Defence & Security Alert May 2018 Edition by Ocean Media

editor’s note

DSA IS AS MUCH YOURS,

AS IT IS OURS!

he Government of India has announced the formation of a new body to oversee the entire gamut of defence and national security for the country. The fresh development is that it includes steps taken earlier by previous attempts at policy analysis and implementation, and it also features an innovation in having the National Security Advisor as the lead player in the new structure. The NSA will now head a new body called Defence Planning Committee that includes the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Service Chiefs, and the Secretaries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Expenditure from the Ministry of Finance. An interesting feature of this new body is the simultaneous creation of four sub-committee to focus on policy and strategy, plans and capability development, defence diplomacy and the defence manufacturing ecosystem. This is a fairly holistic approach to matters connected with defence and national security. Especially at a time when senior military officers have been airing their grievances from public platforms about the slow pace of modernisation afflicting their services. This is a departure

from the past when military officers were seldom seen and never heard. The crisis must, indeed, be serious. Hence, the announcement of this new body. But the moot question is whether creating yet another supervisory structure is going to propel the process when the real issue is really of taking decisions. And decisions have been pending for inordinately long periods, thus, resulting in acute shortfalls in vital areas. The air force is, of course, crying hoarse on the depleting numbers of combat squadrons, the irreplaceable weapons of aerial warfare. The army has a laundry list of purchases, from assault rifles to main battle tanks to artillery pieces, the whole hog. And, the navy can’t seem to get another aircraft carrier sanctioned, nor additional conventional and nuclear powered submarines. The nature and quality of military equipment must always be reflective of national priorities, capabilities, and above all, intentions. In the Indian context, none of these are fixed pillars from which to draw a long-term road map of defence planning and implementation. A vision document detailing the mid- and long-term national security scenario is imperative to realising the dreams and

May 2018

aspirations of India’s professional military men. Such a document would pave the way for prioritising technologies, their research and development, and their subsequent induction into the military structures. The crisis of India’s procurement muddle is sometimes also due to shifting goal posts by the armed forces themselves. The on-off debate over single or double engined fighter jets and the yet to be seen medium multi-role combat aircraft are only the most visible examples. The army’s desire to change from 7.62mm to 5.56mm and back again in a matter of two decades is another such story. The navy has been far more consistent with its vision and plans, but it just doesn’t get the resources allotted. The new DPC will look at the whole gamut, but its greatest contribution to India’s defence and national security would be to make the procurement process speedier and onsistent, something many have announced but none achieved.

Manvendra Singh

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

publisher’s view

An ISO 9001:2015 Certified Magazine

Volume 9 | Issue 08 | May 2018 Chairman Shyam Sunder Publisher and CEO Pawan Agrawal President Urvashi J Agrawal Director Shishir Bhushan Editor-in-Chief Manvendra Singh Copy Editor Vandana Bhatia Palli Copcom & Ops OSD Navjeet Sood Graphic Designer Prem Singh Representative (J&K) Salil Sharma Correspondent (Europe) Dominika Cosic Production Dilshad and Dabeer IT Operations Amber Sharma Photographer Subhash Subscriptions Taniya Sharma Legal Advisor Deepak Gupta

E-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscription: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org Editorial and Corporate Office Prabhat Prakashan Tower 4/19, Asaf Ali Road New Delhi-110002 (India) +91-011-23243999, 23287999, 9958382999 info@dsalert.org | www.dsalert.org Disclaimer

All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part by any means without permission from Defence and Security Alert is prohibited. Opinions expressed are those of the individual writers and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher and/or editors. All disputes are subject to jurisdiction of Delhi Courts.

Defence and Security Alert is printed, published and owned by Pawan Agrawal and printed at Bosco Society For Printing, Don Bosco Technical Institute, Okhla Road, New Delhi-110025 and published at 4/19, Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi (India). Editor: Manvendra Singh

MILITARY PROCUREMENT: FOOL’S PARADISE

he procurement of weapons and munitions for the armed forces has become an exercise in self-delusion. The French Rafale fighter aircraft contract held out to be a paragon of government-to-government deals is still stuck in the price negotiation phase and the first lot of fully operational aircraft is still nowhere on the horizon. The much-touted policy of ‘Make-in-India’ has already shown signs of ending up as another “licence produced” regime whereby knowhow about use of equipment may be exchanged by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) but technology will not be shared. For the better part of two decades, no new artillery weapon was procured because of the political fallout of the Bofors scandal. Politicians of all hues contributed to a stasis that kept in abeyance even the manufacture within the country of the 155 mm howitzers based on the drawings bought and paid for by India. Finally, the first lot of 40 extended range, longer barrel, and towed artillery gun system named Dhanush is being inducted into the Artillery Regiment of the Indian Army. In recent times, the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force have voiced their consternation at the lack of investment in modernisation and acquisition of munitions in a likely two-front war situation. We have already seen how both Pakistan and China are stoking the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. The prophesy of a “two-and-a-half front war”—Pakistan and China acting collusively and at the same time, instigating an Islamic fundamentalist uprising in Jammu and Kashmir – is already confronting the nation. We are forced to recall what the great Indian strategic thinker, Chanakya, had to say about national security. Centuries ago, he had said: “Security of the citizens at peace time is very important because State is the only saviour of men and women who get affected only because of the negligence of the State”. So shall we forget this dictum of Chanakya and firmly believe that no government in India is serious and sincere enough to equip our forces to counter any attack to save its men and women? The current government, which came to power with a massive mandate, has no priority for the procurement process for the defence and security forces as discernable in the paltry budget it has set aside for national security. We appear to have become caught in a vicious circle of our own making. Our expectation that the foreign OEMs will rush into India and share their technology; and the private sector will replace the Defence Public Sector Undertakings in the manufacture of heavy military equipment has been rudely shattered. The Indian companies are totally dependent on foreign partners for the transfer of technology and the latter is in no hurry to create a competitor in India. The ‘Make-in-India’ programme has actually collapsed as no big or small manufacturer in India or foreign OEM has invested in the defence and security sector under the programme. Are we befooling ourselves by making such announcements or are we actually a land of fools that no initiative has been taken even by the current government to adequately defend the nation. The entire responsibility lies at the doorstep of the top leadership. This edition of DSA is focussed on these big hurdles in the procurement process. I am sure that if any of the policy and decision-makers in defence and security reads this edition, he/she will be compelled to rethink as to how they have played fast and loose with national security. Happy reading and awareness, dear reader! Jai Hind!

Pawan Agrawal May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

contents

An ISO 9001:2015 Certified Magazine

NEGLIGENCE DOWN THE DECADES MAJ GEN DHRUV C KATOCH (RETD)

CONFUSING SIGNALS AIR MARSHAL ANIL CHOPRA PVSM, AVSM, VM, VSM (RETD)

EXTENDED RANGE AND LETHALITY CMDE RANJIT B RAI (RETD)

PAUCITY OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONRY LT GEN MUKESH SABHARWAL PVSM,AVSM,VSM (RETD)

“MAKE-IN-INDIA” ONLY ON PAPER LT GEN (DR) V K SAXENA, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (RETD)

OBSOLESCENCE AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY COMMODORE ANIL JAI SINGH, IN (RETD)

DISMAL PICTURE AIR MARSHAL DHIRAJ KUKREJA PVSM, AVSM, VSM (RETD)

PULL IAF OUT OF THIS QUICKSAND AIR MARSHAL SUMIT MUKERJI PVSM, SC, VSM (RETD)

LICENCE-PRODUCED MAISMA COL KV KUBER (RETD)

USE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY AUSPICES DR SUDHANSHU TRIPATHI

DNA OF HISTORICAL MEMORIES SOURABH JYOTI SHARMA

REVIEW – MOUNTAIN WARFARE AND THE INDIAN ARMY Book Review

May 2018

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

hollow arsenal SHORTAGE OF ARMS AND MUNITIONS

NEGLIGENCE DOWN THE DECADES

The Prime Minister’s ‘Make-in-India’ programme, a laudable venture by any yardstick is not taking off in the defence sector precisely because of institutional inertia in the MoD. The entire structure needs to be revamped if India is to progress. There is a need to put the right people in decision-making structures, giving them the power and responsibility and, thereafter, making them accountable to the country. Without reforms in the MoD, the very same babus will continue to kill the ‘Make-in-India’ initiatives and ensure that we remain a nation dependant on imports for our defence needs!

“You have never lived until You have almost died, And for those who choose to fight, Life has a special flavour, The protected will never know.” Capt. R Subramanium, Kirti Chakra (Posthumous)

I 4

n a seminar organised

on the need for the infantry to go

whose role remains to close in with

by the Centre for Land

back to the basics. The basics here

the enemy, attack and destroy

Warfare Studies (CLAWS)

referred to three core attributes

him. However, deficiencies in the

on March, 24, 2018, on the

of the infantry: physical fitness,

quality and types of weapons and

theme ‘Infantry Role and

skill at arms and battlecraft and

equipment for not just the infantry

Employment,’ the Chief of

battle drills at the sub-unit level.

but for the whole army, bespeaks

Army Staff Gen Bipin Rawat, in his

Indeed, this captures the very

negligence of a high order in our

inaugural address laid emphasis

essence of infantry capability,

national security calculus. If the

May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

infantryman does not have a small

soldiering skills. However, it is

arms weapon system with which

technology which enables

he is confident, then we have badly

these skills to be used to their

eroded our cutting edge. It is not

full potential.

enough to say that “we will fight with what we have,”… the

Manpower Par Excellence

oft quoted words of the then

The wars fought by India since independence are proof of the fact that India’s soldiery and officer leadership is second to none. Emphasis by the Chief and others on the need to go back to basics does not mean that the army is losing touch with ground realities, but is simply a reaffirmation of the fact that such activities must remain the prime focus of our training. But focus on the individual soldier, while vital, is but one part of the army’s capability and ability to deliver victory on the battlefield. The second part is the weapon and equipment profile of the field Army. Here, unfortunately, what the army needs, it seldom gets. For years now, the army has been fighting with a sub-optimal rifle and is short of ammunition. The problem lies in our State controlled research and defence production facilities, procurement procedures and the stranglehold which the bureaucracy has in the Ministry of Defence (MoD).

army chief during the Kargil War. We must ensure that the capability exists.

Man, The Weapon The core capability of the infantry remains the three attributes highlighted by the Chief. Unlike the artillery and the armoured corps, in the infantry, the infantryman himself is the weapon, but he must be provided the means to perform. The sine qua non of infantry remains the ability to operate in all weather conditions, at all altitudes, in all terrains, at all times, for prolonged durations. This obviously calls for a high degree of physical fitness from the officers and men, which makes physical fitness a prime requirement. Skill at arms is another basic requirement, for that is what enables the soldier to close in with the enemy and win the battle, which explains why the army lays so much emphasis on weapon handling and accurate shooting. And finally, good field craft and battle drills enable a high degree of survival in battle and the ability to operate as part of a section, platoon and company is what gives the necessary synergy to overcome the odds and win. All this falls in the domain of the military leadership, which is why it was repeatedly emphasised by the Chief. The prevalent high technology environment does not take away from these essential

MAJ GEN DHRUV C KATOCH (RETD) The writer is Director of India Foundation, Editor of SALUTE Magazine and Secretary General of Indian War Veterans Association.

The Defence Public Sector The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), while having a series of successes in its kitty, has failed to deliver on a number of fronts. While India’s missile programme has been an outstanding success, it is inconceivable that India has failed to produce a small arms system that inspires confidence in the infantry. The DRDO has been tardy in meeting its self-defined deadlines, be it the Arjun tank, the

May 2018

The DRDO needs to focus on upper end technology and in those spheres where the private sector has limited capacity. It must not aim to do everything under the sun

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

hollow arsenal SHORTAGE OF ARMS AND MUNITIONS

Perhaps, the time has come to do away with the post of Defence Secretary. Each Service should have its own Secretary LCA and many others. Apparently, the DRDO as an organisation, suffers from the “we can make it” syndrome, and claims to build everything, leaving little scope for the private sector or for defence imports. When they fail to deliver in the stated time, the capability of the armed forces gets eroded to that extent, forcing the government to go in for imports. A change in mind-set and working procedures of the DRDO is required, wherein the organisation needs to focus on upper-end technology and in those spheres where the private sector has limited capacity. It must not aim to do everything under the sun but be more selective in its approach to what it proposes to do. Just because defence is a ‘captive’ buyer, does not mean that the DRDO can offload any of its products on the Services. On the other hand, it is also essential to give to the DRDO the freedom and the unfettered rights and control over what it wants to develop and design, give them a time-frame and an appropriate budget and then hold them accountable to deliver.

aircraft, tanks, guns, heavy and light vehicles, small arms and ammunition and a host of other warlike and non-warlike equipment. Coming under the secretary, Department of Defence Production in the MoD, the entire functioning and charter of the department requires a review. There is an urgent need to close down some of the unproductive factories and DPSUs, and realign the others in tune with defence priorities and needs. A part of what is currently being produced in the ordnance factories must be privatised such as uniform cloth, shoes, blankets, mosquito nets and many other items of equipment. The forces will get cheaper product at better quality, but more importantly, the capacity of these establishments will get freed to undertake tasks that can reduce India’s dependence on imports. This will also give a fillip to the ‘Make-in-India’ campaign by setting the stage for creation of a defence industrial base which will facilitate local manufacture.

A review of the indigenous content in India’s military throws up a dismal picture, which is a sad indictment of the nine Defence Public Sector Undertakings and the 41 Ordnance Factories, mandated to produce a wide range of weapons and equipment for the forces, to include ships,

India’s defence procurement process remains the ultimate impediment for the timely equipping of the forces. Despite the effort in the last four years to revamp the system, the acquisition process remains mired in a bureaucratic maze which puts off potential sellers and leads to humungous delays in the process. And this occurs when the military

Designing Defence Industrial Base

Procurement Procedures

May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

is dependent on imports to meet its operational commitments. Even for routine replacements, where the process needs to be quicker, there is huge delay. The agencies involved in the procurement process are Defence Headquarters, Ministry of Defence and the Government (read Cabinet Committee on Security). There have been slippages in the action of each of these agencies which has led to this situation. The case for the replacement of the ageing MiG 21 fleet would make an interesting case-study in our management institutes. The defence acquisition process is being regularly tweaked, but it remains long and ill-defined, lacks accountability for delays and does not cater for cost overruns due to bureaucratic delays, both at the level of Service HQ and the

MoD. The solution lies in fixing responsibility and accountability at all levels, and also, in further simplifying the acquisition process.

The Bureaucracy

India’s MoD remains perhaps the only such Defence Ministry in the world which has no representation from the defence forces. The advice to the Raksha Mantri (RM) is, hence, given by an organisation which has little capability to do so. As per a former Naval Chief Adml VS Shekhawat, “…Another major deficiency is that the Defence Secretary, who is de-facto Chief Staff Officer to the Defence Minister, does not participate in any meaningful way in formulating and developing the proposals received from the Armed Forces before they are moved for financial executive approval, preferring instead to ‘Examine’ them for ministerial

IF WE CANNOT MAKE OUR OWN SMALL ARM FAMILY OF WEAPONS, THEN INDEED, WE ARE VERY FAR FROM BEING A LEADER EVEN IN SOUTH ASIA endorsement, often without being technically or professionally equipped to do so. Because of the staffing pattern, its competence lies in procedural matters, but as ‘Examiner,’ it feels obliged to raise numerous, supposedly searching queries that are often based on superficial information”.

May 2018

Scrap Defence Secretary Perhaps, the time has come to do away with the post of Defence Secretary. Each Service should have its own secretary, and the seniormost among them can also perform ceremonial duties currently performed by the defence secretary. The core group deciding on procurement could be headed by the respective Service Chief and not the defence secretary as at present, who heads the Defence Procurement Board. In the current dispensation, Service Chiefs are, at best, ‘cosmetic additions’ to what is called the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) headed by the RM. Without altering the composition of the DAC, there is an urgent and crying need to split the DPB three ways, one each for the army, navy and the air force headed by the respective Chief. The Prime Minister’s ‘Make-in-India’ programme, a laudable venture by any yardstick is not taking off in the defence sector precisely because of institutional inertia in the MoD. The entire structure needs to be revamped if India is to progress. There is a need to put the right people in decision-making structures, giving them the power and responsibility and, thereafter, making them accountable to the country. Without reforms in the MoD, the very same babus will continue to kill the ‘Make-inIndia’ initiatives and ensure that we remain a nation dependant on imports for our defence needs! Which is precisely the reason that even a weapon as elementary as a service rifle is now being imported by India! If we cannot make our own small arm family of weapons, then indeed, we are very far from being a leader even in South Asia, let alone at the world stage.

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

fighter aircraft ACQUISITION IN TURMOIL

CONFUSING SIGNALS

While the trend world-wide is to have limited fighter fleet types, IAF is mired by multiplicity of fleets with Jaguars, Mirage 2000s, Su-30s, MiG-21s and 29s, LCA and soon to be inducted, Rafale. Ideally, IAF could have settled for SU-30 MKI, Rafale and LCA fleets in the long run with new fighter and FGFA and AMCA later.

