Shelter after disaster by Ollie Taylor

SHELTER AFTER DISASTER Investigating the benefits and limitations of owner- and donor-driven

reconstruction in the Aceh province of Indonesia after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.

Oliver Taylor

Previous Page: Figure 1.1 - Tsunami devastation in Indonesia. Source: United States Navy, 2005.

SHELTER AFTER DISASTER

Investigating the benefits and limitations of owner- and donor-driven reconstruction in the Aceh Province of Indonesia after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. A Dissertation by Oliver Taylor

Student Number - 11072701 Module Number - U30099 Dissertation Supervisor - Jeni Burnell

Abstract

This dissertation investigates the benefits and limitations of owner- and donor-driven post-disaster reconstruction approaches in the Aceh Province of Sumatra, Indonesia, after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.

Key Words Aceh Donor-Driven Reconstruction Indonesia Owner-Driven Reconstruction Post-Disaster Reconstruction Shelter After Disaster

While Owner-Driven Reconstruction (ODR) is a based on community participation in the reconstruction process, Donor-Driven Reconstruction (DDR) uses a more conventional contractor approach to design and construction. Using case examples from the Aceh Province, this study investigates the benefits and limitations of ODR and DDR within this context. It also highlights current thinking in the field of Shelter after Disaster (SAD). That being, a hybrid of the two approaches thereby creating a reconstruction programme that benefits from community participation but is suitable to be executed at a large scale. The study concludes by stating that there is no single approach to creating a â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;perfectâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; post-disaster reconstruction programme. Each disaster situation is unique and different and therefore reconstruction approaches need to take into account the social, economic, environmental, and political aspects of the country in which the disaster takes place. Both ODR and DDR have their benefits and limitations within these different contexts.

Figure 1.2 - Survivors of the tsunami lose their closest family. Souce: Tsunami 2004 archive, 2013

Contents Personal Motive Architectural Relevance Glossary of Terms Abbreviations Figures Referencing

10 11 13 15 16

Introduction

20 20 21 23 24

Disasters and Post-Disaster Reconstruction I.I Disasters (definitions and statistics) I.II Post-Disaster Reconstruction I.III Reconstruction Approaches I.IV 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami

II Owner-Driven Reconstruction (ODR) II.I JUB/UPLINK II.II The Devastation of two Small Villages: Lam Guron and Lam Badeuk

26 27 30

III Donor-Driven Reconstruction (DDR) III.I The Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR) III.II The CHF (Cooperative Housing Foundation)/Global Communities

34 35 39

IV Conclusion: Benifits and Limitations of Reconstruction in Aceh

Bibliography

Personal Motive Living in Asia since the age of 4 has brought me close to some of the deadliest disasters in the 21st century. At the time of the Asian tsunami in 2004, I was vacationing in the worst hit country; Indonesia, on the island of Bali. Hearing the media broadcasts about this dreadful disaster were so unbelievable, I simply couldnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t believe it was true. Moving to Hong Kong in 2001 brought me in close proximity to Mainland China. In 2008, when the Sichuan Earthquake hit, as the Charity representative, I initiated schemes to raise funds to construct shelter for the affected populations on behalf of my high school. The experiences from my childhood have shaped me to have a strong interest and passion for this field of post-disaster architecture and specifically how affected people can be involved in the rebuilding process.

Architectural Relevance Appropriate and well-designed housing is important for shelter after disaster, as it provides the affected populations an opportunity to continue with their lives after everything has been turned upside down. Providing shelter for displaced populations is complex, where each disaster context is completely different, and each household has distinct needs. Whether it is a community or commercially based approach, there is an inevitable need for a strategy after a community has been hit by a natural disaster.

Figure 1.3 - Post-tsunami flooding in Banda Aceh, January 2005. Source: da Silva, 2010

Glossary of Terms Disaster A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources (UNISDR, 2009).

Disaster Risk The potential disaster losses, in lives, health status, livelihoods, assets and services, which could occur to a particular community or a society over some specified future period of time (UNISDR, 2009).

Disaster Risk Management The systematic process of using administrative directives, organisations, and operational skills and capacities to implement strategies, policies and improved coping capacities in order to lessen the adverse impacts of hazards and the possibility of disaster (UNISDR, 2009).

Disaster Risk Reduction The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the casual factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events (UNISDR, 2009).

Displaced Populations Persons who, for different reasons or circumstances, have been compelled to leave their homes. They may not reside in their country of origin, but they are not legally regarded as refugees (UN, 2008).

Donor-Driven Reconstruction (DDR) In this approach the government or an external agency who is funding the project will lead the reconstruction process with the help of consultants and contractors procured for the project (Ratnayake, 2009).

Early Warning System The set of capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and meaningful warning information to enable individuals, communities and organisations threatened by a hazard to prepare and to act appropriately and in sufficient time to reduce the possibility of harm or loss (UNISDR, 2009).

Emergency Management The organisation and management of resources and responsibilities for addressing all aspects of emergencies, in particular preparedness, response and initial recovery steps (UNISDR, 2009).

Host Families This settlement option involves sheltering the displaced population within the households of local families, or on land or in properties owned by them (UN, 2008).

Livelihoods The ways in which people manage their lives in order to access the resources that they need, individually and communally, such as food, water, clothing and shelter (UN, 2008).

Local Infrastructure The facilities of a local or host populations to meet their communal needs, such as schools, hospitals, water-distribution systems, electricity grids, market services, roads and bridges (UN, 2008).

Glossary of Terms Natural Hazard Natural process or phenomenon that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage (UNISDR, 2009).

Non-Food Items The basic goods and supplies required to enable families to meet personal hygiene needs, prepare and eat food, provide thermal comfort and build, maintain and repair shelters (UN, 2008).

Non-Government Organisation (NGO) A not-for-profit group, principally independent from government, which is organised on a local, national or international level to address issues in support of the public good (UNROL, 2006).

Owner-Driven Reconstruction (ODR) In this reconstruction approach the disasters victims reconstruct their houses by themselves. The role of external agencies is limited to the provision of financial and technical assistance (Ratnayake, 2009).

Reconstruction The rebuilding of entire communities, including livelihoods, such that they are able to support themselves and have reduced vulnerability to future natural disasters (UN, 2008).

Risk The combination of the probability of an event and its negative consequences (UNISDR, 2009).

Risk Management The systematic approach and practice of managing uncertainty to minimise potential harm and loss (UNISDR, 2009).

Shelter After Disaster (SAD) The provision of temporary, transitional or permanent homes for disaster affected populations (UN, 2008).

Vulnerability The characteristics and circumstances of a community, system or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard (UNISDR, 2009).

Abbreviations BAPPENAS National Development Planning Board Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional

BRR Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh-Nias (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstriksi)

CHF Cooperative Housing Foundation

DDR Donor-Driven Reconstruction

INGO International Non-governmental Organisation

JUB Jaringan Udeep Beusaree (the village solidarity network)

NNGO National Non-governmental Organisation

NGO

Non-governmental Organisation

ODR Owner-Driven Reconstruction

RALAS Reconstruction of the Aceh Land Administration

TPK Tin Pembangunan Kempung (the village construction team)

