Defence and Security Alert Magazine (DSA) January 2017 Edition

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January 2017

Volume 8 issue 4

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INDIAN ARMY POST STRIKES NEW POSTURE AND POLICY

editor-in-chief

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DSA is as much yours, as it is ours!

he Indian Army entered into a new terrain recently.

Well not really new in the literal sense since the brave soldiers of the Army have crossed the Line of Control (LoC) on numerous occasions in the past as well. And more so, since Pakistan got actively engaged in training, funding, equipping and pushing armed militants into Jammu and Kashmir. Local skirmishes have always been a regular feature of life on the LoC. But the action in the end of September 2016, was different simply because Pakistan too changed the rules of engagement. The attack at the administrative base of the Uri Brigade was the last straw as far as India was concerned.

So, the surgical strikes launched by the Indian Army across the LoC on the night of 28/29 September served their purpose of modulated escalation. Just as Pakistan made its non-state proxies indulged repeatedly and violated a ceasefire agreement that had been in operation for more than decade, India too upped the ante. The LoC became hot in a very real military sense and no restraint was imposed on the Army in terms of means and methods of retaliation. And in the meantime, a trans-LoC operation was being planned.

By all accounts, the operation had limited objectives and those were achieved by the Army without incurring any casualties. There are enough Pakistani accounts of the number of casualties suffered. But the moot point is that the limited objectives of the surgical strikes were not centred around the number of casualties imposed on Pakistan. The objective was simply to retaliate in the place, time and by means of its own choice. Enter cleanly and return cleanly. That bit was achieved without a hitch. The larger objective was, however, to announce to Pakistan, its people and to the world at large, that India was taking responsibility for its actions.

The ownership of the surgical strikes was a first-of-its -kind in decades of trans-LoC operations.

Neither India nor Pakistan, has ever declared ownership of an operation that it had launched across the LoC. Victimhood has always been the preferred position adopted. The eagerness to please the world at large, as also the locally deployed and totally irrelevant United Nations Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan has also been there. So, all trans-LoC raids, operations or strikes, went unreported as they were never owned by

anyone. Even when the casualties were heavy and brutal, ownership was never announced.

This time, however, ownership has been claimed and with this announcement the Indian Army has entered new territory, in more than a metaphorical sense. From now on, the people of India expect to be informed about each and every operation that it would conduct across the LoC. For it is now certain that there will be further actions to be taken that would require crossing the LoC. Now that is has ‘crossed the Rubicon’, so to say, there is no going back. It must claim and announce its operations, good or bad, successful or unsuccessful. After all, it is not dealing with an amateur opponent but a professional military force in the Pakistan Army.

This new posture comes at a very crucial time in India’s history and evolution into a modern responsible global player. Decades of insularity from the hum drum of tricky political issues has kept the Army isolated from policy formulation and ownership of execution. Now that it has entered the realm of ownership of policy operationalisation, debate and discussion of policy formulation should also be the desirable goals. But that is currently under the monopoly of the civilian leadership, as it should be.

Civilian leadership, unfortunately, also tends to include the bureaucratic structure in India.

This is where the current angst in the Army lies. It is well-nigh time for the political leadership to disassemble the antiquated pre-World War II structure and construct a new modern global model. One that reflects India’s ambition, trajectory and capabilities to play on the world stage. An insular model is hardly in keeping with the current requirements. Thus, the logic of ownership of surgical strikes is that it should lead to further opening of the Army to greater responsibilities and roles. The current structure of governance, unfortunately, prevents the Army from accepting enhanced roles and responsibilities.

Although, it has entered new territory, it had to, alas, return to its old worn out barracks. About time, these too were looked at, from a regional and global perspective.

Manvendra Singh January 2017

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publisher’s view

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Volume 8 | Issue 4 | January 2017 Chairman Shyam Sunder Publisher and ceo Pawan Agrawal President Urvashi J Agrawal Director Shishir Bhushan Editorial Editor-in-Chief Manvendra Singh Associate Editor Supriya Aggarwal Assistant Editor Diana Mehra Corporate Communications Natasha Creative Amit Kumar Gaur Alka Sharma Representative (J&K) Salil Sharma Correspondent (Europe) Dominika Cosic Production Dilshad and Dabeer Webmaster Sundar Rawat IT Operations Sonia Shaw Abhishek Bhargava Photographer Subhash Circulation and Distribution Vijay Kumar E-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscription: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org

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Editor: Manvendra Singh

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Indian Army Post Strikes: New Posture and Policy?

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t has been a period of interminable patience over the past 44 years since the signing of the Simla Agreement when India has used soft diplomacy to convince Pakistan that it is in the interest of both countries that we seek ways to live in peace, amity and cooperation. Nothing worked. Not even the return of 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war evacuated from Bangladesh to prevent the people of that new nation from venting their anger on the Pakistan Army for the merciless genocide of Bengali people. So, the current government had resorted to the surgical strikes across the Line of Control (LoC) raising speculations of a new posture and the advent of a policy of ‘offensive defence’.

Perhaps, it is time to give our due thought to the former Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf (of Kargil infamy) who had remarked that even if Kashmir is settled to Pakistan’s satisfaction India would still be under attack.

Indian leaders have done everything in their power to convince Pakistan to change its ways. The concessions in Simla were an investment in peace. It did not work. Even after the perfidy executed in Kargil by Musharraf during the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance government headed by the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the current Prime Minister Narendra Modi truly stooped to try and conquer the recalcitrant neighbour. He made the unusual and humane effort when he, to everyone's surprise, broke journey in Pakistan on his return from Afghanistan to greet Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on his birthday. Earlier, the opportunity offered by the invitation to Nawaz Sharif to attend the oath-taking ceremony went a begging.

Last year, on 2 January 2016, we faced an attack on Pathankot Air Force base with cogent evidence of the involvement of Pakistani handlers.

We kept our patience and made available all the facts and proofs on Pakistan Army’s involvement but Pakistan denied them completely.

Our patience was again tested by the world community when we raised the issue of Pakistan being the source of terrorism around the globe in the UN Assembly and sought action against Masood Azhar, leader of the Jaish-e-Mohammad terrorist organisation. China scuttled that move.

But the attack on 18 September 2016, on the Army Base Camp at Uri killing 17 soldiers and injuring 19 army personnel was the height of brutality by Pakistan.

The government decided to take a stern action and inflict condign punishment on the perpetrators of terrorism in India. On the night of 28 September, the Indian Army struck at bases across the LoC in Pakistan-controlled territory.

India has never attacked any other State after its Independence. But as a matter of fact, we have paid a huge price in human lives and such an operation was long overdue. Medical science teaches that when sweet pills fail, surgery becomes inevitable.

Our Armed Forces have struck once but they are also ready to repeat surgical strikes if and when needed for the preservation of our national security and dignity. This edition is the first issue of 2017 dear readers and team DSA assures you to provide the same high quality content and impressive presentation for your reading pleasure.

Wish you all a very Happy and Prosperous 2017!

Jai Hind!

Pawan Agrawal @dsalert

contents Unpredictability The Flavour Of The Times Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd)

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Hit Back Harder Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch (Retd)

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Security Apparatus Lt Gen SN Handa (Retd)

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India’s Policy Options Ashok Sajjanhar and Anuradha Sajjanhar

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Institutionalised Armed Forces Presence At Strategic High Table Lt Gen PR Kumar (Retd)

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Sub-Conventional Counter-Strikes Lt Gen Prakash Katoch (Retd)

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Contours Of The Pakistani Nuclear Blackmail Lt Gen (Dr) Vijay Kumar Saxena (Retd)

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Check Infiltration And Scuttle Indus Waters Treaty Lt Gen Harwant Singh (Retd)

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Inadequate Episodic Responses Lt Gen Philip Campose (Retd)

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Calibrated Strategic Restraint Lt Gen BS Pawar (Retd)

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An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine

Strategy Of Punitive Retaliation Brig (Dr) Anil Sharma and Ms Anshu Paliwal 42 Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy And Doctrine Bharat Lather

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Neutralising The Terror Camps In West And East Col Shailender Arya 48 Bleeding At The Borders Col Utkarsh Singh Rathore (Retd)

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post-surgical strikes RULES OF the GAME HAVE CHANGED

Unpredictability

The Flavour Of The Times It should be a national priority to reach out to the people of Kashmir and stabilise the situation. If instability in Kashmir continues till the next summer, Pakistan will exploit it to the hilt. The Army should be prepared to confront an Operation Gibraltar-like influx of mujahideen a la 1965, but on a reduced scale.

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he Pakistan Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), known as the ‘deep State’, have been waging an asymmetric war against India as part of their strategy of ‘bleeding India through a thousand cuts’. Pakistan’s war began in the early 1980s when the ‘deep State’ backed militancy in Punjab. The war intensified in 1989-90 when the Pakistan Army and the ISI began to support an uprising in Jammu and Kashmir.

Correct Description of Intent and Method

With hindsight, it was wrong to have labelled Pakistan’s strategy to bleed India a ‘proxy war’. It is clearly a war being waged by one State against another through asymmetric means. The terrorists being sent into India by the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) are sponsored, financed, armed, trained and indoctrinated by the ISI. They are provided covering fire to help them infiltrate across the LoC by the Pakistan Army and are helped across the international boundary (IB) by the Pakistan Rangers, a border guarding force. During a strike operation, the terrorists are routinely guided by their ISI handlers. Hence, it should be seen as a war that Pakistan is waging against India and not a ‘proxy war’.

Till recently, India had conducted its counter-insurgency campaign within its borders and on its own side of the

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LoC through sustained operations that helped to stabilise the situation and create a reasonably secure environment to enable the development to take place. Neither after the attack on Parliament in December 2001 nor after the multiple terrorist strikes at Mumbai in November 2008 did India choose to inflict punishment on the perpetrators of terrorism in Pakistan and the PoK. While the strategic restraint shown by India despite grave provocation enabled the country to keep the level of conflict low and sustain a high rate of economic growth, it failed to create any disincentives for Pakistan’s ‘deep State’.

The terrorist attack on the Air Force base at Pathankot on New Year’s Day could be deemed to have once again crossed India’s red lines. Despite that, the Indian government gave Pakistan yet another opportunity to make amends by inviting an investigation team to come to Pathankot to evaluate the evidence of Pakistani involvement that India had provided. The attack at Uri on September 18 was the proverbial last straw. The Indian response was pro-active and the rules of the game have now changed.

Surgical Strikes across the LoC

On the night of 28 September 2016, several teams of the Special Forces of the Indian Army crossed the Line of Control (LoC) through gaps in the forward defences

India’s objective should be to gradually raise Pakistan’s cost for waging a war against India of the Pakistan Army. The highly-trained commandos walked quietly over several kilometres across some of the most difficult terrains in the Himalayan mountains under the very nose of the Pakistan Army. Their targets were terrorist training camps in the PoK. They struck with a deadly effect and as quietly as they had come in, they exfiltrated back across the LoC. In his briefing after the attack at Uri, the DGMO Lt Gen Ranbir Singh had said that the army ‘reserves the right to respond’ to the terrorist strike at Uri at a time and place of its choosing. It took ten days to plan the operation, which was based on accurate intelligence. In carefully measured words, the DGMO said during a Press briefing on 29 September that India’s Special Forces had ‘inflicted significant casualties’ on the terrorists and their infrastructure in surgical strikes the previous night.

The operations were meticulously planned and brilliantly executed. According to media reports, surgical strikes were launched at six to eight terrorist camps across the LoC and about forty Pakistan army personnel and terrorists were killed. In an operation that was conducted with the utmost professionalism, the personnel of the Special Forces did not suffer any casualties.

While the credit for the success of these complex operations goes to the officers and jawans of the Special Forces of the Indian Army, the Prime Minister, members of the Cabinet Committee on Security and the NSA deserve to be complimented for giving the go ahead to the Army to launch trans-LoC raids on terrorist training camps. For the first time since the 1971 war with Pakistan, the political leadership of the country has exhibited firm national resolve.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Sabre-Rattling

The surgical strikes came as a huge surprise to the Pakistan Army and the ISI. In keeping with the national psyche, the Pakistan Army has opted to deny that the surgical strikes took place. However, the blame game has begun in Pakistan. In a television interview, Imran Khan was severely critical of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's leadership. He said he ‘will show

Sharif how to respond to Modi’.

Anu Brigadier Sharma Pakistan’s leaders find their Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd) country diplomatically isolated both in the region and beyond.

True to form, they have once again begun to indulge in their favourite pastime of nuclear sabre-rattling. Pakistan Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has once again held out a nuclear threat to India. ‘‘Islamabad,’’ he said, ‘‘is open to using tactical (nuclear) The writer is Distinguished devices against India if it feels Fellow, Institute for Defence its safety is threatened.’’ It is a Studies and Analyses, New patently flawed approach as, in Delhi and former Director, response to a nuclear attack on Centre for Land Warfare its forces, India will execute its Studies, New Delhi doctrine of massive retaliation and Pakistan will cease to exist as a functional nation-State. Surely, that is not the end state that the Pakistan army is prepared to accept.

As had probably been anticipated, since these trans-LoC raids, the Pakistan Army has not reacted except to launch isolated terrorist attacks on civilian and military targets, which have been successfully foiled except the one at Nagrota on 28 November, 2016. However, the Pakistan Army will wait for a suitable opportunity to avenge the losses that it has suffered. In all probability, it will launch its SSG to destroy what it considers a soft and vulnerable target. It could possibly be a Border Outpost (BOP) on the Jammu-Pathankot sector of the international boundary (IB), which Pakistan calls a ‘working boundary’ and where the Army is not deployed.

Pakistan’s Agenda set in Stone

Despite internal instability, creeping Talibanisation, failing economy, international isolation and vitiated civil-military relations, Pakistan will continue to profess that Kashmir is the ‘unfinished agenda of the Partition’.

Its advocacy of the need to wrest Kashmir from India at all costs will become shriller though the strategy to achieve that aim may be fine-tuned to avoid culpability.

Nor will Pakistan give up its quest to control the destiny of Afghanistan and dictate its strategic choices.

Pakistan’s ‘deep State’ is unlikely to back down from its strategy of bleeding India through a ‘thousand cuts’ and waging an asymmetric war through terrorist organisations like the LeT, JeM and the HuM. The Army under General Qamar Javed Bajwa, the new COAS, will continue to raise the bogey of an existentialist threat from India as hostility with India is necessary to justify the Army’s disproportionately large strength and the funds necessary to equip and maintain the war machine.

Introducing Unpredictability in Calculus

India’s response to individual incidents of terrorism had so far been predictable – calling Pakistan lame and avoiding any reaction overtly. Now, by launching surgical strikes and taking other pro-active actions, India has introduced an element of unpredictability. Pakistan can no longer be sure about India’s likely response. The

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post-surgical strikes RULES OF the GAME HAVE CHANGED rules of the game have changed. As one of the writers had noted over a year ago (“India will talk to Pakistan, but only about terrorism,” The Quint, August 27, 2015), “Early contours of the emerging Modi doctrine can be discerned… aggressiveness on the LoC will meet with a firm response”. Clearly, here onwards, India will be pro-active in framing its responses to terrorist incidents with their origin on Pakistani soil.

India’s strategy should be based on a realistic assessment of the threat and carefully formulated to achieve related national security objectives. It should be a national priority to reach out to the people of Kashmir and stabilise the situation. If instability in Kashmir continues till the next summer, Pakistan will exploit it to the hilt. The Army should be prepared to confront an Operation Gibraltar-like influx of mujahideen a la 1965, but on a reduced scale.

By launching trans-LoC strikes on terrorist training camps with its Special Forces India has sent several messages to Pakistan. First, the present Indian government will not tolerate the wanton killing of innocent Indian civilians or soldiers by State-sponsored terrorists from Pakistan.

Second, the surgical strikes are a warning to the Pakistan Army that if it does not put an end to cross-border terrorism, it may expect an even more vigorous Indian response.

India’s Counter Strategy

The remaining roots of the militancy in J&K are now in Pakistan and PoK. The only way India can ensure that Pakistan’s war is brought to a quick end is by dismembering Pakistan. This is neither desirable, as India will have to suffer the consequences and deal with the fallout nor is it militarily achievable as a large-scale war simultaneously on two fronts is not winnable.

Hence, India’s objective should be to gradually raise Pakistan’s cost for waging a war against India with a view to eventually making it prohibitive. It should also be a national security and foreign policy objective to work towards reducing the salience of the Pakistan Army in the country’s polity. With these limited aims in view, it should be possible to synergise the political, diplomatic and military aims and formulate appropriate strategies.

Political-Diplomatic Isolation

India has exercised a range of political, diplomatic, economic and military options in response to the terrorist attack on Uri. The aim of Indian diplomacy should be to isolate Pakistan in the international community and work towards having the country branded as a terrorist State by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Before

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India should unilaterally declare Pakistan a State sponsor of terrorism approaching the UNSC to declare Pakistan a State sponsor of terrorism, India should do so unilaterally. India should also call upon its neighbours in South Asia to do so.

By boycotting the SAARC Summit that was to be held in Islamabad and through deft diplomatic manoeuvres, India has succeeded in isolating Pakistan within South Asia as well as internationally. The shift in emphasis from SAARC to BIMSTECH will also provide handsome dividends in the long term.

In this age of realpolitik, on the politico-diplomatic front, India has many other cards that it can play.

The expression of overt support for the long-oppressed people of Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan has galvanised their movements and caused acute embarrassment to Pakistan.

One more arrow in the quiver is for India to express its support for the Afghan position that the Durand Line is no longer relevant and the boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan needs to be demarcated afresh. This move will give a major fillip to the nascent movement for Pakhtoonkhwa and completely unsettle a sensitive province of Pakistan. It will also further boost India’s image with the Afghan people.

Before holding out a threat to opt out of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, India must first make arrangements to fully utilise India’s quota of water, part of which is flowing unharnessed into Pakistan. This action will have a major impact on the availability of water in Pakistan.

Afghanistan is also not able to fully utilise its share of the water of Kabul River and its tributary Kunar River. Now that India has successfully completed and handed over the Salma Dam hydroelectric project, we should offer to build dams on both these rivers the water of which flows into Indus River.

Making Military Costs Prohibitive

The aim of imposing economic costs should be to choke Pakistan’s economy. India should withdraw the most favoured nation (MFN) status accorded to Pakistan in 1996, which Pakistan has failed to reciprocate. Later, if necessary, India could consider banning over flights for Pakistani aircraft, but this is an option that hurts both.

Military measures should be designed to inflict punishment on the Pakistan Army and its organs to systematically degrade their war waging potential. The aim should be to inflict punishment on the Pakistan Army deployed on the LoC for every act of terrorism on Indian soil for which there is credible evidence of its involvement or the involvement of its organs such as the ISI. For each subsequent act of terrorism the scale and the intensity of the dose should be increased by an order of magnitude.

However, military operations should be carefully calibrated to reduce the risk of escalation.

The surgical strikes conducted across the LoC were the lowest rung on the escalatory ladder. It will take much harsher military measures to make it prohibitive for the ‘deep State’ to wage a war. Military operations designed to inflict punishment should include artillery strikes with guns firing in the ‘pistol gun’ mode to destroy bunkers on forward posts with minimum collateral damage; stand-off PGM strikes on brigade and battalion HQ, communications

One more arrow in the quiver is for India to express its support for the Afghan position that the Durand Line is no longer relevant centres, logistics infrastructure, ammunition dumps and key bridges; and raids by Special Forces and border action teams (BATs). Every Pakistan post through which infiltration takes place should be reduced to rubble by artillery fire assaults.

Target Azhar, Saeed and Zakiur Rahman

Operations against the Pakistan Army deployed on the LoC should be supplemented by covert operations. Since Pakistan is not inclined to bring to justice the leaders of terrorist organisations like the LeT and the JeM, terrorists whom they call ‘strategic assets’, they must be neutralised through covert operations.

When the Pakistan Army begins to hurt and bleed, gradually the ‘deep State’ will realise the futility of its nefarious designs on India. While Pakistan may not give up its claims on Jammu and Kashmir, it will be forced to come to the negotiating table to discuss a long-term solution to the dispute through peaceful means.