May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

AIR MARSHAL ANIL CHOPRA PVSM, AVSM, VM, VSM (RETD) The writer was a pioneer of the Mirage 2000 fleet and commanded a Mirage Squadron, two operational air bases and the IAF’s Flight Test Centre ASTE. He was the Team Leader of an aircraft upgrade project in Russia. He was head of IAF in J&K and Inspections in IAF, and has been member of the Armed Forces Tribunal, and JNU Executive Council.

he Indian Air Force (IAF) has hit an alltime low of 31 fighter squadrons and the extreme possibility of numbers dropping to 25 is already staring at its face. Despite such a gloomy air picture, to keep the morale of his brave air warriors and the nation, the IAF chief Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa has been repeatedly assuring that the IAF was “mission-ready” to fight a “full spectrum war” at short notice. Just last year, he had very optimistically predicted that it would take at least 15 years to deploy its authorised strength of 42 fighter squadrons. Dhanoa was banking on expected deliveries of the Dassault

Rafale fighters from France; increase in production of the indigenous LCA ‘Tejas’; and some clarity on single/multi-engine warplanes to be built in India. Clearly implicit in his statements was that India faces real threat from both China and Pakistan, including a possible two-front war. While the long term emphasis is on the need to quickly reach the strength of 42 combat squadrons, but the immediate real challenge is to stop further depletion of numbers. Extremely slow progress of procurements and inadequate funds for Capital projects are the two main reasons. At 1.57 per cent of GDP, the defence budget allocation ratio is the lowest ever since 1962. The Air Chief’s hopes of making

May 2018

ACCORDING TO MEDIA REPORTS, MOD HAD REALISED INTERNALLY THAT THE MAKE-ININDIA DEFENCE INITIATIVES WERE FLOUNDERING

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

fighter aircraft ACQUISITION IN TURMOIL

good the authorised squadrons by 2032 are already looking like a pipe-dream. In the next 15 years, IAF will require 22 squadrons—11 to make good shortfall and another 11 that will retire. That means over 500 aircraft. The ground reality is that IAF is in a crisis situation and it is high time the nation gets it act right to face this challenge squarely.

Parliamentary Committee Report

India’s Parliamentary Committee on Defence slammed the government for not doing enough to ensure military modernisation despite India being confronted with a clear and present “collusive threat” from China and Pakistan. Indian armed forces continue to grapple with critical operational deficiencies on several fronts, ranging from submarines, fighter jets, howitzers and helicopters to even basic gear like new-generation assault rifles, machine guns, bullet-proof jackets and helmets. They criticised the government for neither providing adequate funds for proper military modernisation, nor fast-tracking defence procurements to plug operational gaps. Overall, the army, navy and air force got only 60 per cent, 67 per cent and 54 per cent of the funds respectively; they had sought for modernisation this fiscal. The committee expressed concern over the “adverse and cascading effect that the deficiency of funds” would have on their operational preparedness.

PLAAF And PAF

China already has state-of-the-art aircraft manufacturing programmes in every department of military aviation - fighters, large transport, attack and utility helicopters,

AEW&C, UAVs, missiles etc. J-31, twin-engine, mid-size fighter with AESA radar and stealth features first flew in October 2012. Stealth fighter J-20 made its public debut at the Zhuhai Air Show on November 6, 2016. The aircraft is expected to enter service by 2018. People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has nearly 2,500 mainstream aircraft including 750 state-of-the-art combat aircraft and has 80 fighter/ bomber squadrons. Its current modern combat aircraft holdings include Su-30 MKK, Su-27, J-16, J-11, and J-10 fighters. They also operate 120 H-6 bombers, and 14 AEW&C variants. China is reportedly working on a stealth bomber designated H-18. China spends a huge US $25 billion on defence R&D. China and Russia signed a contract for 24 Su-35 (with advanced IRBIS-E AESA radar) and deliveries will start in 2018. At least a third of Chinese budget of US $154 billion goes to new acquisitions. China is fast becoming a major arms exporter, and has ambitions to build the airpower like USA for an asymmetric advantage. The PLAAF is targeting to be one of the world’s foremost air forces by 2020, made up of at least 1,000 ‘modern’ combat aircraft. Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has 22 combat squadrons with 400 combat

and taking security lightly would be at its own peril.

aircraft. F-16, JF-17 and FC-20 will finally be the main types. They aspire to go up to 28 squadrons. Pakistan has been in talks with China to acquire J-31 stealth fighters and with Russia for Sukhoi Su-35 air-superiority multi-role fighter. The PAF has been exercising direct control over aircraft building projects such as JF-17 which started later but is pushing ahead of LCA in numbers and exports. There are lessons for India in this. Militarily, India is the most vulnerable nation

order and 260 have been delivered till date. The Su-30 MKI has been upgraded with strategic weapons like BrahMos cruise missiles and nuclear-capable Nirbhay missiles. Initially, 40 aircraft are being modernised with AESA radar, more powerful onboard computers and a new Electronic Warfare (EW) suite. The first squadron of LCA Mk I has got just six aircraft and will be fully formed only by early 2019. The IAF has ordered 40 LCA Mk I aircraft and 83 Mk 1A. The LCA Mk 1A will have

May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

IAF Fighter Strength

Immediately after the 1962 War, the government-constituted Tata Committee had recommended 45 fighter/bomber squadrons for IAF. In 1988, the IAF had peaked and nearly hit 42 squadron strength. It has been a down-hill trajectory ever since. At 31 squadrons, IAF’s current aircraft include few squadrons of older MiG-21 Bis aircraft that may have to stretch till 2019. The 5 squadrons of MiG-21 Bison-fleet may continue till 2025 with depleting numbers and lower availability of spares. The IAF’s dedicated strike aircraft fleet includes 139 Jaguars and two squadrons of MiG-27, and both these types are upgraded. Life has been extended and will take the fleet to 2035. The decision on the more powerful Honeywell F125IN engines is still held in abeyance. Three squadrons of upgraded Mikoyan MiG-29 now have multi-role capability, latest avionics including Zhuk-M radar, and new air-to-air missiles. The 57 upgraded Dassault Mirage 2000 aircraft have RDY-2 radar, and the advanced MICA missiles among others. Aircraft life has been increased by 20 years. 314 Su-30 MKI airsuperiority fighters are currently on

the improved version of the Israeli EL/M-2052 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, and an electro-optic Electronic Warfare (EW) suite. It will also incorporate weight reduction along with easier servicing and maintainability, and have a mid-air refuelling probe. This variant should start inducting in 2020.

Troubling Times Ahead The crisis has been 20 years in the making. The situation is an outcome of many factors such as confusing signals being sent out on IAF’s fighter aircraft requirements (twin/single engine), the complex long-drawn decision-making process before contracting (sometimes decades), slow and floundering indigenous programmes and woefully low budget for capital acquisitions. While the IAF faces depleting combat squadrons, the above factors are made more complicated by political counter attacks against every arms deal. The only things that seem to have gone through smoothly were the government-to-government (G2G) deals with Soviets and Russians in the past and with Americans recently (P-8I, C-17, Apache, Chinook and others). There are some who are asking did the IAF not push hard enough to reach this low point. There is, thus, a need to holistically look at the future.

Tejas And Rafale

After a partial success of the indigenous HF-24 ‘Marut’, which failed only because it could not get a good engine, it was important for the aspiring power, India, to go for the LCA programme. Its success was crucial for further high technology projects like Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft. The LCA met with great delays because of

INDIA HAS TO INCREASE FUNDING FOR DEFENCE R&D WELL BEYOND ITS CURRENT US $6 BILLION, BULK OF WHICH CURRENTLY GOES IN SALARIES external (sanctions) and internal (technology capabilities) reasons. Despite claims, the indigenous content still remains around 30 per cent. Critically, the radar, engine, weapons, EW suite, among others remain imported. Aircraft suffers from short operational range, quality control issues, and is reportedly maintenance man’s nightmare. The LCA Mk 1A variant will meet the Final Operational Clearance requirements but awaits Design and Development (D&D) funds reportedly to the tune of Rs 1,000 crore. Any delay in allotment would send the deadline beyond the planned 2020. The LCA Mk II that may meet the original specifications may induct around 2025. Only six aircraft have been inducted till date. The production rate needs to go up quickly. Often, the DRDO and DPSUs overstate the capabilities to get service contracts and commit funds. The delays and lower performance later affect the user operational capability. After a gruelling selection process, Rafale came out a winner. It has been operationally tested in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Mali. Rafale is universally acknowledged as a good aircraft. Due to delayed and long extended negotiations, the deal was finally reduced to 36 against original 126 aircraft. The Make-inIndia element was also foreclosed. Rafale deliveries are reportedly on schedule and will induct in 2019. In view of the depleting numbers, one

May 2018

school of thought has been to order additional Rafale.

FGFA And AMCA The Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft is the most confusing programme for IAF. The D&D work-share for HAL has been reduced to 15 per cent from original 50 per cent. Russia developed its PAK-FA as a single engine aircraft and has inducted into its air force as SU-57. Russia is demanding additional US $6.8 billion for the D&D of twin-engine IAF FGFA variant. There are nearly 50 technical observations by IAF on the FGFA as on date. Even Russians are facing problems on FGFA and have currently committed only to one squadron. Most importantly, the moneys involved are huge. If IAF was to commit to FGFA, it will have no money left for any other aircraft for next decade or more. With depleting numbers, IAF can ill afford this. It will also put IAF in exclusive Russian basket for another 40 years. One option could be that IAF goes for two squadrons of already matured SU57. A programme in which Russians and Indians were to once buy 250 aircraft each, the numbers for IAF could now be as low as 36 aircraft. Any decision would now be political in nature. The indigenous Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft would surely help India to fly into the big league, but it is very ambitious and thus, has its technological risks. If AMCA makes its first flight in 2025, it may actually induct around

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

fighter aircraft ACQUISITION IN TURMOIL

2035. The AMCA would require considerable foreign help which may come in-built in the new fighter selection package. Stealth is a very complex technology. In today’s world of long range AESA radars and very long range hypersonic missiles, should India be wasting money on stealth at all?

leverage to negotiate the best deals for imported technology. It is next only to China with ability to develop own fighter alternatives, and India must pursue the Make-in-India route, come what may.

With the Jaguar, Mig-29, SU-30, Rafale, and later, FGFA and AMCA as twin engine aircraft, IAF was looking for a single-engine fighter which will make good the numbers and augment the delayed LCA. The single engine aircraft are traditionally

and nearly 2,250 are still flying the world over. Undoubtedly, the airframe has hit the limit of design changes. The Gripen is a relatively newer well-designed aircraft, but has made in USA engine and avionics. Only 270 are flying around the world. Though, India may have greater leverage and support from a smaller country like Sweden. The F-35 is being offered as a long-term bait by the Americans. It is very expensive to buy and maintain and IAF may not be able to afford it presently. The Boeing F-18 is being pushed as an IAF-cum-Navy contender. Chinese have already bought the SU-35 and Pakistan has

cheaper and easier to maintain. The main contenders were the latest Lockheed F-16 Block 70/72 and Saab Gripen JAS-39E/F. Both have tied with large Indian corporate houses for Make-in-India. Indian government recently announced that the fighter may not be restricted to single-engine, thus, once again opening the field to contenders similar to the MMRCA original deal. Lockheed F-16 is time-tested

shown keenness. The SU-35 could also pitch for Indian contract, albeit Russia would prefer India to stick to the FGFA contract. A big negative perception about the Make-in-India option is that most Western vendors (remember Rafale) are unwilling to accept quality-control liability for any aircraft built on license by HAL. India is among the very few countries today that can combine the production scales and political

Rafale and LCA fleets in the long run with new fighter and FGFA and AMCA later.

Make-In-India Fighter

May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Multiple Fleets

While the trend world-wide is to have limited fighter fleet types, IAF is mired by multiplicity of fleets with Jaguars, Mirage 2000s, Su-30s, MiG-21s and 29s, LCA and soon to be inducted, Rafale. It will be a logistics nightmare. Larger fleets can amortise costs and can maintain decent spare backups. Ideally, IAF could have settled for SU-30 MKI,

Bureaucratic Control Defence acquisition is a complex decision-making process that needs to balance the competing requirements of expeditious procurement, development of an indigenous capability for defence sector and conformity to the

highest standards of transparency, probity and public accountability. Is the ‘generalist’ bureaucracy knowledgeable, trained or fully geared for this? Bureaucratic bottlenecks, long winding procedures and at times lack of clear political push continue to hold back both acquisitions and Make-in-India projects. Should not the bureaucrats be also accountable for delays which have security implications? The new defence minister has been meeting the three Service Chiefs, and retired senior officers regularly to sense the ground reality. She is reportedly chairing the meeting of Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) every fortnight. It is clear she wants to break the log-jam in this most critical Make-In-India sector. According to media reports, MoD had realised internally that the Make-in-India defence initiatives were floundering; the weapons acquisitions process continued to be beset with huge delays; only 8-10 per cent of 144 proposed deals in the last three financial years fructified within the stipulated time periods; average time taken by 133 schemes was 52 months which was more than twice the laid-down time-frame; and average time taken to clear files was 120 weeks against stipulated

often seen in India cannot find quick solutions.

Defence acquisitions, currently, are based on unpredictability, without proper prioritisation of scarce funds, lack stability and are not outcomebased. More importantly, they are not supported by budget allocations. Every defence investment must be based on desired outcome. At present, the process of procurement takes 7-9 years. In G2G, it is

HAL slip into total civilian control. Undoubtedly, it is time IAF took positive ownership control of all aircraft and engine projects. China’s growth over the past decade has been spectacular, whereas India has displayed lack of urgency and clear sense of purpose. In view of the delays and uncertainty in LCA Mk II, FGFA, AMCA, some alternative options may have to be exercised. The 200 single/twin engine aircraft would surely make up for delays in LCA and also give higher operational capability. India must seriously revisit the option of increasing the Rafale numbers by ideally manufacturing 90 aircraft through Joint Venture route. Alternatively, at least 24 more aircraft should be purchased. The IAF fighter fleet serviceability continues to hang around 60 per cent. That implies that out of 800 combat aircraft, only 480 are flying fit. The government approved serviceability for operational planning is 75 per cent. If IAF were to achieve this figure it would add 120 additional serviceable aircraft. It would mean adding six squadrons. The main reason for low serviceability is the non-availability of critical spares, some of which may have gone for repairs. A onetime investment on spares could cost Rs 10,000-15,000 crore.

37 weeks laid down by the MoD in 2016. Minister of State Dr Bhamre reportedly said that armed forces continue to view MoD’s Acquisition Wing “as an obstacle rather than a facilitator”. F-35 programme was being driven by a very professional team of uniformed and civilian members of the Pentagon. Indian MoD needs to have such core ability and learn programme management. Programmes of LCA/AMCA magnitude need a national will and backing. The ‘We’ ‘They’ approach

4-5 years. Notwithstanding, the forthcoming general elections and the political heat and crossfire, India cannot lose another year in indecision. India cannot continue to be known for contractual delays (Hawk, Rafale) and cancellations (MRTT). We have a great success story in Naval ship-building. One reason for that is that all ship-design and dockyards are controlled by the Indian Navy, and retired officers are heading shipyards. The IAF over the years allowed the control of

Repeat improvements in Defence Procurement Policy, including the current DPP-2016, has yet to show results. It is mostly procedural with ill-defined timelines. All major defence procurements since first DPP in 2002 have been through government-to-government (G2G) route, thus indirectly signifying DPP’s lack of success. Defence Procurement is like the game of snakes-and-ladders where there are many more snakes and very

Private Sector

India, currently, has the dubious reputation of being the largest importer of defence equipment. Defence imports not only take away large chunks of foreign exchange but also perennially put the nation at the mercy of foreign powers. Big private industrial houses, like Reliance, Tatas, L&T, Mahindras, Bharat Forge and others have come into defence manufacturing in a serious way. India’s thrust is to increase share of manufacturing from the current level of 15 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 25 per cent. India’s target is to reduce defence imports to initially 40 per cent. Private industry can raise funds, take quick decisions and ensure transparency.

Sense Of Purpose

May 2018

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

fighter aircraft ACQUISITION IN TURMOIL

few ladders. “US $0.18 million (Rs 1.1 crore) is all that has come in as FDI in defence in last three years”, MoS Bhamre told the Indian Parliament. Defence acquisitions are not standard open market commercial procurements, and have unique features such as supplier constraints, technological complexity, foreign government regulations, denial of technology, high cost, and geopolitical ramifications. Concept of strategicpartnerships is meant to resolve some of these. Results are still to be seen. It is time to professionalise the entire process of defence acquisitions and bring some continuity. Transfer of Technology clauses are the most difficult to negotiate in any contract and even more difficult to implement. Most countries see India as a great defence market and would never part with technologies that could allow emerging India to be a competitor. India must use its emerging economic muscle, coupled with falling defence markets elsewhere, to leverage technology transfer. May be, it is time to set up a separate defence acquisitions ministry or commission. India has to increase funding for defence R&D

IN TODAY’S WORLD OF LONG RANGE AESA RADARS AND VERY LONG RANGE HYPERSONIC MISSILES, SHOULD INDIA BE WASTING MONEY ON STEALTH AT ALL? well beyond its current US $6 billion, bulk of which currently goes in salaries. The defence budget has to go up from current 1.57 per cent of GDP to 2.5 per cent

Fighter Fleets Options •

•

Invest big in spares to bring up fleet serviceability. Every 5 per cent increase adds two squadrons. This is value for money. Go ahead with more already

May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

•

• •

•

chosen Rafale, albeit expensive but will cut acquisition time. Make them in India. Choose a single engine fighter between Gripen and F-16 (Both already evaluated). Release RFI quickly. Seek commercial bids for latest variant, sign a G2G deal and make them in India. MMRCA uncertainty and fatigue will not allow a selection re-run. All this also costs money and time. The vendor must assist LCA, AMCA and engine development. Lease two squadrons of chosen fighter in the interim. Half of LCA production be handed over to private industry. This will increase numbers and generate competition for time, quality and costs. Quickly clear funds for LCA Mk 1A D&D so that the aircraft come at least by 2022. India needs to rebuild buyer’s credibility after MMRCA confusion. Forget LCA Mk II, because in any case, it is a new aircraft altogether and use all experience to go for AMCA. As a nation, get our act right on security and military aviation.

naval aviation

HOLES TO PLUG

CMDE RANJIT B RAI (RETD)

The writer is a naval analyst and author of The Modern and Future Indian Navy ISBN 9780993289866.

