policy on youth: institutional and communityperspectives

Annex B – NIGER POLICY FOR YOUTH INCLUSION AND IMPACT OF WIDER DEVELOPMENT POLICY ON YOUTH: INSTITUTIONAL AND COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES

In this annex, we compare the perceptions of institutional actors recorded during the ECRIS, focusing on the strengths and weaknesses of youth policy on entrepreneurship in Niger. We compare these with the perceptions of long-term resident community actors on the impact of government policy more generally on youth employment and welfare (KPFGDs), and from gender-disaggregated focus group discussions on different regime periods over recent decades.

B.1 Niger youth policy on entrepreneurship: perceptions of institutional actors

We interviewed the officials we met during the ECRIS in late 2019 and asked them how the past and present youth policy provisions had evolved and about challenges to implementation. From the point of view of the institutional actors interviewed, a series of policies established in recent decades on employment, population growth, health, education and training all influence socioeconomic conditions of youth. These interviews and supporting documentation reveal that a policy focus on youth and a focus on entrepreneurship as a mechanism of change (see Annex A).

First, we note that current employment policies are more focused on the needs of young people

compared to previous decades, during which they were ‘approached in a generic way’, as described by a member of the Ministry of Youth Entrepreneurship, who adds, ‘nowadays policies are focused towards young people and their improvement’. State partners, such as technical and financial partners and I-NGOs, are promoting various youth-related initiatives (see Annex A). Notable amongst these are initiatives for children’s rights (fighting child marriage, promoting free healthcare for children under five, fighting child labour and particularly tala tala, which is discussed in Section 2), for girls and women’s health and family planning (access to contraceptives, free maternal care and female cancer prevention) and women’s rights (notably in the fight against gender-based violence, or GBV). Initiatives also address agriculture, the environment and climate change (soil recovery, agricultural inputs, development of market gardening, breeding) as well as entrepreneurship.

Second, current policies put more emphasis on entrepreneurship in particular by promoting self-

employment, which, it is argued, should generate more jobs for young people and thus allow youth to take their own responsibility for increasing their economic agency and achieving their

development goals. This self-reliance has its basis in a liberalisation in polices in general, and is specifically linked to the history of employment policies in Niger. The notion of entrepreneurship can be related to the first economic reforms implemented following the structural adjustment programmes initiated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the late 1990s. Strategies such as the Support Program for Private Initiative and Job Creation formed the first framework for using the concept, which was then applied in the framework of the policy for retraining civil servants, who were encouraged to leave voluntarily to create their own businesses (MalamSouley, 2018).

Third, whilst institutional actors emphasised that there is a real political commitment to youth at the state level, appreciating the merits of interventions set up in favour of young people, they also deplored the lack of financial and other resources mobilised to support these policies. According to an official from the Ministry of Employment, Labour and Social Security, governments often make statements that are followed up by weak actions. In fact, financial resources to support youth policies come mostly from external aid rather than internal funding.

Moreover, an analysis of policy documents reveals that although the multiple ministries involved in pro-youth initiatives are all committed to promoting access to employment for young people, the

governance structure of youth employment relies on diverse, non-congruent action-strategy documents rather than on a coordinated orientation plan outlining guidelines in relation to the context and current issues of the employment situation in Niger.34 The plurality of ministries brings with it problems of coordination and synergy in interventions across levels of governance. One of the objectives of the Ministry of Entrepreneurship, established in 2016, was to centralise resources and actions undertaken. However, the ministry not been able to resolve these problems yet. A concern raised by one member of the Ministry of Entrepreneurship is that ‘we risk having double statistics’. In addition, we observe the obsolescence of services and the dispersal of their geographical locations across the capital.

B.2 Decline in developmental state interventions for youth employment and welfare: perceptions of community actors

The perceptions of women and men at the community level were collected in different sites across the Zinder and Tahoua regions, including in mixed focus group discussions with long-time male and female residents of the four areas. The participants were invited to compare the different political regimes that have followed Independence (1960), commenting briefly on the pre-liberalisation regimes and then focusing more closely on the period since 2000 through a comparison between the governing of Mamadou Tandja (1999–2010) and that of Mahamadou Issoufou (2010–2020). They focused on the policy measures that have influenced youth employment and youth welfare and incomes. Note that with 16 focus groups, we had approximately 250 participants involved in these indepth conversations.