UN-HABITAT United Nations Human Settlement Programme

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

Figures Referencing Figure 1.1 - United States Navy (2005). A village near the coast of Sumatra lies in ruin. [Online] Available: http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Effect_of_the_2004_Indian_Ocean_earthquake_on_Indonesia. Accessed: 14th Jan 2014 Figure 1.2 - Tsunami 2004 Archive (2013). Tsunami 2004 Survivor Stories. [Online] Available: http://www.tsunami2004.net/tsunami-2004-survivor-stories/. Accessed: 14th Jan 2014 Figure 1.3 - da Silva, J (2010). Lessons From Aceh - Key Considerations in Post-Disaster-Reconstruction. Warwickshire: Practical Action Publishing. Figure 1.4 - Jahoula, M (2013). Post-Tsunami Reconstruction in Indonesia: Negotiating Normativity through Gender Mainstreaming Initiatives in Aceh. Abingdon: Routledge. Figure 1.5 - National Geographic (2005). Photo Gallery: Tsunami. [Online] Available: http://environment.nationalgeographic.com/environment/photos/tsunami-general/. Accessed: 20th Oct 2013. Figure 1.6 - National Geographic (2005). Photo Gallery: Tsunami. [Online] Available: http://environment.nationalgeographic.com/environment/photos/tsunami-general/. Accessed: 20th Oct 2013. Figure 1.7 - IFRC (2013). World Disasters Report: Focus on technology and the future of humanitarian action. Lyons, France: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Figure 1.8 - Photius (1992). Peru - Human Settlement and Population through time. [Online] Available: http:// www.photius.com/countries/peru/society/peru_society_human_settlement_and~763.html. Accessed: 14th Jan 2014. Figure 1.9 - da Silva, J (2010). Lessons From Aceh - Key Considerations in Post-Disaster-Reconstruction. Warwickshire: Practical Action Publishing. Figure 1.10 - da Silva, J (2010). Lessons From Aceh - Key Considerations in Post-Disaster-Reconstruction. Warwickshire: Practical Action Publishing. Figure 1.11 - da Silva, J (2010). Lessons From Aceh - Key Considerations in Post-Disaster-Reconstruction. Warwickshire: Practical Action Publishing. Figure 1.12 - Harris, V (2011). Beyond Shelter - Architecture and Human Dignity; The Architecture of Risk. New York: Metropolis Books. Figure 1.13 - Harris, V (2011). Beyond Shelter - Architecture and Human Dignity; The Architecture of Risk. New York: Metropolis Books. Figure 2.1 - da Silva, J (2010). Lessons From Aceh - Key Considerations in Post-Disaster-Reconstruction. Warwickshire: Practical Action Publishing. Figure 2.2 - Amaratunga, D & Haigh, R (2011). Post-Disaster Reconstruction of the Built Environment: Rebuilding for Resilience. West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Figure 2.3 - Amaratunga, D & Haigh, R (2011). Post-Disaster Reconstruction of the Built Environment: Rebuilding for Resilience. West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Figure 2.4 - Mantel, C (2012). Ownership, Control and Accountability in Post-Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Process in Aceh, Indonesia. In Barenstien, J & Leeman, E (eds). Post-Disaster Reconstruction and Change: Communities’ Perspectives. Florida: CRC Press. Pp 55-70. Figure 2.5 - Mantel, C (2012). Ownership, Control and Accountability in Post-Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Process in Aceh, Indonesia. In Barenstien, J & Leeman, E (eds). Post-Disaster Reconstruction and Change: Communities’ Perspectives. Florida: CRC Press. Pp 55-70. Figure 2.6 - Mantel, C (2012). Ownership, Control and Accountability in Post-Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Process in Aceh, Indonesia. In Barenstien, J & Leeman, E (eds). Post-Disaster Reconstruction and Change: Communities’ Perspectives. Florida: CRC Press. Pp 55-70. Figure 2.7 - Mantel, C (2012). Ownership, Control and Accountability in Post-Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Process in Aceh, Indonesia. In Barenstien, J & Leeman, E (eds). Post-Disaster Reconstruction and Change: Communities’ Perspectives. Florida: CRC Press. Pp 55-70. Figure 3.1 - BRR & International Partners (2005), Aceh and Nias One Year After the Tsunami: the Recovery Effort and Way Forward, Jakarta: BRR.

Figure 3.3 - da Silva, J (2010). Lessons From Aceh - Key Considerations in Post-Disaster-Reconstruction. Warwickshire: Practical Action Publishing. Figure 3.4 - da Silva, J (2010). Lessons From Aceh - Key Considerations in Post-Disaster-Reconstruction. Warwickshire: Practical Action Publishing. Figure 3.5 - Global Communities. (2006). AIG Disaster Relief Fund and CHF Rebuild Peunayong Market in Banda Aceh, Indonesia. [Online] Available: http://www.globalcommunities.org/node/21290. Accessed 14th Jan 2014. Figure 3.6 - Global Communities. (2006). AIG Disaster Relief Fund and CHF Rebuild Peunayong Market in Banda Aceh, Indonesia. [Online] Available: http://www.globalcommunities.org/node/21290. Accessed 14th Jan 2014. Figure 3.7 - CHF International (2008). Indonesia: The CHF International Approach. Maryland, USA: CHF International. [Online] Available: http://www.globalcommunities.org/publications/2008-indonesia-chf-internationalapproach.pdf. Accessed 14th Dec Figure 3.8 - CHF International (2008). Indonesia: The CHF International Approach. Maryland, USA: CHF International. [Online] Available: http://www.globalcommunities.org/publications/2008-indonesia-chf-internationalapproach.pdf. Accessed 14th Dec

Introduction The objective of this dissertation is to explore the benefits and limitations of owner- and donor-drive approaches to post-disaster reconstruction. This study will specifically focus on the province of Aceh, North Sumatra, Indonesia (see figure 1.4)â&#x20AC;&#x201C; an area hit critically by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. This will include looking at the key benefits and limitations of both approaches as well as the lessons learnt from each approach. The study will provide a discussion of post-disaster reconstruction by looking at several case files that have adopted owner- and donor-driven approaches in differing ways.

Figure 1.4 - Regional Map of Aceh Province. Source: Jauhola, 2013. A conference with respected shelter after disaster research associate, William Flinn (2013) reveals that in recent history, the outcome and result of the Indian Ocean tsunami has changed the landscape of the reconstruction sector. Not only because aid funding for the disaster was US$6.1 billion (Jayasuriya & McCrawley, 2010), an unprecedented amount that no disaster aid has come close to, but a huge learning curve after such innovative reconstruction projects. Some of these projects were successful and other were not. This dissertation will pick out several case files from the Aceh region In North Sumatra, comparing the benefits and limitations of each approach as well as a discussion on the lessons learnt.

This study will be divided in to four sections: • The first chapter will define disasters and show insight into the context of disasters and post-disaster reconstruction. Definitions of key terms and statistics of recent disasters from the 21st century will be stated. Reconstruction approaches and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami will be introduced. • Chapter two will look in depth at owner-driven reconstruction in the context of Aceh, Indonesia. Principal characteristics and circumstances will be clearly established as well as in depth context of this reconstruction approach. Case studies have been chosen to demonstrate the aspects of the approach which is illustrated through determining the: context, documentation of the reconstruction process, key benefits and limitations and the lessons learnt. • The third chapter is an account of donor-driven reconstruction approaches after the 2004 tsunami. The main characteristics and contexts of the approach will be established. Two case studies from the Aceh region have been selected to illustrate the key aspects of the approach through determining the: context, documentation of the reconstruction process, key benefits and limitations and the lessons learnt. • The final chapter will be a discussion of the two reconstruction approaches. Key principles will be picked out and general benefits and limitations will be highlighted for each approach. A general discussion about the future of Shelter After Disaster and the role of the architect within this context will follow. Research methods used to carry out this study include both primary and secondary sources. Primary research methods include semi-structured informative interviews with professionals in shelter after disaster and disaster management fields. Secondary research methods, in the form of a desk study, included a review of relevant literature, and case study evaluations. Most research methods utilised qualitative data methods. Key Informant Interviews:

Informant Name

Job Title

William Flinn

Shelter After Disaster Research As- 13th December 2013 sociate for Oxfam. CENDEP (Centre for Development & Emergency Practice) Lecturer at Oxford Brookes University. Post-Disaster Reconstruction, Dis30th December 2013 aster Management and Risk Reduction Consultant. Guest Lecturer on Disaster Management.

Rumana Kabir

Date of Interview

The outcome of this research is to clearly distinguish the differences of each reconstruction approach and the differing ways either approach can be carried out. Highlighting the benefits and limitations of each approach within the context of the Aceh Province and the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. An additional result for this study is to determine what the reconstruction and shelter after disaster sectors have learnt from Aceh’s rehabilitation programmes together with a view on the role of the architect within such projects.

I I.I

Disasters and Post-Disaster Reconstruction Disasters (definitions and statistics)

According to Wisner et al., (2004, Pp.5) disasters are a ‘complex mix of natural hazards and human action’. These events have the capability to destroy life, the natural landscape and man-made infrastructure. Natural disasters are unpredictable, overpowering and outside of our control, resulting in catastrophic consequences (McDonald, 2003) (see figures 1.5 & 1.6). Three main categories of natural disasters account for 90% of the world’s direct losses: floods, earthquakes and tropical cyclones (Swiss Reinsurance Company, 2010). The Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (UNDRO) highlights post-disaster housing as “housing policies and applications following a disaster for meeting the urgent, temporary and permanent shelter needs of the survivors of the disaster” (1982, p.11).

Figure 1.5 - Flooding in Kalutara, Sri Lanka after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Source: National Geographic, 2005.

Figure 1.6 - 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami devastation in Sri Lankan coastal village. Source: National Geographic, 2005.

It is widely agreed that the effect a disaster has on a community is determined by the vulnerability of the affected area. Pelling (2003) identifies vulnerability as having an ‘exposure to risk and an inability to avoid or absorb potential harm’. While Wisner et al. (2004) explains vulnerability as the state of being prone to damage or injury, incorporating a combination of factors that determine the degree to which someone’s life and livelihood is at risk: damage, loss, and suffering. The components of impact can be understood through a series of characteristics, which include: class, caste, ethnicity, gender, disability, age, and seniority (Wisner et al, 2004). In the last decade, the world has suffered some of the deadliest disasters, from the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami to the 2010 Haitian earthquake. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) released statistics in 2013 that indicate fatalities of over 1 million people between 2003 and 2012 (see figure 1.7) . With 2004 (242,010 deaths) and 2010 (297,730 deaths) being extraordinarily high. The 364 natural disasters recorded in the year of 2012 affected 139 million people (IFRC, 2013). Shortly after the release of the World Development Report 2013 release in October, another catastrophe struck the Asian continent, Typhoon Haiyan, paralyzing the Philippines. At the time of writing, there was a preliminary total 5,665 fatalities with several thousand still missing (BBC News, 2013). Unfortunately, the next disaster will be just around the corner and the need for shelter after such natural phenomenon is absolute.

