Metaphysical Foundations of Hegel's History of Philosophy

Metaphysical Foundations of the History of Philosophy: Hegel's 1820 Introduction to the "Lectures on the History of Philosophy" Author(s): Allegra de Laurentiis Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Sep., 2005), pp. 3-31 Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20130575 Accessed: 03-03-2015 14:53 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.

For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Philosophy Education Society Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Review of Metaphysics.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THEHISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: HEGEL'S 1820 INTRODUCTIONTO THE

LECTURES ON THEHISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY ALLEGRADE LAURENTIIS

explicates

Hegel in several

his theory

introductions

of the history of philosophic

to the various

cycles

of Lectures

on

thinking the His

tory of Philosophy held in Jena, Heidelberg, and Berlin. Only the in troductions to the first cycle of Heidelberg lectures (1816) and to the second Since the

own hand.1 lectures survive in Hegel's cycle of Berlin (1820) the earlier of these is an integral part of the latter, an analysis of a 1820 Introduction account reliable of Hegel's provides theory.

Hegel pher, not

lectures

on

as a historian.

the history as a philoso of philosophy mainly "The history of philosophy must itself be

philosophical,"2 he declares in the address delivered ahead of the 1820 he is not interested a in delivering Thus, primarily of philosophic and ideas, propositions, claims, arguments, in the historical order of their formulation.

He pre counterarguments his audience's with historical facts and supposes general acquaintance Introduction.3

chronicle

to: Department of Philosophy, Harriman Hall, State Correspondence of New York at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 11794.

University 1The to all other cycles of lectures on the history of phi introductions survive?some of them in fragmentary form?in students' manu losophy is told in Georg W. F. Hegel, scripts. The editorial history of the introductions Werke in zwanzig Baenden ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl (hereafter,"W), M. Michel 20:520.

(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969-79), 2 "Die muss der Philosophie Geschichte selbst philosophisch seyn"; II (1816-1831).

Gesammelte Georg W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungsmanuskripte Werke Jaeschke (hereafter, "GW'), vol. 18, ed. Walter (Hamburg: Meiner, 1995), 18:39.

3The textual basis for my analysis is the critical edition cited above (n. are my own, but I consult the Haldane/ 2). The translations throughout Simson 1892-96 edition on the History (Hegel's Lectures of Philosophy, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson [New York: The Humani ties Press, 1974]) and the Knox/Miller 1985 translation of the Heidelberg and Berlin introductions on the His to the Lectures (G.W.F. Hegel. Introduction trans. Thomas M. Knox and Arnold V. Miller tory of Philosophy, [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985]).

The Review

of Metaphysics

59 (September

2005):

3-31.

Copyright

?

2005

by The Review

Metaphysics

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

of

ALLEGRADE LAURENTIIS

4

as well as with major to philosophic think theories, pertaining tenets. is rather concerned with ers' general first, why showing, Hegel and enjoyed in these tenets were relevant their time; sec recognition events

they were transformed; subsequently in be discerned them may throughout

how and why a core meaning formations.

ond, how

and their

third, trans

A paradigmatic of Hegel's in interpreting illustration procedure fundamental of the philosophic tradition is provided principles by the on a to comment in treatment Remark his of following "being person"

"property" in the 1821Philosophy

of Right

or in itself The notion to its concept it that what spirit is according and for-itself (thereby that it be person ca should be also in its Dasein idea is itself pable of property, [and] religion)?this having ethicality spirit is such cuius (as causa sui, i.e. as free causation, spirit's concept natura nonpotest concipi nisi existens; Spinoza, Ethics I, Def. 1.) Pre . . in lies there the of the this be concept. cisely possibility opposition . .and tween what spirit is merely in itself and its being also for itself. thus the possibility of personhood.4 of the alienation In other

words:

the

tivity with rights is explained forth) Spinoza's equally

late modern

(to property,

by Hegel "god" (or, as in other unless inconceivable

as subjec of personhood conception to moral and so convictions, beliefs, as realization of the core meaning of

res cogitans, of Descartes's passages, as existent). core meaning The of as nous is the idea of a being that deter

its inception "spirit" since itself into being what it is?one mines important for modern philosophy's is, example, political mous,

self-determining

of which expression notion of an autono

subject.

4 "Dass das, was der Geist seinem Begriffe nach oder an sich ist, auch im Dasein und fuer sich sei (somit Person, des Eigentums faehig sei, Sittlich Idee ist selbst sein Begriff (als causa sui, d.i. als keit, Religion habe)?diese ist er solches, cuius natura non potest concipi nisi existens; freie Ursache, . . . liegt die Moeglichkeit Ethik I, Def. I). In eben diesem Begriffe Spinoza, zwischen des Gegensatzes dem, was er nur an sich und nicht auch fuer sich der Persoenlichkeif) der Entaeusserung ist. . .und hierin die Moeglichkeit des oder Naturrecht W. F. der Rechts Grundlinien Philosophie Hegel, Georg im Grundrisse, und Staatswissenschaft 1821, ?66, Remark.

(In the follow The is cited as "W 7," followed by page or section number.) ing, this work are mine but I consult throughout Thomas M. Knox, HegeVs Phi translations Press, 1952), and Hugh B. Nis losophy of Right (Oxford: Oxford University Elements (Cam of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood of the Philosophy bet, Hegel. bridge: Cambridge

University

Press,

1991).

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

5

METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS The these

of the goals

first

Lectures the

convey meant

(see sense

above) in which

cal and historiographie and necessary

The

to

Introduction

to grasp and to attempt are and concepts arguments This is where the philologi

skill of the historian place.

and

a serious

implies

philosophic at their inception.

and understood

rightful

in the address

outlined

second

and

of philosophy third goals

has its a

presuppose

theory of philosophy as a particular kind of thinking with specific logi cal and

features.

deliver

of historically but also goes

epistemological an interpretation that includes principles intended

by each

The two

sets

which

is where documented

on

lecturing guiding

concepts

the meaning

beyond

the

(dictated

the history

of philosophy theoretical

the

exposition: the analysis

by

is for Hegel a logical and metaphysical order

chronological These

systems. one another. two orders

of

ostensibly

of

their

has, then, order of meanings,

task at once) and the

their

in the history of philosophic expression of criteria do not operate of independently claim is than this.

The explicit actually stronger

sets

two

Hegel's of reconstruction the same:

in principle succession

must the philosopher theories and their

of them.

philosopher of criteria

philosophic

Here

are of the history of philosophic thought to this idea I now maintain that the "According

in history of the systems of philosophy is the same as the in the logical derivation of the conceptual determinations of the Idea."5 succession

As quence

se so the historical cannot be random, sequence logical is not accidental.

Just as little can the reconstruction of these the

in a history of philosophy be arbitrary.

In (as a discipline) observer would think of philosophers' deed, only the most superficial as a random choices of themes and methods series.

To the contrary, as if engaging an in in conversation, epoch-transcending philosophers sequences

variably

relate

to,

criticize,

or make

use

of preceding

ethical

and

5 "Nach dieser Idee ich nun, dass die Aufeinanderfolge der Sys behaupte teme der Philosophie in der Geschichte dieselbe ist, als die Aufeinanderfolge in der logischen Ableitung der Begriffsbestimmungen der Idee" (GW 18:49).

See also Georg W. F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik. Die Lehre vom Sein (1832) (Hamburg: Meiner, 1990), where, regarding Parmenides, Hegel writes: in the science must have shown itself as the historically "What isfirst first.

