Development Aid Reforms in the Context of New Public Management by Agence Française de Développement

Agence Française de Développement

working paper

June 2012

Development Aid Reforms in the Context of New Public Management

Jean-David Naudet, Agence Française de Développement (naudetjd@afd.fr)

Research Department Agence Française de Développement 5 rue Roland Barthes 75012 Paris - France Direction de la Stratégie www.afd.fr Département de la Recherche

119

Acknowledgements The author used research conducted by Vincent Kienzler in the drafting of this article. He would also like to thank Thomas Mélonio for the reflection they conducted together on a similar subject.

Disclaimer The analyses and conclusions formulated in this Working Paper are solely the responsibility of its author. They do not necessarily reflect the position of Agence Française de Développement or its partner institutions.

Publications Director: Dov ZERAH Editorial Director: Robert PECCOUD ISSN: 1958-539X Copyright: 2nd quarter 2012

Layout: Denise PERRIN

Contents

Abstract

Introduction

New Public Management

1.2.

The extension of New Public Management

Development Aid Policy Reforms

1.1.

2.1.

The four characteristics of New Public Management

Segmentation of responsibilities

Performance-based management

2.2.

Accountability

2.4.

Systemic reforms

2.3.

The Challenge of Implementation

3.2.

Collective accountability and individual responsibility

3.1. 3.3.

Management of intangible performance

From segmentation to fragmentation

Conclusion

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

Bibliography

Abstract The purpose of this article is to analyse reforms to the international development aid policy based on the concepts of New

Public Management. Three principles are particularly discussed: the segmentation of development policy implementation, the growing concern for accountability, and the establishment of performance-based management systems. The analysis of

developments in official development assistance clearly shows that New Public Management principles are being applied to

aid policies. Yet the distinctive characteristics of aid – difficulty to define performance, extreme heterogeneity of results, systematic collective responsibility, disconnection between those who pay for policies and those who benefit from them,

absence of global regulation – make it an inappropriate example of the application of these management principles. As a result,

a number of implementation difficulties appear as challenges for the future of aid policies.

Introduction

Development aid has always been the focus of a flow of

place in public management, the so-called New Public

different types of criticism, including that of being managed

Management (NPM).

in an ineffective and excessively bureaucratic manner.

The purpose of this article is precisely to provide an

Some of the proponents of this criticism, such as Bishop

analytical grid for the changes taking place in aid policy

and Green (2008), base their hope on private aid and what

management using the wider framework of NPM.

seeks to demonstrate how development results could be

The first section briefly describes the principles of NPM

employed by the great corporate capitalists to official

literature that is available on this topic. The second section

has recently been called philanthrocapitalism. Their work significantly improved by applying the methods and rigour

using a brief and simplified summary of the abundant

development assistance. Another author (Edwards, 2010)

draws a parallel between these principles and recent aid

challenges this position by arguing that these methods do

policy reforms. By focusing on the three fundamental

activities are based.

accountability and the segmentation of responsibilities), the

This debate is timely and salutary. It should therefore have

that have emerged from the application of these principles

not reflect the values and specificities on which cooperation

aspects of NPM (performance-based management,

third section subsequently highlights the practical issues

taken place in the sphere of official development assis-

to aid policies. This analysis seeks to pinpoint what, among

programs have been seeking to make aid management

appear to stem from the specificities of development aid.

tance a long time ago. Indeed, since the 1990s, reform

the different implementation difficulties encountered, would

less bureaucratic and to bring its management principles

Finally, a brief conclusion outlines the main points that have

movement is clearly inspired by the wave of change taking

how to adapt to NPM in the specific case of aid policies.

more into line with private management principles. This

been dealt with and highlights the need for reflection on

ÂŠ AFD Working Paper No. 119 â&#x20AC;˘ Development Aid Reforms â&#x20AC;˘ June 2012 7

1. New Public Management

NPM came about in the 1980s, at the same time as the

The integration of the options and choices (empowerment)

objective was to emerge from bureaucratic public manage-

beneficiary, is regarded as a determining factor in improving

liberal “counter-revolution”. The political plan was clear: the

of the “client/user” of policies, who is both the payer and

ment, regarded as ineffective, and to reverse the seemingly

them.

relentless upward trend in public expenditure. The guiding

principle was to bring public entities’ management methods

The concept of efficiency in policy implementation becomes

more into line with those of private company manage-

the overarching objective. In the 1990s, it was replaced by

for public policies (Ferlie, 1996) that allows effective incen-

United Kingdom. The aim of public management is to be

ment. This involves building a quasi-market environment

the similar notion of “value for money”, especially in the

tives to be defined for stakeholders. NPM supports and is

able to provide the largest possible quantity and quality of

and privatisation.

seen as playing a role in public management that is similar

complementary to the movement in favour of deregulation

goods and services at the lowest cost. Efficiency can be to productivity in private management.

There is extensive literature on the characteristics of the

principles of NPM (Hood, 1991 and 1995; Mac Laughin et al.,

The public manager replaces the former administrative

the core “concepts” of public management.

procedures and managing processes and personnel, but of

For example, public policy implementation is compared to a

delegation of responsibility and the autonomy of the public

2002; Barzelay, 2001) and on the gradual transformation of

official. It is no longer so much a question of respecting

organising the appropriate means to achieve results. The

process to produce goods and/or services. This blurs the

manager, as with his private counterpart, become conditions

difference between public entities and private companies,

for public policy efficiency.

which are both regarded as service providers. The notion of a user, or even a client, of public policies becomes central

Beyond these conceptual developments, NPM can be

in describing someone who was previously the beneficiary.

generally defined by four main characteristics.

1.1. The four characteristics of New Public Management ●

The first characteristic of NPM is that public policy

units (often agencies) organised by “manageable

delegated to autonomous managerial units that are

implemented horizontally, i.e. in the form of competition

implementation is segmented through missions being

products” (Hood, 1995). Segmentation is sometimes

given the responsibility for clearly identifiable objec-

between public entities that may be given the responsi-

tives. This fragmentation may be achieved within the

bility for similar objectives, or even between public and

institutions, in the form of project teams for example,

private entities. However, it is also carried out vertically,

policy implementation being segmented into strategic

mentation based on principal/agent-type relations.

but often leads to the institutional framework for public

creating chains of delegation for public policy imple-

1. New Public Management The main instrument governing the relations between

objective- and performance-based contracts. The latter

these different entities is the contract (Lane, 2000). It

are more or less formalised, their performance is eva-

generally defines objectives and performance and is

luated and, in principle, they provide the basis for

binding upon the entities in charge of the different

promotion, sanctions and wage policies.

management and implementation levels for public

policies (or is between these entities and users’

●

representatives). One emblematic example is the

●

assessments is central to the way in which NPM

Public Sector Agreement (PSA) established in the United Kingdom for the main public operators1.

operates and constitutes the fourth characteristic.