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post-surgical strikes A NEW RESOLVE

Hit Back Harder

Pakistan has a strong army of over half a million and that country will continue with its agenda of ‘bleeding India with a thousand cuts’. Unless it feels the cost of waging such a war is leading to diminishing returns and has exorbitant costs. So, a chance for peace is likely when heavy costs are imposed on Pakistan, which the State would find increasingly difficult to bear. Till then, while not venturing into a military misadventure with India, Pakistan will continue to use terrorists and suicide squads to carry out debilitating attacks against India.

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here has been a consistent lack of clarity in India on how to deal with the Pakistani State and its policy of bleeding India with a thousand cuts.

The common discourse both in India and in Pakistan, as indeed in many parts of the world, follows the narrative that the core issue between the two countries is the Kashmir problem. The narrative suggests that if the Kashmir issue is addressed to the satisfaction of both countries, relations thereafter will be warm, cordial and affable. This however is a fallacy. Kashmir is but a symptom of the larger malaise that exists between the two countries. The causative factor is ideological and goes back to the events preceding the partition of India, which led to the carving out of the State of Pakistan as a separate homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent. Peace between the two countries will lead to questions as to why

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the country was partitioned in the first place. And that remains an anathema to the establishment in Pakistan.

Discredited ‘Two-Nation’ Theory

What Pakistan suffers from is an identity crisis. The very basis for its existence as a State for Muslims fell apart in 1971 when the country’s eastern wing broke away to form the independent State of Bangladesh.

Shattering the belief that a common religion was an adequate glue to bind the nation together. It also shattered the two-nation theory propounded by Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Pakistan is still bedeviled with an identity crisis, which it needs to resolve if peace is to return to the subcontinent. As of now, the core of Pakistan’s existence is its anti-India stance. It seeks to be the antithesis of India. Pakistan is what India is

Operation Sadbhavana has achieved positive results but it is just one element not. This reality of Pakistani perceptions and policy is neither addressed nor acknowledged by policy makers in India, who seem blinded by the romantic illusion that both countries can live as brothers, oblivious to the changes in the socio-religious fabric of Pakistan that has taken place since Independence. Peace between the two countries will hence remain a chimera, unless the core reality of Pakistan is acknowledged and addressed.

With a change in government in 2014, a more robust foreign policy became manifest in India, with greater emphasis being placed by South Block on strengthening relations within the region. While overtures were made to Pakistan as in the past, to foster friendly relations, pressure was also exerted on Pakistan to cease its support to terrorist groups that were operating from its soil against India. As Pakistan has shown no visible signs to act against such groups, New Delhi is getting more assertive with its policy towards Pakistan, seeking on the one hand to isolate that country politically and diplomatically and on the other hand, seeking to impose military and economic costs on Pakistan for its adventurism. The default position has been reset and that change is reflected in the way the Indian Army is conducting operations along the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan.

the State, a policy enunciated Anu MajSharma Gen

by Pakistan’s military dictator Dhruv C Katoch SM, VSM (Retd) Gen Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, of ‘bleeding India with a thousand cuts.’ This policy spawned a host of terrorist organisations; supported, trained, armed and financed

by Pakistan to spread terror in J&K and in other parts of India. The attack on India’s Parliament in December 2001, on the Akshardham temple in September 2002 The writer is the former and the Mumbai massacres of Director of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS).

November 2008 were but the more prominent of the scores of attacks that have been inflicted on India by terrorists backed by Pakistan since the turn of the century.

India’s patience ran thin after the attack on an Army post in Uri and in response, India launched a surgical strike on 29 September, 2016, against a number of Pakistani terror camps across the LoC, eliminating a large number of terrorists. This was a radical departure from past practises on two counts. First, an operation of such scale had never been carried out earlier. At the local level, there was always a tit for tat response on the LoC but those were localised actions, confined to a single point close to the LoC. Second, by going public about the Indian military response to Pakistan sponsored terrorism, India injected an element of unpredictability into its response patterns. Pakistan can now no longer take India for granted. This by no stretch of the imagination means that Pakistan will cease to support, train, equip, finance and send terrorists into India. It simply means that Pakistan will have to accept the costs of such transgression. That is the new normal.

Nuclear Bluff Called

Pakistan chose to keep a low profile after the surgical strike launched by India. In June 2015, when India had crossed the Myanmar border to hit at terrorist bases inside Myanmar, Pakistan responded by saying that Pakistan is not Myanmar and that the country had nuclear weapons. In effect, the message being

Vanguard of Jihadi Proxy Warriors

Pakistani efforts to grab Kashmir by force failed in the 1965 war. Post the humiliating defeat of its Army in 1971, which led to the surrender of over 93,000 Pakistani soldiers in the liberation war and the creation of Bangladesh, Pakistan realised that its aim of capturing Kashmir through force was no longer a viable option. It thus began a sinister programme to promote terrorism in

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post-surgical strikes A NEW RESOLVE conveyed by Islamabad was that it would be prepared to use nuclear weapons against India, if its territory was violated. That bluff was called when India executed successful surgical strikes across the LoC on multiple targets on 29 September 2016. Being devoid of options, Pakistan chose to deny the strike, their spokesperson stating that such a strike had not taken place and all that the Indian Army had done was to fire at a few Pakistani posts which too caused minimal damage.

This was understandable. An admission of the strikes would have forced Pakistan to strike militarily against India or to lose public support. As it lacked the military capability, it denied the occurrence of the strike, thus obviating the necessity of taking a stand on the issue.

The element of unpredictability which has come into the response options of India is a positive development. The question now arises: Will Pakistan stop using terror as a tool of statecraft?

Will Pakistan Pull in its Horns?

The answer to the above is unfortunately in the negative.

Pakistan is unlikely to change its policy of bleeding India with a thousand cuts. The methodology may become more nuanced and the emphasis may shift to soft targets and engineered public protests in the State of J&K. There would also be specific targeting of Army posts in J&K, with a view to denigrating the image of the Indian Army and the hope of eliciting a brutal response, which the terrorists could exploit to garner popular support. The recent attack on a military area in Nagrota is a case in point. In other parts of India, suicide attacks on vulnerable areas loom as a distinct possibility. Such attacks, either on the military or on civilian targets being perpetrated by terrorists having cross-border support cannot be ruled out. Within Pakistan, there is unlikely to be any action taken in curbing the activities of Pakistan-sponsored terrorist groups such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Hizbul Mujahideen (HM). What essentially has changed is not Pakistan’s war on India, waged with unconventional means, but India’s response to such actions by Pakistan.

What next then? A glimpse of the future is not hard to fathom. It must be understood that the war against Pakistan-sponsored terror will be long drawn out. To presume that Pakistan can be brought to heel by just one surgical strike is giving too little to the enemy.

Pakistan has a strong army of over half a million and that country will continue with its agenda of making India bleed a thousand cuts. Unless it feels the cost of waging such a war is leading to diminishing returns and has exorbitant costs. So, a chance for peace is likely when heavy costs are imposed on Pakistan, which the State would find increasingly difficult to bear. Till then, while not venturing into a military misadventure with India, Pakistan will continue to use terrorists and suicide squads to carry out debilitating attacks against India.

Suicide squads when employed will invariably cause damage to its intended target before it is eliminated. The extent of damage will depend on the amount of surprise achieved. A clean operation against such squads is their elimination before they can reach their assigned target. This requires a very high degree of actionable Intelligence, but such action too is fraught with danger.

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Actionable Intelligence

Getting specific Intelligence is however difficult as suicide squads operate in an extremely opaque environment. When such attacks are executed, the perpetrators have good Intelligence and support, both from the local handlers and their foreign backers. They will invariably achieve surprise and will be in a position to draw first blood. The extent of damage can however be neutralised by good drills and procedures to react to such an occurrence. Solutions do not lie in erecting ever increasing walls and barriers but on an improved Intelligence network, greater vigilance and effective area domination. This is what the field Army will be focussing on now.

On the LoC, there will be increased focus on preventing infiltration. Besides troops, the Army will be looking at a variety of sensors to provide early warning of intrusions under all weather conditions. Pakistani support to infiltrating terrorists is often provided by cross-border firing to divert the attention of Indian troops deployed on the LoC. Pakistan has been getting away lightly when it used such diversionary tactics but that situation stands changed now. The Defence Minister himself has

Pakistan is unlikely to change its policy

made it clear that he has given full freedom to the Army to respond with overwhelming force on enemy forces providing such support. There is, of course, an element of risk in such an approach as it could lead to a dangerous escalation in the conflict. While escalation control will be built into the Army’s response, the risk of the conflict spiraling out of control will have to be taken.

It is important that the Pakistan military is forced to pay the price for its support to cross-border terrorism. This could motivate Pakistan to abandon the path of terrorism or at least to scale down its operations in India. Pakistan can however, ill afford the cost of a conventional war against India and despite its bluster, will not try to create a situation which it is unable to control.

Destroy Sources of Covering Fire

How India responds to terrorist strikes in the hinterland remains to be seen. One surgical strike has been carried out but much more needs to be done to impose caution on Pakistan. It would have an impact if Pakistani posts that render support to infiltrating terrorists are systematically targeted and destroyed as part of a

proactive doctrine to deter infiltration. The doctrine must explicitly state that providing support to infiltrators will be treated as an act of war and responded to accordingly.

That gives the legal justification for destruction of hostile enemy posts providing such support. Once Pakistani troops start feeling the pain of their actions, they will be less inclined to provide such support. If no visible results are still forthcoming, the policy must be ratcheted up to seal infiltration routes by capturing key areas across the LoC. This step is escalatory but would form an important component of the overall strategy. Hitting at targets through precision strikes deep inside Pakistan would form the next logical step in the escalatory ladder. It must be appreciated that Pakistan will respond in kind and there will be damage on own side too. That is the price that must be paid to punish Pakistan.

The Army also needs an effective perception management campaign to change mindsets. Operation Sadbhavana has achieved positive results but it is just one element in a larger frame which goes into shaping attitudes and opinions of the people. This remains a weak spot of the Army and needs to be addressed at the earliest. There does not appear to be any forward movement on this score. It must be remembered that public support is vital in anti-insurgency and anti-terrorism operations and perception management is an important tool to achieve that aim.

Military means are however just one instrument of state power. These must go hand in hand with improving the functioning of the State administration and the justice delivery mechanisms in J&K. Perpetrators of terror and their supporters must be dealt with speedily through the judicial process to inspire a sense of confidence among the masses. This would require proper investigation by the police and fast track courts for dispensation of justice. It is a tall order but a must for conflict stabilisation and eventually for return to normalcy.

De-Radicalisation

The activities of certain groups involved in radicalisation of society must also be monitored and checked. Such groups are funded by money which flows from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries, and their activities target children in school and the general public through a radical discourse in the mosques. The number of mosques which have mushroomed in the area in the last few years is a cause of concern as they are promoting Wahhabi Islam and destroying the Kashmiriyat, which was a distinct feature of the Valley. The challenges are many but so are the opportunities of bringing normalcy back to the State. The Army is playing its part and will give a befitting response to Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. It is for the State of J&K and the Indian nation to look into the other aspects outlined above if lasting peace is to return to the region.

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post-surgical strikes HOLISTIC military reforms

Security Apparatus The ‘surgical strikes’ of 29 September 2016 are behind us. We must shed all hype over them whether for political mileage or otherwise and look ahead pragmatically to prepare ourselves for even more challenging times. It will be naïve to expect any dramatic shifts in our neighbour’s known behaviour with a mere change in its Army chief. There is a definite need to look ahead into the distant future, identify contingencies and develop suitable response options optimising maximum elements of our national power. A more confident NSA of today must shed past misapprehensions and induct the service chiefs into its midst. Militarily, there is a need to focus on attaining far higher levels of operational preparedness than those obtaining today.

T

he ‘surgical strikes’ by the Indian Army marked a welcome paradigm shift in the national security strategy pursued thus far. To look beyond the event, it is important to recapitulate the context and content of trans-LoC ‘surgical strikes’ on terrorist launch pads by the Indian Army on 29 September 2016.

Surgical Strikes – The Context

The most significant aspect of the context of Indian Army’s operation was undoubtedly the display of national will and resolve to ‘act’ overtly against its recalcitrant neighbour. One whose national security strategy for the past three decades has been fashioned around ‘inflicting a thousand cuts’ against the Indian State. And who had got away unpunished for more serious provocations in 1993, 2001 and more lately in 2008. At work behind this display of national will and resolve, was the outcome of a series of moves at the geo-strategic and geo-political level initiated in the last two years after the present political dispensation took charge. The most significant ones worth mention being India’s strategic, political and economic outreach to the US, Japan, Vietnam and Iran to counter the growing influence of China, a close ally of Pakistan. Closer home, the national security apparatus (NSA) actively pursued improvement of relations with South Asian neighbours including Pakistan.

And as a refreshing change, with Muslim nations in the Middle East, who had been strong supporters of Pakistan earlier.

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With the growing Russian dependence on China and the dynamics of Russia-US relations, there is an informal security grouping India’s strong advocacy of the need for nations to unite in the ‘fight against terror’ at various international and regional forums and in its bilaterals with various countries also started finding growing support. Thus, by the time Uri happened on 18 September 2016, India

Shortcomings having been brought to the notice of the then Prime Minister by the then COAS almost four years back had achieved a reasonable degree of success in its efforts to shape the international environment favourably for a strong response to an act of terror from across the border. Diplomatic and other actions post-Uri, including coming out openly against Pakistani rights violations in Balochistan and the PoK, and exposing Pakistan at the UN, helped India bring this process of shaping international opinion and isolating Pakistan. To the point where India felt confident enough to launch the trans-LoC operation without fear of any adverse international fallout especially in view of Pakistan trying to once again play out its strategy of carrying out proxy war against India with nuclear sabre rattling.

This time around it was appropriately chastened and advised to behave more responsibly as a nuclear armed nation. Besides the context, the content of the operation was also substantive involving simultaneous action at eight terrorist launch pads across the LoC over a 250km arc, which saw the country finally shaking off a shameful legacy of indecisiveness and inaction, which not only caused incalculable harm to national interests but also created the strong perception of India being a ‘soft State’.

Emerging Strategic Groupings

That said, is one surgical strike or a repetition of them, the answer in dealing with a neighbour like Pakistan?

Most certainly not. Against the backdrop of the ‘two nation theory’ leading to partition of the country and the formation of Pakistan in 1947, the bottom line is that the focal point of Pakistani national interests remains Kashmir. With the Pakistani Army and its jihadi moorings bequeathed to it by Gen Zia, retaining a stranglehold over Kashmir policy, it is nothing short of a utopian belief to expect such operations to achieve the Indian objective of getting Pakistan to reverse its policy of a ‘thousand cuts’ in a hurry. Pakistan feels emboldened in its designs against India through the strong and assured moral and material support from China, not only directly but also in various international and regional forums. And with the growing Russian dependence on China and the dynamics of Russia-US relations, there is

a virtual coming into being of an informal security grouping of China, Pakistan and Russia to counter the perceived US, Japan, India grouping in the Asia-Pacific. Such groupings seem to be inevitable in the emerging world order for nations to optimally leverage their national power. It is just as well that India has shaken off its past indecisiveness to shed the ‘ghost’ of non-alignment and ambivalence in articulating its views in pursuit of national interests, while accepting the price that it may have to pay economically or otherwise.

The Need

Lt Anu Gen Sharma SN Handa PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

The writer was commissioned into the 5th Battalion of the 3rd Gorkha Rifles on the eve of 1971 Indo Pak War and saw action in Kargil. In a career spanning, 39 years, he has served in various terrain configurations along all borders of the country and in all operational environments.

He has been Instructor at Military Intelligence Training School, Squadron Commander (Operations) in the NSG and Deputy Director General Perspective Planning (Plans).

He commanded his battalion at Dera Baba Nanak through the final phase of Op Rakshak, which witnessed the breaking of the backbone of terrorism in Punjab. After commanding a division along the RajasthanGujarat border, he was Chief of Staff of the Chinar Corps in the Kashmir valley. He retired as DG Infantry in April 2011 after commanding the Desert Corps and being Chief of Staff of the South Western Command.

In dealing with Pakistan, the need is clearly for a well coordinated multi-prong strategy at the national level with all essential ingredients of national power built in.

Key components of such a strategy need to address our ability to continuously shape international environment favourably; developing response capabilities of defence services and para-military, CPOs and State police forces; sharpening intelligence capabilities across all domains from human to cyber; rebuilding covert operation capabilities; neutralising Pak strategy of nuclear sabre-rattling; managing internal security situation in the Kashmir valley and and most importantly to stay a couple of moves ahead of our adversary in anticipating his actions and reactions and our response to the same. While we have certainly done well at the international and at the regional level as evident from boycott of SAARC Conference by majority of the member nations, national security remains a ‘work in progress’. Further, while the sense that any strategic analyst would get is that the NSA is sensitised to the aforementioned components of our Pak policy and there is steady forward movement on all fronts in an effort to undo the inherited policy paralysis, some areas meriting attention need a mention.

The Way Forward

4 Continuous shaping of international and regional environment: It ought to be a matter of satisfaction for us that the NSA has done well to persist with its ‘fight against terror’ in various forums, the latest being the ‘Heart of Asia’ conference at Amritsar. India is today at the forefront of this war against the ‘mothership of terror’, as our PM put it.

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post-surgical strikes HOLISTIC military reforms 4 Rebuilding covert capabilities: While ‘covert ought to remain covert’, there is a case for developing strong intelligence and operational capabilities for covert operations.

4 Development of holistic security strategy and periodic review: One hopes that structures and processes are in place to develop a holistic long-term national security strategy and for its periodic review.

With specific reference to Pakistan, we need to identify reasons for our failure as a nation to deter this neighbour from pursuing its policy of a ‘thousand cuts’ over the last three decades.

4 Developing a response matrix: One is saddened to observe the complete absence of a well-thought-out ‘response matrix’ at the national level despite having been the victim of Pakistan sponsored terrorism for over two and a half decades now. Almost every incident of terror from Pakistan has been followed by needless and at times, mindless media debates, confusing signals from the NSA and at times, what appeared to be knee-jerk responses, losing valuable time and ending up in inaction or improper and inadequate response. Based on the now-well-known pattern of Pakistan sponsored terrorist incidents, it is considered feasible and necessary to develop a response matrix factoring various elements of national power based on current and developing capabilities rather than engage in endless discussion and debate on the occurrence of the incident. The concerned elements need to be taken into confidence and informed of the same for improved responsiveness rather than leaving them guessing in a strategic vacuum.

4 The military component: The response matrix needs to be developed on an escalatory ladder not limited to Army alone but also factoring surgical operations by the Air Force and Navy to raise costs for the adversary, and secondly, to call the ‘nuclear’ bluff, which it has been using as a shield to carry on its proxy war. Sounds hawkish but then being a ‘dove’ all these years has not done much for India either! Further, the pros and cons of having a declaratory response matrix along the lines of a nuclear doctrine, need to be debated by the NSA, the main advantage of the same being ease of shifting responsibility for irresponsible behaviour on to the perpetrator.

4 Do not shrink the space for conventional operations against a nuclear backdrop: There appears to be a strong lobby in the bureaucracy which propagates the view that ‘conventional wars between nuclear neighbours are no longer conceivable’ thereby unnecessarily shrinking this space despite the Kargil War of 1999. This, besides making us victims of Pakistani strategy of nuclear bluff and bluster, has adversely impacted on our response options and modernisation plans of the Army. Further, if one subscribes to the view that employment of Air Force and Navy in a low intensity conflict or proxy war situation could lead to escalation of conflict between nuclear neighbours, which may not be acceptable to international community, then why give these Services priority for modernisation? In any case such a view eminently suits Pakistani strategy and must be rejected.

4 Stop the breast-beating and back-slapping, let’s get real: There is a need for us to recognise that whether we want it or not, the other side is keeping us in a state

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of undeclared war and we are already in an era of fourth generation hybrid warfare. In such a situation, it is unrealistic to expect that a single successfully launched ‘surgical strike’ is the panacea, in fact, it is just the beginning. And so, we must stop all the breast beating over retaliatory strikes and back-slapping in the media.

