Accelerating innovation for the green transition - Insights from the METI-OECD workshop

Accelerating innovation for the green transition Insights from the METI-OECD workshop May 2023

Agency for Natural Resources and Ennergy

This document presents insights from the joint METI-OECD Workshop of 24-26 May 2023 on recent country policy measures undertaken in support innovation for the green transition. The workshop was co-hosted by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the OECD’s Working Party on Innovation and Technology Policy (TIP).

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Table of contents Executive summary ............................................................................................................................... 3 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 5 Green innovation in times of strategic competition ............................................................................ 5 Strategic technologies at the core of STI policy agendas for enhanced resilience .............................. 5 What role for innovation in tackling the climate and biodiversity emergencies? ................................ 7 Strategic STI priorities of the European Union, Japan, Korea and the United States on green innovation and key technologies........................................................................................................... 8 European Union ................................................................................................................................... 8 Japan .................................................................................................................................................. 13 Korea.................................................................................................................................................. 18 United States ...................................................................................................................................... 20 Mobilising citizens, industry and research institutions for green innovation ................................ 22 Co-creation initiatives involving citizens .......................................................................................... 23 Industry-led and company initiatives ................................................................................................. 27 Research organisations and innovation networks .............................................................................. 29 Annex. Agenda of the METI-TIP workshop of May 2023 ............................................................... 32 References .............................................................................................................................................39

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Executive summary

Accelerating the green transition has become a primary focus in science, technology, and innovation (STI) policies, involving investments in green STI to attain net-zero emissions targets while addressing environmental degradation and biodiversity loss. Concurrently, the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical tensions have underscored vulnerabilities in critical technology supply chains like semiconductors and raw materials, prompting heightened investments in key areas like artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing, biotechnology, semiconductors, and telecommunications.

Green innovation efforts primarily focus on net-zero technologies Innovation policy action to support the green transition has primarily focused on initiatives geared towards technology development and deployment to reduce carbon emissions as exemplified by efforts in the European Union, Japan, Korea and the United States.

The EU’s European Green Deal, approved in 2020, places emphasis on the role of research and innovation for the transition. Actions include the following: •

The EU’s current research and innovation framework programme (Horizon Europe, 2021-27) dedicates EUR 33 billion (i.e. 35% of the total available funding) to research and innovation to tackle green transition related challenges. Four out of the five EU missions tackle climate change and environmental protection.

•

The Green Deal Industrial Plan of 2023 aims to enhance the scaling up of the EU’s manufacturing capacity for net-zero technologies. It foresees a range of measures, such as streamlining regulations and speeding up permitting processes for green manufacturing projects, expanding the use of regulatory sandboxes for technology testing, and building the necessary skills through ‘Net-Zero Industry Academies’ aimed at up-skilling and re-skilling 100,000 workers in specific technology areas.

Japan’s Green Growth Strategy, established in 2020, aims to support industry in decarbonisation efforts through a mix of R&D grant funding, tax incentives and regulatory reform. It identifies 14 priority sectors, encompassing both renewable energy and carbon-intensive sectors.

Japan’s Green Innovation Fund of USD 20 billion (JPN 2.8 trillion) supports R&D and demonstration projects in those sectors. Furthermore, the Green Transition Promotion Act of 2022 introduces several financial measures for the green transition, such as green transition bonds and a carbon-pricing mechanism.

In Korea, the Green New Deal, with a budget of USD 45.6 billion (KRW 61 trillion) until 2025, is one of the three pillars of the Korean New Deal (later re-branded Korean New Deal 2.0) - the economic stimulus package launched during the COVID-19 pandemic. The First National Master Plan for Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth, published in 2023, establishes a carbon-neutral technology innovation roadmap, including 100 technologies in 17 fields, and a strategy to foster public-private partnerships for developing them.

In the United States, the Long-Term Climate Strategy, published in 2021, is implemented through a variety of initiatives, including: •

Investments in R&D for a portfolio of game-changing innovations, such as the Energy Earthshots – a challenge programme to accelerate breakthrough innovations in the field of clean energy– and other dedicated programmes targeting the transport, agriculture and other sectors.

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Demonstration and early technology deployment initiatives. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) of 2021 provided USD 21.5 billion for clean energy demonstration projects (e.g. in clean hydrogen and energy storage), and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022 allocated USD 5.8 billion for projects targeting emissions reduction in energy intensive industries such as steel, concrete and chemical production.

•

The manufacturing, deployment, and adoption of available technologies is meant be accelerated through regulations and financial incentives of variety of legislative acts, including notably USD 370 billion of incentives (incl. tax incentives, grants and loan guarantees) provided by the IRA to deploy commercial and emerging clean energy technologies across the economy.

Biodiversity protection is also targeted by some STI programmes Countries have adopted policies to reach the goals set out in the UN Kunming-Montreal Biodiversity Framework (2022) – a global agreement adopted during the 2022 United Nations Biodiversity Conference – to protect critical areas and restore biodiversity. Research and innovation play an important role. Examples of such policy initiatives include the following: •

The European Biodiversity Partnership, launched in 2021 with a budget of EUR 800 million over 7 years, brings together 80 partners from 40 countries to promote pan-European research on biodiversity to improve the monitoring of biodiversity and ecosystem services, and support the development and deployment of nature-based solutions.

•

The National Biodiversity Future Centre in Italy, founded in 2022 with a budget of approximately USD 372 million until 2025 (EUR 350 million, mostly from the NextGenerationEU funds), connects 26 universities, 7 public and 11 private research institutes and 6 companies across the country to leverage diverse expertise to develop frontier research in the field of biodiversity.

While programmes to support R&D and innovation in the field of biodiversity are widespread across OECD countries, they remain relatively minor in the overall STI policy agenda for the green transition in most countries.

Innovation partnerships are critical to advance green innovation Many STI solutions for the green transition require the collaborative efforts of universities, research organisations, businesses, public authorities, and citizens. Such engagement ensures the expertise and capacity to scale solutions are leveraged. Citizen engagement also ensures innovation is people-centred and increases the potential uptake of solutions.

Citizen science initiatives can speed up research and enable large scale projects by engaging citizens in the collection of data in their local environments (e.g. biodiversity sightings). Citizen engagement is particularly useful in innovation projects tackling local challenges. For instance, Aspern.mobil Lab, led by the Vienna University of Technology, engages a range of actors including citizens in the development and testing of new sustainable mobility solutions in the neighbourhood of aspern Seestadt in Vienna.

Research and innovation networks and initiatives led by companies, research institutions and citizens are also working to advance biodiversity. Technology-enabled solutions in this field include animal-friendly designs for wind and water turbine or technologies to support biodiversity mapping and pollution monitoring through sensors, geographic information systems (GIS), drones and other autonomous vehicles.

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Introduction Accelerating green innovation is a key priority of STI policy agendas across OECD countries, as the urgency to tackle climate change, environmental degradation, and biodiversity loss is mounting.

Research and innovation in areas such as renewable energy, green mobility and technology-enabled approaches to protect biodiversity are critical to meet net-zero-emissions targets set by the 2015 Paris Agreement and successfully transition toward green economies and societies.

At the same time, the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and geopolitical tensions with the People’s Republic of China have highlighted the vulnerabilities of interdependent value chains in key strategic technologies, such as semiconductors and critical raw materials needed for producing green technologies.

In this context, countries are adopting STI strategies and implementing a range of policy measures to: 1) support the development and deployment of green innovations; and 2) strengthen domestic STI capacities in core technologies (including green but going beyond, such as AI, robotics and biotechnology), deemed critical to ensure long-term economic competitiveness and national security (OECD, 2023[1]).

This document presents an overview of STI policy approaches implemented by the European Union, Japan, Korea and the United States to support innovation for the green transition and to strengthen STI capacities in key strategic technologies. It also discusses the importance of engaging a range of actors, including citizens, researchers and business, in the development and diffusion of innovations for the green transition, building on specific examples.

This document summarises key discussions of the joint METI-OECD workshop “What makes cocreation work for transitions?”, which took place in Paris on 24-26 May 2023 and was co-hosted

by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the OECD’s Working Party on Innovation and Technology Policy (TIP).

The remainder of the document is structured as follows: Section 1 contextualises the current STI policy focus on supporting green innovation in an era of geopolitical tensions and strategic competition in key technology areas. Section 2 explores the measures supporting of green innovation as part of recent green transition strategies of Japan, the European Union, the United States and Korea. Section 3 presents a number of initiatives that showcase the important roles that different actors play in green innovation, including citizens and businesses.

Finally, the agenda of the event can be found in the Annex. More detailed information about countries’ STI policies for green can be found at the EC/OECD STIP Compass portal on “STI policies for net zero”.

Green innovation in times of strategic competition This section discusses (1) the recent shift in STI policy agendas towards enhancing systems’ resilience by strengthening STI capabilities and reducing dependencies in key strategic technology areas, including in the field of green but also beyond; and (2) the role of STI in achieving green development goals of climate neutrality targets and biodiversity protection.

Strategic technologies at the core of STI policy agendas for enhanced resilience The COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine have highlighted the vulnerabilities of global value chains. The pandemic disrupted supply chains on goods ranging from face masks to semiconductors, leading to critical shortages in many OECD countries. The war in Ukraine has exposed disruption vulnerabilities in the supply of Russian hydrocarbons and

6| Ukrainian grains that engendered unprecedented increases in global gas and food prices, with destabilising knock-on economic effects (OECD, 2023[1]).

Both crises have amplified previously existing concerns about a heavy reliance on nondiversified supply chains, particularly in key strategic technologies and raw materials needed to produce them (Figure 1). This, jointly with the growing ascendancy of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter ‘China’) in frontier technologies and raising tensions between the United States and China, has increased debates around the importance of “technology sovereignty” and “strategic autonomy” – which refer to a polity’s capacity to act strategically and autonomously in an era of intensifying global technology-based competition (OECD, 2023[1]).

