Edelman, 1992,

Hostility is evident, and several fazendeiros we met feel

exacerbated in Brazil by regular outbreaks of “foot and

from abroad, paid 5,000 dollars a month who think they

p.195). Weak pricing extended well into the 1990s,

that large NGOs in the region are filled with: ”[…] people

mouth disease”, which prevented Brazilians from exporting

can tell [us] what to do!”

meat to many international markets, notably to the European Union. Such was the grim economic context that

Within this troubled context, the PRP project emerged as a

project.

new economic competitors; and (2) opposition from

nurtured the anxieties of landowners leading up to the PRP

way for landowners to maintain their way of life despite: (1) influential environmentalists. Thus, the landowners’ attempt at dual containment lies at the root of the project.

The legitimacy crisis: the environmentalist critique and feared take over

Nearly 80% of the land deforested in Amazonia from 1996-

The landowners’ concerns happened to be aligned with the

This says a lot about the reputation that cattle ranchers

the model underlying the French regional park system. An

2006 is now used for cattle pasture (Greenpeace, 2009).

objectives of a foreign model for environmental management:

have among environmentalists working in Brazil. Although

alliance thus was forged between Pantanal landowners and the

the situation is not as bad in the Pantanal, Section 2 of this

French government, which was pleased to export its policies. 21 The

rate of environmental degradation was found to be 2.3% per year.

3. The PRP Genesis: A Community in Crisis in Search of Allies

3.2. The ally: a foreign donor with a different management model

France has been traditionally proud of its environmental

the Pantanal Regional Park, such an association was created in

(industries in which the country boasts some of the biggest

which we will later return in greater detail.

of protected areas. One of the key concepts in protected areas

technical teams and the policies set out in the park charter.

management. This is true for water and waste treatment

2001 and named the Instituto do Parque do Pantanal (IPP) – to

companies in the world) but also when it comes to its system

Above all, “mixed syndicates” are responsible for the park’s

is the creation of regional parks formed by contract with, and

Every regional park has its own Charte du territoire

among, local producers who commit to certain norms. France

(“charter of the territory”) that defines principles and actions

developed this model in the mid-1960s and exported it to various

to be followed, binding together public and private partners.

countries including Russia, Poland, Portugal, Belgium, Chile and

While these charters must be approved by the French

Vietnam. French international efforts have been supporting

Ministry of the Environment, they are based on extensive

diffusion of this model with funding and research programmes.

negotiations among the stakeholders - typically over five

This was the case in Brazil, where the French model for regional

years. One of the strengths of this approach is that the

parks dovetailed with the strategic goals of the cattle-ranchers of

resulting charter is a contract, through which partners

the Pantanal: to reinforce their productivity and keep

commit to principles that are jointly negotiated. Their

conservationists at a distance.

obligation to conform is reinforced by the need to secure

The French model for regional parks dates back to 1966, when

recurrent funding from the national authorities, and thus to

the Délégation à l’Aménagement du Territoire called on the

show appropriate results on a regular basis. Every 10

French government to create a new integrated instrument for

years, the charter of each regional park must be renewed

economic, social and environmental management in rural areas,

by the Ministry of the Environment, a process that involves

based on participation by all the local stakeholders. At the time,

in-depth reviews.

rural areas were experiencing a continuous exodus, and the

Overseeing the French regional parks is the Fédération des

response was to put forward a brand new CP instrument. A

Parcs Naturels Régionaux de France (FPNRF), an entity

decree instituting Regional Parks as a legal category was signed

responsible for managing partnership programmes,

by the government in 1967. At that time, there were still doubts

fostering the exchange of ideas and the capitalisation of

about a management model that could simultaneously involve

knowledge. The (FPNRF) is also responsible for

and satisfy artisans, farmers, small industries, tourism, the

representing the parks in negotiations with the national

preservation of natural and cultural resources, sensitise people

authorities and other institutions regarding the development

to environmental issues, etc. The risk was that a collection of

of official documents and public policies.

disconnected and conflicting sectoral policies would be

The French model for regional parks was first exported to

produced and covered over with some “green paint”.

Brazil through a series of contacts between the French

Nevertheless, over time, the Regional Park model took hold in

embassy and the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, where the

French regions with fragile natural resources and complex

Pantanal largely lies and where this particular management

socioeconomic concerns. Today, more than 40 regional parks

model captured a lot of attention. In 1996, a formal

are functioning in France. They cover roughly 10% of the

agreement was signed, establishing technical cooperation

national territory, 4 million hectares, 2,000 communes (rural or

between the FPNRF and the government of Mato Grosso

urban districts) and around 2.2 million people.

do Sul. The FPNRF was entrusted with the responsibility of

These parks are formed around a specific type of association,

seeking international funds in order to create the Pantanal

an institutional entity known in France as syndicats mixtes (“mixed

syndicates”).

They

bring

together

Regional Park (PRP).

elected

In the next section, we analyse how the connection with

representatives, as well as representatives from NGOs and

foreign donors was established, as well as their critical

professional associations within the target region. In the case of

impact on project design.

3. The PRP Genesis: A Community in Crisis in Search of Allies

3.3. The PRP: a local initiative influenced by foreign experts, criticized by NGOs

As we have pointed out in previous work Charnoz (2009b),

the Pantanal Foundation (representing the interests of the

a mix of internal, external and state-related agents, either

French volunteer, paid by France, was soon appointed to

actors dominate, projects can usually be classified as

the “chief partner” to the point that it was entrusted with the

most community participation (CP) projects are initiated by

local state) and the FPNRF (the French technical body). A

as Initiators, Supporters or Designers – but because certain

work full-time on the project. The FPNRF soon proved to be

originating mainly “from within, above or outside” the

responsibility to search for funding internationally toward

community. However, there are cases when the initial

creating a regional nature park in the Pantanal. Not only

influences come from balanced multiple sources, an

had the concept of regional nature park been developed in

alliance of converging interests. Such was the case with the

France decades earlier, thus giving French experts

Parque Regional do Pantanal (PRP).

authoritative status, but these experts were also directly

The initiators of the PRP project were firmly rooted within

responsible for presenting the Brazilian endeavour to

the local community. The initial spark came from a local

donors, and in process fundamentally influencing

politician, Dr. Mendes Canale, a Federal Senator in search

project’s implementation.

of innovative ways to help the Pantanal’s cattle ranchers

the

A “preparatory project for the creation of the PRP” was thus

improve their economic situation and appease their growing

conceived and named “Apoio a Criaçao do Parque Natural

discontent. Starting in the mid-1980s, Dr. Canale met on a

Regional do Pantanal”, at an expected total cost of

regular basis with a group of well-established fazendeiros

1,022,550 ECUs (European Currency Units, the currency

from the Rio Negro region of the Pantanal. He became

that preceded the euro). The plan was submitted to the

strongly associated with the interests of the local cattle

European Commission and was approved by the General

raisers and started to seek broader support within the

Directorate for External Relations (DGIB) in 1998, with EU

Brazilian federation and among potential foreign partners,

funding of 776,000 ECUs, more than 75% of the amount

thus opening the door to foreign influences.

requested. The funding gap was later taken care of by two

The link that was eventually established with France was

other partners, the local state of Mato Grosso do Sul and

not haphazard. Local authorities in the state of Mato Grosso

French government entities. So not only was this project

technical experts regarding economic planning issues.

mainly funded by foreign donors. In December 1998, the

do Sul had for a long time consulted with a range of French

essentially designed by foreign experts, but it was also

Thus, it was quite natural for Dr. Canal to open a dialogue

“Projeto de Apoio” was launched with the signing of a new

with the French embassy in Brasilia, which notified him of

cooperation agreement between the local state of Mato

the French experience with regional parks. With support

Grosso do Sul and the FPNRF. As agreed, the FPNRF

from the Brazilian embassy in Paris, contacts were made

provided a key expert, a French national, to act as the

with the Federation des Parcs Naturels Regionaux de

Principal Technical Advisor. This person subsequently set

France (FPNRF) (see previous section). From 1986 to

up a technical team and was entrusted with overseeing the

1995, technical meetings took place between the FPNRF

project. His major influence throughout the project’s life was

and the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, represented by the

repeatedly emphasised by interviewees.

As for community participation (CP) during project design,

Fundaçao Estadual de Meio Ambiente do Pantanal

(FEMAP). FPNRF technicians came to Brazil, while

our 2008 interviews about this period revealed a strong

missions involving the FEMAP and a range of landowners

belief among landowners that only a limited number of high-

were carried out in Paris.

profile local figures were involved – notably through trips to

An official demand for technical assistance was made by

France and discussions with Brazilian and French experts.

the state of Mato Grosso do Sul in 1995, and in 1996 an

Missions to Europe were to involve representatives for the

agreement was signed establishing cooperation between

fazendeiros, but several interviewees recalled that instead

3. The PRP Genesis: A Community in Crisis in Search of Allies

of diversifying the representatives, several people from the

other side.

same family were sent. According to one interviewee, “they

And:

were just doing family tourism to Europe!”

Why should NGOs like a project that gives new means

The effort to create a regional park was passively criticised

and voice to the very people they would like to see more

by most international NGOs working in the Pantanal.

controlled or simply out of the picture? […] There is no

Officially, they did not like the fact that this regional park

way [they] could have supported it.”

was not part of existing Brazilian legislation, but was meant

Another interviewee felt that NGOs were simply afraid to

according to several interviewees, their reluctance was

with projects like the PRP: ”Community projects like the

lose their lead in the environmental management scene,

to force a new legal category into the SNUC. However, really caused by – again – their lack of trust in the local

Pantanal Regional Park are meant for the locals, and large

fazendeiros, who were hardly perceived to be “good friends

environmental NGOs are not part of the community […] The

of the environment”. As a former staff member of a local

PRP was not about giving CI or the WFF more of a say in

NGO commented: ” Don’t get me wrong. Some NGOs work

the Pantanal. Quite the opposite.”

today with cattle ranchers, but this does not mean they like

them. Although they share a common interest in the

Indeed, it does not seem plausible that environmental

Environmental NGOs do not feel that fazendeiros are their

result in changes to existing legislation, something that

NGOs criticised the PRP initiative solely because it would

Pantanal, it is rooted in very different views. […]

NGOs routinely support in many different contexts.

allies, much to the contrary. And it is just the same on the

3.4. Conclusion

While the initial impetus for the PRP, a community

structures. In the case of the PRP, moreover, the French

community (and more precisely within a set of elite

seemed to address, to a large extent, the concerns of local

participation programme, was rooted within the local

had a specific management model to offer, one that

families), the financial and technical responsibilities were

cattle ranchers. First, the regional park model places local

largely shared by the Brazilian government and French

producers at the centre of environmental management

experts. As with the SMMA in St. Lucia (Charnoz, 2010), a

programs, instead of excluding them; second, it implies a

foreign partner became instrumental in shaping the

range of socioeconomic supports.

community-led participatory and its subsequent institutional

4. “Salvation through Tradition”: the Construction of a Strategic Discourse

The proposal to create a regional park in the Pantanal was

focused on cattle ranchers and landowners: it left out of the

tradition as the best way to save the Pantanal from

pantaneira community, such as fisher groups and rural

grounded in a specific discourse that advocated reliance on

picture other important groups that are part of the

unwanted change. The core idea was that cattle ranching

employees. Such groups attracted no attention from the

had been the sustenance of the Pantanal for centuries,

donors, although the PRP project was meant to be – in the

given its “low or even positive” impact on the environment,

eyes of the EU, for instance - an exemplary CP project.

and that its continued existence was a positive indication for

Thus, the discourse on tradition not only had containment

the future. It was even been argued that the prohibition of

effects against NGOs and the economic competitors of

cattle ranching would damage the biodiversity of the lands

cattle ranchers, but also against lower socioeconomic

let fallow – a view exactly opposite to that held by

groups living in the Pantanal. Although it may have not been

conservationists, who favour “strict reserves”, such as

a prime strategic objective, this added layer of containment

national parks and private reserves. Proponents of the PRP

was certainly another contributor to preserving the overall

thus put major effort into portraying cattle ranching as a

socioeconomic status quo of the region.

positive and even romantic activity, in harmony with nature.

Here, we first look at the productive power effects of the

In a previous paper (Charnoz, 2010), we identified in St.

discourse on “traditional community”, before analysing its

from the discourse on environmental conservation:

tools previously introduced for analysing discourses (cf.

Lucia’s SMMA project two types of power effects stemming

structural power effects. In doing so, we rely on conceptual

commodification and self-regulation. Here, in the Pantanal,

Charnoz 2009a, 2009b). Following the approach developed

two other such effects are observable: anti-political effects

by Milliken (1999) and Weldes (1999), we show how

These effects work jointly to redefine the legitimate body of

define certain social categories with privileged positions.

and pro-traditional effects (as defined in Charnoz, 2009b).

“systems of signification” are put in place and used to

knowledge, which is taken for granted and which conforms

We also look at the “production of common sense” through

with the strategic objectives of the landowners: the

two processes: articulation (of a discourse with pre-existing

containment of conservationists and of incoming economic

and accepted bodies of knowledge); and interpellation (of

actors.

specific interest groups by the discourse). The analysis

also has structural power effects. “Traditional community”

Table 11.

But this is not the whole story. The discourse on tradition

presented in the next two sub-sections is summarised in

was defined throughout the PRP project as exclusively

4. “Salvation through Tradition”: the Construction of a Strategic Discourse

4.1. The depiction of cattle-ranchers as “protectors” of the Pantanal

An exercise of “productive power” involves redefining the

alliance of the PRP project – one that united landowners,

privileged position within a given context. Like structural

experts. This was not a brand new discourse, but more of a

identity of certain actors to provide them with a more

local political authorities, as well as French donors and

power, it works on the body of knowledge that is taken for

long-standing local discourse that had been running for

granted (unquestionably accepted). The emergence of the

years but had lost pre-eminence given the rise of

PRP was based precisely upon such a productive

conservationist forces in the region. A discourse on

discourse, which took the exact opposite view of the one

“salvation through tradition” had indeed been fostered for a

held by environmental conservationists. It involved a

long time by the local ranchers, increasingly worried about

“system of signification” that reworked “cattle ranchers” into

incoming agricultural and industrial actors. At the same

being the “traditional guardians and protectors” of the

time, local authorities had never depicted cattle ranching as

Pantanal. Here we analyse how this other “common sense”

an environmental problem, having upheld consistently a

was supported. We then show its contingency if a longer-

policy of clearly supporting this industry. Rather, they

term perspective on cattle ranching in Pantanal is adopted,

presented it (including in interviewees and policy

a view that is largely absent from the discourses and

documents we secured in 2008) as a long-term activity that

documents connected to the PRP project. Finally, we

resulted in “harmony with the environment”, or one that

describe the policy implications of this productive

posed insignificant problems to the Pantanal. The creation

discourse, paying special attention to its anti-political and

of this “common sense” was thus more of a “re-activation”,

pro-traditional effects. Our analysis, however, should not

(rather than a new fabrication) especially geared towards

lead one to conclude that international support for local

foreign donors to help legitimatise their contribution to local

cattle ranchers was unfounded. International agencies

development. Several interviewees also suggested that the

adopted a pragmatic approach that took into account the far

easy acceptance of this discourse by foreign donors was

more aggressive environmental impact of the new incoming

facilitated by their a priori desire to promote the international

actors, thus deciding to support long-standing cattle

expansion of the French concept of “regional park”.

ranchers as comparatively good environmental caretakers.