The segmentation of responsibilities is based on a

instrument for managerial and human resource

Performance Measurement and Management Systems – PMMS (cf. Politt, 1986) serve as an accountability

widespread practice of accountability (Mulgan, 2000),

management units. They provide the basis for the

the second characteristic of NPM. Managerial units and

relationship between the public authority/different

the managers themselves are given the responsibility

entities in charge of policy implementation and the

(often under contract) for the results to be achieved.

clients/citizens along with their representations (Radin,

They are also accountable for performance towards all

2006).

the stakeholders. The term that is sometimes used is

360-degree accountability: it is vertical towards the

Performance, a central concept of NPM, is generally

the different control and transparency bodies and social

moving closer towards a maximum ratio between the

authorities responsible for policies, horizontal towards

directly related to the notion of efficiency. It involves

towards public policy users and their representations

resources allocated and the results achieved (value for

The third characteristic concerns the principles of

public policy productivity.

govern human resource management. It involves going

PMMS are very often based on sets of indicators that give

sic bureaucratic management and establishing incenti-

resources, the results achieved and performance. One of

often requires going beyond the excessively inflexible

of indicators. However, this is not the only instrument in the

(Goetz and Jenkins, 2005). ●

The definition of target objectives and performance

money). If one continues the comparison with private

management further, performance is the measurement of

responsibility, autonomy and initiative taking that

beyond the crippling divesting of responsibility of clas-

a practical shape to the target objectives, the use of

ve measures that promote individual effectiveness. This

the specific markers of NPM would appear to be a wide use

rules that govern public service personnel. NPM the-

specific toolbox of PMMS, which also contains certain

refore often relies on semi-autonomous entities

forms of evaluation, performance audits and benchmarking.

dedicated to specific tasks, the growing number of

which is sometimes referred to as a phenomenon of

agencification. Here again, managers and their teams are individually bound to public policy actors under

1 PSAs are organised in the following manner: mission, objectives, performance indicators, “value for money” targets and responsibilities.

1. New Public Management

1.2. The extension of New Public Management All analysts observe that NPM methods have been

NPM has also been taken on board by international

extended to a large number of countries and to an

organisations, particularly the World Bank and the

experimented in pioneering countries, such as New

(OECD) through its Public Management Committee.

gradually spread to all Western countries and beyond

Developing countries, partly under this impetus and more

political contexts, as can be seen, for example, with the

are not left out of the movement. On the contrary, the

increasingly wider scope of public policies. NPM was first

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

Zealand, Sweden and the United Kingdom, and has

(Hood, 1995). It has particularly been adapted to different

generally that of the international aid system as a whole,

case of the United Kingdom, where Tony Blair’s Labour

principles of NPM are quite in harmony with the manage-

government resumed the movement initiated in this

ment message conveyed by donors (depolitisation of policy

direction by the previous Conservative governments.

implementation, priority to efficiency, “agencification”,

accountability and results-based management). As a result,

In other countries, such as France and Germany, NPM was

many of the principles (more or less appropriated) of NPM

introduced later and more gradually. This was the case in

are to be found in developing countries and are often taken

France in the early 2000s (Berrebi-Hoffmann and Grémion,

on board by Ministries of Finance.

2009), where the adoption of the Organic Law on Finance

Laws (LOLF) and the principles of the General Review of

Public Policies provide clear examples.

2. Development Aid Policy Reform

To our knowledge, there is not one analysis in the literature

(iii) the establishment of PMMS. In Northern countries,

and NPM. Yet the application of its principles to development

developments in the internal management of aid institutions,

devoted to the linkage between aid management reforms

these phenomena may systematically be analysed as being

aid policies can be clearly seen. Among the many ways to

but also in Southern countries as the consequence that the

segmentation of the implementation of development

on development policies.

illustrate this, we shall successively be looking at (i) the

“management conditionalities” of aid instruments have had

policies, (ii) the growing concern for accountability and

2.1. Segmentation of responsibilities Prior to the wave of NPM, development aid implementation

mentation and has resulted in “implementation chains” (Aid

was widely segmented into projects, i.e. into “managerial

Chains, according to Wallace et al., 2007) governed by

units” with responsibility for specific objectives. This method

contracts based on logical frameworks that function through

of organisation, a forerunner to new public management,

vertical feedback reporting on activities and their results.

was extensively developed in the 1980s and 1990s. At the

end of this period, the proliferation of projects did, however,

Finally, at the third level of segmentation, since the late

tation of implementation, which is a classic consequence of

institutions in charge of defining and managing aid policies.

pose a problem as it demonstrated the excessive fragmen-

1990s there has been a large increase in the number of

NPM (see below). In the 2000s, programme aid, coordination

This fragmentation sometimes occurs at the national level,

development community. Although the aim was to reduce

fragmentation, the managerial system, which functioned on

empowered by public authorities. This is the case in various countries2: in New Zealand with the creation of the New

was nevertheless not transformed. This can be seen, for

2002; in Australia, with the establishment of the Australian

and alignment became the overarching maxim for the

where the trend is to scale up delegation to “agencies”

the basis of a segmentation of objective-based policies,

Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID) in

example, with the ever-increasing use of the logical

Agency for International Development (AUSAID) in 2010 as

framework tool that links objectively verifiable activities,

an autonomous aid implementation agency; in Spain with

targets and indicators.

the creation in 1998 of the Agencia Española de

At the same time, since the 1980s, aid policy implementation

charge of implementing Spanish cooperation, or again in

Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (AECID) in

(which used to be widely based on local and international

the United States with the creation of the Millennium

administrative apparatus, such as technical assistance) has increasingly been relying on specialised entities. They are mainly non-governmental organisations (NGOs), but also

2 It should be noted that certain countries have taken an opposite or more complex course. New Zealand reversed its decision to empower NZAID (this point is dealt with further on). In Norway, NORAD reintegrated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Japan, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) integrated the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), but at the same time became an autonomous agency for the Japanese aid policy.

public agencies, associations and civil society organi-

sations, sometimes even private entities. This has led to a form of inter-institutional competition in aid policy imple-

2. Development Aid Policy Reform Challenge Corporation in 2002 with a mandate to implement

(GFFATM) and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and

Agency for International Development (USAID).

organise vertical chains for the implementation of aid

selective and effective aid alongside the United

States

Immunisation (GAVI). As their name implies, these funds

programmes. At the local level, they establish competition

However, it is at the multilateral level that the majority of

between different implementation entities on the basis of

instruments and institutions dedicated to specific objectives

specific international objectives. Similarly, there has been a

have been created. According to Severino and Ray (2010),

proliferation in the number of Trust Funds created, which

2000 and 2005. They are mainly vertical funds, such as the

managed by multilateral institutions.

twenty-five multilateral institutions were set up between

are basket funds dedicated to a specific objective and

Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria

2.2. Accountability The issue of accountability, like that of the segmentation of

Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

responsibilities, did not wait for the development of NPM

(SIDA) and from other entities in charge of implementing

before it emerged in debates on aid policies and this was

Swedish aid. In 2010, the Independent Commission for Aid

even before it began to concern other sectoral policies.