Figure 1. Flows of raw materials and their supply risks to selected technologies & sectors in the EU

Source: Bobba, et al. (2020[2]), Critical raw materials for strategic technologies and sectors in the EU – A foresight study, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2873/58081

In this context, many countries have recently introduced initiatives to strengthen domestic STI capabilities and reduce international technology dependencies (Table 1). Green technologies (and associated critical materials) to support the transition to net-zero carbon emissions are among the areas considered of strategic importance, but certainly not the only ones. Strategic technology areas often also include artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, advanced manufacturing (e.g. robotics, industrial IoT), advanced materials science, biotechnology, micro- and nano-electronics, semiconductors, sensors and connectivity/telecommunications technologies. These technologies are deemed critical for future economic competitiveness and national security (OECD, 2023[1]).

Section 2 provides further insights on the approaches implemented by the European Union, Japan, Korea and the United States to supporting those key strategic technologies.

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Table 1. Selected recent policy initiatives to strengthen technological strategic autonomy Country / Region China European Union United States

Initiative Made in China 2025; 14th Five-Year Plan; Dual Circulation Strategy; Military-Civil Fusion; Government Guidance Funds; China Standards 2035; Belt and Road Initiative NextGenerationEU; New Industrial Strategy for Europe; New European Innovation Agenda; Important Projects of Common European Interest; European Chips Act; EU-US Trade and Technology Council CHIPS and Science Act; Inflation Reduction Act; Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act; Quad; Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity; Group of Seven (G7) Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment

Source: OECD (2023[1]), OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Outlook 2023: Enabling Transitions in Times of Disruption, https://doi.org/10.1787/0b55736e-en

What role for innovation in tackling the climate and biodiversity emergencies?

The green transition can be defined as the shift towards environmentally friendly economies and societies. Successfully advancing on the green transition requires investments in R&D and the adoption and scaling of new technologies and innovative solutions to tackle climate change and environmental degradation. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that over 50% of the reduction in energy-related CO2 emissions needed to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 is to come from technologies that are not yet commercially available (IEA, 2021[3]), requiring a major acceleration in low-carbon innovation if the targets set out in the 2015 Paris Agreement are to be met (OECD, 2023[1]).

Innovation strategies and investments tackling the green transition have largely focused on accelerating the development and deployment of clean energy technologies. Technologies to transition to renewable energy sources, improving energy efficiency and storage, and greening the energy-intensive sectors of the economy (e.g. cement, steel, chemicals) are central to reach netzero targets, given that the burning of fossil fuels for power generation and transportation is the largest contributor to CO2 emissions (accounting for 2/3 of the total in 2019), mainly associated with the industry and building sectors (IEA, 2023[4]; Cervantes et al., 2023[5]).

The green transition also requires innovation in other domains, including to respond to the challenge of biodiversity loss. Biodiversity – which refers to the variety of living species on Earth, including plants, animals, bacteria and fungi (United Nations, 1992[6])– is essential for sustaining economic activities and human well-being. It provides vital ecosystem services, including food and clean water, flood protection, nutrient cycling, water filtration and pollination. Yet, biodiversity is declining at an unprecedented rate as a result of resource overexploitation, climate change, pollution and invasive species (OECD, 2021[7]). The global population of wild species has fallen by 60% over the last 40 years, and over one million plant and animal species – constituting a quarter of the world’s species – are at risk of extinction (Brondizio et al., 2019[8]).

Climate change and biodiversity loss are intrinsically intertwined, each exacerbating the impacts of the other. The adverse effects of climate change, such as extreme weather events, longer periods of droughts and wildfires, contribute to a rapid decline in species, with a current estimate of one million species at risk of extinction. Conversely, biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation reduce the natural resilience of ecosystems, undermining their ability to absorb and regulate greenhouse gases. This cycle amplifies the severity of both climate change and accelerates the loss of biodiversity. For effective mitigation and adaptation strategies, both challenges have to be addressed jointly (European Commission, 2021[9]).

STI can play an important role in supporting biodiversity efforts. STI applications in the field of biodiversity, as illustrated by specific examples presented in section 0, include: remote sensing technologies to gather data about the Earth’s physical, chemical and biological ecosystems, map protected areas, and monitor changes; the implementation of technologies for impact mitigation and ecosystem restoration, such as vertical farming and precision agriculture; clean energy

8| technologies that incorporate functionalities to preserve the fauna, such as wind turbines equipped with sensors to adjust the motor speed when birds are close or fish-friendly hydro-electricity turbines; as well as financial innovations (fintech), such as digitised biodiversity credits (Figure 2). Research is also currently underway in the field of biotechnology to reduce pollution, such as with bacterial enzymes to break down PET-plastic (Yoshida et al., 2016[10]), or producing synthetic jellyfish to break down chemicals and protect marine environment after toxic spills (Kachel, 2019[11]).

Figure 2. Examples of STI applications that could help tackle the biodiversity crisis

Source: Presentation by Edward Perry (Policy Analyst, Biodiversity, OECD Environment Directorate) at the METIOECD workshop.

Innovation policy action to support the green transition has gain central importance in OECD countries’ STI strategies. Green transition goals represented 23.8% of the corpus of the STI strategies of 21 OECD countries in place in 2021 (OECD/DSTI/TIP(2023)11). Major topics are green energy, sustainable industries and clean mobility. The above-mentioned review found strategies focus on alternative energy generation and reducing CO2 emissions (7.5%). They also discuss clean mobility and sustainable industries (6.2%). STI strategies reflected to a lesser extent other aspects, such as biodiversity, circular economy, water conservation and management.

Strategic STI priorities of the European Union, Japan, Korea and the United States on green innovation and key technologies This section presents an overview of recent STI policy actions undertaken by the European Union, Japan, Korea and the United States to support green innovation and to strengthen domestic STI capabilities in key strategic technologies. The EC/OECD STIP Compass portal on “STI policies for net zero” (https://stip.oecd.org/stip/net-zero-portal) provides more details on countries’ STI policies for reaching net zero.

European Union STI policies under the European Green Deal The European Green Deal is a package of policy initiatives approved in 2020 aimed at reaching climate-neutrality in the EU by 2050 (European Commission, 2023[12]), a goal which is legally

9 binding as per the European Climate Law of 2021. The policy mix of the European Green Deal includes a range of legislative acts, targets, funding initiatives, collaboration platforms and other support programmes.

Research and innovation for the green transition is a strategic priority of the European Green Deal and is targeted through multiple initiatives and instruments as described in the sections below.

These support the development and diffusion of low-carbon technologies, as well as R&D and innovation activities for biodiversity preservation and restoration.

Supporting STI for the transition to net-zero The EU’s Framework Programmes for Research and Innovation have targeted significant support to R&D and innovation activities for the green transition. The ‘Horizon 2020’ framework programme (2014-2020) included a ‘Green Deal’ call in 2020, under which the European Commission has made USD 1.07 billion (EUR 1 billion) available to 73 projects. The ‘Horizon Europe’ programme (2021-2027) includes a new wave of support for green research and innovation in areas such as transport (including batteries), clean hydrogen, low-carbon steel, circular biobased sectors, environment and biodiversity, with more than 35% of available funding (out of a total of approx. USD 101 billion (EUR 95.5 billion) being allocated to address climate objectives (Regulation (EU) 2021/695, 2021[13]).

Also under Horizon Europe, the EU Missions aim at mobilising public and private actors to bring concrete solutions to pressing societal challenges. Two (out of five) of the missions deal directly with climate change. The ‘Climate-Neutral and Smart Cities’ mission supports innovation actions in diversity fields, ranging from zero-emission mobility, to urban greening and re-naturing and clean energy districts. The ‘Adaptation to Climate Change’ mission supports the testing and demonstrating of solutions for increasing resilience to the effects of climate change. Some of the calls have focused, for instance, on solutions to enhance the climate resilience of the agriculture and forestry sector, and the protection of critical infrastructure from the effects of climate change.

Focusing on the transition of industry towards net-zero carbon emissions, the Green Deal Industrial Plan of 2023 aims to enhance the competitiveness of Europe’s net-zero industry. comprises two legislative proposals of the European Commission: •

The Critical Raw Materials Act seeks to ensure EU’s access to secure, diversified, affordable and sustainable supply of critical raw materials, including those needed to develop green technologies.

•

The Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA) aims at scaling up the manufacturing capacity of strategic net-zero technologies in the EU, to meet at least 40% of the EU’s annual deployment needs by 2030. The Act supports strategic net-zero technologies (see Figure 3) that are commercially available or soon to enter the market, contribute significantly to reducing GHG emissions and currently rely on imports of raw or intermediate goods from outside the EU. Regarding instruments, the NZIA does not provide for additional funding (relying on existing funding tools and EU Member States’ capacities), but foresees accelerated permitting procedures to lower the administrative burden for net-zero manufacturing projects (e.g. through national onestop shops and legally binding maximum duration of permitting procedures), a European legal basis for regulatory sandboxes to help test new technologies, and the enhancement of sustainability and resilience criteria1 in procurement procedures and auctions to help boost demand for those technologies. It also foresees the creation of the ‘Net-Zero Europe Platform’ to facilitate exchange between the European Commission and EU Member States on financing for net-zero strategic projects; and the ‘European Hydrogen Bank’, which shall implement an auction system for renewable hydrogen production to support producers through a fixed price payment per kg of hydrogen produced for a maximum of 10 years of operation and streamline existing financial instruments. Finally, it foresees the creation of ‘Net-Zero Industry

10 | Academies’ aimed at up-skilling and re-skilling 100,000 workers in dedicated technology areas, such as hydrogen and solar technologies.

Figure 3. Strategic net-zero technologies in the EU Net-Zero Industry Act

Source: European Commission (2023[14]), EU Net-Zero Industry Act: Making the EU the home of clean tech industries, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/FS_23_1667

REPowerEU in another EU initiative to accelerate and channel green innovation by decreasing the EU’s dependency on imports of fossil fuels from Russia. Next to activities on increasing gas reserves and saving energy, the plan is set to also channel nearly all (95%) of its approx. USD 320 billion (EUR 300 billion, of which EUR 72 billion in grants, and EUR 225 billion in loans) to speed up and scale up the clean energy transition, including with regard to hydrogen infrastructure, biomethane, solar photovoltaic, and enhancements of the power grid. In this context, two major cross-border innovation and infrastructure projects, so-called Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI), in the hydrogen sector were approved, IPCEI Hy2Tech and IPCEI Hy2Use, bringing together approx. USD 11.3 billion (EUR 10.6 billion) of state aid from EU Member States and approx. USD 17.1 billion (EUR 16 billion) of private investments, to build a hydrogen value chain, incl. the generation of hydrogen, fuel cells, storage, transportation and distribution end-users applications.