And we have to regard the Eleatic One or Being as the first in the knowing of are mine but I consult the translations thought" (GW 21:76). In the following, Arnold V. Science Miller, HegeVs throughout of Logic (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ALLEGRADELAURENTIIS

6 cognitive the case

concerns.

surround

them.

theories

in their

no philosophic

Where

are given, as in precedents refer to concepts in implicit in the Denken), language,

of the Presocratics, philosophers the representational (vorstellendes thinking and wisdom poetry, religion, mythology,

sense-making. as their thread While

Even

here

an exhaustive of Hegel's

claim

strong

to Hegel,

of

a thorough justification on the logical and historical

thought, this brief study aims at clarifying the

two supporting theories elucidating a and correcting view system, pertinacious of the nature of philosophy. the primary

tal) subject matter of philosophy

ject-matter

still

nor

account

claim,

of philosophy know thyself.

and

eye perceives skeptical philosophic as engaged sort succession in some follow Lectures the of this Hegel's logic sense-making of Ariadnes the of history philosophy. through

orders of philosophic

According

preceded

historical

neither

can be given

that have

the most

from

is, both

(that

the body

on Hegel's first

of Hegel's

understanding and

fundamen

is human thinking itself. The history

a gradual fulfillment of the Socratic command: as simultaneous double role and sub subject Thought's a in philosophy lends the latter the character of peculiarly

"speculative"

is thus

much in the sense enterprise, itself of the soul: "The mind

adumbrated

in Aristotle's

is included the ob among can be thought. are immaterial For where the objects that are identical. thinks and that which is thought which Speculative are same In and its the identical."6 Aristotelian object knowledge investigation jects which

the

spirit,

explains Hegel actualization gressive

dynamics

as pro of philosophic thinking what is po of fuer sich) thinking or an sich). nach] [dem Begriffe

(a becoming to its concept tentially (according This is the background for his claim that there is not only chronologi more cal but also, and among philo fundamentally, logical continuity course in it is the of their for history. sophic principles Thus, possible him to identify a common in notions that ap (and evolving) meaning parently

refer

to vastly

different

objects

of reflection.

The

introduc

tory chapter to the Doctrine of Being in the Greater Logic is dedicated to justifying precisely this claim: "Thus the beginning of philosophy is the foundation

that

is present

and

self-preserving

in all subsequent

de

6 ed. and trans. R. D. Hicks De Anima, Aristotle, (New York: he of he episteme Hick's translation Prometheus Books, 1991), 3.4.430a5. is in this context. theoretike with "speculative fully justified knowledge"

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

7

FOUNDATIONS METAPHYSICAL that which

velopments,

remains

in all its further

immanent

determina

tions."7

the history of philosophic is the expres systems toward absolute of human sion of a process thinking self-knowing an isolated to is merit thus also strong enough self-determining) (and in the Greater treatment. has to be sought Its attempted justification The

thesis

that

Logic8 and not in the History of Philosophy.

In section 1 below I treat

of the history of philosophy claim that an in-depth knowledge Hegel's as an I elucidate the argu is such, and integral part of philosophizing ments he defends this claim.

The of the 1820 which interpretation by in this part highlights Introduction contained of aspects important at controver aimed the that, although perspective grounding Hegel's sial metaphysical thesis can themselves tory, by

of the offer

inner unity of thought's needed antidote as a discipline

of the history of philosophy instrumental value for doing philosophy a fundamentally nonhistorical discipline. rary notions

port

for Hegel's

of his system.

thesis

from

proper?as Section

the perspective

In the conclusion

in the the theory expounded tial misconception of Hegel's to phy Zeitgeist.

logic and his to contempo

a much

of the

having merely if the latter were

2 provides internal

then

sup

coherence

(3) I briefly respond, in the light of

1820 text,

to what

understanding

I take

to be an influen

of the relation

of philoso

I

The History

of Philosophy Is Philosophy. The 1820 Introduction begins by highlighting the continuity of, and marking the distinction the natural and the spiritual of human between, grounds nature to unchanging remains fastened laws ing. While anchored

metamorphoses, spirit, though necessarily is capable of transforming the "principles, tradition,

life and

think

its throughout in habit-forming and ... prejudices

7 "So ist der die in allen folgenden Entwicklun Anfang der Philosophie, und sich erhaltende das seinen weitern Be gen gegenwaertige Grundlage, immanent Bleibende" durchaus stimmungen (GW 21:58).

8 in the preliminary essay, "With what must the science be Especially in and the treatment actual of the historical instantiations of the transi gin?", tions from each category to the next.

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ALLEGRADELAURENTIIS

8 that

riches"9

constituting tion are both form . . . but

substance

of our

history

tradition.

. . . the material

also

of each

productions of the next: they are

and matter

"second

The

genera "its soul, spiritual to it."10 Thus, in the

present

the matter

nature"

transformed and the being do not differ in substance.

One

the transformation producing is made and transforms up of that of all previous spirit epoch's epochs the latter by assimilation into something itself.

This is new, namely us a not to to read is for events read of extraneous why history story activity

but

our own

of philosophy, story. As for the history and alien but rather the strange thoughts in one peculiar mode.

The development thinking in a multiplicity mode is articulated of forms?the tale

of

it does

not

of our

story of this

tell a own

thinking sys

philosophic

tems.

not

a history Accordingly, even of opinions about

of philosophy is not a history of opinions, interest such as god, jus topics of general we When the of history studying philosophy

nature. tice, or human are being with confronted that concepts or individuals but rather groups principles be a mere

concept

is the

opinion

fact

are

not just convictions of theories.

What makes

its intrinsic

There are, of course, singularity.11 work innumerable that represent concepts philosophic ular or singular convictions.

But not just any concept is for this reason philosophic theory a notion This is rather that functions whole

theory Such

tency.

refers

Hegel

depends (as a system) a principle is the kind to as Grundbegriff.

alone as

its meaning

upon of

system-identifying

or particularity of thoughts singularity both their form and their content. ion affects ideas

merely partic in a featured

a philosophic concept. theoretical the principle:

The

about

and

consis concept

mere opin embodying As long as my (or my or right are merely my

divinity, morality, are cus referents my merely (or our) opinions, (or our) gods, are of no philo of justice.

As such, these toms, or sense thoughts or as historical sophic import?except cultural, psychological, begin What enables such thoughts concepts. philosophic nings of properly community's)

their

9"Grundsaetze, 10

Stoff

"deren

Seele,

Vorurtheile geistige

und

Substanz,

a

or particularity in the body of every

of

even

perhaps

of

... Reichthum" . . . aber

zugleich

(GW 18:37). . . . ein

vorliegender

fuer sie" (GW 18:37).

11 Compare GW 18:42.

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

9

METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS

on the other hand, is the fact of concepts, or per The thoughts of divinity, justice, or aesthetic, mythological, religious, theologi

to develop into philosophic their intrinsic universality.12 in their many

sonhood, cal guises,

mean content.

Their objective universal have potentially of is inextricable from the connotation "God" is not universality. ing over Athens if he presides divine alone; "justice" is not just if it admits of its intension of exceptions; the concept of alone, and, by virtue some to not cannot extend but other These persons. "personhood" are implicitly from the moment of their inception, universal concepts so. but it is only in the course of history that they do become explicitly As for the truth content of universal reminds his concepts, Hegel audience

theories' differences and mutual contradic that philosophic truth is relative is the tions do not prove that philosophic or, what no or that is in there truth relativistic same, Skeptic philosophy.13 truth abstinence, comments, only stimulates Hegel hunger thought's for truth.14

At first,

the variance

among parts of a disagreement us with to provide truth claiming

and

each equally cognitive undertaking seem to contradict our legitimate rational expectations. we can it becomes clear that tion, however, only notice, differences

grasp theories' the "instinct" that drives instinct

against

a common

compare, This

ground. truth: "The truth

to find thought of reason possesses this

reflec

Upon

and

ground however

is is

or belief.

invincible

one,?the feeling ... of instinct the that the truth pursues Already [the idea]... thinking an instinctive is one."15 in thinking without in the To engage belief in eating without of truth would be akin to engaging belief possibility in the possibility of satiety. in philosophy is neither individual subject matter ubiquitous nor particular cultural but rather the concept of beliefs, of philosophy what is true. The history consists of a meaningful series of formulations of this concept.

Akin to the Phenomenology's descrip The

witticisms

tion

of

the path

of

consciousness,

12 Compare GW 18:43.

13This observation applies tive

of course

the Lectures

equally

on

the History

to the history

of

of the posi

sciences.

14 Compare Gif 15uDie Wahrheit

18:43. aber ist Eine,?dieses un?berwindliche Gefuehl oder . .?dass die Wahrheit nur eine ist. . .

Glauben hat der Instinct der Vernunft. darin folgt schon der Instinct des Denkens" (GW 18:43 and 45).