The interpellation power of the discourse was thus strong for the members of the originating alliance, as it

underpinned their key interests. As for its articulation with

Defining cattle ranchers as the Pantanal’s protectors

Since the end of the 1990s, environmental NGOs working

pre-existing views, it is interesting to note that in Brazilian

in the Pantanal have come to acknowledge the need to

public opinion, the reputation of pantaneiro ranchers is not

work more with cattle ranchers (cf. section 2.3). Yet, this

a bad one. This was illustrated by the huge popular success

new strategy was not meant to redefine local fazendeiros

of an ecological-romantic soap opera broadcast on

as the preferred (or even good) caretakers of the Pantanal,

primetime television in the early 1990s. As Wilcox (1992, p.

of the region. In fact, the atmosphere of tension and

“camera sweeps of striking natural beauty, actors’

but rather as unavoidable partners, since they do own most

233) puts it, the TV programme provided the public with

suspicion between ranchers and NGOs has never

testimonies of the ‘return of the native’ and romantic

disappeared – and had readily translated, as we saw, into

portrayals of ranching life”. This arguably revealed, as well

NGOs’ dissatisfaction with the PRP project.

as contributed, to the public belief that the cowboys of the

A discourse emphasising “ranchers as protectors” was

Pantanal are “good guys” who have saved the region from

nevertheless promoted by the members of the originating

uncontrolled growth22.

22 Another level of articulation that may have taken place, as suggested by a local NGO staff member, relates to the fact that western donors sometimes have a romanticised view of “traditional communities” and of their supposedly “harmonious” relation to the environment.

4. “Salvation through Tradition”: the Construction of a Strategic Discourse

It is curious, as Wilcox (1992, p. 233) comments, that an

pasturing on the open range, little use of fencing and

the extensive degradation of one Brazilian region

Pantanal is due to the favourable interaction of

economic sector (cattle ranching) that is being blamed for

minimal working of the land. The preservation of the

(Amazonia) could be considered a saviour of the

environmental and socioeconomic factors, and thus cattle

environment in another (the Pantanal). In justification of this

ranching can be promoted as an environmentally viable -

view, however, the relatively sound environmental

and even necessary - activity for the Pantanal. Box 2

conditions of the Pantanal to this day are the result of a

summarises the most typical arguments supporting this

specific type of human occupation, dominated for the past

view.

two centuries by “extensive” cattle ranching – which entails

Box 2 – The low environmental impact of traditional cattle ranching: key arguments - The Pantanal has vast natural grasslands that do not require the heavy deforestation one sees in Amazonia, allowing for cattle to graze freely on unaltered land.

- Extensive flooding during the wet season limits the number of cattle that can be raised on a given piece of land to the pasturage available when the land is submerged.

- Until the 1960s, few efforts were made in the Pantanal to rationalise production, even through relatively simple

means, such as selective breeding or the use of fencing to separate properties. This is partly the result of longstanding local traditions and habits; but it is also a consequence of the technical challenges and isolation constraints

presented by the natural environment of the Pantanal. The cost of transportation and the level of meat prices in global markets has not allowed for significant investment.

- Consequently, to date, ranching in the Pantanal has essentially relied on native grasses and natural water cycles, respecting the natural pulse and nature of the region.

- The nature of the region itself limits activities to those that can survive with minimal capital input. Seasonal fluvial and pluvial flooding fosters the growth of nutritious grasses, providing the right conditions for cattle raising but also limiting the scope of ranching, and thus its impact. However, the strongest supporting argument in favour of

birds, compared with traditional non-barbed, 4-wire fences

Earthwatch (2004) and WCS (2009) – that the new

ranches, problems such as erosion, degradation of water

this discourse is the notion – shared by NGOs such as

that allow for animal movement. In such intensively used

incoming farmers, who are buying land from bankrupt

quality, the uncontrolled burning of pasture land and

landowners, are importing productive practices that are

conflicts with wildlife are more frequent.

harshly damaging the environment. To make smaller

For these reasons, the proponents of the PRP project

properties economically viable, these ranchers increase

argued that it was essential to ensure the continuing

their grazing area by clear-cutting native forests. They also

presence of traditional cattle ranchers. The discourse on

productivity during the dry season: the replacement of

concern about the economic viability of traditional ranches

plant exotic grasses (such as the Brachiaria) to increase

“salvation through tradition” was thus channelled into

native pastures and forest by invasive exotic grasses has

- a key focus of the PRP project, as we shall see.

now affected more than 10,000 km2. Overgrazing on limited areas also leads to competition with native grazers

A historical perspective on extensive cattle ranching

fazendas tend to use 6-wire barbed fences that obstruct the

ranching, which allows cattle to graze freely on unaltered

and affects biodiversity. Moreover, the newly purchased

The environmental impact of traditionally “extensive”

movement of medium to large-sized mammals and ground

land, is undeniably low relative to the new incoming

4. “Salvation through Tradition”: the Construction of a Strategic Discourse

practices in the Pantanal, but it can hardly be labelled as

Some areas have been overgrazed and are now covered in

Here, we present some findings that aid in understanding

areas, reducing their ability to regenerate after the waters

“insignificant” – both historically and at the present time.

weeds. The concentration of animals has exhausted large

whether the depiction of traditional cattle ranching as

recede and this has created problems for local pasture

environmentally low-impact is in fact biased. For this, we

survival. This is particularly the case around ranch

rely on accounts provided by Wilcox (1992) and Seidl et al.

headquarters, where many years of cattle trampling and

(2001) whose conclusions were supported during our

animal wastes have caused the soil to become

fieldwork by direct observations and a range of interviews

impermeable to water. This restricts penetration by the

with fazendeiros, peons and NGO staff members.

floodwaters that in the past came closer to living spaces.

To start with, ranchers traditionally set fire during the dry

Natural watering holes become unusable, as the shores

season as a management technique for clearing the

become so muddy and dangerous that other drinking

vegetation unused by cattle and making way for new

sources must be found – a problem that we observed

growth. These fires are initially started in the grassland; but

several times during our fieldwork.

due to open areas, dry vegetation and wind, they often

The use of artificial pastures was not significant in the

spread to savannas, woodland and forests. This can

Pantanal until the 1970s. This was a rare occurrence in

destroy extensive areas of wildlife habitat. Fire also

Brazil until the first decade of the 20th century and was not

contributes to the hardening and impoverishment of the

undertaken much in Mato Grosso until the 1920s. However,

soil, as well as to the gradual displacement of indigenous

where exotic pastures have been introduced, they have had

In the long run, these invaders take over from high-quality

reinforced by the new incoming farmers. But the historical

plant species by fire-resistant grasses and woody species.

important effects on the local ecosystem – a process now

grasses.

presence of cattle ranchers also resulted in some artificial

Since the early 1970s, ranchers have also cleared lands

practices, namely, the development of exotic animal

and planted pastures on the highest ground available in

species. Feral pigs, introduced in the 1800s, still disturb soil

order to increase cattle stocking during the wet season.

and vegetation and fight over territory and other resources

This practice is widespread and is perceived as

with native animals. In a large-scale empirical study, Eaton

economically optimal. It has resulted in large deforested

(2006) compared the aquatic biodiversity of lakes in cattle-

areas, increased land erosion, sedimentation of rivers and

free and cattle-exposed sites in the southern Pantanal.

a decrease in floral and faunal biodiversity.

Despite the supposedly low intensity of traditional ranching,

There is also the issue of the sheer number of animals

he observed dramatic differences in species composition,

grazing in a given area. At first, the size of the Pantanal and

richness, abundance, and biomass for both macro-

the yearly renewal of grasses seemed to ensure that there

invertebrates and birds at cattle-exposed sites, leaving little

would be no problem with over-pasturing. However, the

doubt about the deep impact that cattle ranching has upon

Pantanal is not uniform in terrain and human exploitation.

the local biome.

4.2. The narrow delineation of the “traditional community” “Structural power” refers to the reinforcement of the

In the development of the PRP project, one is struck by the

privileged social position of certain actors involved in longstanding binary or hierarchical

relations23.

fact that important stakeholders living within the Pantanal

It notably works

itself were barely considered or even talked about –

through discourses that keep certain stakeholders from

especially the fisher communities of the area, as well as the

participating in given issues and negotiations.

rural employees working in the fazendas (the so-called 23

See section 2.2.

4. “Salvation through Tradition”: the Construction of a Strategic Discourse

peons). A specific “system of signification”, centred on

The creation of a “common sense”, based on a discourse

identify and locate the “pantaneira community”. Arguably,

a widely shared sentiment among the fazendeiros

landowners, was indeed used throughout the project to

privileging landowners, was fostered by its articulation with

an exclusionary exercise in structural power took place

themselves: the idea of their “historical legitimacy”, which

through a biased delineation of: “who can speak in the

had become part of their common culture. Here, it is

name of the community”; “which actors are the most

interesting to note also that several high-profile landowning

‘traditional’ ones in the region”; and “who embodies the soul

families have in their ranks well-known historians who have

of the Pantanal”, etc. To be fair, and in defence of the

heavily researched, documented and popularised the

French donor, we must underline that CP was not the

history of their families in the Pantanal. Thus, the typical

reason the French became part of the project, but rather to

claim of fazendeiros regarding their “special relation”,

help implement the concept of “regional park” as it had

historical and moral, to the Pantanal was very much present

developed in France, based on cooperation with the local

in many interviews, including in comment such as:”

authorities (municipalités). Still, the PRP project was largely

- The Pantanal is not just where [we] work and live. It is

depicted by the EU donor, the local Brazilian authorities, the

what we are.

local fazendeiros and the foreign technical assistants as an

- For generations and generations my family was born

exemplary instance of “community participation” (see for

here and died here. […] The Pantanal is part of me and

instance Delorme, 2004).

I am part of the Pantanal.

Within the PRP project, landowners involved in cattle

- There are new farmers coming here buying lands from

ranching managed to position themselves as the core, key

some of my impoverished friends. […] I am very

group and legitimate representative of the Pantanal

concerned about that. These people are not part of the

community in the eyes of the local authorities and foreign

Pantanal, they do not know it, they do not love it,

partners, thus capturing all the benefits that come with this

because this takes generations.”

label. This process left out important stakeholders that

As a matter of fact, many landowning families have a

in a CP initiative of this size. Although the PRP project did

century (cf. Box 3). This long history helps to explain the

might also have deserved attention (and possibly funding)

history in the region often dating back to the end of the 18th

have as one of its core rationales “to regenerate and sustain the pantaneira

community”24,

ignored key sub-groups of the community.

self-identification of the landowners as the core of the

it nevertheless

“traditional community”.

Box 3 – The European presence in the Pantanal: a historical reminder European explorers (Jesuit and Spanish priests) entered the Pantanal in the mid-1500s (Earthwatch, 2004; following Corrêa, 1999). The Portuguese, who were seeking slaves and precious metals, began exploring the region later, in the 1600s. Gold was discovered near Cuiabá

in the north of the Pantanal in 1719, and a number of forts and cities, like Corumbá, Cáceres, Coimbra, Poconé, and Miranda, were founded towards the end of the 18th century. Subsequently, the decline of gold mining forced merchant families to seek land grants and to establish

cattle ranches. Loyal to the Portuguese king, they were rewarded with political and economic favours but became victims of anti-Portuguese

riots in the Cuiaba district after Independence in 1822. Later, the Paraguay War caused disruption in the region, as Paraguayan and Brazilian

troops requisitioned cattle and ranch properties, forcing the population to flee. After the war, the former settlers and their relatives returned to begin anew, rebuilding stocks by introducing new cattle, or rounding up remaining feral steers (Wilcox, 1992). Cattle ranching was then boosted by the export of dried meat, which declined after 1945 due to refrigeration techniques. Since then, cattle ranchers have been vulnerable to the ups and downs of meat prices.

Interview with a civil servant in Matto Grosso do Sul.

4. “Salvation through Tradition”: the Construction of a Strategic Discourse

However, there are other groups that have a strong right to

generations, much like the fazendeiros. They are the ones

community. To start with, there are the populations of

and oral myths. While fazendeiros often live in cities

be considered part and parcel of the Pantanal’s traditional

responsible for most of the local folklore, with their traditions

fishers operating throughout the wetlands along river

neighbouring the wetland, peons live throughout the year

are not legally owned by fazendeiros, although they might

a very special and key group within the pantaneira

banks. River banks are indeed public spaces by law and

right in the Pantanal, caring for the cattle. Peons thus form

be partly on their properties. Most of these small

community, and it is they who, arguably, represent a large

communities live along the major rios (Paraguay, Taquari,

part of its “soul”. As a matter fact, it is largely the peon

Negro, etc.). These traditional groups are sometimes

culture and ethos that were singled out by foreign PRP

referred to as “professional fishers”, because they rely on

donors as representing the “harmony of men and nature” in

fishing for their very subsistence. Many move from one

the Pantanal25. Given the importance of peons in the

place to another on a seasonal basis. They do not fish on

pantaneira community yet their total lack of visibility in the

an industrial scale but on an artisanal one, having a limited

PRP’s community participation process, we will return to

impact on the environment. The volume of their annual fish

this sub-community in the last section. An enquiry into their

catch is far below that of the sport-fishing industry, which

social capital will then help explain why the voice of the

brings each year into the Pantanal a growing number of

peons was so little heard in the PRP context.

tourists. Fishers also rely on limited agricultural activities

Thus, the discourse on “environmental salvation through

but cannot run them on a large scale because the lands

the traditional community” was constructed in a way as to

they work on do not legally belong to them.

leave out important sub-communities. This biased

These populations are largely left unsupported by local

production of a “common sense” was also supported by the

public policies – and also left out of typical accounts of the

interpellation of important interest groups. Material

Pantanal’s history. As some of their traditions show, they

collected in interviews with various local observers indeed

were originally related to the Paiaguas Indian tribe,

suggested that this exclusion also suited the interests of the

consisting of expert boatsmen. However, the racial

local authorities involved in the PRP. For the local state, it is

composition of these groups has diversified over the years,

always

including an increasing number of mixed blood people and

technically

difficult,

not

politically

disadvantageous, to deal with and involve the poorer sub-

former agricultural employees who decided to stop working

groups of the Pantanal – especially in a project whereby

for the fazendeiros. Nowadays, these communities no

they could lay claim to important resources. As for foreign

longer identify with native Indians and thus form a distinct

experts, not taking into account the more fragile sub-groups

population.

of the Pantanal made it arguably easier for them to apply

In the PRP context, the definition of “traditional community”

and export their domestic policies and models. Thus,

has also excluded the thousands of rural employees. Let us

although native Indians, fishers and peons have all been

note that ranches (fazendas) are virtually self-contained

living within the Pantanal for generations, they were not

social worlds composed of two types of people: fazendeiros

invited to consider and discuss the PRP initiative, which

and their families, on the one hand (the owners), and the

was nevertheless promoted in Brazil and internationally as

employees on the other (the so-called peons and their

an exemplary community participation (CP) scheme.

families). The peons have usually been such for

25 This comment refers to interviews with project managers and to the documentation they gave us.

4. “Salvation through Tradition”: the Construction of a Strategic Discourse

4.3. Conclusion

In this sub-section, we have shown that the discourse on

Faced with this reality, donors adopted a pragmatic

project neatly fit with the strategic interests of the

incoming actors, who more aggressively affected the

the “traditional community” that gave credence to the PRP

approach emphasising the contrast between the new

fazendeiros and of the public authorities, both part of the

environment, versus the traditional cattle ranchers. They

originating alliance. Paying greater attention to the long-

felt that siding with traditional ranching presented a

term environmental and social history of the Pantanal, we

necessary middle ground, since strict conservation could

showed the sometimes faulty rationale underlying this

not be implemented in a region where much of the land was

discourse – as well as the nature of its productive and

privately owned. .

structural power effects.