236 World Disasters Report 2013

Table 6 Total number of people reported killed, by type of phenomenon and year (2003–2012) 2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

208

n.a.

424

Earthquakes/tsunamis

29,617

227,290

76,241

6,692

780

87,918

1,888

226,735

20,946

711

678,818

Extreme temperatures

74,748

556

814

5,104

1,044

1,608

1,212

57,064

806

1,758

144,714

3,770

7,102

5,754

5,845

8,565

4,029

3,534

8,571

6,142

3,574

56,886

Forest/scrub fires

150

190

135

717

Insect infestation

n.d.r.

n.a.

n.d.r.

n.a.

n.d.r.

n.a.

n.d.r.

n.a.

Mass movement: dry2

n.d.r.

120

n.d.r.

227

Mass movement: wet3

707

313

646

1,638

271

504

657

3,402

314

504

8,956

Volcanic eruptions

n.a.

323

n.a.

363

1,030

6,609

5,294

4,329

6,035

140,985

3,287

1,498

3,103

3,071

175,241

80,340

14,674

12,643

17,140

16,065

147,218

8,882

70,672

10,375

8,929

386,938

Droughts/food insecurity

Floods1

Windstorms Subtotal climato-, hydro- and meteorological disasters

29,617

227,336

76,244

6,708

791

88,054

1,924

227,058

20,949

727

679,408

109,957

242,010

88,887

23,848

16,856

235,272

10,806

297,730

31,324

9,656

1,066,346 13,287

Industrial accidents

1,444

1,797

2,281

1,857

1,667

776

933

1,061

684

787

Miscellaneous accidents

1,438

2,115

2,669

1,126

909

895

911

1,507

755

1,112

13,437

Transport accidents

7,868

6,417

6,702

7,021

5,075

5,275

5,021

4,176

5,144

4,151

56,850

10,750

10,329

11,652

10,004

7,651

6,946

6,865

6,744

6,583

6,050

83,574

120,707

252,339

100,539

33,852

24,507

242,218

17,671

304,474

37,907

15,706

1,149,920

Total technological disasters Total

Source: EM-DAT, CRED, University of Louvain, Belgium

Figure 1.7 - Total number of people killed by type of phenomenon. Source: IFRC, 2013.

I.II

Post-Disaster Reconstruction

A house is often the biggest asset a household will possess in their lifetime (Wisner et al., 2004) and a disaster has the power to take this possession from its owner, leaving a family with no shelter, no home and no livelihood. Reconstruction is an inevitable stage after devastation has hit land. Not only does a disaster create physical damage to infrastructure and environment, but the psychological damage endured by the community could be much greater. The process of recreating someone’s home will take years of incremental development with or without external assistance, that will need to meet their needs (Wisner et al., 2004). Shelter after disaster (SAD) is required to provide security and personal safety, sustain family and community life in the stages following a disaster (da Silva, 2010). One of the world’s leading Shelter After Disaster (SAD) specialists and author of the seminal text ‘Shelter After Disaster’, Ian Davis highlights in his article ‘What have we learned from 40 years’ experience of Disaster Shelter’ (2011) the growth of SAD for developing countries. Davis reached out to a number of experts in the SAD industry, all from varying backgrounds, experiences and understandings of the subject. Mo Hamza; professor at Copenhagen University, Denmark, whom also is an independent disaster risk management consultant in architecture and planning, understands that there is a significance of a shelter or dwelling bring ‘home’. He further elaborates that ‘shelter is the foundation block to people’s recovery’. Moreover, Manu Gupta, also an architect and planner, and director and co-founder of SEEDS, an Indian based NGO seeking to protect the ‘lives and livelihoods of people exposed or prone to disasters’ (SEEDS, 2012). Gupta believes that fulfilling aspirations and building confidence is key to recovery. Stating that ‘home is a manifestation of life long struggles and aspirations, shelter… should restore their confidence of living safely’. Building back better, a term that has ‘become a mantra of 21st century post-disaster reconstruction … It is to diminish the impact of future disasters’ (Infante, 2013). Buildings need to become more resistant to damage and communities need to become more resilient to threat. Before the reconstruction stage begins, governments and agencies need to assess the state of a country prior to the disaster. Understanding the social, political, economic and environmental conditions to effectively present a suitable approach for rebuilding the damaged community.

Annex Disaster data

Focus on technology and the future of humanitarian action

Subtotal geophysical disasters Total natural disasters

Total

In 1970, major earthquakes struck both Peru and Turkey (see figure 1.8). In response to these devastating disasters, the SAD sector; for the first time, reconstructed on a large scale by professionals. Governments from both affected countries inaugurated large reconstruction programmes. Relocation was one of the main solutions, as well as receiving assistance from external humanitarian agencies on a groundbreaking scale (Schilderman & Lyons, 2010). There was little previous experience with reconstruction programmes of a similar magnitude prior to this. The approach followed by governments and agencies alike were to build houses for the people rather than with them â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the beginnings of the donor-driven approach. As highlighted by Wisner et al., (2004) they had often got it wrong, with many of the houses remaining unoccupied. The affected populations soon returned to their old ways of building, remaining vulnerable to future risks (Schilderman, 2010). For social and economic reasons, affected communities are often willing to live with the risk rather than confront the difficulties of breaking their ties with traditions, land and origins (Aysan & Oliver, 1987).

Figure 1.8 - Devastation after the 1970 Peruvian Earthquake in Ancash. Source: Photius, 1992. Still in 2013, many government and aid agency reconstruction strategies continue to work on housing for affected communities that still remain uninhabited. A considerable amount of pressure is being put on decision-makers as their solutions lead to thousands of villages living in temporary accommodations. The media will put additional pressure on the situation if takes too long to create a viable solution. Decisions are still made in a hurry, without much investigation or analysis, and without involving all of the community, whom matter the most (Schilderman & Lyons, 2010).

I.III

Reconstruction Approaches

Throughout the years, governments and agencies have formulated countless approaches to providing shelter for affected communities. This long list can be divided into two general categories: owner-driven reconstruction and donor-driven reconstruction. As Burnell & Sanderson (2010) state in their article ‘Beyond Shelter after Disaster: Practice, Process and Possibilities’ any approach from the list tackle numerous complex issues. These include: sorting land ownership, materials procurement, organizing engagement with those affected, density, rubble clearance, government involvement, space and coordination. The complexity of reducing vulnerability to disasters continues to remain the same requiring a view of reconstruction that goes beyond the production of safe buildings or provision of non-food items to encompass sustainable livelihood development (Lyons et al., 2010). The Owner-Driven Reconstruction (ODR) approach is where donors support housing undertaken by homeowners. It is based on the knowledge that, in non-disaster circumstances, the majority of the population build or manage the construction of their own houses (Schilderman, 2010). In this case governments and agencies often informally follow Turner’s (1976, p.139) terminology: ‘users decide and users provide’. NGOs have provided support to ODR for decades, however on a much smaller scale (Schilderman & Lyons, 2010). Despite that, it is now becoming more widespread, and has been given a number of internal variations (Schilderman, 2010). In ODR, also known as the people-centered approach, there is a bigger role for communities, with the agencies and governments playing more of a supportive role (see figure 1.9). The approach allows the respondents to reconstruct their homes with financial assistance and technical guidance provided by the government (Powell, 2011). The alternative approach, donor-driven reconstruction (DDR) is an approach that involves donors – including governments, multilateral and bilateral agencies or humanitarian agencies (see figure 1.10). They decide how and what to build, with construction organised directly, or through contractors (Schilderman, 2010). Turner (1976, p.139) identifies this typical supply-driven housing process through his term: ‘sponsors decide and sponsors provide’. DDR often uses technologies and designs that the community may not understand. This approach was based on principles that complex engineering and higher standards could solve the lack of resistance to disasters. Normally controlled by an external non-government organisation, an agency is enlisted to the services of a contractor who undertakes the design and construction work (Schilderman & Lyons, 2010). The DDR is commonly known as the contractor- or agency-driven approach and is primarily adopted by governments. To them, it is considered to be the easiest and quickest way of providing housing and order on a large scale for affected populations after a disaster (Powell, 2011).

Figure 1.9 - Community involvement in an ODR programme in Aceh. Source: da Silva, 2010

Figure 1.10 - BRR resettlement sites allocated in a DDR programme in Aceh. Source: da Silva, 2010

I.IV

2004 Indian Ocean tsunami

This investigation will focus on reconstruction approaches in Aceh, Indonesia, following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. The tsunami that hit Asia on the 26th December 2004 was the second deadliest disasters of the 21st century (succeeding the 2010 Haitian Earthquake) with 227,898 deaths in all countries and 167,540 in Indonesia alone (Jayasuriya & McCrawley, 2010). The earthquake’s epicentre was located off the coast of Northwest Sumatra, Indonesia, (see figure 1.11) close to the city of Banda Aceh. The seabed rose by 5 meters, creating giant waves of up to 1000km per hour heading straight for the Acehnese coast (Jayasuriya & McCrawley, 2010). The Aceh province was the worst affected area of the worst hit region, 166,000 people were reported dead or missing, more than 500,000 were displaced and over 800km of coastline was destroyed (da Silva, 2010). Indonesia, which frequently experiences serious natural disasters, was caught unprepared by the scale of the disaster (see figures 1.12 and 1.13). Local communities and national governments, helped by international agencies immediately organized emergency relief operations and, quickly provided food, clean water, basic health services, and temporary shelter (Jayasuriya & McCrawley, 2010).