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ALLEGRADELAURENTIIS

10

describe the continuous of self-differentiations of process Philosophy one thinking As the Phenomenology self-conscious activity. presents of its development out of its own natural reconstruction reason's so do these as inces lectures present stages, philosophic thinking in the endeavor to grasp itself. its own history santly retracing To say that conceptual is philosophy's medium and sub thinking a not to is is of abstractions. science say that philosophy ject matter does not consist thinking and their relations?that

Philosophic of concepts

only of a formal determination to formal is, it is not reducible

or mathematics.

It consists, rather, of the analysis of the meaning of system-identifying concepts. as principle of a concept that functions in a system The content is not to sub- or superordinate exhausted As al concepts. by its relations a not that arises in the ready mentioned, just any concept philosophic logic, linguistics, and determination

a philosophic sense. in the technical is for Hegel Grund concept are whose internal and concepts consistency, begriffe meaning, the grounds of justification of the theory mutual compatibility provide are A embedded in. for example concept, they system-identifying ory

"idea" or Leibniz's is a unity "monad," In virtue it and themselves. from among ing differentiated concept" unity, this "concrete of the features but rather the differentiating

Plato's

At

this point,16

concrete

illustrates

Hegel

concepts

through

representations (sinnliche of "red" is abstract sentation

representations. is more hand, tions One

The concrete,

(life, shape, Idea."17

color,

sensible because smell,

notions

the distinction

that between

ble

of other concepts differ of its being an internally not the common contains

abstract

it encompasses.

between and

abstract concrete

and sensi

The sensible repre Vorstellungen]). it is an abstraction from many because of "rose," on the other representation a unity and so forth), that it is also

of many

representa is, it is "One Subject,

ac as classes, to the familiar for concepts rule holding Contrary a its to extension which always implies concept's increasing cording a system-identifying the more principle intension, decreasing general more is it contains: extensive determinations "Here the most is, the

16GW 18:46.

17Ibid.

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

11

METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS also

the most

the most sense

concrete

and

even

to account

selves

This

intensive."18 of

sciences

as to philosophy refers Hegel and why he maintains that common is why

ratiocination enlightened for philosophic principles

are

insufficient and what

by derives

them from

them: It is in this that knowledge of reason distinguishes itself from knowl to and it is the business of philosophizing edge of the understanding, that the true, the Idea does not consist show against the understanding that in itself is the particular, of empty generalities, but of a universal the determinate.19 This containing

definition particularity

of

the

Idea

(or

or determinacy

"the

universal true") as concrete is an abbreviated form of the

definition of "the Concept as such" (der Begriff)

from the Logic:20

as free equal The Concept as such contains the moment o? universality, it contains of particular the moment ity with itself in its determinacy; inwhich the Universal remains serenely equal ity, or of the determinacy as the inward reflec to itself, and it contains the moment of singularity, of universality and particularity. tion of the determinacies This singular and at negative unity with itself is what is in and for itself determined, the same time identical with itself or universal.21 The

notion

of a universality

that by self-particularization

posits

itself

as a (universal) singularity is elucidated by Hegel in the sections of the 18"Hier ist das Extensivste auch das Intensivste" (GW 18:47-8).

19"Es ist hierin dass sich die Vernunfterkenntnis von der blossen Ver und es ist das Geschaeft standeserkenntnis des Philosophi unterscheidet, rens gegen den Verstand zu zeigen, dass das Wahre, die Idee nicht in leeren in einem Allgemeinen, das in sich selbst sondern besteht, Allgemeinheiten das Bestimmte das Besondere, ist" (GW 18:45).

201 use (with few exceptions noted explicitly) the following translation of the Encyclopaedia Logic: G. W. F. Hegel. The Encyclopaedia Logic (with the Zusaetze), ed. and trans. Theodore F. Geraets, Wallis A. Suchting, and Henry S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991). The textual basis of my analy sis of the main text is GW, vol. 20 and, for the Remarks and Additions, W, vol.

8. The Encyclopaedia Sciences of Philosophical (1830) is cited in the follow ing as "2?,"followed by section number.

21 "Der als solcher enthaelt die Momente als der Allgemeinheit, Begriff freier Gleichheit mit sich selbst in ihrer Bestimmtheit?der der Besonderheit, inwelcher das Allgemeine sich selbst gleich bleibt, Bestimmtheit, ungetruebt als der Reflexion in sich der Bestimmtheiten und der Einzelnheit, der Allge an meinheit und Besonderheit, welche Einheit mit sich das und fuer negative sich Bestimmte und zugleich mit sich Identische oder Allgemeine ist" (E,

?163).

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ALLEGRADE LAURENTIIS

12 Doctrine

of

the Concept that he merely however,

duction,

follow

this passage. comments that this

In the

1820

notion

cannot

Intro be

reason

but

by understanding alone, requires grasped (Vernunft). a particular Reason kind of concepts that can be charac grasps as sharing in a first and general way, the mark of self-referen terized,

tiality. Both this kind of notion and the kind of thinking that makes such

notions

thus be called reason?may intelligible?namely such notion, for example, is "self-consciousness." in the chapter of the Phenomenology this bearing

lative."

One

plained "self-consciousness"

refers

thus also same

self-negating) act of cognition,

to mind's

role of being simultaneously

taking

"specu As ex

name,22 on the contradictory (and and object of one and the

subject and in the same

respect:

as motion If we call the movement of knowing, concept, but knowing less unity, or the Ego, the object, then we see that not only for us, but for to the concept.?Or alterna itself, the object corresponds knowing tively, by calling what the object is in itself, the concept, while [calling] clear that the the object what it is as object or for an other, it becomes is the same.23 and the being-for-another being-in-itself

lyze because tradiction.

ana cannot is a concept that the understanding the sublation, and thus the inclusion, of a con at and grasped It is a speculative arrived concept only by

speculative

reason.24

Self-consciousness

it involves

22The textual

are my own. of the 1807 Phenomenology translations of Spirit Miller's basis is GW, vol. 9. I have consulted HegeVs throughout Press, 1977). of Spirit Phenomenology (Oxford: Oxford University 23 "Nennen wir die Bewegung des Wissens, den Gegenstand Begriff, so als oder als sehen Wissen das Ich, wir, dass nicht nur aber, ruhige Einheit, fuer das Wissen dem Begriffe fuer uns, sondern selbst, der Gegenstand - Oder auf die andere den Begriff das genannt, was der entspricht.

Weise, aber das, was er als Gegenstand, ansich ist, den Gegenstand Gegenstand und das fuer ein oder fuer ein anderes ist, so erhellt, dass das Ansichseyn, ist" (GW 9:103). anderes seyn dasselbe 24Nonstandard of logic does share Hegel's views analytic philosophy and viability of some contradictions.

See with regards to the meaningfulness contributions of Graham Priest on for example the numerous outstanding A Study of the Transconsistent this subject, such as his In Contradiction: to Para introductions (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhof, 1987); the two historical on the Inconsistent, ed. Graham Priest, Richard consistent Logic. Essays and Jean Norman Routley, (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1989); and "What's Journal So Bad about Contradictions?"

95, no. 8 (1998): 410 of Philosophy The

26.

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS

13

characterization of the discipline of the history of Hegel's as can use of the of the Idea be philosophy description development in the following terms. According to this theory, the fully summarized Thus,

subject

matter

through

a

of

series

this of

as

is thinking

discipline theories

articulated

centered

(Systeme)

upon

in time concepts

that are intrinsically speculative and thus intelligible

(Grundbegriffe) to reason.

only

The

1820 Introduction

continues

different but

by highlighting

or of the developing of philosophic Idea: thinking, an structure is of sys (1) its "organic" system (philosophy evolving nature its is knowl tems); (2) speculative (philosophy self-knowing a of its movement, edge); and (3) the characteristic dynamics namely

connected

features

outward

simultaneously features that of

justify

theoretical

Greater whose

Logic technical

and

the claim

concepts, are made meaning

we

inward of the

intrinsically to them first.

turn

necessary he has

As

development.

by Hegel's explained

are

these

historical

character

Incursions present

previously,

use

into of

namely

1812, 1813, and 1816 editions of the three books of the Logic. the Right,

spirit's ?343)

"deeds"

on

parallel

Phenomenology lustrate Hegel's

stage the processes

of Spirit, present

(1) Philosophic

the

the

the

terms in the

Since

of history (compare Philosophy of of consciousness in the described

passages

from

the

latter will

be used

to il

argument.

thinking is an organic system. can be

In its historical

to a living organism. philosophy unfolding Philosophic as a is one, but it exists only of vitally interre thinking dynamic whole lated parts It maintains its its (theories). specific identity throughout transformations.

