Metaphysical Foundations of the History of Philosophy: Hegel's 1820 Introduction to the "Lectures on the History of Philosophy" Author(s): Allegra de Laurentiis Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Sep., 2005), pp. 3-31 Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20130575 Accessed: 03-03-2015 14:53 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Philosophy Education Society Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Review of Metaphysics.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THEHISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: HEGEL'S 1820 INTRODUCTIONTO THE
LECTURES ON THEHISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY ALLEGRADE LAURENTIIS
explicates
Hegel in several
his theory
introductions
of the history of philosophic
to the various
cycles
of Lectures
on
thinking the His
tory of Philosophy held in Jena, Heidelberg, and Berlin. Only the in troductions to the first cycle of Heidelberg lectures (1816) and to the second Since the
own hand.1 lectures survive in Hegel's cycle of Berlin (1820) the earlier of these is an integral part of the latter, an analysis of a 1820 Introduction account reliable of Hegel's provides theory.
Hegel pher, not
lectures
on
as a historian.
the history as a philoso of philosophy mainly "The history of philosophy must itself be
philosophical,"2 he declares in the address delivered ahead of the 1820 he is not interested a in delivering Thus, primarily of philosophic and ideas, propositions, claims, arguments, in the historical order of their formulation. He pre counterarguments his audience's with historical facts and supposes general acquaintance Introduction.3
chronicle
to: Department of Philosophy, Harriman Hall, State Correspondence of New York at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 11794. University 1The to all other cycles of lectures on the history of phi introductions survive?some of them in fragmentary form?in students' manu losophy is told in Georg W. F. Hegel, scripts. The editorial history of the introductions Werke in zwanzig Baenden ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl (hereafter,"W), M. Michel 20:520. (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969-79), 2 "Die muss der Philosophie Geschichte selbst philosophisch seyn"; II (1816-1831). Gesammelte Georg W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungsmanuskripte Werke Jaeschke (hereafter, "GW'), vol. 18, ed. Walter (Hamburg: Meiner, 1995), 18:39. 3The textual basis for my analysis is the critical edition cited above (n. are my own, but I consult the Haldane/ 2). The translations throughout Simson 1892-96 edition on the History (Hegel's Lectures of Philosophy, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson [New York: The Humani ties Press, 1974]) and the Knox/Miller 1985 translation of the Heidelberg and Berlin introductions on the His to the Lectures (G.W.F. Hegel. Introduction trans. Thomas M. Knox and Arnold V. Miller tory of Philosophy, [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985]). The Review
of Metaphysics
59 (September
2005):
3-31.
Copyright
?
2005
by The Review
Metaphysics
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
of
ALLEGRADE LAURENTIIS
4
as well as with major to philosophic think theories, pertaining tenets. is rather concerned with ers' general first, why showing, Hegel and enjoyed in these tenets were relevant their time; sec recognition events
they were transformed; subsequently in be discerned them may throughout
how and why a core meaning formations.
ond, how
and their
third, trans
A paradigmatic of Hegel's in interpreting illustration procedure fundamental of the philosophic tradition is provided principles by the on a to comment in treatment Remark his of following "being person"
"property" in the 1821Philosophy
of Right
or in itself The notion to its concept it that what spirit is according and for-itself (thereby that it be person ca should be also in its Dasein idea is itself pable of property, [and] religion)?this having ethicality spirit is such cuius (as causa sui, i.e. as free causation, spirit's concept natura nonpotest concipi nisi existens; Spinoza, Ethics I, Def. 1.) Pre . . in lies there the of the this be concept. cisely possibility opposition . .and tween what spirit is merely in itself and its being also for itself. thus the possibility of personhood.4 of the alienation In other
words:
the
tivity with rights is explained forth) Spinoza's equally
late modern
(to property,
by Hegel "god" (or, as in other unless inconceivable
as subjec of personhood conception to moral and so convictions, beliefs, as realization of the core meaning of
res cogitans, of Descartes's passages, as existent). core meaning The of as nous is the idea of a being that deter
its inception "spirit" since itself into being what it is?one mines important for modern philosophy's is, example, political mous,
self-determining
of which expression notion of an autono
subject.
4 "Dass das, was der Geist seinem Begriffe nach oder an sich ist, auch im Dasein und fuer sich sei (somit Person, des Eigentums faehig sei, Sittlich Idee ist selbst sein Begriff (als causa sui, d.i. als keit, Religion habe)?diese ist er solches, cuius natura non potest concipi nisi existens; freie Ursache, . . . liegt die Moeglichkeit Ethik I, Def. I). In eben diesem Begriffe Spinoza, zwischen des Gegensatzes dem, was er nur an sich und nicht auch fuer sich der Persoenlichkeif) der Entaeusserung ist. . .und hierin die Moeglichkeit des oder Naturrecht W. F. der Rechts Grundlinien Philosophie Hegel, Georg im Grundrisse, und Staatswissenschaft 1821, ?66, Remark. (In the follow The is cited as "W 7," followed by page or section number.) ing, this work are mine but I consult throughout Thomas M. Knox, HegeVs Phi translations Press, 1952), and Hugh B. Nis losophy of Right (Oxford: Oxford University Elements (Cam of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood of the Philosophy bet, Hegel. bridge: Cambridge
University
Press,
1991).
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
5
METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS The these
of the goals
first
Lectures the
convey meant
(see sense
above) in which
cal and historiographie and necessary
The
to
Introduction
to grasp and to attempt are and concepts arguments This is where the philologi
skill of the historian place.
and
a serious
implies
philosophic at their inception.
and understood
rightful
in the address
outlined
second
and
of philosophy third goals
has its a
presuppose
theory of philosophy as a particular kind of thinking with specific logi cal and
features.
deliver
of historically but also goes
epistemological an interpretation that includes principles intended
by each
The two
sets
which
is where documented
on
lecturing guiding
concepts
the meaning
beyond
the
(dictated
the history
of philosophy theoretical
the
exposition: the analysis
by
is for Hegel a logical and metaphysical order
chronological These
systems. one another. two orders
of
ostensibly
of
their
has, then, order of meanings,
task at once) and the
their
in the history of philosophic expression of criteria do not operate of independently claim is than this. The explicit actually stronger
sets
two
Hegel's of reconstruction the same:
in principle succession
must the philosopher theories and their
of them.
philosopher of criteria
philosophic
Here
are of the history of philosophic thought to this idea I now maintain that the "According
in history of the systems of philosophy is the same as the in the logical derivation of the conceptual determinations of the Idea."5 succession
As quence
se so the historical cannot be random, sequence logical is not accidental. Just as little can the reconstruction of these the
in a history of philosophy be arbitrary. In (as a discipline) observer would think of philosophers' deed, only the most superficial as a random choices of themes and methods series. To the contrary, as if engaging an in in conversation, epoch-transcending philosophers sequences
variably
relate
to,
criticize,
or make
use
of preceding
ethical
and
5 "Nach dieser Idee ich nun, dass die Aufeinanderfolge der Sys behaupte teme der Philosophie in der Geschichte dieselbe ist, als die Aufeinanderfolge in der logischen Ableitung der Begriffsbestimmungen der Idee" (GW 18:49). See also Georg W. F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik. Die Lehre vom Sein (1832) (Hamburg: Meiner, 1990), where, regarding Parmenides, Hegel writes: in the science must have shown itself as the historically "What isfirst first. And we have to regard the Eleatic One or Being as the first in the knowing of are mine but I consult the translations thought" (GW 21:76). In the following, Arnold V. Science Miller, HegeVs throughout of Logic (New York: Humanities Press, 1969).