B.2.1 Pre-structural adjustment developmental state infrastructural investments in health, education, water and agriculture (1960 to late1990s)

In historical focus group discussions of this type in CPAN studies,35 people often choose to focus on those aspects of policy in early administrations that provide a mirror to the key problems they and their children face today. In the four study areas, opinions converge on a vision of the state which is less favourable in terms of the impact on youth employment and general welfare. The discussions began with memories of more state support in the period after Independence but before structural adjustment. Respondents focused specifically on the extent to which Hamani Diori(1960–1974)and Seyni Kountché (1974–1987) invested in rural infrastructure (health and education) and institutional agricultural support:

No one has done better for the people of this village than President Diori Hamani 1960 –1974(civilregime). He is the one who built their health centre and their classrooms. In addition, there is also the agriculture department (FGD, mixed, Bambaye).

This [Kountcheperiod] is the best time people can remember, particularly in terms of support for farming. …The population benefited from the support of the State in case of difficulties such as famine …Agricultural (extension) officers used to go to the fields to ask about the agricultural situation... The inhabitants benefited from plots of land at affordable prices (400m2 between XOF10,000 and XOF25,000 in 1976)(FGD, mixed, Dogo).

34 For instance, the evaluation of the National Employment Policy (PNE) 2008-2012 at the time of the interviews had not yet been followed up with a new PNE publication. However, this is one of two main policy documents, together with the National Youth

Policy (PNJ), that are in line with the Accelerated Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (SDRP), a national framework benchmarking economic and social development. During the ECRIS surveys (Q4 2019), we were only informed of an ongoing

‘draft’ preparation for this policy. 35 For a list of these studies, see www.chronicpovertynetwork.org/poverty-dynamics.

Another key feature of this period was relatively higher educational quality and more civil service employment. Respondents perceived that youth were better off back then because the educational curriculum was of a higher quality and also resulted in documentation that enabled the young to move forward into employment: ‘Education was of good quality. At the time, obtaining a graduation certificate made it possible to be recruited. There was less unemployment (FGD, mixed, Dogo).

B.2.2 Liberalised welfare state under Tandja (1999–2010) and intensified liberalisation/privatisation under Issoufou (2010–2020)

The perception of insufficient support from the state for youth employment and youth welfare continued in discussions comparing the Tandja presidency (1999–2010) with the current Issoufou period (2010–2020).

B.2.2.1 Education and health costs

The majority felt that during the Tandja regime, youth had benefitted from few or no charges for education and health. Young parents in general are very concerned about the new charges in health care: ‘Under Tandja children under the age of five and pregnant women were treated free of charge in health centres. But now this is no longer this free, care requires payment (FGD, mixed, KaraKara). These rising health costs for young parents with small children can prevent young women from seeking treatment for themselves or their children, and thus increase the risk of impoverishment from illness (due to medical costs and loss of adult earnings). Moreover, health costs weigh on the overall ability to save, combined with other costs for what were previously free services. As a result, respondents argued that for the young in this decade, ‘[l]ife is becoming more and more expensive. Even for free services (free health care, distribution of supplies at school, civil status documents) you have to pay money’ (FGD, mixed, KaraKara).

While the costs for education and official documents (proving levels of education and of training) under the Tandja regime were limited, new government fees together with other expenses (school supplies, unform) rose during the Issoufou period, imposing costs on young parents and a forming reason for today’s youth to leave school early: ‘Another problem that parents face is paying their children’s school fees both in traditional schools and at Koranic schools. Because many of their parents do not have stable jobs, their children are chased away for not paying school fees’ (FGD, Mixed, Karakara). There thus appears to be an issue with the understanding of how such fees are set, what they aim to cover and particularly what are the utilisation objectives from the side of schools. In addition to this, as the present system is structured, there is no way to guarantee some forms of flexibility when due to seasonality, households may not be able to fully cover these fees. Moreover, in the recent decade parents feel that schools have become dilapidated and teachers less qualified, and there is a sense that quality of teaching has deteriorated since the Tandja regime that is affecting parents’ decisions to keep children in school: ‘Parents have in mind that the children of the poor will not be able to succeed, so they have stopped sending their children to school. In addition, Karakara is a neglected area because the only school in the area is not even fenced … and the teachers there lack the necessary skills’ (FGD, mixed, Karakara). Yet, without basic literacy it is difficult for the youth to engage in income-generating activities and to participate effectively in youth training schemes.

For adults, there is a demand for literacy, in support of the activities of women’s groups (tontines, fattening, agro-food processing, manufacture of soap and ointment, production and sale of milk, yogurt and cheese), activities market gardening (practiced by women and men) in terms of inputs, seeds and phytosanitary products and in the activities of cutting and selling firewood (FGD, mixed, Gueben Zogui).