Other innovation-related activities undertaken under the umbrella of the European Green Deal include the following: •

The European Research Area (ERA) industrial technology roadmap for low-carbon technologies in energy intensive industries, published in April 2022, provides a list of key emerging low-carbon technologies for energy-intensive industries (such as steel, cement and chemicals) and their level of maturity. It also outlines scenarios for the transition of such industries and elaborates on R&I needs, including public and private R&I investments, green patenting activity and enabling conditions, including regulatory framework, valorisation and standardisation aspects (Figure 4) (European Commission, 2022[15]).

•

The Task Force for demonstrating climate-neutral industries by 2030 is a follow-up to the first key action identified by the ERA roadmap. It was created in October 2022 and has the mandate to map relevant innovation demonstration projects supported at EU-level and assess potential gaps.

•

During the Global Clean Energy Action Forum held in Pittsburgh (United States) in September 2022, the Commission reiterated its support to the Clean Energy Technologies Demonstration Challenge and will contribute to it with over approx. USD 29.9 billion (EUR 28 billion) by 2027 to advance clean energy innovation and deployment, mainly in hard-to-abate sectors, through the Horizon Europe framework programme for R&I (see above), the Innovation Fund, a dedicated funding programme for the demonstration of innovative low-carbon technologies

 11 financed by the revenues of the EU’s Emissions Trading System, and InvestEU, a programme bringing together existing EU financial instruments.

Figure 4. ERA Roadmap: Key findings, related actions and implementation

Source: Presentation by Angelo Wille (Deputy Head of Unit, DG Research & Innovation, European Commission) “Bringing R&I results for green industrial transition to the market – From co-creation of an EU industrial technology roadmap for low-carbon technologies to a report on (EU) demonstration projects for climate neutral energy-intensive industries” at the METI-OECD workshop.

STI measures to support the EU Biodiversity Strategy The EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030, published in 2020, constitutes another core part of the European Green Deal. Some of the main initiatives under the strategy are the enlargement of the EU-wide network of legally Protected areas (minimum 30% of land and sea, respectively), the EU nature restoration plan (enshrined in the Nature Restoration Law, passed in July 2023), which sets targets to restore at least 20% of the EU’s degraded land and sea areas by 2030, in line with the CBD’s Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework. However, research and innovation also play role in tackling the biodiversity challenge, with the strategy noting the importance of intensifying research and innovation activities (European Commission, 2020[16]). Specific EU initiatives to support research and innovation in the field of biodiversity include the following: •

The European Biodiversity Partnership (Biodiversa+) brings together 80 partners from 40 countries to promote pan-European research on biodiversity with the aim of bridging the gap between science, policy and practice, improving the monitoring of biodiversity and ecosystem services, and supporting the development and deployment of nature-based solutions (Figure 5).

Launched in 2021 and expected to run for 7 years, it has a total budget of approx. USD 853 million (EUR 800 million), including member-state contributions. Over this time, the Partnership plans to launch six co-funded joint research calls with an estimated budget of around USD 267 million (EUR 250 million).

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Figure 5. European Partnership on Biodiversity: working areas and main objectives

Notes: NbS stands for nature-based solutions.

Source: Eggermont et al. (2021[17]), Strategic Research & Innovation Agenda, https://www.biodiversa.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2022/12/strategic-research-innovation-agenda.pdf

•

As part of the Horizon 2020 Green Deal call of 2020 mentioned above, more than approx. USD 85 million (EUR 80 million) were invested explicitly in restoring biodiversity and ecosystem services with funding allocated to four projects: MERLIN (ecosystem restoration in freshwater), REST-COAST (low-carbon coastal ecosystem restoration and disaster reduction), SUPERB (forest ecosystem restoration), and WaterLANDS (water-based solutions for carbon storage). Similarly, Horizon Europe’s 2024 call will include a part on ‘Biodiversity and ecosystem services’ (approx. EUR 111 million) under its Cluster 6: “Food, bioeconomy, natural resources, agriculture and environment”.

•

Two (out of five) EU Missions, funded by the Horizon Europe programme, target biodiversity: the mission “A Soil Deal for Europe”, which has the main goal of establishing 100 living labs to co-create, test and demonstrate solutions to achieve healthy soils by 2030; and the mission “Restore our Ocean and Waters by 2030”.

Measures to support key strategic technologies The European Commission defined key enabling technologies already in 2009 as ‘knowledgeintensive and characterized by high R&D intensity, rapid innovation cycles, high capital expenditure and highly skilled labour (…). They enable innovation in processes, goods and services and are of systemic importance for the whole economy´ (European Commission, 2009[18]). In 2018, the European High Level Strategy Group on Industrial Technologies defined the following six key technologies, which the EU’s R&I support prioritises: advanced manufacturing, advanced

 13 materials, life-science technologies, micro/nano-electronics and photonics, artificial intelligence and security and connectivity technologies (STOA, 2021[19]; European Commission, 2023[20]).

With the ‘Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform’ (STEP), the EU is channelling and repurposing funds from existing programmes2 and adding approx. USD 171 million (EUR 160 million) to support investments in companies contributing to preserving ‘a European edge’ on critical technologies, including deep and digital technologies3, clean technologies4 and biotechnologies5 (European Commission, 2022[21]).

In addition to the measures described in section 2.2 (the Green Deal Industrial Plan, Net-Zero Industry Act, the Critical Raw Materials Act, and REPowerEU), specific initiatives focusing on key technologies include notably the European Chips Act (2022), which aims to strengthen Europe’s research and manufacturing capacities in the field of semiconductors and address skills shortages in this area, among others. The Chips Act would result in additional public and private investments of more than EUR 15 billion, complementing existing EU and member-state research and innovation initiatives in semiconductors, and reaching a total of approx. USD 46 billion (EUR 43 billion) by 2030.

Japan Soaring global energy prices have accelerated the movement towards decarbonisation of Japan’s economy, which is currently heavily dependent on external energy sources (Figure 6) and relies on carbon-intensive industries (e.g. steel and chemicals). The government of Japan is actively seeking to transform its economy by supporting the development and diffusion of specific technologies for decarbonisation, such as hydrogen-based energy and carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS), and by deploying financing and incentives-based policies to promote R&D and innovation for the green transition, with the aim of achieving the ambitious goal of carbon neutrality by 2050 (Figure 7).

Figure 6. Energy self-sufficiency rate of major countries

Source: Presentation by Yasushi Nozawa (Director, Innovation and Industry-University Collaboration Division, Industrial Science, Technology and Environment Policy Bureau, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) at the METIOECD workshop; data source: IEA database.

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Figure 7. Japan’s emission reduction pathway

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Source: Presentation by Müge Adalet McGowan (Senior Economist, Country Studies: Japan, OECD Economics Department) the METI-OECD workshop; data sources: IEA World Energy Balances database; OECD Greenhouse Gas Emissions database and OECD calculations.

The Green Growth Strategy In 2020, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in collaboration with other ministries and agencies formulated the Green Growth Strategy – an industrial policy that that sets a national vision and goals to create a positive cycle of economic growth and environmental protection, in order to achieve the ambitious goal of carbon neutrality by 2050 (Figure 7). The strategy aims to support industry and induce private investments in decarbonisation efforts, through a policy mix of grant funding for R&D and technology demonstration projects, tax incentives for capital investments and R&D, policy guidance on green finance, regulatory reforms (e.g. in areas such as hydrogen, offshore wind power, and mobility) and measures to support international collaboration, including both with developed and emerging countries, on innovation policy, standardisation and rule-making (METI, 2021[22]).

The strategy identifies 14 priority sectors, which include both renewable energy industries to power a low-carbon economy through clean electricity, as well as industries that need to be decarbonised, such as the transportation, manufacturing and building sectors. For each of these fields, goals have been formulated (see Figure 8) and sector-specific action and implementation plans for 2050 have been developed, that detailed the role of public support and private action throughout different innovation phases, namely R&D (government support with private complementary investment), demonstration (public-private partnership), scale-up (public procurement and regulation to incentivise scale up) and commercialisation (purely private) (METI, 2021[22]).

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Figure 8. Priority fields in Japan's Green Growth Strategy and their respective targets

Source: Adapted from NEDO (2023[23]), Green Japan, Green Innovation - Working toward a carbon-neutral future, https://www.nedo.go.jp/content/100957298.pdf

The Green Innovation Fund, established in 2021, is one of the main instruments created to implement the Green Growth Strategy. With a cumulative budget of approx. USD 20 billion (JPN 2.8 trillion)6, it disburses grants to support R&D and demonstration projects in these priority fields, where policy effects are significant, and long-term continuous support is required to realise public implementation. Projects must: i) be long-term (up to 10 years) projects and be ineligible for other, more short-term support measures, ii) have an average size of at least USD 140 million (JPY 20 billion), ii) include innovative and fundamental R&D elements, iv) be focused on technology

16 | implementation towards realising ambitious decarbonisation targets by 2030, and v) be mainly implemented by companies capable of carrying out the entire implementation process, in collaboration with universities and/or research institutions, with SME participation being encouraged. Examples of projects supported so far include hydrogen use in steelmaking and carbon capture projects, smart mobility projects and next-generation industrial production of ships, aircraft or solar cells (METI, 2023[24]). The decisions to finance projects are made by field-specific working groups, according to the governance framework illustrated in Figure 9.