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ALLEGRADELAURENTIIS
6 cognitive the case
concerns.
surround
them.
theories
in their
no philosophic
Where
are given, as in precedents refer to concepts in implicit in the Denken), language,
of the Presocratics, philosophers the representational (vorstellendes thinking and wisdom poetry, religion, mythology,
sense-making. as their thread While
Even
here
an exhaustive of Hegel's
claim
strong
to Hegel,
of
a thorough justification on the logical and historical
thought, this brief study aims at clarifying the
two supporting theories elucidating a and correcting view system, pertinacious of the nature of philosophy. the primary
tal) subject matter of philosophy
ject-matter
still
nor
account
claim,
of philosophy know thyself.
and
eye perceives skeptical philosophic as engaged sort succession in some follow Lectures the of this Hegel's logic sense-making of Ariadnes the of history philosophy. through
orders of philosophic
According
preceded
historical
neither
can be given
that have
the most
from
is, both
(that
the body
on Hegel's first
of Hegel's
understanding and
fundamen
is human thinking itself. The history
a gradual fulfillment of the Socratic command: as simultaneous double role and sub subject Thought's a in philosophy lends the latter the character of peculiarly
"speculative"
is thus
much in the sense enterprise, itself of the soul: "The mind
adumbrated
in Aristotle's
is included the ob among can be thought. are immaterial For where the objects that are identical. thinks and that which is thought which Speculative are same In and its the identical."6 Aristotelian object knowledge investigation jects which
the
spirit,
explains Hegel actualization gressive
dynamics
as pro of philosophic thinking what is po of fuer sich) thinking or an sich). nach] [dem Begriffe
(a becoming to its concept tentially (according This is the background for his claim that there is not only chronologi more cal but also, and among philo fundamentally, logical continuity course in it is the of their for history. sophic principles Thus, possible him to identify a common in notions that ap (and evolving) meaning parently
refer
to vastly
different
objects
of reflection.
The
introduc
tory chapter to the Doctrine of Being in the Greater Logic is dedicated to justifying precisely this claim: "Thus the beginning of philosophy is the foundation
that
is present
and
self-preserving
in all subsequent
de
6 ed. and trans. R. D. Hicks De Anima, Aristotle, (New York: he of he episteme Hick's translation Prometheus Books, 1991), 3.4.430a5. is in this context. theoretike with "speculative fully justified knowledge"
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
7
FOUNDATIONS METAPHYSICAL that which
velopments,
remains
in all its further
immanent
determina
tions."7
the history of philosophic is the expres systems toward absolute of human sion of a process thinking self-knowing an isolated to is merit thus also strong enough self-determining) (and in the Greater treatment. has to be sought Its attempted justification The
thesis
that
Logic8 and not in the History of Philosophy.
In section 1 below I treat
of the history of philosophy claim that an in-depth knowledge Hegel's as an I elucidate the argu is such, and integral part of philosophizing ments he defends this claim. The of the 1820 which interpretation by in this part highlights Introduction contained of aspects important at controver aimed the that, although perspective grounding Hegel's sial metaphysical thesis can themselves tory, by
of the offer
inner unity of thought's needed antidote as a discipline
of the history of philosophy instrumental value for doing philosophy a fundamentally nonhistorical discipline. rary notions
port
for Hegel's
of his system.
thesis
from
proper?as Section
the perspective
In the conclusion
in the the theory expounded tial misconception of Hegel's to phy Zeitgeist.
logic and his to contempo
a much
of the
having merely if the latter were
2 provides internal
then
sup
coherence
(3) I briefly respond, in the light of
1820 text,
to what
understanding
I take
to be an influen
of the relation
of philoso
I
The History
of Philosophy Is Philosophy. The 1820 Introduction begins by highlighting the continuity of, and marking the distinction the natural and the spiritual of human between, grounds nature to unchanging remains fastened laws ing. While anchored
metamorphoses, spirit, though necessarily is capable of transforming the "principles, tradition,
life and
think
its throughout in habit-forming and ... prejudices
7 "So ist der die in allen folgenden Entwicklun Anfang der Philosophie, und sich erhaltende das seinen weitern Be gen gegenwaertige Grundlage, immanent Bleibende" durchaus stimmungen (GW 21:58). 8 in the preliminary essay, "With what must the science be Especially in and the treatment actual of the historical instantiations of the transi gin?", tions from each category to the next.
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ALLEGRADELAURENTIIS
8 that
riches"9
constituting tion are both form . . . but
substance
of our
history
tradition.
. . . the material
also
of each
productions of the next: they are
and matter
"second
The
genera "its soul, spiritual to it."10 Thus, in the
present
the matter
nature"
transformed and the being do not differ in substance. One
the transformation producing is made and transforms up of that of all previous spirit epoch's epochs the latter by assimilation into something itself. This is new, namely us a not to to read is for events read of extraneous why history story activity
but
our own
of philosophy, story. As for the history and alien but rather the strange thoughts in one peculiar mode. The development thinking in a multiplicity mode is articulated of forms?the tale
of
it does
not
of our
story of this
tell a own
thinking sys
philosophic
tems.
not
a history Accordingly, even of opinions about
of philosophy is not a history of opinions, interest such as god, jus topics of general we When the of history studying philosophy
nature. tice, or human are being with confronted that concepts or individuals but rather groups principles be a mere
concept
is the
opinion
fact
are
not just convictions of theories. What makes
its intrinsic
There are, of course, singularity.11 work innumerable that represent concepts philosophic ular or singular convictions. But not just any concept is for this reason philosophic theory a notion This is rather that functions whole
theory Such
tency.
refers
Hegel
depends (as a system) a principle is the kind to as Grundbegriff.
alone as
its meaning
upon of
system-identifying
or particularity of thoughts singularity both their form and their content. ion affects ideas
merely partic in a featured
a philosophic concept. theoretical the principle:
The
about
and
consis concept
mere opin embodying As long as my (or my or right are merely my
divinity, morality, are cus referents my merely (or our) opinions, (or our) gods, are of no philo of justice. As such, these toms, or sense thoughts or as historical sophic import?except cultural, psychological, begin What enables such thoughts concepts. philosophic nings of properly community's)
their
9"Grundsaetze, 10
Stoff
"deren
Seele,
Vorurtheile geistige
und
Substanz,
a
or particularity in the body of every
of
even
perhaps
of
... Reichthum" . . . aber
zugleich
(GW 18:37). . . . ein
vorliegender
fuer sie" (GW 18:37). 11 Compare GW 18:42.