Impact (ICAI) was set up in the United Kingdom with the

Indeed, in a review of the history of aid evaluation,

same mandate to independently evaluate the impact of

Cracknell (2000) observes that development institutions’

British aid. Several countries are planning to set up other

cated to this task date back to 1979. However, it would

aid policies.

strong interest in evaluation and the creation of units dedi-

similar control entities (watchdogs) specifically dedicated to

appear that at the time, the focus was clearly more on learning than on the need to “be accountable”. Independent

At the international level, an Oxford Policy Management

this same concern3.

tional mechanisms working for aid accountability, such as,

analyses of aid effectiveness also attest to the existence of

(OPM) study (2008) provides a “selection” of twenty interna-

for example, the Commitment to Development Index of the

However, it was from the 1990s onwards that the concept

Center for Global Development (CGDev), the Annual

on aid and for aid practices. Consequently, development aid

of the NGO CONCORD coordination group.

public policies in the world (hundreds of evaluations of dif-

The concern for accountability was initially oriented vertically

of accountability became a common tool for the discourse

Report of the Reality of Aid Network and the Watch Report

certainly went on to become one of the most evaluated ferent tools or areas related to it are indeed conducted

towards Northern political structures, but went on to

every year).

become mutual between partners from the North and

partners from the North and South, then social, i.e. directed

The agenda increasingly focused on setting up totally

towards the users/clients of development policies.

independent evaluation, audit, supervision and bench-

Mutual accountability was, moreover, adopted as one of

marking mechanisms alongside the dedicated departments

the five principles of the 2005 Paris Declaration.

within each cooperation organisation. In 2006, Sweden set

up the Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation (SADEV) as a new institution totally independent from the

3 These analyses have been regular since Cassen (1985).

2. Development Aid Policy Reform All these mechanisms, along with the exchanges related

Accountability is also promoted in Southern countries

to the complex aid implementation chains, create a

through the activities of aid agencies to support par-

reporting activity that is central to the way in which the

liaments, through the media, control bodies and, more

current system operates. At the institutional (corporate)

generally, the countervailing power (Hudson, 2009), but

ration of scorecards, which are different types of indicator

ability towards authorities and citizens in development

level, this activity materialises, for example, in the prepa-

also through the inclusion of transparency and account-

dashboards (see below) specific to each institution or

programmes and projects.

entity. This type of reporting mechanism is a very recent

phenomenon and all the main multilateral organisations have adopted it or are in the process of doing so.

2.3. Performance-based management

Performance-based management (or PMMS) is the third

the impetus of the European Commission, budget support

management since the end of the 1990s. USAID was the

tionality on the reforms to be implemented to an ex post

pillar of NPM and has been an integral part of aid

therefore (partially) evolved from being an ex ante condi-

first agency to propose introducing PMMS (Results-Based

conditionality based on performance evaluation. This con-

NPM Foundation Act in the United States: the 1993 US

ficiaries and donors on the results achieved, set out in

the other cooperation agencies, which in turn adopted

support and the approach through national poverty reduction

Management Framework) in 1994, immediately after the

tributed to focusing political dialogue between aid bene-

Government Results and Performance Act. It was joined by

Performance Assessment Frameworks. Both budget

mechanisms that were different but based on the same

strategies have also been tools that encourage budget

Management Policy), the Department for International

expenditures and indicators – to be established in a large

principles: ACDI in Canada in 1996 (Results-Based

programmes – based on sets linking target objectives,

Development (DFID) in the United Kingdom in 1998

number of developing countries.

(Performance-Based Management [Hood, 2006]), the

United Nations (Results-Based Management in 2001), the

Output-based aid is the most recent in the family of

European Union (Results-Oriented Monitoring System set

performance-based management tools and is promoted

that concerned all cooperation organisations, even more so

the World Bank. It involves an ex post allocation of aid

up in 2002), etc. These are just a few examples of a trend

by numerous actors in the international community, notably

from 2005 onwards when results-based management was

depending

Declaration with a view to enhancing aid effectiveness.

ambitious instrument of this kind destined to finance deve-

adopted as one of the five principles of the Paris

the

results

achieved.

The

Clean

Development Mechanism (CDM) was certainly the first

lopment projects in the field of climate change. This form of

Similarly, performance-based management was transplanted

aid is currently developing, for example in the health sector

to management systems in partner countries through the

where funds for decentralised healthcare centres (including

instrumentation related to programmes and projects

for wage incentives) are allocated on the basis of an

financed by aid. From the end of the 1990s onwards, under

evaluation of the number and quality of treatments.

2. Development Aid Policy Reform

2.4. Systemic reforms

These three phenomena – segmentation of responsibilities,

temptation to see a management learning process that is

enhanced accountability and performance-based

endogenous to the aid policy or development sector. For

m a n a g e m e n t – are, of course, interrelated. Vertical,

example, results-based management would therefore be

horizontal and social accountability are indeed based on

justified by the fact that aid management had previously

performance assessments. This accountability is core to

been based too much on processes and had not managed

and, first and foremost, their efficiency, as it retroactively

These interpretations do hold some truth. However, the aim

implementation. This can only work if the institutional archi-

article, is to show that all these developments form an

the process to continuously improve policies and projects

to demonstrate the effectiveness of the actions carried out.

creates incentives for the different levels of responsibility for

of this description, and the main argument of the present

tecture is segmented into autonomous “units” that are given

integrated and perfectly coherent whole. They also originate

the responsibility for specific targets, such as the provision

from a powerful global movement to change public

of a certain number of goods and services.

management which, admittedly, can be adapted to the aid

A factual, isolated and contextual interpretation (depending

it. The fact that developments in the aid system are not put

policy, but on the basis of principles that are exogenous to

on the countries studied) is often made of the different

into perspective within the analytical framework of new

changes at work in aid management (for example, by

public management conceals this convergence which

observing the development of earmarked vertical funds or

should, however, be perfectly clear.

independent evaluation entities). There may also be a

3. The Challenge of Implementation There is extensive literature on the ways in which NPM is

achieved and on the difficulties encountered.

applied in practice to different public policies, on the results

Box 1. The “pluses” and “minuses” of the implementation of NPM Ferlie (1996)

The “pluses” •

Greater focus on efficiency and value for taxpayers

•

Transparency through contracts and contestability

•

Champions consumers against public sector producers

•

Active management not passive administration

Challenging poor performance

The “minuses” •

Contract based modes of steering are weak

•

Proliferation of contracts and subcontracts

•

Poor lateral communication around ‘wicked problems’

•

Vertical lines of reporting

No theory of organisational learning

Loss of creative policy making capacity

The blocking factors in public management – heavy

Indeed, this section places more emphasis on the weak-

bureaucratisation, excessive and ever-increasing expen-

nesses and limits related to the implementation of NPM in

managerialism – as identified in the pre-NPM diagnostics have, in many cases, been greatly mitigated4.

The former are easier to document because they are

By contrast, here again, when we look at aid policies, to our

present aid policy management that is difficult to consider,

dit u r e s , a l l - powerful professional cultures that resist

aid policies than on the progress that it has brought about.

derived from the analysis of the difficulties of day-to-day practice. The latter merit a comparative analysis of past and

knowledge there is no overall analytical reflection on the

all things being equal.

management changes that were mentioned in the previous

4 For example, Amar and Berthier (2007) note: “Moreover, the introduction of NPM has made it possible to avoid significant waste and to make substantial savings. This is the case in Australia, without it having any impacts on the quality of services offered (Domberger and Hall, 1996). In New Zealand, according to the former Minister of Industry, Mac Tigue (2005), employment in the administration has been reduced by 66 % and the share of the State in GNP has fallen from 44 % to 27 %, while productivity has increased. The budget surpluses have made it possible to reduce public debt from 63 % to 17% of GNP and to bring down income tax rates.This reduction has led to an additional income of 20 %. According to Burnham (2000), in the United Kingdom, NMP has reduced costs, improved service quality, increased productivity and greatly reduced the number of civil servants (down 34 % since 1979) (…)”.

section. This section provides elements that are quite

exploratory on this topic by focusing on the management of aid institutions. The scope of management changes in Southern countries – the consequences of aid policy

reforms – merits a separate analysis and will not be addressed below.