It develops time due to an internal drive. through likened

. . . like the liveliness of liveliness is an urge, passes Physical spirit... over into the hunger and thirst for truth, presses for knowledge of it, for the satisfaction of this urge . . . [T]he true has the urge ... to develop it self. Only the living, the spiritual moves, stirs itself inside itself, self-de In this way the Idea, concrete in itself and self-developing, is an velops. in itself a,wealth organic system, a totality that contains of stages and moments.2^

25 "Die . . wie . . . die Lebendigkeit des Geistes physische Lebendigkeit. ist Trieb, geht ueber in den Hunger und Durst nach Wahrheit, nach Erkennt ... [D]as Wahre nis derselben, dieses Triebs dringt nach Befriedigung [hat] den Trieb . . . sich zu entwickeln.

Nur das Lebendige, das Geistige bewegt, ruehrt sich in sich, entwickelt sich. Die Idee ist so, concret an sich und sich ein organisches ein Reichtum entwickelnd, System, eine Totalitaet welche von Stuffen und Momenten in sich enthaelf and 18:43 (GW 47).

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ALLEGRADELAURENTIIS

14

the description of an organism's the description of ontogenesis, a concept in history of self-movement in which philosophy requires the connotation of change to an does not that of transition imply Like

other.

Hegel's he uses

term

term

technical in this

or self-movement?and for organic to characterize philosophy's

tory?is "development" Rather than using

(Entwicklung). the term indiscriminately the use of "development" confines

process,

Hegel structure

dynamic

of self-related

thinking.

to denote

sets

He

his

any kind

of

to the in the Logic it apart from other

to the being and to In the opening of the Ency thought. we read: of the Concept by which other than

dynamic configurations the essence of things Doctrine

clopaedia's

the

Introduction

thinking

relates

or shin The progression of the Concept is no longer either passing-over for the [moments] that are distin ing into an other, but development; posited at the same time as identical with one guished are immediately and the determinacy is as a free being of another and with the whole, the whole Concept.26 This

summarizes the three structural passage so fundamental whose considers distinction Hegel organizational ing Being, the relation

principle and Essence,

of the entire

the Concept to thinking itself.

of each

The Logic. are functions

features

of

thinking as to constitute the

differences

in think

of the difference

in

When thinking has categories of Being for its generic objects (for example, its quality,

indeterminate or

being, intrinsic

nothing,

determinate becoming; being, and so forth) its dynamic is an one to from (Uebergehen)

measure, as a over"

by Hegel "passing In this context, the denotation other category. of thinking is category independent seemingly quantity

described

of each (the signified) to itself and is related

to it. extrinsic by a reflection has of Essence of Being for its ge the thinking categories as a "shining to describe its movement neric prefers objects, Hegel a reflection into another" in Anderes), that is, reciprocal (Scheinen the next

category

When

among

the meanings

of different

categories.

Each

of the categories

26 "Das ist nicht mehr Uebergehen noch Schei des Begriffs Fortgehen nen in Anderes, unmittel sondern Entwicklung, indem das Unterschiedene bar zugleich als das Identische mit einander und mit dem Ganzen gesetzt, die ist" (E, ?161). als ein freies Seyn des ganzen Begriffes Bestimmtheit

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

15

FOUNDATIONS METAPHYSICAL involved

in this

constitutes of the part of the meaning logical sphere as of the one, though only logical analysis following preceding can detect this reciprocal "shine." For example, the category of iden reflection?the of distinction tity already contains?upon category in turn, contain and vice versa. the category of Both, (Unterschied)27 as well

ground

versa:

and vice

a notion

of something's

identity

from, though also identical with, what

ily distinguishable by it. Equally, of the world's

the ground

the notion essence

as appearance

of the world versa.

and vice

of the world's

actuality of the categories

is necessar

is grounded

implies a notion in turn, "shines"

both, Through includes both its essence

that

and

its

as referring of essence is meant si a to of is the of Essence multaneously determinacy (Essence Being and a determinacy of thought is also the Concept?or Being) (Essence x truth?of reason the of the for the provides ground objective Being): appearance.

Each

of x while

existence

or truly is.

It is only when

also

providing

thinking

has

the concept

itself

of what

as its explicit theories:

x essentially in the

object?as

of philosophic

concepts idea, nous, system-identifying god, res cogitans, mind?that refers to its reason, substance, monad, Hegel as movement In the 1820 Introduction, in particular, he development. it explicit makes that self-referentiality is the differentia of specifica genuinely

philosophic

thinking

over

against

all other

Thus, the logical and chronological movement is correctly

identified

kinds

of thought.

of philosophic

thinking

as self-development:

known truth exists in the element of thought, in [T]hat philosophically the form of universality,... this is familiar to our common way of think itself contains its own determination, ing. But [to say] that the universal ... here begins a properly philosophic it is, therefore, proposition?here that a consciousness that does not yet cognize philosophically with draws and says that it doesn't understand this.28

27Two

and concise discussions excellent of Hegel's uses of Unterschied and Differenz in the Logic are in E, pp. xxiii-xxiv, and Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 131-3.

28 im Elemente erkannte Wahrheit des Gedan "[D]ass die philosophisch es ist diss unserer gewoehnlichen kens, in der Form der Allgemeinheit ist,...

Aber dass das Allgemeine selbst in sich seine Bestim Vorstellung gelaeuffig. . . . hier Satz an?hier mung enthalte, philosophischer faengt ein eigentlich tritt darum das noch nicht philosophisch erkennende zurueck, Bewusstseyn und sagt es verstehe diss nicht" (GW 18:45-6).

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ALLEGRADELAURENTIIS

16

the organic-systematic of philosophy character is a con of its self-referential that its of sequence nature, is, being speculative. is a speculative The system. thinking organic (2) Philosophic reason for philosophy's nature is its character. speculative organic

Accordingly,

In a move

parallel consciousness

natural

to that described discovers

itself

in the Phenomenology, where in its rebirth as self-conscious

ness ("Ego is the content of the relation [of knowing to object] and the includes the in inquiry always already itself')29 philosophic itself or "the universal") of the agent and (that is, thinking vestigation or or of In the medium investigation (that is, concepts "universals"). what its objects, whether der to determine it is, how it affects thinking relating

or distorts

constitutes with

them, whether is no other tribunal

there

them,

itself. Philosophy thinking its own universal containing but

as

"The Concept

such

. . . and

contains

proper

...

to or incongruous to use instrument

of a the recognition in the Logic: ... of universality, of

with

begins

as defined

determination, the moment

of singularity, and particularity.

This

particularity, .. .universality

it is adequate to turn to or

as the

inward

reflection

of

. . . itself is unity with negative One fundamental what is in and for itselfdetermined.^0 of meaning is otherwise is that it objectifies what "speculative thinking" (for ex To for make theoretical and merely subjective. ratiocination) ample, human into an object of logical and historical inves thinking an to turn for This is is into object why both thought thought. tigation whole of philosophic theories and the theory of this his the historical

practical

tory merit These

being

introductory

of Philosophy

History

as "speculative." reflections premised

characterized

to the Lectures

parallel what Hegel had written

on

the

in 1807 when

as generic of consciousness. activity Thinking to is Erken conceptual (begreifendes ueberhaupt) cognition (Denken is to self-consciousness. consciousness Philosophic nen)2,1 as natural introducing

the history

29 "Ich ist der

Inhalt der Beziehung,

und

das Beziehen

selbst"

9:103).

30 "Der

(GW

. ., der Allgemeinheit.

Begriff als solcher enthaelt die Momente . . und der Einzelheit, Al der... als der Reflexion-in-sich der Besonderheit. welche und Besonderheit, negative Einheit mit sich das an und lgemeinheit ... see Bestimmte sich above, n. 21). fuer ist"(i?, ?163; 31The distinction is also outlined and illustrated by Hegel in ?2 and Re mark of the 1830 Encyclopedia, GW 20:40-1 and W 8:42-3, respectively.

