Capabilities briefing – North Korea and South Korea by Open Briefing

IHS Jane’s Armed Forces Capabilities Briefing – North Korea and South Korea

jmsa.janes.com

February 2012

e c n e li SM i s E e R & ASW & Torpedos

ce rfa iles Su iss M

Pr o Sp puls ee i d ( on & kn ts)

Hull

Air Force Capabilities

206

South Korea 32

388

•

The Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF), once largely serving as an adjunct to US air power, is now focused on developing independent operational capabilities, including long-range precision strike and advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), in addition to enabling rapid response to threats.

•

The surprise attacks from North Korea in 2010, revealed weakness in the ROKAF’s ability to monitor North Korean military developments and deployments. The ROKAF has bolstered its efforts to strengthen its C4ISR capability by accelerating acquisition the RQ-4 Global Hawk UAV and the purchase of two Dassault Falcon 2000s in late 2011.

•

The government is now looking to acquire additional advanced fighter aircraft under its F-X Phase III programme. Additionally, the government continues to move forward with development of its next-generation fighter (KFX) programme, which will eventually field an aircraft to replace the F-16.

Multirole

Inventory Figures

Air Defence C4ISR Transport Trainer

204

245

North Korea 220 70

340

•

With a personnel strength of 110,000 and approximately 1,600-1,700 aircraft, the Korea People’s Air Force (KPAF) is large in size but deﬁcient in modern and sophisticated weapon systems, and a large number of combat aircraft are obsolete.

•

Aviation assets are almost entirely of Russian (Soviet) and Chinese origin. A signiﬁcant percentage of ageing aircraft have been relegated to use as decoys, training aids for special operations forces, cannibalised for spare parts and so on.

•

The air force places great emphasis on pilot training, but actual ﬂying hours are minimal due to shortages of spares and fuel.

•

Efforts since the 1990s to improve North Korea’s air defence networks have arguably made it one of the densest in the world. Modest progress has been made in introducing modernised radars and EW equipment and it is most effective at lower altitudes. However, it remains primarily based on obsolete weapons, missiles and radars.

Ground Attack Air Defence

Inventory Figures

Attack Helicopters Transport Trainer

Combat Aircraft – Comparative Capability

Situational Awareness

Defensive Aids Suite

Flight Performance

•

The North Korean ﬂeet is largely comprised of very old MiG-19 / F-6 and MiG21 ‘Fishbed’ aircraft, while the bulk of South Korean inventories are modern F-16 Block 52 ﬁghters.

•

North Korea would be signiﬁcantly disadvantaged in terms of situational awareness – mainly driven by the advantages in F-16 radar – and also would be vulnerable to South Korea’s potent force of AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles.

•

North Korea has a slight advantage in terms of ﬂight performance, largely because its MiG-29 ‘Fulcrum-A’ ﬁghters are twin-engined and have a greater thrust-to-weight ratio than the F-16 and also bleed less energy after air combat manoeuvring.

•

North Korea may also have greater comparative capability in terms of within visual range missiles, based on the features of its AA-11 ‘Archer’ infra-red guided missiles. However, this may be offset by the superior seeking technology in South Korea’s AIM-9M Sidewinder missiles.

0 10 20 Guns

30 40

Beyond Visual Range Missiles

50 Within Visual Range Missiles South Korean Fleet

Higher point totals relate to better equipment performance data (based on points systems similar to commercial wargaming)

North Korean Fleet

Navy Capabilities

South Korea

Submarines

The Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) has long experience operating under combat conditions in the extensive littoral areas surrounding the Korean Peninsula. It is also rapidly acquiring an expanded blue water capability.

•

To counter North Korea’s numerical advantage at sea, South Korea is developing advanced submarine technology and is procuring a new ﬂeet of future frigate (FFX) ships. Additionally, it is building a new class of three KDX-3 Aegis-equipped destroyers that will play a pivotal role in defending against the North Korean ballistic missile threat.

•

The ROKN is divided into three operational fleets with each fleet containing a combat flotilla with destroyers, corvettes and patrol boats; a logistics and support squadron; and a training unit.

•

The navy’s long-term expansion plans lies in the creation of a balanced ﬂeet with overlapping capabilities to meet all possible North Korean naval threats.

Destroyer

•

Frigate Corvette Patrol Craft Mine-warfare Vessels

Inventory Figures

Maritime Patrol Aircraft

380

5 3

North Korea

The Korean People’s Navy (KPN) is divided into two ﬂeets with one on each side of the Korean Peninsula. This precludes the navy from exhibiting its full potential in either sea or from reinforcing either ﬂeet.

•

The KPN is primarily a coastal defence force and is ill-equipped and ill-trained for blue water operations. Most of the KPN’s technology is from the 1960s, with the majority of its vessels being fast attack craft - missile, gun and torpedo – of obsolete design and capabilities.