Looking at the structural power effects of the discourse, we

Considering the productive power effects of the discourse,

showed that little attention was paid by the members of the

we showed that the relationship between cattle ranching

originating alliance to other traditional members of the

and the environment was in fact not a strictly harmonious

pantaneira community – especially the local fishers and

one, contrary to the claims of the “salvation through

peons. In context of the PRP, “the tradition community” had

tradition” mantra. As Wilcox (1992, p. 255) argues, ranching

been successfully identified as being the fazendeiros. This

is not some “benign partner” coexisting with its

successful exercise of structural power contributed toward

environment. The entry of “thousands of voracious

reinforcing the long-standing local hierarchies. The

herbivores”, and the economic inputs necessary for their

interests behind this move were quite clear; the fazendeiros

survival, did have a strong impact on the environment,

were to be the prime beneficiaries of the PRP and had no

including competition for space with wild animals,

interest in sharing the benefits or even the governance of

introduction of new diseases, gradual vegetation change,

the CP structure. Meanwhile, the local authorities did not

disruption of the habitat for other species, etc. The

have to bother with the poorer sub-communities, which are

introduction by humans of fire and fencing, as well as exotic

difficult to reach and might want to make political claims.

grasses, have taken their toll on the local ecosystems. Table 11 – “Salvation through tradition”: key discursive mechanisms

4. “Salvation through Tradition”: the Construction of a Strategic Discourse

Two core systems of signification

Defining landowners as the core of the “traditional community” Articulation with pre-existing and accepted

Reworking the history of “cattle rancing” as environmentally friendly Articulation – with pre-existing and accepted

- Landowners of European descent are usually

- The Pantanal cattle ranchers are positively perceived by the

discourses : Production of a common sense

(how the discourse is made to seem “natural”)

prominently featured in brief accounts of the Pantanal’s history.

Interpellation of interest groups:

- It is technically difficult and potentially politically disadvantageous for local authorities to deal with the poorer sub-groups of the Pantanal.

discourses

Brazilian public, altrhough not by the NGOs.

Interpellation of interest groups:

The local state authorities have upheld over time a policy that clearly fosters cattle ranching over conservation.

If cattle ranching is defined as “environmentally compatible”, foreigners

For foreign experts, taking less account of the

can better promote their model for regional parks, wich is based on

poorer sub-groups makes it easier for them to

apply their domestically developed model for regional

working with the local land users.

parks. Policy effects

Structural power effect: quasi invisibility in the PRP

Productive power effects

notably fishers, Indians and rural employees.

a) Pro-traditional effect: containment of the “non-traditional” economic

project of key traditional stakeholders in the Pantanal –

actors. Reinforcement of the legitimacy of the “traditional” economic actors.

b) Anti-political effect:

The “greening” of cattle ranchers helped them qualify for international funding in the name of the environment. This was particularly impor-

Discourse reproduction

(How the discourse hides alternative views)

Hidden alternative views the landowners are just one

group among others in the community, the PRP, as an

exemplary CP scheme, should have included peons and

tant in the application for EU funds. Hidden alternative view: the historical impact of cattle ranching on the

Pantanal has been significanlty negative.

ishers in its design and governance structure.

Contingency (questionable aspects) of the discourse

can be shown by the juxtaposition of under-analysed facts (long-term history and social analysis).

Contingency ot the discourse can be shown by a long-term

historical and environmental analysis.

5. Creating Pluralism: The Unintended Consequences of the Preliminary Project

In this section, we look at the first implementation phase the

association of the fazendeiros, the SODEPAN. This was the

was turned into a mechanism for social control. This time

influence of other actors later on – notably the foreign

PRP project, and the way that community participation (CP)

sole institution that could have counter-balanced the

around, “containment” affected the fazendeiros themselves,

experts and the local authorities. In this sense, the artificial

by weakening their main association through the mantra of

and hasty “fabrication of pluralism” introduced a new form

“pluralism” that was being promoted by the foreign partners.

of social control and containment, primarily affecting local

Accordingly, the so-called “preliminary project for the

elite families but also, through them, the whole community

creation of PRP” (Apoio a Criaçao do PRP) was launched

of fazendeiros. This process, we claim, laid the groundwork

in 1998 and was meant to organise and mobilise the local

for the institutional disempowerment of the fazendeiros -

population. It had two main components: first, the speedy

that was soon to take place within the “participatory” park.

creation of a range of new local organisations, meant to

Here, we first review the productive power effect of the

pluralise the local civil society; second, the launch of a

discourse on “pluralism”: it challenged the influence and

variety of development projects, functioning as “bait” to

legitimacy of the pre-existing landowner association, the

attract landowners to these new associations.

SODEPAN, through the forced creation of a range of new

Since foreign experts were intent on drawing on CP best

organisations. We then show how this pluralisation process

practices, they became highly concerned with (and directly

was fuelled by the use of compulsory power and the

involved in) “fixing the local civil society”, “democratising it”

anticipated benefits of “bait projects” for people who joined

and making it “more diverse”. This pluralisation work was

one of the new associations. Finally, we look at the

meant to ensure that the Park would be constructed with

containment effect of this “fabricated pluralism”; how it

healthy support from an inclusive CP. Yet, we argue that

lowered the profile and impact of the fazendeiro community

pluralisation undermined the process of CP, notably its

within the PRP scheme; and how in practice these new

intensity (i.e. the degree of active participation), by

structures failed to secure any significant lobbying power,

destabilising the only well-established and functioning

including for the voice of the fazendeiros.

5.1. Challenging the landowner association with new ones As explained in Charnoz (2009b), “productive power”

Before preparatory work on the civil society was

values and knowledge normally taken for granted, often

representing the landowners of the Pantanal, namely the

manifests itself through emerging discourses that redefine

undertaken, there was essentially one association

resulting in the reinforcement of new social actors or

Sociedade de Defesa do Pantanal (SODEPAN). Created in

categories. Here, we argue that a form of productive power

1985 in Campo Grande, the SODEPAN had been active in

was exercised by the foreign partners of the PRP: they

both Mato Grosso and Mato Gross do Sul as the main

developed a strong discourse on the need to make the local

mechanism through which fazendeiros joined together in

civil society more plural, and this lowered the profile and

common causes. Its creation had been instigated by the

influence of the main pre-existing landowner organisation.

illegal poaching of jacares (crocodiles) on private lands in

5. Creating Pluralism: The Unintended Consequences of the Preliminary Project

the mid-1980s, which led to a sharp decrease in their

Pantanal, with special emphasis on the needs of the cattle

in this first battle, helped by new international regulations

approximating a full-fledged political programme for the

population. The SODEPAN gained legitimacy and credibility

ranchers. Box 4 shows the breadth of its concerns,

prohibiting trade in jacare skins. Later on, the SODEPAN focus

progressively

widened

encompass

region, although little attention is given to the fisher groups

most

and the Indians.

development issues of interest to people living within the

Box 4 – A programme for the Pantanal: SODEPAN’s vision Access to credit. Reduce red-tape and increase financial support for cattle producers through the FCO (Fundo Constitucional de Financiamento do Centro-Oeste), a public fund that is a key source of financing for fazendeiros.

Animal health. Improve animal health support and protection for the producers. Reorganise the IAGRO (Agência Estadual de Defesa

Sanitária Animal e Vegetal), the state agency in charge of animal health. Improve guarantees through mechanisms such as the FEFA (Fundo Emergencial da Febre Aftosa), an emergency fund to help producers cope with outbreaks of foot and mouth disease. Energy. Complete the “Light for All” programme in the Pantanal.

Environment. Revitalise the Taquari River by containing the sediment coming from the plateaus and creating dikes to stabilise the riverbed. Speeding up procedures for environmental licensing of farming activities. Define precise time periods for controlled fires. Research. Stimulate applied research by institutions such as the EMBRAPA and universities.

Social policies. Ensure professionalised basic education within the Pantanal, by obtaining continuous public support for the “Pantaneira schools” in partnership with farmers (payment of professors, building and equipping new classrooms and lodging for pupils). Creation of state

agricultural schools (Escolas Rurais Estaduais) in key locations within the Pantanal, so as to maximise attendance and offer education up to

the level of agricultural technician. Re-certification programmes for professional fishers, so they can become, for instance, tourist guides, artisans or environmental assistants.

Telecommunications. Installation of telecommunication towers in key locations to ensure complete mobile phone coverage.

Tourism. Creation of an aerial bridge between Foz do Iguaçu and Bonito. Creation of a regional airline operating small aircraft (11-seat, single-engine airplanes) to carry tourists to all requested parts of the region. Creation of new direct bus lines between various points of interest. Cobbling of the 77km of road between the three tourist centers of Mato Grosso (Porã Tip, Pretty and Corumbá). Transport. Development or repair/recovery of various roads, bridges and river transports.

Source: SODEPAN (2009).

Over the years, the SODEPAN had especially lobbied the

assistance from various Brazilian organisations to test

infrastructure/services, although with modest results. It had

ecotourism. Given this background, this organisation was

local state for better delivery of transportation and health

economic alternatives, such as the production of honey or

also advocated research on cattle production by various

for the PRP project the obvious partner, if not the essential

local universities, as well as promoting public recognition of

one, and SODEPAN was indeed closely linked to the PRP’s

the “pantaneira culture” through initiatives such as the Dia

early development: the organisation was represented in

do Homen Pantaneiro (the “day of the pantaneiro man”)

meetings with French experts early on, and it helped

and the publication of reference books on local history,

organise a range of information meetings within the

often written by members of local families. The SODEPAN

Pantanal about the PRP.

also obtained some technical support and financial

5. Creating Pluralism: The Unintended Consequences of the Preliminary Project

However, various interviews conducted with fazendeiros

few interviews with smaller landowners brought about the

among the foreign experts, that the SODEPAN could “take

”- I was happy to hear that the SODEPAN would not be

and civil servants suggest a fear had developed early on,

following comments:

over the whole initiative”, as one observer recalled. The

alone any longer. Some of us got really tired of hearing “the

social representativeness of the association was called into

SODEPAN here”, “the SODEPAN there”, and not feeling

question by the French partners. It is very instructive to see

clearly that we were represented by this organisation.

that the main foreign experts, while holding a conference in

- People wanted new faces, although they did not know

2004 about the PRP experience, made no reference

how to do this and who could do this.”

whatsoever to the SODEPAN and even claimed that before

For some fazendeiros, thus, the leadership of the

the project: ”[…] no institution in the territory existed that represented the

SODEPAN seemed to reflect a too-narrow sample of their

people.26”

community – and to be solely led by a few prominent

The French partners thus strongly backed the idea that

families – “always the same big ones”, as one person put it.

there should be more pantaneira associations to represent

There were also concerns that the organisation had

the various sub-regions and production groups of the

become too formal and institutional, while focusing on the

Pantanal, before the creation of the PRP. Faced with this

wealthier part of the community. A modest landowner

proposal, which in fact was non-negotiable in the eyes of

declared during an interview : ”[The SODEPAN] had

the French, the feelings of the fazendeiros were mixed.

become a closed society [with] a philosophy for the ‘big

Recalling this moment, several interviewees made rather

ones’. The ‘small ones’ did not really count. […] Quite

negative comments about the idea:

illustratively, one has to pay a yearly contribution to be part

” Many people, like me, did not see the point of more

of it and this has been on the rise. We [the small ones]

associations. We had the SODEPAN and it was working

really started to think that these fees were there to exclude

well for us. We also had a strong attachment to this

us.”

Such feelings fed the growing suspicion on the part of the

organisation.

foreign experts that the SODEPAN “would want to capture

- To find solutions among ourselves, why should we

the PRP and control it from A to Z”27. They considered the

need, 4, 5, 6 associations? This is nonsense, really.

pre-eminence of this organisation as “unhealthy”, “anti-

- Fazendeiros can talk to one another any time. They

democratic”, “not representative” and “too concentrated”, as

don’t really need or even like formal organisations to do

an observer at the time recalled. In other words, using the

so. Only when they really need to form a common front, in the face of some problem or authority, then it makes

vocabulary defined in Charnoz 2009b, we can say that the

divide ourselves in more groups? We could only lose

and elite-centred” form of CP, merely focusing on the

French view was that the SODEPAN reflected a “narrow

sense. That was the idea of the SODEPAN. But why

wealthiest fazendeiros and excluding many sub-groups of

strength that way.”

As on interviewee explained, the idea to increase pluralism

the Pantanal community.

through new associations essentially came from the foreign

The initial implementation phase of the PRP, namely its

team, although it was also supported by some local

“preliminary project”, was launched in 1998 and was meant

ministries, which seemed happy to challenge the regional

to prepare for the creation of the actual park within four

influence of the SODEPAN. However, the concerns of the

years. Its first responsibility was to delineate a territory (a

French technicians were not totally removed from the whole

zone called the “study area” in project documents) within

fazendeiro community. Some locals were indeed more

which landowners would be called upon to voluntarily join

positive about the prospect of having new associations. A

the Park. Second, it had to lead to the write-up of a park 26 Delorme (2004, p.7): “Essa primeira fase foi fundamental […] porque num território […] não existia nenhuma instituição que representasse as pessoas”.

This paragraph contains quotes from two interviews, with a fazendeiro and a local NGO staff member.

5. Creating Pluralism: The Unintended Consequences of the Preliminary Project

charter, namely a set of management principles and

associations” and “mobilising the population”. Based on the

the legal status, the sources of finance, the staff and

a series of meetings and discussions took place in various

common objectives to be followed by park members. Third,

fieldwork of a technical team led by the main French expert,

competences of the management structure needed to be

sub-regions of the Pantanal to promote these ideas. This

worked out. Fourth, the preliminary phase was also

process led in 1999-2000 to the creation of three new

supposed to involve the lobbying of federal authorities and

regional associations:

publicising the concept of a regional park, based on co-

UNIPAN (Uniao dos Pantaneiros da Nhecolandia);

management and a collective contract, in order to initiate

APANMERA (Associação dos Pantaneiros da Margem

the recognition of a new legal category of park. However,

Esquerda do Rio Aquidauana); and AVRN (Associação do

the most striking feature of the preparatory work was the

Vale do Rio Negro).

deep reshaping it asked in regard to the Pantanal’s local

Two more regional associations were created later: one in

civil society. According to the methodology put forward by

the region of Rio Verde; and another in the region of

the French partners, notably the FPNRF, the first and

Taboco.

essential step towards the creation of a “participatory park”

These five new entities attained a membership of about 250

had to be the “preparation of civil society”, meaning, in the

landowners by 2002, which was deemed an important

case of the Pantanal, a complete restructuring of the

success (PRP, 2002, p.11). The process also led to the

region’s associative landscape. As we saw, the latter used

creation of three sectoral associations: APPEP (Associaçao

to be dominated by the SODEPAN, which was deemed by

de Parceiros, Pais e Professores da Escola Pantaneira)

some locals, as well as the French team, to be not

dedicated to the development of educational facilities and

representative and pluralistic enough.

teaching methods adapted to the Pantanal; APPAN

This key aspect of the preliminary project was formally

(Associaçao de Poussadas Pantaneiras) focused on the

called “work on the organisation of the local population”. It

development of ecotourism; and GTE (Groupo de Troca de

emphasised the discourse on “pluralism”, “better organising

Experiencias) focused on cattle ranching.

the people”, “increasing the representativeness of

Fuelling the process: the use of “bait projects” “Compulsory power” can be non-confrontational, as when

could participate in the various development projects only if

certain preferred behaviour, thus avoiding the use of

the SODEPAN, notably, did not count. Over the years, this

material resources are used to produce incentives for a

they joined one of the new associations; being a member of

outright constraint. Certain incentives, however, can be so

“bait” managed to bring over 250 fazendas into the PRP

strong that they function almost as a constraint; if, for

initiative, covering about 2 million hectares (FPNRF, 2002,

instance, not taking advantage of them can become a

p.17). In fact, as several interviewees recalled, the so-

handicap relative to the peer group. Here we argue that a

called work on the mobilisation of the local population was

constraining incentive mechanism supported the reworking

essentially a propaganda exercise in favour of creating the

of the local civil society during the PRP preliminary project.

park and its related associations, by pointing out to

As soon as the preliminary work started, a set of

fazendeiros that it was in their best interest to join the

development projects were launched that proved essential

various pilot projects.