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

17

METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS we

science,

read

in the

Introduction

the truth because convey a medium that modifies

thinking or distorts

to the Phenomenology, is apt to an instrument nor is neither merely a subject

matter

alien

to

it but

inves itself. Since any object of philosophic this subject matter must be always conceptual, philosophic thinking investigates tigation of truth.32 Thus, the historical of itself in the investigation inception

rather

with the rise of the self-reflexive coincides stage philosophic thinking as of consciousness, self-consciousness.

As conscious namely long ness has for its object a content which it does not consider to belong to

itself?"beings" that it understands

that

it senses,

to exist

"things" that it perceives, the things perceived?its

"forces"

is beyond history of the natural history of knowing.

The stages of natu do not yet constitute let alone proper, knowing as not yet of the the natural soul do just stages cognition,

part and parcel ral consciousness philosophic constitute

spirit

proper.

has for its object only appearing knowledge, Now, since this exposition ... it can be taken as the path of natural consciousness its way making or as the path of the soul that journeys through a se to true knowledge; as stages set for it by its own nature, that it ries of its own configurations . . . Natural consciousness itself into will prove itself may purify spirit. to be only [the] concept of knowing, or nonreal knowing.33 or philosophic are being objects

Real

knowing, lation,

knowing determined

then, come together and the relating itself;

that its realizes34 begins when thinking the object and self by itself.

Knowing in one Ego

of the re "Ego is the content an other, and is itself over against act:

32See GW 9:53-4.

33 "Weil nun diese nur das erscheinende zum Gegen Wissen Darstellung stande hat, so . . .kann [sie] ... als der Weg des natuerlichen Bewusstseyns, das zum wahren Wissen oder als der Weg der dringt, genommen werden; welche die Reihe ihrer als durch ihre Natur ihr vorgest Seele, Gestaltungen, eckter Stationen durchwandert, dass sie sich zum Geiste laeutere ... Das nat wird sich erweisen, nur Begriff des Wissens, uerliche Bewusstseyn oder nicht zu seyn" (GW 9:55-6). Hegel insists that natural consciousness reales Wissen "Das natuerliche Bewusst per se "loses its truth" on the path of philosophy: seyn ... verliert auf diesem Wege seine Wahrheit" (GW 9:56).

34 English offers as many speculative insights as German does. The use of "to realize" for "to become aware of is the perfect psychological counter of Hegel's "self-actualization of conscious part to the speculative meaning ness."

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ALLEGRADELAURENTIIS

18

this other which for the Ego is like grasps simultaneously beyond35 wise the itself."36 only Ego as it merely The phenomenological of knowing ap presentation in to relation what is other than is, pears,37 namely knowing, allegedly to "free science moving in the form proper prelude then, the negative to it."38 The

latter,

then,

cal history of philosophy: or "free" thought. ing The

of a philosophi subject matter and thereby self-determin self-investigating

is the proper

is outward and inward development. thinking also claims that the externalization of philo in the historical of its systems is at the same sequence

(3) Philosophic 1820 Introduction

sophic thinking time an inwardization philosophic

or recollection of (Insichgehen) (Erinnerung) its consciousness?a of self-reflexive charac deepening

ter.

is not directed Further, this development [only] outwards as in external a going inwards;... is As the but the also developmental ity, unfolding a is not...

Idea in its development outward going of the philosophical a deepening other but likewise a going-into-itself, of itself in becoming render the Idea, previously itself, so does the progression general and more determinate in itself.39 rather undeterminate,

35Michael.

J. Petry, HegeVs Philosophy Spirit of Subjective (hereafter, vols. 1-3 (Boston: Reidel, 1978), uses "to include" to "Subjective Spirif), in the definition of the Ego in the Philosophy translate Hegel's uebergreifen of reason is explained of Subjective the universality Spirit (E, ?438), where as the Ego's capacity of being permeated and grasped by the object as well as In the object. the Ego's activity of "grasping beyond" and incorporating "to embrace" or "to overreach" (58-9). wood, Dictionary, suggests 36 "Ich ist der Inhalt der und das Beziehen selbst; es ist selbst Beziehung, gegen ein anderes, und greifft zugleich ueber diss andre ueber, das fuer es ebenso nur es selbst ist" (GW 9:103).

37 Wissen."

Compare GW 9:55, quoted above: "nur das erscheinende 38 "die Wissen Gestalt sich bewegende freye, in ihrer eigenthuemlichen schaft" (GW 9:55).

39 "Ferner nicht nach Aussen als in die Aeusser geht diese Entwicklung ist eben so ein Ge der Entwicklung lichkeit, sondern das Auseinandergehen Idee in der philosophischen hen nach Innen; . . . Indem das Hinausgehen zu einem Andern sondern ebenso ein nicht... ihrer Entwicklung ein Werden ein sich in [sich] Vertieffen ist, so macht das Fortschre In-sich-hineingehen, unbestimmtere iten die vorher allgemeine, Idee in sich bestimmter" (GW 18:47).

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

19

METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS or the inclusion If self-referentiality, is characteristic of philosophy, object, in time will

also

follow,

at the beginning

sued

in conformity of its history,

in the of thought then the advance with an

of the thinking of philosophy

the Socratic

inward

trajectory:

is

command advancing

knowledge will imply increased cognition of the knowing

philosophic self.

not only of philosophy It is true, of course, but of other forms of that their movement is always more than objectification spirit as well or the material in an "other," be this the spiritual of our spe products a recollection nature. cies's second Their is as well development (Erinnerung), itself precisely

whereby

through attains

spirit other, coming in the Phenomenology

knowledge

its grasp spirit enhances its self-externalization.40 an ever more

self-experience

and determination

of be

By

apparently shape of itself. As to lead the soul to self

concrete is said

(the soul "achieves cognition of what it is in itself through

so in the Philosophy of itself'),41 of Spirit, experience of its own externalizations leads to its increasing spirit's experience And since consists of human spirit develop self-knowledge. thought's the

complete

ment inner This, soul.

in self-knowing, determination

means also increased self-knowledge nature of the of spirit. very (and "concretion") to the Anthropology illustrated of the by recourse increased

again, may be In the development

of spirit from natural soul to consciousness in the externalization of the soul?its proper, every stage taking pos session of corporeality, its positing and taking possession of the exter a phase nal world, and so on?also of spirit's inwardiza represents

transformation of its in-itself into is, the progressive into subjectivity.

Both sides of the soul's itself, or of its corporeity are ideologically externalization and velopment, inwardization, rected toward the full sublation into conscious of soul selfness tion,

that

for de di or

Egoity:

40For a detailed overview of the role of in the general econ Erinnerung of thinking in Hegel see Angelica omy of the logic and psychology Nuzzo, in Hegel's Philosophy," "Thinking and Recollecting.

Logic and Psychology in La memoria, ed. Gianna Gigliotti forthcoming (Naples: Bibliopolis/Vrin, 2005).

41 "durch die ihrer selbst vollstaendige Erfahrung was an sie sich selbst ist" gen gelangt, (GW 9:55).

zur Kenntnis

desjeni

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ALLEGRADELAURENTIIS

20

In itself, matter has no truth within the soul; as being-for-itself, the soul itself from its immediate separates being, and sets the latter over The soul that has posited42 its being over against itself as corporeity.... that has and determined sublated it as its own, has lost the against itself, of soul as immediacy of the spirit. The actual soul... is in-it meaning self the ideality for-itself of its determinacies; in its externality [it is] in and infinitely related to itself.43 recollected a philosophical ing or recollective

Only

can of philosophy of spirit's external

history dimension

capture

the

inwardiz

development, namely the successive sublations of philosophic by reconstructing principles in the history of the systems.

The logical that is, in concretization, intension and extension,44 of philosophic is then creasing concepts the

to complement of ancient philosophies

their

necessary

principles and their cluded

more

signification or recollected

in these:

thinking more complete The history

philosophy of philosophy

spective

more comparatively than later ones, but

The "abstract"

they are in for itself the is itself

this

thriven,

the

is."45

to philosophy

external

succession.

is, now, "Philosophy as and, conceptual thinking, further this development has

of this development The development.

knowing

are

"external"

chronological

a story told from a per is not Historie, or a report on real occurrences as op

42 translates "Soul which posits its being over Petry, Subjective Spirit, hat. against itself," but Hegel uses the verb in the past tense: entgegengesetzt of positing its own content as an other from itself Indeed, the soul's process must be concluded for it to cease to be mere soul and to begin its journey as consciousness.