The reality is, there are no easy and early round-thecorner solutions in sight. We have been fighting a proxy war for almost three decades and need to be prepared for perhaps another three. Also, we must grant the devil his due and expect retaliation and setbacks not only on the military but also on the diplomatic front. With a new President-elect in the US and China aggressively pursuing its national security strategy, we can’t be too sure of what is in store. The need is for us to think through various contingencies and be nimble and fleet footed in our responses.

Remedy-National Security Architecture

4 Rules for Business by Government of India: The rules for business by the Government of India, which have kept the Armed Forces out of the decision making loop and the formal national security architecture, need an urgent review.

4 Restructuring and Reform of the Ministry of Defence (MoD): This aspect warrants a separate essay and only few major issues are being flagged hereafter. The rules of business of the Government of India mandate the Ministry of Defence with ‘Defence of India and every part thereof including preparation for defence and all such acts as may be conducive in times of war to its prosecution and after its termination to effective demobilisation’. With a mandate so solemn and significant and a well-meaning Raksha Mantri, ‘Perestroika’ (restructuring) and ‘Glasnost’ (openness or transparency) aptly apply to the makeover urgently needed in the Ministry of Defence. Based on widely held perceptions, it may not be out of place to describe the relationship between the MoD and the three services as ‘integrated in letter’ and ‘detached in functioning and spirit’.

4 Bureaucracy and military tangle: There is perhaps no other ministry of the Government of India, which is perceived to be so pathologically hostile to the interests

of the organisations and personnel that come under its charge, as the MoD. It is regrettable that while the Indian armedforces are rated among the best military professionals, there is a strong perception of their being managed by an equally incompetent, apathetic and insensitive bureaucracy. More important than creating a five or four star post of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or permanent Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee (Chairman COSC), is the long pending restructuring of the Ministry of Defence as recommended in the Kargil Review Committee Report. This is being stoutly resisted by a well-entrenched bureaucracy. The political environment in the last decade, mired as it was in large scale corruption with the Defence Ministry a much sought after ‘cash cow’, was not conducive to effect the restructuring. For obvious reasons of that not being in the comfort zone of both the political leadership and the bureaucracy. But with the bugle on the war against corruption having been sounded by the present government and ‘good governance’ being one of its priorities, time is now ripe for the MoD being the next target of a ‘demonetisation’ type ‘surgical strike’.

At the stroke of midnight on a chosen date, 50 per cent civilians in the Ministry of Defence to be swapped with men in uniform, consequences notwithstanding. In any case, the consequences will only be for the better!

Creation of CDS or Chairman COSC in the absence of this fundamental reform will only pave the way for further marginalisation of the three Services by the bureaucracy.

4 Some other areas crying for urgent reform are: • Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP). The question that begs an answer here is, what good is a ‘well written, sound’ DPP, which has only led to degradation of the operational preparedness of the Armed Forces since its introduction? We must be the only country in the world to have this great marvel of bureaucratic expertise that envisages timelines of 3-5 years for procurement and affords ample opportunities to the vendors to repeatedly derail ongoing procurements, all to the detriment of Armed Forces’ operational preparedness.

• Department of Defence Production. Controlling

the vast military-industrial complex comprising Ordnance Factories and Public Sector Undertakings which are another ‘cash cow’ and ‘comforter’ that the bureaucracy is unwilling to let go despite gross mismanagement, inefficiencies, corruption and critical failures that continue to impact adversely on operational preparedness. The stubborn attitude of the bureaucracy to not ‘let go’ is the single most important factor responsible for preventing entry of private sector in defence production and thus scuttling all attempts at indigenisation.

• Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare. If its present style of functioning were any yardstick, ‘Department of Ex-Servicemen Harassment’ would appear to be a more apt designation, for its primary pre-occupation being to fight cases against ex-Servicemen and widows to deny them their legitimate dues.

4 Operational capabilities and Preparedness: Perspective plans require development of operational capabilities within specified time frames to meet emerging threats to national security that are expected to manifest by the end of such specified time frames.

Critical procurement failures have ensured that Indian Armed Forces have missed some vital time lines to acquire the requisite capabilities to meet visualised threats. Also, the flurry of activity in the aftermath of Uri did not inspire confidence in the levels of operational preparedness of the military despite shortcomings having been brought to the notice of the then Prime Minister by the then COAS almost four years back. If we are serious about dealing with Pakistan, we need far higher levels of operational preparedness than what seem to be obtaining today. Capability enhancement of Special Forces, a relook at their role with an eye on trans-border covert operations and their reorganisation into an SF Command also merit serious consideration.

4 Morale of the Armed Forces: Besides handling issues affecting serving and retired Armed Forces fraternity in recent times, reasons appears to border on the ‘subversive’ leading to widespread disaffection. There appears to be an enemy within trying to inflict its own ‘thousand cuts’ on them. The man behind the gun was, is and will always remain more important than the gun.

It is imperative that ‘the man’ is given his legitimate due in status and emoluments to keep his faith alive in the country’s leadership and his morale at desirable levels.

In Conclusion

The ‘surgical strikes’ of 29 September 2016 are behind us. We must shed all hype over them whether for political mileage or otherwise and look ahead pragmatically to prepare ourselves for even more challenging times. It will be naïve to expect any dramatic shifts in our neighbour’s known behaviour with a mere change in its Army Chief.

There is a definite need to look ahead into the distant future, identify contingencies and develop suitable response options optimising maximum elements of our national power. A more confident NSA of today must shed past misapprehensions and induct the service chiefs into its midst. Militarily, there is a need to focus on attaining far higher levels of operational preparedness than those obtaining today.

January 2017

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post-surgical strikes DEALING WITH PAKISTAN

India’s Policy Options

Prime Minister Modi’s government has so far acted with exemplary synergy, flair, aplomb and finesse to internationally isolate Pakistan. India needs to improve and step up its vigilance at the borders to make its security foolproof so that no terrorists are able to slip in from Pakistan and accomplish their nefarious designs. Pressure on the diplomatic front for continued isolation of Pakistan needs to be continued and sustained.

D

ealing with Pakistan has continued to be an intractable dilemma for India’s policy makers since the two countries became independent in 1947. This predicament has become even more acute over the last 30 years when Pakistan started using terrorism as an instrument of its State policy to achieve its objective of ‘bleeding India with a thousand cuts’ as propounded by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the early 1970s.

Supporting and funding terrorist operations through groups like Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Laskar-e-Toiba (LeT) and others created specially by Pakistan to wreak havoc upon India, present a cheap option, financially and militarily. They also have the added advantage of deniability. Such attacks are however able to create immense uncertainty, bordering on a siege mentality within India.

Strengthening Periphery

India’s response so far to counter this ‘low-cost option’ has been to increase deployment of defence personnel on the borders. Last few months have witnessed attacks on the Army and the Air Force bases in Pathankot, Uri and Nagrota. These have sent a wave of dismay and anger across the country as common citizens feel perturbed that the defence establishment is not able

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to secure its own units and men in forward areas from terrorist attacks. It needs to be realised that to secure the bases of the Indian Air Force alone would cost `8,000 crore and those of the Indian Navy `7,000 crore. Committees under Lt Gen Campose, former Vice -Chief of Army Staff and Madhukar Gupta, former Home Secretary established after the Pathankot attacks on 1 January 2016 have already submitted their reports to upgrade security arrangements on the border and at military establishments in close proximity to the Line of Control or the International Border. Acceptance and implementation of recommendations by these committees in the coming months could result in substantial financial outlays and significant improvement in the security situation in border areas. While operationalisation of proposed measures is likely to impose a heavy financial cost, they could still leave a large number of civilian and industrial targets (including schools, water-works, public infrastructure, factories, etc vulnerable to terrorist strikes.

Total Pak Involvement

Given the extent of involvement and covert support of the Pakistani State to so-called non-State actors, these cross-border terrorist strikes are not likely to end anytime

Ashok Sajjanhar

The writer, a postgraduate in Physics from Delhi University and a career diplomat, has served as the Ambassador of India to Kazakhstan, Sweden and Latvia. He has also held several significant positions in Indian Embassies in Moscow, Tehran, Geneva, Dhaka, Bangkok, Washington and Brussels. He negotiated for India in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.

He has been an active participant in many of the International Seminars organised by the UNCTAD and the WTO. Anuradha Sajjanhar

Along with the surgical incision, India has also skilfully and adroitly isolated Pakistan soon. India has thus far not been able to work out a viable and effective response to this policy of a ‘thousand cuts’ by Pakistan. Operation Parakaram, whereby the Indian Army was mobilised consequent to attack on the Indian Parliament in Dec 2001 ended in a fiasco. This operation cost the country `1,000 crore and the lives of 800 soldiers in various accidents.

Over the last several years, after every attack of the nature that we have seen in Pathankot, Uri and Nagrota, the Indian defence and security establishment has spoken of inflicting pain on Pakistan so that it is forced to review and reverse its policy of inflicting damage to India’s security, political stability and economy!

Such attacks also extract a huge emotional and psychological price from India.

Pakistan itself has been a frequent victim of terror attacks, which are a fallout of its policy of running with the hares and hunting with the hounds. There is no such thing as good terrorists and bad terrorists.

As former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton pointed out to her counterpart Hina Rabbani Khar in 2011,“if you rear snakes in your backyard, don’t think that they will bite only your neighbours.”

Pakistan has pledged several times after attacks on its own security establishments, schools etc that it will not differentiate between the so-called good and bad terrorists. But time and again, it has taken action only against those groups like Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Lashkar-e -Jhangvi, etc which target Pakistani assets while leaving those like JeM, LeT and Haqqani network which it has created to perpetrate attacks against India and Afghanistan. Known terrorists like Hafiz Saeed and Masood Azhar freely roam

January 2017

The co-writer had pursued her schooling in Delhi, Washington, Brussels, Moscow and Bangkok. She has completed her Honours in English Literature from the University of York, UK and MA in Sociology from the Delhi School of Economics, Delhi University. Currently, she is working as a Research Assistant at a premier think tank in New Delhi.

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post-surgical strikes DEALING WITH PAKISTAN

Modernisation and technological upgradation of defence forces and Intelligence gathering need to be urgently attended to the streets of Pakistani cities exhorting common people to take up arms against India! At the root of this policy is its military and spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), that do not want improved relations with India. Good relations with India militate against any rationale for Pakistan to have such a large military which otherwise is a heavy burden on the country’s economy. Moreover, Pakistan’s security establishment, especially its army and the ISI, would not be able to justify the enormous power, clout, status, economic benefits and privileges that they enjoy by virtue of being the sole, effective security providers and saviours of Pakistan’s territorial integrity.

The Uri Provocation

The audacious and dastardly attack on the Uri army camp in Jammu and Kashmir on 18 September, 2016 in which 19 Indian soldiers were martyred proved to be the last straw on the camel’s back for India. This generated a wave of indignation and revulsion throughout the country an appropriate muscular response be administered to the continuing spate of terrorist attacks emanating from Pakistan. In a measured statement, the head of the military establishment in J&K stated that the Indian Army will respond at a place and time of its own choosing.

The Indian response came in the form of surgical strikes on the night of 29 September when seven launch pads, within a range of 2-4 kms from the Line of Control, housing terrorists waiting to sneak into India before the snows set in, were destroyed and more than 30 terrorists liquidated. The operation was carried out so meticulously and with such finesse that all Indian commandos returned

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back to base without suffering any damage.

The purpose of these surgical strikes was manifold: one, to satisfy domestic public which was becoming increasingly restive and wanted some visible and strong action against Pakistan. Pressure on the government to demonstrably act was perceived to be much greater as it had won the election in 2014 on the plank that it would take tough action against all perfidious and treacherous actions by Pakistan-based terrorists.

Indian Response Below Nuclear Threshold

The second objective was to inflict pain on Pakistan so that it would think several times before undertaking such actions in future. Academics, scholars, analysts and professionals in India have strongly advocated for long that Pakistan should be punished and should feel the hurt for its actions so that it did not indulge in future attacks with impunity. It is well recognised that a single surgical strike will not stem the rot of future attacks from across the border. But the strike will make Pakistan think and pause before it indulges in such extremist actions in future.

The strikes raised the threshold of conflict while still keeping it well below the nuclear limit. It also pushed the onus of a response on Pakistan which came in the form of a daring, though foolhardy, attack on the army base in Nagrota on 29 November, 2016.The same day on which Gen Raheel Sharif handed over charge to his successor General Qamar Bajwa. It is generally recognised that Raheel Sharif let loose this attack on that day as he wanted to demit office in a blaze of glory after having been considerably diminished in Pakistani public esteem and estimation by the surgical strikes of September 29, 2016.

DGMO Gambit

Thirdly, it was considered necessary that the operation should be of such intensity that it did not automatically lead to escalation. Also, action by the Indian forces should be against operatives who are responsible for carrying out terrorist activities and not against Pakistan army

regulars. It is in this context that the Director General of Military Operations called up his Pakistani counterpart on 29 September morning to inform him about the strikes against the terrorist launch pads. It was clarified that it was not the intention of Indian security forces to conduct any further operations for the time being.

Lastly, the message was to the international community that India had the right to defend itself when attacked and that its action had been directed against terrorists who were getting ready to cross over into India and not against Pakistani armed forces. By announcing that it had no plans to carry out more attacks for the time being, India categorically signalled to the world that the onus of escalation depended squarely on Pakistan.

With the action on 29 September, India announced to Pakistan and the world that it will do what it takes to protect its security and lives and property of its citizens. The theory of ‘strategic restraint’ and treating the LoC as sacrosanct, never to be crossed come what may, was dumped. With this action, India also called Pakistan’s bluff that it will have to face Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if it were to launch an offensive operation. A new doctrine was enunciated with this action which will stand India in good stead.

placed under prolonged curfew restrictions because of stone-pelting by young protesters who were openly incited

by Pakistani agents. This disrupted the normal life and resulted in the death of several common people and security personnel. All such instances of stone-pelting and protests in the Kashmir valley witnessed an abrupt cessation following the announcement of de-monetisation of `1,000 and `500 currency notes by the government on 8 November 2016. This has clearly demonstrated that the large sums of hawala cash and fake currency notes flowing in from Pakistan were instrumental in continuation of the violence, killings and demonstrations in Kashmir.

The change in Nawaz Sharif’s stance from one of cooperating with India to actively following the directions of the military needs to be understood in the context of the rapidly changing internal dynamics of Pakistan. The Pressure on Nawaz Sharif due to his name figuring in the leaked Panama Papers alleging involvement in several underworld financial dealings explains his submissive attitude towards the army. While the clout of Pakistan Army and its chief Gen Raheel Sharif rose over the last few years, that of Nawaz Sharif dipped steeply because of questions raised on his integrity, competence and dealings with India.

Fake Notes Syndrome

Since then, terrorist attacks have occurred at Nagrota, Baramulla and Handwara. Indian forces need to be ready for any adventurous, and spectacular attacks from across the border.

The attack in Uri was preceded by the worsening situation in the Kashmir valley since the killing on 8 July 2016 (Burhan Wani, a terrorist of the proscribed Hizb-ul-Mujahideen). Several parts of the valley were

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post-surgical strikes DEALING WITH PAKISTAN Diplomatic Offensive Along with the surgical incision, India has also skilfully and adroitly isolated Pakistan in all regional and international fora. The charge was led frontally by Prime Minister Modi even before the Uri attack when at the G20 Summit in Hangzhou, China (4-5 September) and at the East Asia Summit in Vientiane, Laos (6-8 September), during his bilateral and plurilateral meetings. He advised President Xi Jinping of China that it should not look at the issue of terrorism through the prism of politics. He told the G20 gathering that all countries sponsoring and supporting terrorism should be isolated and sanctioned. At the UN General Assembly in New York, it was stated by the young Indian diplomat Eenam Gambhir in India’s right of reply to PM Nawaz Sharif’s statement on 21 September: “The land of Taxila, one of the greatest learning centres of ancient times, is now host to the Ivy League of terrorism. It attracts aspirants and apprentices from all over the world. The effects of its toxic curriculum are felt across the globe.”

External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj, in her address to UNGA on 26 September, responded to Nawaz Sharif’s contention that Pakistan wants to have a dialogue with India but India has imposed unacceptable conditions. She asserted that the only condition that India had imposed was that Pakistan should abjure terrorism against India from its soil.

The boycott of the SAARC summit in Islamabad in November 2016 by India, followed by all other members, on account of insecurity due to terrorism, confirmed Pakistan’s total isolation in South Asia. Pakistan’s isolation from the international community became complete with the strongly worded statement emanating from the BRICS summit in Goa on 16 October, in which all BRICS members including China agreed to take strong steps against the growing menace of terrorism. Strong action against the scourge of terrorism was also reiterated at the BRICS-BIMSTEC Summit.

The invitation by India to BIMSTEC countries instead of SAARC members for the Outreach Summit with BRICS leaders denied Pakistan the advantage of sharing the prestigious international platform with world leaders.

Isolation of Pakistan in the international community was further sealed when for the first time names of several Pakistan based terrorist groups like JeM, Haqqani network, LeT etc were mentioned in the Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process Amritsar Declaration on 4 December, 2016. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani said that according to a senior Taliban commander, the Taliban would not be able to last a month if it was not provided sanctuary by Pakistan. Ghani snubbed Pakistan on its development assistance pledge of US $ 500 million saying that it could be more appropriately utilised to deal with terror that Pakistan was supporting against Afghanistan.

Pak Internal Dissension

The purpose of isolating Pakistan is to put pressure on it to mend its ways. The growing isolation appears to be having a salutary effect as several newspapers, media channels, civil society and political activists in Pakistan have started questioning the stand of the army and political establishment in supporting LeT, JeM, Masood Azhar, Hafiz Saeed and others. A report that

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Generate employment so that the people feel that they have a sympathetic and supportive political dispensation appeared in Dawn newspaper just after the surgical strikes graphically described the verbal altercation between the Director-General of the ISI and Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary on support by the Pakistan Army to terrorist groups and individuals. Prime Minister Modi’s government has thus far acted with exemplary synergy, flair, aplomb and finesse to internationally isolate Pakistan. India needs to improve and step up its vigilance at the borders to make its security foolproof so that no terrorists are able to slip in from Pakistan and accomplish their nefarious designs. Pressure on the diplomatic front for continued isolation of Pakistan needs to be continued and sustained.

Options

Modernisation and technological upgradation of defence forces and Intelligence gathering need to be urgently attended to. Adequate budget should be allocated to the defence forces. If the Army is strong, the adversary would exercise the utmost caution before stepping out of line.

All elements of India’s comprehensive national power including political, diplomatic, economic and military need to be utilised in an efficient, cohesive manner to send a clear, unambiguous message to Pakistan that support terror against India must stop. Technology should be inducted to ensure that all military units are properly sealed, that there are no loopholes in the external perimeter security and in access control. Use of technology in Intelligence gathering, stopping infiltration through the Line of Control and International Border and protecting the perimeters of defence units is critical.

Both the Central and State government in J&K need to take all appropriate measures to reach out to the common people, create a peaceful and conducive environment, promote skill development, expand educational opportunities, generate employment so that the people feel that they have a sympathetic and supportive political dispensation which is keen to work for their security and prosperity. We also need to be cognisant of the fact that Pakistan is only one of India’s neighbours, albeit the most vicious and hostile of all. We need to quickly move beyond Pakistan in our quest for strong relations with other neighbours and strategic partners like the USA, Japan, Europe, Russia, Africa and several more. Spending too much time on Pakistan also runs the risk of being hyphenated again with that failing State.

This needs to be avoided at all costs.