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
9
METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS
on the other hand, is the fact of concepts, or per The thoughts of divinity, justice, or aesthetic, mythological, religious, theologi
to develop into philosophic their intrinsic universality.12 in their many
sonhood, cal guises,
mean content. Their objective universal have potentially of is inextricable from the connotation "God" is not universality. ing over Athens if he presides divine alone; "justice" is not just if it admits of its intension of exceptions; the concept of alone, and, by virtue some to not cannot extend but other These persons. "personhood" are implicitly from the moment of their inception, universal concepts so. but it is only in the course of history that they do become explicitly As for the truth content of universal reminds his concepts, Hegel audience
theories' differences and mutual contradic that philosophic truth is relative is the tions do not prove that philosophic or, what no or that is in there truth relativistic same, Skeptic philosophy.13 truth abstinence, comments, only stimulates Hegel hunger thought's for truth.14
At first,
the variance
among parts of a disagreement us with to provide truth claiming
and
each equally cognitive undertaking seem to contradict our legitimate rational expectations. we can it becomes clear that tion, however, only notice, differences
grasp theories' the "instinct" that drives instinct
against
a common
compare, This
ground. truth: "The truth
to find thought of reason possesses this
reflec
Upon
and
ground however
is is
or belief.
invincible
one,?the feeling ... of instinct the that the truth pursues Already [the idea]... thinking an instinctive is one."15 in thinking without in the To engage belief in eating without of truth would be akin to engaging belief possibility in the possibility of satiety. in philosophy is neither individual subject matter ubiquitous nor particular cultural but rather the concept of beliefs, of philosophy what is true. The history consists of a meaningful series of formulations of this concept. Akin to the Phenomenology's descrip The
witticisms
tion
of
the path
of
consciousness,
12 Compare GW 18:43. 13This observation applies tive
of course
the Lectures
equally
on
the History
to the history
of
of the posi
sciences.
14 Compare Gif 15uDie Wahrheit
18:43. aber ist Eine,?dieses un?berwindliche Gefuehl oder . .?dass die Wahrheit nur eine ist. . . Glauben hat der Instinct der Vernunft. darin folgt schon der Instinct des Denkens" (GW 18:43 and 45).
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ALLEGRADELAURENTIIS
10
describe the continuous of self-differentiations of process Philosophy one thinking As the Phenomenology self-conscious activity. presents of its development out of its own natural reconstruction reason's so do these as inces lectures present stages, philosophic thinking in the endeavor to grasp itself. its own history santly retracing To say that conceptual is philosophy's medium and sub thinking a not to is is of abstractions. science say that philosophy ject matter does not consist thinking and their relations?that
Philosophic of concepts
only of a formal determination to formal is, it is not reducible
or mathematics.
It consists, rather, of the analysis of the meaning of system-identifying concepts. as principle of a concept that functions in a system The content is not to sub- or superordinate exhausted As al concepts. by its relations a not that arises in the ready mentioned, just any concept philosophic logic, linguistics, and determination
a philosophic sense. in the technical is for Hegel Grund concept are whose internal and concepts consistency, begriffe meaning, the grounds of justification of the theory mutual compatibility provide are A embedded in. for example concept, they system-identifying ory
"idea" or Leibniz's is a unity "monad," In virtue it and themselves. from among ing differentiated concept" unity, this "concrete of the features but rather the differentiating
Plato's
At
this point,16
concrete
illustrates
Hegel
concepts
through
representations (sinnliche of "red" is abstract sentation
representations. is more hand, tions One
The concrete,
(life, shape, Idea."17
color,
sensible because smell,
notions
the distinction
that between
ble
of other concepts differ of its being an internally not the common contains
abstract
it encompasses.
between and
abstract concrete
and sensi
The sensible repre Vorstellungen]). it is an abstraction from many because of "rose," on the other representation a unity and so forth), that it is also
of many
representa is, it is "One Subject,
ac as classes, to the familiar for concepts rule holding Contrary a its to extension which always implies concept's increasing cording a system-identifying the more principle intension, decreasing general more is it contains: extensive determinations "Here the most is, the
16GW 18:46. 17Ibid.
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
11
METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS also
the most
the most sense
concrete
and
even
to account
selves
This
intensive."18 of
sciences
as to philosophy refers Hegel and why he maintains that common is why
ratiocination enlightened for philosophic principles
are
insufficient and what
by derives
them from
them: It is in this that knowledge of reason distinguishes itself from knowl to and it is the business of philosophizing edge of the understanding, that the true, the Idea does not consist show against the understanding that in itself is the particular, of empty generalities, but of a universal the determinate.19 This containing
definition particularity
of
the
Idea
(or
or determinacy
"the
universal true") as concrete is an abbreviated form of the
definition of "the Concept as such" (der Begriff)
from the Logic:20
as free equal The Concept as such contains the moment o? universality, it contains of particular the moment ity with itself in its determinacy; inwhich the Universal remains serenely equal ity, or of the determinacy as the inward reflec to itself, and it contains the moment of singularity, of universality and particularity. tion of the determinacies This singular and at negative unity with itself is what is in and for itself determined, the same time identical with itself or universal.21 The
notion
of a universality
that by self-particularization
posits
itself
as a (universal) singularity is elucidated by Hegel in the sections of the 18"Hier ist das Extensivste auch das Intensivste" (GW 18:47-8). 19"Es ist hierin dass sich die Vernunfterkenntnis von der blossen Ver und es ist das Geschaeft standeserkenntnis des Philosophi unterscheidet, rens gegen den Verstand zu zeigen, dass das Wahre, die Idee nicht in leeren in einem Allgemeinen, das in sich selbst sondern besteht, Allgemeinheiten das Bestimmte das Besondere, ist" (GW 18:45). 201 use (with few exceptions noted explicitly) the following translation of the Encyclopaedia Logic: G. W. F. Hegel. The Encyclopaedia Logic (with the Zusaetze), ed. and trans. Theodore F. Geraets, Wallis A. Suchting, and Henry S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991). The textual basis of my analy sis of the main text is GW, vol. 20 and, for the Remarks and Additions, W, vol. 8. The Encyclopaedia Sciences of Philosophical (1830) is cited in the follow ing as "2?,"followed by section number. 21 "Der als solcher enthaelt die Momente als der Allgemeinheit, Begriff freier Gleichheit mit sich selbst in ihrer Bestimmtheit?der der Besonderheit, inwelcher das Allgemeine sich selbst gleich bleibt, Bestimmtheit, ungetruebt als der Reflexion in sich der Bestimmtheiten und der Einzelnheit, der Allge an meinheit und Besonderheit, welche Einheit mit sich das und fuer negative sich Bestimmte und zugleich mit sich Identische oder Allgemeine ist" (E,
?163).