3. The Challenge of Implementation In fact, it does not seem possible to compare aid effective-

aim to conduct an assessment and make a judgment, but to

reforms, although this could contribute to a real evaluation

brought about. We shall proceed by examining in turn what

ness or efficiency prior to and following these managerial

identify the new managerial issues that these reforms have

of the latter. To our knowledge, the very abundant literature

we have identified as being the three characteristic

on aid evaluation never raises this question of how aid

phenomena of the implementation of NPM in policies in the

effectiveness evolves over time. And, if this were the case,

reverse order to the previous section: performance-based

changes rather than to changes in political or economic

tation of responsibilities.

it would be extremely difficult to attribute it to management

management, multi-faceted accountability and the segmen-

contexts. Consequently, the critical analyses below do not

3.1. The management of intangible performance

The great merit of performance-based management

has on public health (Is prevention taken into account?

(decision-makers, users, managers, etc.) to the results of actions, whereas experience shows that resource-based

Is morbidity reduced?) and take account of the equity of access to the service5.

focus of attention for the institutions that implement these

These ambiguities over the definition of performance can

However, generally speaking, NPM analysts observe that

indicators on resources (percentages of resources and of

cult to define, and that it is both a political and technical

achievements (irrigated areas and number of classrooms

systems is that they draw the attention of aid actors

Does the care provided meet the priorities of public health?

management has been, and remains to a large extent, the policies.

clearly be seen on the lists of indicators defined in the scorecards of multilateral institutions6, which integrate

the concept of public policy performance is extremely diffi-

projects allocated to different sectors to be developed),

issue. First of all, at what level in the results chain should

built), intermediary results (outcomes, such as the primary

this performance be situated? Bouckaert (2005) draws a

completion rate), sectoral impact (infant and maternal

line between private and public activities by assuming that

mortality rate) and overall impact (growth and Gini

for private activities, outputs are an end in themselves,

coefficient), efficiency (ratio of operating costs to aid trans-

perspective that is necessary in order to give meaning to a

(percentage of projects rated satisfactory at completion)

while their consequences (outcomes or impacts) provide a

fers and appraisal time periods), judgment of effectiveness

public activity. Moreover, beyond effectiveness and efficiency, the values are an element of judgment that is

essential for assessing public policies: are they fair or

5 To give a literary parallel, Dr. Knock in the play by Jules Romains, “Doctor Knock or the triumph of medicine”, is an efficient private service provider, but a mediocre public doctor.

unfair, equitable or not, coercive or not, participatory or not,

socially useful or not etc.? (Dalton and Dalton, 1988).

6 The scorecards of sixteen multilateral institutions were examined: World Bank (International Development Association – IDA – and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development – EBRD), African Development Bank (ADB), Asian Development Bank (AsDB), European Investment Bank (EIB), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), European Commission, Global Environment Facility (GEF), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFFATM), Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol (MLF), Clean Technology Fund (CTF), Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI), International Finance Corporation (IFC) and UNITAID. All the indicators referred to in the rest of this section are extracts from these different scorecards.

To illustrate these points, one could basically say that the

performance of a private healthcare centre can be gauged

by the quantity and quality of the services delivered compared to their cost, while that of a public healthcare centre must integrate the impact that the service provided

3. The Challenge of Implementation and organisational effectiveness (number of supervisory

irrigation systems is an equally important dimension of the

activities per operation). Few of these indicators reflect

characterisation of the performance of the policy in

questions of value and when they do (percentage of local

question. A managerial use entirely focused on the “surface

teams and corporate social responsibility – CSR – indica-

performance.

that are intrinsic to aid policies or policies financed by aid

Finally, management requires aggregated information. This

the poverty rate or the Gini coefficient).

types of indicator (outputs, outcomes and impact, for

personnel in teams, percentage of executive women in

area” indicator would be likely to lead to poor actual

tors), it is a question of corporate ethics and not of values

(or they are otherwise highly aggregated indicators, such as

point poses a fresh problem as the aggregation of different

example) is difficult to conceive, and even the aggregation

We shall briefly mention the problems of measuring these magnitudes7 that can be illustrated by an indicator used by

of results of a similar nature often leads to results that are

meaningless. For example, the indicator “kilometres of

most institutions: the reduction of CO 2 emissions. By definition, this indicator is not observable as it quantifies an avoided nuisance8. In order to be measured, it requires

transport routes built or rehabilitated” includes new rapid

urban routes and rehabilitated rural roads in the same

calculation and excludes issues of distribution and equity.

modelling based on a reference scenario, the definition of which raises considerable methodological difficulties9.

whether the classrooms have been built in poor or more

Some areas that are difficult to quantify – such as education quality10, healthcare quality, capacity development, the

All these points have been commented on by PMMS

Similarly, “the number of classrooms built” does not indicate

advantaged regions.

reduction in corruption and the improvement in governance

analysts concerning policies that are different to the one

that they are often priorities for the relevant institutions.

“pathologies” by way of response to these difficulties to

– have no (or few) performance indicators, despite the fact

analysed here. They identify two types of institutional

grasp, interpret and use public policy performance.

However, it is just as difficult to interpret and use indicators

as it is to define and measure them. Indeed, it is the causes

The first is often mentioned (Hood and Peters, 2004; Pollitt

of the variations in performance that a priori provide

et al., 1999) and involves adopting only the appearance

operational managerial data (Smith, 1990). This causal

and rhetoric of performance-based management, while

relationship is sometimes included in a performance

retaining real, more bureaucratic and less formalised

case with the “reduction in CO2 emissions” or the “number of jobs created”. The difficulty then lies in how to measure it11. The indicators are often more the result of multiple

appear to provide examples of this type of gap between

indicator that implicitly integrates a counterfactual, as is the

management methods. Aid policies would certainly

discourse and practice.

causes (maternal mortality rate or primary completion rate),

7 Extensively documented, particularly in the case of poverty rates (see, for example Bhalla, 2002).

the effects of which would need to be evaluated separately

for a managerial use.

8 It should be noted that aid used to prevent nuisances or disasters systematically comes up against this difficulty of delivering results and notably, therefore, of measuring the latter.

9 This has been widely studied, for example under the CDM, and for a few technologies has (with difficulty) given rise to shared methodological principles.