Figure 9. Governance and project evaluation of the Green Innovation Fund

Source: NEDO (2023[23]), Green Japan, Green Innovation - Working toward a carbon-neutral future, https://www.nedo.go.jp/content/100957298.pdf

Japan also aims at playing a leading role in shaping the green transition on a global scale, in collaboration with international partners. This includes bilateral cooperation, such as with the United States on carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies and next generation nuclear reactors (METI, 2022[25]), as well as multilateral formats. Examples of the latter are the Asia Zero Emissions Community, in which Japan support projects of renewable energy, energy saving, hydrogen, ammonia and CCUS across the Asia-Pacific region with up to USD 8 billion until 2030; and the Asia Energy Transition Initiative (AETI), in which Japan supports ASEAN countries in the development of energy transition technologies with USD 10 billion, along with capacity building, knowledge sharing and policy advisory activities.

The Green Transition Promotion Act In 2023, Japan has passed a number of ‘Basic Policies’ (general policy directions) and developed strategies for the green transition (GX) in order to achieve the ambitious goal of carbon neutrality by 2050 (see Figure 7). The most recent are the ‘Basic Policy for the Realization of GX’ (February 2023, which provided the overall framework and direction for the green transition, and the

 17 subsequent “Act on Promotion of a Smooth Transition to a Decarbonized Growth-Oriented Economic Structure” , commonly known as the ‘GX Promotion Act’ (July 2023), which provided the legal basis and tools for implementing green transitions policies, including a number of financial measures to support the green transition, such as: •

Issuing green transformation bonds [approx. USD 140 billion (JPY 20 trillion)] in 2023 to support investments in non-fossil energy technologies that are still in development, such as carbon capture, use and storage (CCUS) or hydrogen, with the aim of spurring private investment through regulation in order to reach a total of approx. USD 1 trillion (JPY 150 trillion) of investment over ten years.

•

Introducing a ‘pro-growth carbon pricing concept’, including: o

Levying a carbon surcharge on importers of fossil fuels, in proportion to the amount of CO2 that their imports contain, starting in 2028 (with the exact formula still to be decided)

o

Introducing a nation-wide mandatory emissions trading system, i.e. an organised trading of government certificates that allow trading emissions (‘carbon credits’) between companies, which had so far been traded on a voluntary basis without a centralised trading mechanism. The system will be trialled in 2023 and fully applied from 2026, with the exception of electricity generators, for which it will apply as of 2033.

National Biodiversity Strategy Japan has also taken action to support innovation to preserve biodiversity. With regard to its strategic policy on biodiversity, Japan has been closely involved in international efforts, developing and implementing its 4th National Biodiversity Strategy for 2012-2020 following the adoption of the Aichi Biodiversity Targets by the UN Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) conference held Aichi, Japan, in 2010, and establishing the Japan Biodiversity Fund to support CBD members in revising and implementing their National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans. While Japan exceeded Aichi Target 11 (conserving at least 17% of the terrestrial and inland water, and 10% of the coastal and marine areas), on a global level, however, none of the Aichi Targets were achieved in full (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2020[26]).

In response to the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KM-GBF), adopted during the 2022 United Nations Biodiversity Conference, Japan developed its National Biodiversity Strategy 2023-2030, which highlights the need for coordinated efforts to address the “two environmental crises” of biodiversity loss and climate change. As with Japan’s other strategies in the framework of the green transition, described above, the government is actively involving the private sector, for example through disclosure requirements and facilitating investments with specific emphasis on environmental issues. With regard using technology for biodiversity purposes, the strategy emphasises the use of monitoring tools, as well as the potential of smart agriculture technologies to aid in conservation.

Measures to support key strategic technologies The Cabinet Office of Japan selected its key enabling technologies in its 2022 Innovation Strategy, which include: artificial intelligence, biotechnology, quantum technology, semiconductors, and materials science (Cabinet Office of Japan, 2022[27]). The 2023 Innovation Strategy reaffirmed strengthened support for quantum technology, generative AI and nuclear fusion energy (Cabinet Office of Japan, 2023[28]). Support for such technologies is implemented through existing crosstechnology programmes such as:

18 | •

An endowment for universities of approx. USD 70 billion (JPN 10 trillion), announced in 2021, to develop research facilities and recruit both young and world-leading researchers, with funds to be distributed to universities on a competitive basis

•

the Moonshot R&D Program (201 ), under which Japan’s research institutions are tasked to develop new technologies and collaborate internationally with R&D support of approx. USD 676 million (JPN 100 billion) in pursuit of ten goals tied to important societal challenges, such as ‘Cool Earth & Clean Earth’, “To Age 100 without Health Concerns” or “Fault-tolerant universal quantum computer.”

•

The ‘Key and Advanced Technology R&D through Cross Community Collaboration Program’ (K Program), developed in 2022, which promotes 50 R&D and demonstration projects over 5 years, focusing on 23 multi-purpose technologies with security implications – such as relating to disinformation, digital infrastructure, and technologies containing rare minerals – through two funds of approx. USD 1.7 billion (JPN 250 million) each, administered by the Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST) and NEDO, respectively.

•

The Cross-ministerial Strategic Innovation Promotion Program (SIP), in its second phase since 2018, with approx. USD 200 million (approx. JPN 30 billion) annual budget available, promotes joint interdisciplinary R&D projects Japan’s research agencies in twelve fields ‘necessary to drastically improve productivity’, such cyberspace, automated driving, quantum technologies.

Individual strategies for specific technologies set up by the Japanese government include the “Strategy for Semiconductors and the Digital Industry” (METI, 2021[29]), the “Strategy of Quantum Future Development” (Cabinet Office of Japan, 2023[30]). Next-generation semiconductors are a strong focus. As part of the “Basic Semiconductor Revitalization Strategy” (METI, 2023[31]), a new R&D organisation, the Leading-edge Semiconductor Technology Center, was set up in 2022, as an open collaborative R&D platform, with inputs from various academic institutions and national research labs in Japan to conduct R&D for designing technologies as well as for equipment and materials related to the new generation of semiconductors.

Korea Korea’s green STI policies In 2020, Korea’s government announced it ambition to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, laying out its vision with the 2050 Carbon Neutral Strategy. Since then, many policies and strategies have been adopted to advance on that goal.

The Green New Deal (GND) was one of the three pillars of the Korean New Deal, announced in April 2020 as a stimulus package to lessen the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, the government rebranded the initiative as Korean New Deal 2.0. It consists of four pillars7 and foresees approx. USD 45.6 billion (KRW 61 trillion) of public investments from the national budget until 2025.

The Framework Act on Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth for Climate Change, in force since March 2022, enshrined the targets into law, and foresaw the establishment of a Korea Climate Action Fund. The Presidential Committee for Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth Commission (set up in 2021 as “20 0 Carbon Neutral Committee” and rebranded through the 2022 Framework Act) set new policy directions and was set up to monitor various climate policies, which include notably the following: •

The National Green Growth Strategy for Carbon Neutrality (2022) includes four main policy orientations: 1) responsible carbon neutrality through concrete and efficient solutions; 2) innovative carbon neutrality and green growth led by the private sector; 3) carbon neutrality

 19 led by the co-operation of all members of society; and active participation to carbon neutrality leading the global market and the international community. Based on these four orientations, 12 key projects were defined, and specific policy directions and responsible departments were specified.

•

the Strategy for Green Growth Technology Innovation, launched by the Commission in 2022, has three main orientations: technological innovation toward carbon neutrality mainly through private-sector-led missions; enhanced investment in rapid and flexible carbon neutral R&D; and pre-emptive building of infrastructure for innovative technology development.

•

the First National Master Plan for Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth, published in 2023, establishes a carbon-neutral technology innovation roadmap, selects 100 key carbon-neutral technologies tailored to Korea in 17 fields8 and develops a comprehensive strategy to foster public-private partnerships in developing climate technology.

•

The First Climate Technology Master Plan was adopted in December 2022 by the Ministry of Science and ICT to coordinate with 27 other plans and action plans related to climate change technology development. The Master Plan has adopted 15 strategies under the following three strategic directions: reducing greenhouse gas emissions, adapting to climate change, and establishing an innovation ecosystem for climate response. One of the initiatives developed under this Plan is the 2050 Carbon Neutral Energy Technology Roadmap (2022-2050), which identifies 197 key energy technologies in 13 technological areas. It provides guidance on how to develop them, how to cooperate with international partners, and how to foster human resources in the short-, mid-, and long run.

A range of other strategies have been recently adopted, focusing on innovation in specific sectors (e.g. Strategy for agri-food carbon neutrality) or technologies (e.g. the 2030 K-battery development strategy, the Future strategy for hydrogen technologies)

Measures to support key strategic technologies The National Strategic Technology Fostering Plan of Korea explicitly aims to make Korea a ‘technology hegemon’, seeking to build capacities in strategic technologies as a key driver for the future competitiveness. The government has selected 12 technologies to pursue as nationally strategic ones, divided into three categories (Figure 10) These technologies are directly related to the strategic objectives and the national understanding of the development and use of certain technologies, and include: (1) Technologies to drive economic innovation of Korea, such as semiconductors or next-generation nuclear power; (2) Fundamental technologies, such as AI and quantum technologies, which are expected to be essential technological infrastructure in the future; and (3) Technologies directly linked to rapid growth and security, such as hydrogen or cybersecurity technologies (MSIT, 2022[32]).

The Korean government is concentrating policy support through mission-oriented goals developed in conjunction with the private sector. Dedicated support in the form or R&D investment, crossborder cooperation projects and talent development, will be rolled out successively for 50 subspecific technologies (under the 12 technology areas), aiming to facilitate investments of over USD 414 billion (KRW 550 trillion) by 2027 (MOTIE, 2023[33]).