The logic underlying this process is explained in the Greater Doctrine of the truth l.C: from the Logic, Being, chap. resulting analysis of undetermined being and undetermined nothing (namely that they are becom into each ing) is not just that being and nothing are permanently passing other, but that they have always already done so (GW 21:69).

43 "An sich hat die Materie keine Wahrheit in der Seele; als fuersichsey ende scheidet diese sich von ihrem unmittelbaren Seyn, und stellt sich das selbe als Leiblichkeit Die Seele, die ihr Seyn sich entgegeng gegenueber.... und als das ihrige bestimmt hat, hat die Bedeutung der esetzt, es aufgehoben ... ist der Unmittelbarkeit des Geistes, verloren.

Die wirkliche Seele Seele, an sich die fuer sich seyende Idealitaet in ihrer Aeus ihrer Bestimmtheiten, in sich und unendliche serlichkeit erinnert auf sich" (E, ?412).

Beziehung 44

See

45 "Die

above,

n.

18.

Philosophie und ist als begreiffendes weiter diese Entwicklung

ist nun fuer sich das Erkennen dieser Entwicklung, Denken selbst diese denkende Je Entwicklung. desto vollkommner ist die Philosophie" gediehen,

(GW 18:47).

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

21

FOUNDATIONS METAPHYSICAL posed

to a fable

schichte,

the

developed

cannot

investigation oras resembles

about

unreal

developmental be made

ones.

The

history

history without For

of philosophy which what

example, intelligible.46 meant all that "mind" has ignoring of psychologists the efforts attempting

of mind

is Ge has

a philosophic since Anaxag to grasp

their

of their personal without patients' personalities history.47 knowledge name a a se not In theorizing Mind per does "mind" concept. thing but one cannot to term which the indicate any signified corresponds thing

46Geschichte core meaning in its Old derives from geschehen, whose is "to turn [out] suddenly."

Over time, the lat High German form (scehanto) new event (Ereignis) ter acquired the connotation of the unexpected, and fi in general. nally that of Werden, becoming 47For such an ahistorical see John R. Searle's The Mystery approach of York: Consciousness New York Review of Books, (New 1997). In the intro of the "religious and philosophical duction, "errors" and "obsolete categories" mind But tradition" are said to "plague" contemporary theory (p. xii). is a natural, biological It Searle's own thesis?"consciousness phenomenon. is as much part of our biological life as digestion, growth, or photosynthesis" and nineteenth-century differs from those of eighteenth(p. xiii)?hardly thinkers like de laMettrie, Cabanis, C Vogt, or Du Bois-Reymond.

This pecu is reproduced in Daniel Dennett's liar a-historicity study of "the mind (or De Stance 1997], 123). brain)" (The Intentional [Cambridge: MIT Press, into "mind" are philosophical, Den that his investigations spite assurances are oddly se to mind theories inWestern philosophy nett's sparse references In The Mind's I (with Douglas R. Hofstadter) lective.

(New York: Bantam, a of he from sketch of Locke's conscious mind as leaps conception 1982), to Freud as discoverer to itself of "the existence of uncon "transparent scious mental processes" is made to Leibniz's re (ibid., 11-2). No reference on Human buttal of Locke, his theory of petites perceptions (New Essays or of the differ of life-degrees in the monad Understanding), (Monadology), ence of "perception" from "apperception" and Grace)-, (Principles of Nature to apperception's central role in Kant's theory of mind; to Hegel's distinction between conscious and unconscious thinking (E, ?398) and implicit and ex or on content to soul extensive debt to Nietzsche Freud's plicit (E, ??402-3); this subject. distinct ancestries "somewhat Thus, there are certainly more worth noting" (Consciousness Tho Explained, suspects.

44) than Dennett mas Nagel (Other Minds York: Oxford offers [New University Press, 1995], 7) an interesting for this philosophizing.

He claims, "philosophers explanation don't have to know much about history or anything about literature, but they ... to have at least an amateur's grasp of the contributions are expected of Newton, Maxwell, Darwin, Einstein, Heisenberg, Cantor, Goedel, and Turing. . . all of which provide data for philosophical reflection."

One cannot help a of why grasp nonamateurish) Plato, Aristotle, wondering (prefereably is not seen as providing at least as good Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, or Hegel "data" for doing philosophy.

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ALLEGRADELAURENTIIS

22

the concept of mind itself. "the concept of "Mind" signifies The contemporary and this, as all concepts, has a history. mind" must be the it has of thus codetermined "mind" by meanings meaning An adequate in the history of philosophy. embodied contemporary than

other

to overcome

of mind will have concept ous ones.

In announcing is study of philosophy phy

include

all previ

(sub?ate)

of the history of philoso cannot be otherwise,"48 itself,?as Hegel a for the radical idea that his audience prepares history philosophical of the intrinsic is a chronological of philosophy recapitulation logic of

philosophic

that

and

"the STUDY

thinking.

II The History

of Philosophy

to maintain

not extravagant probably section but the opening his

entire

philosophy the succession

tain that

as the succession

same

Parallels

the Logic of the Idea.

It is

that Hegel's thesis (quoted the lies at foundation here)

to be

in of

repeated as system: to this idea, I now main "According in history is the of philosophy of the systems de of the conceptual in the logical derivation

of the Idea."49

terminations

suc as stating that the historical a use of philosophy parallels (to or coincides with of the claim) weak version strong (to use Hegel's in its and of the succession practical spirit's phases logical version) of theo whole of knowing itself.50 The sequential theoretical activity The

cession

ries

can be paraphrased in the history systems

thesis

of

der Systeme)

(die Aufeinanderfolge

spond to internal principles bestimmungen

by the necessity systems

der

Idee),

displays

phases

that

of human thinking and acting (Begriffs

and

the

sequence

of the phases

is dictated

intrinsic to the logic of these principles.

in the history

corre

of philosophy

are different

expressions

Since the of one

thinking process, Hegel claims further that their principles, though necessarily known (erkannt) only through historically documented

48 "das STUDIUM

der Philosophie der Geschichte es denn anders nicht seyn kann" losophie selbst,?wie 49GW 18:49. Seen. 5.

50See GW 18:52.

[ist] Studium (GW 18:50).

der Phi

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

23

FOUNDATIONS METAPHYSICAL theories, tions of pounded

can

be

only

adequately determinations

the

Idea, in the Logic:

as determina (begriffen) connection is ex logical

grasped whose

Imaintain that if one strips the fundamental concepts [Grundbegriffe] in the history of philosophy that have appeared of what of the systems concerns to the particular, and their exterior shape, their application similar features, then one obtains the various stages of determination of the Idea itself in its logical concept.51 in a somewhat

different the philosopher the way: reconstructing of understands the theories each other history philosophy succeeding in time to be expressions of (or real appearances: Erscheinungen)52 theoretical and of of the principles practical activity self-knowing

Put

called

"the Idea."53 In the

text

for the

argument

discussion

under idea

Hegel

does

that

other?let

ing correspond that they are porting to the metaphysics fers us here Nature.54

of

time

After a brief treatment of the philosophy ferent

an explicit of philosophic think develop

the history and logic alone for the stronger In support of his thesis "the same."

to each

here

not

as explanatory of this thesis (1), we doctrine of Hegel's that provides

shall

from

his

version he merely Philosophy

pur re of

of time being invoked turn to a related

additional

(though

but dif far from

definitive)

support for it (2). This is the theory of the parallel and

seemingly ments of

inverse

directions

"knowing

of

substance"

the

ontological

and

(wissende

Substanz)

logical

develop into its

51 "Ich

der in der Ge dass wenn man die Grundbegriffe behaupte, erschienenen schichte der Philosophie rein dessen entkleidet, was Systeme ihre aeusserliche ihre Anwendung auf das Besondere, und dergle Gestaltung, ichen betrift, so erhaelt man die verschiedenen Stuffen der Bestimmung der Idee selbst in ihrem logischen Begriffe" For an exhausting (GW 18:49-50). and critical assessment of Hegel's thesis and its metaphysical pre explication see Klaus Duesing, Hegel und die Geschichte der Philosophie. suppositions und Dialektik in Antike und Neuzeit Ontologie (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftli che Buchgesellschaft, 1983).