Figure 1.11 - Epicentre of the earthquake and illustration of its impact. Source: da Silva, 2010 Aceh, one of Indonesia’s poorest and most vulnerable areas, had already suffered from nearly three decades of armed conflict (Jauhola, 2013). As Armatunga & Haigh (2011) indicate in their text, ‘Post-Disaster Reconstruction of the Built Environment: Rebuilding for Resilience’, the infrastructure in Indonesia is not well designed to deal with disasters. Many houses were not designed to resist earthquakes, tsunamis or flooding. The increase in population size and density also contributed to the vulnerability of Indonesia (Amaratunga & Haigh, 2011). As a developing country, government funding available to establish Indonesia as a country resilient to disaster is still limited and infrastructure was not in place to cope with disasters. Ethnic diversity, different beliefs, and deep gaps between wealth and poverty are among factors that contributed to the areas vulnerability. The level of education and knowledge especially about disaster management is very low (Amaratunga & Haigh, 2011).

The funding for the disaster initially appeared to be more than adequate to cover both initial relief and reconstruction (Jayasuriya & McCrawley, 2010). Because of large sums of funds, raised internationally, agencies who particularly specialised in disaster response, for the first time expanded their activities to reconstruction (Lyons, Schilderman et al., 2011). The key stakeholders for Acehâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s recovery were: governments, NGOâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s, and corporate businesses. According to the Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR); or Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias, 78 countries, 30 organisations and many individual donors promised support of approximately US$6.1 billion in total by November 2005 (Jayasuriya & McCrawley, 2010). The UKâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC), a management and administration organisation, raised over US$600 million. The funds were allocated to its member agencies; including the British Red Cross and Islamic Relief, among others, accounting for the building of 15% of the overall housing requirement (da Silva, 2010). In some cases, such as the United Kingdom, United States, and Italy, private contributions exceeded government contributions by a wide margin (BRR & International Partners, 2005). The following chapters will examine the owner- and donor-driven reconstruction approaches undertaken in the Aceh province, as a response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.

Figure 1.12 - Acehnese coastline before the tsunami. Source: Harris, 2011.

Figure 1.13 - Acehnese coastline after the tsunami. Source: Harris, 2011.

Owner-Driven Reconstruction

The participatory, (ODR) approach to reconstruction is built on the view that people who are affected by a disaster should participate in the reconstruction process. In essence, it indicates that people are empowered to be in control of the development process (Kenny, 2010). Hinton & Groves (2004) determine that this particular approach involved respecting, listening to and working with local people and that local participation (see figure 2.1) is key to a successful owner-driven redeployment scheme. The key stakeholders in Acehâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s owner-driven recovery were local Acehnese survivors, Acehnese NGOs (initiated in the aftermath of the tsunami), the Acehnese diaspora, Indonesians from outside Aceh: including government officials, religious leaders and NGOs, both large and small and international NGOs (Kenny, 2010). Many organisations began construction without clear strategies, and as a result constructed unsuitable housing that did not meet requirements or needs of the community. This led to delays and even abandoning of the initial programmes (da Silva & Batchelor, 2010). Several organisations aimed at empowering women in the planning and decision making stages. Others implemented cash for work schemes to rebuild infrastructure and one agency provided micro-finance for manufacturing and construction materials (da Silva, 2010). In some programmes cash was provided directly to chosen households, who were then responsible for the purchase of materials or labour locally. Other programmes provided materials to communities, which were purchased from national or international suppliers (da Silva & Batchelor, 2010). Some owner-driven reconstruction schemes integrated a contractor into their programme, where the agency effectively took the role of developer, developing a design, and nominating a contractor for the build. Organisations in this type of hybrid scheme continued to involve the communities in the physical planning, design or overseeing the quality of construction (da Silva & Batchelor, 2010). Essentially maintaining the participatory nature of typical owner-driven reconstruction programmes. The following three case files have been chosen for further exploration of their differing approaches to ODR. Figure 2.1 - Participatory planning is commonly adopt- The JUB/UPLINK strategy was to an extent a scaling up of ODR, where 3500 homes were constructed for those ed by ODR programmes. Source: da Silva, 2010. whose properties had perished in the disaster. The last two, are villages close to one another, of smaller scale to the previous, in an area of the Acehnese coast that was worst hit. Each village utilised a differing approach to community participation in ODR. To examine each case, the; context, documentation of the reconstruction process, key benefits and limitations and key principles, have been outlined.

II.I

JUB/UPLINK

Context Jaringan Udeep Beusaree (JUB) (the village solidarity network) – is a network of 25 Acehnese costal fishing villages that was initiated post-disaster (Ophiyandri, 2011). 47% per cent of the network’s population died, reducing the population to 6,500 (WHA, 2007). There was a need for 3500 homes to be reconstructed (see figure 2.2). Urban Poor Linkage (UPLINK), an Indonesian partnership of community based organisations and NGOs focusing on impoverishment issues, supported management for the reconstruction (DIABP, 2008). All houses are free for beneficiaries, with additional project benefits of: creating economic renewal, reinforcement of social relations/cultural cohesion, and environmental regeneration (Ophiyandri, 2011). This project used donor aid provided in response to the event (Ophiyandri, 2011). The programme has cost around US$45 million. MISEREOR Germany, Development and Peace Canada, CIDA Canada, and Plan International are the major project donors. There are also in-kind contributions from the beneficiaries who provide labour, local wisdom, particiFigure 2.2 - JUB village data. Source: Amaratunga & Haigh, 2011 pation and solidarity in the overall planning and implementation of the project (WHA, 2007).

Documentation of the reconstruction process Community members were involved in most aspects of the programme. Some important roles of the beneficiaries - or community members - through the housing reconstruction (see figure 2.3) process were (Ophiyandri, 2011): • The homeowners are implementers, builders and inspectors. Construction did not involve contractors. • Families are asked to chose one design from among the five proposed by UPLINK • Beneficiaries are responsible for the supervision of the house construction assisted by UPLINK construction inspectors – maintaining building quality and standards • Communities are invited to procure some materials, while UPLINK provides: timber, steel, cement, sand and rock through the JUB Material Bank. • A card system is initiated for material allocation and distribution. Technical support was also given to communities involved in reconstruction, this included: digital mapping, planning, drawing designs, cost estimation and construction supervision (Ophiyandri, 2011). For any disaster-affected community, rebuilding for resilience is a key aspect for building a community back better, with a non-negotiable rule that construction has to be built for seismic resistance. The project had a target that 60 per cent of the funds for reconstructing houses and infrastructure should stay in the village, so that the rebuilding process boosts the village economies (WHA, 2007). For the economic development, loans are provided for communities, in particular women’s groups to kick start their businesses (Ophiyandri, 2011). Training has been carried out to extend the villagers range of skills and giving them greater opportunities for livelihood development. Typical activities include: acupuncture, block making, composting, mushroom cultivation, disaster management, rice farming, earthquake-resistant construction and pedi-cab businesses (WHA, 2007).

A series of environmental developments have been implemented to reduce the impact of a future disaster. Natural barriers, which create buffer layers between the villages and the coast, have been introduced, such as planting mangrove forests, cypress, coconut, banana, papaya and pine trees. Dikes and ditches will also be established (Ophiyandri, 2011). Evacuation routes, with well-signposted wide escape routes lead the villagers to built evacuation centres in the hills behind villages to reduce their vulnerability to another disaster (WHA, 2007).

Figure 2.3 - Type of houses built in JUB villages (photo by Y. Kusworo). Source: Amaratunga & Haigh, 2011

Key benefits and limitations Since the villagers moved into the reconstructed homes and community, the impact has been a success (WHA, 2007): • The sense of community cohesion has been strengthened in an area which had been torn apart with years of conflict. • There has been an increase of awareness amongst governments, NGOs and other agencies working on similar projects as to the importance of community participation in the post-disaster reconstruction process. • Due to the approach’s success, it has been implemented elsewhere, transferred and up-scaled. For example, the Australian Red Cross is collaborating with UPLINK to initiate the same approach in Nasi Island, a small island off the Banda Aceh coast. It has also been applied by the government Post-tsunami Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency (BRR) to its work (DAIBP, 2008).

The several barriers of the reconstruction programme, outlined by UPLINK were (WHA, 2007): • With the large number of different stakeholders and their differing approaches and attitudes initially created tension and even fragmentation within the communities. Uplink operates an open policy, being keen to work with any groups and organisations willing to co-ordinate and share. • There has been no clear policy and control over the building material prices. The unique context and influx of money has allowed prices to rise significantly. Resulting in possible budgeting problems. Appeals and demands to the government make very little difference. Materials are being shipped from further away where prices are lower.