20 |

Figure 10. National strategic technologies of Korea as of National Strategic Technology Intensive Fostering Plan, October 2022

Source: Presentation by Bonjin Koo (Associate Research Fellow, Korea Institute of S&T Evaluation and Planning (KISTEP)) “Introduction of Korea’s National Strategic Technology Fostering Plan and Co-creation Strategy” at the METI-OECD workshop

United States STI policies to implement the Long-Term Climate Strategy The Long-Term Climate Strategy of the United States, published in 2021, outlines multiple pathways to reduce GHG emissions by 50-52% from 2005 levels by 2030, putting the US on a path to achieve net-zero emissions no later than 2050. As explained in detail in a report released in April 2023 by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) (OSTP, 2023[34]), the country has adopted a range of initiatives to support innovation to achieve those goals, which can be divided in three pillars: •

Invest in R&D for a portfolio of game-changing innovations. Examples include the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Energy Earthshots – a challenge initiative that targets specific technologies such as long duration energy storage, carbon removal, clean hydrogen, enhanced geothermal systems, floating offshore wind, and industrial heat. The National Science Foundation and other US departments (incl. in the field of transportation, agriculture, oceans, space) have ongoing programs that invest in innovation from basic science to demonstration projects for climate mitigation and resilience. Furthermore, a whole-of-government Climate Innovation Working Group was established to assess current and guide future innovation investments. The group identified a portfolio of 37 net-zero game changer technologies.

 21

Figure 11. Portfolio of 37 net-zero game changers identified by the US interagency working group

Source: White House (2022[35]), U.S. Innovation to Meet 2050 Climate Goals: Assessing initial R&D opportunities, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/U.S.-Innovation-to-Meet-2050-Climate-Goals.pdf

•

Demonstrate and support early deployment of emerging technologies. The demonstration projects aim at increasing market confidence and beginning to make equitable investments in the infrastructure needed to enable widespread deployment. Examples include advanced offshore wind, carbon capture and storage, advanced nuclear power, and advanced grid technologies. The Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) of 2021 provided USD 21.5 billion for clean energy demonstration projects in clean hydrogen, energy storage, carbon capture, advanced nuclear, direct air capture, and other technologies (White House, 2021[36]; White House, 2022[37]). The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022 complements this with USD 5.8 billion for demonstration projects aimed at reducing emissions from energy intensive industries (iron, steel, concrete, glass, pulp, paper, ceramics, and chemical production) (White House, 2023[38]) .

Early-stage incubators like DOE’s Advanced Research Projects Agency–Energy (ARPA-E) and technology transfer programs like the Lab Embedded Entrepreneurs Program accelerate the transition from lab to market. Furthermore, the new DOE Office of Clean Energy Demonstrations (OCED) was created to fill a critical gap in funding innovative large-scale demonstrations on the path to commercial scale.

•

Use regulations and financial incentives to accelerate manufacturing, deployment, and adoption of technologies that are available today, such as solar, wind, batteries, electric vehicles, and highly efficient appliances and equipment, as well as an expanded transmission network to support more renewable energy and electrification. Scale-up of these clean energy technologies is supported by new efforts to secure supply chains for critical materials and

22 | components. In addition to demonstration of emerging technologies, funding in the BIL (including the USD 62 billion provided to the Department of Energy alone) accelerates deployment of commercially available clean energy, clean transit and school buses, and grid modernization technologies. The BIL also invests in associated clean energy infrastructure (such as a nationwide electric vehicle charging network), domestic manufacturing and supply chain capacity, and workforce needs.

•

The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022 includes, among other provisions9, USD 370 billion of incentives (incl. tax incentives, grants and loan guarantees) to deploy commercial and emerging clean energy technologies across the economy. The IRA extended or created tax credits10 for adoption of clean technologies across many sectors—including for clean electricity, clean hydrogen and other fuels, carbon capture and carbon removal, energy efficiency, and electric vehicles and appliances—as well as for manufacturing of many clean energy technologies.

•

In addition, the DOE Loan Program Office now has more than USD 100 billion in loan authority to help deploy and scale up innovative clean energy, advanced transportation, and tribal energy projects in the United States, and USD 250 billion in new loan authority to retool or repurpose energy infrastructure for the low-carbon economy.

The United States also aims at strengthening international partnerships in the field of net-zero innovation, including through multilateral initiatives such as Mission Innovation, the First Movers Coalition, Net Zero World, the Glasgow Breakthrough Agenda and a number of bilateral collaborations, such as the US-India Partnership to Advance Clean Energy-Research (PACE-R), and the US-Israel Center of Excellence in Energy, Engineering and Water Technology.

Measures to support key strategic technologies The CHIPS and Science Act (2022) predominantly focuses on supporting US semiconductor research and manufacturing, but also identifies a list of “key technology focus areas that will enhance the competitive advantage and leadership of the United States in the global economy”, including AI, high performance computing, robotics, biotechnology and advanced materials science (CHIPS and Science Act, 2022, SEC. 10387).11 The Act also includes important provisions on R&D on clean energy and decarbonisation technologies, through a range of new R&D funding programmes, competitions, and new institutions. However, the Act provides mainly authorisation for these programmes, funding would need to be appropriated through the budget process. The President’s Budget Request for the Fiscal Year of 2024 foresees USD 11 billion of R&D investment in the Department of Energy (Chong, 2023[39]; White House, 2023[40]; Matt Hourihan, 2023[41]; Meyer, 2022[42]).

Another initiative is the Critical Minerals and Materials Strategy, adopted in 2021 by the US Department of Energy. It aims at fostering scientific innovation and develop technologies that will ensure resilient and secure critical mineral and material supply chains, and enhancing the capabilities of the innovation ecosystem in these fields.

Mobilising citizens, industry and research institutions for green innovation Developing STI solutions for the green transition require collaborative efforts of universities, research organisations, businesses, public authorities, and citizens. This section presents initiatives that showcase the mobilisation of a wide diversity of actors in this context, focusing on i) cocreation initiatives involving citizens, ii) industry-led and company initiatives, and iii) research organisations and innovation networks.

 23

Co-creation initiatives involving citizens Citizens can engage in science and research activities by formulating or prioritising research questions, conducting scientific experiments, collecting and analysing data, interpreting results, or developing technologies and applications transition (Paunov and Planes-Satorra, 2023[43]). Such engagement ensures that innovation responds to societal needs and concerns. It enables tapping into diverse ideas, information and resources to improve solutions provided.

As discussed by Sauermann et al. (2020[44]), citizen science can contribute to green transitions in three important ways: 1) helping in the process of problem identification and research agenda setting; 2) mobilising resources in the form of effort and knowledge, which can speed up research or enable large scale projects that would be difficult to perform otherwise; and 3) facilitating the co-evolution of techno-scientific and socio-political aspects of transitions – a necessary condition for transitions to succeed. In this regard, citizen science can lead to increased awareness and understanding of sustainability problems, contributing to changing behaviours (e.g. consumption patterns), which can in turn lead citizens to push for complementary policy actions and needed reforms for the transition (Figure 12).

Figure 12. Three roles of citizen science support for green transitions

Source: Sauermann et al.

(2020[44]), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2020.103978.

Citizen

science

and

sustainability

transitions,

Citizen science is not new, but has gained renewed interest as it provides ways for citizens to contribute to addressing global challenges related to climate change, energy transitions and biodiversity loss, to name a few. According to the Web of Science database, the number of annual publications mentioning ‘citizen science’ went from 1 1 in 201 to more than 640 in 2021 (Dance, 2022[45]). Digital platforms and apps have greatly facilitated such engagement. SciStarter, for instance, is an online citizen science hub with around 140,000 registered participants. More than 3,000 projects have been published in the platform, searchable by location, topic, age group, and related sustainable development goal, among others (SciStarter, 2020[46]).

In the field of biodiversity, citizen science initiatives have expanded significantly over the past decades, often used as a means of gathering large scale data on the location of specific species. For

24 | example, eBird allows citizen volunteers across the globe to submit data about the birds they see into a central database at the Cornell Lab of Ornithology, contributing to a knowledge base on the distribution, abundance and migration of bird species. The data can then be used by scientists, land managers, and bird watchers use the data to track changes in bird distributions and identify bird populations that require conservation (Bonney, 2023[47]).

Other initiatives, led by universities or other research institutions, also encourage the engagement of citizens in some of its activities. For example, the Aspern.mobil Lab, led by the Vienna University of Technology and created under the umbrella of the Austrian Mobility Labs programme of the Austrian Federal Ministry for Climate Action, Environment, Energy, Mobility, Innovation and Technology, offers a space for universities, companies, citizens, and the government to participate in joint innovation for a more sustainable and inclusive local mobility system in the neighbourhood of aspern Seestadt (Vienna). The lab offers a range of opportunities to work closely with citizens and local businesses to achieve sustainable mobility objectives. These include pop-up labs, which are temporary labs set up in public space to interact with citizens; games that allow for co-creation with the community; idea competitions where citizens can propose projects, and a research mat, which is a mobile carpet with a scale image of the city used to explore daily routes, points of interest, transport routes, hot spots in the neighbourhood, problem areas and potential new uses of public spaces. The lab also makes citizens experience the positive impacts of their actions. For instance, they provide citizens with sensor boxes developed by the lab to measure air quality, making citizens better acquainted with the outputs of the project and reinforcing their engagement. By making all research findings publicly available, they allow people to witness the tangible impact of their engagement, increasing trust in the initiative and willingness to continue to contribute in the future.

The Lorraine Smart Cities Living Lab is another example. Located at the University of Lorraine (France), the living lab collaborates with local authorities/municipalities, companies, citizens and incubators to co-create user-centred solutions related to the green transition. For example, the lab has co-created new objects based on plastic waste.

Governments use a diversity of instruments to promote citizen participation in research and innovation activities related to the green transition (Paunov and Planes-Satorra, 2023[43]).

Table 2 presents an overview of such instruments, which include citizen science programs, collaboration and co-creation programs involving citizens or civil society organisations, open challenges, hackathons, online collaborative platforms, living labs, fablabs, serious games, and crowdfunding initiatives.

Table 2. Policy instruments to encourage citizen participation in research and innovation activities: overview and examples

Citizen science programmes

Description

Examples

Citizen science can be defined as the direct voluntary participation of individual citizens (in their personal capacity) in research projects in ways that may include formulating research questions, conducting scientific experiments, collecting and analysing data, interpreting results, making new discoveries, developing technologies and applications, and solving complex problems.