The challenge confronting the country as a result of violence erupting post 8 July and the lull subsequent to the 8 November de-monetisation announcement needs to be converted into an opportunity by taking far reaching measures to bring peace, stability, security and economic development to the people of J&K. The country has been able to admirably achieve its objectives on the international front. It is now time to show the same deftness, agility and unity of purpose and intent on the domestic front as well.

post-surgical strikes STRATEGIC RESTRUCTURING

Institutionalised Armed Forces Presence At Strategic High Table

This paper has focussed on the vital strategic necessity of having a permanent Armed Forces presence in all spheres of national security during peace, crisis and conflict which is currently adhoc and periodic. The Armed Forces must be involved throughout from perspective and contingency planning, war gaming, budgeting, sourcing, modernisation, management and execution for all security crisis and disaster management situations.

A

rmed Forces are in the business of managing security. The very definition and scope of security has expanded from the traditional boundary and historical animosities to encompass internal, cyber, economic resources, energy, water security and freedom to act based on national interests. Especially for a regional power the capability and capacity of the

Lt Gen PR Kumar PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

The writer is an alumnus of the National Defence Academy and was commissioned into the regiment of Artillery on 15 December 1976. He is the former Director General Military Operations and the Director General of Army Aviation. He superannuated after 39 years of glorious service on 30 September 2015.

Armed Forces is an essential component of comprehensive national power. When Thomas L Friedman wrote the The World is Flat in 2005, he basically alluded to globalisation of commerce. It is not a surprise that the metaphor is even more relevant when it comes to security.

Every major and minor incident in any corner of the globe impacts everybody in various degrees some time or the

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post-surgical strikes STRATEGIC RESTRUCTURING other. This was found out by the Americans and western countries when 9/11 and jihadi attacks across Europe affected them disproportionately. Not to forget the Al Qaeda and the IS, and minor events like doodling on walls by Syrian students which precipitated the Syrian crisis.

Indian Armed Forces are Nation Builders

There is an urgent call for India to review and revamp its management of national security. Political supremacy and stewardship is a must in a democracy, with the bureaucracy optimising civil control mechanisms under political guidance with sagacity. It has been proved repeatedly that our Armed Forces have the commitment, wisdom, culture and ethos to perpetuate democracy and secularism and is a premium nation builder.

The Armed Forces senior commanders do not while away time reading Sad Sack comics and watch cartoons munching popcorn as sometimes depicted. The Indian Armed Forces are amongst the most battle hardened in the world and its officers grow up studying tactics, operational art and strategy, and practice it in the field across the entire spectrum of conflict. Ranging from counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism sub-conventional operations and localised operations to full scale war across multiple fronts within the nuclear dimension, out-of-area contingencies, aid to civil authorities, crisis and disaster management. Prosecution of war is a very complex manoeuvre involving all pillars of national power, the three Services, mammoth and complicated logistics and managing the environment post conflicts, which even the USA and its allies failed to comprehend having won the battle but lost the war in many instances.

Institutional Self-Sufficiency

The military commander is given a clear mandate (if at all), broad directions by the political dispensation and works out the strategy, concept of operations, carries out detailed planning, coordination and finally executes and accomplishes the mission. Numerous contingencies are prepared for including Murphy’s Law where the unexpected situation always emerges. It needs mention that the Armed Forces are self-sufficient in terms of HR, transportation (road, rail, sea, air, river waters), Intelligence, communications, cyber, multiple skills like engineers, aviators, divers, etc. All weaved into a seamless, synergised, disciplined whole with a distinct, flexible and dynamic chain of command and control, both centralised and decentralised deployed pan-India, well versed in numerous crisis and disaster management, apart from purely military tasks. All operations are conducted in a timely manner, with professionalism, minimum of fuss with the entire nation and media looking on. The stakes are the sovereignty and security of the country.

The very fact that the Indian military has prevailed and succeeded since independence (barring 1962 Indo-Chinese war, due to reasons beyond the military) clearly demonstrates the professionalism of the senior commanders. At appropriate levels, the security situation in all its dimensions to include natural disasters are monitored and contingency plans drawn in case armed forces who more often than not become the first responders are called upon to restore an adverse

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The Armed Forces must be involved throughout from perspective and contingency planning to execution situation. As mentioned in the beginning, the military is in the business of safeguarding the security of the nation in all dimensions. Being a democracy, the supremacy of the Constitution and the political dispensation is beyond doubt and unquestioned. Neither has the military ever questioned it. It is obvious that the expertise, recommendations of the military must be taken before any decision is reached. A seat in the strategic decision making high table for the military for all matter concerning security is painfully obvious.

Vague Rules of Business

Who is responsible for national security in India? The Government of India rules of business are distinctly vague on responsibility, accountability, preparation and readiness.

National security (sovereignty, security, integrity, stability) is distinctly a political leadership mandate. Methodology of execution naturally too remains the prerogative of the government. Even responsibility of military preparedness is vague which should be of the Raksha Mantri. The emphasis is on security preparedness in all its dimensions where the Armed Forces must be heard.

Unfortunately, in India the military is rarely consulted or asked to give its input regularly sometimes even on matters military. The ethos developed since Independence by the political masters and cemented by the bureaucrat is a dangerous practice. While at the tactical level the military, specially the Army, is given some room to manoeuvre, at the strategic level they are rarely consulted and decisions conveyed to them. It is a known fact that leaders controlling the State are largely ignorant of military affairs having never served or been involved in matters military. Carrying out a SWOT analysis, administrative and organising ability, consistency and ability to deliver well and on time is the hallmark of our forces.

Sub-Optimal use of Military Leaders

Regular and periodic, direct inputs on all security issues from a single point (CDS when appointed) or currently by the Chief of Staff Committee or single Service if only one Service is involved, as also at operational levels (say, between Command HQs and States) should be the norm. These inputs should reach the PMO, NSCS, NSA and where relevant, the MHA and the MEA and other ministries and agencies. Currently, inputs if and when taken, form part of the MoD, MHA, MEA or civil Intelligence agencies where they become the lead agency and so a direct recommendation or voice is missed leading to suboptimal use of the intrinsic expertise of the military leaders.

This will provide direct communication and interaction between the Armed Forces and political masters. In India, we have developed a culture of working in compartments. It finally always boils down to a matter of safeguarding ones turf. There is neither integration nor coordination between the Ministries of Defence, Home, Finance, External affairs with the army, paramilitary and intelligence forces, even as a concept, let alone in practice. Ironically, there is little intra institutional synergy like between the three Services and the MoD. The HQ and the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) tries its best to establish tri-Service synergy with little success and the institution of Chief of Staff Committee is more effective. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) must lay down institutionalised mechanism for integration and synergy between NSA, Ministries, security and Intelligence agencies with the Armed Forces on all security related issues.

Direct inputs and interaction leads to better understanding, timely tackling of live emergent security situations with a clear mandate, optimal use of all instruments of national power and a successful completion of mission including the end state. To illustrate the necessity of a constant voice in the strategic circle, a peep into the management of the LoC, LAC and the the IB sector is indicative. Along the western front with Pakistan, the situations and the Indian response along the LC and IB Sector has become routine and largely remains within the tactical Army and BSF domain. Except during particularly hot periods like the Uri-Pathankot-Nagrota incident where the media and circumstances takes it to the operational, strategic and political domain.

Along the Line of Actual Control against China, however, even minor transgressions are hyped up by the media, political parties and armchair defence strategists and a tactical situation at the company or battalion level becomes a strategic issue. It is best handled on the ground at the tactical level and resolved expeditiously using the standard operating procedures which exist. The Armed Forces representation at operational and strategic levels provides tremendous flexibility and the escalation ladder can be drawn up based on well thought out plan or orchestration and avoids knee jerk reaction involving the PMO, NSCS, MoD, MHA and the MEA.

Civil-Military Relations

A lot has already been written about the civil military relations and higher defence management in India and many of the other powers including the USA, Russia, NATO and China. Before and post the recent US elections,

In India, numerous committees and defence analysts have written on national security civil military relations including the working style of the President, who is the Supreme Commander, is under intense debate with focus on Obama, previous war time presidents and likely methodology to be adopted

by President-elect Trump. The US President is basically served within the White House by the Chief of Staff, NSA or NSCS by the Defence Secretary constitutionally. Here too the turf wars, lack of synergy and coordination between the various institutions dealing with security including Intelligence agencies and especially lack of Armed Forces experts deployed vertically and horizontally to render advice has been commented upon adversely. President -elect Trump has generated lots of interest worldwide by nominating three top retired generals to his cabinet viz Defence Secretary, NSA and Homeland Security Secretary.

It remains to be seen if they develop synergy amongst various constituents looking after national security.

In India numerous committees and defence analysts have written on the subject. To name a few, the Group of Ministers (GOM), Kargil Review Committee Report led by K Subrahmanyam etc have given recommendations on higher defence management, integration and restructuring of the MoD by absorbing Armed Forces officers into the organisation to ensure optimum efficiency, functionality and integration, creation of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or of Permanent Chief of Staff Committee as recommended by the Naresh Chandra Task Force. Though that is a dilution of CDS which will not be an optimum solution in my opinion.

Lack of synergy between various ministries and agencies on security matters has also been commented upon and recommendations made. This paper has focussed on the vital strategic necessity of having a permanent Armed Forces presence in all spheres of national security during peace, crisis and conflict which is currently adhoc and periodic. The Armed Forces must be involved throughout from perspective and contingency planning, war gaming, budgeting, sourcing, modernisation, management and execution for all security crisis and disaster management situations. This step is essential for national security and proactive management of the complex, dynamic security environment spread across the international, regional, immediate neighbourhood and in the realm of internal security.

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post-surgical strikes STRATEGIC PRO-ACTIVATION

Sub-conventional Counter-strikes

Pakistan has so many fault-lines which, if exploited intelligently, will snap their army beyond limits. That is the only panacea since the Pakistani army is the ‘deep State’ within Pakistan and unless this ‘deep State’ is struck, the ground situation is unlikely to change. Fortunately, Pakistan has created a two-front for itself by making enemies with both India and Afghanistan. This is an envelope waiting to be exploited.

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he year 2016 saw an upsurge in Pakistan -sponsored terrorism and infiltration in India.

The dawn of the new year witnessed the terrorist attack on the IAF base in Pathankot. India, in usual magnanimity, permitted the Pakistani Special Investigation Team to not only visit India but the site of the terrorist attack itself. Ignoring the writing on the wall that it is futile to hope Pakistan will act against perpetrators when anti-India terrorist groups are patronised by the Pakistani military and act as ISI’s covert arm. It is for this very reason that Pakistan has taken no worthwhile action against the perpetrators of

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the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attacks. Radical terrorist leaders like Hafiz Saeed and Masood Azhar not only hold open rallies but act as de-facto foreign policy spokesman of Pakistan. The attacks continued in India throughout 2016. China’s strategic footprints in Gilgit-Baltistan, development of the CPEC and Gwadar port have given a fillip to Pakistan exporting terrorism both in India and Afghanistan.

Miscalculation in Valley

With the killing of Burhan Wani, Pakistan was waiting to stoke the fires in Kashmir. By default or design, the

J&K government played into the ISI’s hands by releasing 634 stone pelters from jail just four days earlier, despite the fact that when jailing them there was clear evidence of them indulging in stone throwing on behest of the ISI. Significantly, Israel has legislation that caters for a minimum of three-year jail term for stone-pelting and cessation of State benefits for such individuals. Just two months earlier, many CRPF bunkers were removed in Srinagar area exposing security forces and making protection of passing vehicles difficult, one consequence of which was terrorist attack on the CRPF convoy at Pampore.

All this while ISIS and Pakistan flags were being waived and hoisted periodically in the Kashmir Valley and Hurriyat separatists were visiting and getting briefed by Abdul Basit at the Pakistani High Commission. No action was being taken for the Pakistani and ISIS flags being unfurled during Friday prayers and during anti-India rallies by separatists.

On balance, the ISI’s psychological war to inflame the youth of J&K directly and through the separatists had free hand.

Our Intelligence sleuths who kept on saying Hurriyat separatists are ‘insignificant’ miscalculated gravely, leading to the current situation in the Valley.

The terrorist attack on the administrative base of the Army at Uri was ghastly where terrorists used incendiaries to burn the wounded and inflict large number of casualties. India struck back through coordinated surgical strikes inside the PoK using Special Forces to hit multiple launch pads on the night of 28-29 September. Pakistan was taken by complete surprise but denied any such strikes had taken place. However, intercepts of conversation by the SP of Mirpur (PakistanOccupied Kashmir) proved that the surgical strikes had in fact inflicted large casualties on the enemy including Pakistani military officers. Then came the heinous border action team (BAT) of Pakistan beheading an Indian soldier. India reacted at the time of its own choosing by flattening Pakistani posts in area of Kel, which resulted in heavy casualties to Pakistan. Later on November 29, Pakistan-sponsored terrorists struck at two places in Jammu region – Nagrota and Samba. These two terrorist incidents coincided with Qamar Javed Bajwa taking over as the new Pakistani army chief.

tape conversation between Anu Lt Sharma Gen Burhan Wani and Hafiz Saeed.

Prakash Katoch The politico-terrorist nexus in PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SC (Retd) J&K is a fact with corruption and money as the backdrop.

That is why a politician like Farukh Abdullah who perhaps would have been booked if an inquiry into the ethnic cleansing of Kashmiri Pandits was instituted, today is supporting Hurriyat’s call for ‘azadi’. During 2016, India’s permanent representative The writer is a third generation to the UN, Syed Akbaruddin Army officer who retired as told the UN General Assembly the DG Info Systems in 2009 that Pakistan had pumped in after 40 years of service. He some ` 50-60 crore into J&K had participated in the 1971 Indo-Pak War, commanded a for terrorism. Then there are Special Forces Battalion in Sri the NIA reports of financing Lanka, a Brigade on Siachen J&K terror within India, much Glacier during Kargil conflict, of which obviously had the a Division in Ladakh and a State government involvement.

Strike Corps in semi deserts.

Ironically, as per 2015 media He is a former Colonel of reports, the J&K government the Parachute Regiment. A spent over `506 crore on leading defence expert, he is a Visiting Fellow in foreign Hurriyat separatists in the think tanks and contributes last five years including travel, regularly to Indian and foreign hotel stay and meetings with publications.

Abdul Basit and his cohorts at Delhi. This was in addition to the Centre spending some `7207 crore on security related issues of Hurriyat and Hillary Clinton once accused Pakistan of breeding snakes in its backyard!

Financial Support to Hurriyat

The declaration of the Heart of Asia (HoA) Conference held at Amritsar in December 2016 named Pakistani proxies indulging in terror attacks in the region, the first by any HoA Conference. But other than words, what external support should India expect other than intelligence inputs, that too when it suits the national interest of the country providing it. Surprisingly, Russia’s special envoy to Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov said at the HoA conference that allegations made against Pakistan

by India and Afghanistan are totally baseless and criticising Pakistan is wrong, while he appreciated the speech by Sartaj Aziz, calling it constructive and friendly.

Militancy is generally associated with politico-socio -economic problems but in the case of J&K, the Pakistan factor, fully backed by China, outweighs other factors.

Among the scores of proofs is the recently released audio

The answer to sub-conventional war lies in the sub-conventional, not conventional Russian Backstab

China-Pakistan Nexus

The China-Pakistan anti-India nexus at the sub-conventional level is well established, with China repeatedly blocking Masood Azhar being labelled ‘terrorist’ by the UN. Not without reason, Chinese flags were recovered from Baramulla and the PLA cadres sighted on

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post-surgical strikes STRATEGIC PRO-ACTIVATION

As per recent intelligence inputs, the LeT is providing terrorist training to Uighur youth on the behest of China for fighting in Syria Pakistani posts along the LoC. That China is funding J&K terrorists is established. As per recent intelligence inputs, the LeT is providing terrorist training to Uighur youth on the behest of China for fighting in Syria. China wants a Sino-centric Asia and intends to keep India constrained within South Asia, using Pakistan in its ancient strategy to ‘kill with borrowed knife’. The CPEC is China’s highway to the Indian Ocean but we must remember Chinese history of creating ‘depth’ to whatever she considers vital in strategic terms. With the CPEC passing through Gilgit-Baltistan and Baluchistan, she will prefer Pakistan export more terror than let the CPEC be subjected to terror attacks.

US Attitude

There is much speculation what the American policy will be towards Pakistan when Donald Trump takes over as President of the US. But then recently the US House of the Representatives cleared another $900 million ‘economic aid’ for Pakistan despite earlier history of Pakistan diverting such aid elsewhere.

Following the January 2016 terrorist attack on the IAF base at Pathankot, the editorial of Washington Times of 6 January 2016 titled ‘Islamic terrorists open a new front’ said, “Just what the civilised world needs, a new

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front in the war against radical Islamic terrorism: Two terrorists were killed this week in an attack on the Pathankot Indian Air Force Base.” It may be noted that out of the 1,67,221 terrorist related fatalities during 2001-2015, only 2.2 per cent were suffered by the US and Western Europe which included 9/11; which is a happy situation while 75 per cent of those killed were in 25 Muslim-majority countries. Significantly, Ashley Tellis of Carnegie Endowment had said in 2012, “India being continuously subjected to terror actually suits many …

India is a sponge that absorbs global terror.”

Also, post 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008, Tellis recommended to a Senate panel that the US must go for the evisceration of the LeT and allied terrorist groups with or without the cooperation of Pakistan.

But there is hardly any pressure on Pakistan. Pakistan was as big a country with nuclear weapons in 2001 when Colin Powell, as US Secretary of State, threatened Pakistan to join the global war on terror (GWOT) or they would be bombed into stone age. So, we should be clear that we have to fight terror on our own, other than coordinating with Afghanistan which is affected even more by Pakistani terrorism.

Emerging Scenario

Three things must be acknowledged with regard to dealing with terrorism in J&K: One, the Army can only keep violence at a particular level while the balance has to be taken on by the State administration; two, the State administration has failed miserably as the situation being handed over to the Army in South Kashmir shows, with police too having abandoned their posts, and; three, Pakistan is not going to stop exporting terror, remember Musharraf saying, “Even if the Kashmir issue is resolved, jihad against India will continue”. Recently, Sartaj Aziz had announced Pakistan setting up a high-level committee to formulate ‘a doable and sustainable’ policy to highlight the Kashmir issue globally, described by the Dawn as reaching out to Indians who are opposed to Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ‘extremist policies’. This committee is to consist of senior officials from the ministries of defence, interior and information, the military operations directorate, the ISI and the IB – none from the ministry of foreign affairs.

Obviously, the unstated aim would be to destabilise India as much as possible through increased terror.

The J&K State government, in addition to bettering administration, maintaining contact at ground level and

creating employment opportunities must implement a well planned deradicalisation programme. Civil society can contribute greatly in preventing and countering terrorism rather than encourage especially since it gives voice to the marginalised and vulnerable people and victims of terrorism, generating awareness and providing constructive outlet for redress of grievances.

Review Defensive Outlook

Sure, the Army must look at smart fences, smart perimeters for posts or installations, better surveillance including the UAV and satellite cover etc but these are defensive measures. For that matter, Army’s SubConventional policy signed by AK Anthony is grossly inward looking in line with UPA’s policies. This must be completely overhauled, even though strategic level subconventional response is the forte of the highest political authority. With the escalation of violence, casualties have been heavy on both sides, however, while Pakistani military personnel would have been killed and wounded by our actions, bulk of the terrorists killed are riff-raff who are radicalised, some maybe petty criminals released from jails, even though Pakistan mixes regulars with terrorists. So, it is a low cost option for Pakistan.

Sub-Conventional vs Sub-Conventional

The answer to sub-conventional war lies in the sub-conventional, not conventional. Pakistan knows this and therefore, is provoking us at every opportunity knowing we have progressed little beyond an inward

looking policy at physical level. Fire assaults and short-distanced surgical strikes are no deterrent.

Conventional war too is not a solution even as these would be short and intense, wouldn’t resolve the problem of terrorism, but would retard the economy of both countries by years. We must also acknowledge that having fanned radicalism in J&K, Pakistan can continue sustained terror attacks in conjunction with infiltrating terrorists even with reduced ceasefire violations.