Lessons Learnt Understanding community aspirations in order to drive the reconstruction process is essential to the ODR process. • Community organisation has been evident from the onset of this programme, with UPLINK assisting the most vulnerable first and training community members. Initiating a network structure through reconstruction is key to the development of the regions a community, economy and livelihoods. • This includes providing loans for people to start small businesses and training the community skills that will further improve their chance at creating successful businesses and giving them confidence. A challenge can be turned into an opportunity. • In the case of UPLINK, one of their main objectives was to provide a sense of security to the affected community. Not only after the devastation of the tsunami, but also to restore stability of the traumatized country, after years of civil unrest. This was achieved by empowering the community through the reconstruction process, including them in decision-making and training them new skills.

II.II

The Devastation of two Small Villages: Lam Guron and Lam Badeuk

The two villages, both in the Aceh region were almost completely wiped out and only about one-quarter of the population remained. “All the houses, any kind of infrastructure, the village mosque and community hall, and the school were gone from one minute to the other” (Mantel, 2012).

Lam Guron Context Lam Guron, a small fishing village on the Acehnese coast, was devastated by the tsunami, with a population that declined to 116 from 320 (see figure 2.4). After the disaster struck, survivors found temporary shelter and emergency aid in a school of an inland neighbouring village (Mantel, 2012). Six weeks after the disaster, the Indonesian government launched a policy declaring 3km of the coastline to become “costal regulation zone” (BAPPENAS, 2005). This policy would have made it virtually impossible for the villagers to return to their land. An Indonesian NGO (name not given) fought the policy by means of advocacy and encouraged the people to move back to their community land immediately (Mantel, 2012). This demonstrated to the Indonesian government their inclination to rebuild where the original village was, claiming right to their ancestral land (ACHR, 2005 see Mantel, 2012 Pp.61). This NGO was supported through a partnership with an experienced Indian NGO, having a leading role in the owner-driven reconstruction after the Gurjat earthquake, 2001 (Mantel, 2012).

Figure 2.4 - The remains of a house in Lam Guron after the tsunami. Source: Mantel, 2012.

Figure 2.5 - Lam Guron after reconstruction. Source: Mantel, 2012.

Key benefits and limitations The villagers of Lam Guron generally felt that the reconstruction process was great (Mantel, 2012): • Complaints about the quality of construction were few. • Those who had lost houses which were of a better quality and standard expressed appreciation about their new home. • The NGO offered technical guidance and training for those with little knowledge or experience in order to ensure the homes were earthquake resistant. The community also encountered some limitations with the reconstruction process: • A few of the villager’s felt that the TPK have taken personal and financial benefit from their position, in particular the leader. • Several villagers mentioned the poor quality of timber building materials, however it was understandable, as one respondent stated, “there was none of better quality” (Mantel, 2012. Pp.66).

Lessons Learnt Working with an organisation or partnership with previous post-disaster reconstruction experience can greatly aid the reconstruction process. • The approach is built on successful experience, from that of the Indian partner NGO, who aimed at giving people full control of the reconstruction of their homes. It is vital to empower the community at the beginning of the programme, aiming at involving them in as many aspects of the reconstruction process as possible. • This ensures that the affected people have a clear understanding of the progression of their homes and have input into the decision-making stages. Communities who are involved in the reconstruction process have a clearer understanding of post-disaster reconstruction. • They become more appreciative of the support and efforts the agencies and organisations offer them.

Lam Badeuk Context In Lam Badeuk, the population decreased significantly, from 782 before the tsunami, to 182 after. The survivors did not move back to their original land soon after the disaster; like those of Lam Guron, but stayed in temporary shelters 30km away from their village. The head of the village had died in the disaster and a meeting was held to elect a new leader. Informal leadership developed from the outset, and a woman accused the new leader of corruption. She soon became one of the key stakeholders in the reconstruction process. An international NGO (name not given) assisted in Lam Badeuk’s redevelopment (Mantel, 2012).

Documentation of reconstruction process The description of this case study is taken from Mantel’s (2012) article: Ownership, Control and Accountability in Post-Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Processes in Aceh, Indonesia (see figures 2.6 and 2.7). “At the beginning, the NGO was successful in motivating the community to participate in planning the reconstruction on their village by drawing a village map with its land plots …Difficulties soon emerged; the NGO aspired to pursue a participatory approach also during construction with the idea of tasking decisions together with the community. The NGO expected people to participate with their free labour in the construction of houses that were not necessarily their own; most people had no building experience and the training was poorly organized … A considerable amount of time was spent in endless meetings discussing various wishes and opinions which many of the community could not attend because of the distance between the camp and village … The villagers depended on indirect information that was often confusing. After 18 months, only 10 houses were completed and the NGO came to a negotiation that the their “participatory approach” was not working as they had expected … The NGO hired a contractor to continue the construction of the remaining 50 houses, but still expected the community to supervise construction. Some tried to do so, but the contractor did not feel accountable for the community and accordingly paid no attention to critiques of the contractors the poor construction quality. As a result, workers suspended construction of the houses of those who criticized them only returning to them after at the end … After this, many villagers were afraid to voice their opinions with the risk that the workers may leave their homes unfinished”

Figure 2.6 - Young fishing traders in Lam Badeuk. Source: Mantel, 2012.

Figure 2.7 - Lam Badeuk after reconstruction. Source: Mantel, 2012.

Key benefits and limitations The villagers were frustrated about the whole reconstruction process (Mantel, 2012) • They had a combination of real safety issues and concerns with visible flaws like cracks in the paint that might not have been a safety problem but contributed to the feeling of powerlessness and insecurity. • The quality of construction was poorer than expected • The lack of trust in the contractor led to high levels of dissatisfaction and to feeling unsafe in the new houses. • Information came from both leaders and was at times confusing and contradictory. • The NGO found it difficult to fulfil the communities’ wishes and high expectations.

Lessons Learnt Experience in post disaster reconstruction is of the utmost importance in understanding what strategies work as a success. • The NGO involved in Lam Badeuk’s reconstruction; although having good intentions, had no previous experience in housing reconstruction post-disaster. Leadership is key, especially in a community that has endured such a decline in population. • Lam Badeuk’s head of the village had died in the disaster and so an election took place, some of the villagers did not agree with the outcome and so informal leaders emerged. The confusion of both leaders bringing contradictory information back to camp created bad management, confusion and tension – resulting in consequences through the whole reconstruction process. Trust in agencies, organisations or any other parties involved in the reconstruction process creates an enjoyable process and positive outcome • The trust issue between the community and the NGO/contractor made the process unpleasant for the respondents. It is not possible for a community to enforce good construction quality if they have no input into the rebuilding phase of the programme. In this chapter, several owner-driven approaches were explored – some were successful while others were ineffective. The key lessons learnt from owner-driven reconstruction are that trust, leadership, community empowerment and clear communication are pertinent to a successful outcome when using ODR. The benefits, limitations and principles will be investigated further in the conclusion, compared alongside those of donor-driven reconstruction.

III Donor-Driven Reconstruction The donor-driven approach is typically controlled by an external non-government agency on an individual community basis. Governments predominantly adopt this approach, considered to be the easiest and quickest way of providing housing on a large scale to affected communities. Documented advantages of this approach include (Lyons, Schilderman et al., 2011): • It is the preferable approach where there is a lack of construction knowledge and self-building traditions within a community • Agencies consider this is the most appropriate approach when the site condition is deemed too unsafe to reconstruct • Vulnerable beneficiaries benefit as they may be incapacitated and unable to take advantage of the ODR approach Advocates of large-scale ODR Schilderman & Lyons (2011) highlight several drawbacks to DDR in their book Building Back Better: delivering people-centred housing reconstruction at scale. These drawbacks include: • A lack of user participation leading to inappropriate designs • A preference for building many uniform houses on large sites, which are difficult and time consuming to acquire and service • High cost, but often with limited spin-off into local economy • Lack of local capacity building As a result of the construction sector becoming more aware of the limitations in ODR, a hybrid of incorporating ODR into DDR has become apparent, introducing some of the core principles of ODR to a typically contractor-based approach. This allows for DDR to become more aware of the importance of livelihood development and focus not only on provision of facilities, but gradually including people into the process. The key stakeholders in this contractor-based approach involve large NGOs, donors and governments. The government or external agency, whom is funding the project, will lead the reconstruction process with assistance from consultants and contractors facilitating the programme (Ratnayake, 2009). Many agencies and governments involved in Aceh’s recovery initiated disaster responses followed the DDR approach. Most of these were large organisations. Islamic Relief (2005), an international relief and development charity based in the United Kingdom reconstructed housing and key infrastructure, such as essential medical centres across the Aceh region. They also introduced a cash-for-work scheme, aiming at reconstructing the economy, effectively developing the communities’ livelihoods (Islamic Relief, 2005a). The British Red Cross (2010), is another large humanitarian organisation aiding disaster-affected communities. Kabir (2013) states that the British Red Cross had a successful programme – using contractors, while letting the community have ownership over management and supervision. Their efforts in the tsunami recovery included: large scale housing reconstruction, repairing hundreds of fishing boats, introducing cash grants, rehabilitating the local agriculture and training the local population how to rebuild (British Red Cross, 2005). The following case files critically explore the differing approaches to donor-driven reconstruction. The Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR) was an organisation initiated by the Indonesian government, the agency was involved in more reconstruction than any other agency in Aceh. The BRR tackled the reconstruction of thousands of homes, critical infrastructure, industry and livelihoods. The CHF (Cooperative Housing Foundation), an American international organisation initiated a programme of a smaller scale, focusing particularly of rehabilitating the economy and reconstructing homes. To examine each case, the context, documentation of the reconstruction process,