Governments support citizen science in many ways. For example, CitizenScience.gov is an official US government website designed to accelerate the use of crowdsourcing and citizen science across the US government. The Center for Citizen Science (OeAD), established in 2015 by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Education, Science and Research (BMBWF), serves as an information, advisory and service centre for Citizen Science, primarily addressing researchers and scientific institutions aiming to implement citizen science research approaches. In Switzerland, the Citizen Science Center Zurich created in 2017 and run jointly by the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich, supports the collaboration of academic scientists and the public to implement co-created projects.

 25 Description

Examples

Digital platforms and apps have greatly facilitated citizen science over the past years. SciStarter, for instance, is an online citizen science hub with around 140,000 registered participants. More than 3,000 projects have been published in the platform, searchable by location, topic, age group, and related sustainable development goal, among others (SciStarter, 2020[46]).

Some governments provide grants and prizes to stimulate citizen science. The Citizen Science Grants in Australia, which are part of the Inspiring Australia – Science Engagement Programme, provides competitive grants from AUD 150,000 to AUD 500,000 for citizen science research projects that contribute to areas of national significance. The 2022 round supports projects in the areas of disaster resilience and preparedness, environmental change, food and agribusiness, and cybersecurity and artificial intelligence. Examples of prizes include the Eureka Prize for Innovation in Citizen Science in Australia, and the Citizen Science Awards in Austria that mainly target students.

Some portals have also been created by governments or non-profit organisations to publicise citizen science projects, so that citizens can easily identify projects in which they could be interested to participate. It is the case of the Citizen Science Portal of the Government of Canada. It is also one of the functionalities of the “Citizens create Knowledge” platform (Bürger schaffen Wissen) in Germany.

The Plastic Pirates – Go Europe! initiative is an example of Citizen Science project. School classes and youth groups collect plastic samples from streams and rivers and document their findings. The collected data is then analysed by scientists and researchers. In this way, young European citizens are making an important contribution to researching the state of European rivers and the extent and pollution caused by plastic waste.

Collaboration and cocreation programmes involving citizens / CSOs

Programmes that promote collaboration and co-creation engaging multiple stakeholders, including civil society organisations and/or citizens.

In Sweden, the project call “Civil society’s solutions to climate transition”, launched by VINNOVA in April 2022, supports innovative initiatives led by civil society organisations in collaboration with other actors that show potential to accelerate the pace of the green transition. The call had four focus areas: sustainable industry, sustainable mobility, sustainable built environments and sustainable food systems. Civil society organisations (CSO) could apply in collaboration with at least one additional party from another sector such as public or private. The CSO has to be the project coordinator. It was possible to apply for up to USD 140,000 (SEK 1.5 million) per project, corresponding to a maximum of 80% of projects’ total eligible costs, for a project duration of a maximum of 24 months. The call is part of Vinnova’s new work area “Transformative public sector and civil society”. A total of 20 projects were awarded as part of a similar call launched in 2021.

In Korea, the R&SD Frontier Programme launched in 2020 engages researchers and local communities in identifying and solving science and technology problems. It implements “Living Lab Projects”, with a specific focus on solving urban challenges using existing R&D outcomes.

Innovation prizes / open challenges

Instruments used to encourage innovation that tackles a concrete, ambitious goal without specifying the path to reach it.

Innovation prizes or challenges reward those that can first or most effectively solve a problem. They attract new innovators by lowering barriers to participation, while raising the visibility of specific challenges. They can have a systemic impact by raising public awareness about neglected and/or complex problems.

The United States has a long tradition of using prize competitions and challenges. In 2010, the federal government launched the Challenge.gov website, which provides resources and collaborative opportunities to facilitate the use of prize challenges government wide. This includes a comprehensive Challenges and Prizes Toolkit – a guide to planning and executing federal prizes.

Some of the recent prizes launched at federal level focus on green transition issues. An example is the American-Made Challenges programme, launched in 2018 by the Department of Energy to accelerate entrepreneurship and innovation in clean energy. Since its creation, it has awarded about USD 100 million in cash prizes and team support activities to competitors in more than 30 prizes spanning solar, water, geothermal, buildings, hydrogen, energy storage, and transportation, among others. For instance, the Inclusive Energy Innovation Prize funds projects that make the clean energy innovation ecosystem more inclusive and accessible to disadvantaged communities and individuals from groups historically underrepresented in STI activities.

26 | Description

Examples

Prizes should provide incentives that motivate teams to engage – these often go beyond cash awards to also include capacity building support and technical support for the testing and validation of solutions, or facilitate access to funders and networks (Challenge Works, 2022[48])

Many other countries have innovation prizes or open challenges programmes in place. These have become even more popular during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Examples targeting green transition goals include the Climate Smart Cities Challenge, launched in the United Nations (UN-Habitat) and Sweden (Viable Cities), and several of the challenges launched by the Government of Canada and publicised through the Impact Canada Challenge Hub, such as the Smart Cities Challenge open to indigenous communities and the Afri-Plastics Challenge. An example organized at local level is the Helsinki Energy Challenge (2020-21) in Finland, aimed at finding sustainable urban heating solutions, reducing the use of coal and using as little biomass as possible.

24- to 48-hour events open to all, in which participants are provided with data with which they have to create an innovative product. Winners are often compensated with funding and support to develop and scale their ideas. Used by governments as well as firms, nonprofits, universities and international organisations to draw innovative ideas from diverse contributors.

The GreenHack was an international hackathon tackling sustainable development and future challenges. It was part of the EU Green Week 2022 initiative by the European Commission and organised under auspices of The Ministry of the Environment and the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic, the City of Prague and the Embassy of Netherlands.

Online collaboration platform

Virtual spaces that support the engagement of citizens in innovation activities by facilitating networking and matchmaking with other actors.

The Civic Innovation Platform, developed by the Policy Lab of the German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, aims to stimulate social innovation based on AI technologies. Anyone can create a personal profile to share preliminary rough ideas as well as specific proposals for which they are looking for partners. The platform provides an infrastructure with a matchmaking functionality (“the ideas market”) that enables partners from different sectors – such as the public sector, business, the scientific community as well as civil society actors – to discover aligned interests and to work jointly on developing and implementing ideas. Once the resulting team has formulated the project idea in sufficient detail, the proposal can be submitted to the “ideas contest” through the same platform. Similarly to innovation prizes described above, the awarded teams receive up to 20,000 of financial support to develop their idea, as well as non-material support in the form of advice and workshops.

Living labs

Open innovation ecosystems in which citizens can engage in user-centered co-creation and experimentation activities in real world settings.

The Citizen Innovation Lab aims to empower people in Limerick (Ireland) to take part in co-creating a climate-neutral city by 2050. It is co-located with the School of Architecture at University of Limerick, and operates as a collaboration between Limerick City, the County Council and the University. The Citizen Innovation Lab includes a Citizens’ Observatory, an Engagement Hub, a digital platform and a programme of events. The Citizens’ Observatory provides access to digital tools so people can make and share observations on their local environment and buildings. It is also the location of the 3D-printed city model.

The Engagement Hub is a meeting space and a hub for collaboration and cocreation where co-design workshops and creative engagement events take place.

Hackathons

Living labs operate as intermediaries among citizens, research organisations, companies, and regional and local authorities. They are localised areas of experimentation in which actors collaboratively develop new (often technology-enabled) solutions.

City Councils are leading many hackathons with green transition goals.

Examples are the Seoul City Energy Information Platform Hackathon Competition (2021), launched by the Seoul Metropolitan Government (Korea) and the Hacking the Future (2021) launched by the Glasgow City Council (UK).

 27 Description

Examples

Fablabs and other digital fabrication spaces (e.g. makerspaces, makerlabs, hackerspaces) provide people with access to infrastructure and equipment they need (e.g. 3D printers, laser cutters) to experiment and make things.

These facilities aim at democratizing access to advanced tools, offering a physical space where innovations can be developed as prototypes or in small series. They are also social spaces where people come together, exchange ideas and work collaboratively, contributing to expand networks between expert and non-expert users.

The Lorraine Fab Living Lab Fablab, located at the University of Lorraine (France) is a collaborative innovation space that brings together in the same space complementary tools that make it possible to co-create, prototype and test products and services between citizens, businesses and researchers.

Serious games

Serious games consist in the application of entertaining, enjoyable techniques to encourage the involvement of the public in research-related activities.

Radchuk, Kerbe and Schmidt (2017[49]) identify 87 science games. Aspern.mobil LAB, for example, has developed its own game to encourage playful idea generation among citizens. The game board, a representation of Seestadt Aspern, encourages players to communicate and learn from each other to decide on setting scenarios, answer research questions and find mobility solutions. The goal is to explore micro-mobility and sharing transportation options in Aspern, but it could be adapted to other topics and scenarios.

Crowdfunding

Crowdfunding enables citizens to connect with science and contribute to advancing specific research paths by providing their financial support. It also encourages researchers to formulate their research projects in ways that respond to specific societal needs.

The Spanish Foundation for Science and Technology (FECYT) launched the crowdsourcing platform Precipita. The platform allows citizens to learn about different ongoing research projects and provide financial contributions to support them.

Fablabs

Fab Lab Limerick in Ireland, which is part of the Citizen Innovation Lab presented above, is a maker space and open digital fabrication laboratory run by the School of Architecture at University of Limerick. It offers cultural, educational and research programmes on digital fabrication.

Source: Paunov and Planes-Satorra (2023[43]), Engaging citizens in innovation policy: Why, when and how?, https://doi.org/10.1787/ba068fa6-en

Industry-led and company initiatives Private sector initiatives range from company-led green innovation ecosystems to start-ups using technology for environmental protection.

GreenLab is a circular and green industrial park in Spøttrup (Denmark), inaugurated in 2020 and based on a private-public partnership (public investments of approx. USD 11 million (DKK 80 million), that combines energy generation, sharing and storage, with interdisciplinary research and technology development and business activity in these as well as related fields (renewable energy, green fuels and waste handling systems). In addition, GreenLab is licensed as a regulatory test zone for sector coupling (the act of limiting energy waste by storing excess energy from one energy sector in another sector) and makes it possible for the businesses active in the park to share excess energy amongst each other, through its own smart grid solution, SymbiosisNet (see scheme in Figure 13). GreenLab offers a testing ground for Denmark’s technical universities and industry partners to co-create such sustainable energy solutions. The technologies developed and scaled up on its platform are a proof of concept with potential for commercialisation in national and global markets.