So India is in a situation where casualties on our side, mainly security forces, may continue to rise on daily basis while the Pakistani army is hardly damaged. No doubt, Pakistan’s obsession is to wrest J&K but her army dare not walk in knowing the very limited area of influence she has managed to create in J&K, that too restricted to the Valley. But the fact remains that we are on the receiving end and are suffering avoidable casualties because we are largely responding conventionally. We need to put in place sub-conventional response at the strategic level, integrating multiple non-kinetic measures. This has to be planned at the national level integrating external intelligence and Special Forces directly under the Prime Minister. Pakistan has so many fault-lines, which if exploited intelligently will snap their army beyond limits.

That is the only panacea since the Pakistani army is the ‘deep State’ within Pakistan and unless this ‘deep State’ is struck, the ground situation is unlikely to change.

Fortunately, Pakistan has created a two-front for itself by making enemies with both India and Afghanistan. This is an envelope waiting to be exploited.

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post-surgical strikes IS DETERRENCE WORKING?

Contours Of The

Pakistani Nuclear Blackmail

The hard reality is that in spite of our resolve for massive retaliation with unacceptable damage, the adversary has hardly been deterred.

It has effectively put into place a ‘workable nuclear blackmail’ and is comfortable in his belief that despite using a TNW in the battlefield with local effect, the likely Indian ‘one leap response’ for ‘total annihilation’ is unlikely to get past the political decision dilemma.

T

his paper highlights how the contours of Pakistani nuclear blackmail have shaped up over the years making our decision makers believe that the space for conventional warfare has further shrunk; a belief that stymies our response every time a Mumbai, Pathankot, Uri or Nagrota takes place. What options exist on two sides of the opinion divide.

Crunch Point of India’s Nuclear Doctrine

In essence, the salient points of India’s nuclear doctrine as per the CCS notification of 4 January 2003, states that India will build and maintain a credible minimum deterrent. It will follow a no-first-use posture and will use nuclear weapons only in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or it’s Armed Forces anywhere. The nuclear retaliation to the first strike

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will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage. Retaliatory attacks will be authorised only by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority. Nuclear weapons will not be used against the non-nuclear weapon States and India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons in the event of a major attack against it with biological or chemical weapons.

Dilemma of our ‘One Leap’ Response

In its formulation of massive retaliation causing unacceptable damage, the Indian deterrence is a one leap response which we want our potential adversaries to believe for one and every situation. In that, as per the architects of the doctrine lies the punch of deterrence, which essentially is a mind game.

The above position when seen in the context of India-Pakistan scenario seemed an ideal fit at the time it was conceived and the years that followed, till it was overtaken by events. To take it forward from here, it is stated that the ‘ultimate retaliation resolve’ of India was met by ‘ultimate thresholds’ as defined by Pakistan.

Salient points of these thresholds are as under: 4 Spatial Threshold: The armed and military penetration of Indian armed forces into Pakistan on a large scale which the Pakistan Army was unable to stop. The limit of this penetration was left to imagination of the analysts. The general belief was that it could be the line of Indus, the lifeline of Pakistan. Thus, penetration of forces up to Indus valley with the capture of key objectives in the crucial northeast-southwest axis was considered to be a situation bad enough to trigger a nuclear retaliation from Pakistan.

4 Military Threshold: The complete knockout or comprehensive destruction of a large part of Pakistan’s armed forces particularly Pakistan Air Force (PAF), could lead to a quick nuclear response. Alongside this, an attack on nuclear installations, as also a chemical or biological weapon attack on Pakistan could trigger nuclear responses.

4 Economic Threshold: This threshold referred to a potential Indian naval blockade of Sindh province or the coastal cities of Baluchistan province or the stoppage or significant reduction of Pakistan’s share of water in the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab rivers or the capture of vital arteries such as the Indus.

4 Political Threshold: Political de-stabilisation or large scale internal destabilisation of Pakistan leading to a stage where the integrity of the country became at a stake was considered a political threshold triggering nuclear response.

If the shift is from deterrence to war -fighting then why go into the battle with a posture of nuclear asymmetry?

A read through of the above thresholds clearly suggests that they relate to the ‘ultimate’ and extreme situations.

This fitted very well with the Indian military doctrine then in force, popularly called the Sundarji Doctrine. As per this doctrine, while the seven holding Corps of the Indian Army deployed along the Indo-Pak border had only limited offensive power, adequate enough to check a possible Pakistani thrust, the main punch resided in the three strike Corps based well away in the hinterland. While the holding Corps halted the Pakistani onslaught, the Strike Corps were to mobilise from their peacetime locations and launch deep strikes into Pakistan inflicting sledgehammer blows in a high intensity war of attrition. The equation thus rested with the concept of deep strikes from India that at a point in time may trigger a nuclear backlash from Pakistan. Accordingly, the Indian forces trained and prepared for the above pattern of warfare, namely, ‘conventional operations under a nuclear overhang’

Op Parakram Fiasco

The fissures in the above doctrine came out loud and clear during the attack on the Indian Parliament on

13 December, 2001, by five masked men killing 12 people including five security personnel. Operation Parakram mounted in response, lost its raison d’etre as it took nearly three weeks for the strike forces to get to the international border, a time period adequate enough for Pakistan to counter mobilise and for the intervening powers becoming intermediaries to the conflict restraint.

Three main weaknesses of the doctrine became glaring. First, it was realised that the Strike Corps were far too big and located far away, making it impossible for them to get ready for attack in a quick timeframe.

Second, the long timeframe required for mobilisation gave out the strategic surprise as movement of such large forces across the length and breadth of the country could not be hidden. And lastly, the lack of offensive power of the holding Corps prevented them from taking any significant offensive operations, thus seizing fleeting opportunities.

‘Cold Start’ Doctrine

Anu Lt Sharma Gen (Dr) Vijay Kumar Saxena PVSM, AVSM, VSM (Retd)

The writer is an alumnus of Defence Services Staff College, College of Defence Management and the coveted, National Defence College. He has served as the Additional Director General Army Air Defence at Army HQ and as the Commandant of the prestigious Army Air Defence College. He is the only Army Air Defence Officer to have had the privilege to Command the Army Air Defence College for the second time. Decorated thrice by the President of India, the General Officer took over as the Director General Army Air Defence on 1 July 2013, from where he superannuated on 31 May 15.

Post superannuation, he has been re-employed as Advisor in Bharat Electronics Limited, where he is facilitating many an ongoing project towards their completion and rendering other knowledge-based services.

In order to address the above weaknesses, a new doctrinal development took place over time indicating a deviation from the existing posture. This deviation, referred to as the Cold Start Doctrine, pointedly addressed the three weaknesses stated above. It aimed to establish a proactive stance with a capability to launch retaliatory conventional strikes against Pakistan involving rapid armour thrusts with infantry and necessary air support in the form of multiple thrusts along a wide front in Punjab and Rajasthan. While such thrusts were likely to inflict significant harm on the Pakistan Army, they were to also remain shallow enough as not to escalate the clash to nuclear threshold level.

Pakistan having realised that its nuclear bluff has been sort of made redundant by the strategy of shallow multiple responses along a wide front, it recalibrated its response strategy. Smarting over a series of joint military exercises (Azm-e-Nau III), it focussed on an offensive defence type of response against the Cold Start Doctrine. One significant fallout of the above was the testing of Nasr (Hatf IX), a Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) with a range of 60 km. A multiple launch rocket system capable of carrying four ready-to-fire nuclear capable missiles with a weapon yield in the region of 0.5 to 5 KT. Starting from its first flight test on 19 April 2011, the missile was quickly claimed to be operational on 5 October 2013.

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post-surgical strikes IS DETERRENCE WORKING? It is this incredibility of the one leap response that emboldens Pakistan in playing the game of nuclear blackmail The aftermath of Nasr was interesting: l Lt Gen Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, the then DG Strategic Plans Division (SPD) stated that Pakistan in Nasr, has consolidated its strategic deterrence capability at all levels of threat spectrum. l Since Nasr arrived post Azm-e-Nau III and as a ­­ consequence of it, Pakistan has stated that it is in response to the Indian Cold Start Doctrine. By implication and though covert and overt statements and posturing, Pakistan has tried to convey the following: l Since the Indian objectives have become shallower transiting from the erstwhile to the Cold Start Doctrine, the nuclear redlines aimed to blunt and stop the Indian offensive have also come down as Pakistan now possesses the low yield weapon or Tactical Nuclear Weapon (TNW) or battlefield nuclear weapons, implying that these are usable in the battlefield space on counterforce targets with limited or localised effect. l Making overt statements that Pakistan will use every weapon in its inventory to protect its territorial integrity and to stop a possible Indian onslaught.

The erstwhile nuclear thresholds have come down substantially basically in response to Indian shallow thrusts in proactive mode. The space for conventional operations has further shrunk. And that TNWs are war-fighting weapons.

The Blackmail comes into Being

• With the above posturing in place, Pakistan continues to engage in acts of cross-border terrorism. In doing that, it draws assurance from its conviction that Indians actually believe nuclear thresholds have indeed come down. And in any case, the Indian resolve of massive retaliation with unacceptable damage is unlikely to pass the decision dilemma. Pakistani nuclear blackmail is thus succeeding and under its garb are the continuous acts of crossborder terrorism.

• On our part, every time a nasty incident takes place, there is a decision dilemma of putting boots across the border. One of the factors of hesitation is the chance of inviting a battlefield nuclear weapon thus starting a nuclear exchange, that will fast snowball into an uncontrollable nuclear war. Something that is neither desirable nor in our national interest. By repeated inactions, are we not granting success to Pakistani nuclear blackmail which has led our decision makers into believing that space for conventional warfare has indeed shrunk?

Another significant asymmetry has cropped up post-Nasr, wherein, one side has battlefield nuclear weapons while the other side does not. The human angle to the above nuclear asymmetry is the unwelcome feeling in the minds of field force commanders and the troops they command. The men feel that even if the adversary uses a

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battlefield nuclear weapon, they have to fight through only with conventional weapons. While it is understood that the effect of these weapons will be localised, the feeling of inequality does not remain localised.

Options on Two Sides of the Opinion Divide

Is low yield nuclear weapon the answer for India to get out of this inequality? The vehement opposers of this idea say the following: n By succumbing to the Pakistani game and fielding a in tit-for-tat mode, we will actually make a departure from our mind game of deterrence anchored on massive retaliation with unacceptable damage to any use of nuclear weapon by the adversary. n We will signal to Pakistan that we are now ready for a proportional or graduated response which will lure him into using his battlefield nuclear weapons in the hope that it will only invite a similar low yield weapon, thus making nuclear game-play possible and feasible with contained effects.

4 Even on our side of the fence, it is hard to believe that in response to a low yield nuclear weapon whose effects are restricted to only a portion of the battlefield we will nuke out a few cities of Pakistan. It is this incredibility of the one leap response that emboldens Pakistan in playing the game of nuclear blackmail. Who is actually getting deterred is the question to ponder.

4 The bottom line is that nuclear weapons, of whatever yield, are political weapons of deterrence. This may sound inconceivable on the face of it but the reality is that nuclear weapons are weapons of deterrence. A nuclear exchange once started just cannot be controlled. It has eminent danger of spiraling out of control in no time.

4 As to Pakistani TNWs, there are basically three schools of thought. First, TNWs merely serve to extend Pakistan’s deterrence posture further down the conflict-intensity spectrum. Second, it indicates a shift in strategy from deterrence to war-fighting and third, questions the utility of TNWs in stopping Indian armoured attacks.

4 Taking the above thoughts, if the TNWs only serve to strengthen the deterrence posture, why give the adversary the advantage of gaps in our deterrence arsenal, wherein our one leap response actually leads him into believing the sheer incredibility of the same.

Has Nuclear Overhang Shrunk?

By developing TNWs, we signal to the adversary that we have no gaps in our nuclear arsenal n Our threat of massive retaliation is good enough deterrent to stop him from using his TNW in the battlefield. India therefore, does not require a low yield weapon.

In the face of the above status-quo thoughts, the following arguments are put forward: 4 The hard reality is that in spite of our resolve for massive retaliation with unacceptable damage, the adversary has hardly been deterred. It has effectively put into place a ‘workable nuclear blackmail’ and is comfortable in his belief that despite using a TNW in the battlefield with local effect, the likely Indian ‘one leap response’ for ‘total annihilation’ is unlikely to get past the political decision dilemma.

4 By holding low yield weapons, we don’t have to let go of the option of the ‘retaliation’ in the manner decided in our doctrine for it is for India and not the adversary to decide the scale of massive retaliation.

4 If the shift is from deterrence to war-fighting then why go in the battle with a posture of nuclear asymmetry.

And lastly, if the reality of the sheer futility of TNWs in stopping the Indian onslaught dawns on the adversary, it will only strengthen the no-use stance.

4 It is for no small reason therefore, that hundreds of low yield weapons deployed by the NATO forces at the height of Cold War in Germany never got be used. Both superpowers having had them in large numbers, at best derived a deterrent value from the same and having found them non-usable, gave up the idea of TNWs. 4 If that be so, why have TNWs at all? The need to have them is not for using them but to deter its use by the adversary. Since our doctrine of massive retaliation is very much in place, it is for us to decide what is massive, and to that effect, what is punitive? By developing TNWs we signal to the adversary that we have no gaps in our nuclear arsenal. What we use or do not use at a point in time is our decision.

4 If the likely response to Pakistani TNW is going to be massive retaliation only, then why TNW? This is to put to rest, the adversarys’ credibility deficit of the unlikely feasibility of a massive annihilation strike by us in response to his use of battlefield nuclear weapon.

4 Another significant thing will happen in the minds of our field commanders and troops. With low yield weapons in our arsenal too, the feeling of a perceived inequality will be obliterated. By implication and as a precipitate, holding of low yield weapons and thus having a ‘a complete arsenal range’ will also expand the perceived space for conventional operations currently being claimed as dwarfed by the adversary.

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post-surgical strikes PUNITIVE RETALIATORY ACTION

Check Infiltration And Scuttle Indus Waters Treaty If Pakistan were to continue with its policy of ‘thousand cuts’ against India, then this country will have to look at some of the other options available to make Pakistan relent from crossborder terrorist attacks. Both the World Bank and Pakistan need to be apprised, in firm language, that terrorism and treaties cannot go hand in hand and they should be put on notice.

P

akistan has been following the policy of ‘thousand cuts’ against India. To implement this policy, there are State sponsored sanctuaries for terrorists for operations against India and Afghanistan. Although nurturing such terrorist groups and making them operate against India has, on one part, resulted in Pakistan becoming a terrorist State and on the other hand, has itself become their target. While it would be of little interest to India if such groups target people of Pakistan, but their actions against India is of serious concern to this country.

After a series of attacks by terrorists from these groups against India, such as at Gurdaspur, Pathankot, Udhampur and Uri, retaliation from this country was undertaken in the form of ‘surgical strikes’ as a punitive step to discourage future attacks from across the border.

Unfortunately, this action by the Indian Army was followed by uncalled for chest thumping and boasting

to derive political mileage by the ruling party. The Raksha Mantri talked of gouging the eyes of the enemy and that Pakistan with folded hands was begging to be spared.

The media too overplayed the incident of surgical strikes.

Such utterances on the part of Indian politicians showed Pakistan military in poor light and at another level provoked it, as its standing and place in the scheme of things in Pakistan could be seriously dented. So, reaction from Pakistan emerged in the form of an attack at Nagrota.

No Viable Strategy

India has not been able to work out a viable strategy to dissuade Pakistan from continuing with this policy of’ ‘thousand cuts’ against it. While Pakistan is obsessed with the thought that Kashmir is the unfinished agenda of partition of the subcontinent, its anti-India stance is the very raison d’être for the existence of Pakistan Army in such large numbers and its relevance and say in the political arena.

It is essential to find a way out of this on-going threat from across the border Consequent to the recent incidents of terrorist attacks, both across the LoC in J&K and Punjab border, there has been much crossborder firing, both by small arms and artillery. It has resulted in dislocation of civil population from villages along both sides of the border and has seriously disrupted their lives, besides leading to a number of civilian casualties. Such an action by both sides is a zero sum game, with neither side gaining any advantage.

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China is using Pakistan as a proxy to engage and tie-down India locally Terrorist for Terrorist?

While at one time the Indian Defence Minister talked of meeting this crossborder terrorism by creating similar capability to retaliate, but such a policy is against India’s stand on terrorism as such. India cannot encourage growth of terrorism in the country as a counter to Pakistan’s policy of exporting terrorism. On the other hand, India has been striving hard to eliminate all forms of terrorism from its soil. In fact, there is no room in India for terrorists, dead or alive and even those coming from across the border from Pakistan and are killed in India, should not be buried in the sacred Indian soil and therefore, must be cremated and their ashes floated down the Chenab River.

This continuing threat from terrorist attacks on military units and establishments located in the vicinity of the border with Pakistan, has resulted in deployment of disproportionately large body of troops on security duties which impinges on other essential activities and training at unit level. At many places boundary walls have been built on the peripheries of unit areas and this is creating a sort of siege mentality amongst the troops.

Therefore, it is essential to find a way out of this on going threat from across the border.

While there could be a number of military options to put caution on Pakistan to refrain from following this policy of thousand cuts, but this issue is better dealt at the diplomatic level through dialogue. Pakistan must be made to realise that this animosity and acts of terrorism against India is harming Pakistan, both in its economic development and the casualties and damage these terrorist organisations are inflicting on its people. These terrorist organisations and groups are also leading to radicalisation of the population and even those in uniform.

China’s Proxy

China is using Pakistan as a proxy to engage and tie-down India locally. At the same time India’s added involvement in Afghanistan irks Pakistan to no end.

Pakistan wants a political set up in Afghanistan which is completely under its influence so that country provides it with the chimera of what it calls ‘strategic depth’ against India. So on its western front Pakistan continues

to support the Taliban and Lt Gen the Haqqani network to Harwant Singh displace the existing political PVSM, AVSM (Retd) dispensation.

There is no way in which India will give up J&K and the sooner Pakistan reconciles to this position, the better it will be for them. On the other hand, there is much for Pakistan to gain from developing good relations with India and opening up of trade and commerce between the two countries. During the Heart The writer was of Asia Ministerial Conference commissioned in the at Amritsar, Afghanistan’s Armoured Corps.

President openly pointed at Has held key staff Pakistan as the breeding ground appointments in of terrorism and refused to armoured formations accept US $500 million offered and commanded as financial help to his country School of Armoured and suggested that instead, Warfare. He was senior this sum be used to eliminate instructor at the War terrorist groups operating from College. Commanded Pakistan. At this conference, mountain brigade and though India did not directly an armoured brigade. point the finger at Pakistan Raised Infantry division but linking it with terrorism, (RAPID ) and fielded it indirectly, was sufficient to in Op Brass Tacks as the drive home the point. India did defending commander. right by scuttling the SAARC Was Director General Summit which was to be held at Islamabad.

Weapons and Equipment India needs to effectively at Army Headquarters. check terrorists crossing Commanded a Corps in into Indian territory with the J&K and retired as Deputy use of high-end technology Chief of Army Staff. and greater deployment and vigilance both along the International Boundary and the Line of Control in J&K. Along the Punjab border, there appear to be some tunnels beneath the fence, used for smuggling drugs and are possibly being used by terrorists to cross into India.

These tunnels must be located and heavily bobby-trapped.

Those attempting to cross over to India must be dealt with at the IB and the LoC itself.

If Pakistan were to continue with its policy of thousand cuts against India, then this country will have to look at some of the other options available to make Pakistan relent from crossborder terrorist attacks. Both the World Bank and Pakistan need to be apprised, in firm language, that terrorism and treaties cannot go hand in hand and they should be put on notice. In the past, we delinked the United Nations Observer Group from J&K and should do the same with the World Bank as it relates to Indus Waters Treaty. Pakistan knows that this treaty is its, ‘Achilles Heel’ and it must be warned that one more terrorist attack from across the border will result in the termination of this treaty and that India would proceed with harnessing waters of the three western rivers in the Indus Waters Treaty to meet its requirements of power generation and irrigation.