Indicators generally reflect part of the complex notion of performance. To take one example used in several score-

10 It should be noted that measurement systems in developing countries are making headway on this topic.

cards, “the surface area of land put under irrigation” clearly

reflects a dimension of the efficiency of an agricultural

11 Concerning the number of jobs created, another difficulty in terms of both measurement and interpretation is the integration of the leakage effect, i.e., for example, unproductive jobs that are suppressed due to the creation of more productive jobs under a modernisation process.

development project or policy, but this dimension is not

sufficient in itself. Experience tells us that the durability of

3. The Challenge of Implementation For example, the first phase of the evaluation of the Paris

sectors. The debate on aid selectivity, which is typical of

mentation of the principles of the text in aid agencies

attention that international aid pays to the countries in

Declaration (OECD, 2007) focusing on the level of imple-

creaming, has until recently contributed to reducing the

observed “the relative… lack of progress recorded” in the

greatest difficulty.

field of management based on development results, noting that “indicators and conceptual understandings are still

The same causes produce the same effects. It is not

the level at which results are to be defined”. It also points

to the application of PMMS as in the other policies.

in discussion about indicators”. The second phase of this

the specificities of the aid policy may be vis-à-vis

been “advancing least”. Another example of the gap

their consequences.

internally debated issues”, as well as “a lack of clarity about

surprising to find the same symptoms in aid policies linked

out that “donors and the government seem frequently to be

Conversely, it is perhaps more interesting to look at what

evaluation (2011) in turn observes that this principle has

performance-based management and to seek to identify

between theory and practice is the Peer Review of Swedish

aid (OECD, 2009), which, from the very first pages, high-

The first of these specificities is probably the heterogeneity

lights the aid policy commitment to results-based manage-

of the targeted results. Performance includes different types

the future. However, about ten pages on, the report

ratings) that have different maturities in the impact chain

ment and the aim of placing even more emphasis on it in

of results (organisational, field, cost-benefit ratios and

observes that “At the time of the peer review visits, few staff

(outputs, outcomes and impact). This is not specific to the

means in practice ”. The same observation could certainly

aid finances nearly all the public policies and therefore aims

aid policy, but the specificity encountered here is that the

were clear on what results-based management really be made for other institutions.

to achieve different types of results in all sectors. Moreover,

these results are obtained in a wide range of contexts,

A second institutional pathology is goal displacement (cf.

which makes comparisons and aggregations difficult. In

multiple and often ambiguous objectives, focus on a small

comparative cost of connecting urban families in India and

Gregory, 1995). The fact that complex public policies, with

terms of performance, what can be said, for example, of the

number of quantitative targets leads to the purpose and

rural families in Niger to drinking water? Or again, of the

meaning of these policies being “distorted”. This goal

aggregation of children in school in Peru and in the

displacement may take several forms: performance may

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)? The extreme

prevail over relevance (notably by dividing up specific

heterogeneity of results that are relevant to describe aid

micro-objectives, which masks the overall relevance of the

performance certainly seriously hampers the implemen-

policy in question); beneficiaries that are least able to

tation of operating systems for performance-based

achieve “performance” may be excluded from the benefits

management in this field.

health and employment policies. It has become known as

A second characteristic of the aid policy is its great need to

typical of performance-based management); decision-

public support and attention. They seem particularly eager

are difficult and slow to measure; etc. These phenomena

transparent vis-à-vis all stakeholders. For example, the

of public policies (a well-known phenomenon, notably in

“creaming” and is considered to be a perverse effect that is

acquire legitimacy. ODA actors are anxious to benefit from

makers' attention may exclude quality objectives as they

to communicate to the public and to be accountable and

exist, to a certain extent, in aid policies. The focus on the

OECD’s Development Co-operation Report 2010 mentions:

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has undoubtedly

“It is not easy to demonstrate and communicate that aid

prompted a crowding out effect on all that is not included in

money is well managed and that it is having an impact. (…)

them; service quality versus service access; electricity

As taxpayers and legislators are really only interested in

equipment versus water equipment; infrastructure or

results and impacts, not process, this is where the focus of

supp o r t to the private sector versus financing for social

communication should be.” (OECD/DAC, 2010).

3. The Challenge of Implementation One could therefore assume that one of the mainsprings of

explain the gap that exists between a highly proactive

ment is the aim of contributing to an argument for

measurement for the purpose of gaining legitimacy would

instrument to manage aid policies. This could then partly

for managerial purposes.

institutions’ willingness to commit to performance measure-

discourse and a more moderate practice: performance

advocacy at the same time as, or even before, having an

appear to take the place of performance-based management

3.2. Collective accountability and individual responsibility As we have just seen, the increasing concern for account-

However, accountability is not just a principle of transpa-

ability in aid policies appears to be one of the major trends

rency. It is the cornerstone of a continual improvement loop

policy may appear to be one of the most “virtuous” policies

which relies on mechanisms for feedback, learning and

of recent decades. In many ways, the development aid

for the effectiveness and efficiency of the policy in question,

in this respect compared to other public policies: evaluation,

incentive changes.

audit and reporting practices are not only extremely widespread and formalised in each aid institution, interna-

Yet aid policy responsiveness to the results achieved partly

encourages the entire system to approximate to best prac-

sibility” and “accountability”. Development professionals

tional coordination is also strong in this field and certainly

comes up against the issue of the gap between “respon-

tices in this field.

feel that they are expected to be accountable for the outputs

and, even more so, for the outcomes of their activities.

This progress towards accountability has nevertheless

However, as these results are attributed to various causes,

difficulties.

sibility concerns different types of elements: compliance

been accompanied by a number of implementation

depending on the activities, much of their feeling of responwith the mission, reputation, respect of procedures, good

The first, of course, stems from the analyses of the previous

professional practices, cooperation and coordination,

section. Performance assessment provides the basis for

quality, level of resources earmarked for an objective and,

measure and interpret the performance of aid policies

comes.

“quality” of accountability, independently of the scale of the

More generally speaking, the responsibility is individual

accountability. Yet the fact that it is difficult to define,

when it is possible, outputs, or even the contribution to out-

obviously has repercussions on what could be called the systems in question.

(and concerns a manager, a department or an institution),

There would appear to exist a gap in all donor countries

the level of outcomes. The ambition of dividing up the

on public aid and the feeling frequently expressed by politi-

between institutions or within institutions, that would be

whereas the results are always a group effort, especially at

between the intensive practice of evaluating and reporting

overall results of a policy into a multitude of smaller results,

cians and citizens that the policy is opaque, lacks clarity

measurable and attributable to an individually identifiable

and transparency and is not sufficiently accountable for its

organisational element is often only a question of mana-

accountability – and particularly its performance indicators

c o m bination of the sound of each instrument made

of aid, notably as a result of the complexity and hetero-

ments are rarely accessible and relevant to the different

actions. It is postulated that this gap is due to the content of

gerial utopia (just as the sound of an orchestra is the

– which ultimately provides little information on the “quality”

harmonious by the conductor). In practice, results measure-

geneity described above.

levels of aggregation and attribution (Bouckaert, 2005).

3. The Challenge of Implementation All in all, in terms of learning loops, analysts have mixed

This burden varies depending on the level of confidence

Peters, 2004). The focus on accountability is, of course,

generally conducted between institutions of a different nature

views over the practices that stem from NPM (Hood and

that exists in the relations between actors. Reporting is

accompanied by a significant increase in the number of

and culture that are linked by a vertical principal/agent

potential feedback tools (reporting, evaluations and

t y p e o f r e l a t i o n : pa r l i a m e n ts a n d a i d i n s t i t u tions,

performance audits), but the latter may end up competing

bilateral donors and multilateral funds, aid institutions and

sometimes bureaucratic use as part of a necessary stage in

funds and implementation entities, aid donors and NGOs,

with each other. Their learning function also suffers from a

contracting authorities in developing countries, vertical

implementation processes.