28 |

Figure 13. GreenLab's smart grid solution

Source: Presentation by Christopher Sorensen (CEO, GreenLab) “Green & Circular Energy Park – Technology Enabler– National Research Facility” at the METI-OECD workshop.

Tech-based companies and start-ups also play a central role. In the field of biodiversity, a number of technology applications are being developed. Two company examples are the following: Morfo, founded in 2021, draws from co-creation in disciplines such as agritech, machine learning, and computer vision to generate technologies for reforestation. Based on data gathered by analysing seeds, soils and monitoring areas with drones (see Figure 14), they act to restore biodiversity and protect the climate, e.g. through reforestation, in collaboration with local communities.

•

BeeOdiversity, active since 2012, generates data based on the pollen collected by bees, which are bioindicators to monitor pollution and biodiversity (specifically, number and type of plant species and their deficiencies). On this basis, the company develops environmental impact analysis and provides ecological audits of sites, providing these services to large enterprises as well as local business and communities, in order to increase awareness of the importance of biodiversity, and promote action for the conservation of the environment.

 29

Figure 14. Drone technologies for reforestation developed by Morfo

Source: https://www.morfo.rest.

Research organisations and innovation networks Collaboration across a diversity of actors is critical to address global challenges linked to the green transition. Such collaborations are often supported by academic or non-profit institutions. The Belmont Forum, for example, brings together funding organisations, international science councils and regional consortia to further transdisciplinary research providing knowledge for understanding, mitigating and adapting to global environmental change. Its research mission for sustainability is implemented through calls for proposals, under which projects are funded that are interdisciplinary (natural and social sciences) and international (at least three countries) and involve stakeholders (e.g. local communities, policymakers, business and industry, unions, tribal organisations, nongovernmental organisations). With 21 calls as of 2022, the Forum has supported 155 projects with a cumulated amount of approx. USD 250 million (EUR 235 million) (Vermeer et al., 2022[50]).

Another example of academic collaboration in biodiversity is the National Biodiversity Future Centre that connects 26 universities, 7 public and 11 private research institutes and 6 companies across Italy to work towards the common goal of addressing direct drivers for biodiversity decline at marine, urban and terrestrial level. The Centre, founded in 2022 is endowed with approx. USD 372 million (EUR 350 million, of which EUR 320 from the NextGenerationEU framework until the August 2025) and coordinated by the National Research Council (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, CNR). It seeks to develop frontier research involving companies throughout Italy, as well as different departments across partner universities and research institutions. This collaborative model aims to leverage diverse expertise and promote knowledge-sharing in order to promote biodiversity as a central element of sustainable development.

A further example is the expansion of cooperation networks in the field of ocean science and innovation, bringing together public research institutes, large enterprises, SMEs, universities, and other institutions. For instance, such networks play a key role in advancing capacities in biodiversity mapping and conservation (OECD, 2019[51]).

While there is a long tradition of research- and industry-led partnerships in the field of ocean science and innovation (e.g. for sharing data to ensure safety at sea or advance technology

30 | developments within the marine industry), new networks are emerging, driven by rapid advances in research requiring new disciplines to connect with each other (e.g. robotics, digital, biology and eDNA), new rapid ways to collaborate across continents, and the availability of more complex tools and technologies (e.g. digital twins). Some examples of such networks are presented in Table 3.

Table 3. Ten ocean economy networks identified in an OECD survey on innovation in the ocean economy

Source: OECD (2019[51]), Rethinking https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264311053-en

Innovation

for

a

Sustainable

Ocean

Economy,

Creating such networks in the ocean economy can bring various benefits, including improved cross-sector synergies, access to specialised knowledge and research facilities (e.g. research vessels), building new scientific capacity, and the development of new products and support “blue” SMEs and start-ups (OECD, 2019[51]).

The OECD survey of networks for the ocean economy identifies three types of organisations acting as orchestrators of the innovation networks. These are Higher Education Institutions (HEIs), Public Research Institutes (PRIs) and technology or innovation hubs. The role of these orchestrators is to manage knowledge mobility, ensure network stability, as well as facilitate innovation appropriability (OECD, 2019[51]).

Partners in these networks include actors across private and public institutions. The largest share of network partners are SMEs, followed by the category “Other”, consisting of private and public research institutions. Other partners in innovation networks include large industry, academia, government, and NGOs (Figure 15).

Co-creation has proven relevant in STI capacity building for ocean biodiversity, especially in regions with rich biodiversity but limited resources, as well as in reconciling local economic development with biodiversity preservation. Co-creation also presents challenges such as the costs of managing relationships with external partners and the potential leakage of knowledge to competitors. Another concern is that smaller players are more reliant on networks to gain access to technology and financing (OECD, 2019[51]).

 31

Figure 15. Types of actors in ocean economy innovation networks

Source: Ibid.

Note: Total number of partners from each category reported by surveys innovation network centres

Technological innovation to support ocean-based biodiversity includes biodiversity mapping through geographic information systems (GIS) and Earth observation techniques. These are critical for scientific research and have substantial potential to support sustainable aquaculture management, with recent technical advances in remote sensing as well as higher resolution and capacity of satellite imaging increasing the coverage and quality of data. This is critically supported by the free provision of certain data through the United States Geological Survey and Copernicus programme of the European Space Agency. Other examples technological advances in this field include monitoring and assessing the composition of species in marine ecosystems through DNA sequencing and genetic toolkits, or using autonomous underwater vehicles for monitoring inaccessible or polluted areas.

32 |

Annex. Agenda of the METI-TIP workshop of May 2023 Day 1: 24 May 2023 14.00-14.30: Welcome coffee/registration

Welcome and introduction to the workshop 14:30-14:45 Welcome and introductory speeches • •

Göran Marklund, Deputy Director General and Head of Operational Development at VINNOVA & Chair, OECD Working Party for Technology and Innovation Policy (TIP) Caroline Paunov, Head of the TIP Secretariat, Science and Technology Policy Division, OECD

This session included an introduction to the three work strands the workshop will contribute to as well as an explanation of the interactive elements of the workshop.

1. Framing the debate: Issues in Science, Technology and Innovation in 2023 and beyond 14.45-15.30 Moderator: Yongsuk Jang, Senior Research Fellow, Science and Technology Policy Institute (STEPI) / Chair of the OECD Committee on Scientific and Technological Policy (virtual) Introduction to the CSTP Ministerial •

Alessandra Colecchia, Head of Science and Technology Policy Division, OECD

Presentation of key insights from the OECD Science, Technology and Innovation Outlook 2023 •

Michael Keenan, Senior Policy Analyst, Science and Technology Policy Division, OECD

2. Keynote speeches: Co-creation for transitions – challenges looking forward 15.30-16.15 Moderator: Göran Marklund, Deputy Director General and Head of Operational Development at VINNOVA & Chair, OECD Working Party for Technology and Innovation Policy (TIP) Keynote speakers on international co-creation for transitions: •

Elisabeth Eppinger, Professor, University of Applied Science for Economics and Technology (HTW) Berlin (virtual)

•

Nicole Arbour, Executive Director, Belmont Forum

•

Christopher Donald Sorensen, CEO, GreenLab 16.15-16.45: Coffee break

3. International co-creation for biodiversity: defining issues, building STI capacities and advancing policy 16.45-18.00

 33 This session aimed to identify how international co-creation in science, technology and innovation can enhance efforts to for biodiversity.

Key questions: •

How can international co-creation projects contribute to STI capacity building for biodiversity, specifically in countries/regions with high levels of bio-diversity but limited resources?

•

What measures undertaken by partners of international co-creation projects are most effective in reconciling local economic development with biodiversity?

•

What are the best ways to engage local communities and industries, when promoting new technologies and innovation for biodiversity?

Moderator: Alberto di Minin, Professor of Management, Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna & Vice Chair of the OECD Working Party for Technology and Innovation Policy (TIP) Kick-off: •

Edward Perry, Policy Analyst, Biodiversity, OECD Environment Directorate

•

Claire Jolly, Head of Unit for Innovation Policies for Space and the Ocean, Science and Technology Policy Division, OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Innovation

Panellists: • • • •

Luisa F. Echeverría-King, Internationalisation leader, Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, Colombia (virtual) Cristina Prandi, Prorector for Research, University of Turin Adrien Pagès, Co-founder & CEO, Morfo Michaël van Cutsem, Co-Founder and CEO, BeeOdiversity

Day 2: 25 May 2023

4. K y

c

:J

’

b

c

b

S I

9:30-10.00 This session featured a high-level address by Japan on the context of the METI-TIP collaborative project and Japan’s role and interest in global collaboration on science, technology and innovation, as well as an introduction by the Deputy Director of the OECD’s Directorate for Science, Technology and Innovation.

Moderator: Göran Marklund, Deputy Director General and Head of Operational Development at VINNOVA & Chair, OECD Working Party for Technology and Innovation Policy (TIP) Speakers: •

Kenichiro Mukai, Deputy Permanent Representative of Japan to the OECD

•

Jens Lundsgaard, Deputy Director, Directorate for Science, Technology and Innovation, OECD

34 |

5. I

:J

’

c

c -creation: instruments, partners and sectors

10.00-11.00 This session featured a presentation and Q&A with a representative of Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) on METI’s Science and Technology policy and the role international cocreation plays in this policy.

The OECD’s senior economist working on the Japan country desk provided input on the wider context of Japan’s current economic developments.

Moderator: Göran Marklund, Deputy Director General and Head of Operational Development at VINNOVA & Chair, OECD Working Party for Technology and Innovation Policy (TIP) Speaker: •

Yasushi Nozawa, Director, Innovation and Industry-University Collaboration Division, Industrial Science, Technology and Environment Policy Bureau, METI Contextualisation and recent economic developments in Japan: •

Muge Adalet McGowan, Senior Economist, Country Studies: Japan, Economics Department, OECD 11.00-11.30 Coffee break

6. International co-creation in practice: the view from Japanese industry and research 11.30-12.30 This session featured presentations and Q&A with representatives of Japanese industry and (applied) research from relevant sectors who are engaging in international co-creation projects, giving insight into their experience and learnings. The session also included representatives of international collaborative projects between Japan and other countries.