Given the benefits ranchers were to reap, the development

The VITPAN project

former president of the SODEPAN commented. People

the most appealing to the landowners. Its core idea was to

in attracting “volunteers” to the newly created associations. projects fostered enthusiasm and functioned as “bait”, as a

The Vitelo Pantaneiro (VITPAN) was the key project and

5. Creating Pluralism: The Unintended Consequences of the Preliminary Project

develop a new line of meat products (pantaneiro veal) with

eyes of the locals, it is interesting to note that it was not

than-average prices. Here again the concept came from

the local Ministry of Agriculture (80,000 euros for the first

a visible and marketable local identity to be sold at higher-

directly supported by foreign funds, but only with funds from

France, mirroring the notion of produits du terroir, i.e. rural

phase and then 100,000 additional euros). As for the

products with a strong regional identity. This production

scientific support, it came from local universities and the

strategy is largely used in French regional parks in order to

Brazilian EMBRAPA30. This suggests that the priorities of

obtain the cooperation of local producers, label their

the fazendeiros were not exactly the same as those of the

products and sell them under a common label, with uniform

foreign donors. While the former were primarily concerned

higher quality standards.

with the economic viability of cattle production, the latter

VITPAN consisted of producing meat from cattle between

were trying to push them towards new concerns and

10 to 12 months old, reaching around 180 kilos and

activities. Thus, other projects not directly related to cattle

carrying a precise level of fat. These animals would be

production were developed with the support of foreign

raised using natural pasture, without antibiotics, limited

money, but they attracted much less local interest.

vaccinations and according to the European standards of

Nevertheless, the foreign experts managed to ensure that

organic agriculture. Commercialisation and distribution

joining an association was a pre-condition for benefiting

were to be revamped – and labels to be obtained from the state ministry in charge of

agriculture28,

from the veal production project.

as well as well from

a French enterprise29. These conditions did not please all

Less local interest, fewer expectations: the other

own enterprise in the absence of any technical necessity. In

A range of other actions were taken under the so-called

partners, as it was felt that the French were imposing their

projects

any case, the hope was that VITPAN would profoundly

“Project of Pilot Actions for the Valorisation of the

renew the economic use and productivity of the entire

Biodiversity of the Rio Negro Region of Pantanal”. This

region.

programme was heavily financed by French entities (58%)

To join the project, fazendeiros had to enrol in one of the

and to a lesser extent by the European Union (14%) and

new regional associations and pledge to follow its technical

various local partners31 (28%). As one interviewee

guidelines. VITPAN especially seduced small landowners

explained, the pilot programme managed to attract the

(with less than 10,000 hectares) in search of higher

interest of “some of the most innovative and forward-

productivity. With its promise of adding value to cattle

looking fazendeiros […] those who are unafraid to take new

ranching and improving the marketing of locally produced

paths”.

meat, it raised hope for “saving the small ones”. By the end

The programme’s first component was the promotion of

of 2002, the pantaneiro veal reached a sale price of 700

ecotourism, presented as an alternative for small

Brazilian Reais per head, more than twice the price of

landowners. This led to the creation in February 2001 of a

standard beef. Five percent of the sale price was also paid

sectoral association, the Associação de Pousadas

to the recently created IPP (the institutional mechanism

Pantaneiras (APPAN) initially bringing together 16

running the regional park) as a contribution to its operating

fazendas, most of which were already operating lodges.

costs.

This new organisation was meant to allow the pousadas to

Although the VITPAN was the key PRP pilot project in the

join forces, to offer coordinated tourism packages, market

28 29

MAPA, Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento. Ecocert/Brasil.

The EMBRAPA (Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation) is a federal organisation whose mission is to carry out applied research and technology transfers to support the sustainable development of Brazilian agribusiness. 30

More specifically, 44% of the programme’s cost was financed by the French Fund for the Global Environment (FFEM), 14% by the CIRAD (a French public research network), 14% by the European Union and 28% jointly by EMBRAPA and the local State of Mato Grosso do Sul.

5. Creating Pluralism: The Unintended Consequences of the Preliminary Project

the Pantanal destination more widely, ensure the proper

this problem. Training was also provided to local tourist

international tour operators. APPAN also developed some

“watch hunt”. This project proved useful and its results

training of guides and better negotiate with domestic and

guides by Zimbabwean professionals on how to better

communications tactics, including the creation of a website

significant. The World Conservation Society (WCS) is still

and attendance of some professional fairs. In the following

currently working on these issues.

years, however, ecotourism clearly did not develop in the

Finally, the preliminary project leading to the PRP also

Pantanal, suffering from ongoing logistical constraints

engaged in educational efforts, building on an already

(transportation costs to start with) as well as strong variations in American

tourism32.

existing network of “pantaneira schools”. This was the most

A number of pousadas

social of the “bait projects”, but it only turned out to interest

diminished by more than half by 2008, at the time of our

1990s, some landowners had started to create schools

have now closed down and APPAN membership had

very few and already-motivated fazendeiros. Since the mid-

fieldwork.

within the Pantanal to better cater to the needs of their

The second aspect of the programme concerned the

workers’ families to avoid their departure to the city when

diversification of meat production beyond cattle, in order to

their children reached school-age. All the operating costs

commodify and take advantage of the region’s wildlife. The

were born by fazendeiros while the State only paid the

idea was to either capture or raise wild species. With the

teachers’ regular salaries.

help of French and Brazilian researchers, the pilot project

Under the influence of the PRP preliminary project,

focused on the production of porco monteiro (a wild pig)

concerned with fostering new associations, the Associaçao

and soon involved 21 fazendas. It also encompassed other

de Parceiros, Pais e Professores da Escola Pantaneira

wild species such as capivara, cateto, ema and jacaré. New

(APPEP) was nevertheless created in 1998. Until 2003,

commercial outlets were identified through which to market

with financial backing from the PRP project, the number of

these new products. Although not a failure, this project

pantaneiro schools increased from 3 to 11, catering to

proved to be only mildly successful in the following years.

almost 500 children. This work was awarded several

As of 2008, production is extremely limited and does not include many

species33.

Brazilian distinctions. After 2005, however, the collapse of

An important step was the creation

the PRP drastically affected this movement, which the local

in 2004-2005 of a state-of-the-art multi-species meat-

state decided not to pursue. Most pantaneira schools thus

treatment facility: the “Campo Grande Experimental

closed down, and only a few were running at the time of our

Technology Station for Meat”, under the responsibility of the

fieldwork.

French CIRAD and funded by the French Fund for the

On the whole, the mobilisation of fazendeiros through “bait

Global Environment (FFEM). To date, this facility is used for

projects” was rather effective in gaining support for the

to the steady development of the wildlife meat industry.

Landowners were far less interested in environmental and

both commercial and research purposes, but it has not led

regional park. Still, it encountered some limitations.

The third component of the programme was geared

social concerns, compared with economic ones. As the first

towards reducing the conflicts between jaguars, pumas and

president of the PRP recalls: ”The VITPAN project was the

cattle ranchers – and was thus the only project directly

key project in the minds of the fazendeiros. (…) But when

related to environmental protection. The resulting loss of

the time came to discuss other questions such as

cattle is around 0.2% of the total per year, but this can mean

conservation, ecotourism, education, the difficulty in

hundreds of heads of cattle per fazendeiro, making many

making people meet was much greater. If you had a

landowners nervous about the issue and leading to

meeting on VITPAN, you would have 40 or 50 people, but if

unregulated jaguar hunting. Some techniques were thus

you had a meeting on education, then only 6 or 8 people

presented to cattle ranchers to diminish the occurrence of

would come; and even less for ecotourism.” 32

Notably following the attacks of September 11, 2001, just like in Soufrière.

One of the problems is that wildlife “consumption” in Brazil is largely integrated with illegal, taboo hunting. 33

5. Creating Pluralism: The Unintended Consequences of the Preliminary Project

By 1998, meat prices were entering a new rising phase,

continuous focus of the PRP project on beef production,

currency34.

projects.

given the progressive devaluation of the national

and its lack of enthusiasm for other more adventurous

This provided ranchers with a strong incentive

to emphasise meat production, which partly explains the

5.2. The impact of delegitimisation: lowering CP intensity and inclusiveness

Thus, in a few years, eight new organisations had been

commitments. However, as we have seen, the hundreds of

landowners, a process hailed at the time as a “success” by

organisations as the only way for them to join the VITPAN

created from scratch, drawing together hundreds of

“volunteers” had largely been pushed into these new

the French team. This result looked indeed exceptional

project, which offered the prospect of rapid rewards. As it

when contrasted with the traditional lack of associative

soon became evident, these “volunteers” had no genuine

habits within the fazendeiro community. The creation of the

desire to become actively involved in regular meetings nor

SODEPAN in the 1980s had already been somewhat

a collective in order to define and represent the views of

outstanding in that regard. In the course of fieldwork, many

their community.

interviews underscored the typical and long-standing

The coming years were to demonstrate that unlike the

reluctance among the fazendeiros to team up through formal

associations

endeavours.

and

engage

SODEPAN, these new regional associations functioned

collective

quite poorly, with low and decreasing attendance rates at

their rare meetings Their function to represent the locals

This is not to say, however, that there is no practice of

was thus not ensured, nor their ability to simply coordinate

solidarity among them. Traditionally, landowners do help

the actions of fazendeiros, including for the sake of the

one another but on limited matters, as good neighbours do,

VITPAN project itself. None of these associations managed

something that was essential to their way of life in the past, given the geographical isolation of many

fazendas35.

to gain significant influence on any issue, notably when it

Still,

came to obtaining resources from the state. As several

fazendeiros of the Pantanal also have a propensity and

interviewees suggested, each association was “too small

desire to be the “master of their own kingdom”: they want to

and inexperienced” to conduct substantive negotiations

preserve their autonomy. Not only are they reluctant to have

with any actor within or outside of the fazendeiro

any boss, but even joint partners with whom they must

community. This also proved true for the two sectoral

share decision-making. Decisions on all issues are to be

associations, although they were highly focused on specific

their own. There is no history in this community of running

sectors. The APPEP, for instance, had to run its educational

any significant project as a group. As one fazendeiro clearly

programme without securing significant support from the

put it: “Any type of cooperative, association or syndicate

local authorities, who to a large extent abandoned the

project after 2005. As for the APPAN, it tried to promote

means that you lose part of your freedom.”

Thus, the appearance of eight brand new associations

ecotourism in the Pantanal, but it lacked state support and

seemed unthinkable in the local mindset. This “associative

even a basic level of coordination among its members.

mania”, as an interviewee put it, even seemed suspicious to those who shared the local distaste for collective

The Brazilian currency devalued from 1.2 reais per dollar in December 1998, to 3.6 in December 2002. During this period, the price of Brazilian beef approximately doubled in local currency terms, while its price in dollars fell.

35 Modern life in cities (where most landowners actually live), as well as roads and cars, have partly changed this.

5. Creating Pluralism: The Unintended Consequences of the Preliminary Project

In the end, this “fabricated pluralism” had hastily created

”The politicians needed to weaken the SODEPAN to take

member put it, “dwarfs or empty shells”. The associations

hands.”

associations that much resembled, as one NGO staff

control of the park and make it an instrument in their own

did not merely prove ineffective in mobilising and organising

Another observer did not hesitate to add to the “plot” the

locals on various common causes; they also proved

foreign technicians: ”The foreigners and the state used

damaging to the fazendeiro community as a whole, since

demagogy to fragment our community. […] They wanted to

they lowered the profile and legitimacy of the only correctly

marginalise us way or another, so that they would have a

functioning fazendeiro association, the SODEPAN. Unlike

free hand.”

these new associations, the SODEPAN “had not been

Not only did the process of pluralisation set the groundwork

created as a laboratory experiment”36 and was more of a

for low-level CP intensity within the participatory park, since

grassroots organisation, although it was led in practice by

it weakened from the start the fazendeiro voice, but it also

prominent local families.

endorsed the low inclusiveness that was built into the

The wish to avoid the takeover of the PRP project by a

discourse on “tradition”, which placed the fazendeiros at the

was arguably in line with CP best practices, as followed by

of project designers that they were relying on the best CP

single community association with limited representation

centre of the community. This took place despite the claims

the foreign technicians. Nevertheless, this effort resulted in

practices. For instance, commenting on his work, the main

the only well-established community organisation losing its

foreign expert working on the PRP argued that his team first

credentials as the voice of the landowners and its ability to

conducted a very large review of who lived and worked in

represent the full force of the fazendeiros when negotiating,

the region, so as to ensure the largest inclusion of social

for instance, with the local state. At the same time credible

actors in the scheme: ”To secure participation it is

organisations that could have effectively represented the

necessary to know who are the people living in the place

containment mode here is one of delegitimisation.

an institutional diagnosis to know who were the people

interests of the community were not created. The

and what they do. In fact, the first phase of the project was

Through such representative associations, placed at the

living there and what they were doing.38”

heart of the PRP governance system, CP was to be a low

Nevertheless, the newly created associations left out of the

intensity37 practice for the fazendeiros, their participation

picture some key groups living and working throughout the

being more nominal or consultative at best, if not anything

area of the projected park. The rural employees and the

less. It is our contention, as well as the view of several

fisher groups, particularly, were never mobilised, or even

interviewees, that this process laid the groundwork for the

talked to in order to delineate a common vision. The

takeover of the PRP project by other influential actors –

restricted range of community sub-groups involved in the

something that took place later on, as we shall see in the

“pluralisation process” transformed the narrow CP

next section. The feeling even emerged among some

inclusiveness of the “traditionalist” discourse into an

fazendeiros that the sidelining of the fazendeiros had been

institutional practice.

designed from the start as a plot. As one interviewee put it:

Quote from an interview with a fazendeiro

5. Creating Pluralism: The Unintended Consequences of the Preliminary Project

5.4. Conclusion

In this section, we showed that the weight of foreign

be-created park. Four years were enough to lower the

a fundamental way, which did not necessarily reflect

and more obscure associations. Meanwhile, this “fabricated

expertise influenced the preliminary phase of the project in

profile of the SODEPAN but not to raise that of the newer

demand from the locals: massive emphasis was indeed put

pluralism” also legitimised a view of the local community

on “fixing the local civil society first” and making it “more

entirely centred on the fazendeiros, leaving out the other

plural” instead of building the PRP upon already existing

social groups of the Pantanal. All in all, this process turned

community institutions. This may be praiseworthy according

CP against itself and made it, as is often the case, an

to the logic of the global CP discourse; but just as the road

instrument contributing not to an inclusive mode of

to hell is paved with good intentions, we argue that this

governance, but to more social control and containment.

preliminary phase turned out to be detrimental to the

As we shall soon see, the SODEPAN still managed to retain

landowners themselves. The drive for pluralism, challenged

some influence at the beginning of the park’s operation,

the legitimacy and thus the influence of their only long-

since the SODEPAN President at the time was

standing association, the SODEPAN, which was the sole

understandably elected as the park’s first president; but this

functioning fazendeiro association that could have

did not prevent the fazendeiros from swiftly losing control of

countered a major actor later on. What the preparatory work

“their park”. The process of political capture and

leadership and capacity of the landowners to stand up to

section.

essentially did in the short run was to diminish the

disempowerment that followed is explored in the next

non-community forces in the management of the soon-to-

6. Institutional Power at Work

In this section, we look at the deployment of the Pantanal

the actual management and the influence of foreign actors.

power within its central institution, the Instituto do Parque

continual presence of foreign experts

Regional Park (PRP) to compare the theory and practice of

The governance of the IPP was indeed marked by the

Regional (IPP). We analyse this institution as a “power

who never left

centre-stage, even after the end of the preliminary phase of

formation”, as defined in Charnoz 2009b, which brings

the project and the formal creation of the PRP. These

together various local, domestic and international actors to

technicians stayed on, well beyond their role as facilitators,

share a set of responsibilities. In doing so, we concentrate

wielding heavy institutional power due to their strong ties to

on “institutional power” and the varying abilities of the

the donors.

different actors to make use of the IPP.