NGOs from the North and NGOs from the South, etc. It is

based on tools which, for the reasons mentioned above,

In the field of aid, an OECD report observes that:

only partly provide an objective and shared basis for

“Regrettably, increased emphasis on performance moni-

performance assessment. The system that is designed is

deficient as a result of a lack of confidence and thus

toring and reporting often came at the expense of more

generates high transaction costs. Beyond the case of aid

rigorous program and project evaluation, which declined

markedly at most bilateral agencies during the 1990s. The

activities, some analysts even refer to the risk of there being

over 50 per cent in this period, and other donors witnessed similar declines” (Cooley and Katz, 2011)12.

numbers”) on performance measurements that have a

an excessive incentive to achieve targets (“meet the

number of evaluations conducted by USAID dropped by

degree of flexibility in their calculation method. Gregory

(1995) uses the evocative expression of “creative

The low level of knowledge accumulation generally recurs

a c c o u n t ing” to qualify the materialisation of this risk.

respect, assume that a large part of accountability practices

Once these practical implementation difficulties have been

accountable and that the control function often outweighs

cities of the aid policy would be in this respect.

as a leitmotiv in development aid policies. We may, in this first and foremost meet the increasing obligation to be

explained, it is necessary to re-examine what the specifi-

that of learning.

The first specificity would appear to us the fact that it is

A second practical difficulty stems from the fact that

systematically based on collective responsibility. Most

accountability is more demanding. The idea that each

public policies are multi-actor and partnership-based; this is

individual is accountable to all for the achievement of their

therefore a common characteristic, but in some cases they

feasibility in its implementation.

responsibilities. In the case of the aid policy, the partnership

objectives raises the issue of relevance and even of

can give rise to certain actors being assigned specific

is inherent to the activity and poses the well-known problem

The culture of accountability and control creates a need for

of the division of responsibilities (Ostrom, 2004): what type

constant justification, an attitude of adversity to risk (Ferlie

of development results can an aid institution be held

et al., 2008) and an administrative burden that is sometimes extremely heavy, to the detriment of the man-

12 This phenomenon has been observed with NPM in other policies, notably in the United States where there has been a sharp decline in evaluation following the 1993 Government Performance and Results Acts (GPRA) (Varone and Jacob, 2004).

agement of the policies themselves (Wallace et al., 2006).

For example, a recent study conducted by USAID shows

13 Once again, this observation is not confined to aid policies. For example, the US Government reconsidered the Government Performance and Results Act, mainly for reasons of bureaucratic congestion: “Nearly 10 years have passed since the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) was enacted. Agencies spend an inordinate amount of time preparing reports to comply with it, producing volumes of information of questionable value. If one were to stack up all the GPRA documents produced for Congress last year, the pile would measure over a yard high. A policy-maker would need to wade through reams of paper to find a few kernels of useful information.” (The White House, 2003).

that field officers devote 36 % of their time to external reporting (quoted by Cooley and Katz, 2011)13. At a

certain level, accountability is certainly no longer a factor of efficiency.

3. The Challenge of Implementation accountable for? The commitment to the MDGs clearly

connected and, especially, very distant. Consequently, the users of these policies are less demanding15 and corrective

shows the kind of collective responsibility (and even “hypercollective” to use the concept developed by Severino and

incentives prove hard to put in place.

Ray, 2010) that can only be accompanied by a limited

individualisation of accountability.

Accountability is partly a good in itself, but it is especially a

tool for improving policies and adjusting incentives. Here

The second specificity has been analysed several times

again, the shared responsibility and absence of an institu-

and lies in the fact that it is more difficult to have feedback from accountability because the learning loop is broken14.

tional feedback loop are a major obstacle to creating a

“quasi-market” to regulate public aid management

The taxpayers and beneficiaries of aid policies are dis-

according to the principles of NPM.

3.3. From segmentation to fragmentation It would be wrong to associate the increasing fragmentation

often prohibitive costs, as clearly illustrated by Severino

of aid architecture with the progress made by the principles

and Ray (2010).

of NPM too closely. There have undoubtedly been different

trends at work that explain this phenomenon: increase in

It is, once again, a phenomenon that is traditionally asso-

forms of cooperation (decentralised cooperation, non-

to New Zealand’s experience and observes that “Problems

the number of donor countries, development of non-State

ciated with NPM, beyond aid policies. Gregory (2003) refers

governmental cooperation and philanthropy), increasing

of coordination and integration have resulted from having

concern for political visibility that fosters the launch of new

about 170 central government agencies in a country with a

initiatives, etc.

population of four million people” and analyses that the excessive vertical accountabilities – which he qualifies as

However, the result is indeed an institutional fragmentation

the “siloisation” of public policies – have made us lose sight

that is partly in line with the principles of NPM: implemen-

of an overall view of the government’s approach.

tation chains based on the principal/agent model, instruments

earmarked for refocused objectives, decentralised decision-

This analysis could be applied to aid policies, despite the

making and principal of autonomy of the empowered

fact that quite considerable progress has been achieved in

working for development. The World Bank manages over

there is one thing that makes these aid policies different

contribute to the national cooperation effort. These few

are not dominated by an authority capable of defining

entities. There are today 263 multilateral organisations

terms of coordination (OECD, 2011). However, once again,

1,000 trust funds. In the United States, 26 agencies

from other policies: they are comprehensive policies and

examples from Severino and Ray (2010) could be multiplied

incentives or laying down regulatory rules. All efforts

at different levels to illustrate the extensive and increasing

towards transparency, coordination, standardisation or

fragmentation of the system for implementing aid policies.

convergence are made in a collaborative manner within

consultative bodies that generate significant transaction

Here again, it is clear that this trend, which has partly met

costs and cannot prevent “free-rider” approaches.

real challenges (such as excessive centralisation or the lack of autonomy) has in turn become a source of problems.

14 Broken Accountability Feedback Loop, Svensson 2006 and Martens, 2002.

The number of actors in aid policies makes it difficult to

15 See Lavigne Delville and Abdelkader, 2010.

have a comprehensive view and results in a coordination of

3. The Challenge of Implementation It would therefore appear to be difficult to reverse the

New Zealand’s aid, this led to the reintegration of NZAID

fragmentation of the institutional landscape of aid policies,

(established as a semi-autonomous agency in 2002) into

as the New Zealand government did when it embarked on

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2009.

a post-NPM refocusing of its public system. Moreover, for

Conclusion Although this article elaborates on the difficulties encoun-

accountable to clients who have the power to make their

intended to be a critique of the current management of

improved through regulatory political institutions. Yet this

tered in managing and implementing aid policies, it is not

voices heard. This allows services to be retroactively

these public policies. Indeed, the management methods

ideal is out of touch with the complex system for the actual

that have been established have replaced the former

implementation of aid policies, thus revealing a number of

f e a tured prominently and that give little reason to be

article.

bureaucratic systems where vote-catching may have

difficulties in policy management, which are analysed in this

nostalgic.

According to the recent evaluation of the Paris Declaration,

The aim of this article is to offer an external analytical

results-based management is advancing at a snail’s pace.

framework – that of NPM – in order to put into perspective

In view of this fact, we cannot simply recommend a more

recent decades. This framework makes it possible to

this system over fifteen years ago. What is needed is to

in public management and what is specific to the aid

resources of management sciences and organisational

and understand the reforms implemented in aid policies in

proactive political approach, some agencies having set up

measure what has been the result of overall developments

conduct in-depth collective reflection, notably using the

policies themselves.

theories, in order to understand the issues, obstacles, actors’ strategies and prospects for these ongoing reforms.