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ALLEGRADE LAURENTIIS
12 Doctrine
of
the Concept that he merely however,
duction,
follow
this passage. comments that this
In the
1820
notion
cannot
Intro be
reason
but
by understanding alone, requires grasped (Vernunft). a particular Reason kind of concepts that can be charac grasps as sharing in a first and general way, the mark of self-referen terized,
tiality. Both this kind of notion and the kind of thinking that makes such
notions
thus be called reason?may intelligible?namely such notion, for example, is "self-consciousness." in the chapter of the Phenomenology this bearing
lative."
One
plained "self-consciousness"
refers
thus also same
self-negating) act of cognition,
to mind's
role of being simultaneously
taking
"specu As ex
name,22 on the contradictory (and and object of one and the
subject and in the same
respect:
as motion If we call the movement of knowing, concept, but knowing less unity, or the Ego, the object, then we see that not only for us, but for to the concept.?Or alterna itself, the object corresponds knowing tively, by calling what the object is in itself, the concept, while [calling] clear that the the object what it is as object or for an other, it becomes is the same.23 and the being-for-another being-in-itself
lyze because tradiction.
ana cannot is a concept that the understanding the sublation, and thus the inclusion, of a con at and grasped It is a speculative arrived concept only by
speculative
reason.24
Self-consciousness
it involves
22The textual
are my own. of the 1807 Phenomenology translations of Spirit Miller's basis is GW, vol. 9. I have consulted HegeVs throughout Press, 1977). of Spirit Phenomenology (Oxford: Oxford University 23 "Nennen wir die Bewegung des Wissens, den Gegenstand Begriff, so als oder als sehen Wissen das Ich, wir, dass nicht nur aber, ruhige Einheit, fuer das Wissen dem Begriffe fuer uns, sondern selbst, der Gegenstand - Oder auf die andere den Begriff das genannt, was der entspricht. Weise, aber das, was er als Gegenstand, ansich ist, den Gegenstand Gegenstand und das fuer ein oder fuer ein anderes ist, so erhellt, dass das Ansichseyn, ist" (GW 9:103). anderes seyn dasselbe 24Nonstandard of logic does share Hegel's views analytic philosophy and viability of some contradictions. See with regards to the meaningfulness contributions of Graham Priest on for example the numerous outstanding A Study of the Transconsistent this subject, such as his In Contradiction: to Para introductions (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhof, 1987); the two historical on the Inconsistent, ed. Graham Priest, Richard consistent Logic. Essays and Jean Norman Routley, (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1989); and "What's Journal So Bad about Contradictions?" 95, no. 8 (1998): 410 of Philosophy The
26.
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS
13
characterization of the discipline of the history of Hegel's as can use of the of the Idea be philosophy description development in the following terms. According to this theory, the fully summarized Thus,
subject
matter
through
a
of
series
this of
as
is thinking
discipline theories
articulated
centered
(Systeme)
upon
in time concepts
that are intrinsically speculative and thus intelligible
(Grundbegriffe) to reason.
only
The
1820 Introduction
continues
different but
by highlighting
or of the developing of philosophic Idea: thinking, an structure is of sys (1) its "organic" system (philosophy evolving nature its is knowl tems); (2) speculative (philosophy self-knowing a of its movement, edge); and (3) the characteristic dynamics namely
connected
features
outward
simultaneously features that of
justify
theoretical
Greater whose
Logic technical
and
the claim
concepts, are made meaning
we
inward of the
intrinsically to them first.
turn
necessary he has
As
development.
by Hegel's explained
are
these
historical
character
Incursions present
previously,
use
into of
namely
1812, 1813, and 1816 editions of the three books of the Logic. the Right,
spirit's ?343)
"deeds"
on
parallel
Phenomenology lustrate Hegel's
stage the processes
of Spirit, present
(1) Philosophic
the
the
the
terms in the
Since
of history (compare Philosophy of of consciousness in the described
passages
from
the
latter will
be used
to il
argument.
thinking is an organic system. can be
In its historical
to a living organism. philosophy unfolding Philosophic as a is one, but it exists only of vitally interre thinking dynamic whole lated parts It maintains its its (theories). specific identity throughout transformations. It develops time due to an internal drive. through likened
. . . like the liveliness of liveliness is an urge, passes Physical spirit... over into the hunger and thirst for truth, presses for knowledge of it, for the satisfaction of this urge . . . [T]he true has the urge ... to develop it self. Only the living, the spiritual moves, stirs itself inside itself, self-de In this way the Idea, concrete in itself and self-developing, is an velops. in itself a,wealth organic system, a totality that contains of stages and moments.2^
25 "Die . . wie . . . die Lebendigkeit des Geistes physische Lebendigkeit. ist Trieb, geht ueber in den Hunger und Durst nach Wahrheit, nach Erkennt ... [D]as Wahre nis derselben, dieses Triebs dringt nach Befriedigung [hat] den Trieb . . . sich zu entwickeln. Nur das Lebendige, das Geistige bewegt, ruehrt sich in sich, entwickelt sich. Die Idee ist so, concret an sich und sich ein organisches ein Reichtum entwickelnd, System, eine Totalitaet welche von Stuffen und Momenten in sich enthaelf and 18:43 (GW 47).
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ALLEGRADELAURENTIIS
14
the description of an organism's the description of ontogenesis, a concept in history of self-movement in which philosophy requires the connotation of change to an does not that of transition imply Like
other.
Hegel's he uses
term
term
technical in this
or self-movement?and for organic to characterize philosophy's
tory?is "development" Rather than using
(Entwicklung). the term indiscriminately the use of "development" confines
process,
Hegel structure
dynamic
of self-related
thinking.
to denote
sets
He
his
any kind
of
to the in the Logic it apart from other
to the being and to In the opening of the Ency thought. we read: of the Concept by which other than
dynamic configurations the essence of things Doctrine
clopaedia's
the
Introduction
thinking
relates
or shin The progression of the Concept is no longer either passing-over for the [moments] that are distin ing into an other, but development; posited at the same time as identical with one guished are immediately and the determinacy is as a free being of another and with the whole, the whole Concept.26 This
summarizes the three structural passage so fundamental whose considers distinction Hegel organizational ing Being, the relation
principle and Essence,
of the entire
the Concept to thinking itself.
of each
The Logic. are functions
features
of
thinking as to constitute the
differences
in think
of the difference
in
When thinking has categories of Being for its generic objects (for example, its quality,
indeterminate or
being, intrinsic
nothing,
determinate becoming; being, and so forth) its dynamic is an one to from (Uebergehen)
measure, as a over" by Hegel "passing In this context, the denotation other category. of thinking is category independent seemingly quantity
described
of each (the signified) to itself and is related
to it. extrinsic by a reflection has of Essence of Being for its ge the thinking categories as a "shining to describe its movement neric prefers objects, Hegel a reflection into another" in Anderes), that is, reciprocal (Scheinen the next
category
When
among
the meanings
of different
categories.