Moderator: Tiago Santos Pereira, Senior Researcher, University of Coimbra and Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) & Vice Chair of the OECD Working Party for Technology and Innovation Policy (TIP) Panellists: •

Nobu-Hisa Kaneko, Prime Senior Researcher, National Metrology Institute of Japan (NMIJ), National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) (virtual)

•

Toshiyasu Ichioka, Director of Europe Office, RIKEN

•

Sanna Öörni, Business Development Manager, VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland

•

Takeshi Shosu, General Manager, Intellectual Property Department, R&D Headquarters, DKS Co. Ltd. 12:30-14:00 Lunch

7. Panel discussion. Navigating co-creation projects: international perspectives 14:00-15:15 This panel discussed the various opportunities and challenges related to intellectual property (IP) that appear in co-creation initiatives, featuring experts on IP as well as representative of international co-

 35 creation projects.

Moderator: Caroline Paunov, Head of the TIP Secretariat, Science and Technology Policy Division, OECD Panellists: •

Yann Ménière, Chief Economist, European Patent Office (virtual)

•

Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, Head of Section, Economics and Statistics Division, World Intellectual Property Organisation (virtual)

•

Christopher Donald Sorensen, CEO, GreenLab

•

Ioannis Legouras, Director of Brussels Office, Helmholtz Association 15.15-15.45: Coffee break

8. Panel discussion: Lessons from on-going policy reform process regarding co-creation and knowledge transfer 15.45-16.45 The session commenced with Japanese policy makers introducing Japan's Bayh-Dole system for knowledge transfer between the public and private sectors and the best practices that have emerged from it, as well as other measures taken by the Japanese Government to prevent the outflow of key technologies, especially in public-private projects.

The following panel discussion then featured government representatives reporting on recent experience with new policy initiatives to promote co-creation and reforms related to knowledge transfer between academia and industry, addressing questions such as how governments go about improving co-creation, and what it takes to reform the science sector.

Moderator: Tiago Santos Pereira, Senior Researcher, University of Coimbra and Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) & Vice Chair of the OECD Working Party for Technology and Innovation Policy (TIP) Speaker: •

Yuta Okuyama, Deputy Director, Research and Development Division Industrial Science, Technology and Environment Policy Bureau, METI Panellists: •

Barbara Gibbon, Director General, Innovation, Science and Economic Development, Canada

•

Rami Tzafon, Technology Transfer Manager, Israel Innovation Authority

•

José Guimon, Professor, Autonomous University of Madrid / Collaborator in the Cabinet of the Minister for Science and Innovation, Spain

•

Fulvio Esposito, Adviser at the Ministry for Universities and Research, Italy, and Delegate to the OECD Committee for Scientific and Technological Policy (virtual) 16:45-17:00: Short break

36 |

9. Civil society engagement: new actors in co-creation for the green transition 17.00-18.00 This session brought together experts and stakeholders to discuss innovative approaches and strategies for enhancing the participation of civil society in co-creation for the green transition.

Moderator: Sandra Planes-Satorra, Policy Analyst, Science and Technology Policy Division, OECD Speakers: •

Alessandro Bellantoni, Head of Open Government and Civic Space Unit, Open and Innovative Government Division, OECD Public Governance Directorate

•

Rodney Ghali, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Impact & Innovation Unit, Privy Council Office Government of Canada (virtual)

•

Hilda Tellioglu, Associate Professor, Technical University Vienna (Co-creation project: Aspern.mobil.LAB) (virtual)

•

Mauricio Camargo, Professor, Université Lorraine & Laurent Dupont, Co-Founder and Scientific Manager of the Lorraine Smart Cities Living Lab (virtual)

Commentator: •

Margit Harjung, Deputy Head of Unit, Federal Ministry for Climate Action, Environment, Energy, Mobility, Innovation and Technology, Austria

18.00-19:30 Cocktail (OECD Conference Centre: George Marshall room, Château de la Muette) Day 3: 26 May 2023

10. Input speeches. Technology areas and their specific challenges to international cocreation 9.30-10.15 In this session, expert speakers provided expert input on the state of key frontier technologies, with regard to their development, their potential use cases, nascent regulatory considerations, as well as collaborative programme (such as the EU’s IPCEI) and the specific challenges that may arise in international cocreation projects related to such technologies.

Moderator: Nikolas Schmidt, Policy Analyst, Science and Technology Policy Division, OECD Speakers: •

Bonjin Koo, Associate Research Fellow, Korea Institute of S&T Evaluation and Planning (KISTEP)

•

Kazuyuki Motohashi, Professor, Graduate School of Engineering, University of Tokyo

•

Angelo Wille, Deputy Head of Unit, DG Research & Innovation, European Commission

 37

11. Breakout discussions. Exchanging on best practices for international co-creation: technology areas and their specific challenges 10.15-11.15 In this session, participants split up into breakout groups and discuss the challenges and best practices of international co-creation with regard to specific technologies.

Group rapporteurs offered insights in the next session. The in-person groups changed their topic after 25 minutes. An additional virtual group will discuss both topics.

• • •

What is unique about innovation for the green and digital transitions? What does it mean for cocreation?

What is the potential for international co-creation in key technologies for transitions and associated technologies?

What are the implications for innovation policy? What are other important priorities that emerge in the context of transitions?

Topic 1: Cutting-edge technologies in the field of computer science (e.g. artificial intelligence, quantum computing) • Moderator: Andrés Barreneche, Science and Technology Policy Division, OECD Topic 2: Key technologies for green innovation (e.g. batteries, semiconductors, biomanufacturing, renewable energy) •

Moderators: Nikolas Schmidt, Science and Technology Policy Division, OECD 11.15 – 11.45: Coffee break

12. Insights from the breakout. Moderated interview session with group rapporteurs 11.45-12.30 Moderator: Göran Marklund, Deputy Director General and Head of Operational Development at VINNOVA & Chair, OECD Working Party for Technology and Innovation Policy (TIP) Group rapporteurs from the previous session reported on the learnings from the respective groups in the form of a moderated interview session.

Wrap-up 12.30-12.45 Moderator: Göran Marklund, Deputy Director General and Head of Operational Development at VINNOVA & Chair, OECD Working Party for Technology and Innovation Policy (TIP) •

Caroline Paunov, Head of the TIP Secretariat, Science and Technology Policy Division, OECD

•

Nikolas Schmidt, Policy Analyst, Science and Technology Policy Division, OECD

The final session summarised the workshop, based on the inputs received through the interactive elements of the workshop.

38 |

Notes 1

Sustainability and resilience criteria for the award of public procurement contracts and auctions to must be subject to a mandatory weighting between 15% and 30% of the award criteria 2

Including InvestEU, Innovation Fund, Horizon Europe, EU4Health, Digital programme, European Defence Fund, Recovery and Resilience Facility, and cohesion policy funds 3

Deep and digital technologies include microelectronics, high-performance computing, quantum computing, cloud computing, edge computing, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, robotics, 5G and advanced connectivity, and virtual realities, including actions related to deep and digital technologies for the development of defence application 4

Clean technologies include renewable energy; electricity and heat storage; heat pumps; electricity grid; renewable fuels of non-biological origin; sustainable alternative fuels; electrolysers and fuel cells; carbon capture, utilisation and storage; energy efficiency; hydrogen; water purification and desalination; and advanced materials such as nanomaterials, composites and future clean construction materials; and technologies for the sustainable extraction and processing of critical raw materials 5

Biotechnologies, such as biomolecules and its applications, pharmaceuticals, medical technologies and crop biotechnology 6

In 2021 initially approx. USD 14.3 billion (JPY 2 trillion) for ten years, with additional USD 2.1 billion (JPY 300 billion) and USD 3.2 billion (JPY 456 billion) having been added in 2022 and 2023, respectively 7

Green transition in cities/spatial planning/living infrastructure, diffusion of low-carbon and distributed energy, and establishment of innovative green industry ecosystems and laying a foundation for carbon neutrality.

8

In the following fields: solar, wind, hydrogen production and storage, other carbon-free new power sources (such as ammonia- and hydrogen-based power generation) energy storage, power grid, integrated energy systems (e.g. power-to-heat), zero-energy buildings, carbon capture, use and storage, carbon-free ships, steel, petrochemical, cements, common industries, ecological automobiles, environmental technologies, nuclear power 9

Next to provisions on clean energy, the Inflation Reduction Act also includes measures in other policy areas, such as healthcare and tax policy.

10

The IRA has created or extended tax incentives for the installation and production of renewable energy.

Examples are the ‘Clean Energy Production Tax Credits’ and ‘Clean Electricity Investment Tax Credits’. While tax credits have previously been used on a smaller scale for deployment of wind and solar energy, the new credits support all forms of low-carbon energy generation, including wind, solar, geothermal, nuclear, as well as energy storage technologies; they are also more impactful due to a number of structural enhancements: among others, they are directly paid (they are not dependent on actually existing tax liability), transferable between beneficiaries, and, after the initial period of 10 years (until 2032), will not be phased out unless emission reduction targets (electricity greenhouse gas emissions in 2032 are below 25% of 2022 levels) have been achieved (White House, 2023[52]; IRS, 2023[53]).

11

The full list includes the following: Artificial intelligence, machine learning, autonomy, and related advances; high performance computing, semiconductors, and advanced computer hardware and software; quantum information science and technology; robotics, automation, and advanced manufacturing; natural and anthropogenic disaster prevention or mitigation; advanced communications technology and immersive technology; biotechnology, medical technology, genomics, and synthetic biology; data storage, data management, distributed ledger technologies, and cybersecurity, including biometrics; advanced energy and industrial efficiency technologies, such as batteries and advanced nuclear technologies, including but not limited to for the purposes of electric generation; advanced materials science, including composites 2D materials, other next-generation materials, and related manufacturing technologies and digital infrastructure.

39 |

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