EXTENDED RANGE AND LETHALITY The INS Vindhyagiri and Taragiri (earlier Leander class frigates) were ingeniously fitted out with UAV control containers that extended their search range especially for missile attacks. Both ships are de-commissioned and it was hoped that new orders would be placed. The INS Vikramaditya’s MiG-29K fighters have just about enough take-off length with full payload and fuel which has to be reduced in high humid tropical conditions and planning and funding for a third aircraft carrier needs to be re-started.

t was well articulated by Lord Mountbatten that to rule the waves, it is essential to rule the skies above, and the depths beneath the oceans. This

dictum has been followed by the Indian Navy to gradually expand its naval air arm, despite low naval budgets which have waxed and waned. Hence, naval aviation acquisitions have not kept pace with long-term perspective plans, but the Navy has cut its coat well, within the available funds. A few operational inadequacies need to be made up to ensure that it remains fighting fit. The Navy has around 200 aircraft, helicopters and around 20 UAVs and the target is to raise the force to 400 with three aircraft carriers by 2027. Soon after Independence in 1948, Prime Minister Pt

May 2018

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

naval aviation

HOLES TO PLUG

THE SEA KING HELICOPTERS HAVE AGED AND SHIPS ARE IN DIRE NEED OF MODERN 10 TONNE MULTI-ROLE HELICOPTERS WITH DUNKING SONARS AND RADARS

flew into the Andaman Nicobar islands and set up airfields.

Chinese Expansionism Mountbatten seems to have also foreseen what Alfred Mahan and Ambassador Pannikar had

Nehru invited Prof Blackett,

scripted a ‘naval blue

predicted, that geostrategic issues

defence adviser to the British

print’ and recommended that

of the 21st century will be decided

Government, to visit India and

India’s Navy should acquire an

on the waters of the Indian

table a technology report for

aircraft carrier in lieu of war dues

Ocean. The predictions appear to

the government. He was able to

from Britain for the Royal Indian

be coming true. China has built

convince Nehru that India should

Navy, and grow to become a three

up its naval aviation with two large

acquire an aircraft carrier and

aircraft carrier navy. He stressed

aircraft carriers (Lianoning and

build an air arm. Capt HC Ronalds

the importance of the Indian

Shadong) equipped with China

was appointed as director of

Ocean from his experience in

built JF-15 carrier planes and

Naval Aviation.

the Southeast Asia campaign in

operates shore-based aircraft and

World War II when Japanese naval

ship-borne HQ helicopters and

As Governor General of

aviation played havoc on the Royal

has pushed its interests in the

Independent India, Adml

Navy and sank Royal Navy’s latest

Indian Ocean with ‘cheque book

Lord Louis Mountbatten

and most powerful cruiser HMS

diplomacy’. China is also building

INS Vikramaditya

Hood off Singapore. Japanese even

May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

THE SIKORSKY TYPE SH-60 ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE SEA KING HELICOPTERS WERE SELECTED, BUT PRICE NEGOTIATIONS AND OTHER ISSUES HAVE DELAYED THE BADLY NEEDED AIR ASSETS

the China Pakistan Economic

Viraat (HMS Hermes) respectively,

Corridor (CPEC) in its Belt and

and Mk42B/C multi-role

Road Initiative (BRI) worth $56

helicopters from all major naval

billion and has taken leases

platforms, and armed Cheetahs

in ports like Gwadar, Hambantota,

(Alouettes) from smaller warships

Maldives and Djibouti with naval

and auxiliary vessels. The

interests. China has done this at

larger Delhi class Destroyers

a time when USA’s lease on Diego

have embarked and operated

Garcia expires this year, and

two 14 tonne Sea Kings on

International Court of Justice

trials and the INS Jalashwa

(ICJ) will decide its future. India

(LPD USS Trenton), bought

has been approached by

out on FMS basis, sailed

Mauritius to assist in its

back from USA with six

case. China is watchful.

second hand Sikorsky UH-

2H Sea Kings it selected from

Over the years, the Indian

Arizona’s holding. The Navy

Naval aviation cadre has

operates five IL-38 maritime

successfully operated Sea Hawk

reconnaissance planes and had

and Sea Harrier fighters from the

operated eight TU-142, which were

small decks of Navy’s two, now de-

recently de-commissioned. The

commissioned aircraft carriers INS

Dornier-228s for reconnaissance

Vikrant (HMS Hercules) and INS

operate from naval ports. Navy trains its fighter pilots on Hawk trainers in a squadron at INS Dega at Vishakapatnam.

the KA-31’s, E-801 airborne early warning and command (AEW&C) system which is wrapped around a radar towing a 6-m2 3600 aerial which is slung under the helicopter, the system provides for 200-target multiple detection and 20-target multiple-tracking

Order Of Battle

capability at 150 km for

Since 2006, India’s naval aviation arm has also been operating Searcher II and Heron UAVs aptly called ‘Eyes in The Skies’ from Porbunder airfield from INS Sardar Patel, from INS Garuda in Cochin and INS Purundu near Ramnad. The UAVs with EL/M2055 Synthetic Aperture Radar and ground moving targets identification (GMTI) mode can take-off from shore bases, scour the seas, and return to base after 12 hours sorties, providing live highresolution images for detailed examination by ships and shore controllers. In collaboration with

May 2018

aircraft and 250 km for surface target to facilitate missile targeting. The Krivacks have a KA-31 helicopter for automatic mode via a tele-code data link for launch of long-range Klub and BrahMos missiles.

American Platforms USA has re-balanced its forces in the East with a ‘pivot’ like move, and included India in a QUAD of USA, Japan and Australia and supplied Indian Navy with 8 plus 4 powerful interoperable Boeing P8i 737 maritime reconnaissance planes with latest Mk 48 torpedoes, Mk 84 Harpoon

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

naval aviation

HOLES TO PLUG

missiles, sonar buoys, and radars

Antony commissioned the MIG-

ashore. It has CCS-MKII

and electronics to almost do

29K Black Panthers INAS 303

communications and Link II/X

what a warship and an AWACs

Squadron at the INS Hansa airfield

command and control systems

can do to prosecute a target or

with a take-off 14 degree

from Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL),

intercept a plane with its nose-

ramp and three landing wires

with allied EW suites.

mounted Raytheon APY-10 and

replicating the aircraft carrier INS

belly-mounted Telephonics APN-

Vikramaditya’s flight deck which

Maritime Strike

143(V) airborne radars.

along with Rheinmetal supplied

The eight American P8i maritime

MiG-29K simulator joined the

strike planes operate from INS

Air power is universally accepted

Sea King simulator at Goa. The

Rajali and eight Russian Ilyushin

as an essential arm of any large

Indian Navy has always leaned on

IL-38 from INS Hansa and

maritime nation and its bluewater

simulator training to save precious

Dornier-228 MR and IR flying

navy. It surprises many when

flying hours from ships afloat and

machines from all stations,

they learn that the Indian Navy’s

this has paid rich dividends.

along with aging upgraded anti-

aviation cadre took birth on May

submarine Sea Kings Mk42B/C

11, 1953, when INS Garuda was

From the amphibian Sea land

AND Ka-28s and Chetaks

commissioned by Defence Minister

and a borrowed IAF helicopter

(Alouettes) from ships. Navy’s

Mahavir Tyagi at Cochin, under the

that operated from Cochin,

aviation arm helps patrol India’s

command of a former RN officer

the flying arm of the navy

2.2 million sq km of Exclusive

Cdr G Douglas with the first of

while operating above the

Economic Zone (EEZ) with Heron

10 Short Brothers Amphibious

waves has built up a multi-

and Searcher 11 UAVs and the

Sea land flying boats ordered for

dimensional capability that

Indian Ocean Region (IOR) as

India. Two Fireflies which could tow

today encompasses carrier-borne

Indian Navy is nominated as

targets for ship’s gunnery practice

operations with 44,000 tonne INS

the net security provider for

arrived Cochin on February 14,

Vikarmaditya, flying powerful

the IOR, and support the coast

1955, in what began as a small

Mig-29Ks with KH-35 sea and

guard for Search and Rescue

Fleet Requirement Unit (FRU)

land attack missiles and rockets,

(SAR). Indian Naval aviation

to support the Fleet at sea

air-to-air missiles and Ka-31AEW

has been built upon sacrifices,

and was expanded with Target

helicopters with under slung

experience and foundations laid

Towing Units of IAF Dakotas

radars. The Vikramaditya has

by many illustrious officers and

at INS Garuda in Cochin. Today,

a Resistor Automatic Landing

men and has evolved into a potent,

autonomous targets like Chukar

(ALS) and the Luna optical landing

reckonable and effective arm of

and Lakshya are used for training.

systems of Russian origin working

Indian Navy.

in conjunction with Indian-made

Training Simulators

Deck Approach Projector Sight and

There have been set-backs

On May 11, 2013, in a milestone

ship-aircraft data exchange fitted

too. Naval aviation suffered a

event, Raksha Mantri Mr A K

on board and will be replicated

severe blow on October 1, 2002,

USA HAS RE-BALANCED ITS FORCES IN THE EAST WITH A ‘PIVOT’ LIKE MOVE, AND INCLUDED INDIA IN A QUAD OF USA, JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA 18

May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

when two IL-38 MR aircraft of the 315 Squadron which had a record of accident free flying for 30,000 hours collided in midair at Goa during a ceremonial fly past. Twelve experienced air crew were killed and deserve remembrance. The Indian Navy

Jawaharlal Nehru

Blackett received two upgraded IL-38s with

missiles needs long-range radar

search range especially for

the Sea Dragon umbrella type

and sonar equipped helicopter

missile attacks in exercises.

radars from Russia in lieu, but

carrying a torpedo and a short-

Both ships are de-commissioned

will need replacement in the

range missile. Indian Navy had

and it was hoped new orders

coming decade.

received a single lot of Sea Eagle

would be placed. The INS

missiles for Sea King and maritime

Vikramaditya’s MiG-29K fighters

The Navy will soon have to

Jaguars that the IAF operates

have just about enough take-off

retire and replace the 30 year

from Pune but the Sea Eagle

length space with full payload

old Alouettes and an RFP for

failed to become operational. The

and fuel which has to be reduced

57 replacements with Make-

helicopters, today, are equipped

in high humid tropical conditions

in-India was replied but is

with Penguin type naval missiles.

and planning and funding for a

pending, as the Dhruv is unfit

third aircraft carrier needs to be

for sustained deck operations.

Budget-hit UAVs

re-started. These are the holes to

The Sea King helicopters have

There is also a need for latest

be plugged and also set up a Navy

aged and ships are in dire need

long-range UAVs and an order

Aerobatic Display Hawk squadron.

of modern 10 tonne multi-role

for some UAVs from Israel and

helicopters with dunking sonars

26 Sea Guardian UAVs from

The importance of maritime

and radars, for the Type 15 and

General Atomics of USA has been

security is seminal for nations

Type 17/A Shivalik class that

cleared but it appears the 2018-

and the continued ability of a

will easily fit into the hangars and

19 budgets has little leeway for

nation to exploit the maritime

operate from the decks for 24x7

any new big orders. The INS

environment which encompasses

operations. The Sikorsky Type

Vindhyagiri and Taragiri (earlier

the high seas, the skies, the

SH-60 anti-submarine warfare

Leander class frigates) were

littoral and the coastal assets has

Sea King helicopters were selected

ingeniously fitted out with UAV

been critical for economic

over the NH-90 Eurocopters after

control containers by Orbit

success and indeed, the

tenders were opened for 16, but

Technologies Ltd of Israel and the

survival of the majority of

price negotiations and other issues

ships operated UAVs by taking

nations throughout history. For

have delayed the badly needed air

control of the UAVs launched

this, naval aviation can

assets. A warship with long-range

from shore and extending the

contribute heavily.

May 2018

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

armed police PROCUREMENT AND MODERNISATION

PAUCITY OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONRY One area of concern that remains is the avoidable shortages in procurement of non-lethal weapons and crowd control equipment. The CAPFs are called in to support the State police forces on numerous occasions. In J&K especially, the selection, quality and efficacy of the non-lethal weapons and their availability in sufficient quantities leaves much to be desired and definitely needs to be looked into by the MHA and the State security establishments.

order Management is one of the important aspects in Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s internal as well as external security. The country has

15,106 km of land border running through 92 districts and 17 states and a coastline of 7,516 km touching 13 States and UTs. India faces perpetual risks as its borders are porous and its neighbourhood is unstable. Since independence, India has been engaged in fighting insurgencies in its northeast. There are also extremist Leftist groups, proclaiming to be Maoist that operates in the Central hinterland. Conventional wisdom suggests that external security threat stems from hostile countries and internal threats

May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

are entirely indigenous. In the last six decades, the internal security situation has undergone a sea-change. Many internal security threats are now externally sponsored, guided, inspired or supported. In fact, Pakistan is continuously waging a proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir for almost 30 years. The army has been the vanguard for tackling the situation along the Line of Control with Pakistan and the Line of Actual Control with China, as well as facing the brunt of the proxy war along with the Rashtriya Rifles and quelling insurgencies with the Assam Rifles. The Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) are expected to perform three distinct roles i.e. maintenance of public order, border guarding and the security of vital installations. The CRPF is handling counter-insurgency in several parts of the country in conjunction with State police over the years. The BSF has effectively guarded the borders along Pakistan and Bangladesh, even as the ITBP is deployed along the Tibet border and the SSB opposite Nepal and Bhutan.

Challenges At Hand To understand the issue of procurement and modernisation of the CAPFs, it would be prudent to carry out a quick reality check. The objective is to find out the extent of the challenge at hand. In keeping with the high risk roles performed by the CAPFs in maintaining internal security and border guarding, there has been a corresponding increase

LT GEN MUKESH SABHARWAL PVSM,AVSM,VSM (RETD)

The writer is the former Adjutant General of the Indian Army and erstwhile Corps Commander of the sensitive 15 Corps in Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir. A professional to the core, he is passionate about writing on defence issues.

in budget provisions as indicated in MHA Annual Report 2016-17. The figures of actual expenditure for the last 10 years are available in Table 1:

Source: Page 191 of MHA Annual Report 2016-17. The strength of the CAPF on March 01, 2017 is shown in Table 2 :

May 2018

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

armed police PROCUREMENT AND MODERNISATION

THE PROCUREMENT POLICY OF THE MHA IS SUPPOSEDLY BEING REFINED SINCE THE LAST FOUR YEARS BUT NO FORMAL DOCUMENT HAS YET BEEN PUBLISHED.

powers of the respective Director General of the Force. In her article on Homeland Security Procurement in Q Tech Synergy, Ritika Behal, explains that the system of procurement in the MHA has been decentralised and procurement is carried out at several levels. Procurement is carried through the

Man/Weapon Mismatch On examination of the expenditure

•

Underutilisation of Funds – The

table, it is observed that there was an

Committee observed that

increase in funds to the tune of INR

throughout the 12th Five Year

18,000 crore in the first five years and

Plan, several important divisions

increase of INR 13,000 in the next five

of MHA have surrendered funds

years, which is actually a decline over

to the tune of 50 per, which

a five-year period. Correspondingly,

indicates incoherent planning,

there was an increase in CAPF

lack of conviction and their

strength of 68,984 in the first five

inefficient functioning.

years and a substantial increase

•

Non-allotment of Funds for

of 167,063 in the next five years,

Modernisation of Police Forces

i.e. seven per cent and 17 per cent

Scheme – The committee pointed

approximately. Therefore, increase

out the misuse of non-plan

in overall funding has not kept pace

funds meant for mobility,

with the additional manpower raised.

communication, weapon and

The fiscal implication is obvious.

equipment by states that

Salary, pension, healthcare and other

procured a huge number of

such expenses shall continue to rise

vehicles instead.

at the cost of essential weapons and

7th CPC recommendations.

equipment. The Defence Services

Procurement For CAPFs

are being challenged with a similar

Procurement for all segments of

situation much to their chagrin. Every

the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is

adverse situation evokes a flurry

governed by the Defence Procurement

of utterances indicating rising of

Procedure (DPP). On the other hand,

additional forces and extra-budgetary

the CAPFs and the CPOs functioning

provisions but these do not result

under MHA follow the Public

in concrete physical acquisition in

Procurement Policy. This policy is

sufficient quantity to be effective.

governed by three basic documents:

The Department-Related

Delegation of Financial Power Rules

Parliamentary Standing Committee

(DAFPR) 1978; General Financial

on Home Affairs presented significant

Rules (GFR) 2005; and the Directorate

observations on March 15, 2017,

General Supplies and Disposal

as follows:

(DGS&D) rate contracts. Whereas

•

Allocations – The Committee

the general provisions followed are

felt that the nominal increase in

the same, each CAPF carries out its

Demands for Police might not

basic procurement either through the

even be sufficient to offset the

rate contracts of DGS&D or by direct

impact of higher wages due to the

tenders if it falls within the financial

May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Ordnance Factory Board (OFB); MHA Procurement Wing; DGS&D; Provisional Branch; or Local Purchase of Goods. Although, independent procedures prevail for the CAPFs for procurement, in some instances, they have to coordinate with respective Services through the MoD, for example acquisition of air assets and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) with the air force, maritime assets of the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) with the navy and certain weapons and equipment with the army.