Each
of the categories
26 "Das ist nicht mehr Uebergehen noch Schei des Begriffs Fortgehen nen in Anderes, unmittel sondern Entwicklung, indem das Unterschiedene bar zugleich als das Identische mit einander und mit dem Ganzen gesetzt, die ist" (E, ?161). als ein freies Seyn des ganzen Begriffes Bestimmtheit
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
15
FOUNDATIONS METAPHYSICAL involved
in this
constitutes of the part of the meaning logical sphere as of the one, though only logical analysis following preceding can detect this reciprocal "shine." For example, the category of iden reflection?the of distinction tity already contains?upon category in turn, contain and vice versa. the category of Both, (Unterschied)27 as well
ground
versa:
and vice
a notion
of something's
identity
from, though also identical with, what
ily distinguishable by it. Equally, of the world's
the ground
the notion essence
as appearance
of the world versa.
and vice
of the world's
actuality of the categories
is necessar
is grounded
implies a notion in turn, "shines"
both, Through includes both its essence
that
and
its
as referring of essence is meant si a to of is the of Essence multaneously determinacy (Essence Being and a determinacy of thought is also the Concept?or Being) (Essence x truth?of reason the of the for the provides ground objective Being): appearance.
Each
of x while
existence
or truly is. It is only when
also
providing
thinking
has
the concept
itself
of what
as its explicit theories:
x essentially in the
object?as
of philosophic
concepts idea, nous, system-identifying god, res cogitans, mind?that refers to its reason, substance, monad, Hegel as movement In the 1820 Introduction, in particular, he development. it explicit makes that self-referentiality is the differentia of specifica genuinely
philosophic
thinking
over
against
all other
Thus, the logical and chronological movement is correctly
identified
kinds
of thought.
of philosophic
thinking
as self-development:
known truth exists in the element of thought, in [T]hat philosophically the form of universality,... this is familiar to our common way of think itself contains its own determination, ing. But [to say] that the universal ... here begins a properly philosophic it is, therefore, proposition?here that a consciousness that does not yet cognize philosophically with draws and says that it doesn't understand this.28
27Two
and concise discussions excellent of Hegel's uses of Unterschied and Differenz in the Logic are in E, pp. xxiii-xxiv, and Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 131-3. 28 im Elemente erkannte Wahrheit des Gedan "[D]ass die philosophisch es ist diss unserer gewoehnlichen kens, in der Form der Allgemeinheit ist,... Aber dass das Allgemeine selbst in sich seine Bestim Vorstellung gelaeuffig. . . . hier Satz an?hier mung enthalte, philosophischer faengt ein eigentlich tritt darum das noch nicht philosophisch erkennende zurueck, Bewusstseyn und sagt es verstehe diss nicht" (GW 18:45-6).
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ALLEGRADELAURENTIIS
16
the organic-systematic of philosophy character is a con of its self-referential that its of sequence nature, is, being speculative. is a speculative The system. thinking organic (2) Philosophic reason for philosophy's nature is its character. speculative organic
Accordingly,
In a move
parallel consciousness
natural
to that described discovers
itself
in the Phenomenology, where in its rebirth as self-conscious
ness ("Ego is the content of the relation [of knowing to object] and the includes the in inquiry always already itself')29 philosophic itself or "the universal") of the agent and (that is, thinking vestigation or or of In the medium investigation (that is, concepts "universals"). what its objects, whether der to determine it is, how it affects thinking relating
or distorts
constitutes with
them, whether is no other tribunal
there
them,
itself. Philosophy thinking its own universal containing but
as
"The Concept
such
. . . and
contains
proper
...
to or incongruous to use instrument
of a the recognition in the Logic: ... of universality, of
with
begins
as defined
determination, the moment
of singularity, and particularity. This
particularity, .. .universality
it is adequate to turn to or
as the
inward
reflection
of
. . . itself is unity with negative One fundamental what is in and for itselfdetermined.^0 of meaning is otherwise is that it objectifies what "speculative thinking" (for ex To for make theoretical and merely subjective. ratiocination) ample, human into an object of logical and historical inves thinking an to turn for This is is into object why both thought thought. tigation whole of philosophic theories and the theory of this his the historical
practical
tory merit These
being
introductory
of Philosophy
History
as "speculative." reflections premised
characterized
to the Lectures
parallel what Hegel had written
on
the
in 1807 when
as generic of consciousness. activity Thinking to is Erken conceptual (begreifendes ueberhaupt) cognition (Denken is to self-consciousness. consciousness Philosophic nen)2,1 as natural introducing
the history
29 "Ich ist der
Inhalt der Beziehung,
und
das Beziehen
selbst"
9:103). 30 "Der
(GW
. ., der Allgemeinheit. Begriff als solcher enthaelt die Momente . . und der Einzelheit, Al der... als der Reflexion-in-sich der Besonderheit. welche und Besonderheit, negative Einheit mit sich das an und lgemeinheit ... see Bestimmte sich above, n. 21). fuer ist"(i?, ?163; 31The distinction is also outlined and illustrated by Hegel in ?2 and Re mark of the 1830 Encyclopedia, GW 20:40-1 and W 8:42-3, respectively.
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
17
METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS we
science,
read
in the
Introduction
the truth because convey a medium that modifies
thinking or distorts
to the Phenomenology, is apt to an instrument nor is neither merely a subject
matter
alien
to
it but
inves itself. Since any object of philosophic this subject matter must be always conceptual, philosophic thinking investigates tigation of truth.32 Thus, the historical of itself in the investigation inception
rather
with the rise of the self-reflexive coincides stage philosophic thinking as of consciousness, self-consciousness. As conscious namely long ness has for its object a content which it does not consider to belong to
itself?"beings" that it understands
that
it senses,
to exist
"things" that it perceives, the things perceived?its
"forces"
is beyond history of the natural history of knowing. The stages of natu do not yet constitute let alone proper, knowing as not yet of the the natural soul do just stages cognition,
part and parcel ral consciousness philosophic constitute
spirit
proper.
has for its object only appearing knowledge, Now, since this exposition ... it can be taken as the path of natural consciousness its way making or as the path of the soul that journeys through a se to true knowledge; as stages set for it by its own nature, that it ries of its own configurations . . . Natural consciousness itself into will prove itself may purify spirit. to be only [the] concept of knowing, or nonreal knowing.33 or philosophic are being objects
Real
knowing, lation,
knowing determined
then, come together and the relating itself;
that its realizes34 begins when thinking the object and self by itself. Knowing in one Ego
of the re "Ego is the content an other, and is itself over against act:
32See GW 9:53-4. 33 "Weil nun diese nur das erscheinende zum Gegen Wissen Darstellung stande hat, so . . .kann [sie] ... als der Weg des natuerlichen Bewusstseyns, das zum wahren Wissen oder als der Weg der dringt, genommen werden; welche die Reihe ihrer als durch ihre Natur ihr vorgest Seele, Gestaltungen, eckter Stationen durchwandert, dass sie sich zum Geiste laeutere ... Das nat wird sich erweisen, nur Begriff des Wissens, uerliche Bewusstseyn oder nicht zu seyn" (GW 9:55-6). Hegel insists that natural consciousness reales Wissen "Das natuerliche Bewusst per se "loses its truth" on the path of philosophy: seyn ... verliert auf diesem Wege seine Wahrheit" (GW 9:56). 34 English offers as many speculative insights as German does. The use of "to realize" for "to become aware of is the perfect psychological counter of Hegel's "self-actualization of conscious part to the speculative meaning ness."
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ALLEGRADELAURENTIIS
18
this other which for the Ego is like grasps simultaneously beyond35 wise the itself."36 only Ego as it merely The phenomenological of knowing ap presentation in to relation what is other than is, pears,37 namely knowing, allegedly to "free science moving in the form proper prelude then, the negative to it."38 The
latter,
then,
cal history of philosophy: or "free" thought. ing The
of a philosophi subject matter and thereby self-determin self-investigating
is the proper
is outward and inward development. thinking also claims that the externalization of philo in the historical of its systems is at the same sequence
(3) Philosophic 1820 Introduction
sophic thinking time an inwardization philosophic
or recollection of (Insichgehen) (Erinnerung) its consciousness?a of self-reflexive charac deepening
ter.
is not directed Further, this development [only] outwards as in external a going inwards;... is As the but the also developmental ity, unfolding a is not... Idea in its development outward going of the philosophical a deepening other but likewise a going-into-itself, of itself in becoming render the Idea, previously itself, so does the progression general and more determinate in itself.39 rather undeterminate,
35Michael.
J. Petry, HegeVs Philosophy Spirit of Subjective (hereafter, vols. 1-3 (Boston: Reidel, 1978), uses "to include" to "Subjective Spirif), in the definition of the Ego in the Philosophy translate Hegel's uebergreifen of reason is explained of Subjective the universality Spirit (E, ?438), where as the Ego's capacity of being permeated and grasped by the object as well as In the object. the Ego's activity of "grasping beyond" and incorporating "to embrace" or "to overreach" (58-9). wood, Dictionary, suggests 36 "Ich ist der Inhalt der und das Beziehen selbst; es ist selbst Beziehung, gegen ein anderes, und greifft zugleich ueber diss andre ueber, das fuer es ebenso nur es selbst ist" (GW 9:103). 37 Wissen." Compare GW 9:55, quoted above: "nur das erscheinende 38 "die Wissen Gestalt sich bewegende freye, in ihrer eigenthuemlichen schaft" (GW 9:55). 39 "Ferner nicht nach Aussen als in die Aeusser geht diese Entwicklung ist eben so ein Ge der Entwicklung lichkeit, sondern das Auseinandergehen Idee in der philosophischen hen nach Innen; . . . Indem das Hinausgehen zu einem Andern sondern ebenso ein nicht... ihrer Entwicklung ein Werden ein sich in [sich] Vertieffen ist, so macht das Fortschre In-sich-hineingehen, unbestimmtere iten die vorher allgemeine, Idee in sich bestimmter" (GW 18:47).
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
19
METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS or the inclusion If self-referentiality, is characteristic of philosophy, object, in time will
also
follow,
at the beginning
sued
in conformity of its history,
in the of thought then the advance with an
of the thinking of philosophy
the Socratic
inward
trajectory:
is
command advancing
knowledge will imply increased cognition of the knowing
philosophic self.
not only of philosophy It is true, of course, but of other forms of that their movement is always more than objectification spirit as well or the material in an "other," be this the spiritual of our spe products a recollection nature. cies's second Their is as well development (Erinnerung), itself precisely
whereby
through attains
spirit other, coming in the Phenomenology
knowledge
its grasp spirit enhances its self-externalization.40 an ever more
self-experience
and determination
of be
By
apparently shape of itself. As to lead the soul to self
concrete is said
(the soul "achieves cognition of what it is in itself through
so in the Philosophy of itself'),41 of Spirit, experience of its own externalizations leads to its increasing spirit's experience And since consists of human spirit develop self-knowledge. thought's the
complete
ment inner This, soul.
in self-knowing, determination
means also increased self-knowledge nature of the of spirit. very (and "concretion") to the Anthropology illustrated of the by recourse increased
again, may be In the development
of spirit from natural soul to consciousness in the externalization of the soul?its proper, every stage taking pos session of corporeality, its positing and taking possession of the exter a phase nal world, and so on?also of spirit's inwardiza represents
transformation of its in-itself into is, the progressive into subjectivity. Both sides of the soul's itself, or of its corporeity are ideologically externalization and velopment, inwardization, rected toward the full sublation into conscious of soul selfness tion,
that
for de di or
Egoity:
40For a detailed overview of the role of in the general econ Erinnerung of thinking in Hegel see Angelica omy of the logic and psychology Nuzzo, in Hegel's Philosophy," "Thinking and Recollecting. Logic and Psychology in La memoria, ed. Gianna Gigliotti forthcoming (Naples: Bibliopolis/Vrin, 2005).
41 "durch die ihrer selbst vollstaendige Erfahrung was an sie sich selbst ist" gen gelangt, (GW 9:55).
zur Kenntnis
desjeni
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ALLEGRADELAURENTIIS
20
In itself, matter has no truth within the soul; as being-for-itself, the soul itself from its immediate separates being, and sets the latter over The soul that has posited42 its being over against itself as corporeity.... that has and determined sublated it as its own, has lost the against itself, of soul as immediacy of the spirit. The actual soul... is in-it meaning self the ideality for-itself of its determinacies; in its externality [it is] in and infinitely related to itself.43 recollected a philosophical ing or recollective
Only
can of philosophy of spirit's external
history dimension
capture
the
inwardiz
development, namely the successive sublations of philosophic by reconstructing principles in the history of the systems. The logical that is, in concretization, intension and extension,44 of philosophic is then creasing concepts the
to complement of ancient philosophies
their
necessary
principles and their cluded
more
signification or recollected
in these:
thinking more complete The history
philosophy of philosophy
spective
more comparatively than later ones, but
The "abstract"
they are in for itself the is itself
this
thriven,
the
is."45
to philosophy
external
succession.
is, now, "Philosophy as and, conceptual thinking, further this development has
of this development The development.
knowing
are
"external"
chronological
a story told from a per is not Historie, or a report on real occurrences as op
42 translates "Soul which posits its being over Petry, Subjective Spirit, hat. against itself," but Hegel uses the verb in the past tense: entgegengesetzt of positing its own content as an other from itself Indeed, the soul's process must be concluded for it to cease to be mere soul and to begin its journey as consciousness. The logic underlying this process is explained in the Greater Doctrine of the truth l.C: from the Logic, Being, chap. resulting analysis of undetermined being and undetermined nothing (namely that they are becom into each ing) is not just that being and nothing are permanently passing other, but that they have always already done so (GW 21:69). 43 "An sich hat die Materie keine Wahrheit in der Seele; als fuersichsey ende scheidet diese sich von ihrem unmittelbaren Seyn, und stellt sich das selbe als Leiblichkeit Die Seele, die ihr Seyn sich entgegeng gegenueber.... und als das ihrige bestimmt hat, hat die Bedeutung der esetzt, es aufgehoben ... ist der Unmittelbarkeit des Geistes, verloren. Die wirkliche Seele Seele, an sich die fuer sich seyende Idealitaet in ihrer Aeus ihrer Bestimmtheiten, in sich und unendliche serlichkeit erinnert auf sich" (E, ?412). Beziehung 44
See
45 "Die
above,
n.