III.I

The Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR)

Context On 16 April 2005, the Indonesian government established the BRR, knows as the Aceh Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency. The BRR, based in Banda Aceh, was a government agency that worked alongside several organisations and agencies, including the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to the newly founded BRR (BAPPENAS, 2007). Their designated aim was to restore livelihood and strengthening communities in Aceh before overseeing a coordinated reconstruction development programme (Jayasuriya and McCrawley, 2010). The BRR was established as a coordinating rather than executive agency to operate for a four-year period, to ensure transparency, accountability and speed in reconstruction (BAPPENAS, 2007). During the emergency response stage, the Indonesian government received more than US$700 million as tsunami aid (Mardhatillah, 2010). The government’s approach included rehabilitation of the communities’ livelihoods and the reconstruction of their homes. Their homes were constructed either in their original village or close to the location they lived in before the tsunami (Wegelin, 2006). The government’s master plan was formulated in early 2005 by the reconstruction planners, and later formalised by Indonesia law which was taken as a general guide for the BRR in managing the reconstruction process (Mardhatillah, 2010). The master plan was divided into two categories, short-term and medium-term developments. The short-term efforts ran from shortly after the disaster struck, up to two years after the event, and is referred to as the ‘rehabilitation’ phase having the aim to restore public services to a higher level (Mardhatillah, 2010). The medium-term efforts, known as the ‘reconstruction’ phase continued to four years after the disaster, encompassing the rebuilding of the social, economic, cultural and political infrastructure (Mardhatillah, 2010).

Figure 3.1 - BRR’s sequencing emergency and recovery. Source: BRR & International Partners (2005).

Documentation of the reconstruction process The first priority was house construction (see figure 3.1), these activities were expected to peak at the end of 2006 and be completed by 2007. The second priority in the early-stage was the rebuilding of livelihoods. Rebuilding infrastructure would take longer with limited activity expected until 2006. The process of rebuilding livelihoods and infrastructure was expected to be completed by the end of 2009 (Jayasuriya & McCrawley, 2010). “The tsunami changed much of the physical landscape, which included references to land plots and boundaries. For most families, land was their most valuable physical asset… The BRR, in partnership with the National Land Administration Agency launched a project for Reconstruction of the Aceh Land Administration System (RALAS), in August 2005 … Aims for the project were to identify land ownership, recover land records and establish a land database (see figure 3.2). This included issuing of 600 000 land titles by the time the project was completed in 2008” (Jayasuriya & McCrawley, 2010, Pp. 94-95). Major housing rehabilitation and reconstruction began in mid-May 2005 (see figure 3.3) (Jayasuriya & McCrawley, 2010). The BRR initiated two core objectives for its housing reconstruction phases. Each surviving family would be entitled to grant funds to rebuild their household, amounting to US$3000 per family if the house had to be built from scratch. US$1000 was given to households who only needed their homes to be renovated. Grant funds were also allocated for repairing and reconstruction of the communities’ key infrastructure (Wegelin, 2006). It was estimated by the BRR that a housing reconstruction programme for 85,000 new houses and 17,000 renovated houses was needed to recover from the devastation. The reconstruction, not including redeveloping community infrastructure amounted to US$ 280 million (Wegelin, 2006). “Efforts to rehabilitate livelihoods involved several activities. First, steps were taken to restore the agriculture and fishery sectors through revitalizing agricultural and plantation land, rebuilding ports, and replacing lost fishing boats. Second, microfinance, other forms of cheap credit, and assistance were made available for small and medium enterprises. Third, employment programmes such as cash-for-work and training programmes were developed.” (BRR & International Partners, 2005 see Jayasuriya and McCrawley, 2010, Pp. 99). BRR reported in December 2006, 50,000 hectares of agricultural land has been restored, 4400 boats had been replaced and 680 hectares of fishponds repaired (Jayasuriya & McCrawley, 2010). SPAN (2005), indicated that in September 2005, approximately 46% of the population in the region above 10 was engaged in some form of employment, 49% of which were self employed. By April 2006, the BRR had trained 148,000 people skills enabling them to return to the job market, more than 41,000 farmers had been assisted to return to their fields (BRR, 2006 see Jayasuriya & McCrawley, 2010, Pp. 102).

Figure 3.2 - A village plan signed by residents and RALAS. Source: BRR, 2006

Figure 3.3 - Brick housing reconstruction to reduce impact from future disasters. Source: da Silva, 2010.

The need for social and health care recovery was pertinent for livelihood rehabilitation (see figure 3.4) (Jayasuriya & McCrawley, 2010). Around 2000 school buildings needed to be rebuilt and approximately 2500 teaching positions needed to be filled. By December 2006, it was reported that only around 750 schools had been built, but 5400 teaching positions had been filled. In terms of school buildings, only around 40% of the target had been reached but the number of teachers had exceeded pre-tsunami levels (BRR & Partners, 2006). In the health sector, by the end of 2006, 324 hospitals and health clinics/centres had been rebuilt, far exceeding the number of health services prior to the tsunami (Jayasuriya & McCrawley, 2010). “Towards the end of 2005 USAID agreed to reconstruct 240 km of road from Banda Aceh to Meulaboh … Meanwhile, the Japan International Cooperation Agency agreed to rehabilitate the existing 122 km road from Calang to Meulaboh … Moreover, the Asian Development Bank agreed to finance the rehabilitation of another main route, a 490 km road connecting Banda Aceh with North Sumatra… Besides roads, BRR indicated that 14 seaports, 11 airports/air strips, 120 arterial bridges and around 1500 minor bridges needed to be rebuilt. Compared with progress in other sectors, infrastructure reconstruction was relatively slow” (Jayasuriya & McCrawley, 2010, Pp. 104-105). The infrastructure’s reconstruction encountered problems that caused the construction process to develop at a slow pace. Concerning issues involved in the development were: land acquisition, substandard planning and poor weather (Jayasuriya & McCrawley, 2010).

Key benefits and limitations Several of the key benefits from the BRR’s approach include (Jayasuriya & McCrawley, 2010., Wegelin, 2006., Mardhatillah, 2010): • Peace talks had commenced prior to the tsunami, but progress to regain peace after the civil unrest was slow. The BRR put pressure on the parties to the peace negotiations to reach early agreements on key issues for reconstruction to progress smoothly. Suddenly, the great majority of people in the region were united in their demand that there be peace. • Given the generous financial assistance for post-tsunami reconstruction coming from national and international donors, the BRR had adequate resources to support the housing reconstruction program. • One action that was taken by the BRR was joint land titling between husbands and wives. This demonstrated to be the one like in the chain of gender issues and encouraged the participation of women in reconstruction. • The BRR targeted all aspects of recovery in Aceh, not only reinstating the communities’ shelter, but dividing the rehabilitation into categories of: land titling, housing, livelihood recovery, social and health services and infrastructure. This organisation allowed every aspect of the populations life to be reconstructed, rehabilitated or reinstated in someway. The limitations of the BRR’s approach encompass (Jayasuriya & McCrawley, 2010., Mardhatillah, 2010): • Various statements and pledges from government leaders, NGOs and donors, generated unrealistic high community expectations. • Spending by the BRR had lagged well behind budget – under expenditure of this degree was a threat in leading to widespread dissatisfaction amongst Acehenese locals. • Issues of coordination and commitment arose, where the BRR needed to establish smooth coordination agreements with local governments and donor agencies. They were unable to work in cohesion with the three separate divisions: the Executive Agency, the Advisory Board and the Supervisory Board. • There was a challenge in establishing a viable exit strategy. The mandate of BRR continued until 2009, when it was expected for the redevelopment process to be handed to local governments. There was an inevitable challenge in the completion of the transitional process between the BRR and the local governments. • The BRR had been accused for employing more workers from outside Aceh than from the local population. Especially dominant in the first year of reconstruction when it forced to recruit a high number of staff from Jakarta. These positions included planning and management of the programme.

Lessons Learnt Effective coordination amongst all agencies is essential to a large-scale reconstruction process using DDR. • The BRR, as a coordinating agency needed to operate in close collaboration with local people, local governments and donor agencies. When there was inadequate consultation and coordination, reconstruction programmes tended to be delayed, parties involved lacked a sense of ownership towards the various activities. This includes the coordination of the monies, so that under expenditure does not occur, like it did in the case for the BRR. Working closely alongside the affected community in all stages of reconstruction is important to successfully develop and create a sense of community cohesion. • The BRR had been accused of employing staff from outside Aceh, creating strains on the already damaged region. Employment within the local population not only creates a sense of unity and pride, but also the local knowledge these people have for Aceh could be key in shaping an appropriate and successful reconstruction programme. Establishing a sense of safety and security will allow for a community to recover and prosper from its development into the future. • One of the BRR’s initial key principles in their Aceh recovery programme was to bring peace to the devastated Indonesian region after unstable civil unrest. The BRR’s scheme effectively enforced peace agreements that revealed to be pertinent to Aceh’s reconstruction programme.

