al-Risālah al-Kubrā fī al-Manṭiq The Greater Treatise on Logic by ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad Astarābādī, better known as Mīr Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī (d. 1413) Translated from the Persian with a Commentary and Notes by Alasdair Watson
jklm In the name of God, the Universally Merciful, the Particularly Merciful 1 Human beings possess the faculty of perception such that the ideas1 of things may be impressed upon them as in a mirror except that in a mirror only sensibles2 may occur whereas, in the perceptive faculty of man, the ideas of both sensibles and intelligibles may occur. What is meant by sensible is that which may be perceived by one of the five senses – sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. What is meant by intelligible is that which may not be perceived by any of the five senses.3 2 Every idea which occurs in the perceptive faculty of man, that is the mind, may either be a conception or an assent. Every idea which relates something with something else either by affirmation, for example when we say “William is a writer”, or negation, for example when we say “John is not a writer”, then we call this idea an assent. If, however, that idea which occurs is not an idea which relates things in the way mentioned above then that idea is known as a conception. Knowledge then, understood as perception, is confined to conception and assent. 3 It is clear from this that relating one thing to another whether by affirmation or negation can be by one of three types of assent: Firstly categorical as is clear from the aforementioned examples. 1 2 3
Mental images. Properly, visible things only may be represented in a mirror.
Secondly conjunctive (conditional) as in one’s saying “If the sun has risen then it is morning.” but not “If the sun has risen then it is night.” Thirdly disjunctive (conditional) as in one’s saying “This number is either even or odd.” but not “This figure is either a human or an animal.” The perception of the categorical or the conjunctive or the disjunctive relation by affirmation or negation is known as assent and it is also called judgement. The perception of anything other than this is called conception. 4 Since assent is to perceive the relation of one thing to another either by affirmation or negation then it must necessarily be composed of three conceptions: 1.
A conception to which something is related which is called that upon which judgement is made.
2. A conception by which relation is made which is called that by which judgement is made. 3. A conception of the relation between the two which is called a judgemental relation. For example, in the assent “John is standing”, there must necessarily be three conceptions; firstly a conception of John upon whom the judgement is passed, secondly a conception of standing by which judgement is made, and thirdly a conception of the relation between John and standing which is a judgemental relation. This is so that the perception of that relation by affirmation or negation may occur. Therefore, every assent depends upon a conception about which a judgement is made, a conception by which a judgement is made, and a conception of a judgemental relation. However, in the opinion of the learned doctors, these three conceptions are not part of the assent but rather are conditions of the assent.
5 Conceptions are of two types: 1. Those which occur without requiring speculation and thought such as the conception of heat or cold, black or white and the like. These are known as necessary or selfevident conceptions. 2. Those which require speculation and thought to occur such as the conception of the soul and angels and jinn and the like. These are known as speculative or acquired conceptions. In the same way, assents may also be necessary as they need no speculation or thought to occur such as the assent that the sun is bright, or that fire is hot and the like. Assents may also be speculative as they require speculation and thought to occur such as the assent that the Creator exists, or that the universe is incident and so on. 6 It is possible for a speculative conception to occur from a necessary conception and similarly a speculative assent from a necessary assent via speculation and thought. This consists of arranging existing conceptions or assents in a way which leads to the occurrence of a conception or assent which had not previously occurred such as when one combines the conception of an animal, and the conception of rational and one says “rational animal” such that the conception of a human being occurs. Similarly, when one combines the assent that the universe is changeable, and the assent that everything changeable is incident and one says “the universe is changeable and everything changeable is incident”, from there the assent that the universe is incident occurs. 7 Humans are distinguished from other animals in that they may arrive at unknowns from knowns through speculation and thought which other animals cannot do. Hence, it is necessary for every person to understand the proper method of thinking and speculation so that when he wishes to arrive at unknown conceptions or assents from known conceptions and assents in a correct manner he will be able to do so.