18.
Philosophie und ist als begreiffendes weiter diese Entwicklung
ist nun fuer sich das Erkennen dieser Entwicklung, Denken selbst diese denkende Je Entwicklung. desto vollkommner ist die Philosophie" gediehen,
(GW 18:47).
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
21
FOUNDATIONS METAPHYSICAL posed
to a fable
schichte,
the
developed
cannot
investigation oras resembles
about
unreal
developmental be made
ones.
The
history
history without For
of philosophy which what
example, intelligible.46 meant all that "mind" has ignoring of psychologists the efforts attempting
of mind
is Ge has
a philosophic since Anaxag to grasp
their
of their personal without patients' personalities history.47 knowledge name a a se not In theorizing Mind per does "mind" concept. thing but one cannot to term which the indicate any signified corresponds thing
46Geschichte core meaning in its Old derives from geschehen, whose is "to turn [out] suddenly." Over time, the lat High German form (scehanto) new event (Ereignis) ter acquired the connotation of the unexpected, and fi in general. nally that of Werden, becoming 47For such an ahistorical see John R. Searle's The Mystery approach of York: Consciousness New York Review of Books, (New 1997). In the intro of the "religious and philosophical duction, "errors" and "obsolete categories" mind But tradition" are said to "plague" contemporary theory (p. xii). is a natural, biological It Searle's own thesis?"consciousness phenomenon. is as much part of our biological life as digestion, growth, or photosynthesis" and nineteenth-century differs from those of eighteenth(p. xiii)?hardly thinkers like de laMettrie, Cabanis, C Vogt, or Du Bois-Reymond. This pecu is reproduced in Daniel Dennett's liar a-historicity study of "the mind (or De Stance 1997], 123). brain)" (The Intentional [Cambridge: MIT Press, into "mind" are philosophical, Den that his investigations spite assurances are oddly se to mind theories inWestern philosophy nett's sparse references In The Mind's I (with Douglas R. Hofstadter) lective. (New York: Bantam, a of he from sketch of Locke's conscious mind as leaps conception 1982), to Freud as discoverer to itself of "the existence of uncon "transparent scious mental processes" is made to Leibniz's re (ibid., 11-2). No reference on Human buttal of Locke, his theory of petites perceptions (New Essays or of the differ of life-degrees in the monad Understanding), (Monadology), ence of "perception" from "apperception" and Grace)-, (Principles of Nature to apperception's central role in Kant's theory of mind; to Hegel's distinction between conscious and unconscious thinking (E, ?398) and implicit and ex or on content to soul extensive debt to Nietzsche Freud's plicit (E, ??402-3); this subject. distinct ancestries "somewhat Thus, there are certainly more worth noting" (Consciousness Tho Explained, suspects. 44) than Dennett mas Nagel (Other Minds York: Oxford offers [New University Press, 1995], 7) an interesting for this philosophizing. He claims, "philosophers explanation don't have to know much about history or anything about literature, but they ... to have at least an amateur's grasp of the contributions are expected of Newton, Maxwell, Darwin, Einstein, Heisenberg, Cantor, Goedel, and Turing. . . all of which provide data for philosophical reflection." One cannot help a of why grasp nonamateurish) Plato, Aristotle, wondering (prefereably is not seen as providing at least as good Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, or Hegel "data" for doing philosophy.
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ALLEGRADELAURENTIIS
22
the concept of mind itself. "the concept of "Mind" signifies The contemporary and this, as all concepts, has a history. mind" must be the it has of thus codetermined "mind" by meanings meaning An adequate in the history of philosophy. embodied contemporary than
other
to overcome
of mind will have concept ous ones. In announcing is study of philosophy phy
include
all previ
(sub?ate)
of the history of philoso cannot be otherwise,"48 itself,?as Hegel a for the radical idea that his audience prepares history philosophical of the intrinsic is a chronological of philosophy recapitulation logic of
philosophic
that
and
"the STUDY
thinking.
II The History
of Philosophy
to maintain
not extravagant probably section but the opening his
entire
philosophy the succession
tain that
as the succession
same
Parallels
the Logic of the Idea.
It is
that Hegel's thesis (quoted the lies at foundation here)
to be
in of
repeated as system: to this idea, I now main "According in history is the of philosophy of the systems de of the conceptual in the logical derivation
of the Idea."49
terminations
suc as stating that the historical a use of philosophy parallels (to or coincides with of the claim) weak version strong (to use Hegel's in its and of the succession practical spirit's phases logical version) of theo whole of knowing itself.50 The sequential theoretical activity The
cession
ries
can be paraphrased in the history systems
thesis
of
der Systeme)
(die Aufeinanderfolge
spond to internal principles bestimmungen
by the necessity systems
der
Idee),
displays
phases
that
of human thinking and acting (Begriffs
and
the
sequence
of the phases
is dictated
intrinsic to the logic of these principles.
in the history
corre
of philosophy
are different
expressions
Since the of one
thinking process, Hegel claims further that their principles, though necessarily known (erkannt) only through historically documented
48 "das STUDIUM
der Philosophie der Geschichte es denn anders nicht seyn kann" losophie selbst,?wie 49GW 18:49. Seen. 5. 50See GW 18:52.
[ist] Studium (GW 18:50).
der Phi
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
23
FOUNDATIONS METAPHYSICAL theories, tions of pounded
can
be
only
adequately determinations
the
Idea, in the Logic:
as determina (begriffen) connection is ex logical
grasped whose
Imaintain that if one strips the fundamental concepts [Grundbegriffe] in the history of philosophy that have appeared of what of the systems concerns to the particular, and their exterior shape, their application similar features, then one obtains the various stages of determination of the Idea itself in its logical concept.51 in a somewhat
different the philosopher the way: reconstructing of understands the theories each other history philosophy succeeding in time to be expressions of (or real appearances: Erscheinungen)52 theoretical and of of the principles practical activity self-knowing
Put
called
"the Idea."53 In the
text
for the
argument
discussion
under idea
Hegel
does
that
other?let
ing correspond that they are porting to the metaphysics fers us here Nature.54
of
time
After a brief treatment of the philosophy ferent
an explicit of philosophic think develop
the history and logic alone for the stronger In support of his thesis "the same."
to each
here
not
as explanatory of this thesis (1), we doctrine of Hegel's that provides
shall
from
his
version he merely Philosophy
pur re of
of time being invoked turn to a related
additional
(though
but dif far from
definitive)
support for it (2). This is the theory of the parallel and
seemingly ments of
inverse
directions
"knowing
of
substance"
the
ontological
and
(wissende
Substanz)
logical
develop into its
51 "Ich
der in der Ge dass wenn man die Grundbegriffe behaupte, erschienenen schichte der Philosophie rein dessen entkleidet, was Systeme ihre aeusserliche ihre Anwendung auf das Besondere, und dergle Gestaltung, ichen betrift, so erhaelt man die verschiedenen Stuffen der Bestimmung der Idee selbst in ihrem logischen Begriffe" For an exhausting (GW 18:49-50). and critical assessment of Hegel's thesis and its metaphysical pre explication see Klaus Duesing, Hegel und die Geschichte der Philosophie. suppositions und Dialektik in Antike und Neuzeit Ontologie (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftli che Buchgesellschaft, 1983). 52GW 18:51. 53On in the manuscript of this passage margin Hegel notes: "only be cause of this do I bother to deal with it, to lecture on it [nur darum gebe ich mich damit ab, halte Vorlesungen darueber]" (GW 18:51), that is, on the his tory of philosophy. 54E, ??254-9.