52GW 18:51.

53On in the manuscript of this passage margin Hegel notes: "only be cause of this do I bother to deal with it, to lecture on it [nur darum gebe ich mich damit ab, halte Vorlesungen darueber]" (GW 18:51), that is, on the his tory of philosophy.

54E, ??254-9.

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ALLEGRADELAURENTIIS

24

form (Begriffsgestalt), that is, into self-knowing conceptual or subjectivity This is found in the section proper. theory of the 1807 Phenomenology.55 Knowing

(1) By referring to the time metaphysics Nature,

Hegel are both

spirit Idea.

is reminding his audience forms of the self-external common

This

self-externality, of their spatiality spirit, consists for example, space Mechanics, a more

from

fundamental

and and

determination

substance on Absolute

from the Philosophy

of the theory

of

that nature

and

being (Aussersichsein) to the existence of nature

of the

temporality. time are defined of nature,

In the

and

section

on

as derivations

namely

exter

pure

is nature's thus it nality Space externality (Aeusserlichkeit). in-itself, is called immediate time is nature's externality externality;56 for-itself, thus it is called mediated externality.57 same

underlies conception of the "natural dimensions

The temporal

the exposition of the spatial and of Sub soul"58 in the Philosophy at first in its spatial is described

soul Spirit.

Spirit as natural as a of geographic, that and existence, is, multiplicity ethnic, familial, characterized individual traits and temperaments by the inertia and as phe indifference of all natural typical reciprocal things regarded are the "places" of spirit's first self-external nomena in space.

These jective

ization, second

or the soul's dimension

natural

qualities of the natural soul

as they coexist on earth.59 The is temporal: the stages of life, re oscillations between the sleep

and the individual soul's production, are the "epochs" of spirit's first shape state. These ing and the waking as soul. in which is a way the soul undergoes Each of these natural as a lend human and other animal life its character They changes. continuum

of differentiations.60

This

distinction

of spatial the natural

(or soul

imme

forms of is, of (or mediated) at in there all and all What course, is, analytical. places times, purely of the It is is their unity, that is, the mediated immediacy living body.61

diate)

and

temporal

55GW 9:428.

56 Compare ?, ??254-6.

57 Compare ?",??257-9.

58?, ??391^02.

59 Compare ?',??392-5.

60 Compare ?*, ??396-8.

61On the logical identity of "soul" and "living body" in Hegel see Michael zu Hegel, Enzyklopaedie Kommentar Problem.

Wolff, Das Koerper-Seele ? 389 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1992).

(1830),

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

25

METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS

in and of the soul and changes the dynamic unity of qualities precisely can eventually how this phenomenon of nature distin that explains own and itself from its is inwardness.

Soul acquire corporeality guish to lose its one-sided nature begins It the stage at which extrinsicality. in the actualization of the concept of corpo is the first turning point real nature: truth of matter, that matter "Spirit is the existent [namely] itself has no truth."62 Thus soul, the first concrete of unity spirit, con sists

of the

simultaneous

and

the continuous

The

soul

experience or finds

that senses

of diverse

perception

qualities (sensations) of a variety of changes. (as Erlebnis) one totality of sen in itself (empfindet)

sations is the feeling soul (die fuehlende will

eventually, turn tience,64

ego sumes

is the

spirit

in

through into actual

lightning its naturalness."65 its most

that

and and

Seele).63 Merely feeling soul

repetition soul, the precursor strikes

mode acts

or habitual

of sensations

These

natural

shapes.

Spirit exists of space dimensions

the

features

primitive

over

carry always

of consciousness: the natural

through

and

sen

into

exclusively

soul

"The con

and

of the existence all

of

its

subsequent in the external

time.

The 1820 Introduction to the History of Philosophy

stresses

the

as particular of representations (Vorstellungen) self-reflective As all activity, exists only in its exter thinking. thinking or nalization: what is actual that is, having ef only wirkend, (wirklich exists. is no exception: it only exists Philosophic fects) thinking role of space

and

time

its actualizations.66

through

If time

and

space

are dimensions

of ex

in extrinsic in general and if thinking exists trinsicality only forms, are as as of nature, then time and space constitutive of thinking much of the natural of the Idea. This, soul, and of all other determinations Hegel spirit

as much as to to individual consciousness applies and its absolute that is, art, religion, and expressions, The time-space of individual consciousness is individual

clarifies, in general

philosophy.

62 "Der Geist ist die existierende der Materie, dass die Materie Wahrheit selbst keine Wahrheit hat" (E, ?389 Remark). ??399-403.

63Compared, in ??409-10. is described 64Habituation 65 "Das Ich ist der durch die Naturseele und ihre Natuerlich schlagende keit verzehrende Blitz" (E, ?412 Addition).

66 Compare GW 18:52.

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ALLEGRADELAURENTIIS

26 the

life;

of spirit

time-space

is human

and

history;

the

of

time-space

the history of philosophy:

philosophy,

This being-there and thereby being-in-time not only of sin is a moment, in general that as such is essentially finite, but also [a gle consciousness of the development of the philosophical Idea in the element of moment] ... and so pure philosophy appears in thinking as an existence thinking proceeding through time.67 determines space and time as, respectively, Thus, Hegel ate and mediated dimensions of the Idea's externality. of

its immediacy

displays

mode

speculative

thought?the

of which

in thought's

the

immedi

In the element

is philosophy?the

logic and

Idea

its mediation

in

The fact that nature as a whole is one mode of actu history. event must of the Idea explains natural be every why always codetermined is the by space and time. The fact that spirit as a whole

thought's alization

other mode of actualization

of the Idea makes

are quintessential logic and history of philosophic eral?and thinking cination

that abstracts

be

found

to codetermine

sions

ness

of

they will spirit

that

of logical and historical dimen

as philosophy finds some development intrasystem movement in Hegel's of the of conscious conception on Absolute to subjectivity.

In the chapter substance

in the Idea's support from

Knowing the phases starts out tent

self-actualization

arti

separates

In actuality, however, the

thinking is.

(2) The thesis of the coincidence atic

of thinking in gen Only the kind of ratio

in particular. actual existence thought's

its logic from its history.

ficially always

from

it intelligible why both

determinations

also

from the 1807 Phenomenology, of consciousness

described

Hegel recapitulates in the book.

that is, as simple "substance," or thought and object.

It then develops as

diremptions, by which

identity

briefly

Consciousness of form

by progressive

and

con

internal

the originally immediate identity rev?ales itself

to be (and thus becomes for itself) a mediated one, or a unity In the end, absolute site determinations. represents knowing

of oppo a phase

67 "Diss und damit in der Zeit seyn, ist ein Moment nicht nur des Daseyn das als solches wesentlich endlich einzelnen Bewusstseyns ist, ueberhaupt, Idee im Elemente des der philosophischen sondern auch der Entwicklung ... und so erscheint im Denken die reine Philosophie Denkens als eine in der Zeit fortschreitende Existenz" (GW 18:52-3).

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

27

METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS in which now

consciousness

has

its own

so that it diremptions as having been all along also as a taken the move whole,

sublated

its initial

recognizes

substantiality remarks that, in the Phenomenology described but seemingly parallel contrary then

subjectivity.

Hegel ment of consciousness in two proceeding consciousness aliter,

as substance

must

to be

appears directions.

Re

of as preceding nature must be

be

thought consciousness that (in the same way self-knowing as or as preceding con of the natural soul spirit, thought preceding sciousness substance is there in actuality and mind): "Now, knowing

earlier

than

or conceptual itmust contain

its form

at all, self-develop movement. of its ciple

From

to But for a substance shape."68 from the beginning the internal prin

a logical

perspective, then, substance's for knowing and then self-knowing, its subjective capacity dynamis or "conceptual consciousness in the substantial precedes shape," or truth of mode.

This arch? the concept is, in Hegel's terminology, consciousness, of the principle

self-consciousness. namely or concept of consciousness

or concept, principle movement that knowing the for-itself of substance the

into object

Spirit is the dynamic with that of which

unity it is

substance: namely is?the transformation

"is in itself the spirit of that in-itself into of the object of consciousness

into subject, of self-consciousness, that is,... a form of spirit, self-consciousness

into the Concept.'"69 is a process, not a state

Being is and not hexis).