Air Assets For CAPFs There is no doubt that each CAPF is growing rapidly and aspirations to fulfil their operational roles effectively are understandable. To illustrate, the ITBP and CRPF feel the necessity of air support. According to AVM Bharti, IG (Air) BSF, air assets are very expensive and involve huge investments and infrastructure to manage, maintain and operate. Accordingly, the requirements of CAPFs are being coordinated by BSF. Another area where close coordination is necessary is the deployment of UAVs by the border guarding forces. Whereas the acquisition is technically possible by the CAPFs themselves, procurement can proceed once the operating procedures are coordinated with the IAF. The process does get delayed as it follows the interministerial route (MHA and MoD). The ICG consisted of less than 50

ageing vessels, six hovercrafts and

vision devices have been procured in

have been empowered to procure

some 40 odd fixed wing aircrafts and

reasonable quantities in the last year.

items for trials up to INR 2 crore,

helicopters by 2005. Post the 26/11

A former DG of infantry has said

which is double of existing powers.

terror attacks in Mumbai, the Indian

that procurement of weapons and

Navy was made overall incharge of

equipment for the infantry and the

Umbrella Scheme

coastal security. With 150 vessels

PARA (Special Forces) has often

The Union Cabinet on September 27,

and a dozen hovercrafts on order

suffered in a bureaucratic quagmire,

2017, approved the implementation of

in Indian shipyards, the ICG is on a

as files for sanction by Empowered

the umbrella scheme of “Modernisation

growth glide. With most sea-borne

Committees languish within the MoD

of Police Forces” for the years 2017-

assets being procured indigenously

(Finance). According to him, the

2020. The financial outlay for the

and operational requirements better

CAPFs are better-armed and equipped

scheme is INR 25,060 crore. The MHA

understood by the navy and the MoD,

in terms of small arms and night

Year End Review 2017 mentioned that

the procurement process is smoother

fighting capabilities, at least the NSG

the scheme caters not only for internal

and simpler.

and the COBRA of the CRPF. The

security, law and order, but elements

CRPF has been the biggest beneficiary

like logistics, hiring, national satellite

Sluggish System

of the modernisation drive of the

network, CCTNS Projects, E-prison

Speaking at an event in September

MHA in the last three years. The major

project, etc. So, when it comes down

2017, to hand over indigenously

weapons include 67,965 “AK-47”

to the crunch of CAPF operations

made equipment to the CAPFs by a

rifles; 16,430 assault rifles; 2,537 “X95”

and the business end of acquisition of

DPSU, the home minister remarked

assault rifles; 1,576 “MP5” submachine

weapons and equipment for the forces

that the “procurement for CAPF is

guns; 2,608 “Glock” pistols; 1,805

on ground, there is a shortfall of funds

done through the Defence Ministry

automatic grenade launchers; 1,164

or delay in its allotment.

but the CAPF don’t get the priority

hand-held thermal imagers. Similarly,

they deserve. This delays acquisition

the BSF has procured 34,377 “Storm

One area of concern that remains is the

of weapons and equipment for these

MX4” submachine guns from Italy

avoidable shortages in procurement

forces and leads to losses”. He urged

and the NSG, “Tavor X95” carbines

of non-lethal weapons and crowd

the Raksha Mantri to look into the

from Israel. For larger scale items like

control equipment. The CAPFs are

issue. He also stated that otherwise

assault rifles, the MHA has advised

called in to support the State police

they might need a different framework

the CRPF to issue a global tender.

forces on numerous occasions. In J&K

for procurement. The procurement

For remainder requirements, the

especially, the selection, quality and

policy of the MHA is supposedly

forces carry out procurement within

efficacy of the non-lethal weapons

being refined since the last four years

the powers delegated by the MHA.

and their availability in sufficient

but no formal document has

Overall, as may be observed, the

quantities leaves much to be desired

yet been published.

procurement process is fairly flexible

and definitely needs to be looked

and consequently much faster in

into by the MHA and the State

comparison to the MoD.

security establishments.

weapons and ammunition from the

A PTI report of January 02, 2018,

In a growing and developing nation,

OFB route. Each CAPF has its specific

published in the Business Standard

every sector aspires for a piece of

requirements for acquisition but

indicates that the financial powers

the economic pie. Budgeting is a

certain essential items are common to

have been delegated to the level

challenging exercise and “security”

all, i.e. personal weapons, protective

of Commandants in CAPFs for

may not receive the attention it seeks in

gear and communication equipment.

procurement. This fast tracking is

financial consideration. The

The scale of these is understandably

likely to improve their operational

answer lies in streamlining the

very large for the entire CAPF and

efficiency and effectiveness.

modernisation, procurement and

runs into several lakhs in number.

Additional DG shall now head the

acquisition systems by prioritising

However, specialist assault rifles, close

purchase committee to expedite

essential requirements and their

quarter battle weapons and night

finalisation of tenders. The CAPFs

efficient implementation.

The MoD comes into picture primarily when the CAPFs procure their

May 2018

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

arms procurement SURFEIT OF OVERSIGHT

“MAKE-IN-INDIA” ONLY ON PAPER The original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) need clarity and assurance on a large number of issues, most importantly, the transfer of technology (ToT). It is the sense of the author that the strategic partnership model (SPM) has not yet acquired the type of traction and momentum that is required to make steady progress. It is for the MoD to come clear on all the lurking doubts in the SPM. Given its tardy progress, some of the Subject Matter Experts have come to believe that the government itself is not keen enough to take this initiative forward.

t is a common knowledge at many aspects in the overall domain of defence procurement is not right. Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) can make a long list of sub-optimalities, but these entire boil down to the following two bottom line points: 1. The defence procurement as a vehicle of modernisation of our armed forces is dysfunctional. It is ridden with endless delays and time and cost overruns keeping the forces deprived of their critical operational

requirements for years on end. 2. The Make-in-India initiative launched by the Hon’ble PM in February 2015 largely remains on paper, in so far as the defence private industry is concerned Taking the above two issues as given, this article very briefly focusses on the challenges and a possible way ahead out of the same from a user’s perspective. If there is one common thread that runs right through and actually,

May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

“governs” defence procurement end-to-end, it is the Rule Book, i.e Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP). This is the first port of call that needs to be addressed. It is for consideration that DPP 16 which was launched with great expectations at the Goa Def Expo in March 2016, largely failed to galvanise the procurement monolith despite the fact that it had introduced many new features like new enabling provisions of essential and enhanced parameters

in Services Qualitative Requirements (SQRs), strong bias on Indian Design Development And Manufacture (IDDM), easing of offset guidelines, new provisions of Transfer of Technology (ToT) and more. Even the new Draft DPP 2018 has all the positive features - transforming India from being the top arms importer (assessed at 12 per cent of global arms import for the period 2013-2017) to be amongst top five aerospace and defence producers, reducing import dependence, increasing self-reliance and more. But will these lofty dreams ever get realised? That is the big question.

Bold Systemic Changes

While one approach to remedy the above state is to carry out peripheral and symptomatic corrections here and there, the other is to go for a bold systemic change to address the deeprooted shortcomings. The author subscribes to the later approach. In the above belief, it is stated that the existing heterogeneous procurement structure with multiple verticals, spread across Service HQ (SHQ), HQ Integrated Staff (HQ IDS), Department of Defence Production (DDP), Defence Acquisition and Defence Finance under the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Ministry of Finance (MoF) and more, must yield to one unified structure under one central leadership, one hierarchy, one decision centre and one organisation that can be called, “The Department of Defence Procurement” (DPO). This could be the final destination. While talking of the DPO, there is a need to adopt a minimalistic approach. The current structure comprising of 12 different stages in a procurement cycle which incidentally have remained unchanged ever since the regime of DPP evolved in 2002, has too much flab by way of “over ensuring” and “too many people doing the same job” resulting in re-inventing the wheel, time and again. This needs to be de-cluttered, shortened and simplified.

While the DPO remains the desired end state, for the “immediate” and the “existing” structure, following is stated:

Eliminating Duplication

There is a need to consider combining the two categorisation committees, namely the Services Capital Acquisition Plan Categorisation Committee (SCAPCC) and Higher Committee (SCAPCHC) into one forum. While the counter view to this is, that since the Charter (hence attendance) of the two Committees are different and the lower one acts as a filter to the higher committee, the resultant committee will become unwieldy, and hence, dysfunctional. Notwithstanding this view, the author makes this suggestion based on his conviction and experience that combining is very much possible with a bold modification of the existing Charters and the same will result in reducing net time delays by cutting on redundancies and duplications As regards the grant of Acceptance of Necessity (AoN), the current practice of having three verticals of SCAPCHC, Defence Procurement Board (DPB) and the Defence Acquisition Committee (DAC) according AoNs up to 150 crore, 150-300 crores and above 300 crore respectively, needs to be cut down to just two levels, i.e, SCAP and DAC by enhancing the financial powers at the SCAP level. Cutting down additional stages simply means cutting down delays and time cycle runs. With due respect to the civil hierarchy, Service domain experts must be placed at all such positions where core competencies and Service specific expertise is needed in analysis and decisionmaking. In this context, the small beginning by the previous Raksha Mantri (RM) to appoint a Service Advisor and the current RM appointing a 13 member advisory body to undertake independent

May 2018

LT GEN (DR) V K SAXENA, PVSM, AVSM, VSM (RETD) The writer is an alumnus of Defence Services Staff College, College of Defence Management and the coveted, National Defence College. He has served as the Additional Director General Army Air Defence at Army HQ and as the Commandant of the prestigious Army Air Defence College. He is the only Army Air Defence Officer to have had the privilege to Command the Army Air Defence College for the second time. Decorated thrice by the President of India, the General Officer took over as the Director General Army Air Defence on 1 July 2013, from where he superannuated on 31 May 2015. Post superannuation, he has been re-employed as Advisor in Bharat Electronics Limited, where he is facilitating many an ongoing project towards their completion and rendering other knowledge-based services.

‘Strategic partner’ itself, has gone through so many rounds of amendments that it has lost its objectivity and focus.

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

arms procurement SURFEIT OF OVERSIGHT

There is a need to work out the modalities in the “relaxed criteria” and provide clarification on issues like suo moto proposal, foreclosing of projects and more. review and status check of critical projects is a step in the right direction.[i]

Reduce Collegiate Vetting

It has been the experience of the author that tremendous amount of time is getting wasted in three types of activities, one Collegiate Vetting (CV), second comments and comments on comments and three trials, re-trials and re-re-trials. In this context, following points are made: There must be a strict curb on the number of CVs a procurement case will be subjected to. For instance, if a case has been collegiate vetted in the Weapons and Equipment (WE) Directorate, it must not be again subjected to CV at the office of Technical Manager (TM) or in the Perspective Planning Directorate or anywhere up the chain; Collegiate means Collegiate. It should be once for all by selecting the participants properly. There is a tendency of one and all to comment on every case even if it is remotely connected to them. This wastes tremendous amount of time in awaiting comments, replying to comments and convincing nonstake holders and fence sitters. Who will comment and who will not needs be clearly spelt out? This is one single reason why Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC), especially involving foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) gets stretched for years. In fact, needless commenting and extensive paper evaluation actually

becomes superfluous when the same parameters are to be checked out again during field trials. Coming to field trials per se, the tendency to go for re-trials, re-retrials and more extends the process for years on end. There is a need to cut the trial process to one episode before a decision is arrived.

Fix Accountability

Another big culprit for delay is the absence of accountability, responsibility and ownership. A case of five years running gets dropped for SQR default; who is responsible? A Request for Proposal (RFP) gets retracted for non-compliance to standard format or information deficit; who is responsible? A decision-maker hangs on to a critical decision for nearly a year; who is responsible? An AoN expires because the stake-holder fails to issue the RFP in time/or issues a faulty RFP? This list can go on. Unless we bring in a regime of accountability and ownership with the defaulter having to answer for it, unaccounted delays in procurement cases will continue. Then comes the issue of user expertise. It is the experience of the author that the users at large (save some exceptions) lack sharp procurement expertise. The two main reasons are the absence of any institutional training and short tenures where on-the-job training proves to be too little and too late. Detailed knowledge of rules and procedures, capability to make “doable SQRs” without compromising operational requirements, knack of carrying out negotiations, initial cost estimation, life-cycle

May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

costing, benchmarking costs for reference at Price Negotiation Committee (PNC) , carrying out world scan, conducting oversight evaluations, driving offset contract negotiations and many more, are verticals that require sharp subject matter expertise. There is a need to put in place an institutional system of training and consider giving long tenures to key procurement staff. A food for thought is the creation of a separate “Procurement Professionals Cadre”. Another big decelerator of defence procurement cases is the non-finalisation of the Offset Contract Negotiations. As regards offsets, three challenges need to be overcome: There is a need for the users, as well as, the indigenous Defence industry as stake holders to realise that offsets cannot be wished away or taken lightly. These have the absolute potential to stall any defence procurement deal. The key requirement for the users and the industry is AWARENESS, as knowledge deficit about the intricacies and nuances of the various provisions of offsets (multipliers, discharge fields, delays and penalties, ToT, Foreign Direct Investment, banking credits et al) is the single biggest culprit that stalls offset proceedings.

Single Window IOP

The second area of action relates to Indian Offset Partners (IOPs). Even after the MoD has eased the IOP stipulations vide two important amendments, homing on to an optimal IOP for a potential OEM today, remains a Herculean task. This is so because there is no single body or platform which provides an institutional interface with the OEM as regards the “one window IOP solution”. Though there are a few offset solution providers in the market but these are too less and too inadequate for bringing about the desired end state. MoD should seriously consider putting in place an institutional platform

for providing “single window IOP solution” to the potential OEMs. Thirdly, there is an urgent need to correct the fundamental “fault line” on which stands the whole edifice of offsets. This fault-line is the duality of control between DG Acquisition and DG Defence Production, wherein, the former is responsible to execute the offset contract while the latter is to ensure its discharge in the run time to follow. This duality, which could not be resolved during the last Study on Offset Guidelines, sits at the base of all confusion, delay and sub-optimality in contracting and executing offset contracts.

Tardy Make-in-India

Finally, a word why “Make-in– India” is only on paper as regards the private defence industry. The statistics available at the open source have it, that in the period 2014-2017, out of a total of 70 contracts signed with foreign vendors at a cumulative cost of Rs 1.3 lakh crore and 120 contracts signed with the Indian Vendors at a cumulative cost of Rs 1.17 lakh crore, only 10 per cent of the orders actually flowed to defence private industry. The Make Procedure which was launched with a great promise is not moving forward the way it should have. In that, the “Make-in-India” Projects, namely, the Futuristic Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV), Tactical Communication System (TCS) and Battle Management System (BMS) have not even reached the development stage even after four years, leave aside the approval stage which itself is years away. Even after approval, a long process

of selection of the prototype manufacturer, actual production and placement of orders is to follow (8-10 years for that). Going further on the Make procedure, while the recent simplification in Make II procedure by the MoD is a step in the right direction, there are a lot of doubts and confusion as to its execution. There is a need for the MoD to carefully work out the modalities of implementing each and every point in the “relaxed criteria” and providing clarification on issues like suo moto proposal, foreclosing of projects and more.

Four Crucial Projects

Even in the Strategic Partnership Model (SPM), there is not much progress or forward movement in any of the four projects, namely, P75(I) submarine, Naval Multi Role Helicopter (NMRH), Naval Utility Helicopters, Future Ready Combat Vehicles and Single Engine Fighter Aircraft. Though the SPM is based on the laudable aim of allowing local private sector companies to form manufacturing joint ventures with foreign OEMs, there is lack of clarity on many issues. Even the definition of ‘strategic partner’ itself has gone through so many rounds of amendments that it has lost its

There is a scope of increasing the overall quantum of PPP Projects on a year-on-year basis.

objectivity and focus leading to several different interpretations and connotations. The OEMs need clarity and assurance on a large number of issues, most importantly, the ToT. It is the sense of the author that the SPM has not yet acquired the type of traction and momentum that is required to make steady progress. It is for the MoD to come clear on all the lurking doubts in the SPM. Given its tardy progress, some of the Subject Matter Experts have come to believe that the government itself is not keen enough to take this initiative forward Even in the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model, while good beginnings have been made in the context of Akash Weapon System, Pinaka, 3D Tactical Control Radar and more, there is a scope of increasing the overall quantum of PPP Projects on a year-on-year basis. The above commentary was an attempt to flag many of the challenges that stare us in the face as regards the complex issue of defence procurement. It is heartening to note that MoD is taking every step to bring about major changes in the defence procurement procedure in order to make it more responsive, more transparent and less cumbersome by cutting down redundant stages, reducing the number of approval stages and streamlining and simplifying the stages in between. It is the sense of the author that if the above is followed up vigorously in letter and spirit the aims set out in Draft DPP 2018 will no longer remain a flight of fancy.