•

Many factors hinder overall naval capabilities: limited training; obsolescing equipment; the poor material condition of a number of principal combatant ships; lack of sophisticated electronic warfare equipment; shortage of modern weapons; an inefﬁcient and inadequate logistic system; and inefﬁcient command and control.

Submarines

Frigate Corvette Patrol Craft Mine-warfare Vessels

Inventory Figures

Anti-submarine Aircraft

Submarines – Comparative Capability

Hull ASW & Torpedos

Surface Missiles

•

South Korea’s submarine ﬂeet is small but modern, with more new KSS-2 boats being procured. North Korea’s large ﬂeet of attack, reconnaissance and midget submarines are older, but demonstrated their potency when they sank a South Korean corvette in November 2010.

•

Both navies use diesel-electric submarines, but the South Koreans have air-independent propulsion (AIP) on the KSS-2 and generally their vessels are between ﬁve and 10 knots faster than North Korean boats.

•

The South Korean navy also enjoys a signiﬁcant qualitative advantage because they use modern digital submarine command systems and digital US-based (and increasingly indigenously-designed) sonars. All of this equipment is well in advanced of the old, Russian-style analogue systems in place in North Korean submarines.

•

The largest advantage to South Korea is in terms of weaponry. North Korea simply does not have anything equivalent to the submarine-launched Harpoon anti-ship missiles in service with the South. Additionally, North Korea is disadvantaged because its submarines are ﬁtted with fewer torpedo tubes.

Resilience & ESM

Sonars

Propulsion & Speed (knts) 30

C2 Radars

South Korean Fleet North Korean Fleet

Higher point totals relate to better equipment performance data (based on points systems similar to commercial wargaming)

Army Capabilities

185

South Korea

2349

3239

•

The Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) employs force structure, tactics and equipment similar to those of the US Army, based on heavy infusions of American training and regular combined training exercises and planning for combat operations.

•

Although maintaining an active reserve force of 600,000, upon full mobilisation the ROKA can theoretically ﬁeld a multi-million-strong reserve component amounting to another army headquarters and 23 infantry divisions.

•

The bulk of the ROKA is still infantry and artillery-centric, occupying static defensive positions facing a North Korean Army similarly deployed in the same positions they held in 1953.

•

The ROKA has received less procurement funding against the expensive ambitions of the navy and air force. Recent improvements include the introduction of new selfpropelled howitzers, new main battle tanks (MBTs) and armoured infantry ﬁghting vehicles (IFVs)

1949 1080

Main Battle Tank Infantry Fighting Vehicle Armoured Personnel Carrier

Inventory Figures

Howitzers Multiple Rocket Launcher

4100

5100

North Korea 2100

•

With approximately 1.02 million active-duty troops, the ground forces are the largest and most formidable of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) components, with approximately 70 per cent of its active duty ground forces south of the P’yongyang-Wonsan line facing South Korea.

•

KPA’s special operations force is one of the largest in the world, broadly divided into two categories: the 11th “Storm” Corps, consisting of approximately 60,000 troops; and light infantry units consisting of 140,000 troops.

•

The development, production and deployment of ballistic missiles have received the greatest emphasis of all land forces modernisation efforts.

•

Notable improvements in the KPA since the year 2000 include: the production and deployment of small numbers of new tanks and long-range self-propelled artillery systems, the restructuring of some corps into divisions; the expansion of existing light infantry units and the establishment of a number of mechanised/ motorised light infantry brigades.

8500

Main Battle Tank Armoured Personnel Carrier

Inventory Figures

Howitzers Multiple Rocket Launcher

Main Battle Tanks – Comparative Capability

Armament

Intelligence, Surveillance,Target Acquisition & Reconnaissance

Mobility

Other Equipment

80 100 120

Armour & Protection South Korean Fleet North Korean Fleet

•

The KPA’s newest MBT is the M-2002 P’okpoong, which is likely a stretched and heavily modiﬁed version of the T-62. Production continues but the backbone of KPA heavy armour is still formed of the T-62, T-55 and Chinese-made Type 59. Meanwhile, the ROKA operates 1,400 K1 and K1A1-type MBTs.

•

North Korean MBTs cannot match the digital ﬁre control systems and thermal imagers ﬁtted onto South Korean tanks, providing a huge edge in ISTAR (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance) capability.

•

The ROKA advantage is also signiﬁcant in armour and protection, largely because its K1 and K1A1 are Chobham armoured vehicles to a modern design. In contrast, KPA vehicles use older types of armour including add-on explosive reactive armour in some cases.

•

In terms of armament, there is a lack of consensus on the primary weapon of the North Korean M-2002. Crediting the M-2002 with a 125 mm smoothbore gun (as shown) provides only a slim advantage to South Korea. However, if the M-2002 is credited only with a 115 mm gun, the gap between the KPA and ROKA would grow noticeably wider. Higher point totals relate to better equipment performance data (based on points systems similar to commercial wargaming)