Figure 3.4 - BRR’s reconstruction of schools. Source: da Silva, 2010.

III.II

The CHF (Cooperative Housing Foundation)/Global Communities

Context CHF International, known now as Global Communities (2013), is an international non-profit organisation that works closely with communities to improve the lives and livelihoods of the vulnerable. CHF was one of the first international agencies to respond to the disaster, resulting in them being the recipient of USAID’s High Impact and Revitalization of the Economy of Aceh (HIRE) programme (CHF International, 2008). CHF partners in this programme with: DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary, AmeriCares Foundation, Briggs & Stratton Corporation and AIG DRF (CHF International, 2005). In 2005, the US government provided $400 million to USAID/Indonesia for its tsunami recovery and reconstruction fund, $62.3 million earmarked for transition activities focused on shelter, livelihoods, and related transition support. Rebuilding housing was a critical part of restoring hope and livelihoods in the region. The government of Indonesia made quick reconstruction a high priority (CHF International, 2008). The programme focuses on rebuilding homes and community infrastructure. CHF reconstructed the economic infrastructure that is crucial to the market and key industries. Improving governance, ensuring that the local population participates in resettlement and reconstruction (CHF International, 2005).

Documentation of the reconstruction process CHF’s reconstruction programme aimed at redeveloping many of the key livelihood aspects the communities of Aceh lost during the tsunami. Several of their objectives were (Global Communities, 2005): • Rebuilding homes and community infrastructure for the displaced (see figures 3.7 & 3.8) • Rebuilding economic infrastructure and processes that are critical to market chains and key industries in affected areas • Restoring the productive capacity of individual trades people and small- and medium-sized enterprises • Revitalizing business and market associations and cooperatives; and improving governance, so as to ensure the local populace’s participation in resettlement and reconstruction issues. CHF oversaw the design and reconstruction of Peunayong Market (see figures 3.5 & 3.6), Aceh’s primary marketplace for the retail trade of fish and vegetable products. A new 2,000 square meter facility serves as an employment, health services, and trading hub for thousands of community members (CHF International, 2008). The reconstruction of the market provided labour intensive jobs and CHF chose to employ those who were displaced by the tsunami. As a result, the market created hundreds of opportunities for market vendors wishing to continue or kick-start a business.

Figure 3.5 - Reconstruction of Peunayong Market. Source: Global Communities, 2006

Figure 3.6 - CHF opening the Peunayong Market after restoration. Source: Global Communities, 2006

Another principle fish market; the Lampulo Market, was resorted as part of CHF’s efforts to reinstate the fishing industry of Aceh. They partnered with AmeriCares, a non-profit emergency response and global health organisation (AmeriCares, 2012). Briggs and Stratton (2011) a producer of air-cooled petrol engines for outdoor equipment donated critical equipment needed to revitalize the market, including more than 300 generators, water pumps, and boat motors (CHF International, 2008). CHF had prioritised the recovery of these services, understanding that the economic recovery would help rehabilitate the villagers’ land, reconstruct their homes and restore businesses. CHF’s partnerships with agencies and organisations ensured that all aspects of the reconstruction programme were conducted with sufficient knowledge, skill and expertise in every area. Funding from the AIG DRF supported a variety of livelihoods activities in Pulot Village: four fishing boats were built, 93 homes and a barn were constructed, stocked with 30 cows (CHF International, 2008). Alanis Morissette, renowned Canadian singer/songwriter gave CHF a generous donation, this made it possible for the reconstruction of Lhok Seudu, a costal village reliant on the fishing industry (CHF International, 2008). A local NGO, Udep Saree Lhok Seudu partnered alongside, reconstructing homes, fishingSETTInG industry. 9 — CHAPTEr I MEETInGlivelihoods THE CHALLEnGESand oF A the PoST-dISASTEr Alanis Morissette’s donation contributed to the 9construction of aTHE new boat building workshop, — CHAPTEr I MEETInG CHALLEnGES oF A PoST-dISASTEr SETTInG as well as sourcing boat materials. This construction replaced the boats lost in the disaster. The donations also assisted in the reestablishment of farming for other industries: rice, watermelon, corn soybeans, groundnuts, and vegetables. Villagers are now able to earn a substantial living and restart their businesses with help of the zero-interest loan fund (CHF International, 2008). “There was a bit of chaos, as would be expected after any emerBuilding on the success of the Transitional Shelter Program, last “There wasAlongside a bit of chaos, as would be expected after any the emer-communities’ Building on the success of the industries, Transitional Shelter Program, last CHF’s objectives to restore economy of multi-donor 1,326 homes gency, but it was fairly well organized,” van Husen said. “It made it year CHF and received additionalconstruction funding from the Java was gency, but completed it was fairly wellby organized,” van Husen “It made it year contractors CHF received additional funding from the multi-donor Java materials and laJune 2008. CHFsaid. worked alongside and local communities, using local easier that fewer agencies were involved.” reconstruction Fund (JrF), administered by the World Bank, to to buildwere homes and other infrastructure that they expected communities invest and tomaintain (CHF Intereasier thatbour fewer agencies involved.” reconstruction Fund (JrF), administered bytothe WorldinBank, provide 8,000Government’s durable shelters intsunami Java usingrecovery the same communitynational, 2008). A partnership was established with the Indonesian agency, BRR, provide 8,000 durable shelters in Java using the same communityThe Javanese cultural climate was also more conducive to cooperaThe Javanese cultural climate was also more conducive to cooperabased approach and methodologies. In a recent statement, who provided materials for reconstruction that amounted to US$150,000. Several agencies, such as Worldthis Vision based approach and methodologies. In a recent statement, this tion than Aceh’s. In Java there exists the tradition of gotong royong, International CHF, appreciating with contracts to construct homes in challengtion than Aceh’s. In Java thereapproached exists the tradition of gotong royong, their accomplishments, ground-up strategy was applauded by JrF donors. ground-up a locations community spirit volunteerism, sharing burdens and working withstrategy was applauded by JrF donors. ingspirit (CHFofsharing International, 2008). a community of volunteerism, burdens and working with others. (See 10 for an example ofingotong others. (See page 10 for an page example of gotong royong action)royong in action)

In addition to efforts in the reconstruction of Aceh after the tsunami, CHF also constructed 3,000 transitional shel-

implementing the Transitional Program, tapped tersIn for the displaced communities in the Galle and into Matara regions, Sri Lanka (Global Communities, 2005). In implementing the Transitional Shelter Program,Shelter CHF tapped intoCHF

Figure 3.7 - Constructing the timber frame of a CHF constructed house. Source: CHF International, 2008

Figure 3.8 - CHF built house near completion. Source: CHF International, 2008

gotong royong through a highly innovative community-based apgotong royong through a highly innovative community-based approach, collaborating closely with the university of Gadjah Mada “The community-based development proach, collaborating closely with the university of Gadjah Mada “The community-based development and other local universities during all phases of program design and other local universities during all phases of program design approach has certainly been the right choice and implementation. (See “Building Innovation: Collaborating with approach has certainly been the right choice and implementation. (See “Building Innovation: Collaborating with Local universities in Yogyakarta” page 14) to build ownership and motivation for the Local universities in Yogyakarta” page 14) to build ownership and motivation for the

The outcome was attractive, sturdy shelters constructed from reconstruction efforts among community outcome attractive, sturdy shelters constructed from reconstruction efforts among bamboo, usingThe material such was as bricks, roof tiles, doors, and win-

bamboo, using material such as bricks, roof tiles, doors, and win- members.

It is very meaning ful to see

community

Key benefits and limitations The positive outcomes of CHF’s reconstruction approach (CHF International, 2008., Global Communities, 2010): • More than 1,300 houses have been built, with an estimated occupancy rate of 98%. Of these occupants, it has been identified that the communities are positive and appreciative of the outcome. • The markets in the region were one of the key aspects to a substantial living for small businesses as well as the economies key source of development. CHF reconstructed and rehabilitated 14 key markets across the region, serving almost a quarter of a million people. • CHF was responsible to the rehabilitation and constructions of several roads, drainage systems and other key infrastructure – enabling the region to progress economically, politically, socially and environmentally. • CHF provided microloans to entrepreneurs and people wishing to continue or begin opening of small businesses. Some of the limitations that CHF encountered in the reconstruction process and from the result (CHF International, 2008., Global Communities, 2010): • Even though there was a positively high occupancy rate of the reconstructed homes, many respondents shared that there was not a sense of individuality. Many of the homes in villages were constructed in the same design, using the same materials that lacked the owners’ personal input. • CHF worked alongside several other agencies and organisations, this proved to cause confusion amongst donors and respondents. Coordination needed to be clearer, so that donors could understand accurately where their donations were going.