Reference Note [i]

https;//www. spsmai.com>RM appoints a panel to accelerate defence capital acquisition. Accessed on April 12, 2018.

May 2018

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

submarines THE CHALLENGE WITHIN

OBSOLESCENCE AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY The Indian Navyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s conventional sub-sea capability has some very visible deficiencies which need urgent attention but the current pace of progress is not telling an encouraging story. In an increasingly dense regional sub-sea environment with a clear and present threat to our maritime aspirations, this is a critical vulnerability which we can ill-afford. Current requirements require a submarine force level of five SSBNs, six SSNs and about 18 SSKs. This could, however, take the better part of two decades to materialise, thus leaving no room for complacency.

May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

he distinct maritime

being addressed in the near

orientation of the

future either.

Indo-Pacific with its

warfare and India’s

Strategic Deterrence (SSBN)

pre-eminent

India has been a nuclear weapon

focus on undersea

status as a regional power

power since 1998 with ‘No First

make submarine capability an

Use’ and ‘maximum retaliation’

imperative for India across the

as the cornerstones of its nuclear

strategic, the operational and the

doctrine. For both of these to be

tactical domains. Whether it is

credible, an invulnerable and

nuclear deterrence, a bluewater

effective second-strike capability

force structure or the ability to

is essential. The nuclear powered

shape the littoral, submarines

ballistic missile submarine (SSBN),

are the most suitable platforms,

with its inherent attributes of

though the type may vary

concealment, stealth, independent

depending on their roles.

operations and enough firepower

to inflict unacceptable damage

Submarines are basically of

on the enemy is, thus, the most

three types. There are the large

effective element of the nuclear

nuclear powered ballistic missile

triad. India has two increasingly

submarines (SSBN), the nuclear

belligerent nuclear neighbours

powered but conventionally armed

with an unholy nexus between

attack submarines (SSN) and

them. Therefore, our deterrence

the conventional diesel-electric

capability has to be both robust

submarines (SSK).

and effective. This requires a

constant presence at sea for which

Conventional And Nuclear

COMMODORE ANIL JAI SINGH, IN (RETD) The writer is the Vice President of the Indian Maritime Foundation. He retired from the Indian Navy after 30 years as a submariner and ASW specialist and had five command tenures including four submarine commands. A post-graduate in Defence and Strategic Studies, he is keenly interested in matters maritime.

a minimum of three SSBNs are

India is one of only three countries

required. The commissioning

operating all three types, the

of INS Arihant, India’s first

others being Russia and China.

nuclear powered ballistic missile

This is an impressive achievement

submarine in 2016 has made

for a young navy with only 50

India only the world’s sixth nation

years of submarine operating

with this capability. The second

experience. However, while

one is being fitted out and it is

the Indian Navy’s submarines

understood that three more will

have done the country proud

follow. However, since there is

and are the gold standard in

very little open source information

professionalism, commitment

available on this project, little can

and efficiency, the same cannot

be said about its progress.

be said of those in the decision-

making echelons in the Ministry of

Attack Submarines (SSN)

Defence responsible for submarine

In 1988, India leased a Charlie-I

acquisition. In fact, these 50

class nuclear attack submarine

years have been marked by the

(SSN) from the erstwhile Soviet

consistent lack of consistency in

Union for a period of three years

submarine acquisition and there

which provided an invaluable

appears to be little hope of this

insight into the intricacies of

May 2018

THE INTANGIBLE EFFECTS ON THE MORALE, CREW CONFIDENCE, MOTIVATION LEVELS AND PROFESSIONAL PRIDE MUST ALSO BE FACTORED IN

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

submarines THE CHALLENGE WITHIN

THE INDIAN NAVY’S CONVENTIONAL SUB-SEA CAPABILITY HAS SOME VERY VISIBLE DEFICIENCIES WHICH NEED URGENT ATTENTION

malaise and is running woefully behind schedule with little visible effort being made to retrieve this lost time.

Present Status The commissioning of INS Kalvari, the first of the Project 75

operating and maintaining these

altar of political expediency and a

extremely complex platforms.

golden opportunity to consolidate

Scorpene class submarines built

This was returned in 1991. In

our indigenous capability was lost.

at Mazagon Docks Ltd, Mumbai,

2012, India acquired an Akula-2

The effects of that myopic decision

in collaboration with Naval Group

class SSN, also christened INS

are being felt even today.

(formerly DCNS) of France in

Chakra, on a 10-year lease from

December 2017 was significant

Russia. Media reports indicate that

Five years later (in 1999 and

as a new submarine was being

another one may be in the offing.

2000), the IN acquired two

inducted into the Navy after 17

The government has also approved

more Kilo class submarines to

long years and it was built in

a programme for six SSNs to be

make good the depleting force

India. The submarine itself took

built indigenously. It is understood

levels caused by the phased

all of 12 years to build for reasons

that these are at an early design

decommissioning of the old Foxtrot

which do not bear recounting

stage and could, therefore, take

class submarines. None were

here, but should be analysed,

over a decade to build. However,

added thereafter till the second,

accountability established where

this is a start and a moment could

INS Kalvari, was commissioned

due and should lead to the right

not come too soon.

in December 2017.

lessons being learnt for the

future. Five more of this class

Cause for Concern

become a victim of the prevailing

The 30-Year Plan

will follow, at intervals of one year

India’s conventional submarine

In 1999, the Cabinet Committee

each and will be the mainstay of

programme has been bedevilled by

on Security (CCS) approved a

our undersea warfare challenge

inordinate delays and long gaps

30-Year Plan for indigenous

for many years to come. However,

between acquisitions ever since

construction of conventional

these boats are bereft of two

the first submarine, INS Kalvari

submarines. Well thought out

was commissioned over 50 years

and aimed at streamlining the

ago (December 08, 1967) and is

submarine acquisition cycle, it

now a serious cause for concern.

was felt that this was the panacea

A total of eight submarines were

to the prevailing inconsistency.

commissioned within the next

The Plan envisaged two

seven years (1967-1974) despite

production lines, each building six

a war in between. A 12-year long

submarines apiece in collaboration

hiatus ensued till the first of the

with a leading foreign submarine

Sindhughosh and Shishumar

building original equipment

classes of submarines were

manufacturer (OEM). These were

commissioned in 1986. This was

to be followed by 12 indigenously

followed by a flurry of acquisitions

designed submarines so that by

– 12 submarines were added in

2030, the navy would have a force

eight years (1986-94) including

level of at least 20 contemporary

two built indigenously. A

conventional submarines and

lull followed; the indigenous

series production would continue.

programme was terminated at the

Regrettably, this plan has also

May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

FOR A START, THE CONVENTIONAL SUBMARINE PROGRAMME HAS TO BE DE-LINKED FROM THE COMPLEX PROCEDURAL IMBROGLIO

critical capabilities essential to modern day submarine operations in littoral waters – Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) and a Tubelaunched Missile (TLM) capable of being launched at stand-off ranges. The lack of an AIP system makes these submarines almost as vulnerable to detection as the older submarines in a dense MDA environment. The Exocet SM-39 TLM on board has a range of just 50 km which is less than the range of contemporary heavyweight torpedoes and therefore, offers little advantage. In fact, it increases the submarine’s vulnerability to a counter-attack by ASW forces. It is understood that the DRDO is at an advanced stage of developing an indigenous AIP system which perhaps will be retrofitted on board as and when it is productionalised but could still be some years away.

Obsolescence These limitations notwithstanding, the induction of these submarines will bring much needed relief to

the dismal state at present; 12 of

the principal contenders, with the

the 13 submarines are 24 to 32

Swedish A26 being a new entrant

years old and the 13th is 18 years

(but as yet an unproven design)

old. Despite the navy’s efforts

except that they would now

at keeping these submarines

cost a lot more.

combat worthy, the effects of

age and obsolescent technology

Fleet Depletion

are harsh realities that cannot

Even if a contract is concluded

be ignored. The Mid-Life Update

in three to four years from now,

planned for six of these should

the first submarine will not

extend their life by up to a decade

enter service for at least another

or so and will arrest the

decade by which time the present

decline in numbers.

submarines would have either

been decommissioned or would

The second programme of

be severely limited in their

collaborative indigenous

operational availability, thus

construction, Project 75(I), has

adversely affecting India’s already

also been languishing. The

constrained undersea

procurement of all big-ticket

warfare capability.

items for the armed forces so far

has come through a government-

This delay is not only affecting the

to-government mechanism and

navy’s current but also its future

not via the Defence Procurement

preparedness, the effects of which

Procedure. Project 75(I),

will be felt for at least the next

expected to be worth over Rs

half century or so. The indigenous

60,000 crore at current prices

programme, which was to follow

is unlikely to be any different. It

the P75 and P75(I) acquisitions

may, therefore, be prudent for

and has now been truncated to six

the MoD to acknowledge this

SSKs (due to the SSN programme)

and de-link this programme

has not even begun and could be

from the DPP and the Strategic

at least 15-20 years away from

partnership model which is beset

fruition. Hence, the 30-Year Plan

by ambiguities and uncertainties

is looking increasingly like a

in its implementation. A RFI for

50-Year Plan!

P75(I) was issued in July 2017,

the third in 10 years, but little

The original 30-Year Plan was

progress has been made. The main

predicated on two production

submarines in the fray in 2008

lines but if the MoD decides to

were the French Scorpene, the

shelve the SP model, it could

German Type 214 and the Russian

well nominate MDL for the

Amur class. Ten years later, the

P75(I), thereby, maintaining only

same three submarines remain

one production line. This will

May 2018

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

submarines THE CHALLENGE WITHIN

SUBMARINES ARE THE CUTTING EDGE OF A NAVY’S FRONTLINE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY AND HAVE TO OPERATE AT THE HIGHEST OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY WITH NO ROOM FOR COMPROMISE

further delay the indigenous SSK programme besides forsaking the strategic dispersion of submarine building capability.

ToT And Indigenisation The prime minister’s ‘Make-inIndia’ initiative, of which defence is a key constituent, had articulated the need for foreign technology to come to India to enhance its scientific, technological and industrial capacity. The Indian Defence Procurement Procedure was already following this by categorising all capital acquisitions into one of five categories depending upon the

time at sea for the crews to train for combat. The intangible effects on the morale, crew confidence, motivation levels and professional pride must also be factored in.

Hope For Optimism? Indian naval planners are cognisant of India’s regional power aspirations. In a predominantly maritime environment, the importance of a strong bluewater multi-dimensional navy has underpinned the navy’s undersea warfare force level planning. The Indian Navy’s conventional sub-sea capability has some very visible deficiencies which

extent of indigenisation feasible

limitations leads to unrealistic

need urgent attention but the

in each case. This included

expectations which, in turn, leads

current pace of progress is not

not only the platform but other

to long and avoidable delays thus

telling an encouraging story. In

equipment as well, be it weapons,

compromising combat capability

an increasingly dense regional

sensors, systems, propulsion

and very often, making import

sub-sea environment with a

machinery, etc. However, despite

the only option.

clear and present threat to our

the acknowledgement that

maritime aspirations, this is a

foreign technology is essential

Delays in submarine acquisition

critical vulnerability which we can

and depends on the willingness

programmes are not just about

ill-afford. Current requirements

of foreign OEMs to partner

depletion in force levels and

require a submarine force level of

with Indian companies, the

obsolete technology. Submarines

five SSBNs, six SSNs and about 18

implementation has been dismal.

are the cutting edge of a navy’s

SSKs. This could, however, take

Strangely enough, the reluctance

frontline offensive capability and

the better part of two decades to

to make the necessary investments

have to operate at the highest

materialise, thus leaving no room

has been more from Indian

operational efficiency with no

for complacency.

industry because the MoD has

room for compromise. This is

been unable to create an enabling

achieved by spending long hours

For a start, the conventional

environment for encouraging

at sea and constantly honing the

submarine programme has to

investment despite the lofty aims

crew’s individual and collective

be de-linked from the complex

of various defence production

skills into a ‘well-oiled fighting

procedural imbroglio. With the

related policies and procedures

machine’. Numbers or lack of

limited options available globally

emanating from the hallowed

them, therefore, not only affects

and a clear understanding of our

portals of South Block.

the availability of submarines

requirement, a quick decision

for combat but also the degree of

on the partner OEM as well

The reluctance to engage with

professionalism of those manning

as the Indian shipyard is not

foreign OEMs for absorbing

them. Operating old submarines

the daunting challenge, it is

any meaningful technology

means greater downtime in

being made out to be and the

and the Defence Research and

harbour, more maintenance

programme needs to be

Development Organisation’s state

routines in harbour and at sea and

fast-tracked at the highest levels

of denial in acknowledging its

consequently, less then optimal

in government.

May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

IAF

A STATUS STUDY

DISMAL PICTURE

AIR MARSHAL DHIRAJ KUKREJA PVSM, AVSM, VSM (RETD)

Since 2014, large ticket procurements have been cleared by the Raksha Mantri in the Defence Acquisition Council, yet not many have been finalised. It affects the credibility of the country in the international market on which India is more than 60 per cent dependent, not just for outright purchases, but also for starting joint ventures. India’s stalled defence procurements have become an international joke, but it is not funny to the users. The IAF continues to be at the losing end!

The writer retired as the AOC-in-C of Training Command, IAF on 29 February 2012. In his long stint in the air force of about 40 years, he has held many operational and staff appointments. He is the first air force officer to have undergone an International Fellowship at the National Defense University, Washington DC, USA. He is a postgraduate in ‘National Security Strategy’ from National War College, USA.

MiG-21 aircraft

Sukhoi-30MKI

etween the years 1979-1989, the MiG21 aircraft, in all versions, became the mainstay of the combat fleet when the IAF phased out its fleets of the Gnats, Hunters and Maruts, on completion of their total technical life (TTL) or on reaching obsolescence. The operational effectiveness,

improved when the British Jaguar, Russian MiG-23, MiG-27, MiG-29 and the French Mirage-2000 aircraft were inducted, placing the IAF in a comfortable position in respect to its adversaries. The MiG-21 aircraft, in an upgraded Bison version, continues in service till date. The MiG23 and a part of the MiG-27 fleets

May 2018

have already been phased out; the other fleets of the, MiG29, Jaguar and Mirage-2000, along with some MiG-27 aircraft, with a fresh lease of life through upgrades and overhauls, are likely to fly for another two decades or more. All these aircraft are third-generation vintage and do not really project frontline combat capability, so direly needed today, notwithstanding the

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

IAF A STATUS STUDY

Light Combat Aircraft (LCA-later christened as Tejas) in 1983, as a lightweight platform, comparable to the then best in the world, and for the IAF to maintain a balance against Pakistan and China. The IAF was, however, sceptical, of the capability of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), to deliver such an advanced fighter aircraft, and as per the schedule required.

Mig-21 Upgrade

induction of SU-30 MKI. The combat fleet strength of the IAF, is reported to have dropped to 31 squadrons as against the desired strength of 42 squadrons, with every likelihood of a further drop to below 30 by the end of the year, when it should have been on the increase—a serious situation inconsistent with the preparations for a two-front scenario.

Rafale Delayed

The rapid depletion of the combat force levels is mainly due to the obsolescence of the older fleets, with no fresh inductions. The depleting numbers were to be replenished by new acquisitions of the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA), the French Rafale. But with the ‘mother of all deals’ for the purchase/manufacture of the 126 aircraft receding into history, and the progress of a direct government-togovernment purchase of 36 aircraft also running into an initial deadlock over pricing and offset obligations - the arrival of the new aircraft is expected only during the latter half of 2019. The honest truth, therefore, is that the IAF can barely muster 30-odd squadrons of SU-30 MKIs, MiG-29s, MiG-27s, Mirage-2000s, MiG-21 Bisons, and Jaguars; this, too, could be an overstatement of the IAF’s war-fighting potential because of attrition, poor serviceability, and operational conversion, which have taken a fairly high toll. The MiG-21, which was originally intended for air defence operations, proved its worth also for medium

THE HONEST TRUTH, THEREFORE, IS THAT THE IAF CAN BARELY MUSTER 30-ODD SQUADRONS. THIS, TOO, COULD BE AN OVERSTATEMENT BECAUSE OF ATTRITION AND POOR SERVICEABILITY and low altitude missions of close air support and battlefield strikes. It is not surprising, hence, that the fleet remained as the backbone of the IAF over the years. It was only in the 1980s, that the IAF began planning for a replacement to the MiG-21. However, the induction of the F-16 by Pakistan in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, forced IAF to look for aircraft that could match its capabilities; two squadrons each of Mirage-2000 and MiG-29s were inducted by 1986. The inductions did improve the operational capabilities but also complicated the force structure, since a replacement of the MiG-21 was yet to be found. The Government of India initiated an indigenous programme for a

May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

As a stop-gap, a project to modernise a part of the MiG-21 fleet, 125 aircraft of the newest airframe in the inventory, were selected to get new air-to-air missiles, avionics and new cockpit displays; this was, however, meant to be only as a stop-gap measure till the eventual replacement to the entire fleet. In addition, after the superb performance of the Mirage-2000 aircraft during the Kargil conflict, the IAF also decided to acquire aircraft of a later generation from the same family. A requirement of 126 aircraft, with a provision to purchase another 74, to make it a total of 200 aircraft, was considered as the Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) replacements for the MiG-21s and the MiG-23s. Unfortunately, the contract could not be finalised due to some sloppy decision-making and a lumbering acquisition process; the purchase was very nearly scuttled and revived only after a change in the government in 2014. With some very active ‘military-diplomacy’ between the French and Indian Governments, a decision was then taken to purchase 36 aircraft and a government-to-government sale deal finalised during the visit of Prime Minister Modi to France; IAF, would hopefully, get the first aircraft in 2019. The IAF has been reluctant to induct the indigenous Tejas for many years, due to sluggish progress in its development and the inherent weaknesses thus creeping in. It accepted small numbers into its test establishments, in the fond

hope that someday our designers and scientists would appreciate the shortfalls and probably design a better aircraft by leapfrogging technology, which would then not be so delayed to roll out from the production lines. Sadly, it was not to be, and the aircraft today has been thrust down the throat of IAF, after a three-decade delay of development and production. As a result, IAF now has an overweight aircraft with a suboptimal thrustweight ratio despite the copious use of composites; the airframe has its plus points, but the minus points far outweigh them. The aircraft has been inducted into service, with much fanfare, without the Final Operational Clearance (FOC), which should have been completed prior to induction, but is nowhere near completion! So much for the efficiency of the production agency and ‘total belief’ in its capabilities by the policy-makers and policy implementers (read bureaucrats)! There are claims and counterclaims to the superiority of the Tejas in comparison with the Chinese J-10 and the Pakistani JF-17, and whether the Mk-II would be more effective; the fact, however, is that the IAF is saddled with an unwanted order.

Sukhoi-30MKI

As of 2017, the Su-30 MKI is the single largest aircraft type in the IAF inventory; the numbers are likely to increase further over time. This is a fourth-generation aircraft, modified specially to meet the needs of the IAF; it integrates Indian systems, with Israeli and French sub-systems. The fleet has provided the IAF with the strategic reach to counter any threat, both within the country’s airspace and in the region. The aircraft, though not initially designed to carry strategic weapons, is under modification to carry the Indossian Brahmos and Nirbhay cruise missiles. Talks are on with Russia to upgrade the fleet to fifthgeneration standards; if culminated successfully, this fleet will continue to be in the Indian skies for at least another three decades. Apart from plans to acquire an upgraded, fifth-generation version of

the SU-30 MKI aircraft, the IAF has also been moving towards India’s largest programme to acquire a ‘true-blood’ fifth-generation fighter aircraft (FGFA). India and Russia have signed an agreement to codevelop a FGFA Indian version of the Russian T-50 PAK FA that is currently undergoing test-flights. While the FGFA will have features such as stealth, super-cruise and ultra-manoeuvrability, combined with modern weapon systems, hence satisfying IAF’s needs, the programme has not progressed as per initial discussions with Russia. The series production for the Indian version is scheduled to commence only in 2019, and the induction to commence by 2020. Whether the aircraft actually flies under the IAF colours or not, is anybody’s guess!

the IAF and the Ministry, there exists a situation like the Bollywood film “Kabhi haan Kabhi naa” (KHKN); it was reported in the media some weeks ago that a conscious decision has been taken to avoid inducting single-engine fighter aircraft, only to be contradicted a few days later. In the meanwhile, joint ventures/ strategic partnerships (JV/SP) between Indian companies and foreign manufacturers are being signed and production facilities being set up.

Indigenous FGFA

There is also talk of development of an indigenous fifth-generation aircraft, AMCA– the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft. Feasibility study on AMCA and the preliminary design stage are reportedly completed, with the project awaiting the final go-ahead. As announced by the design agency, Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), during the biennial international air-show in Bengaluru in February 2015, the construction of the first prototype was scheduled to commence later in 2015, on the allotment of funds; during the subsequent air-show in 2017, the head of ADA announced full-scale engineering development till the prototype stage to take at least a decade with a specific timeframe for a first flight: 2030, with low-rate production to begin in 2035. The delays, as always, have crept in and the author sincerely hopes that the project takes off as per plans, since all indicators are otherwise.

‘Yes’/’No’ Syndrome

There are other aircraft, names of which are flying around in the IAF and the corridors of power: the US Lockheed-Martin built F-16 Block 70 and the Swedish Saab JAS 39 Gripen-E. There is much speculation as to which of the two would be selected as a part of the much-touted ‘Make-in-India’ programme. Between

May 2018

Whether a collaborative effort to design and build an indigenous aircraft or pursue the ‘Make-inIndia’ programme through a JV/ SP, requires serious consideration by the GoI. Whether it is a strategic partnership with USA or the timetested partnership with Russia, the GoI has to realise that there are no longer any free lunches; all governments, be it American, Russian, French or Swedish, will ultimately ask for their pound of flesh. There are many instances of the operational potential, or the training, or the development of infrastructure in the IAF, being adversely affected due to lethargy in clearing projects/ procurements. A delay in such cases can result in a catastrophe. The Standing Committee of Parliament on Defence has repeatedly raised concerns about the shortage of aircraft and the consequential poor operational preparedness. Since 2014, large ticket procurements have been cleared by the Raksha Mantri in the Defence Acquisition Council, yet not many have been finalised. Any announcement of a clearance of a large purchase builds up excitement, which dies soon after! The KHKN factor affects the credibility of the country in the international market on which India is more than 60 per cent dependent, not just for outright purchases, but also for starting joint ventures. India’s stalled defence procurements have become an international joke, but it is not funny to the users. The IAF continues to be at the losing end!

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

falling numbers NO NEW ACQUISITIONS

PULL IAF OUT OF THIS QUICKSAND The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has dragged its heels in virtually every capital acquisition. As a case file transits, each department seems to possess its own interpretation of policy and procedure. Given the absolute lack of accountability and total apathy towards a stated task, the system takes advantage of the multiple decision agencies in the chain which, in turn, necessitates duplication of processes. The entire exercise, as is evident, is more a hurdle than facilitation.

s a young student in a residential school nestled in the Garhwal hills, I vividly remember a scene from one of the monthly black and white movies that were screened in our auditorium. The year was 1961 and a classic ‘Western’ film was on show. In the scene, while negotiating a marshy swamp in the failing light of dusk, the horse and rider stumble into a quicksand pit and the rider is thrown off the saddle into the murky black mass. What ensued thereafter would be firmly etched in our memories. The viscous, sucking morass seemed to be slowly but surely swallowing the two unfortunate victims, drawing them into the nether world. The early

panic, which worsens the situation, gave way to a resignation which belied the fear of the inevitable. However, after bringing his nerves under control, the cowboy was somehow able to extricate him, exhausted but safe. His mount could not be saved. Half a century later, the scene appears to re-create itself in a different avatar. The Indian Air Force finds itself mired in the quicksand of an acquisition process which, rather than assist and promote mobility and growth, seems to be slowly but surely eroding the very purpose for which it was created. But like the cowboy extricating himself, the IAF has, over the years, struggled to remain afloat and eventually get back to its feet.

May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Foresight The steady decline in the number of fighter squadrons in the IAF is, indeed, a matter of concern. As the sword-arm of the Indian defence forces, airpower, projected through the IAF’s fighter squadrons, will be the game changer in any war. The world’s fourth largest air force cannot be allowed to reach a stage of impotency because the deterrence value of national security hinges squarely on its shoulders. In fact, a well-established procedure exists wherein a system of perspective plans provides the requisite foresight for the planners and the government, which will fund the necessary acquisitions. The Long Term Perspective Plan (LTTP) followed by the Five Year Perspective Plan and the Annual Perspective Plan exist to

AIR MARSHAL SUMIT MUKERJI PVSM, SC, VSM (RETD)

An alumnus of NDA and DSSC, the writer has served the IAF as a fighter pilot with distinction. He has Commanded three units, a MiG-29 Sqn, a MiG-25 SR Sqn and TACDE (considered the ‘Top Gun’ school of the IAF). He has also served as the Air Attache in Washington DC. He retired in 2011 as the AOC-in-C of Southern Air Command, IAF.

project a graded requirement, allow for some adjustment with technology changes and make a firm bid or commitment towards an acquisition. With such a system in place did the IAF fail to make its pitch which has resulted in the sorry state of affairs that the service finds itself in, presently?

DPP – Hurdle or Facilitator?

India’s Defence Procurement Procedure or DPP has been at the centre of controversy and criticism from the time the first of its editions came out. Periodic iterations and tweaking, efforts to ‘short-circuit’, ‘fast-track’ procedures, etc. have somehow not been able to create a favourable model for business nor has it provided confidence and satisfaction to the buyer or the seller. Steeped in bureaucratic red tape,

with no technical domain knowledge or expertise, the Ministry of Defence (MoD), which processes the case, has dragged its heels in virtually every capital acquisition. As a case file transits, each department seems to possess its own interpretation of policy and procedure. Given the absolute lack of accountability and total apathy towards a stated task, the system takes advantage of the multiple decision agencies in the chain which, in turn, necessitates duplication of processes. The entire exercise, as is evident, is more a hurdle than facilitation. Time delays in the Indian defence procurement system are legendary, with processes taking five / six or even eight times their stated periods. Large gestation periods of any new acquisition only makes the in-house

May 2018

THE REDOUBTABLE LOCKHEED MARTIN F-35? GIVE IT A PASS, I SAY. THE CARROT OF THE F-35 HANGS AT THE END OF A WITHERING STICK CALLED THE F-16. LET US CONCENTRATE ON OUR INDIGENOUS AMCA PROGRAMME

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

falling numbers NO NEW ACQUISITIONS

delays more prominent, leading to ominous situations on ground. International geopolitics have contributed their bit. The fact that ‘Total War’ in our context is possibly a thing of history and only localised short, sharp conflicts are expected, lends an air of laissez-faire to defence acquisitions. A constant fear of allegations of graft and corruption dogs the process preventing effective decision-making. So, is there a way to stem the rot and can we seriously address the issue of national security and counter the perceived threat on our borders? Given the trend of the government and the budget allocations for defence, it is unlikely that the 1.6 per cent of GDP figure, even in times of crisis, will exceed 2.0 per cent although 2.5 per cent would be desirable. The investment of 2.5 per cent is considered necessary to not just keep our nose and mouth out of the quicksand but gain the ability to drag oneself out of the morass.

LCA Viability

The IAF is presently down to 34 fighter squadrons of which really 31 squadrons can be considered effective. The breakdown appears like this:-

of self-reliance, a major factor

The IAF had very realistically

in national security concerns.

predicted the draw-down and

It is also the task of the IAF to

HAL optimistically painted a rosy

carry HAL piggyback and lend

picture of a state-of-the-art LCA

the necessary support. The

as the suitable replacement for

acceptance of the first 20 LCAs (in

the MiG-21. The LCA programme

IOC configuration) and the next

has been subjected to so much

20 LCAs (in FOC configuration)

battering; this author does not

has paved the way for HAL to now

feel the need to flog the issue any

move forward with alacrity to make

further. Suffice to say, after 30

up the numbers. It appears that

years of development, the first

we will see these two squadrons

squadron of the Tejas LCA has

operational by 2024-2025, at best.

only six aircraft. A production rate

IAF’s order for 83 more Tejas,

of eight aircraft per year promised

at a cost of Rs 33,200 crore, is

by HAL with a ‘ramp-up’ possibility

encouraging and should boost

to 16 aircraft per year utilising the

HAL further. These aircraft, the

now defunct Hawk assembly line

Tejas Mk 1A, will have enhanced

really finds no believers, given its

features such as the advanced

reputation. The fact that Dassault

AESA radar, reduction in weight

refused to endorse the warranty

with improved manoeuvrability,

clause on Rafale fighters to be

easier maintainability and

produced by HAL in the original

a more effective target

MMRCA procurement plan has

engagement system.

been a big blow to their

production credibility.

Way Forward

The fastest and ‘cleanest’ process

Notwithstanding the criticism,

to acquire new platforms is

there is an urgent need for the

probably a government-to-

LCA to succeed, for the growth of

government (G2G) transaction

the indigenous aviation industry

with a country with which India

and for India to get on the path

enjoys a strategic partnership, as also the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system of the United States. The languishing 126 MMRCA acquisition was brutally snapped off and the Prime Minister went into a direct acquisition of 36

SU-30 MKI 11 Sqns

MiG-21 Bison 6 Sqns

Jaguar 6 Sqns

Rafale fighters from Dassault Aviation. A bold decision indeed, of immense value to the IAF and the country. It is hoped that in the follow-up of the signing of the contract, Dassault will

Mirage 2000 3 Sqns

MiG-29 3 Sqns

MiG-27 (UPG) 2 Sqns

(Considered ineffective are three squadrons of MiG-21 / 27 on their last legs and suffering from maintainability issues.)

May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

provide, on loan, six or nine Rafale fighters in current use by the French Air Force to initiate the operational training and creation

IN THE MEANTIME, THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA MUST RESORT TO G2G DEALS WITH STRATEGIC PARTNERS TO OVERCOME THE SHORTFALL

of infrastructure. These aircraft would subsequently be replaced by the production aircraft specific to the IAF (a process very akin to that followed for the Jaguar and SU-30). It is also hoped that the Government of India realises the benefits of a follow-on order of additional 36 / 54 Rafales. The Rafale acquisition is not the answer to stem the draw-down and further augmentation is necessary. It was thus disheartening when the government cancelled the IAFs proposal for 100 singleengine fighters. Fortunately, the cancellation was merely to redraft the proposal to include twin-engine fighters to broaden the selection base. The fact that a new acquisition is expected to see the IAF through the next 40 years, it is absolutely essential that India look for two main issues when negotiating the deal. Firstly, which platform has the best architecture for growth and secondly, what is the ‘package’ that the vendor can offer which could possibly allow for transition to the next generation. In both these issues, the key feature of the procurement must hinge on PM Modi’s “Make-in-India” programme

really cannot demonstrate any

The redoubtable Lockheed Martin

further architectural growth. The

F-35? Give it a pass, I say. The

Dassault Rafale and the SAAB

carrot of the F-35 hangs at the

Gripen are eminently suited to

end of a withering stick called the

fulfill the requirements. For cost

F-16. Let us concentrate on our

consideration reasons vis-à-vis

indigenous AMCA programme.

the numbers involved, the SAAB

Gripen would actually be the most

Exploit G2G Channel

and assured “Transfer of Technology”. This will be the only way that the indigenous defence industry will garner technology and focus the resources (men and machinery) towards our goal of self-sufficiency. A third factor for definite consideration is the compatibility with another service, say the navy, in our case.

suitable platform for the IAF and

No country in the world can afford

the IN. For rapid inclusion, a G2G

to replenish their inventory with

execution will definitely speed up

new aircraft always. Thus, most

the acquisition process.

modern aircraft incorporate a

The 5th generation fighter certainly merits discussion. The FGFA

design architecture which supports growth and modernisation through upgrades. The IAF must exploit this

programme, the Government of

arena to the fullest on its existing

India entered with the Russian

fleets. The large gestation periods of

Federation, turned out to be, as someone said, “A road to nowhere”.

new acquisitions demand a smooth

An ambitious plunge to co-develop

initial initiation. Our acquisition

and co-produce a Generation Five

process needs to address the

fighter has left India floundering

existing lacunae to uphold its

in the deep. The prohibitive cost

credibility. In the meantime, the

escalation, especially after the

Government of India must resort to

Russians reneged on their own

G2G deals with strategic partners

requirements, has made the FGFA

to overcome the shortfall in fighter

programme untenable. India

squadrons and build up the

should now gracefully bow out of the joint venture and pursue a path to develop its own 5th generation

deterrence factor. Prime Minister Modi’s thrust for “Make-in -India” is ideally suited to promote the

fighter, the Advanced Medium

indigenous defence industry and

Combat Aircraft (AMCA). The

give India an opportunity to

SAAB, while enhancing the Gripen

become self-reliant in defence.

to Gen 4++ scale has offered all

The IAF and HAL need to take

technological assistance to the

serious cognisance of this and look

SAAB Gripen Best

‘Make-in-India’ programme to

A professional assessment would indicate that the F-16 and F-18 have lived their life and

AMCA project. The SAAB offer must

and resolute ambition will pull the

not be missed.

IAF out of the quicksand.

to the future. Some clear thinking

include facilitation even for the

May 2018

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

military procurement

PROCESS A BIG HURDLE

LICENCE-PRODUCED MAISMA

It is important that the policy must be divorced from procedures. Then, we can have a strong policy guideline and a flexible and implementable procedure. The procurement executive must have complete freedom to navigate the procedures while ensuring strict adherence to policy guidelines. This will help the bureaucracy to find fewer opportunities to stall programmes on grounds of procedural compliance.

risoners to

the civilian bureaucracy. The sum

the structure and departments

Procedures—may be

total of all of this is, procurement

in Indian Defence. A Military

the best description

of arsenal for the armed forces is

Department was created by the

of the procurement

moving at a snail’s pace.

Supreme Government of the

executive in the

British East India Company at

MoD. Adherence

Background

Kolkata in the year 1776. Its main

to the letter, spirit forgotten, the

The Government of India thrust

function was to co-ordinate and

procurement process is, indeed, a

on the Indian Armed Forces the

record orders, relating to the army,

giant hurdle in national security.