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post-surgical strikes POSTURE AND POLICY

Inadequate

Episodic Responses It appeared India was considering a combination of political, diplomatic, economic and military measures as part of a strategy to punish Pakistan and make it roll back its terror policy. The decision to launch ‘surgical strikes’ was borne out of that robust approach and appeared to have achieved its aim. However, since then, there is an apparent weakening of India’s approach, providing space to Pakistan to hit back and dilute India’s professed advantage, as is manifest in attacks like the one at Nagrota. To that extent, it would not be wrong to conclude that our overall response to security threats are lethargic, episodic and highly ‘adhoc’, to say the least.

T

he latest attack against an artillery unit of the Army at Nagrota on 29 November 2016, by a Pakistan-originated cross-border terror module has yet again highlighted the diabolical designs of our western neighbour. The terror attack has also emphasised to the Indian government and its security establishment, particularly the defence forces, that the continuing vulnerabilities of our defence units and establishments against terror attacks and the urgent need to take the required action to thwart such attacks.

There can be no doubt whatsoever that the terrorists who

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perpetrated these attacks need to be neutralised swiftly before they cause any harm or damage to men, material or morale of the security forces and the country at large.

More importantly, a serious message needs to be conveyed to those directing and controlling these attacks from across the border that India is capable of not only defending itself effectively, but also, it can pay back strongly and bring to justice the perpetrators of these attacks.

The Pakistan Army has been using suicide modules of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) to launch terror attacks against targets in India,

Articulation of formal National Security Strategy and National Defence Policy would provide the requisite guidance to a certain extent especially in J&K, for a long time now. After the Mumbai terror attack of November 2008, there was a five year lull, possibly due to fear of conventional retaliation by the Indian military. Subsequently, the terror attacks re-commenced three years ago in September 2013 with the attack against the police station at Hiranagar and the tank regiment at Samba in the Jammu region.

Significantly, a month earlier, Pakistan had claimed to have commenced induction of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) into service.

Nuclear-Terror Nexus

There is a direct link between the nuclear weapons and the rogue terror policy of the Pakistani State because the former provides cover to the latter, in as much as the nuclear weapons are meant to neutralise the threat posed by a possible response based on India’s pro-active conventional military strategy. The terror attacks against military targets are meant to kill as many Indian security personnel and civilians as possible, to ‘bleed’ and demoralise the Indian State while highlighting the J&K

problem internationally. And the Anu Lt Sharma Gen J&K problem is important (the Philip Campose PVSM, AVSM, VSM** jugular vein!) to be kept alive for (Retd) Pakistan because it justifies the ‘two nation theory’ on the basis of which Pakistan was born and has existed since then.

To that extent, there was nothing different in the source, nature and intent of the Pathankot, Uri, Nagrota and other cross-border terror attacks of 2016 from the numerous other such attacks.

Pakistani suicide terror The writer is former Vice modules have been launched Chief of the Indian Army. repeatedly since 1999 as His expertise lies in the realm of national security strategy, manifestations of the State’s military deterrence and force diabolical terror policy. structuring, operational What makes some of these planning, nuclear policy, attacks like Mumbai, Pathankot capability building, mechanised and Uri stand out is the warfare, counter-insurgency importance of the target or the and UN peacekeeping. higher number of casualties.

The aim of these attacks was enunciated by late Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq in the mid-1980s, “to bleed India by a thousand cuts”.

After each attack, the Pakistani State makes efforts to deny its involvement and concurrently plays down the attack as being of minor, tactical nature, with an obvious intent of thwarting international condemnation or a strategic response by India. And, so far, it has largely succeeded in its efforts.

Pakistan Serves US-Saudi Interests

Pakistan’s closest backers in the international community, especially China and Saudi Arabia and even the United States, have ensured so far that it is protected from serious international opprobrium on its terror policy against its neighbours, as Pakistan serves their geo-political interests. That is indeed very surprising in the case of the United States because Pakistan, which

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post-surgical strikes POSTURE AND POLICY

There appears to be little integration between the Defence Ministry and the Armed Forces

has been the recipient of approximately 28 billion dollars of American military and economic largesse since 9/11, uses part of this money occasionally to finance attacks by the Taliban against US personnel and interests in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, there are recent indications that the US government may finally be willing to read the riot act to Pakistan, especially with regard to attacks

by Pakistan sponsored terror modules against US targets in Afghanistan.

Indian Vulnerabilities

Shockingly, despite lessons learnt each time, the numerous vulnerabilities on our side continue to exist and these get highlighted each time there is a major cross-border terror incident which results in serious casualties to our personnel or their families. The Uri attack led to anger all over the country and the government was forced to consider actions at the strategic level to force Pakistan out of its intransigence.

It appeared India was considering a combination of

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political, diplomatic, economic and military measures as part of a strategy to punish Pakistan and make it roll back its terror policy. The decision to launch ‘surgical strikes’ was borne out of that robust approach and appeared to have achieved its aim. However, since then, there is an apparent weakening of India’s approach, providing space to Pakistan to hit back and dilute India’s professed advantage, as is manifest in attacks like the one at Nagrota. To that extent, it would not be wrong to conclude that our overall response to security threats are lethargic, episodic and highly ‘adhoc’, to say the least.

So, what are the problems? First, it is a well accepted fact that, as Indians, we lack a strategic culture, attitudinally and organisationally, which would enable us to address such a problem comprehensively, with long term effects.

Strategic think tanks in Delhi are making a huge effort to correct this inadequacy, but a lot more needs to be done.

Secondly, we do not have a system of formal strategic guidance on military issues to our leadership. Articulation of formal documents in the form of a National Security

Strategy and National Defence Policy, as is prevalent among many developed countries, would provide the requisite guidance, to a certain extent. Thirdly, there appears to be inadequate access to direct military advice and expertise at the highest level of governance as well as some related flaws in the current ‘rules of business’.

Further, there appears to be little integration between the Defence Ministry and the Armed Forces, despite the recommendations of the post-Kargil Group of Ministers and the Naresh Chandra Committee in this regard. And, most importantly, there requires to be serious coordination and optimisation of functioning between the three wings of the armed forces. Recommendations on many of these issues were provided by the Naresh Chandra Committee in May, 2012. These need to be acted upon expeditiously.

Have not Turned Tables on Pakistan

Due to all the above reasons, our responses appear inadequate most of the time. Our actions, if any, end up looking very ‘tactical’, thus making us do exactly what Pakistan wants us to do. Instead, if our responses to the past ‘episodes’, over the last many years, had been well coordinated and strategic, employing all instruments of India’s Comprehensive National Power (CNP), we could have succeeded in reversing Pakistan’s insidious terror policy and make it dismantle its terror infrastructure.

Unfortunately, this has not happened so far.

So what are the lessons for dealing with attacks like Pathankot, Uri and Nagrota? Here are some suggestions:

Suggested Actions

A. We must hold the Pakistani State and its Army wholly and solely responsible for the attacks by cross-border terror modules. We must not allow them to get away from responsibility and accountability for the terror attacks by denying their involvement or shifting the blame to non-State actors.

B. We must use all instruments of national power political, diplomatic, economic and military - to draw up a well coordinated strategic response. Politically, the message to the Pakistani leadership must be clear: unless it rolls back its terror policy, India will treat it as the ‘enemy’ and use all resources within its power to punish those who attack Indian interests and its people.

Diplomatic

C. Diplomatically, we must cut ties with Pakistan and simultaneously, work at highlighting Pakistan’s terror policy internationally and isolating it in the comity of nations.

Countries which support terrorism or come in the way of sanctioning terrorist leaders and groups, must be named and shamed appropriately, by concerted diplomatic efforts.

Economic

D. Economically, we must use our leverages to squeeze Pakistan as also convince other countries to see our point of view. We must review our decision to provide the ‘most favoured nation’ trade status to Pakistan.

Military

E. Militarily, we must raise the cost of terror attacks for Pakistan to unacceptable levels. We must exploit

our military strengths to target Pakistan’s weak points.

Concurrently, we must secure our vulnerabilities.

F. In terms of operational preparedness, we must keep our ‘powder dry’ at all times. We must always keep available the minimum essential levels of military capability, which enable a speedy response whether in a ‘hot pursuit’ option, a fire assault across the Line of Control, or initiating the ‘cold start’ strategy.

Plug Gaps On Periphery

G. Gaps in guarding of the border and Line of Control must be removed by optimising and energising the existing system of border fence, patrols, ambushes, guard dogs and ‘humint’ to make it foolproof in all aspects and areas.

H. We must secure all our defence establishments effectively and efficiently. All SOPs in this regard must be implemented scrupulously. To start with, all military units in J&K and adjoining areas must be provided hardened, technology based, multi layered security infrastructure.

Security and counter-terror responsibilities must be reiterated and training carried out appropriately. Security rehearsals must be conducted regularly and audits made more stringent.

Review Indus Waters Treaty

I. Politically, we must show willingness to review our commitment to the Indus Waters Treaty, to the point of being willing to withdraw from the treaty if Pakistan does not withdraw from its terror policy.

J. Internally, we must make efforts to resolve the Kashmir issue politically by reaching out to the people. Initiatives to mainstream the Kashmiri youth must be given fresh impetus. Efforts must be made to provide justice and restore harmony among all communities in J&K. In the long term, efforts must be made to de-radicalise sections among the Kashmiri people and restore traditional ‘Kashmiriyat’ to the Valley.

K. The Indian State must be prepared to deal directly with terrorist masterminds like Hafiz Sayeed, Masood Azhar, Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, Syed Salahadin and their like, who have been involved with the killing of Indian citizens and bring them to justice under international law.

Towards that end, the Special Forces Command must be raised at the earliest.

L. Levels of cooperation of the military with the police and paramilitary, especially the BSF, need to be raised to higher levels. Army personnel need to be co-located in police check points and control rooms.

M. And last but not the least, we need to modernise the military, especially the Indian Army, in keeping with the need to strengthen our deterrent posture and give a message to Pakistan about our capability and intent to retaliate appropriately if provoked.

In sum, it is high time all agencies formulate and implement a clear and focused policy to put a stop to Pakistan’s terror policy, once and for all. Any vacillation in our resolve on this account would condemn us to repeated assaults and resultant casualties in the future too. Nonetheless, efforts must also be made to resolve the latest unrest in Kashmir and put this episode behind us, before it gets complicated any further.

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post-surgical strikes SEA of CHANGE?

Calibrated Strategic Restraint

While India should continue to exercise strategic restraint, the country is no longer interested in pursuing deterrence by denial. Instead, deterrence by punishment should now be the name of the game. India must raise the cost for Pakistan for waging a proxy war by inflicting punishment on its army and its organs. The measures adopted must be made progressively tougher till the cost becomes prohibitive.

F

or three decades, Pakistan Army and its ISI, known as the ‘deep State’, have been waging a proxy war against India as part of their well-known strategy of bleeding India through a thousand cuts. Neither India’s size, economic might, conventional military superiority, nor the crushing and humiliating defeat suffered in 1971 and loss of face in the 1999 Kargil misadventure have diminished Pakistan’s determination. To continue with its State-sponsored policy of inflicting thousand cuts-this despite the policy’s devastating effect on Pakistan itself. Over the years, India has tried to build a normal and productive relationship but barring an occasional glimmer of hope, there has been no paradigm shift in Pakistan’s policy towards India, especially the ‘deep State’ which controls foreign and defence policy vis-a-vis India.

India’s conciliatory approach adopted by various governments, underlining the economic benefits of normal relations and the debilitating effect of an arms race or an all-out war, and above all, using terrorism as a State-sponsored policy, have also yielded no positive results. Even the international campaign for naming and shaming Pakistan as the main sponsor and exporter of terrorism and exposing its human rights violations particularly in Balochistan, has not induced any long-term change in attitudes. The terror strike on the Army camp at Uri on 18 September 2016 just 6 km from the Line of Control (LoC), which resulted in the death of twenty soldiers, was finally the proverbial last straw and resulted in the execution of punitive strikes aka ‘surgical strikes’ against multiple terror launch pads across the LoC in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (The PoK) on the intervening night of 28-29 September.

These surgical strikes were hailed by the government as well as a number of strategic thinkers across the country, as a paradigm shift in India’s strategic resolve and policy in fighting Pakistan-sponsored terror – a so-called doctrinal shift from the earlier strategic restraint. The Indian Army has undertaken many cross-LoC raids earlier also but these were limited in nature and never acknowledged publicly.

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The multi-faceted offensive from Pakistan in a more aggressive, yet subtle manner, points towards the ready adaptability with which it responds to any Indian move In a first ever, the 29 September strikes across the LoC were planned at the level of the National Security Advisor and publicly acknowledged by the government and the Indian Army. The message was very loud and clear to Pakistan, the ‘deep State’, its proxies and the international community that there will be no more business as usual – there will be a cost to be paid. The public acknowledgement of strikes was also to an extent aimed at testing Pakistan’s bluff on nuclear escalation and threshhold.

Pakistan’s Response

As expected, the Pakistani leadership went on record to say that no such surgical strikes took place and denied the Indian claim. In fact, the Pakistan Army went on to further

explain that its seven soldiers were killed in the ongoing fire assaults across the LoC and would be avenged at an appropriate time. This was on expected lines, not because it wanted to de-escalate as some strategic thinkers have stated, but was put across as a face saver and for consumption of the public in Pakistan. Any belief that Pakistan would change tack and revisit its policy of proxy war has been put to rest with the twin terrorist attacks in Samba and the army camp in Nagrota last month. There are enough indicators that Pakistan will continue to wage the proxy war as hither-to-fore but at a higher cost and caution now – the surgical strikes have brought in a factor of unpredictability in the Indian response which Pakistan will have to factor in its future actions.

Following the strikes, there was some tension between Pakistan’s civil and military establishment over the Pakistan Army’s Kashmir policy as reported in the Dawn’s controversial article. This was quickly lapped up by our pseudo intellectuals, who felt that peace in Kashmir was around the corner. But subsequent events in Pakistan belied their hopes and clearly reiterated a known fact, that it was the ‘Deep State’ which dictated and controlled the Kashmir policy and not the civilian establishment.

Pakistan more Adamant

With a formal induction of surgical strikes in the Indian Army’s conventional response strategy, it was felt that Pakistan could no longer plan its strategies by making India’s nuclear doctrine a static focal point. However, as events progressed, quite the contrary has happened and Indo-Pak relations continue to experience a downward spiral with no sign of a breakthrough in the near future.

The LoC continues to simmer with close to 280 ceasefire violations since the surgical strikes took place. An even more dangerous development is the killing and mutilation of Indian soldiers’ bodies allegedly by Pakistan Army’s Border Action Teams. The attack at Nagrota, which left seven soldiers including two officers dead, has raised serious doubts and questions in many quarters about the efficacy of these strikes on Pakistan’s policies vis-a-vis India. The multi-faceted offensive from Pakistan in a more aggressive, yet subtle manner, points towards the ready adaptability with which it responds to any Indian move.

On the diplomatic front, India’s concerted efforts to isolate Pakistan at regional as well as international level have been thwarted by Pakistan’s close ally China.

Pakistan’s defence and foreign policy towards India will continue to be controlled by the ‘deep State’ - no civilian government in Pakistan is likely to challenge them in near future, despite a change of guard in the army. Hence, its advocacy of the need to wrest Kashmir from India at all costs will become shriller though the strategy to achieve that aim may be fine-tuned to avoid culpability.

Nor will Pakistan give up its quest to control Afghanistan’s destiny and dictate its strategic choices. Given these hard ground realities, what should India do? Only a long-term, multi-pronged policy utilising all bilateral, regional and international leverages might work.

India’s Policy and Strategy

The surgical strikes conducted by the Indian Army across the LoC on the night of 28-29 September 2016, came as

a huge surprise to Pakistan Lt Anu Gen Sharma BS Pawar Army and the ISI. India has PVSM, AVSM (Retd) introduced an element of unpredictability and Pakistan can no longer be sure about India’s likely response, hence this form of response must remain in our ambit of options However, India’s counter-proxy war strategy should be based on a realistic assessment of the threat and carefully formulated to achieve related national The writer is a Gunner and security objectives. The latest an Aviator. He was head of the Army Aviation Corps surgical strikes were the and commanded the School lowest rung on the escalatory of Artillery during a career ladder. The aim should be spanning four decades. A to inflict punishment on the defence analyst, he writes for Pakistan Army and its organs a number of defence journals and systematically destroy its and publications. He is war-waging potential. However, currently the President of the Northern Region of Helicopter military operations should be Society of India. carefully calibrated to reduce the risk of escalation.

We need to get our own house in order in Kashmir and find a political solution and not keep banking on the military to bring normalcy every time the situation goes out of control. It should be a national priority to stabilise the situation. India’s objective should be to gradually raise Pakistan’s cost for waging a proxy war, with a view to eventually making it prohibitive. It should also be a national security and foreign policy objective to work towards reducing the Pakistan Army’s salience in the country’s polity.

By boycotting the Islamabad SAARC summit and through deft diplomatic manoeuvres India has succeeded in isolating Pakistan in South Asia but internationally, it remains a pipe-dream with China coming to its rescue on every issue raised, including State-sponsored terrorism. It is time for India to shift the emphasis from SAARC to Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC),which will provide handsome dividends in the long term.

China also needs to be told in unequivocal terms that it has to be considerate to India’s interests and sensitivities - a difficult proposition in the current scenario. In this age of realpolitik on the politico-diplomatic front, India has many other cards that it can play. The expression of overt support for the long-oppressed people of Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan is one such card which India needs to play consistently and aggressively across the international fora.

This policy must be pursued vigorously both in letter and spirit and not left to pure rhetoric.

While India should continue to exercise strategic restraint, the country is no longer interested in pursuing deterrence by denial. Instead, deterrence by punishment should now be the name of the game. India must raise the cost for Pakistan for waging a proxy war by inflicting punishment on its army and its organs. The measures adopted must be made progressively tougher till the cost becomes prohibitive.

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reader's corner

Edited by: Gurmeet Kanwal Year of Publication: 2016 No of Pages: 436 Price: `799 Publisher HarperCollins India ISBN 978-93-5177-751-9

Polycentric World Order:

Era of Strategic Uncertainty 40

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he twentieth century was perhaps the bloodiest in history. Two world wars, the spectre of nuclear weapons, numerous small wars and insurgencies and many ethnic conflicts in the past few decades ensured that the last century of the second millennium remained mired in violence. The peace dividend that was expected to accrue after the Cold War ended in 1991 failed to materialize. Instead, numerous small wars and insurgencies broke out all over the world, such as those in Bosnia– Herzegovina, Kosovo, Somalia, Rwanda, Kampuchea, Chechnya and East Timor, and then in West Asia. In a world that continues to be in a state of transition after the collapse of bipolarity, new challenges and threats to national security are emerging constantly. While conventional war is becoming increasingly unviable as an instrument of foreign policy, sub- conventional conflict and armed violence have become more prevalent. The end of the Cold War has led to what may be characterized as an era of strategic uncertainty. Almost three decades later, the world order is once again in the process of transition; this time from America’s ‘unipolar moment’1 to a polycentric future.

The global balance of power is shifting gradually but inexorably from North America and Europe to the IndoPacific region that is poised to become the new strategic centre of gravity in international politics. ‘Brexit’, Britain’s impending exit from the European Union, has jolted the foundations of globalization and brought nationalism once again to the fore. Some commentators have declared that the twenty-first century will be an Asian century. For the first time since the commencement of the Industrial Revolution, the single largest concentration of economic power will be found not in Europe or the Americas but in Asia. However, despite its growing economic clout, the Indo-Pacific region will remain a relatively turbulent region—beset by internal conflicts and political transitions and subject to continuing instability due to a contested external environment and increasing militarization.

Though national security is still essentially an amalgam of political, economic and military components of national power, there has been a gradual erosion of the primacy of the state as the predominant player in international geopolitics. While, at one level, regional groupings like the European Union have subsumed some of the functions of the state— now being contested by movements like Brexit—at another, terrorist warlords like Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of the so-called Islamic caliphate and ethnic chieftains are emerging as powerful entities. Some armed forces have begun to outsource limited security functions to private entities.

For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) employs Blackwater (now called Academi) for ancillary security duties in Afghanistan and Iraq. In January 2015, the US Central Command had 54,700 private security guards under its jurisdiction.

Mercenaries have been hired by both sides in the

ongoing war in south Yemen between the Houthis and the coalition led by Saudi Arabia. Large multinational corporations (MNC) are increasingly taking protective measures to guard their commercial interests across national boundaries and may soon raise their own private armies. International non-governmental organizations (NGO) are also gradually becoming a force to reckon with in eroding the sovereignty of nation states. Paradoxically, despite all these changes, nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles have continued to remain central to international politics as the predominant currency of military power, though the reliance on other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has declined.

While many old territorial and boundary disputes are yet to be resolved, some of these are latent and are unlikely to be the cause for a sudden conflagration. The more potent emerging challenges to security stem from cyber attacks on military and civilian infrastructure, radical extremism and fundamentalist terrorism, the proliferation of small arms, narcotics trafficking, socioeconomic disparities and ethnic tensions. All of these need to be addressed with vigour. In fact, narcoterrorism will be a primary concern in the next few decades. Like China, India will soon emerge as a major economic and military power. India will continue to seek cooperative and constructive engagement with all major powers. A closer economic linkage between the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and a shared interest in peace and stability will drive maritime cooperation as trade across the Indian Ocean increases rapidly. The architectural framework of security of the global commons in the Indo-Pacific region will work satisfactorily only if, despite being driven by strategic competition, it is encased in a matrix of cooperative security.

Extracted from the book The New Arthashastra: A Security Strategy for India with permission from the author Brigadier Gurmeet Kanwal and publisher

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post-surgical strikes INTEGRATED APPROACH

Strategy Of Punitive Retaliation India considering its security scenario, which is vastly different from the US and Israel, will require distinctly original imperatives vis-à-vis other countries. As a way ahead for effective deterrence by retaliation, it should rely upon the selective intentional aggressive response as a demonstration across the entire spectrum of warfare, unrestricted.

O

n 18 September 2016, eighteen Indian Army soldiers were killed in a pre-dawn terrorist attack on Uri Brigade Headquarters administrative camp, where rear parties of two infantry battalions were located as a part of relief programme. The Indian government and the Army not only condemned the incident but promised a retaliatory response at the time and place of their own choosing.

Media including social media went on an offensive blitz.

Diplomatic response was equally noisy. It considered withdrawing of most favoured nation status and nullifying the Indus Waters Treaty. In the aftermath, the border skirmishes along the Line of Control intensified.

On 29 September, 2016, swift retaliation in five subsectors along the LoC came about where Special Forces, backed by the Ghatak platoons of the two infantry battalions which had suffered in Uri, attacked terrorist launch pads.

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Thirty four terrorists were reportedly killed. These strikes were hailed far and wide as clear indication of India’s changed strategic posture. It was also hoped that Pakistan will now get deterred from conducting proxy war under the nuclear umbrella and getting away with impunity. This also demonstrated to the world, India’s resolve to take care of its own security rather than approaching major powers like the US, China etc to rein in Pakistan.

Then on 29 November, 2016, an Army Corps Headquarter base, 40 km from the international boundary was attacked by a group of militants. During the ensuing gun battles seven Indian soldiers, including two officers were martyred and all three militants were killed. There was consternation all around. The Army is being blamed for laxity and the minister has called for a report.

The questions which arise are - whether India has changed her security doctrine of deterrence by denial to

deterrence by certainty of response? Is India prepared for this fundamental shift – politically, diplomatically, militarily and economically?

Failure of Deterrence by Denial

Deterrence by denial is predicated upon defensive forces guarding the border and a counter offensive component in the form of conventional strike forces. Nuclear capability is not yet dovetailed into it. It has often failed in the past.

The reasons are summarised in the succeeding paragraph.

There are vast hollows existing in the Armed Forces structure in quantitative terms, to include upgradation and modernisation aspects. There is qualitative mismatch due to doctrinal gap. This is the disconnect between the lack of strategy or doctrine to fight the emerging or future wars and develop the forces structure accordingly. Our ‘No First Use’ nuclear doctrine has also lost its bite, with current reports of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal having grown even bigger than India’s including its development of tactical nuclear weapons. In the current imbalance India’s second strike would fail to inflict unacceptable damage on adversary, thus causing no deterrence on this count.

Deterrence by denial also implies a defensive mindset.

Meaning that, keep improving the defensive grid to such a level that adversary cannot penetrate within costs acceptable to it.

The Indian government, less the Armed Forces, fails to accept that Pakistan has launched hybrid war against India This concept had failed due to our inability to apply the learnings of the ongoing nature of conflict that India is experiencing. In Jammu and Kashmir, the proxy war continues. Along the LoC, regular troops continue to engage in exchange of fire with small arms, automatic weapons, mortars and even artillery. In the hinterland subversion and coercion of political system through Intelligence and social media continues with religious overtones. Fake currency notes are used to payout the disruptive elements to incite mass protests in J&K. Thereafter, media is manipulated to show security forces as having used excessive force.

Politicisation of this situation and concerns for international opinion, very often result in the criticism of security forces. This further demoralises them, which leads to their becoming over-cautious or demoralised. Proliferation of information through social media, TV and print media spreads this sense of despondency in the minds of security forces across the country. This results in weakening their will to fight through the hybrid war being unleashed against India. The terrorist infiltration strikes, whether in the border areas of the LoC or across international border at the bases like Pathankot, Nagrota or in Mumbai, Bengaluru or Delhi add another dimension to it.

At economic level, attempts to derail our economy through fake currency notes or smuggling of narcotics from across the border are another feature. At the same time, Pakistan continues to enjoy trade benefits of being

the most favoured nation, while denying the same to India.

Incitements of conservative religious elements and radical sleeper cells is another dimension.

Brig (Dr) AnuAnil Sharma Sharma

Multipronged ‘War by Other Means’ Diplomatically, Pakistan dexterously exploits its MMS from Osmania nuclear status at the same University, Ph D (System Dynamics Modelling of time posing its vulnerability National Security Strategy) of nuclear arsenal falling into The writer Brig (Dr) Anil the hands of radicals. This Sharma is an honorary Joint nightmarish concern, coupled Director with Institute for with America’s own strategic National Security Studies and interests in Afghanistan leave currently working as Professor them with no choice but cum Director Student Affairs at University of Petroleum to keep providing massive and Energy Studies (UPES), economic and military aid Dehradun. packages. Pakistan, on the other hand, has drawn China into strategic and economic MsAnu Anshu Sharma Paliwal development ties due to mutual convergence of interests, mainly to contain India.

Pakistan is also succeeding with Russia to some extent.

This is diplomatic dimension of Indo-Pak standoff, where in spite of massive recent efforts

by Indian government, key parameters of the game remain clearly tilted in the favour of The writer is Research Pakistan. Hence, there is no Associate in the team headed compulsion on it to change its

by Brig Sharma for research in Strategic Management. She is behaviour towards India. currently working as Deputy Pakistan therefore, is engaged Proctor at the University with India in a war by other of Petroleum and Energy means or warfare unrestricted Studies(UPES), Dehradun. or hybrid war, extending She has submitted her Ph D in across conventional military “Study Habits, Learning Styles along borders, proxy war, and Goal Setting as a predictor of Academic Performance of terrorist strikes, at economic, College Students”. media, cyber, socio-political, diplomatic and strategic levels.

In such a reality, days of deterrence by denial are over long ago. There had been an imperative for India to change its posture. The surgical strikes do indicate a change in our policy.

Imperatives of Deterrence by Retaliation

Assuming that India has changed its policy, there is a need to examine the aftermath of India’s responses as to what a shift to deterrence by certainty of retaliation would entail.

The Indian government, less the Armed Forces, fails to accept that Pakistan has launched a hybrid war against India rather than a conventional war involving the Armed Forces of the two nations. No wonder that post-Nagrota attack, government publicly criticised the Army. If it was able

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post-surgical strikes INTEGRATED APPROACH

Actions like firing across the LoC are not the answer to establish this capability.

After Nagrota, there should have been another swift surgical strike to strike a parallel with conventional war, the incident was like a platoon level tactical reverse which will not make even a brigade level Commander to raise an eyebrow. On the other hand, in irregular warfare of this kind, terrorists supported

by Pakistan Army have targeted a peace time location where families of officers were residing. As for the outcome, all terrorists were killed. It merits support and encouragement and not condemnation. Either out of ignorance or for getting media attention. This ignorance extends to many media houses as well.

There is need to have a look at the operational context of major world powers which exercise the policy of deterrence by retaliation. The US is foremost. It believes in taking the war into adversary’s homeland as retaliation.

This is evident from its campaigns in Afghanistan. It only faces terrorist threat and no vulnerabilities along its borders. Another most active proponent is Israel.

It does face existential threat from all around. This is mostly in the form of terrorists variety, as its very strong conventional military capability under the overhang of credible nuclear deterrence, with first use option allows it to exercise retaliation doctrine.

Be Ready to Strike

India considering its security scenario, which is vastly different from the US and Israel will require distinctly original imperatives vis-à-vis other countries. As a way ahead for effective deterrence by retaliation, should rely upon the selective intentional aggressive response as a demonstration across the entire spectrum of warfare, unrestricted.

Militarily, the idea of armed suasion has its origin in the thinking of Chinese philosopher ‘Sun Tzu’. It is amplified using an analogy. The corporate houses are famous for victories in wars or conflicts. The ultimate selling product of the armies is their demonstrated capability to wage a winning war. So, they must keep retaliating by striking at credible targets with tangible results which are well publicised. The actions like firing across the LoC are not the answer to establish this capability. For example, after Nagrota strike, there should have been another swift surgical strike targeting terrorists without worrying about collateral damage. Acquiring capability for sustained surgical strikes

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should be part of our force development plans. Media, government and public must support this strategy without fear of escalation.

At diplomatic level, India has no options but to succeed in its efforts to wean America away from Pakistan. Americans expect quid pro quo in their diplomacy, their experience is that we do not reciprocate their gestures, whereas they expect our support in more substantial way. It is because of the same reason that the Russians are also moving away from us. Similarly, a consistent strategic approach should be evolved towards China where in both strategic, economic and border defence imperatives are merged. Then only China would realise that it does not suit its interests to keep Pakistan as a proxy client. There should not be any flip-flop in our policy regarding engaging with Pakistan, due to domestic electoral politics compulsions.

Government needs to take firm proactive steps to evolve a bipartisan approach across all political parties on this score. A tough task, but it has to be done, Pakistan has to be denied leverage of our own political leaders speaking out against our national interests. It also demotivates the security forces.

There are caveats in this. Our media campaign should expose Pakistan’s military and political leadership to make their people realise the incalculable harm their policies are doing to the future of Pakistan. Most often, it ends up shaping the perceptions of the Indian people that show divisiveness of the Indian political system and instruments of State power.

In order to counter impact of Pakistan’s full spectrum irregular war, India’s retaliation should also encompass the entire range of options, which can be used. There is need to identify our instruments of strike across diplomacy, economy, central police or paramilitary forces and internal socio-political dynamics, information, cyber space and even space. Match and group these with the effect based operations of military with calibrated timings and magnitude.

This kind of integrated range of strikes conducted in ‘symphony’ will yield desirable results as also give a clear message to elements hostile to India’s interests not to mess around with an emerging major power like India.

post-surgical strikes JIHAD MOTIVATED

Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy And Doctrine

Bharat Lather

Perhaps the most dangerous weapon in Pakistan’s arsenal The author is Post is its terrorist groups. Radical non-State actors supported Graduate in Defence by the notorious ISI and Pakistan Army continue to wage Studies, Punjab University, Chandigarh. a proxy war against India. The danger to India is that these groups, particularly those plotting and conducting attacks against civilians and security forces, could pressure the Indian government to retaliate militarily against Pakistan. The larger danger of such groups is that they could prompt the Indian government to take measures that would lead to all-out war between the two countries.

O

ne of the strongest motivations for Pakistan to place greater reliance upon its nuclear arsenal is its sense that India has stolen a march on it in terms of national power, economically as well as militarily. Pakistanis sense they’re facing an ever-steeper power gradients in relation to their neighbour.

On top of this, an enormous conventional military imbalance between India and Pakistan has forced it to invest heavily on its nuclear weapons capabilities. Like North Korea, Pakistan is a weakening State that has invested in nuclear weapons as an inexpensive way to assure territorial integrity. An invasion of Pakistan is now extremely dangerous and one of the surest ways to a nuclear war.

In that respect, Pakistan’s nuclear programme can be considered a success. Pakistan’s Hatf series of ballistic missiles have been developed and is still under development, keeping India in mind. These missiles have varying ranges starting from 70 km and go up to 2750 km.

Typically, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals have been small and comparatively unsophisticated. But now they’re undergoing a high level of technological churn. That includes the development of manoeuvering warheads and manoeuverable re-entry vehicle intended to evade terminal Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). The MARV is a highly complex and sophisticated technology which would allow Pakistani warheads to dodge intercepting missiles. It also involves a noticeable new emphasis on solid fuelled ballistic missiles (Shaheen 1,2 and 3) as well as on the mobile land-based missile launchers imported from China. So far, relatively small numbers of delivery vehicles are involved but are trending upwards.

the world’s seventh nuclear weapon State.

Since becoming nuclear in 1998, Pakistan continues to follow First Use policy vis-à-vis India. In an interview back in 2002, Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, the first head of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which is responsible for Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, outlined four scenarios where Pakistan would consider using nuclear weapons against India: 1. If India conquers a large part of Pakistan; 2. If India destroys large parts of Pakistan’s army or air force; 3. If India tries to strangle Pakistan economically; 4. If India tries to destabilise Pakistan politically, including by creating large scale internal subversion.

Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons

In order to offset India’s growing conventional superiority, Pakistan has accelerated its nuclear weapons programme and begun to field short-range, low yield tactical nuclear weapons, Nasr. Large numbers of small nuclear weapons scattered at different locations increase the risk that some will fall into the hands of violent extremists. A terrorist

What is Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy?

On 28 May 1998, Pakistan conducted five simultaneous nuclear tests in Balochistan. This test, designated Chagai-I, was followed up with another test two days later Chagai-II. Officially, from that day, Pakistan became

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post-surgical strikes JIHAD MOTIVATED The MARV is a highly complex and sophisticated technology which would allow Pakistani warheads to dodge intercepting missiles

group gaining control of a nuclear weapon remains one of the most frightening scenarios of the current arms race.

India has threatened to use its strategic weapons in response to Pakistan’s use of short-range nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, Islamabad seems to believe that the use of tactical nuclear weapons has no strategic implications and that a limited nuclear strike within Pakistani territory to impede advancing Indian forces will not escalate into a fullfledged nuclear war. The presence of requisite infrastructure at Rahwali for launching tactical nuclear missiles clearly illustrates that Pakistan is ready to take the risk.

Role of Army in Pakistan’s Nuke System

Early 1990 marked the beginning of an escalation in Pakistan’s covert support to terrorism in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and the Indian establishment was facing a complex internal security challenge which was clearly being stoked by an external agency. The Pakistani

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Army was using its nascent nuclear weapon capability to create a firewall to ‘deter’ India even while abetting terrorism. It is very important to note that China conducted a nuclear test for Pakistan on 28 May 1990. Therefore, by May 1990, Pakistan did develop a nuclear capability.

Writing in the New Yorker in 1993, journalist Seymour Hersh noted with characteristic flourish: “The American Intelligence community, also operating in secret, had concluded by late May (1990) that Pakistan had put together at least six and perhaps as many as ten nuclear weapons, and a number of senior analysts were convinced that some of those warheads had been deployed on Pakistan’s American-made F-16 fighter planes. The analysts also suspected that Benazir Bhutto, the populist Prime Minister of Pakistan, had been cut out of or had chosen to remove herself from the nuclear planning. Her absence meant that the nation’s avowedly pro-nuclear President, Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the Pakistani military,

The Nasr raises concerns in the international community about the safety of these weapons in the light of the terrorist organisations operating in Pakistan

Weapons Infrastructure’ also reiterates that in violation of the US guidelines Pakistan has converted its F-16 fighter jets for use with nuclear weapons. In addition to this, “French-produced Mirage aircraft are widely assumed to be equipped to deliver the Ra’ad (350km) air-launched cruise missile.”

The report stated that a division of Pakistani Air Force fighters, capable of delivering nuclear warheads, are kept at the Masroor Air Base, west of Karachi. The air base offers a massive underground facility, possibly a command centre, located in a high-security area. Hans M Kristensen, a top scientist at FAS said, ‘‘Analysis of commercial satellite photos has identified features that suggest that at least five bases might serve a role in Pakistan's emerging nuclear posture. This includes army garrisons at Akro [Sindh], Gujranwala [Punjab], Khuzdar [Balochistan], Pano Aqil [Sindh] and Sargodha (forward airbase). A sixth base at Bahawalpur may be under construction. There is also a seventh base near Dera Ghazi Khan, but the infrastructure is very different and not yet convincing”.

Significance of Khushab Nuclear Complex

headed by Army General Mirza Aslam Beg, had their hands, unfettered, on the button”. By looking at this instance, it can well be understood that Pakistani military has a major say in respect to its nuclear weapons.

Pakistani Nukes In The Air

Historically, F-16 aircraft was the first means by which Pakistan could deliver nuclear weapons. Apart from being a battle-proven platform, in terms of capability, the PAF’s F-16s are equipped for precision-strike as well as air-to-air warfare. The PAF has 500 AIM-120C5 BVRAAMs (105km), Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), and Paveway Guided Bomb Units (GBU) in its inventory.

Pakistan has a nuclear stockpile of between 130 and 140 nuclear warheads, according to a group of American scientists, whose tally is partially based on close scrutiny of satellite images and matches other recent estimates. Their report 'Pakistan's Evolving Nuclear

The steady production of weapons-grade plutonium continues at the Khushab Nuclear Complex, coupled with the miniaturisation of warheads and testing of tactical cruise missiles, the 750km range Babur and the 350km range Ra’ad. These comparatively smaller missiles enable Pakistan to field a wide range of tactical systems, such as fighter aircraft and submarines, as potential nuclear delivery platforms. Moreover, one would assume that smaller and relatively high-yield, via tritium boosting, plutonium warheads would be produced in greater numbers, easier to distribute, that too in a much wider delivery network encompassing conventional assets and more difficult to track.

Despite the proliferation of Pakistani nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles, this does not particularly mean it has a secure or reliable nuclear arsenal. The deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, Nasr raises concerns in the international community about the safety of these weapons in the light of the terrorist organisations operating in Pakistan. Political instability and terrorist attacks, with inside support, on military installations, including General Headquarters in Rawalpindi, a naval base in Karachi, an air base in Kamra, and Peshawar, have exacerbated these concerns.

Terrorist Hand on Nuclear Trigger

Perhaps, the most dangerous weapons in Pakistan’s arsenal are its terrorist groups. Radical non-State actors supported by the notorious ISI and Pakistan Army continue to wage a proxy war against India. The danger to India is that these groups, particularly those plotting and conducting attacks against civilians and security forces, could pressure the Indian government to retaliate militarily against Pakistan. The larger danger of such groups is that they could prompt the Indian government to take measures that would lead to all-out war between the two countries.

The activation of India’s ‘Cold Start’ conventional military doctrine, in which the Indian Army would defeat the Pakistani Army and then rapidly move into Pakistan, could trigger a nuclear response from Pakistan, leading to a nuclear exchange between the two countries.

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post-surgical strikes PAK ASSETS IN DANGER

Neutralising The Terror Camps In West And East

Pakistan has shifted many terror training camps from their previous locations to near residential population, thereby inducing caution on Indian Army due to the possibility of collateral damage. A total of 16 to 17 terror camps of the LeT, Jaish-e-Mohammed and the Hizbul Mujahideen were relocated with reports also indicating that some terror camps have even been shifted inside Pakistan Army bases in the PoK. These camps were shifted with the help of Pakistani Army and the ISI.

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he Indian security doctrine has undergone a practical and unstated shift in recent months.