Lessons Learnt A history of working in post-disaster reconstruction or working alongside an agency with expertise and experience in the SAD sector is important. • CHF has a long construction history with reconstruction in post-disaster circumstance. Working in socially unstable environments such as Afghanistan, El Salvador, Colombia and South Africa (Global Communities, 2010). This knowledge, experience and expertise is crucial in managing a disaster on a scale like Aceh and producing a programme to sufficiently incorporate rehabilitating the social, economic, cultural and environmental aspects. Reconstructing significant industries’ infrastructure in the destroyed region is crucial to recovering the economy. • Providing the community with facilities, including initial start-up to kick-start their businesses – purchasing equipment for fishing or tools for farming for example. Providing microloans is in effect essential to reinstating employment and restoring the economy. Provision of resources as well as infrastructure to restore industries is significant in restoring the communities’ livelihoods. • CHF worked closely with fishing villagers and provided them with the materials and infrastructure to replace fishing boats that were lost in the disaster. This chapter explored two distinct donor-driven approaches – each with successful and unsuccessful characteristics. The key lessons learnt from donor-driven reconstruction are that having previous post-disaster experience, effective coordination and trust amongst all parties are essential to a successful DDR outcome. Further benefits, limitations and principles will be discussed alongside those of owner-driven reconstruction in the conclusion.

III Conclusion: Benifits and Limitations of Reconstruction in Aceh Success of post-disaster reconstruction is very much dependant on geographic location, vulnerability and the political state of the region prior to disaster. According to Schilderman (2010, p.23-24), “It is poverty, environmental degradation, rapid population growth and poor governance that make Third World populations more vulnerable”. This study has revealed both owner- and donor-driven reconstruction approaches are suitable strategies for postdisaster recovery, having both advantages and disadvantages. The following discussion will highlight some of the key principles, benefits and limitations that came about from each approach. The case studies within this investigation highlighted a number of essential principles common to the owner-driven approach (ODR). These include: • Understanding community aspirations and desires in order to help drive the reconstruction process • Working alongside agencies with post-disaster experience can dramatically assist inexperienced aid agencies and community groups with rebuilding. • Empowerment of the community is vital to provide appropriate solutions that rehabilitate their lives and reduce vulnerability for future disasters. • Leadership within communities is important to prevent corruption, confusion and contradictory information. • Communities trusting agencies and aid organisations creates a more positive outcome because there will be higher satisfaction from the outcome of reconstruction. Essential principles apparent from a donor-driven approach (DDR) include: • Organised coordination is needed amongst actors involved in the reconstruction process to provide a suitable programme. • Agencies need to work closely with the affected community to create a sense of community cohesion and trust – incorporating people’s reconstruction ideas into the design. • Establishing a sense of safety and security within communities will allow the process to prosper that allows families to trust agencies to reconstruct their homes. • A history of a humanitarian agency working in previous post-disaster programmes is important as they will understand what will work well based on previous experience and be able to adapt this process to the new context. • Reconstructing industries’ infrastructure; such as structures to build fishing vessels and markets, kick-starts the key local economies – providing employment and important resources for the community. • The following table encapsulates the benefits and limitations established from the evaluation of owner- and donordriven reconstruction approaches in Aceh, Indonesia, after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami (see chapters 2, 3):

Benifits

Owner-Driven Reconstruction

Donor-Drivn Reconstruction

Communities are central to the reconstruction process either through design input or construction. This creates greater community cohesion while contributing to the rehabilitation process (WHA, 2007). Awareness amongst governments, and agencies has been established about the importance of community participation in SAD (WHA, 2007).

Large-scale programmes force the government to improve political situation to reduce confusion when re-titling land. As a result, joint land titling has been established for both men and women (Wegelin, 2006). Peace negotiations were a result of the governments reconstruction programme (Jayasuriya & McCrawley, 2010).

Communities are appreciative of the agenciesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; reconstruction and the final outcome (Mantel, 2012). Agencies offered technical guidance and training for those with little knowledge or experience of SAD (Mantel, 2012).

Limitations

Complaints about the quality of construction are few, because the communities understood the reconstruction process and trusted in the agencies (Mantel, 2012). Acehâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ODR programmes have been implemented elsewhere because of its success (WHA, 2007). Community participatory reconstruction delivers a large number of well-constructed homes within a reasonable time frame (WHA, 2007). ODR programmes not only reconstruct physical facilities. They also rehabilitate the community and its relationships (Mantel, 2012). Timing for the villagers to return back to their original village was quick (Mantel, 2012). A large number of stakeholders cause tension and at times fragmentation of the community (WHA, 2007). There is sometimes no clear policy and control over the building material prices (WHA, 2007). Some of the communities felt that the leaders have taken personal and financial benefits (Mantel, 2012).

Donor agencies received unprecedented amount of funds for the reconstruction (Mardhatillah, 2010). Large-scale reconstruction programmes have rebuilt a high proportion of houses, which has a successfully high occupancy rates, approx. 98% (CHF International, 2008). Large, key markets in the region have been reinstated and restored (CHF International, 2008). Rehabilitation of most infrastructures: roads, drainage systems, bridges and other key infrastructure (Global Communities, 2010). Microloans were given to people and entrepreneurs to kick-start their businesses (Global Communities, 2010).

Pledges made by governments and agencies created high expectations that could not be met (Jayasuriya & McCrawley, 2010). Under expenditure had occurred for the government creating dissatisfaction for the community (Jayasuriya & McCrawley, 2010). Issues arose of coordination and commitment; there were not smooth agreements within separate divisions (Mardhatillah, 2010). Several of the houses were constructed with Large DDR programmes were subject to poor quality timber, which were the only lo- employment outside of Aceh creating tension cally available resources (Mantel, 2012). and unemployment in the region (Mardhatillah, 2010). When a contractor was involved there was Viable exit strategies for large programmes often a lack of trust (Mantel, 2012). were not initiated clearly (Jayasuriya & McCrawley, 2010). As leadership was not clear in some villages, Many respondents felt that there was not a the information of the reconstruction was sense of originality and individuality with the contradictory (Mantel, 2012). housing sector (Global Communities, 2010).

Aceh’s reconstruction was like no other. The amount of funds donated for aid and recovery was on an unprecedented scale, no other post-disaster reconstruction aid has come close to that of Aceh (Jayasuriya & McCrawley, 2010). Also, for Aceh the immediate aid response was much quicker. The 2010 Haitian earthquake – causing damage and loss of life similar to the scale of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami – progressed at a much slower speed. According to the BBC (2010) Aceh received a large force of trucks, moving equipment and water purification systems alongside huge quantities of food, shelter and basic sanitation from the international response. In contrast, the most visible sign of aid in the same timeframe in Haiti was the “sight of US Navy helicopters ferrying ready-to-eat meals and bottled water from the fleet anchored offshore” (BBC News, 2010). The outcome from reconstruction in Aceh has shaped a framework for the reconstruction sector to learn from for post-disaster recovery. Mulligan (2013) explains in his article Aid responses to typhoon Haiyan – lessons from the Indian Ocean tsunami that the experience in 2004 suggests that there needs to be a clear differentiation between the relief effort and the longer-term social recovery work. As soon as the community receives adequate food, water, shelter, medicine and social support, it is important to take time to ensure the aid for recovery is well coordinated, fairly and effectively delivered. Following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, and because of the lack of coordination amongst contributing agencies, a group of international aid agencies and organisations formed ‘The Shelter Cluster’ in 2005. It is a coordination group managed by the IFRC and UNHCR, which brings together key agencies and organisations to support people affected by natural hazards. Partners of the Shelter Cluster include: Article 25, Care UK, CHF, Oxfam, UN Habitat, World Vision and others (Shelter Cluster, 2010). A hybrid of owner- and donor-driven reconstruction has surfaced in recent years and is evident in several reconstruction approaches in Aceh. As Flinn (2013) discusses, hybrids include introducing a contractor into an approach with typical owner-driven reconstruction characteristics. A secondary hybrid that has surfaces is the introduction of participatory involvement into an approach with typical donor-driven qualities. Large aid agencies are realising that introducing participatory involvement relieves stress on the agency; management of the reconstruction is a huge task alone. Rumana Kabir (2013) worked with Oxfam shortly after the tsunami in 2005, adding “even if the houses were not built to a high standard by the community, they will complain less because it is done by themselves, giving them independence and ownership of their design”. The architect needs to engage in the problem and collectively solve a physical, environmental challenge. The architect needs a range of skills, additional to their standard practice, this would include – an understanding of vernacular architecture, community engagement tools and techniques. Their approach to design will need to be collaborative, enabling others to direct the process and supported with technical advice. Architects need to focus on the wider context of post-disaster architecture, managing the economical, social and political attributes to shelter after disaster. Benefits and limitations are evident for all approaches, as demonstrated in the case files. There is no perfect approach to reconstruct a community. However, in most cases a participatory approach to planning and reconstruction has proven to provide a successful outcome – the central characteristic to an owner-driven approach. The key to a successful reconstruction programme is creating a balance. A balance between providing suitable housing as well as handling livelihood aspects: leadership, ownership and accountability.

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