Defence Procurement Procedure

issued by various departments

British have left and gone, their

(DPP), which came into effect

of the Government of the East

legacy is upheld by bureaucracy at

on December 30, 2002. So, how

India Company. The Military

all levels and in all organisations.

did the Indian Armed Forces

Department was abolished in

The Indian Armed Forces have

procure weapons and equipment

March 1906 and was replaced by

their own bureaucracy, imposed

prior to 2002? To get a better

two separate departments, the

by themselves on themselves for

understanding, we need to go

Army Department and the Military

themselves, sometimes worse than

back in time and understand

Supply Department. In April 1909,

May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

COL KV KUBER (RETD) the Military Supply Department

until then were governed by the

was abolished and its functions

central procurement policy of

were taken over by the Army

the Government of India and the

Department. The Army Department

General Financial Rules (GFR).

was re-designated as the Defence

Department in January 1938. The

The GFR were issued for the first

Department of Defence became the

time in 1947 bringing together in

Ministry of Defence (MoD) under a

one place all existing orders and

cabinet minister in August 1947.

instructions pertaining to financial

matters. These have subsequently

Post-independence, in November

been modified and issued as GFRs

1962, a Department of Defence

1963 and GFRs 2005.

Production was set up to deal

An alumnus of the prestigious National Defence Academy and the Technical Staff College, super specialised in Electronic Warfare. Chief architect of the offset policy since its inception in 2005. He was an Advisor with NSIC and DRDO, and is presently CEO, Sugosha.

with research, development and

Post-Kargil Review

production of defence equipment.

The broad array of challenges,

In November 1965, the Department

both existing and potential, to

of Defence Supplies was created

the national security in the fast

for planning and execution of

changing geostrategic security

schemes for import substitution of

environment mandated a periodical

requirements for defence purposes.

reappraisal of India’s security

These two departments were later

procedures to cope with them. The

merged to form the Department of

government, keeping this in view,

Defence Production and Supplies.

had instituted a comprehensive

In 2004, the name of Department

review of the National Security

of Defence Production and Supplies

System in its entirety for the first

was changed to Department of

time in the history of independent

Defence Production.

India. The review was carried out

by a Group of Ministers (GOM)

So while we had the formation

constituted on April 17, 2000.

of defence departments and

The GOM consisted of the Home

their restructuring between

Minister, the Raksha Mantri, the

1947 and 2004, we did not have

External Affairs Minister and the

a defence procurement policy

Finance Minister. The Group of

until 2002. All procurements

Ministers set up four Task Forces

May 2018

How did the MoD in the first place have a stipulation that value addition in IDDM should be done by only one unit/ one company? Whoever was the cause to incorporate such a stipulation must be asked to explain.

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

military procurement

PROCESS A BIG HURDLE

IDEA OF OFFSETS OMBUDSMAN IS GREAT, THIS WAS ALSO SUGGESTED BY THE “EXPERTS COMMITTEE”, CHAIRED BY SHRI DHIRENDRA SINGH. one each in the areas of:

manufacturing capabilities and

(i) Internal Security

technology. It provides framework

(ii) Border Management

and criteria for allotment of

(iii) Intelligence Apparatus and (iv) Management of Defence;

defence contracts. The Defence Procurement Procedure

which were multi-disciplinary

has since been revised in 2005,

in character and comprised of

2006, 2008, 2009, 2011, 2013

acknowledged experts, to facilitate

and 2016, enhancing the scope to

its tasks.

include “Make”, “Buy and Make

(Indian)” and “IDDM” categories,

As part of the implementation of

concept of “Offsets”, “Strategic

the report of the GOM on reforming

Partnerships” and Ship

the National Security System, new

Building procedure.

Defence Procurement Management

Structures and Systems were set up

A Quagmire

in the Ministry of Defence. In order

The Ministry of Defence has

to implement the provisions laid out

recently put in public domain, a

in the new Defence Procurement

draft Defence Production Policy

Management Structures and

and has invited comments from the

Systems, the procedure for Defence

industry and all stake-holders. This

Procurement laid down vide MoD ID

is, indeed, a very welcome move

No 1(1)/91/PO (Def) dated February

from the MoD. Probably for the first

28, 1992, was revised to form the

time we have a Defence Production

first DPP in 2002. The Defence

Policy document, written in an

Procurement Procedure-2002

extremely comprehensive manner,

(DPP-2002) came into effect from

notwithstanding the one in 2011,

December 30, 2002, and was

which was in fact a very basic

applicable for procurements flowing

document, without teeth.

out of “Buy” decision of Defence

Acquisition Council (DAC). The MoD

We presently have a Defence

is one of the few ministries under

Procurement Procedures of

the Government of India to have its

2016 vintage (DPP 2016 having

own procurement policy.

undergone serial modifications

from the first DPP 2002), a

The Defence Procurement Procedure

Defence Procurement Manual

is a set of guidelines approved by

of 2009, a Defence Production

the Defence Acquisition Council

Policy of 2011(that is bereft of any

that govern capital procurements

substantial value) and a host of

in terms of defence equipment,

independent opinions that shape

May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

the procurement process. In a democracy, every individual and department has an opinion and an interpretation, and these become more vocal and emphatic, especially when it concerns someone else or a different stake-holder. Here is where I bring about the concept of stake holders and non-stake holders. In the procurement for the Indian Armed Forces, the stake holders (the ones who are directly affected by either the induction or the noninduction of the platform/weapon system) are (i) Political Hierarchy, Armed Forces, Indian Army, Indian Navy, IAF and the Indian Coast Guard; (ii) Industry, both domestic and foreign; and (iii) to an extent the DRDO, when the technologies they have developed are concerned. All others in the system are non-stake holders, the induction or otherwise of the platform do not directly affect them in any manner, may be they could get rewarded for effectively stalling programmes. The DPP has too many protective measures to protect it against any wrong doing by the industry and few supportive measures to engage with industry in a constructive manner. In an effort to make it a good document, too many clauses have been added from time to time, thereby mixing the document with policy imperatives as well. So, there are few policy aspects and many procedural aspects, intertwined. Policy First Need of the hour is to separate the policy and procedural aspects of the DPP. What is needed is a Procurement Policy first. The Production policy

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE POLICY MUST BE DIVORCED FROM PROCEDURES. THEN WE CAN HAVE A STRONG POLICY GUIDELINE AND A FLEXIBLE AND IMPLEMENTABLE PROCEDURE.

must follow the procurement

free of any encumbrances, lest it is

policy to integrate aspects related

reduced to remaining at the mercy

to procurement. The production

of the beholder (of technology). Get

policy cannot by itself promulgate

the defence industry rid of

procurement related policy

licenced production, it does not

imperatives. This is fundamental to a

help anyone, neither the Forces,

good policy document.

nor the industry. It may add a

brownie point to the bureaucrat

Incidentally, we do not have a

who supposedly engineered the

procurement policy in the MoD.

contract; the idea is flawed from

Thanks to our Prime Minister, we do

the beginning. Remote is always

have a strong guidance in the form

with the OEM, so the entire activity

of “Make in India”, “Start Up India”,

is deprived of knowledge. This is

“Skill India”, “Come, Make in India”

the chief spoiler due to which our

and the like, for the MoD to adapt its

DPSUs/OFB have remained where

procurement philosophy. However, a

they were when they began their

procurement policy is in order.

journey. In many cases they were

better off, when they began, they

odd SOEs they have. China also

This is the major reason for all

got into this quagmire of licenced

realised that the SOEs had become

the loopholes in the DPP that the

production, only to ruin themselves.

inefficient and public money is

bureaucracy takes advantage of

May be, the MoD is responsible

being sunk into them year after year

in finding faults with the progress

for the state of OFB/DPSUs, by

with less returns. Thus, began a

of any programme, hence stalled,

pushing them into this quick-sand.

journey for increasing the efficiency

simple. While the Forces take

of the SOEs. The SOEs that were

recourse to the DPP to progress

Procurement Policy

performing well post investment

procurement cases, the bureaucracy

MoD may consider promulgating

from private companies, in respect

takes recourse to the DPP/

a Procurement Policy to guide

of those, China invited these private

procedures to halt, re-examine,

technology and production.

companies to take over the said

analyse, delay and in some cases

This would simply mean, that,

SOEs. Thus, efficiency was brought

derail. How many times have the

should an industry house follow

in, and public money pumped into

non-stake holders taken recourse

the Technology and Production

the SOEs was reduced. We have a

to the DPP to progress the cases?

policy, the procurement policy is

lesson or two here.

Answer, would reveal intention.

in support and orders are assured.

Else, why should the industry

Offsets Fiasco

Decreasing predictability of future

make an investment based on a

One of the major problems in the

needs is the premise to ensure

TPCR (Technology Perspective and

implementation of the Offsets

increased awareness in Force

Capability Roadmap), that is

Policy/guidelines is that there

Preparedness, basically amongst the

non-committal.

were a number of caveats and

bureaucracy in the MoD. Industry

stipulations in the guidelines,

can be vibrant, dynamic and

Industrial Policy

besides the truck-load of

responsive, but then who will buy?

One of the important pillars

documentation that was never

Where is the buyer? Where are the

of strategy is the “PPP” model.

ending. To add fuel to the fire, MoD

orders?

China had embarked on the

very intelligently brought in the

Licenced Production. These two

privatisation of the SOEs (State

CGDA for an audit before award

words must be removed from

Owned Enterprises), by inviting

of any credits for OEMs who have

the procurement books and the

top 100 private companies listed

successfully discharged offsets. Is it

production policy must clearly state

on the Shanghai stock exchange

not a known fact that the accounts

upfront, that all production must be

to come forward and bid for the 89

department is the weakest link in

May 2018

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

military procurement

PROCESS A BIG HURDLE

the execution of programmes and

This will help to become a single

working. Following aspects need

are known more for stalling them

window mechanism for facilitation

consideration:

than for delays that they cause

and approvals.

•

seldom a cause of strength.

FDI. Despite several statements

and policy push, FDI seems to be

Recommendations

elusive. Let the focus shift inwards,

can and why should a half-

For the procedures to be effective,

FDI will automatically flow. A foreign

yearly report for credits take

few recommendations are as under:

investment will get attracted to a

Ease of Doing Business. Various

strong and sustainable business

stipulations incorporated into

anywhere in the world. Let us focus

the DPP are a cause of worry. For

on domestic industry; FDI will have

example, How did the MoD in the

little choice but to get attracted.

first place have a stipulation that

Offsets. Offsets has been the most

value addition in IDDM should

used and abused word in the decade

Offsets, to be contributed by

be done by only one unit/one

and a half since its inception. We

FOEMs and invested in Indian

company? Whoever was the cause to

started with a simple policy, took

industry. OEMs share the risk

incorporate such a stipulation must

the baby steps, resisted FOEMs

of investment, well, industry

be asked to explain. Did they not

advances to expand quickly, and did

will have one more avenue for

understand the meaning of IDDM

well. We had a reasonably restrictive

funding.

then? After all, MoD is expected to

policy as a part of DPP 2006, and

think at national level, not look at

an excellent, outgoing and industry-

interpretation by DOMW

putting such stipulations that would

friendly implementation. Intent of

to an offset clause is

potentially ruin a good idea, like

the GoI was stated upfront, through,

incomprehensible. For example,

that of IDDM. All such stipulations

DOFA (Defence Offsets Facilitation

since DPP 2006, till DPP 2016,

must be removed forthwith.

Agency), the key was FACILITATION.

the first avenue for discharge

Also, the TPCR must incorporate

MoD at that time knew that their

read thus, “Direct Purchase/

accountability as well. TPCR cannot

role was just Facilitation. Since

execution of export orders for

be allowed to become a document

2006, the Offsets guidelines were

…”. At the time of formulation,

in technical fiction. What do we

improved each time at the behest of

in 2006, the idea was to make

understand by “positioning of the

OEMs and in some cases, domestic

use of the good offices of the

industry”? If the industry must

industry as well and while we made

FOEMs in various countries

position, they must invest and

flexible guidelines, implementation

and encourage exports of Indian

for the sake of national efficiency,

became more rigid. From DOFA

products to those geographies.

MoD cannot allow such genuine

it became DOMW, a management

Somehow, our DOMW that

investments to be reduced to scrap.

wing, vested with authority,

was formed only in the year

Licences. It is imperative for the

concept of collegium for discussions

2012, at least six years after

MoD, MHA, MEA, MoC to have

and decisions, so accountability

the initial DOFA, came to

a JV (or in other words a closed

reduced, individuals were no

interpret this clause completely

working group or a cross posting of

longer responsible, collegium was,

differently, came as a surprise

personnel in the IL approval cell).

and who ever saw a collegium

to people like myself, who was

CHINA ALSO REALISED THAT THE SOES HAD BECOME INEFFICIENT AND PUBLIC MONEY IS BEING SUNK INTO THEM YEAR AFTER YEAR WITH LESS RETURNS. 44

May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Accountability. Needs to be fixed on individuals.

•

Timeliness. Be ensured, how

such a long time? •

Documentation is killing. Needs drastic reduction.

•

Outcome-oriented offsets is the requirement of the day.

•

Incorporate Fund of Funds for

Interpretation. Sometimes,

involved since day one. DOMW clarifies through a FAQ, that execution of export orders is not an avenue for FOEM but for Indian companies that participate in a “Buy Global” tender; this would allow them to discharge offsets. Can’t believe

till now that Indian companies

Boeing, SAAB, RADS are like

away with, in keeping with ease

also need to discharge offsets.

HAL (where everything happens,

of doing business. CGDA neither

When an Indian company

because HAL did not have an

understands procurement nor

participates in a global tender,

idea of outsourcing, they had

offsets, and therefore, another

it does on its own right of

excessive plant and machinery

agency introduced to cause

having an indigenous product,

that they needed more work to

excessive delays once again,

unless the MoD has decided

keep the machines running).

without any accountability. This

to allow traders to participate

This is a problem of plenty, a

in global tenders (this is the

different problem here.

Simple Policy. Offsets

Ombudsman. Idea of Offsets

guidelines should be simple

DOMW explanation). So, what

ombudsman is great; this was

to understand and effective to

has actually happened is, we

also suggested by the “Experts

implement, a speedy disposal

have successfully destroyed the

Committee”, chaired by Sh

of cases will attract effective

fundamental idea of promoting

Dhirendra Singh, in its report.

exports, even when we had

Many times a procurement

an avenue, just because some

executive may need to bounce

Flexible Procedures

official in the MoD interpreted

off his predicament regarding

In conclusion, it is important that

it in this manner. So is the

a particular programme and

the policy must be divorced from

case with discharge by Tier 1

its nuances and no better than

procedures. Then, we can have a

vendors on behalf of FOEM, my

an ombudsman, a neutral

strong policy guideline and a flexible

question is, did someone have a

person, with experience of

and implementable procedure. The

doubt on this? Did someone in

policy, procedures, both from

procurement executive must have

the MoD think that the FOEM,

the government perspective as

complete freedom to navigate the

who has just 20 to 25 per cent

well as industry perspective to

procedures while ensuring strict

of the platform, will be able to

throw light. It will be of great

adherence to policy guidelines.

discharge the complete offsets?

help to the Procurement/

This will help the bureaucracy

If so, then, our officials did not

Offset executive to take a more

to find fewer opportunities to

informed decision.

stall programmes on grounds of

CGDA Audit. Must be done

procedural compliance.

impression that one gets from

•

is clearly superfluous. •

have an idea of manufacturing, they thought companies like

•

May 2018

implementation.

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

averting IIIrd World War US-NORTH KOREA CONTRATEMPS

USE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY AUSPICES At this crucial juncture, what is needed is the urgent convening of United Nations General Assembly meeting under the provision of Uniting for Peace Resolution, which was devised for the first time during the much talked about Korean crisis of early 1950s, asking immediate withdrawal of the American forces and weapons accumulated around North Korea and further making them both committed to strictly observing the No First Use of any kind of weapons.

he US President looks firm to execute his categorical resolve to collide head on with the North Korean dictator despite well-calculated assessment of unimaginable disaster in the event of any unfortunate WashingtonPyongyang showdown. The dictator, on the other hand, looks equally firm in repeatedly ignoring the US threat with it overtone of an ultimatum, reminding the world of the days of Iraq’s dictator Saddam Hussain who always showed his balanced

composure and metal coolness visa-vis US’ sponsored North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) threat sanctified by United Nations ultimatum, calling for immediate withdrawal of Iraqi’s forces from Kuwait or face consequences. But what happened to Saddam Hussain is known to us.

US Created ISIS

Will history repeat itself? Will those unfortunate events follow the same course? Is North Korea having the same magnitude and degree of problems as that were once

May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

shouldered by Iraq? If America successfully trampled Iraq more than a decade ago, the after effects of that highhandedness and misdeeds by the US continues to resonate unabated ever since then. Is the origin and rise of Islamic State terrorists (ISIS) operating in Syria and Iraq not an offshoot of the American misdemeanour in Iraq as well as the entire West Asia? Today, everybody has seen the barbarity, notoriety and macabre violence unleashed by ISIS upon innocent people in the world which has jolted the very conscience of common man

and has caused horrible tremors in their spines.