The camps of terrorists across the International Border (IB) and the Line of Control (LoC), cocooned in the territory controlled by other countries and far away from any punitive actions by India, are no longer safe havens. With surgical strikes across the IB in Myanmar in June, 2015, and across the LoC in September, 2016, these terror camps are suddenly under the spotlight. They are now unsafe, require to be shifted frequently and cannot be too big, unless they become a viable target. This may preclude construction of any substantial infrastructure for training the terrorists. The camps are also going to be located deeper inside, relatively obscure and possibly more in nature of transit camps being used by the terrorists while moving across the boundaries. In case of Pakistan, the training camps may be shifted to areas bordering Afghanistan, far away from the Indian eyes. Like the camps which flourished all along the Durand Line during the mujahideen days of 1980s when fighters from all across the Arab world and North Africa flocked to these camps to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. The changing complexion and the increased vulnerability of these camps to an aggressive surgical posture has induced unpredictability in the minds of the terrorists and their handlers, while generating greater policy options for India.

Inside the Camps

As of recently, it is estimated that there are 40 to 50 terror camps of various sizes existing in Pakistan. There are apparently three kinds of camps; those for recruitment,

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training and launching attacks. The recruitment camps are located between Muzaffarabad and Lahore as many of the recruits are in no way connected with J&K but are simply radicalised and unemployed youth from Pakistani Punjab. After initial screening, the stay in the recruitment camps lasts for about 30 to 35 days. It also involves significant indoctrination, after which they are sent to other training camps to learn about arms, navigation and radio telephony. Some selection is carried out at each stage and the chosen persons are directed to the launching camps which are close to the LoC. The launching camps, often co-located with Pakistan Army posts, have 10 to 30 terrorists including handlers and instructors.

Here, they wait for an opportunity to cross the LoC, either by breaching or scaling the LoC fence or by quietly sneaking across with guides while the Pakistan Army tries to divert attention by firing and ceasefire violations.

These terrorist training camps have been identified by the US intelligence and investigation agencies including the FBI which had told a US court that satellite pictures pointed towards such a camp near Balakot in northeast Pakistan during the trial of 23-year-old Pakistani American

Many Kashmiri militant groups (designated as terrorist organisations by the US) still maintain their headquarters in the the PoK

Hamid Hayat, who had been accused of terrorism-related charges in the US. The accused had confessed to being in this camp and as also in another camp in the the PoK. Similarly, according to WikiLeaks, several detainees at the Guantanamo Bay facility told the US interrogators that they were trained and aided by the ISI for attacks in Kashmir.

Many key Al-Qaeda operatives like David Hicks, Richard Reid and Dhiren Barot have also received instruction and training in LeT camps.

The PoK Camps

Col Shailender Anu Sharma Arya

The writer is an alumnus of RIMC, Dehradun and NDA, Khadakvasla. He has served as GSO 2 of a mountain artillery brigade on the Line of Control, a company commander with Assam Rifles in Nagaland and as a Staff Officer with the United Nations. He is an MSc in Weapon Technology from Poona University and an MSc in Defence and Strategic Studies from Madras University. He has served as a GSO 1 (Operations) of a newly raised Assam Rifles Sector HQ in a counter-insurgency environment in South Manipur and is now commanding his unit on the Line of Control in J&K.

The camps in the PoK have been well documented by the Intelligence agencies from across the globe. Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy in their book Islamist Networks: The Afghan -Pakistan Connection have mentioned three training camps in the the PoK, the principal one being the Umm-al-Qura training camp at Muzaffarabad. Every month five hundred militants are trained in these camps. The 26/11 mastermind, Zabiuddin Ansari alias Abu Jundal who was arrested by Indian intelligence agencies has disclosed that paragliding training was also included in the training curriculum of Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) in camps in Muzaffarabad. Muhammad Amir Rana in his book A to Z of Jehadi Organisations in Pakistan has listed five training camps. Four of them, the Muaskar-e-Taiba, the Muaskar-e-Aqsa, the Muaskar Umm-al-Qura and the Muaskar Abdullah bin Masood are in the the PoK and the Markaz Mohammed bin Qasim training camp is in Sanghar District of Sindh. By their estimates, over ten thousand militants had been trained in these camps since 2004.

LeT Pre-Eminent in Kashmir

For long, the Pakistan Army and the ISI have considered LeT to be the country’s most reliable proxy against India.

The group still provides utility in this regard as well as the potential for leverage at the negotiating table. The LeT was formed in Afghanistan’s Kunar province in 1990 and gained prominence in the early 1990s as a military offshoot of Markaz-udDawa-wal-Irshad. Initially, most of the training camps were located in North-West Frontier Province but as Pakistan gained adequate influence in Afghanistan by its proxies like Taliban, many LeT camps were shifted to the the PoK for the sole purpose of training volunteers for the ‘jihad’ in Kashmir. The LeT then became an India-centric terror group and from 1991 onwards the militancy surged in J&K, as many LeT militants infiltrated from the the PoK with the help of the Pakistan Army.

The LeT training camps for militants are located at a number of locations with the base camp named

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post-surgical strikes PAK ASSETS IN DANGER Markaz-e-Toiba in Muridke near Lahore and another main camp near Manshera. In these camps, the training is well structured and the regular turn-over of batches give an impression of being a legitimate training facility rather than a terror factory. A French anti-terrorism expert, Jean-Louis Bruguière, in his book Some Things that I Wasn’t Able to Say has stated that the regular Pakistani Army officers trained the militants in the LeT camps. He reached this conclusion after interrogating a French militant, Willy Brigitte, who had been trained by the LeT and arrested in Australia. The terrorist camp was in a high-altitude area and when the camp was resupplied; all the material was dropped off by Pakistani Army helicopters.

However, the shifting of these terror camps to the vicinity of population centres has not gone down well with the local populace. In October 2016, the residents of Muzaffarabad, Kotli, Chinari, Mirpur, Gilgit, Diamer and Neelum Valley protested against the presence of these camps in the the PoK. They condemned that the ‘banned organisations, terror camps are provided food and ration here’ and threatened that ‘if management doesn’t end Taliban’s terror camps and ‘‘no-go’’ areas in Diamer, Gilgit, Baseen and others, then we’ll take action.’ These protests were widely covered by the Indian media and provided irrefutable proof of the existence of the camps. It was also interesting to note that the majority of the locals in the PoK do not support these camps, an indication that it is not Kashmiris on either side of the LoC but radicalised (and generally unemployed) Punjabi recruits from Pakistan’s hinterland, with some smattering of Pashtuns, who form the bulk of the terrorists trying to breach the LoC.

Camps in Myanmar

Regular Pakistani Army officers trained the militants in the LeT camps The training in the LeT camps is progressive, consisting of a 21-day religious course named Daura-e-Sufa, a 21-day basic combat course named Daura-e-Aam and three-months advanced combat course named Daura-e-Khaas for some selected persons. Most of the suicide bombers or fidayeens undergo Daura-e-Khaas.

The LeT base camp Markaz-e-Toiba is at Nangal Saday, about 5 km north of Muridke, on east side of GT road and about 30 km from Lahore. It was established in 1988 and is spread over 200 acres of land and contains a madrassa, hospital, market, residences, a fish farm and agricultural tracts. The initial sectarian religious training, Daura-e-Sufa is imparted here to the militants.

Shifts Post Uri

The terrorist strike at Uri and the surgical strikes by the Indian Army across the LoC were a watershed event.

Even before the retaliatory strikes, the Intelligence reports suggested that Pakistan has shifted many terror training camps from their previous locations to near residential population, thereby inducing caution on Indian Army due to the possibility of collateral damage. A total of 16 to 17 terror camps of the LeT, Jaish-e-Mohammed and the Hizbul Mujahideen were relocated with reports also indicating that some terror camps have even been shifted inside Pakistan Army bases in the the PoK. These camps were shifted with the help of Pakistani Army and the ISI. In particular, four terror camps operating from Mansehra and Muzaffarabad were shifted by the Pakistani Army, many of them near heavily populated villages and crowded towns within the the PoK in an attempt to camouflage them with local population.

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India shares a 1,643km porous and unfenced border with Myanmar where inhabitants can cross over to the other side and travel up to a distance of 16 km under a system called the ‘Free Border Regime.’ Myanmar has strong connections with the India’s North East as the Kuki-Chin-Mizo groups who migrated from Myanmar in the last century are settled along the border areas and share ethnicity in Myanmar. Myanmar has long been a safe haven for the insurgent groups, mostly on account of its remote border regions with India which are poorly administered by Naypyidaw. The Nagas who are spread on both sides of the border are hardly conscious of the IB, freely crossing over and maintaining connections on both sides of the border.

Almost all the major insurgent groups have their camps in Myanmar, mainly in Sagaing Division as well as in Kachin and Chin States. This includes the Naga groups – the NSCN (IM) and the NSCN(K), the Manipuri insurgent groups like the UNLF, KYKL and the PLA, and the Assamese group, ie the anti-talk faction of ULFA and the Bodos. In total, as many as sixty big and small camps and hideouts exist in Myanmar, especially in northern Sagaing Division. Most of these camps belong to the NSCN (K) and the NSCN (IM), but even other over-ground insurgent outfits in the North East, such as the Zomi Revolutionary Army and the Kuki National Army also have hideouts in Myanmar. The key camp locations are Taga area across the Tirap-Changlang sector of Arunachal Pradesh and the area across the border with Manipur. Taga has a number of the NSCN (K), PLA and the ULFA camps spread over an area of 20 to 30 kilometres while the PLA and the UNLF camps are based across Moreh in Manipur. The ULFA also has a camp in the Hukwang Valley bordering the conflict-ridden Kachin State, possibly shared with the NSCN (K).

While the surgical strikes by the Indian Special Forces in June 2015 on two of these camps were quite successful, the larger issue remains the porous borders, which is further complicated by the forested terrain, neglect of these border areas by Myanmar, drug smuggling and the ethnic similarities. All reports indicate that the camps have been pushed deeper and well dispersed. In addition, at least two

outfits – the anti-talks faction of the ULFA and the PLA have established camps in the mountainous region of Shan State in Myanmar bordering China’s Yunnan province.

However, there is increased cooperation from the Myanmar Army on this issue. In March 2016, Myanmarese Army raided camps belonging to an insurgent outfit in Somra Tract, a region adjacent to Manipur’s Ukhrul district that is inhabited by the Tankhul Naga tribe. The reports indicated that it was an NSCN (IM) camp, an outfit which is concurrently engaged in peace talks with New Delhi.

Even earlier, a camp of the proscribed UNLF was burnt down by the Myanmar Army in October 2011. However, the Tatmadaw, ie Myanmar’s armed forces, lack the resources for a full-scale offensive against the rebels in Sagaing division. Myanmar has signed an agreement with the NSCN (K) in 2012 and their Army would not prefer to open another front with the Nagas with conflict already raging in Shan State and perpetual disturbances in Arakan and Kachin.

Policy Options for India

In the North East, the broad policy option is to develop better relations with Myanmar and assist its army by providing it with the weaponry to take on the anti-India rebels. In addition, increased trade with Myanmar, undertaking developmental projects, better border management and fencing the main transit routes shall make a major difference. India competes with China for influence in Myanmar and towards this, assisting its army, a major power centre in the country, shall pay handsome dividends in own counter-insurgency operations in the North East. With a reluctant China, a positive Bangladesh and no-go Bhutan, the space for establishing camps by the North East insurgent groups is already shrinking. Devoid of bases in Myanmar, the groups will simply not be able to sustain insurgency in Asom, Manipur and Nagaland.

Legitimate Targets in the PoK

In the PoK, the military options should be complemented by a contemporary border fence modelled on the Israeli fences, modern sensors and stronger infrastructure, including protecting own installations from terror attacks.

It may be noted that apart from the terror camps which are legitimate targets, many Kashmiri militant groups

India needs to invest heavily in future technologies and precision weapon systems (designated as terrorist organisations by the US) still maintain their headquarters in the PoK. These so-called headquarters are merely a front-office for terror activities and therefore, may also be a suitable target for the Indian Army in its future target options. In fact, unpredictability and the ability to strike at will at place and time of own choosing shall be a major deterrence for the terrorist groups operating from the PoK. Pakistan shall then be left with no choice but to shift them to the Afghan border where they shall be increasingly drawn in the power vacuum being created by the drawdown of the US forces in Afghanistan and the limited ability of the Afghan National Security Force in securing major population centres or increasing the government-controlled territory.

Emerging Precision Weapons

The future may also belong to precision attacks and deep surgical strikes. Already, according to Gen Sir Rupert Smith in his book The Utility of Force, “War as a massive decisive event in a dispute in international affairs no longer exists”.

However, to achieve success, India needs to invest heavily in future technologies and precision weapon systems. A glimpse of the future of war fighting was provided in a cover article in The Economist. Aptly titled “Select Enemy.

Delete”, it highlighted not merely the near surgical ability for destruction by a new generation of weapons, but a range of new capabilities as well that can dramatically enhance effectiveness in war. Towards this armed drones or Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle ‘AURA’, as the project was named by India, shall play a key role.

Finally, a combination of deep surgical strikes, aggressive diplomacy, improved border infrastructure and future technologies shall provide the way ahead for India. The new posture has to be complemented by modern technology and imaginative thinking to keep a step ahead of the hordes of terrorists being indoctrinated, trained and nurtured in the terror camps.

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Defence AND security alert

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post-surgical strikes THE CIVILIAN DIMENSION

Bleeding At The

Border domination is important to send a strong signal to the opponent.

Pakistan would try to provoke the Indian troops as it suits her designs but trans-border firing should be resorted to as a last option. In such stand-off, there are no clear winners especially when both the sides are equally matched. Hence, trans-border attrition is, by itself, not a doctrine.

It is a part of border management strategy under prevailing circumstances.

I

ndia and Pakistan are perhaps the most inimical neighbours in the world. Their animosity is deep-rooted. It has resulted into four wars and a running armed conflict in the State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) since the late 1980s. It has also seen the formation of Bangladesh in 1971, a mortal blow to

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Pakistan’s sovereignty and national pride. They etch their sovereignty on ground in a variety of ways. Starting from the north, the 110-km-long Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) runs through the Siachen Glacier culminating at NJ 9842, the most famous map coordinate courtesy the Cease Fire Line Agreement, 1949. Further south, there

Infiltration Gameplan

Anu Colonel Sharma The year 1989 could well Utkarsh Singh be considered as watershed Rathore (Retd) as far as the LoC and border management in J&K is concerned. Hordes of terrorists, after receiving training in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir PoK were pushed across the LoC. The Pakistan Army would fire at the Indian posts to disrupt observation and The writer is a defence and counter-infiltration operations security expert and risk and by the Indian troops to threat analyst. facilitate their infiltration. The Indian Army which manages the entire segment of the AGPL, LoC and the IB in J&K was faced with peculiar operational requirements of the LoC domination, counter-infiltration and counter-terrorist operations. Its successful conduct of counter-infiltration operations frustrated Pakistan Army, which resorted to unprovoked firing at Army and civilian targets on a much larger scale.

To check infiltration, the Indian Army has established a number of posts along the LoC and sends in hundreds of night patrols and ambushes. Considering the terrain and weather conditions in which troops operate, it is extremely manpower intensive, repetitive and a difficult task.

Success rate in such operations is difficult to quantify, but one can draw satisfaction from the fact that for one infiltration that has been successful at least five such attempts have been thwarted by the troops. There was a considerable check on infiltration with wire fence coming along the LoC and the IB, which was completed in 2004.

Borders runs the 740-km-long Line of Control (LoC), passing through treacherous terrains and weather conditions.

The LoC culminates in Akhnur sector, from where International Border (IB) runs south-westward into the Arabian Sea. Pakistan does not recognise this 190-kmlong IB segment running through the J&K and flags it as ‘Working Boundary’.

Considering the troops, field fortifications and weapons deployed by both sides, this 1040km line would perhaps be the most fortified border in the world. Till about early-eighties, the LoC and borders were not so active; only smugglers and intelligence agents used to sneak across. Occasional firing across the LoC to dominate weak enemy posts had started in mid-eighties, which gradually escalated into full-fledged exchange of fire across many sectors involving heavy calibre weapons for days together.

Counter-Terror Net

Counter-terrorist operations by the Army, Central Armed Police Forces and J&K Police neutralise terrorists present in the hinterland. To keep the pot boiling, the dead terrorists are replenished by Pakistan before the onset of winter. It is so cyclic for both Pakistan to send in the terrorists and for India to hunt for them.

Over the years, conflagration on the borders has become a sort of expression of frustration and anger of Pakistan military and political establishment against India. The frequency of such standoff has perceptibly increased since the Narendra Modi led government came to power in 2014.

The recent conflagration, which started after the terror attack on Uri Army camp and retaliatory surgical strike by the Indian Army in September, 2016, lasted for quite long. It was a good decision to vacate border villages in J&K and Punjab to prevent collateral damage.

Effect of Translocation of Civilians

The Human cost of sudden translocation of hundreds of villages during crop harvesting or sowing season and impending winters is huge. Monetary compensations are not enough. Similar exodus has been reported from Pakistan side as well. Border areas of the Indian side are more developed and prosperous as compared to Pakistan.

Losses caused by the dislocation to Indian civilians are

January 2017

Defence AND security alert

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post-surgical strikes THE CIVILIAN DIMENSION

The human cost of sudden translocation of hundreds of villages during crop harvesting or sowing season and impending winters is huge

more. It must be understood by the political and military leaders that neighbouring nations cannot afford to live in perpetual hostility. The Trans-LoC attrition is a graduated response to a particular situation. It has been taking place since late 1980s. Barring a brief spell of tranquility, after the signing of a ceasefire agreement by India and Pakistan in 2003, the LoC has witnessed many firing episodes.

Pakistan has been over-aggressive on the LoC and the IB since May 2014. There were incidents of large scale firing in October 2014, July-September 2015 and September-November 2016. Indian troops also retaliated with coordinated fire assaults and both sides suffered casualties on troops and civilians.

Trans-border firing follows a definite curve; starting from sporadic small arms and automatic weapons fire, it graduates to mortars, missiles and large calibre guns, then the artillery steps in. Lull follows after an intense duel. After counting their dead and surveying the damage both sides sue for peace over the hot line, maintaining a brave front. It has happened on so many occasions.

Advantages and Disadvantages

On the borders, both sides have their advantages and disadvantages. In some sectors, India dominates Pakistan posts; in some, Pakistan enjoys the advantage. During my days in J&K, whenever Pakistan tried to dominate Srinagar -Leh road in Dras-Kargil sector, we used to retaliate by firing on vulnerable sections of Neelum Valley Road along Kishanganga River in Keran Sector. It will be incorrect to assume that trans -border firing would give any side an unrestrained advantage.

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India and Pakistan enjoy near parity in terms of troops and weapons as far as their border deployments are concerned.

Hence, both sides can inflict or suffer similar losses. India’s prime concern at the LoC and the IB in J&K is to check infiltration, carry out successful counter-terrorist operations and build-up harmonious relations with border population.

Border management is an operational responsibility of units and formations. Peace is a precondition for this task.

Cross border firing disrupts normal operations, destroys fortifications and causes unnecessary casualties. It also gives Pakistan an opportunity to send in more terrorists.

Troops cannot be expected to live and work in such ‘no war, no peace’ situation for ever.

To worsen the situation, trans-border raids are also carried out. Here, Pakistan has a clear advantage. It has jihadis and border action teams, who are expendable foot soldiers. If caught alive or killed during action, Pakistan does not accept them as her citizens. India does not have any such elements. If any trans-border action is to be undertaken, it will be by the Army. Risk of failure and leaving behind dead or prisoner in such operations are inherent.

Border domination is important to send a strong signal to the opponent. Pakistan would try to provoke the Indian troops as it suits her designs but trans-border firing should be resorted to as a last option. In such stand-off, there are no clear winners, especially when the both sides are equally matched. Hence, trans-border attrition is, by itself, not a doctrine. It is a part of border management strategy under prevailing circumstances.

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RNI NO. DELENG/2009/31195