Vocational training is preferred over long academic studies because it is a less expensive and

more secure route to employment. Respondents argued that ‘vocational training centres (electricity, auto mechanics, refrigeration, masonry, carpentry) are preferred among young people because with a little support, can set up on their own trade …the formal education circuit is too long and too expensive. Often, even if young people finish and graduate, accessing jobs is very difficult’ (FGD, mixed, Gueben Zogui).

B.2.2.2 Declining opportunities for youth employment in farming, off-farm and in the public sector

During the Tandja regime, under a more liberalised economy, there was some decline in state agricultural support for extension and inputs, together with rising costs of land (see Section 2). However, there was some compensatory support for struggling rural farmers and workers through initiatives for youth employment in livestock, grain processing and credit, enabling some job diversification: ‘Under Tandja, rural populations were supported through the distribution of goats… For women, there is multifaceted support for women’s groups: grain mills, provision of small ruminants for fattening and for the reconstitution of livestock capital, credit for conducting IGAs (FGD, mixed, Gueben Zogui). Respondents perceived a decline in these forms of rural livelihood support in the decade under Issoufou (2010–2020).

A second key concern was the decline in recruitment of local youth to local civil service jobs under Issoufou, primarily education, health and local police, in the recent period: ‘No young people from the neighbourhood were recruited into the civil service. According to them, if you are not an activist in a political party that is in power, you cannot be recruited’ (FGD, male, Karakara). Similarly: [The Tandja regime (1999–2010) was characterised by] less youth unemployment, by massive recruitment of contract teachers, health workers and the creation of schools and health huts… and the national participation service (free vocational training for young people who have dropped out of school. By contrast, under Issoufou, the period is characterised by a significant number of unemployed graduates…. This is why people are sceptical about the fact that school is a lever for success(FGD, mixed, Dogo).

Whilst some participants linked failing recruitment under Issoufou to failings in educational quality (and teacher quality), others made allegations of corruption, embezzlement and politicised interventions. Support of youth vocational training and employment was identified as one area of suspected corruption or mismanagement: ‘In 2018, IOM provided support to young people in various sectors of activity (small businesses, transport, electricity, sewing, etc.), but in most cases this support was diverted from its initial objectives and did not produce the desired results’ (FGD, mixed, Karakara). These accusations based on suspicions – whether justifiable or not – refer to the logic of a clientelist type of governance (Olivier de Sardan, 2004: 6).

Respondents also remarked on previous young male employment through migration to Libya, which is no longer possible. During the Tandja period, migrants had safer employment opportunities. ‘It was easier for young migrants to first go to Libya and work with respect’, according to community actors. By contrast, under the regime of Issoufou, young returning migrants say that, ‘the young people who are now in Libya live-in secrecy and fear because of the war situation. They are holed up in houses and can no longer go out even to send money to their families’ (FGD, men, Gueben Zogui).

Thus, according to community actors in the FGDs, the Issoufou period was marked by both pressures on youth employment (rural assets and employment, public sector jobs, suspicions of corruption in IOM support for youth) and rising costs associated with health, education, and documentation that cut deeply into young adult incomes. There were some enablers of youth inclusion during this decade,

such as a stronger focus on female employment. However, even enablers require qualifications. Stronger female involvement in employment, for example, derives largely from the state relying on NGOs and donors to run programmes on female empowerment and entrepreneurship, given the absence of a well-resourced public salaried sector or a plan to provide more generous support for new sustainable agricultural policies, marketing and extension programmes. In particular, there was a general view that due to the combined effect of reduced recruitment into civil service employment, fewer training opportunities for men and problems with migrating to Libya, men now have fewer employment opportunities in the current decade compared to women: ‘Under Tandja, there were training centres for weaving, sewing and masonry. These continued under Issoufou, but it was mainly young men who did not benefit enough in terms of employment during the regime of President Issoufou Mahamadou’ (FGD, mixed, Bambaye).

Another enabler of youth employment under the Issoufou regime is the electrification of some rural areas, which stimulates new forms of employment: ‘In 2016 President Issoufou Mahamadou, who is currently in power, electrified the village… [Inhabitants] are able to do new activities related to electricity such as selling fresh water, ice, metal welding, selling construction materials, etc.’ (FGD, mixed, Bambaye). Several young male sustained escapers rely on electricity to operate printing and computer services, phone repairs, garage repairs, and so on (see Section 3.2). However, community actors also commented on problems associated with privatised electricity combining with privatised management of water infrastructure to reduce or weaken water supply. This has increased real costs through the opportunity costs of female domestic labour and/or the concrete costs of purchased water (see Section 3.3). Thus, whilst there were important interventions under the Issoufou regime, respondents felt that these were less impactful as a consequence of privatisation and perceived corruption in distribution. This prompted grassroot, local informal alliances to form to address local problems directly (as summarised in Section 2).

B.3 Impact of decline in farm size and yield on youth employment

A key concern for local youth among focus group respondents related to the combination of poor educational endowments and falling size of farm inheritance. They did not directly relate this to policy, but to population and soil fertility trends instead. This has created a downward spiral where households do not have the money to fatten livestock, leading to a declining reliance on livestock as a productive asset.36Respondents often referred to the youth’s ‘lack of (farm) foundation’, which they ascribed to falling farm size and yields and insurance forms of subsistence that support precarious off-farm employment.

By ‘foundation’, they refer to a vast productive field whose production covers the family’s food needs. In the absence of this… the family most often has a limited number of working days, and therefore low production. This is why people from these families do agricultural labour during weeding, and during the dry season engage in small survival activities… Due to the lack of means to buy land, the small part of the field inherited will be passed on to future generations, which will become even more insufficient for them (FGD, male, Gueben Zogui).

The purchase of new land is beyond many youth’s ability to pay. Youth access to a farm foundation may be exacerbated by liberalisation and the polarising economic tendency for the rich to accumulate land as a means of investment (rather than off-farm diversification), leaving less land available for young people except through rental. Moreover, in both Zinder and Tahoua there seems to be insufficient local agro-processing on a scale sufficient to absorb rural labour surpluses, while rural recruitment of public sector workers has fallen. As such, many youths survive through agricultural and wage labour and dry season survival (desperation) activities. What little farmland is inherited is

36 One of the sites were also more likely to hide small livestock assets owned, which might contribute to some of these results.

often shared among large, multi-generational families and is entangled in inheritance patterns among siblings and within complex family compositions, often including multiple wives and intergenerational households, where siblings farm together with the older generation. When the land is split, there is too little to produce enough to even cover subsistence.

In the past, large farms with fertile soil could lead to farm surpluses, which could be used to invest cash into capital for trade or to rear/fatten livestock. Now, even on large farms yields are declining, and the price of fertiliser is beyond the means of the majority of the population: ‘In the context of soil degradation, production is increasingly declining. To boost it, this requires the application of fertilizer. This requires large sums of money that are beyond the capacity of the majority of the population’ (FGD, men, Dogo). With reduced yields, the majority of households produce barely more than three months’ worth of food, and so young farmers are forced to find work under pressure:

In recent years, agricultural yields have been declining. I used to harvest 420 bunches of millet in the field I was farming. Last year, we only had 60 bunches. This yield can only cover two months of the year. The rest is covered by migration. They (the government) only say to ‘stay at home’, but people cannot. The state cannot give work to everyone. This is why people are forced to migrate. You earn a lot through migration(LH-M-Bambeye-II-27).

Many youth are forced into the labour market on weak terms. While the lucky turn to migration, others turn to farm and off-farm labour or trade without the cash/capital necessary for investment (known as ‘forced entrepreneurship’). According to FGD respondents, this is why many youth eventually give up.

The low educational and farm asset ‘foundation’ of young people is exacerbated by the costs of living they face, which are typically beyond their local rural earning power and erode their ability to save. This includes small but rising costs of public services (education, health, justice). Corruption norms have also evolved in this context, which reduces quality of access. This is accompanied by rising monetisation and costs of basic needs (including ceremonial costs) and high costs of productive asset purchase (land, transport vehicles, large livestock) relative to incomes. Lack of sufficient access to credit further limits young people’s ability to obtain capital to improve their farms or to start a business.

B.4 Summarising institutional and community perspectives on youth inclusion policies

In summary, institutional actors noted that there was a focus on youth entrepreneurship building in the first economic reforms implemented following the structural adjustment programmes in the late 1990s. Since 2000 and more recently, there has been a clear political commitment to focus on youth employment and multiple plans at the state level involving various themes and interventions by technical and financial partners as well as I-NGOs. However, institutional actors pointed out that such plans lacked financial resourcing and that there was weak political commitment to implementation and little coordinated action strategy across government ministries.

The knowledgeable long-term residents in each community (KP FGDs) identified further weaknesses in the impact of government policy on youth employment and welfare arising from declining state intervention in agriculture, rising costs of access to education and health, and reduced recruitment of local youth into salaried public sector jobs. They also recounted that in recent years, state withdrawal has coincided with economic, climatic and demographic pressures on youth such as depletion of farm endowments water resources, a competitive employment environment, rising real costs of living and productive assets, and poor educational endowments. These intersect to challenge further youth inclusion in labour markets in Niger.