Regime Change Operations

It is quite evident from almost century long events of the past that wherever the US did intervene for the ostensible reasons of protecting human rights or preserving and maintaining democracy in the world, the end results had always been highly tumultuous and destructive causing instability and even heinous violence and ultimately, revolutions. The continuing crisis in West Asia, Syria and Iraq, Africa, Latin America or elsewhere in the world today, owe their inevitable evil effects to the American misdeeds in different forms. The US highhandedness and unwanted hegemonic policies had always hurt and humiliated the pious nationalist sentiments and had caused to erupt extreme kind of reactionary nationalism or jingoism, leading to emergence of undemocratic fascist ideologies as was seen in Germany and Italy immediately after the World War I, under the leadership of Hitler and Mussolini, respectively. Every nation is well aware that America is basically a merchant nation and for that end, it can go to any extent. It can even make arrangements for killing a Head of State as it is said to be involved in ensuring elimination of President Salvadore Allende of Chile in 1973 in a coup plotted by its CIA because he was considered as a hindrance in the way towards securing the American economic interests spread over there in the form of multinational corporations. In the same way, Washington made ceaseless efforts but failed every time during many of the past decades in the previous century for eliminating Cuban leader Fidel Castro when he rose to power during 1953-59 revolution in Cuba.

Third World War Prognosis

Obviously, such American practices have always contributed to aggravating mutual tensions thereby

killing the spirit of harmony and conciliation. If Washington continues to carry over these discriminatory and hegemonic policies with Pyongyang, the result may be very awesome and destructive. The North Korean dictator, Kim Jong-un, is a real challenge for the US in dealing with Pyongyang. Today, both the likely belligerents are nuclear weapon powers even possessing hydrogen bombs and other lethal weapons. In the very unfortunate event of both nations deciding to enter into nuclear fray as the US forces are preparing to ward-off chemical weapons attack near North Korea’s border, thereby, instigating the dictator, the resultant holocaust will be an unimaginable catastrophe on the mother earth, forcing alignment and realignment of countries. Both Russia and China have already decided to shoot down the American fighters in the air and NATO powers will essentially take sides with the US in the comity of nations propelling a possible worst ever Third War.

UN Auspices For Peace

At this crucial juncture, what is needed is the urgent convening of United Nations General Assembly meeting under the provision of Uniting for Peace Resolution, which was devised for the first time during the much talked about Korean crisis of early 1950s. It sought immediate withdrawal of the American forces and weapons accumulated around North Korea and further making them both committed to strictly observing the No First Use of any kind of weapons. Then, both the US and North Korea, along with other stakeholders like China, Russia and NATO powers and South Korea be brought for discussion across table under the auspices of the UN so that all apprehensions and misunderstandings between them may be removed and the golden path for harmony, peace and progress be found. This is possible as nothing is beyond human endeavour.

May 2018

DR SUDHANSHU TRIPATHI The writer is Professor, Political Science in UPRTOU, Allahabad. His book ‘NAM and INDIA’ was published in 2010/2012 and a co-authored text-book ‘Rajnitik Awadharnayein’ in 2001. His numerous articles and research papers have appeared in many reputed national & international journals, online journals and magazines.

BOTH THE US AND NORTH KOREA, ALONG WITH OTHER STAKEHOLDERS LIKE CHINA, RUSSIA AND NATO POWERS AND SOUTH KOREA BE BROUGHT FOR DISCUSSION ACROSS TABLE UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

foreign policy ROLE OF ‘STRATEGIC CULTURE’

DNA OF

HISTORICAL MEMORIES India’s security strategy, to some degree, changed correspondingly, yet it remained stable due to the great influences of ‘Indic culture’ cum Nehruvian heritage in the making of India’s foreign policy. The ending of the Cold War witnessed that Nehruvian legacy, being more idealistic and less realistic, challenged by new strategic concepts, gradually losing its predominance.

May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

“The concept of strategic culture captures the essence of inter-State behaviour, looking at the set of preferences that States have in using one foreign policy tool or another.” Jack Snyder

ike individuals, nation-States also bear distinctive personality based on their shared historical memories that have been shaping their identities, consciously or unconsciously, since time immemorial. The foreign policy of a nation-State is, therefore, an extension of its own distinctive personality personified in the global realm of world politics. The identity of a nation-State that has been shaping its unique identity or personality or the way it is perceived by other nation-States is nothing but the sum total of its shared historical memories that come to the making of its culture. This ‘unique culture’ acts as the DNA of a nation-State and its own foreign policy formulation is nothing but the exact mirror or replica of this DNA, that can broadly be called as its ‘strategic culture’ that plays the most pivotal role in the making of its foreign policy. It also provides answers as to why India has always been ‘reactionary’ (i.e. react/act after an event) in its security strategy, not having ‘preemptive’ posturing like US or Israel. Seventy-year Databank As we are witnessing 70 years of operation of Indian Foreign Policy (IFP), it is but natural for any curious onlookers of IFP to ask some pertinent questions about what has been going into the making of the foreign policy of the world’s largest democracy having the oldest civilisational history of mankind on this planet earth. How the IFP has been conceptualised from the Nehruvian years to the present day of a de-ideolised and globalised interconnected interdependent world? Why did India choose to be non-aligned in the good old Cold War days? Why India went nuclear in 1974 and again in 1998? Why IFP

was reoriented in the post-Cold War days via adopting various futuristic ‘grand strategies’ like ‘Look West’ and ‘Look East’, now transforming into ‘Act East’ and Act West’ policies? The word ‘strategy’ is ubiquitous and can be found in all walks of life. The word ‘strategy’ has military connotations, because it derives from the Greek word “strategos” which means “to plan the destruction of one’s enemies through effective use of resources”. The term ‘Strategic Culture’ was coined by Jack Snyder in 1977, while analysing erstwhile Soviet Russia’s military strategy, where he felt that the origin of Soviets’ strategic thinking had a deep-rooted influence from Soviet history and the leaders of the Soviet Union did not behave according to any “rational choice theory”. Snyder defined strategic culture as “the sum total of ideals, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of the national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to [nuclear] strategy”. ‘Strategic culture’ is an existential reality like real-politik. Nation-States do have established notions and habits regarding security policy, but that does not mean that these must play the primary role in guiding said policy. An elite Indian Foreign Service (IFS) mandarin may have an agenda item that would be considered counter-cultural for that nation (as has often been argued regarding pre-emption for the United States) but are able to push it through the resistant mechanisms of strategic culture, nonetheless.

No Strategic Culture

With the winding down of the Cold War, India started to recast its approach to the world. In

May 2018

SOURABH JYOTI SHARMA The writer is a Strategic Commentator & Columnist based in Gauhati, Assam. Currently Pursuing PhD on “India-Israel Strategic Defence-Intelligence Friendship” & Working as Assistant Professor, Political Science at Gauhati University. The writer specializes on Indo-centric Strategic Affairs with publications in National, International Print & Web Journals.

INDIA’S STRATEGIC CULTURE MAINLY MEANT NEHRUVIAN LEGACY

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

foreign policy ROLE OF ‘STRATEGIC CULTURE’

THE EVOLUTION OF INDIA’S ‘STRATEGIC CULTURE’ FINALLY RESULTED IN THE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES OF INDIA’S SECURITY STRATEGY, ITS NUCLEAR STRATEGY IN PARTICULAR

order to understand India then opening up, the US Department of Defense commissioned the RAND Corporation to do a project on “India’s Future Strategic Role and Power Potential”. The project leader was George K. Tanham. His influential finding, disseminated in an essay, “Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay” (1992), was that India lacked a strategic culture. Tanham attributed limitations in strategic thinking to India lacking political unity historically; the Hindu concept of time discouraging planning; the cultural view of the mystery of existence; the fact that Indians were largely kept out of strategic circles by the British; and, lastly, to little interest in strategic planning in the elite ever since. In the realist narrative, India is a ‘Soft State’ (a term coined by economist Gunnar Myrdal in “Asian Drama”, 1968) and ‘weak power’. This betrays its lack of an understanding of and felicity in power play between nations. It is a commonplace of the discourse on Indian security that India does

not have a strategic culture and that Indians have historically not thought consistently and rigorously about strategy. At the very least, Indians have not recorded their strategic thinking in written texts, the only exception being the ancient classic i.e. Arthasastra. That India does not have a tradition of strategic thinking is not altogether incorrect. On the other hand, since India’s independence in 1947, it has had to deal with a number of security challenges, and the volume of writings on these issues is enormous. Newspaper and magazine commentary is probably the largest single source on Indian thinking. In addition, the strategic community has produced a corpus of scholarly writings on security. Finally, there are the texts of Indian prime ministers and other leaders who have over the years written and spoken publicly on security policy. India’s ‘strategic culture’ is based on two broad-based contours of philosophical foundation with its own belief-system with commensurate instrumental implications. The belief-system of its philosophical base includes certain age old guiding views viz sacred permeates Indian identity, goals are timeless, not time-bound, India’s status is a given, not earned, knowledge of truth is the key to action and power and world order is hierarchical, not egalitarian.

Post-Independence Legacy

India’s ‘strategic culture’ is the synthesis of its various historic

May 2018 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

experiences and ideas of different schools. Existing and developing as it had been since the beginning of the history of its political civilisation, it was only after independence that India’s ‘strategic culture’ came into its mature form since only then were Indians able to systematically address its strategic issues according to strategic needs of their modern Nation-State. Centreed upon New Delhi’s South Block atop Raisina Hill, contemporary India’s strategic culture mainly meant Nehruvian legacy i.e. Jawaharlal Nehru’s views about security and the world, over a rather long time (1947-1964). Later on, with the weakening of the dominance of Nehruvian legacy, India’s ‘strategic culture’ experienced constant changes and now even more under PM Narendra Modi’s politicocultural and economic vision for making a ‘New India’ but the spirit or soul remained unchanged being unalterable like ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’, ‘Sarve Bhavantu Sukhina’, ‘Kriyantu Vishwam Aryam’ etc. To conclude succinctly, India’s security strategy, to some degree, changed correspondingly, yet it remained stable due to the great influences of ‘Indic culture’ cum Nehruvian heritage in the making of India’s foreign policy. The ending of the Cold War witnessed that Nehruvian legacy, being more idealistic and less realistic, challenged by new strategic concepts, gradually losing its predominance, as ‘Bhisma-Pitamah’ of India’s strategic thinker late K. Subrahmanyam, too agrees. The evolution of India’s ‘strategic culture’ finally resulted in the fundamental changes of India’s security strategy, its nuclear strategy, in particular, which has profound bearing on its foreign policy reorientation in a post-Cold War era.

tactical offensive operations MOUNTAIN WARFARE

REVIEW – MOUNTAIN WARFARE AND THE INDIAN ARMY Past experiences of Indian Army in mountain (especially Infantry) offensive operations have been very restricted and except few isolated successes that to be mostly on dare devil actions by Individuals or at elementary section levels

Reviewed by: Maj Rakesh Sharma, Shaurya Chakra (Retd)

aving operated in Mountains extensively in my Army tenure and also being in active combat at Kargil in 1999, I can certainly and conclusively state that Gautam Das in his book “Mountain Warfare and The Indian Army” has comprehensively dealt with all aspects of Mountainous Operations. The book not only discusses the real and ground complicacies and intricacies as well as strategic and tactical aspects of mountain warfare but also has appropriately dealt on how current Internal commitments of Infantry and typical organisational structuring (like 60 per cent of strength of Rastriya Rifles coming from Infantry) would impact real war scenario. Many contemporary and critical value points have been raised in the book. Two most critical aspects which merits attention is that of Organisational Structuring and very limited experience of Indian Army in Tactical Offensive Operations in the mountains. It has been very rightly pointed out by author that too much of infantry deployment in CI/Internal Security is surely going to have a toll in Infantry preparedness for war situations. The requirement of War, both mentally and physically, is much more gruelling and different to that of CI activities. Past experiences of Indian Army in mountain (especially Infantry) offensive operations have been very restricted and except few isolated successes that to be

Author : Gautam Das ISBN 13 : 9789383930746 Year : 2018 MRP : Rs 1195 No Of Pages 262 mostly on dare devil actions by Individuals or at elementary section levels, there is nothing much to really feel great about. Many factors are limiting which have been elaborately brought forth by the author. Author has also dealt with various other aspects of mountain warfare like Operations in extreme weather conditions, fire support and all important logistical requirements.

May 2018

The ideas expressed by the author are accumulative and progressive. It makes a very interesting read with sense of realism and captivating narration of past Mountain Operations of Indian Army. Anyone with interest in Military Operations, in general, and in Mountain Warfare, in specific, would certainly find this book a great read.

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

April 2018

get connected

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT The First and Only ISO 9001:2015 Certified Defence and Security Magazine in India TENURE

COVER PRICE

DISCOUNT

DISCOUNTED PRICES

INDIA

SHIPPING CHARGES

YOU PAY

DELHI NCR

REST OF INDIA

DELHI NCR

REST OF INDIA

1 year

` 1800

30%

` 1260

` 400

` 780

` 1660

` 2040

2 years

` 3600

35%

` 2340

` 800

` 1560

` 3140

` 3900

3 years

` 5400

40%

` 3240

` 1200

` 2340

` 4440

` 5580

SAARC COUNTRIES 1 year

US$ 240

30%

US$ 168

US DOLLARS

120

US DOLLARS

288

2 years

US$ 480

35%

US$ 312

US DOLLARS

240

US DOLLARS

552

3 years

US$ 720

40%

US$ 432

US DOLLARS

360

US DOLLARS

792

REST OF THE WORLD 1 year

US$ 300

30%

US$ 210

US DOLLARS

240

US DOLLARS

450

2 years

US$ 600

35%

US$ 390

US DOLLARS

480

US DOLLARS

870

3 years

US$ 900

40%

US$ 540

US DOLLARS

720

US DOLLARS

1260

Subscribe to our DSA magazine I would like to subscribe to DSA for I would like to gift a subscription of DSA for

1 Year

2 Years

3 Years

Name (Self )................................................................................................................................ Organisation ................................................................... Billing Address................................................................................................................... City.......................................... Pin code ................................ Shipping Address.............................................................................................................. ......................................City....................................................... State.........................................Pin code............................Tel.......................................................................Mob................................................................. E mail id...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... DD / Cheque No...................................................................................................Dated.................................Drawn on.................................................. for ` ............................................................................................................................................... in favour of OCEAN MEDIA PRIVATE LIMITED Payable at New Delhi. Please add ` 50 extra for all outstation cheques.

Terms and Conditions

• Minimum subscription is for one year ie 12 issues. Your subscription will start with the next available issue after the receipt of your payment. • DSA issues will be dispatched through Courier Service in Delhi NCR and through speed post for rest of India as advised by the subscriber. • Please forward the completed subscription form with all the required details. DSA will not be responsible for any theft, loss or delay once the magazine has been dispatched. Please mention your subscription ID in all your future communications with us. • Please inform our subscription department about non-receipt of your copy latest by 20th day of the month, failing which the request for re-dispatch will not be entertained. • Subscription prices can also be viewed at the following web link http://www.dsalert.org/dsa-subscription/print-edition • Print and Online editions can be subscribed online through credit card via Payment Gateway. • The terms and conditions may change without any prior notice. This offer is for new subscribers only. • This subscription form supersedes all the previous. Please address all your subscription related queries through E-mail: subscription@dsalert.org or call us at: +91-11-23243999, 23287999. Write to us at: Subscription department, Defence and Security Alert (DSA), Prabhat Prakashan Tower, 4/19 Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi - 110002, INDIA.

For print edition login at: www.dsalert.org/dsa-subscription/print-edition

May 2018For DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT online edition login at: www.dsalert.org/dsa-subscription/online-edition

AQUILA

RNI NO. DELENG/2009/31195

ERADICATE SMELLS AND AIR POLLUTION QUICKLY, ECONOMICALLY AND SUSTAINABLY! A range of high capacity wall mounted Ozone generators for all PUBLIC areas Fast, eﬀective, safe

radicate smells and air pollution quickly, economically and sustainably with nature’s own powerful air puriﬁer – OZONE. Watership Down Technologies Aquila Series of Ozone generators, powerfully oxidise all smells within minutes. If left on overnight, it will eradicate bacteria and viruses leaving rooms with Pure, Clean Air ready for the next day, all automatically. AQUILA Speciﬁcations: Ozone control:

Fully adjustable O output

Control:

Automatic on ﬂow

Cabinet:

Stainless steel

Dimensions:

3gm - 460 x 160 x 220 mm 5gm - 460 x 160 x 220 mm 10gm - 580 x 260 x 280 mm (w x d x h) 5.4, 5.5, 8.5 KG

Exclusive Distributors in India

For trade queries: ceo@pawitra.com

> May 2018

Weight:

> ISSUE 08

3, 5, 10 Grams per hour

> VOLUME 9

Ozone output:

Ozone is the strongest available air cleaner and disinfectant for treating odours. The Aquila generator uses the Corona discharge system, with ceramics rather than coils. These produce a higher ozone concentration in the 3 standard sizes 3g/h, 5g/h and 10g/h. You could install two or more units in parallel increasing output if required. Allowed to run remotely during the day in public areas such as dormitories, the Aquila will keep smells and odours at bay. Then, when a deep clean is needed when the occupants have left, this can be done easily using the supplied remote control. Filling the rooms with ozone will mean all surfaces will be disinfected by killing oﬀ all pathogens. The Aquila is ideal for school classrooms, oﬃces, restaurants, cafés, shops and general public areas. Depending on volume/size of a room, the 10grm model will look after up to 1000 M . The Aquila can be used in multiples to cover larger rooms.