A first point that appears from this analysis is that the

This is also the case for the other areas mentioned in this

principles of NPM have been applied in a rather implicit

article, such as accountability or institutional segmentation.

were endogenous to the policy in question, and therefore

This collective reflection may become essential in view of

principles of exogenous origin to the specific case of deve-

international commitment to development would appear to

manner, as if they were the result of developments that

without reflection being conducted on how to adapt

the current weakening of aid policies. Advocacy for the

lopment aid. This is demonstrated by the fact that, to our

have reached an impasse: there is an increasing demand

linkage between NPM and aid management. There

this is, moreover, fuelled by the promises of the aid system

knowledge, there have been no articles about the close

from politicians and citizens to demonstrate “results” and

are simply a few references made to this topic, particularly

itself. The analyses of this article lead us to believe that it

in OECD documents.

will be difficult to be up to the mark on this performance

accountability. Severe budgetary pressure in Northern

The second point, which results from the first, is that some

countries will then pose a real risk for a policy that has not

management methods appear to be adapted to a certain

managed to justify itself under the terms that it has

ideal type of public policy: autonomous entities that produce

contributed to defining.

well-identified and measurable services for which they are

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations ADB

African Development Bank

AFD

Agence Française de Développement

AECID

Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo

AsDB

Asian Development Bank

CDM

Clean Development Mechanism

CSR

Corporate Social Responsibility

AUSAID

CGD CTF

DFID

DRC

EBRD

Australian Agency for International Development

Center for Global Development Clean Technology Fund

Department for International Development

Democratic Republic of Congo

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

EIB

European Investment Bank

GEF

Global Environment Facility

GAVI

GFFATM

GPRA

ICAI

IDA

Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation

Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria

Government Performance and Results Act

Independent Commission for Aid Impact

International Development Association

IFAD

International Fund for Agricultural Development

JBIC

Japan Bank for International Cooperation

IFC

International Finance Corporation

JICA

Japan International Cooperation Agency

MDGs

Millennium Development Goals

LOLF MLF

NGO

Loi organique relative aux lois de finances (Organic Law on Finance Laws) Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol

Non-governmental Organisation

NPM

New Public Management

OECD

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

NZAID

PMMS

PSA

New Zealand Agency for International Development

Performance Measurement and Management System

Public Sector Agreement

SADEV

Swedish Agency for Development Evaluation

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

SIDA

USAID

Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency United States Agency for International Development

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N° 78

« L’itinéraire professionnel du jeune Africain » Les résultats d’une enquête auprès de jeunes leaders Africains sur les « dispositifs de formation professionnelle post-primaire »

Richard Walther, consultant ITG, Marie Tamoifo, porte-parole de la jeunesse africaine et de la diaspora

N° 79 N° 80

Contact : Nicolas Lejosne, département de la Recherche, AFD - janvier 2009.

Le ciblage des politiques de lutte contre la pauvreté : quel bilan des expériences dans les pays en développement ? Emmanuelle Lavallée, Anne Olivier, Laure Pasquier-Doumer, Anne-Sophie Robilliard, DIAL - février 2009.

Les nouveaux dispositifs de formation professionnelle post-primaire. Les résultats d’une enquête terrain au Cameroun, Mali et Maroc

Richard Walther, Consultant ITG

Contact : Nicolas Lejosne, département de la Recherche, AFD - mars 2009.

N° 81

Economic Integration and Investment Incentives in Regulated Industries

N° 82

Capital naturel et développement durable en Nouvelle-Calédonie - Etude 1. Mesures de la « richesse totale »

Emmanuelle Auriol, Toulouse School of Economics, Sara Biancini, Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA,

Comments by : Yannick Perez and Vincent Rious - April 2009.

et soutenabilité du développement de la Nouvelle-Calédonie

Clément Brelaud, Cécile Couharde, Vincent Géronimi, Elodie Maître d’Hôtel, Katia Radja, Patrick Schembri, Armand Taranco, Université de Versailles - Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, GEMDEV

N° 83 N° 84 N° 85 N° 86 N° 87 N° 88 N° 89

Contact : Valérie Reboud, département de la Recherche, AFD - juin 2009.

The Global Discourse on “Participation” and its Emergence in Biodiversity Protection Olivier Charnoz. - July 2009.

Community Participation in Biodiversity Protection: an Enhanced Analytical Framework for Practitioners

Olivier Charnoz - August 2009.

Les Petits opérateurs privés de la distribution d’eau à Maputo : d’un problème à une solution ? Aymeric Blanc, Jérémie Cavé, LATTS, Emmanuel Chaponnière, Hydroconseil Contact : Aymeric Blanc, département de la recherche, AFD - août 2009.

Les transports face aux défis de l’énergie et du climat

Benjamin Dessus, Global Chance.

Contact : Nils Devernois, département de la Recherche, AFD - septembre 2009.

Fiscalité locale : une grille de lecture économique

Guy Gilbert, professeur des universités à l’Ecole normale supérieure (ENS) de Cachan

Contact : Réjane Hugounenq, département de la Recherche, AFD - septembre 2009.

Les coûts de formation et d’insertion professionnelles - Conclusions d’une enquête terrain en Côte d’Ivoire

Richard Walther, expert AFD avec la collaboration de Boubakar Savadogo (Akilia) et de Borel Foko (Pôle de Dakar)

Contact : Nicolas Lejosne, département de la Recherche, AFD - octobre 2009.

Présentation de la base de données. Institutional Profiles Database 2009 (IPD 2009)

Institutional Profiles Database III - Presentation of the Institutional Profiles Database 2009 (IPD 2009)

Denis de Crombrugghe, Kristine Farla, Nicolas Meisel, Chris de Neubourg, Jacques Ould Aoudia, Adam Szirmai Contact : Nicolas Meisel, département de la Recherche, AFD - décembre 2009.

N° 90

Migration, santé et soins médicaux à Mayotte

Sophie Florence, Jacques Lebas, Pierre Chauvin, Equipe de recherche sur les déterminants sociaux de la santé et du recours aux soins UMRS 707 (Inserm - UPMC)

N° 91

Contact : Christophe Paquet, département Technique opérationnel (DTO), AFD - janvier 2010.

Capital naturel et developpement durable en Nouvelle-Calédonie - Etude 2. Soutenabilité de la croissance néo-

calédonienne : un enjeu de politiques publiques

Cécile Couharde, Vincent Géronimi, Elodie Maître d’Hôtel, Katia Radja, Patrick Schembri, Armand Taranco Université de Versailles – Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, GEMDEV

N° 92 N° 93 N° 94 N° 95 N° 96 N° 97 N° 98 N° 99 N° 100

Contact : Valérie Reboud, département Technique opérationnel, AFD - janvier 2010.

Community Participation Beyond Idealisation and Demonisation: Biodiversity Protection in Soufrière, St. Lucia

Olivier Charnoz, Research Department, AFD - January 2010.

Community participation in the Pantanal, Brazil: containment games and learning processes

Participation communautaire dans le Pantanal au Brésil : stratégies d’endiguement et processus d’apprentissage Olivier Charnoz, département de la Recherche, AFD - février 2010.