Only those people who are divinely assisted by having saintly souls may achieve knowledge of things without the need for speculation and thought. 8 In the terms of the logicians, conceptions arranged so that a new conception is arrived at are called definitions or explanatory statements. Assents arranged so that a new assent is arrived at are called proofs or evidences. The purpose of logic is to arrive at knowledge of definitions and proofs. Definitions and proofs are, in reality, meanings and not mere words. For example, the definition of a human being is the meaning of “rational animal” rather than the expression “rational animal”. The proof of the incidence of the world is the meanings of the propositions which were mentioned earlier and not the mere expressions. Indeed, a proponent of logic in essence does not require words, but since understanding and making oneself understood is dependent upon words and expressions then it is necessary for the logician to examine words given that words indicate meanings. 9 An indication is something the knowledge of which necessitates the knowledge of something else. The first is known as the thing which indicates and the second is known as the thing indicated. Convention is assigning something to something else in such a way that by knowledge of the first thing knowledge of the second thing occurs. Knowledge of the convention is one of the causes of indication. Indications are of three types: 1. The Conventional Indication is an indication which is governed by convention and this may be verbal such as the word “John” indicating the person of John. It may also be non-verbal such as scripts, or measurements, or masons’ lines, or roadsigns which indicate meanings which may be understood.
2. The Rational Indication is an indication governed by the intellect and this may be verbal such as hearing the sound of words from behind a wall which indicates the presence of a speaker. It may also be non-verbal such as creation indicating the existence of the Creator. 3. The Natural Indication is an indication which is governed by nature. It may be verbal such as the rasping “Ah ah” indicating a pain in the chest. It may also be non-verbal such as blushing indicating embarrasment or pallour indicating fear or the speed of the pulse indicating the health or otherwise of the body. 10 The indication which is of importance to logic is the conventional verbal indication since it is usual to use it in order to communicate and derive meanings. The conventional verbal indication can be one of three types: 1. The indication by coincidence is a word which indicates the entire concept for which that word was appointed such as the word “man” indicating the meaning “rational animal.” 2. The indication by implication is a word which indicates a part of the concept for which the word was appointed such as the word “man” indicating the meaning “animal” alone, or “rational” alone. 3. The indication by nexus is a word which indicates something external to the concept itself but which is a concomitant of that concept such as the word “man” indicating the meaning “receptive of knowledge and capable of the art of writing.” 11 It is clear that any particular word, solely by reason of its appointment, indicates the entire concept for which that word was appointed. It also indicates a part of the concept for which it was appointed since comprehending the entire concept is not possible without comprehending its part. However, a word’s indication of a concomitant external to the concept for which it was appointed requires that the external concomitant adheres to the mind such than whenever the concept for which it was appointed occurs to the mind, the external concomitant also
occurs. Otherwise, the word cannot be said to indicate the concomitant universally and perpetually. For the logicians, the indication which is universal and perpetual is given precedence. Whereas, for rhetoricians, indication alone is sufficient and the adherence of the concomitant to the intellect is not a condition for them, but rather adherence in general. 12 Whenever the concept for which the word has been appointed is simple4 and does not have a concomitant which adheres to the mind then there will be indication by coincidence but not by implication or nexus. However, indication by implication and nexus but without coincidence cannot occur because the former two are subject to appointment and wherever there is appointment there will also be coincidence. If the concept for which the word has been appointed is simple and also has a concomitant which adheres to the mind then there will be indication by coincidence and nexus but not by implication. If the concept for which the word has been appointed is compound then there will be indication by coincidence and implication but not by nexus. 13 When a word is employed to refer to the entirety of the concept for which it was appointed then this is called literal. When a word is employed to refer to part of the concept for which it was appointed or something external to it then this is called metaphorical and in this case a context is required. 14 When a word has been appointed to refer to a single concept then that word is called a monoseme. A word referring to more than one concept is called a polyseme5 and in this case for each concept context is necessary such as in the word “spring�. 4 5
That is, non-compound or not consisting of parts. Cf. monosign and plurisign.
When two words are appointed to refer to a single concept then they are called synonyms such as mankind and humans. When two words are appointed to refer to different concepts then they are called heteronyms such as man and horse.