It consists of the permanent (it metabol? recapitula and preservation, of all stages of know tion, that is, acknowledgment past forms of conscious ing that lead up to it. In absolute knowing, ness

are

not

present only but also always curiosities) of consciousness's ponents denies definitiveness Hegel stores

validity which each by

to every one is overcome.

in their in their

in-itself for-itself

own

grasp of to each stage

of them

precisely

mode mode

(as

archeological (as stages and com In this way, while

itself). of consciousness, in the

logical

he

re

transitions

68 "In der Wirklichkeit ist nun die wissende Substanz frueher da, als die Form oder Begriffsgestalt derselben" (GW 9:428).

69 ... ist an sich die die das Erkennen ist?die "[Der Geist] Bewegung, in das Fuersich, in das Subject, des der Substanz jenes Ansichs Verwandlung des Bewusstseyns in Gegenstand des Selbstbewusstseyns, d.h.

Gegenstands ... in den Begriff (GW 9:429).

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ALLEGRADELAURENTIIS

28 This

from

a substantial

concrete

form

movement

entire

and

subjective creasingly if the possibility of the latter were as telos: its intrinsic namely logically,

place

and

of not

abstract

spirit included

that knows itself as Concept Thus, in the Concept earlier than the fulfilled whole whose becoming in consciousness those moments.

Contrarywise, is earlier than the moments.70 conceptualized,

to an never

could

in the

in take

former

the moments emerge is the movement of the whole, though un

that the logical and real developments thesis phenomenological as movements of consciousness and contrary while appear parallel in the 1820 Introduction to explain the same, reemerges being realiter

The

the definition states

here

verse

as unfolding

of philosophy

of absolute

spirit.

Hegel

"on a seemingly in philosophic proceeds thinking to that of its historical The inversion unfolding. seeming

that

path"71 from the

that the philosopher circumstance the real studying to has of the "already bring along philosophy knowledge progression as to in the the Idea order of the process of development recognize to knows the Idea thanks The his his Idea."72 philosopher privileged arises

torical This

He

position.

unfolding

can

is what

look

makes

the concept of philosophy. two self, it fulfills moments appear

roles to

back

Idea's

As

it as preceding As subject,

object

of

present

to its own

embodiments are

"fulfilled

unfolding. whole")

of

is thought that thinks it its past phases the subject thought, itself,

however, from resulting

as principles of systems, of the the logical elements present, of systems In this sense, the series

their cess

historical

(the

Since philosophy

at once.

philosophic knowing. state (the unity its grasps present as intelligibility moments) lending

losophy.

at the

up the content

philosophic the sublation

or of

thinking of those

In past in the first place. the moments of this pro concrete of phi concept in the history

of philo

70"In dem treten hiemit die Momente der sich als Begriff weiss, Begriffe, die Bewegung frueher auf, als das erfuellte Ganze, dessen Werden jener Mo aber mente ist. In dem Bewusstseyn ist das Ganze, unbegriffne, dagegen frueher als die Momente" (GW 9:429).

71"auf anscheinend umgekehrtem Wege" (GW 18:45).

72 "um . . . ihren der Idee zu [der Philosophie] Fortgang als Entwicklung der Idee schon mitbringen" erkennen, muss man freylich die Erkenntnis

(GW 18:50).

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

29

FOUNDATIONS METAPHYSICAL sophic series

can be interpreted as being thinking of the Idea. of self-determinations

as the

"the same"

logical

Ill the central claim from the 1820 Introduction has seriously Taking in far reaching and evalua one's consequences grasp, interpretation, as systematic tion of Hegel's of science of conception philosophy truth. Only one such consequence, understand upon Hegel's bearing can of the of be discussed here. history philosophy, ing A widespread view attributes to the function with phy's regard to and is presses responds purely

that

philoso it ex reality

in part, the is strengthened charac by the paraphrasing a to the of famous passage from the Preface

of this reading popularity ter of English translations

1821Philosophy

to Hegel the thesis cultural and political recollective.

At

least

of Right. Hegel speaks here of philosophy

its appearance

as making

has completed its formative process Translations the reflex usually ready."73 disregard a common ive form of sich fertig that means "to machen, expression as actu make oneself and the that ready," interpret phrase indicating "after

and has made

ality pletion ceding Hegel's should phases since

actuality

itself

form implies both com in the pre is preparedness. completion expressed has completed its formative and phrase ("actuality process"), connotation is seldom the of prose redundant, "preparedness"

is "finished"

But

(fertig).14

and

be

in translation.

stressed

and the

the reflexive

Since

has made of

subject

Actuality for the ready the phrase is actuality, itself

odds with

consistently Hegel's that by definition does

tivity translations

neglect

simultaneously

here

anticipatory

use

Aristotelian not

attain

to convey function

one of its completed More importantly, the translation is also at

has

next.

any

as an ac of "actuality" state." "completed Thus, idea of a recollective and

Hegel's of philosophy.

Indeed,

73 "nachdem

if the

die Wirklichkeit ihren Bildungsprozess vollendet und sich hat" fertig gemacht (W 7:28).

74 sich fertig gemacht hat with Knox, Philosophy of Right, paraphrases "is already there cut and dried" (12); Nisbet, Elements, with "has attained its state" (23). completed

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

ALLEGRADELAURENTIIS

30

history of philosophic

thinking follows

the logic of the Idea, then

as much

determined by those they as yet only implicitly.

As in in the causes implicit they in

must philosophic principles as by the ones have sublated causal effects chains, where

be they must

contain be

turn sub?ate, or as in a chain of syllogisms at invokes (the image Hegel as "Idea to illustrate the end of the system75 the concept of philosophy the sublation of earlier into later principles also thinking itself'),76 the immanence of the latter in the former. it is implies Thus, while a true that for Hegel in sublating the principles of all previous system, an do whose life is it is equally ones, express cycle epoch concluded, a new same true that these anticipate principles epoch.

Prima

facie

this appears

to contradict

the

"owl of Minerva"

alle

gory from the Preface to the Philosophy of Right. But the allegory (often quoted out of context) intends to highlight only one of the func to philosophy.

It is embedded in a passage tions Hegel attributes vig a or the idea of directed gener orously moralistic, against ideological, vocation of philosophy and philosophers. ically normative Hegel's concern the assumption main here is to criticize that philosophers' not normative criteria aright by positing one more in it: of word about ready present "By way giving adding as to how the world to at rate struction be: any philosophy ought too to arrives If late do the of is so."77 ways history philosophy role

is to set

the world

al in al the

of self-knowing, the owl alle of spirit's process expression cannot to the whole of functions. be taken capture gory philosophy's of one decaying the final wisdom epoch, philosophy By expressing to grasp to go beyond it. full of But is always the first grasp provides outward

is Uebergreifen).78 is being grasped (Begreifen of the it at is "the world."79 says Hegel, thought Philosophy, Though at the end of an epoch, it thinks beyond tains systematic completion to of from the Preface this end. The historical conception philosophy the

limitations

of what

75E, ??575-7.

76E, ?574.

77 "Um noch ueber das wie die Welt sein soll, Belehren, so die immer zu spaet" kommt dazu ohnehin Philosophie sagen, 78 Compare n. 35.

79"der Gedanke der Welt" (W 7:28).

ein Wort (W 7:27-8).

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

zu

31

FOUNDATIONS METAPHYSICAL the Philosophy we

find

of Right

is indeed the same as the conception

at its conclusion:

The history of the spirit is its ... of making deed consists ... This comprehending is its one comprehending is at once Thus, spirit

of spirit

each and

deed, as spirit is only what it does, and its itself into the object of its consciousness. of being and principle, and the completion its externalization and transition.80

an epochal both system grasps philosophic new it has "made itself for which the beginning

State University

closure

of

ready."

ofNew York at Stony Brook

80 "Die Geschichte is seine Tat, denn er ist nur, was er tut, des Geistes zu machen. und seine Tat ist, sich ... zum Gegenstande seines Bewusstseins ... Dies Erfassen ist sein Sein und Prinzip, und die Vollendung eines Erfas sens ist zugleich seine Entaeusserung und sein Uebergang" (W 7:?343).

This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions