Sea Change: Ensuring Baltic Security and NATO’s Evolving Defense Posture - An Interview with Jeroen van Wijngaarden

In this interview, we speak with Jeroen van Wijngaarden, Member of the Parliament of the Netherlands and Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on Transatlantic Defence and Security Cooperation (DSCTC) at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Mr. van Wijngaarden has recently prepared a report titled “Sea Change: The Rapid Evolution of Baltic Security After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine.” Our discussion delves into the key messages and recommendations of the report, exploring topics such as NATO’s preparedness, security concerns in the Baltic Sea region, and the aspirations of countries like Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO.

Let’s start with the report itself. Could you provide a brief summary of its key message and main recommendations for the upcoming summit?

The report focuses on the defense posture of NATO in the Baltic Sea region, particularly the Baltic states. Currently, NATO’s approach can be described as a tripwire defense posture, where a modest military presence is maintained in the region, with the expectation that additional troops from within NATO territory would be alerted and reinforced in the event of a Russian invasion. However, this approach has inherent weaknesses due to the geographic location of the Baltic Sea region, which is surrounded by Russia. The report acknowledges the wake-up call presented by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and accepts the possibility of a Russian invasion in the Baltic States. Recognizing that the Baltic States are smaller than Ukraine and face a stronger Russian military presence, the report recommends reinforcing military presence in the region. It also welcomes the future accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO as a means to achieve a better balance of power. The report emphasizes the importance of investing in surveillance and detection capabilities, as well as counter-strike capabilities and military presence, including stockpiles, in the region. The inclusion of Finland and Sweden in these efforts presents a significant military opportunity. Overall, the report advocates for a paradigm shift in NATO’s approach to the Baltic Sea region, addressing the vulnerability of the Baltic States based on the new reality that has emerged.

It seems that you are presenting this viewpoint and overview due to concerns that a potential loss for Ukraine in its conflict with Russia could lead to an attack on the Baltic states. Is that a correct interpretation?

No, I apologize for any confusion. I am not afraid that Ukraine will lose the war. However, what we have learned from Ukraine is that a full-scale land invasion cannot be ruled out. This realization highlights the need to be prepared, which we currently are not in the Baltic Sea region. Therefore, it is crucial to adapt our defense posture to the new reality that has emerged. It is not solely about Ukraine but about adopting a more proactive and robust approach to ensure the security of the Baltic States.

Do you believe that NATO was not adequately prepared for the situation in Ukraine?

NATO was not sufficiently prepared. Although there was a certain level of preparedness and unity demonstrated in response to the conflict in Ukraine, it was not enough. The current situation requires us to push our arms factories and resources into overdrive in order to keep up with the pace of events.

While we focus on the security of the Baltic states, we must not forget countries like Georgia, which aspire to become NATO members. You mentioned that Georgia’s position is still unclear, influenced by Russian propaganda and pressure. What do you think NATO should do in this case?

It is important to adopt a step-by-step approach with countries like Georgia. While some indicators might suggest they are moving towards NATO and Europe, others might point in a different direction due to various factors, including influence from Russia. It is crucial for NATO and the European Union to be critical of these countries and the steps they take. For instance, in the case of Serbia, we observe a minority that feels associated with Russia, which is their right. However, we must be clear in our expectations and make it known that if these countries want to join us, they need to make a serious commitment. We cannot allow them to have conflicting allegiances or circumvent sanctions through actions that undermine our collective security. This approach should also apply to countries like Georgia.

Regarding Ukraine, what recommendations do you have for the NATO Summit in terms of support for Ukraine? Do you believe we will see Ukraine as a NATO member in the near future, or are there specific conditions that need to be met?

The question of Ukraine’s NATO membership goes beyond the scope of my report. However, it is evident that Ukraine expects more than the status quo from NATO. Every country has the right to determine its own path, and Ukraine is no exception. If Ukraine meets the necessary requirements, it can join NATO.