Third, we identify a parallel process of active “political

It is first shown that the park’s legal construct created a co-

capture” whose origins we trace back to 1999, soon after

management scheme in which decisions were to be shared

the start of the preliminary phase of the project. Using the

by the fazendeiros and various levels of Brazilian

formal and informal channels of state power, a handful of

governance. On paper, the balance of influence clearly

local politicians increasingly exerted direct influence on the

favoured the local landowners, as the IPP was supposed to

IPP

give them the “driver’s seat” and ensure a high level of CP

structure.

They

notably

imposed,

through

“suggestions”, the appointment of a range of people within

inclusiveness, scope and intensity. In that sense, the IPP

both the IPP’s higher-management and the technical team.

closely mirrored the two founding discourses of the

Not only were these new staff members held little

originating alliance: (1) “salvation through tradition” which

accountable towards park members, but they also had

gave pre-eminence to economic development within

unclear agendas. This “political capture” of the IPP led to a

environmental management; and (2) the definition of “local

variety of management mistakes and irregularities that

community”, which gave pre-eminence to the local

eventually brought about the collapse of the park.

landowners (cf. section 7.4).

Finally, we argue that this collapse was hastened, rather

Second, we demonstrate that the institutional practices of

than delayed, by the election in April 2003 of a new park

the IPP led to the displacement of authority away from

president – a nationally famous pantaneiro artist who was

fazendeiros and to the emergence of a “power formation”

expected by the fazendeiros to use his fame to regain

whereby foreign actors enjoyed an important role. We

control of the situation. This election, in fact, turned on the

qualify this process as “passive” rather than “active”

spigots of political control leading to the complete

because we believe that it was caused less by the will to

disempowerment of the local community.

deprive the locals of their prerogative than by the inertia of

As defined in section 4.2.3.

38 Delorme

(2004, p.6): “Para conseguir a participação é necessário saber quais são as pessoas que estão vivendo nesse lugar e o que eles estão fazendo. Foi feito, no primeiro momento, na primeira fase do projeto, um diagnóstico institucional para saber quem eram as pessoas que viviam lá e o que eles estavam fazendo”.

6. Institutional Power at Work

6.1. High CP inclusiveness, scope and intensity: the founding pledge of co-management

On August 29, 2002, the state of Mato Grosso do Sul

management scheme (gestao compartilhada). Five rural

environmental protection under the name of Area Especial

Corguinho; Miranda; Rio Negro; and Rio Verde de Mato

created within its boundaries a new legal category of

districts (municipios) were also integrated: Aquidauna;

de Proteçao Ambiental (AEPA). In the same decree, which was signed by the

Governor39,

Grosso.

this category was

Finally, the AEPA was defined as an entirely voluntary

immediately put into effect by the creation of the Parque

undertaking that landowners could join at will. This aspect

Regional do Pantanal. Compared to the existing Brazilian

was particularly new in the Brazilian legal landscape, and a

legal framework – the national system of conservation units

step further into the CP discourse. As a consequence, the

(SNUC) – the AEPA category was novel in several ways.

territory of the PRP would not necessarily be continuous, as

First, unlike most of the SNUC categories, the AEPA was not

it could contain only those properties whose owners had

basing environmental protection on the limitation of human

decided to opt in.

activities, but rather on their promotion. It did not involve,

Some states of the Brazilian federation had already

therefore, things like taking property rights away from

advocated for new legal categories of conservation,

landowners in exchange for compensation payments. It was

different from the standard SNUC framework. The state of

rather meant to reinforce the presence of the landowners and a

Rondonia, for instance, had established two further classes,

more sustainable type of development. As formally stated in the

namely “state extractive forests” and “state sustainable

founding decree, the aim of the PRP was to: ”[…] maintain the

production forests” allowing for more economic activities to

take place in the protected areas. But no state has gone

pantaneiro man producing in the Pantanal as well as preserve

his economic, social and ecological equilibrium; […] base

further that Mato Grosso do Sul in trying to put local

the community.”

French concept of regional park. Although referred to as a

producers in the “driver’s seat”, through adaptation of the

economic development upon the human and natural heritage of

The AEPA especially gave itself the following objective: ”[…]

“protected area”, the PRP was not meant to interfere with the environmental management of private properties

prove the sustainability of extensive cattle raising.”

All of these objectives manifested the strong adherence of the

beyond ensuring that standard laws were carefully applied.

AEPA to the discourse on “salvation through tradition”

Moreover, the Pantanal’s local actors were more

(analysed earlier), whose core intent was the reinforcement of

empowered than the local actors in France’s regional parks

the fazendeiro community and the preservation of its status

– the Pantanal’s private landowners were chief partners in

the creation of the PRP, whereas in France, rural district

quo.

The second important feature of the AEPA was its participatory

governments had the lead.

nature. The management of the AEPA was to be shared among

On this basis, a “territorio de estudo” was defined as the

three levels of public governance in Brazil: the federal

maximum spatial extension of the park. It encompassed

government; the local state (including municipios); as well as

four sub-regions of the Pantanal wetland. These choices

the local civil society organisations. The decree explicitly stated

were made a priori by the technical team to provide the park

that: ”The Special Area of Environmental Protection [is to be]

with “ecological coherence and diversity”40, as project

entirely managed in a democratic and participatory fashion.”

documents explain. This delimitation gave the future park a

together the state and local stakeholders through a co-

of 14,000 inhabitants, making it possibly one of the largest

The PRP was thus introduced as a “joint initiative” bringing

potential extension of five million hectares with a population

Decree number 10.906, state of Mato Grosso do Sul.

This coherence and diversity can bee seen on Map 6, in which the boundaries of the PRP encompass four sub-regions of the Pantanal wetland. 40

6. Institutional Power at Work

protected areas in the world. Most of this space (98%)

The second governance mechanism of the IPP was its

50,000 hectares, with extensive cattle-raising as their main

much closer than the Assembly to the park’s actual

consisted of private properties, ranging from 3,000 to

Council of Administration (Conselho de Administração),

activity. Not all qualified landowners joined the project, but

operations. This Council was responsible for overseeing

250 fazenderois did, eventually providing the PRP with a

and approving the budget, the strategy and the work-plan of

total surface area of 2 million hectares – close to 15% of the

the PRP, as well as ensuring that these were properly

Pantanal’s wetland. This result was considered a great

implemented by the IPP’s upper management. Its

success, considering an operating time of five years.

membership consisted of one representative from each of

On 15 February 2001, one year before formal creation of

the nine “founding associations” of landowners (among

the PRP, its management body was created under the

which was the SODEPAN), two representatives from the

name of Instituto do Parque do Pantanal (IPP). The IPP was later

recognised41

state (FPNRF, 2002, p.17) and a representative from each

by the local Parliament as an “NGO

of the municipios involved44. The rural workers were not

of public interest” (OSCI, Organização da Sociedade Civil

represented at all at this level.

construct comparable to the SMMA in Soufrière, St. Lucia.

General Assembly45. This was an unpaid position with

de Interesse Público), making it a sort of public-private

The IPP also had a President, who was elected by the

Also like the SMMA, the IPP based its structure, as well as

nevertheless significant legal liabilities. The president’s

legitimacy, on its previous work on “mobilising the local

level of influence over the operations of the IPP largely

population”.

depended on his/her managerial style and delegation of

The governance of the IPP consisted of several bodies.

authority.

First, the IPP was under the authority of the PRP’s General

Finally, the IPP had a Technical Team, consisting of various

Assembly, which was responsible for approving the charter

experts, fieldworkers and administrative assistants led by

(Carta do Parque) at the first session of each year42;

approving a multi-year development plan; and reconciling

charge

everyday

Coordinator, whose responsibilities and hierarchical

times a year and was composed of the following members:

position were not clearly defined but who nonetheless

one representative from each of the newly, created

turned out to have a major influence.

associations; one representative from the SODEPAN; all of

The governance structure of the IPP was thus based on

the individual landowners who joined the park; one representative from each of the municipios

Secretary

management. The team also included a French Executive

actions with expenses. The Assembly was to meet three

involved43;

Executive

power-sharing between the state government, the rural

one

district and the local community, effectively reduced to the

representative for the government of Mato Grosso do Sul;

landowners. The General Assembly was specifically in

one for the Governor; and finally a representative from the

charge of ensuring a high level of CP inclusiveness by the

regional union of rural workers. The General Assembly thus

local fazendeiros, while the Council of Administration was to

embodied the co-management spirit of the PRP. Even the rural

enable a high level of CP scope and intensity. All of this

workers, barely mentioned throughout the initiating process,

closely reflected the founding agreement of the originating

were supposed to be represented. Private landowners,

alliance for the PRP, based on the motto “salvation through

however, had a strong say in the Assembly, since they were to

tradition” and geared to preserving the traditional

be represented both collectively and individually.

landowners. 41

In November 2002,

42 As

we explain later, this Charter was in fact never completed.

More precisely, one representative from the Conselho de Desenvolvimiento Rural of each of the municipios. 43

44 Aquidauana,

Miranda, Corumbá, Rio Verde and Rio Negro.

During its first months, the IPP had an executive board (direitoria executiva) that met monthly, but this schedule was found to delay the work of the technical team. In December 2002, the Assembly approved the permanent function of “president”. 45

6. Institutional Power at Work

6.2. Active political capture for unclear agendas

Whereas the legal construct of the PRP seemed committed

everyday running of the IPP. As an interviewee recalled, he

and people involved worked rather differently.

governance of the IPP soon surfaced as the president

to highly participatory governance, the actual institutions

“would sign every cheque”. However, tensions in the

First, although the IPP’s entire legitimacy derived from its

started to lose management power to the foreign experts

General Assembly, in practice the latter rarely met. Only a

still involved with the project.

limited number of landowners were present at each session

The IPP’s technical team indeed included several foreign

and attendance decreased over time. The Assembly did not

technicians who were running their programmes largely

fulfil its role as a forum in which to debate the contents of

outside of the IPP management structure. Step by step,

the park’s Charter (Carta do parque), the key document for

moreover, the local state increased its influence over the

embodying the PRP’s vision and the common pledges of its

IPP, wrestling control from the Council of Administration and

members. As a matter of fact, this Charter was never

the President. Through the state ministries, a group of

completed and adopted, beyond a working version

influential politicians seemed to be working in both the

designed during the preliminary project (Gouveia, 2006).

interest of their party and of certain individuals with political

Thus, the Assembly played in fact a small role beyond

connections. According to several interviewees, the

electing the IPP presidents, and even less of a role, if one

groundwork for this “political capture” had been laid during

considers that there was only one declared presidential

the 1998-2002 preparatory phase of the project. At first, it

candidate in each of the two elections during the park’s

took the form of getting the PRP initiative under the

short history. As for the Assembly’s social inclusiveness, we

supervision of higher state authorities, arguably to ensure

were not able during our fieldwork to confirm the existence

more direct and personal influence by specific people.

of the so-called “rural workers union”, which officially had a

Then, when the IPP started to function fully, this slow

representative on the Assembly. None of the rural workers

takeover increasingly took the form of direct involvement,

(peons) we interviewed knew of its existence and no

as certain people were imposed on the IPP management

fazendeiro mentioned this organisation.

team, a process that veered out of control after 2003.

The Council of Administration, in turn, had more of a

As early as 1999, after a period of indecisiveness, the local

practical say in the running of the IPP than the Assembly,

government started to be increasingly interested in the PRP

but it also met less often than expected and had uneven

project since it had managed to attract international funds.

attendance. People on the Council had either too little time

As regards the involvement of the state, the project was

or not enough technical competence to monitor precisely

initially located within the FEMAP, a state foundation

what was going on within the IPP. During the four years of

entrusted with implementing environmental policy as

operation, the Council in fact relied on the elected President

defined by the local ministry of the environment (Secretaria

to oversee operations. As several of our interviews

de Meio Ambiente). But this management structure was

confirmed, in case of a problem with the IPP, the Council at

soon judged to be too removed from the top authorities, a

most could discuss it (usually informally) with the President.

concern officially based on the fact that the institutional

As for the park’s Presidency, its institutional practices

positioning of the PRP project did not allow it to “secure the

evolved over time. During the first two years of IPP

full input of all ministries” – such as that of finance,

operations (2001-2003), the post was held by the former

infrastructure, economics and the environment – given their

president of the SODEPAN. This fazendeiro, from a long-

“vertical mode of functioning”46. Consequently, to ensure

established pantaneira family, took a very active role in the

“better cooperation of the PRP project with the local State”,

Quotes in this paragraph are drawn from an interview with a local civil servant.

6. Institutional Power at Work

a new convention between the Mato Grosso do Sul and the

groups: 1) the French, who were not at ease with a

Responsibility for the PRP was then transferred higher to

number of state-appointed workers on the IPP technical

French

FPNRF

was

signed

June

28,

2000.

president drawn from the SODEPAN; 2) the growing

the Secretaria de Estado de Governo - which has direct

team, who were acting in their own interest, to obtain such

authority over all other ministries. Meanwhile, the responsibility

for

administrative

support

was

things as good salaries or cars47. Most interviewed

also

fazendeiros were vocal in denouncing this process. As a

development agency under tighter political control – the

people sent by the government did not do anything. […]

transferred from the FEMAP foundation to an economic

former vice president of the IPP claimed: ”Many of the

CODEMS (Companhia de Desenvolvimento Economico de

They were surely not working, they were only pretending.

Mato Grosso do Sul).

But they still had to be paid!”

It was thus on the basis of strong state supervision that the

Regarding the way they were appointed, the same person

IPP was created in 2001, taking into its Council of

explained:”You know, you have a politician who says: ‘This

Administration two state representatives, including one for

one will go and work there’ and that is it. What can you say?

the Governor himself. The IPP was also to receive from the

The same person has power over the ministries on which

state an annual financial subsidy, which gave public

the IPP depended. […]”

authorities even more power over it. As one former

Other observers added:

employee of the IPP put it, commenting on what he saw

” They gave positions to friends and people who helped

happening: ”How could the IPP refuse the instructions and

the party.

people sent by those financing it?”

- It was a distribution of cakes. […]. It was all part of an

During the first two years of IPP operation, its President

electoral strategy.”

played an active role in everyday management. During this

A university professor, also a fazendeiro, feels that this

smoothly under tight financial management, although the

government used the IPP structure to ‘triangulate’

tenure, the organisation seems to have functioned rather

process was more than a form of nepotism: ”The

overall budget was still small, with more international funds

resources. It was giving funds to the IPP, but the IPP in turn

expected in the future. As we have said, however, the

had to contract certain people, for certain political reasons

President had started to share his decision-making power

and affiliations, or to engage in specific state projects that

with the foreign technicians. But there was also another

were not directly related to the regional park.”

group with increasing influence, made up of the growing

According to this person’s own estimates, between 5 and

number of people appointed through political connections,

6 millions Brazilian reais (around 2 millions euros) were

who acted as if they were unaccountable to the President.

“triangulated” during the lifetime of the institution. The

By the end of 2003, the President felt that he lost almost all

exact agenda of this triangulation is still not clear, but – as

of his management power and that an “objective coalition of

of 2009 – it was under public investigation.

interests” had emerged against him formed by these two

This judgement is not the author’s but one provided by two interviewees.

6. Institutional Power at Work

6.3. Elusive hopes of community repossession: hastening the final collapse

These power games did not prove sustainable for very long.

As another interviewee put it: ”Everybody was happy with

First, political capture did not come with efficient

the choice of Sater as president: the fazeindeiros were

clear to many observers that the park was not being

knew that he would be an ‘absent’ one.”

management; much to the contrary, it was increasingly

reverting to a sort of ‘dad’ while the people within the IPP

properly run. Second, as the governance situation was

From then on, indeed, the new President gave complete

becoming increasingly delicate, the IPP was also

autonomy to the IPP’s technical team, as he chose to leave

encountering technical problems with the implementation of

all managerial responsibilities to the Executive Secretary,

its development projects, especially promotion of Pantanal

with little monitoring. As a fazendeiro commented: ”The

veal (vitelo pantaneiro) through the VITPAN association.

election of Almir Sater amounted to a total desertion of post,

The VITPAN project was the heart of the PRP for most of

to the benefit of the ‘technicians’ who did not include a

the landowners and the one that raised the highest hopes.

single fazendeiro!”

Its malfunctioning spilled over onto the entire community,

The Executive Secretary had been officially chosen by

and by the start of 2003, an atmosphere of discontent had

Sater, but according to many interviewees, that choice was

set in.

strongly “advised” by certain politicians. The appointed

Hoping to fix these governance and technical problems, the

Secretary was little-known to the fazendeiros and ended up

General Assembly met to elect a new President on April 23,

running the IPP in a way that is now widely judged by locals

2003. This date proved to be the turning point of the IPP’s

as “incompetent”, “crooked” or both. Through the Council of

short history. The Assembly designated as President Almir

Administration, or in informal meetings, the fazendeiros did

Sater, a famous pantaneiro singer known throughout Brazil,

complain on several occasions to the President about the

who also owns a 25,000 ha fazenda within the Pantanal.

obvious mismanagement of the IPP. Accordingly, the

There were several rationales behind the choice of this

Executive Secretary was changed twice by Almir Sater, but

highly public figure as president, elucidated by the

to no avail, and apparently under the influence of the same

comments of many interviewees.

politicians. The successive people appointed to this job

First, the idea was for the community of fazendeiros to give

never seemed to enjoy any real trust from the fazendeiros.

a higher profile to its regional park, attract more attention,

Thus, under political influence, the IPP continued to add

sympathy and financial resources. The discourse was to

staff throughout this period, growing to over 50 permanent

“move to a second phase” whereby the project could scale

members, even though its financial resources were not

up and blossom out. Another important motivation was to

increasing nearly as fast. People from various public

use the authority of a well-known name to counter-balance

institutions were integrated into the IPP, without clear

the growing influence of non-local actors. Third, the name

technical qualifications, but with higher salaries than in the

“Almir Sater” helped create consensus in a community

local bureaucracies. Two local ministries (for the economy

divided over how to run the VITPAN project.

and environment) had particularly recourse to this

But this was not all. This election also had strategic

mechanism.

meaning for the politically appointed staff members, who

This burden proved far too heavy for a new and fragile

paradoxically also supported Almir Sater. As an interviewee

organisation. As one observer commented: ”At this point,

explained: ”Not only was the candidacy of Almir Sater one

the IPP had turned into a hangar for State jobs. [It had]

of ‘consensus’ that seemed to maintain unity among

opened many fronts but none was functioning correctly.”

fazendeiros; it was also the candidacy preferred by the

technical team of IPP, because these people knew that

As suggested by the lawsuits in progress in 2009, financial

Especially, he would not sign every cheque!”

the personal and political misappropriation of funds. To start

mismanagement also surfaced. There are even rumours of

Sater would not work locally, unlike the previous president.

6. Institutional Power at Work

with, the various Executive Secretaries regularly paid

over the “PRP scandal”, as one called it. These frustrations

Some observers also feel that they indulged in a variety of

politicians whose undue interventions led to this

project expenses with funds intended for other projects.

are essentially directed against the state government and

unjustified expenses, such as trips, meetings and major

catastrophe, in the eyes of locals. They are also directed,

office equipment. Most notably, they “forgot” to pay a range

but to a much lesser extent, against the permanent foreign

of local and federal taxes, involving huge sums of money.

influence that “complicated everything”. As of 2009, Almir

Problems were further exacerbated when the state started

Sater was still President of what remains of the IPP and

not to meet its financial commitments, from 2003 onwards.

was possibly to face legal action. He is now openly

All of this led to the closure of all IPP operations in July

criticised, although most fazendeiros still have a lot of

2005. In 2008, at the time of our fieldwork, the IPP still

respect for this public figure who embodies the Pantanal in

existed as a legal entity but as one heavily indebted and

the eyes of many Brazilians. Many landowners feel that

under public investigation. Its outstanding debt (including

Almir Sater had just been too naïve and was manipulated.

unpaid taxes and salaries) was close to one million

A fazendeiro summarised these feelings of injustice

Brazilian Reais in mid-2008 (about 400,000 euros), with

regarding the failure of the IPP: ”The debt is now ours, but

another million having already been repaid.

it should be the government’s.”

Frustrations among the fazendeiros are extremely high

6.4. Conclusion

In this section, we inquired into the actual management and

that are an important part of the region’s history and its

its 36 months of existence, from its creation in August 2002

the PRP) was subject to growing political capture, through

short history of the Pantanal Regional Park (PRP) – during

current economy. Secondly, the IPP (the governing body for

to the end of its operations in July 2005. We showed that

the imposition of state-appointed people with weak

the institutional practice of community participation (CP)

management skills but with personal connections, political

proved biased on several fronts. First, the CP process was

affiliations and private interests. On the whole, these

skewed from the start by relying on an ambiguous definition

successive applications of productive and institutional

of the “local community”, which in the end solely meant the

power led to a complete dispossession of the locals from

landowners: it thus cast aside agricultural employees (the

the running of what was to be a “community park”.

peons) and other communities (such as fishers), groups

7. The Role of Social Capital and its Impact on CP

As we have seen, the story of the Pantanal Regional Park

estrangement from the institutional functioning of the PRP.

dynamics. They include intended and actual effects against

adapted to, and skilful with, institutions, notably politicians

(PRP) offers a complex mix of multiple containment

This facilitated the influence of actors that are more

conservationist environmentalists, new economic actors in

and technical experts.

the region, rural employees, fisher groups and the

Finally, we suggest the PRP “failure” may have sown,

fazendeiros themselves. In this section, we question how this “containment mille feuilles”

nevertheless, seeds for the renewal of the local social

was connected to and

capital. The failure has indeed stimulated self-criticism,

impacted the entire community’s social capital. We first

critical thinking about what collective action is and means,

consider the Pantanal’s rural employees who were entirely

what needs to be changed in how fazendeiros cooperate,

kept out of the PRP processes: we show that this

and what precautions need to be taken regarding state

disconnection was underpinned by their symbiotic

involvement in CP schemes. This process is particularly

connection to a long-established paternalism dispensed by

observable in the way fazendeiros moved from Loyalty to

fazendeiros, resulting in social capital that is estranged

Voice as their response strategy to the PRP’s collapse,

from institutions and collective action.

although this came too late for the collapse to be avoided.

Second, we analyse the social capital of the crushing

It is also observable at the present time in the operations of

majority, the Pantanal landowners. We argue that their

a relatively new association of producers that seem to have

ingrained habits of individualism and preference for

benefited from the PRP experience.

informal modes of communication contributed to their own

7.1. Symbiotic paternalism: keeping peons away from institutions and collective action

The complete absence of peons (rural workers) from the

the incapacity of peons to emerge as an autonomous

design and governance of the vast CP project taking place

community actor worth considering and integrating into the

(SC) and structural position of this sub-community. In

absorption of the peons into the small world of the fazenda;

in the Pantanal closely mirrored the peculiar social capital

PRP project reflects several social features: the complete

Charnoz 2009b, we had defined SC as the “collective

their structural domination by the landowners through a

bonds” of a given group both within itself and with other

long-established paternalism; their lack of habit (and

groups. In the case of peons, what seems especially at

apparent capacity) for collective claims and actions; their

stake is their bridging SC – namely the way they connect to

self-withdrawal from the more “modern and aggressive

external groups. Peons are indeed thoroughly attached to

world” that lies outside of the Pantanal; and their subjective

fazendeiros, in a structurally dependent way. Accordingly,

feeling of relative freedom and contentment with their life.

Mille feuilles (a thousand leaves) is the name of a typical French cake composed of many layers of thin pastry dough. It is often used as a metaphor to depict a system composed of a great many different levels.

7. The Role of Social Capital and its Impact on CP

During the whole PRP process, no attention was paid by

characters and spirits. Peons fundamentally live in a

the traditional pantaneira fazenda, whose survival was

nowadays are modern urban people. Interviews with peons

the Brazilian or foreign promoters to the internal workings of

different spiritual world from the fazendeiros, who

being supported. This left untouched and unquestioned the

strongly suggested that their view of time is extremely

deep social inequalities and entrenched paternalism upon

circular, with little awareness of anything changing around

which societal spaces such as the fazendas have been

them. It was especially striking to see that none could

based for centuries. Fazendas do constitute universes in

articulate during an interview a structured and informed

themselves, founded on the hierarchical and binary

discourse on what was going on, wrong or right, within the

distinction between the fazendeiros and their families (the

Pantanal region. While their work makes it theoretically

owners), and on the other hand, the agricultural employees

possible for them to be the best experts on the Pantanal,

and their relatives (the peons). In the life of a peon,

their understanding of the region seemed severely limited

paternalism is everywhere. These people work for rather

by their lack of education, general awareness or even

low wages while landowners provide them in turn with

desire to know about the outside world.

modest accommodation for their families, meat and other

As for their symbiotic connection, peons do not only provide

foodstuffs, as well as assistance in times of hardship – for

cheap labour to landowners; they also constitute a

some fazendeiros have even tried to enhance education

attention or money. While most fazendeiros now live in

instance, in case of health problems. As mentioned earlier,

tremendous public relations asset when fazendeiros need

services available to children, but with limited results.

cities and only come to their property as needed or during

To some local observers, this looks like a healthy

their spare time, peons live full-time in the wetland and they

relationship. According to anthropologists we met, peons

are the ones in the magnificent pictures known throughout

even have a strong subjective feeling of their own

Brazil of “cowboys” riding horses, leading cattle herds

freedom: ”Peons live in the open air with no boss every day

(comitivas) in the open landscape, telling stories from a

unique folklore, etc. It is the peon, thus, who carry most of

on their shoulders. […] And if they are not happy with their condition or employer, they know they can always take their

the external identity of the pantaneira community, as well as

This capacity to move from one employer to the other has

they, also, who engender the sentiment in public opinion –

the favourable reputation and public affection it enjoys. It is

horse and move to the next fazenda.

apparently supported a feeling of autonomy among peons

and in donors’ headquarters in Europe – that life has

for generations. One may question, however, the extent to

remained “traditional and in harmony with the environment”.

which this capacity to change employer is a real source of

Yet, peons were not to gain anything from, or have any say

autonomy. When they move to the next property, peons

in, the vast PRP project. Their only presence was on

enter a similar world that provides them with the same low

“leaflets and PowerPoint presentations showing off the

opportunity for personal growth. Their level of education is

lifestyle of the region”49.

usually very low and many of them are barely literate.

Peons are not demanding people. Despite centuries of

Although most of them have learned basic literacy skills at

work in fazendas as a well identified group with its own

school, their lifestyle provides them with little reason to write

identity, they have never organised any form of collective

or read. In that sense, they very much resemble the poorer

action to dialogue as a group with the fazendeiros on any

fishers of St. Lucia, most of whom have had some formal

issue. All concerns are treated informally and individually.

education but which has been largely forgotten.

Peons we talked to specifically stated that they did not know

Interviews with local anthropologists confirmed that peons

of any “workers union” representing their interests – an

do form a society of their own, with its own beliefs, including

absence of unionism typically found in paternalistic

a strong folklore populating the Pantanal with mythical

societies. During face-to-face interviews, peons came 49

Quote from an NGO staff member operating in the Pantanal.

7. The Role of Social Capital and its Impact on CP

across as simple and quiet people, markedly shy with an

as a local put it. Although it is difficult to point to any explicit

white people. Let us note that fazendeiros are typically

themselves as autarchic societies where cohesiveness and

apparently ingrained low profile during discussions with

mode of outright exploitation, fazendas largely present

much “whiter” than peons, who often have Indian blood.

inequalities function hand in hand.

Interviewees would only answer our questions briefly and

In Charnoz 2009b we had referred to Lukes’ definition of

without providing information beyond what was asked.

“subjective interests” as those that “are consciously

life, their jobs and their relation to the fazendeiros. The

are goals and desires that actors “would want and prefer,

They all showed a lot of restraint when commenting on their

articulated and observable”, whereas “objective interests”

overall impression was one of a typically “passive” peon

were they able to make the choice” (Lukes, 1975, p.34).

temperament, an impression that converged with those of

The world of fazendas seems to us to be a case where such

various interviewees, such as NGO staff members and

concepts can be usefully applied. The paternalistic relation

passing tourists.

between peons and landowners is so successfully

We ended our fieldwork in the fazendas with the general

constitutive of their identities that no desire for change

feeling that peons are essentially people locked up in a

seems to emerge. How could a CP scheme successfully

small and circular world where they do not encounter

involve populations in such a mindset, when structural

opportunities to develop. They seem to have little means or

power is so strong and effective?

desire to free themselves from this “safe but closed world”,

7.2. Individualism and informalism: the institutional ineptitude of most fazendeiros

The implementation of the PRP process was paralleled, as

working together that produced: 1) an inability by the

disempowered fazendeiros. One benefited the foreign

projects; 2) an inability to engage with formal institutions

we have seen, by two powerful containment dynamics that

landowners to cooperate on and coordinate important PRP

technocrats while the other fostered the institutional capture

like the IPP, beyond entrusting one single representative

of the IPP by a group of politicians and well-connected

with this responsibility.

people. Here, we argue that these two exercises of

The lack of cooperative habits among the fazendeiros

institutional power were greatly facilitated, not only by the

seems rooted in their traditional mindset of “being alone on

weakening of the SODEPAN (cf. section 4.3), but also by

their land” and not being able to count on anyone but

the institutional inaptitude of the vast majority of the

themselves. All fazendeiros we interviewed openly

fazendeiros. By this, we mean the landowners’ difficulty and

acknowledged a strong individualism, which they present

relative inability to engage with formal collective actions and

positively as a desire for autonomy. One landowner,

institutions. This led to a chronic lack of institutional

however, provided an extra insight: ”No, there is no tradition

monitoring by the landowners within the governance

of associating among us. Associations, cooperatives, etc.,

structure of the PRP; it also generated free-riding behaviour

all of these things are fragile in the Pantanal. This is

that disarticulated the implementation of important projects.

because of the following. Here, there is a culture of

In the previous section, we claimed that the bridging type of

immediatism: the expectation that things should bring

social capital (SC) was key to understanding the situation of

benefits immediately. […] We do not like acting in groups

peons within the PRP project. We now contend that

unless we see results right away.”

bonding SC is what best sheds light on the position and

During the lifespan of the IPP, a number of projects were

evolution of the fazendeiros within the project. As explained

launched that encountered recurring problems related to

in Charnoz 2009b, bonding SC refers to the nature and

the lack of coordination. This turned out to be especially

strength of ties within a given group. What especially

true with the critical VITPAN project. The issues that it

mattered in the PRP story was a mix of social norms

confronted did indeed suggest that “individualism and

7. The Role of Social Capital and its Impact on CP

immediatism” are strong community features. VITPAN was

the part of the cattle ranchers, with organisations that try to

and goodwill on the part of the producers. It especially

Issues faced in the Pantanal by the EMBRAPA, the key

a complex project that required a fair level of coordination

provide them with services.

required rigorous standards for meat production so that the

Brazilian public institution for agricultural research, are

output of this collective could be marketed to consumers under

unique

and

consistently

reliable

illustrative of this situation. This institution has been working

label.

for decades in the region on numerous technical issues

Disagreements soon surfaced over the appropriate

related to production and conservation. Interviews carried

production techniques and standards – and even over the

out in 2008 in Campo Grande showed that, today, its main

transport routes used for meat collection, some of which

concern is not finding more technical solutions for cattle

were more or less convenient for the various producers.

ranchers, but implementing and promoting those that have

Procedures were not thoroughly applied, and this resulted

long been identified. Moving innovations from the institution

in unsatisfactory product quality, of which distributors

out to the pantaneiro producers has proved incredibly

eventually grew tired.

difficult.

There was also a growing mistrust among the producers

This problem has led the EMBRAPA to devote more

due to free-riding behaviour. Each one had indeed a

resources to researching social dynamics, since they seem

personal interest in deviating from the required age at which

to prevent the local appropriation of both agricultural

the cows were to be sent to the slaughterhouse. The

techniques and the ideas of research institutions.

financial incentive was to deliver animals older than the

Increasing attention is being notably paid to the way change

required age of 10 to 12 months, since they would weigh

occurs among traditional cattle ranchers, reverting to the

more and thus bring in more money when sold. The meat

sociology of knowledge and of information networks.

of older cows, however, is too fatty, thus spoiling the whole

Researchers have been looking at the processes through

quality-control procedure. During an interview, the first IPP

which new technologies are adopted, ignored or rejected (e.g.

President recalled that at the end of his term, a “political

Cezar, 2000). They have found that formal sources of

dispute had developed regarding the vitelo among

knowledge and technical advice, such as written information or

fazendeiros who divided into three or four fighting groups”.

training opportunities, are largely ignored by the fazendeiros of

These tensions were such that the IPP could not manage,

the Pantanal.

even after two full years, to get VITPAN producers to join a

To start with, people do not like to read or to feel as if they

single other cooperative, a necessary step toward organising this new economic

are “being taught”. What is more, the crushing majority of the

sector50.

fazendeiros do not feel they have the capacity to participate

According to many, this low capacity for collective action

personally in formal processes – due to lack of time, their often

hindered the fazendeiros from exerting their full influence

advanced age or the cultural distance that inevitably exists

on IPP management, since their credibility and moral

between the traditional rancher and the technical expert –

leadership as reliable partners was deeply diminished. But

something that was also true in regard to the IPP. Although

even without this, the influence of the fazendeiros was

EMBRAPA had developed a policy of inviting fazendeiros to

hampered by another problem: their low capacity for

participate in its research decisions, its evaluation review shows

institutional involvement, a quality of the vast majority of

that this approach largely failed. Even its “open door policy”,

landowners. To characterise this, a local observer

whereby fazendeiros could arrive anytime to have informal

suggested the term “informalism”51. It first relates to the rare

discussions with researchers, did not do the trick: ranchers

and fragile existence of community organisations (cf.

simply did not want to go there.

section 4.3), but also to a lack of interest and interaction, on

The EMBRAPA is now looking at developing a participatory According to a former technician of the IPP, the technical team of the organisation did not adopt a clear stance on these matters and thus stimulated conflicts instead of easing a consensus.

51 This concept was suggested by a researcher of EMBRAPA in Campo Grande, Mato Grosso do Sul.

7. The Role of Social Capital and its Impact on CP

system of knowledge and information dissemination that

they are better able to use them.

prefer to rely on informal modes of communication.

fazendeiros reverted to trusted persons (the PRP

goes beyond people joining formal groups. Fazendeiros

From this discussion, it appears that within the IPP, the

Conversations and direct observation of neighbouring

presidents) to monitor the institution on their behalf and to

fazendas are the most usual ways to obtain information.

be their voice in its governance. However, their sole

Meanwhile, learning networks are structured around a

reliance on the two successive PRP presidents proved

limited number of “trusted persons” (pessoas de confiança)

insufficient to counterbalance the other forces we have

who act as models for other fazendeiros and somehow

already analysed; this also prevented the Council of

become opinion leaders. These trusted persons typically

Administration from carrying out its key role of constant

rely on a much larger information network; they are more

monitoring.

apt to recognise the usefulness of formal institutions, and

For all its shortcomings, and in fact because of them, the

7.3. From Loyalty to Voice: renewing the local social capital

PRP project induced self-reflection within the fazendeiro

the Council of Administration to choose Loyalty rather than

collective action. This was first seen in the way that

the problem largely shared by the fazendeiro community.

community about the need to strengthen its capacity for

Voice as their response strategy, reflecting an approach to

discontent about the IPP’s collapse found new modes of

After a few warning discussions with President Almir Sater,

expression. In Charnoz 2009b, we detailed how social

they resigned themselves to watching an “announced

frustrations subsequent to an unsatisfactory CP scheme

tragedy”, as an active observer at the time recalled. As we

can lead to three types of community response: Exit (actual

have seen, Almir Sater responded to these concerns by

or psychological withdrawal); Loyalty (silence and

appointing two successive Executive Secretaries, but

resignation, in the name of the higher principle of unity); or

always based on political recommendations that did not

Voice (open complaints and actions for change). We then

appease the landowners. As the landowners feared, these

argued that the Voice strategy can at best lead to a renewal

changes led to no managerial improvement, much to the

of the local social capital, thus enabling more collective

contrary.

action. Here, we show that the fazendeiros indeed moved

Council members refused to exercise their veto power over

from Loyalty to Voice when faced with the collapse of

the IPP management, since this would have been equated

community participation within the PRP project; this opened

in the public eye as the disowning of Sater. Interpersonal

up the possibility of community cooperation on new and

loyalties and friendships arguably took their toll on IPP

more effective terms – as suggested by the recent success

governance at this point. As one fazendeiro recalled: ”At

of a local organisation of organic cattle producers. This,

one point, we stopped complaining to Almir. Nobody

however, does not mean that the final impact of the PRP

wanted to criticise him too much and put him in a corner.

story can be evaluated as of 2009. Although the fazendeiro

[…] We felt he was not in control anyhow.”

community seems to be moving along a positive

As another put it: ”Almir is a friend from childhood for many

organisational learning curve, only time will tell if a range of

of us. We went to school together. […] He is our best hope

inertia-causing factors do not finally dominate.

when our community needs to be heard out there. We cannot harm him. This would be harming ourselves.”

This community group was thus placed in a schizophrenic

The choice of Loyalty

After 2003, given the path taken by the IPP, its collapse was

situation: they were concerned about the future of “their

being predicted by many fazendeiros. This perspective, and

park”, but they felt they could not use the legal means

the relative inaction of the president, led the members of

available to them to either remove the President or force

7. The Role of Social Capital and its Impact on CP

him to appoint a new Executive Secretary of their choosing.

each in our little corner. We need to add one person to the

Administration had power over the President; it had enough

this opportunity was spoiled.”

As a fazendeiro further explained: ”The Council of

other. […] The Park was the best idea for us in years but As for the principle of Loyalty (in the name of apparent unity

power to shake up the whole thing. But doing this also

or personal friendship), it seems to us that the fazendeiros

depended on inter-personal relations. Power is one thing,

would not resort to it as automatically as before, should

and people-to-people relations are something else. […]

another dilemma of this kind appear. Next time, they may

People on the Council thought: ‘I do not want to damage the

choose to Voice their discontent in time for it to be effective,

reputation of the President; I will not use my veto power to

even at the cost of disowning one of their kind – something

remove everybody there; I could but I will not’.”

Here, we see how social bonds can prevent checks and

that several of them suggested should have been done.

balances from working correctly in community organisation,

The existence of a collective learning process is also

leading the members to choose Loyalty over Voice, even if

suggested in the way the fazendeiros now relate to the

the collapse is foreseen. The need for unity, the desire not

state: they have grown even more wary about public

and powerful, as well as the tacit rule against public conflict

interferences that took place in the IPP have since then

to diminish the reputation of someone who is well known

involvement in their affairs. The political intrusions and

within the community, left the IPP with poor regulatory

been heavily discussed among the landowners. Some think

mechanisms. At first, the choice of Loyalty may seem

that this type of political capture is simply unavoidable:

inconsistent with the pervasive individualism of the

In a new IPP, it would be difficult to do much better

fazendeiro community that we have already presented. But

[regarding the influence of politicians]. A time always

it is quite possible for a community to harbour strong norms

comes when you depend either upon municipal, state or

about public-conflict avoidance while still displaying a high

federal decisions. Whether this is through taxes or

level of individualism in many of its other interactions.

anything else, there is always a strong connection [so that politicians] can always ruin things when they want!

Voice: opening up a collective learning process

Other fazendeiros think that political infringements are

fazendeiros, the PRP collapse was not digested very easily,

“something that may change when a new government

Although Loyalty was the response chosen by the

directly linked to the “corruption of the current government”,

and another response started to emerge in the following

comes”52. Meanwhile, still others feel that state influence

years: more discussion about what went wrong and what

can be managed if the use of public resources in a CP

should have been done, as well as what should be done

scheme is absolutely minimal. The prospect of co-

next – an approach much closer to Voice.

managing with the state has now little credibility. However,

Indeed, a range of interviews suggested that the PRP

this is not to say that the idea behind the PRP has been

experience had stimulated hopes and expectations that did

abandoned. On the contrary, making the PRP an even

not disappear with it. Above all, the “catastrophe” – as it is

more “community-owned organisation” seems the right way

often referred to – led community members to question the

forward for most interviewees. We met several fazendeiros

pros and cons of their own dual culture of cohesiveness

who actively suggested re-launching the PRP once its debt

and individualism. To start with, many fazendeiros now

has been cleared, a process that may take time and might

seem to acknowledge that individualism and free-riding

involve penal sanctions against the last President. As a

were detrimental to the PRP project and that “things need

fazendeiro put it, in a poetic tone:”The IPP is like a baby we

to change in the future”. As one put it:”Changes are slow to

love and who is now sleeping. We watch over it with tender

take place here. Pantaneiros need to organise themselves

eyes and we wait for its awakening.”

much more and much better. […] We need to stop working

Quote from an interview.

7. The Role of Social Capital and its Impact on CP

Unchartered future

asked their children “not to divide the land and work it

strong sense that a failed participatory scheme can

smoothly implemented or well accepted process.

On the whole, our fieldwork interviews did provide us with a

together”, but this does not appear to be a widely shared,

stimulate change; but such processes are likely to take

Such inertias beg the question of whether this community

time, especially in the Pantanal. There is plenty of evidence

has the capacity to survive the coming decades. At the

to suggest that change does indeed take a long time in the

same time, the question arises as to what is the proper time

region. As one fazendeiro explained: ”When one develops

scale for evaluating the end result of a CP effort, even a “failed” one like the PRP, which nevertheless awakened the

a new system, a new model, there must be a time for investment,

period

transition

and

often

community to some its weaknesses. In fact, this process

already seems to have born fruit. Following the demise of

disappointment. You need to work a lot with your head and

the VITPAN project, a local “Association of Organic Cattle

your hands. And you need to change mentalities. In

Producers” has recently been growing fast and gaining new

Pantanal, this can happen, but it is very very slow. […] It

members. It works exclusively with private funds and with

can take 10 or 15 years to really change anything here.”

Practices of land inheritance provide a good illustration.

the support of the WWF. This cooperative has been doing

Although the local community is under direct pressure to

rather well so far, setting common production standards

change in order to survive, the social norms pertaining to

and organising a commercial network. In this endeavour,

the division of inherited lands are not evolving fast at all.

the fazendeiros have carefully avoided looking for any state

The habit of dividing properties between the male heirs has

funding. To date, 30 fazendas, with around 100,000 head of

still not fundamentally changed, although many properties

cattle, are working to produce organic beef.

hectares). Some fazendeiros we interviewed allegedly

In this section, we have shown how the various

are now falling below the viable size (around 7,000

7.4. Conclusion

containment processes embedded in the PRP project

that the collapse of such an ambitious participatory scheme

the community. We first identified how the bridging SC of

capacities and fostered new initiatives. As of 2009, the

affected, and were connected to, the social capital (SC) of

stimulated a local learning process that built up local

the peons is entirely embroiled in a symbiotic and

choice of Voice, as an alternative response strategy to

paternalistic relationship with the fazendeiros, which

frustration,

prevented the peons from being given (and even trying to

have) any voice in the PRP process. We then argued that elements

—

immediatism,

have

fostered

community

that may prove beneficial to this community’s capacity for

the bonding SC of the fazendeiros is a complex mix of several

seems

introspection on the causes of what went wrong, a move collective action.

individualism,

informalism and unity — that all played a role in the PRP’s

collapse. Finally, from a longer-term perspective, it appears

Conclusions

Thus, from its origins to its collapse, several processes of

way that destabilised the IPP and eventually led to this

(PRP) project, which was intended to be a prime example

Yet, a complete understanding of these multi-layered

containment developed within the Pantanal Regional Park

project’s demise.

of community participation (CP). The containment

containment processes requires going beyond the analysis

processes were either simultaneous or successive, bearing

of their power effects to their “catalysts” – i.e. what enabled

both actual and intended consequences. The first layer of

them to play out so strongly. This is where social capital

long-established local producers to counter the increasing

which peons are embroiled never let their voice come

this complex “containment mille feuilles” was the will of the

comes in. We showed that the symbiotic paternalism in

influence of environmental conservationists in the Pantanal,

through during the PRP process. At the same time, the

as well as the incoming economic actors who were

long-standing preference of fazendeiros for individualism

challenging their viability. These founding intentions were

and informalism in their social relations provided the basis

embodied in the discourse on “salvation through tradition”,

for the institutional inaptitude that fostered their own

whose spirit permeated the whole PRP: while “greening”

disempowerment. The failure of the PRP, which is more

the landowners, it also reinforced their structural position by

than embarrassing for the fazendeiros, seems nevertheless

centring around them the entire traditional community. This

to have initiated a process of self-analysis in this community

provided the PRP with a second layer of containment,

that in the future may renew its capacity for collective

although a less apparent one, that pushed well into the

action.

background the voice of the rural employees and of the of

The operational implications of our fieldwork in Pantanal

fisher groups living in the Pantanal for generations.

complement and reinforce those emphasised in our St.