Développer le premier cycle secondaire : enjeu rural et défis pour l'Afrique subsaharienne

Alain Mingat et Francis Ndem, IREDU, CNRS et université de Bourgogne

Contact : Jean-Claude Balmès, département Education et formation professionnelle, AFD - avril 2010 Prévenir les crises alimentaires au Sahel : des indicateurs basés sur les prix de marché

Catherine Araujo Bonjean, Stéphanie Brunelin, Catherine Simonet, CERDI - mai 2010.

La Thaïlande : premier exportateur de caoutchouc naturel grâce à ses agriculteurs familiaux Jocelyne Delarue, Département de la Recherche, AFD - mai 2010.

Les réformes curriculaires par l’approche par compétences en Afrique

Francoise Cros, Jean-Marie de Ketele, Martial Dembélé, Michel Develay, Roger-François Gauthier, Najoua Ghriss,

Yves Lenoir, Augustin Murayi, Bruno Suchaut, Valérie Tehio - juin 2010.

Les coûts de formation et d’insertion professionnelles - Les conclusions d’une enquête terrain au Burkina Faso

Richard Walther, Boubakar Savadogo, consultants en partenariat avec le Pôle de Dakar/UNESCO-BREDA. Contact : Nicolas Lejosne, département de la Recherche, AFD - juin 2010.

Private Sector Participation in the Indian Power Sector and Climate Change Shashanka Bhide, Payal Malik, S.K.N. Nair, Consultants, NCAER

Contact : Aymeric Blanc, Research Department, AFD - June 2010.

Normes sanitaires et phytosanitaires : accès des pays de l’Afrique de l’Ouest au marché européen - Une étude empirique

Abdelhakim Hammoudi, Fathi Fakhfakh, Cristina Grazia, Marie-Pierre Merlateau. N° 101

Contact : Marie-Cécile Thirion, département de la Recherche, AFD - juillet 2010.

Hétérogénéité internationale des standards de sécurité sanitaire des aliments : Quelles stratégies pour les filières d’exportation des PED ? - Une analyse normative

Abdelhakim Hammoudi, Cristina Grazia, Eric Giraud-Héraud, Oualid Hamza.

N° 102 N° 103

Contact : Marie-Cécile Thirion, département de la Recherche, AFD - juillet 2010.

Développement touristique de l’outre-mer et dépendance au carbone Jean-Paul Ceron, Ghislain Dubois et Louise de Torcy.

Contact : Valérie Reboud, AFD - octobre 2010.

Les approches de la pauvreté en Polynésie française : résultats et apports de l’enquête sur les conditions de vie en 2009

Javier Herrera, IRD-DIAL, Sébastien Merceron, Insee - novembre 2010.

Contact : Cécile Valadier, département de la Recherche

N° 104

La gestion des déchets à Coimbatore (Inde) : frictions entre politique publique et initiatives privées

N° 105

Migrations et soins en Guyane - Rapport final à l’Agence Française de Développement dans le cadre du contrat

Jérémie Cavé, Laboratoire Techniques, Territoires et Sociétés (LATTS), CNRS - décembre 2010. AFD-Inserm

Anne Jolivet, Emmanuelle Cadot, Estelle Carde, Sophie Florence, Sophie Lesieur, Jacques Lebas, Pierre Chauvin

N° 106

Contact : Christophe Paquet, département Technique opérationnel (DTO), AFD - décembre 2010. Les enjeux d'un bon usage de l'électricité : Chine, Etats-Unis, Inde et Union européenne

Benjamin Dessus et Bernard Laponche avec la collaboration de Sophie Attali (Topten International Services),

Robert Angioletti (Ademe), Michel Raoust (Terao) N° 107

Contact : Nils Devernois, département de la Recherche, AFD - février 2011.

Hospitalisation des patients des pays de l’Océan indien - Prises en charges spécialisées dans les hôpitaux de la Réunion

Catherine Dupilet, Dr Roland Cash, Dr Olivier Weil et Dr Georges Maguerez (cabinet AGEAL)

En partenariat avec le Centre Hospitalier Régional de la Réunion et le Fonds de coopération régionale de la Réunion

N° 108

Contact : Philippe Renault, AFD - février 2011.

Peasants against Private Property Rights: A Review of the Literature Thomas Vendryes, Paris School of Economics - February 2011.

N° 109

Le mécanisme REDD+ de l’échelle mondiale à l’échelle locale - Enjeux et conditions de mise en oeuvre

N° 110

L’aide au Commerce : état des lieux et analyse

ONF International

Tiphaine Leménager, département de la Recherche, AFD - mars 2011.

Aid for trade: A survey

Mariana Vijil, Marilyne Huchet-Bourdon et Chantal Le Mouël

N° 111 N° 112

AGROCAMPUS OUEST, INRA, Rennes - avril 2011.

Métiers porteurs : le rôle de l’entrepreneuriat, de la formation et de l'insertion professionnelle Sandra Barlet et Christian Baron, GRET

Nicolas Lejosne, département de la Recherche, AFD (lejosnen@afd.fr) - avril 2011.

Charbon de bois et sidérurgie en Amazonie brésilienne : quelles pistes d’améliorations environnementales ? L’exemple du pôle de Carajas

Ouvrage collectif sous la direction de Marie-Gabrielle Piketty, Cirad, UMR Marchés, N° 113

Contact : Tiphaine Leménager, département de la Recherche, AFD (lemenagert@afd.fr) - avril 2011.

Gestion des risques agricoles par les petits producteurs Focus sur l'assurance-récolte indicielle et le warrantage Guillaume Horréard, Bastien Oggeri, Ilan Rozenkopf sous l’encadrement de :

Anne Chetaille, Aurore Duffau, Damien Lagandré N° 114 N° 115

Contact : Bruno Vindel, département des Politiques alimentaires, AFD - mai 2011.

Analyse de la cohérence des politiques commerciales en Afrique de l’Ouest Jean-Pierre Rolland, Arlène Alpha, GRET

Contact : Jean-René Cuzon, département PSP, AFD (cuzonjr@afd.fr) - juin 2011

L’accès à l’eau et à l’assainissement pour les populations en situation de crise : comment passer de l’urgence à la reconstruction et au développement ?

Julie Patinet (Groupe URD) et Martina Rama (Académie de l’eau), sous la direction de François Grünewald (Groupe URD)

Contact : Thierry Liscia, département du Pilotage stratégique et de la Prospective, AFD (lisciat@afd.fr)

N° 116

Formation et emploi au Maroc - Etat des lieux et recommandations

N° 117

Student Loans : Liquidity Constraint and Higher Education in South Africa

N° 118 N° 119

Jean-Christophe Maurin, division Education et Formation professionnelle, AFD Thomas Melonio, département de la Recherche, AFD

Marc Gurgand, Adrien Lorenceau, Paris School of Economics Thomas Mélonio, département de la Recherche, AFD

Quelle(s) classe(s) moyenne(s) en Afrique ? Une revue de littérature

Dominique Darbon, IEP Bordeaux, Comi Toulabor, LAM Bordeaux

Contacts : Virginie Diaz et Thomas Mélonio, département de la Recherche, AFD

Les réformes de l’aide au développement en perspective de la nouvelle gestion publique

Jean-David Naudet, division Evaluation et Capitalisation, AFD