Firefighter Near-Miss

Do Decisions Add Risk?

Oklahoma City FD

Responding to a fire alarm can be one of the most challenging assignments for firefighters. While there are thousands of decisions to consider, many of those decisions are contingent on what we find on arrival. Just based on the dispatch information, our thought processes can branch into many directions. Like an objective coming into focus as we get closer, a fire scene becomes more precise with additional information. When the first apparatus arrives, an initial report can change the entire operational action plan. The term dynamic is used frequently to describe this type of event, but the speed with which information can change is a match for the fire itself. The featured report details a residential house fire with a person likely trapped inside. The initial response is limited, and crews must adapt to the conditions found. While reading this report, consider when you have encountered these conditions and how your experience now could have changed your decision-making. The complete report can be found at http://firefighternearmiss.com/Reports?id=15879.

ROOF COLLAPSE FOLLOWING EXTREME RESCUE EFFORT

Initial size-up

One-story, residential, with heavy smoke showing from the A/B side with reports of a person trapped.

Event Description

My department responded to a reported structure fire. The first engine on the scene reported a “bedridden” patient trapped in a bedroom. The decision was made to make the rescue of the trapped individual first. The first engine took that assignment and operated as the Rescue Group. The second engine to arrive on the scene initiated the fire attack. The fire was in the garage and extended into the attic. There were no visible flames from the exterior, but a large volume of “pea green” smoke was billowing out the front door. The fire attack team took a defensive position to protect the egress of the Rescue Group. The Rescue Group reported hoarder-like conditions inside the residence and had contacted the trapped person. The egress route was still protected, and an additional crew was sent in to help with the rescue effort. Due to the hoarding conditions, the rescue effort posed multiple complications. An assessment of the room showed the only way out was through the door. Outside, trees and bushes blocked any attempt to go out of the bedroom window. To further complicate the rescue, interior crews were running low on air. The incident commander ordered the interior crews out of the building to exchange air bottles. New crews deployed into the building and completed the rescue under severe fire conditions. The roof of the building collapsed shortly after all crews exited the building. trigger turning points in the event. Discuss the information triggers in this narrative that may have changed on-scene decisions. • Given the initial size-up, is there any additional information you consider essential to arriving companies? • Given the two types of single-story homes pictured at right, would heavy smoke from the garage change your assignment decisions? Discuss why these house types are different with your crew and what more you would like to know about them. • Discuss how incident priorities can dictate assignments and how those assignments need to be very specific. • The two assignments mentioned were Rescue and Fire Attack. What other assignments may have been performed at the scene but did not make it into the report? What would have been the priority assignments, in your opinion? • A single-story residence fire is considered by many to be the most common type of fire response. Are there things about this type of response that you always look for while conducting a 360?

Lessons Learned

The Rescue Group encountered multiple issues with the rescue attempt. Hoarding conditions and the physical state of the patient inhibited a fluid extrication of the patient. Second, the large volume of heat and smoke, coupled with the issues mentioned above, used up resources on the scene quickly. The Incident Commander did not supplement resources in a timely fashion, thus further complicating the incident. As far as rescue, in the future, discussion of utilizing an alternative method for bedridden patients is being discussed and researched. Command became task saturated and missed tactical benchmarks and time stamps. In the future, second alarm support will be called earlier. Last, a designated Safety Officer was not assigned until late in the incident. There was a total of seven firefighters inside the building that escaped the collapse. Potentially, if a Safety Officer had been assigned sooner, the collapse potential may have been identified and a new plan implemented.

When things on the fire scene change, we all have the responsibility to improve situational awareness. Requests for additional resources or a change in other assignments are based on new information. The focus of this report has been about changing conditions at the scene and responding to the differences. Every lesson from this report has been about reacting to those changes. The multiple issues encountered by the rescue group require the group leader to be specific about resource requests. Adding an additional crew to assist when hoarder conditions are noted can hinder maneuverability when space is limited. The reporter’s comments about needing extra resources for the rescue need to be balanced with the space available. The IC could consider announcing on-deck resources or assigning a formal Rapid Intervention Crew when complications with interior crews are broadcast. Reassuring the interior groups that reserves are ready when needed. The next issue mentioned involved fire conditions hampering operations. The report indicated a defensive posture for attack crews to protect egress. Using progressive tactics to knock back or extinguish the fire could be an alternative to protecting egress. We could consider water mapping the attic space or transitional attacks into the garage. Techniques that prevent disturbing the thermal layering are very useful even when interior crews are operating away from the fire seat. Our goal in these situations is to protect life safety by separating the fire from the people and rescuing the occupants. Fortunately, when we have adequate resources, both objectives can be accomplished simultaneously. The last consideration involved command issues and assignments. While task saturation can become a significant part of any assignment on the fire scene, having additional personnel to absorb some of the decision-making is critical. When an incident commander has more than five objectives to manage, thought should be given to dividing assignment management into separate categories. Using a division commander to oversee some of the elements can help with span-of-control. Remembering a command chart, the parts of the incident that are not assigned are still the responsibility of the incident commander. While some of the positions in a full command chart are not critical in a small fire response staging, accountability and safety are command responsibilities additional to rescue, ventilation, fire attack, and RIT. Task saturation is always a consideration when span-of-control is exceeded. A final thought about this incident is that only one person submitted this report from this response. We don’t know the person’s perspective initiating this report or what their assignment may have been. We can predict, from the narrative, that this person was possibly part of the rescue group, but that isn’t given. By assuming each person carried out their assignment to the best of their abilities and used the information available to make decisions, the crews all focused on completing the rescue. When a report is posted, we get a slice of the information and only guess about other aspects of the incident. Each side discussion about this report is useful for helping other firefighters plan for future decisions they may have to make.