But things did not end there. As we have shown, still

Lucia case study (Charnoz, 2010).

another process of containment appeared in the course of implementation:

multi-layered

one

affecting

The evaluation of CP schemes is not easy and requires a

the

larger timeframe than that usually used by donors involved

fazendeiros themselves. First, championed by foreign

in environmental management. Donors should accept that

expertise, the will to make the civil society more “plural”

they have to invest more time and money in CP schemes,

weakened and delegitimated the only working organisation

be more tolerant of their ups and downs and not lose faith

of the fazendeiros, in a community context where the

despite apparent failures. Donors should accept that CP

emergence of such entities is very uncommon and fragile.

schemes constitute bets that cannot be won each time and

Second, the institutionalisation of CP into a formal

whose benefits appear only over a very long period of time.

organisation like the IPP led to the estrangement of the vast

The evolution of social capital should be given increased

majority of the fazendeiros from its functioning. Their low

attention in such evaluations.

involvement in the governance of the IPP was rapidly offset

Second, “institutional participation” often causes the poorer

by the institutional power wielded by full-time staff

and most fragile groups to head toward the exits of the

members. In parallel, a full-fledged “political capture” took

decision-making process, while allowing the more powerful

place by local politicians with unclear agendas who

interest groups to predominate. Despite the exclusion of

imposed themselves on the IPP’s governance structure in a

certain key local groups, this approach can provide the

Conclusions

scheme with local legitimacy in the eyes of the government

beyond the initial consultation phases, or even association-

Regional Park, little attention was given to rural workers

seem. Representation, participation and actual influence

and international donors. In the case of the Pantanal

building, no matter how comprehensive these phases may

and fisher groups, which were virtually absent from the

are distinct notions. Ensuring a real and balanced influence

whole process. To address these problems, donors may

by stakeholders who are socio-economically disadvantaged

want to strengthen the socio-political dimension of their ex

may take a variety of forms, including entrusting an outside

ante and ex post evaluation processes, as well as their on-

expert to either represent them himself, or monitor the

going monitoring mechanisms. Involvement by international

balance of power within the institutions on an ongoing

donors in participatory environmental management

basis.

schemes should indeed be ideally more “open-eyed” about

Given the dynamics of the local social capital in the

what these projects do socially and politically to local

Pantanal, which was stimulated by the PRP experience, the

societies, on both ethical and efficiency grounds. This is

overall lesson that comes out of all this seems to be that

especially necessary in contexts where local social capital

institutional maturity takes time – for trials and errors to

is little adapted for the community to correctly engage with

emerge. The question is whether international donors are

and gain ownership of institutions. It is also especially

willing and financially able to support such processes over

important when issues of deontology may appear – for

the long term, accepting failures as normal aspects of

instance, where donors may be supporting paternalistic

institutional development. This long-term view is something

societies.

that greatly contrasts with the increasingly results-oriented

It would also seem advisable that donors work harder to

culture and political commitment to proving “development

find ways and means that better represent the interests of

effectiveness”.

some of the least-prepared stakeholders. Efforts should go

References

Albuquerque de Vargas, I. (2006), Território, identidade, paisagem e governança no Pantanal Mato-Grossense: um calei-

doscópio da sustentabilidade complexa. PhD. Curitiba, Universidade Federal do Paraná, Brazil. Available at: http://dspace.c3sl.ufpr.br/dspace/bitstream/1884/3799/1/icleia%20-%20tese%20 completa.pdf [Accessed 23 August 2009].

ANA (Agencia Nacional de Aguas, Brazil), GEF (Global Environment Facility), UNEP (United Nations Environment

Programme) & OAS (Organization of American States) (2005), Strategic Action Program for the Integrated Management of the Pantanal

and

the

Upper

Paraguay

River

Basin:

Final

Report.

Available

http://www.ana.gov.br/GestaoRecHidricos/ProgramasProjetos/docs/PAE_Pantanal_Ingles.pdf. [Accessed 27 July 2009]

at:

Barcellos Harris, M. (2006), Estimated Loss of Natural Area in the High Paraguay River Basin and the Brazilian Pantanal, Conservation International, Brasilia, Brazil.

Charnoz, O. (2009a), The Global Discourse on ‘Participation’ and its Emergence in Biodiversity Protection, AFD Working Paper

No. 83, Paris.

Charnoz, O. (2009b), Community Participation in Biodiversity Protection: An Enhanced Analytical Framework for Practitioners, AFD Working Paper No. 84, Paris.

Cezar, I.-M. (2000), Os pecuaristas e suas redes de conhecimento e informaçao, EMBRAPA, Campo Grande, Mato Grosso do Sul. Available at: http://www.cnpgc.embrapa.br/publicacoes/bp/bp10/index.html [Accessed 23 August 2009].

Charnoz, O. (2010), Community Participation Beyond Idealisation and Demonisation: Biodiversity Protection in Soufrière, St.

Lucia, AFD Working Paper, upcoming, Paris.

Conservation International (2009), CI History. Available at: http://www.conservation.org/ discover/pages/history.aspx. [Accessed 4 August 2009]

Corrêa, L.-S. (1999), História e fronteira, o sul de Mato Grosso, 1870-1920, Universidade Católica Dom Bosco, Campo Grande MS.

Delorme, J.-P. (2004), “O Parque Regional do Pantanal, o novo espaço institucional para uma gestão participativa dos recur-

sos naturais” in: FUMDHAM (Fundação Museu do Homem Americano), Seminário Internacional sobre Preservação da Arte Rupestre nos Sítios do Patrimônio Mundial, Parque Nacional Serra da Capivara, Brazil, 22-25 May. Available at:

http://www.fumdham.org.br/fumdhamentos5/artigos/Jean_Phillipe_Delorme.pdf [Accessed 23 August 2009].

Earthwatch (2004), Pantanal Conservation Research Initiative: Annual Report 2003, Earthwatch, Maynard, MA.

Eaton, D.-P. (2006), Cattle-Associated Impacts on Aquatic Macro-Invertebrate and Wading Bird Assemblages of Rare, Highly Productive Habitats in the Nhecolândia Region of the Pantanal, UNIDERP/FMB, Campo Grande, MS. Edelman, M. (1992), The Logic of the Latifundio, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA.

Ferguson, J. (1990), The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho, Cambridge

University Press, Cambridge.

FFEM (2000), Avis du conseil scientifique technique concernant le projet d’appui à la valorisation de la biodiversité dans le Pantanal du Rio Negro, FFEM, Paris.

Foucault, M. (1975), Surveiller et punir : naissance de la prison, Gallimard, Paris.

FPNRF (2000), Projet d’appui à la valorisation de la biodiversité dans le Pantanal du Rio Negro, FPNRF, Paris. © AFD Working Paper No. 93 • Community participation in the Pantanal, Brazil - January 2010 67

References

FPNRF (2002), Projeto de apoia a criaçao do parque natural do Pantanal: relatorio de avaliaçao final, FPNRF, Campo Grande, Brazil.

Girard, P. (2002), Efeito cumulativo das barragens no Pantanal, Instituto Centro Vida, Campo Grande, Mato Grosso do Sul,

Brazil.

Gouveia, F. (2006), “Modelo francês de Parque Natural não apreende complexidade do Pantanal”, Com Ciencia Online, [Internet] 16 March. Available at: http://www.comciencia.br/comciencia/handler.php?section=3&noticia=60 [Accessed 26 August 2009].

Greenpeace (2009), Amazon Cattle Footprint, Mato Grosso: State of Destruction. Greenpeace, Sao Paulo, Brazil. Available

at: http://www.greenpeace.org/raw/content/international/press/ reports/amazon-cattle-footprint-mato.pdf. [Accessed 10 August 2009]

Junk, W.-J. and C. Nunes da Cunha (2005), “Pantanal: A Large South American Wetland at a Crossroads”, Ecological Engineering, 24(4), pp. 391-401.

Junk, W.-J, C-J da Silva, K.-M. Wantzen, C. Nunes da Cunha and F. Nogueira (2009), “The of Mato Grosso : Status of

Ecological Research, Actual use, and Management for Sustainable Development”, in Maltby E. (ed.), The Wetlands Handbook, Blackwell Science, Oxford, UK.

Lukes, S. (1975), Power: a Radical View, the Macmillan Press, London.

Olson, D., E. Dinerstein, P. Canevari, I. Davidson, G. Castro, V. Morisset, R. Abell and E. Toledo Biome (1998), Freshwater Biodiversity of Latin America and the Carribean: A Conservation Assessment, Biodiversity Support Program, Washington, DC.

Parque Regional do Pantanal PRP,(2002), Apresentaçao sintetica, septembre 2002, Instituto do Parque do Pantanal, Campo Grande, Brazil.

Patterson, J. (1999), “Wetlands and Climate Change: Feasibility Investigation of Giving Credit for Conserving Wetlands as Carbon Sinks”, Wetlands International Special Publication, 1-1999, Wetlands International, Ottawa, Canada.

Seidl, A.-F., J. dos Santos Vila de Silva and A.-S. Moraes (2001), “Cattle ranching and deforestation in the Brazilian Pantanal”, Ecological Economics, 36, pp. 413-425.

SODEPAN (2009), Objetivos. Available at: http://www.sodepan.org.br/objetivos.html. [Acessed 12 August 2009]

Wade, J.-S. (1999), “The Brazilian Pantanal and Florida Everglades: a Comparison of Ecosystems, Uses and Managment”, in

EMBRAPA, Simpósio Sobre Recursos Naturais e Sócio-econômicos do Pantanal: Manejo e conservação, Corumbá, MS,

Brazil, 18-22 November 1996, Embrapa Pantanal: Corumbá, pp. 29-37.

Wildlife Conservation Society WCS (2009), Protecting Biodiversity in the Brazilian Pantanal. Available at:

http://archive.wcs.org/globalconservation/latinamerica/brazil/pantanalbioe380.html? preview=&psid=&ph=class%25252525...

[Accessed 9 August 2009].

Wilcox, R. (1992), “Cattle and Environment in the Pantanal of Mato Grosso, Brazil”, 1870-1970, Agricultural History, 66(2), pp.

232-256.

Série Documents de travail / Working Papers Series Publiés depuis janvier 2009 / published since January 2009 Les numéros antérieurs sont consultables sur le site : http://recherche.afd.fr Previous publications can be consulted online at: http://recherche.afd.fr

N° 78

« L’itinéraire professionnel du jeune Africain » Les résultats d’une enquête auprès de jeunes leaders Africains sur les « dispositifs de formation professionnelle post-primaire »

Richard Walther, consultant ITG, Marie Tamoifo, porte-parole de la jeunesse africaine et de la diaspora Contact : Nicolas Lejosne, département de la Recherche, AFD - janvier 2009.

N° 79

Le ciblage des politiques de lutte contre la pauvreté : quel bilan des expériences dans les pays en développement ?

N° 80

Les nouveaux dispositifs de formation professionnelle post-primaire. Les résultats d’une enquête terrain au Cameroun,

Emmanuelle Lavallée, Anne Olivier, Laure Pasquier-Doumer, Anne-Sophie Robilliard, DIAL - février 2009. Mali et Maroc

Richard Walther, Consultant ITG N° 81

N° 82

Contact : Nicolas Lejosne, département de la Recherche, AFD - mars 2009.

Economic Integration and Investment Incentives in Regulated Industries

Emmanuelle Auriol, Toulouse School of Economics, Sara Biancini, Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA, Comments by : Yannick Perez and Vincent Rious - April 2009.

Capital naturel et développement durable en Nouvelle-Calédonie - Etude 1. Mesures de la « richesse totale » et soutenabilité du développement de la Nouvelle-Calédonie

Clément Brelaud, Cécile Couharde, Vincent Géronimi, Elodie Maître d’Hôtel, Katia Radja, Patrick Schembri, Armand Taranco, Université de Versailles - Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, GEMDEV N° 83 N° 84 N° 85

N° 86

N° 87

N° 88

Contact : Valérie Reboud, département de la Recherche, AFD - juin 2009.

The Global Discourse on “Participation” and its Emergence in Biodiversity Protection Olivier Charnoz. - July 2009.

Community Participation in Biodiversity Protection: an Enhanced Analytical Framework for Practitioners Olivier Charnoz - August 2009.

Les Petits opérateurs privés de la distribution d’eau à Maputo : d’un problème à une solution ? Aymeric Blanc, Jérémie Cavé, LATTS, Emmanuel Chaponnière, Hydroconseil Contact : Aymeric Blanc, département de la recherche, AFD - août 2009.

Les transports face aux défis de l’énergie et du climat Benjamin Dessus, Global Chance.

Contact : Nils Devernois, département de la Recherche, AFD - septembre 2009.

Fiscalité locale : une grille de lecture économique

Guy Gilbert, professeur des universités à l’Ecole normale supérieure (ENS) de Cachan Contact : Réjane Hugounenq, département de la Recherche, AFD - septembre 2009.

Les coûts de formation et d’insertion professionnelles - Conclusions d’une enquête terrain en Côte d’Ivoire

Richard Walther, expert AFD avec la collaboration de Boubakar Savadogo (Akilia) et de Borel Foko (Pôle de Dakar) Contact : Nicolas Lejosne, département de la Recherche, AFD - octobre 2009.

Série Documents de travail / Working Papers Series

N° 89

Présentation de la base de données. Institutional Profiles Database 2009 (IPD 2009)

Institutional Profiles Database III - Presentation of the Institutional Profiles Database 2009 (IPD 2009)

Denis de Crombrugghe, Kristine Farla, Nicolas Meisel, Chris de Neubourg, Jacques Ould Aoudia, Adam Szirmai N° 90

Contact : Nicolas Meisel, département de la Recherche, AFD - décembre 2009.

Migration, santé et soins médicaux à Mayotte

Sophie Florence, Jacques Lebas, Pierre Chauvin, Equipe de recherche sur les déterminants sociaux de la santé et du recours aux soins UMRS 707 (Inserm - UPMC)

N° 91

Contact : Christophe Paquet, département Technique opérationnel (DTO), AFD - janvier 2010.

Capital naturel et developpement durable en Nouvelle-Calédonie - Etude 2. Soutenabilité de la croissance néocalédonienne : un enjeu de politiques publiques

Cécile Couharde, Vincent Géronimi, Elodie Maître d’Hôtel, Katia Radja, Patrick Schembri, Armand Taranco Université de Versailles – Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, GEMDEV N° 92

Contact : Valérie Reboud, département Technique opérationnel, AFD - janvier 2010.

Community Participation Beyond Idealisation and Demonisation: Biodiversity Protection in Soufrière, St. Lucia Olivier Charnoz, Research Department, AFD - January 2010.