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ALLEGRADELAURENTIIS
24
form (Begriffsgestalt), that is, into self-knowing conceptual or subjectivity This is found in the section proper. theory of the 1807 Phenomenology.55 Knowing
(1) By referring to the time metaphysics Nature,
Hegel are both
spirit Idea.
is reminding his audience forms of the self-external common
This
self-externality, of their spatiality spirit, consists for example, space Mechanics, a more
from
fundamental
and and
determination
substance on Absolute
from the Philosophy
of the theory
of
that nature
and
being (Aussersichsein) to the existence of nature
of the
temporality. time are defined of nature,
In the
and
section
on
as derivations
namely
exter
pure
is nature's thus it nality Space externality (Aeusserlichkeit). in-itself, is called immediate time is nature's externality externality;56 for-itself, thus it is called mediated externality.57 same
underlies conception of the "natural dimensions
The temporal
the exposition of the spatial and of Sub soul"58 in the Philosophy at first in its spatial is described
soul Spirit. Spirit as natural as a of geographic, that and existence, is, multiplicity ethnic, familial, characterized individual traits and temperaments by the inertia and as phe indifference of all natural typical reciprocal things regarded are the "places" of spirit's first self-external nomena in space. These jective
ization, second
or the soul's dimension
natural
qualities of the natural soul
as they coexist on earth.59 The is temporal: the stages of life, re oscillations between the sleep
and the individual soul's production, are the "epochs" of spirit's first shape state. These ing and the waking as soul. in which is a way the soul undergoes Each of these natural as a lend human and other animal life its character They changes. continuum
of differentiations.60
This
distinction
of spatial the natural
(or soul
imme
forms of is, of (or mediated) at in there all and all What course, is, analytical. places times, purely of the It is is their unity, that is, the mediated immediacy living body.61
diate)
and
temporal
55GW 9:428. 56 Compare ?, ??254-6. 57 Compare ?",??257-9. 58?, ??391^02. 59 Compare ?',??392-5. 60 Compare ?*, ??396-8. 61On the logical identity of "soul" and "living body" in Hegel see Michael zu Hegel, Enzyklopaedie Kommentar Problem. Wolff, Das Koerper-Seele ? 389 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1992). (1830),
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
25
METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS
in and of the soul and changes the dynamic unity of qualities precisely can eventually how this phenomenon of nature distin that explains own and itself from its is inwardness. Soul acquire corporeality guish to lose its one-sided nature begins It the stage at which extrinsicality. in the actualization of the concept of corpo is the first turning point real nature: truth of matter, that matter "Spirit is the existent [namely] itself has no truth."62 Thus soul, the first concrete of unity spirit, con sists
of the
simultaneous
and
the continuous
The
soul
experience or finds
that senses
of diverse
perception
qualities (sensations) of a variety of changes. (as Erlebnis) one totality of sen in itself (empfindet)
sations is the feeling soul (die fuehlende will
eventually, turn tience,64
ego sumes
is the
spirit
in
through into actual
lightning its naturalness."65 its most
that
and and
Seele).63 Merely feeling soul
repetition soul, the precursor strikes
mode acts
or habitual
of sensations
These
natural
shapes. Spirit exists of space dimensions
the
features
primitive
over
carry always
of consciousness: the natural
through
and
sen
into
exclusively
soul
"The con
and
of the existence all
of
its
subsequent in the external
time.
The 1820 Introduction to the History of Philosophy
stresses
the
as particular of representations (Vorstellungen) self-reflective As all activity, exists only in its exter thinking. thinking or nalization: what is actual that is, having ef only wirkend, (wirklich exists. is no exception: it only exists Philosophic fects) thinking role of space
and
time
its actualizations.66
through
If time
and
space
are dimensions
of ex
in extrinsic in general and if thinking exists trinsicality only forms, are as as of nature, then time and space constitutive of thinking much of the natural of the Idea. This, soul, and of all other determinations Hegel spirit
as much as to to individual consciousness applies and its absolute that is, art, religion, and expressions, The time-space of individual consciousness is individual
clarifies, in general
philosophy.
62 "Der Geist ist die existierende der Materie, dass die Materie Wahrheit selbst keine Wahrheit hat" (E, ?389 Remark). ??399-403. 63Compared, in ??409-10. is described 64Habituation 65 "Das Ich ist der durch die Naturseele und ihre Natuerlich schlagende keit verzehrende Blitz" (E, ?412 Addition). 66 Compare GW 18:52.
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ALLEGRADELAURENTIIS
26 the
life;
of spirit
time-space
is human
and
history;
the
of
time-space
the history of philosophy:
philosophy,
This being-there and thereby being-in-time not only of sin is a moment, in general that as such is essentially finite, but also [a gle consciousness of the development of the philosophical Idea in the element of moment] ... and so pure philosophy appears in thinking as an existence thinking proceeding through time.67 determines space and time as, respectively, Thus, Hegel ate and mediated dimensions of the Idea's externality. of
its immediacy
displays
mode
speculative
thought?the
of which
in thought's
the
immedi
In the element
is philosophy?the
logic and
Idea
its mediation
in
The fact that nature as a whole is one mode of actu history. event must of the Idea explains natural be every why always codetermined is the by space and time. The fact that spirit as a whole
thought's alization
other mode of actualization
of the Idea makes
are quintessential logic and history of philosophic eral?and thinking cination
that abstracts
be
found
to codetermine
sions
ness
of
they will spirit
that
of logical and historical dimen
as philosophy finds some development intrasystem movement in Hegel's of the of conscious conception on Absolute to subjectivity. In the chapter substance
in the Idea's support from
Knowing the phases starts out tent
self-actualization
arti
separates
In actuality, however, the
thinking is. (2) The thesis of the coincidence atic
of thinking in gen Only the kind of ratio
in particular. actual existence thought's
its logic from its history.
ficially always
from
it intelligible why both
determinations
also
from the 1807 Phenomenology, of consciousness
described
Hegel recapitulates in the book.
that is, as simple "substance," or thought and object. It then develops as
diremptions, by which
identity
briefly
Consciousness of form
by progressive
and
con
internal
the originally immediate identity rev?ales itself
to be (and thus becomes for itself) a mediated one, or a unity In the end, absolute site determinations. represents knowing
of oppo a phase
67 "Diss und damit in der Zeit seyn, ist ein Moment nicht nur des Daseyn das als solches wesentlich endlich einzelnen Bewusstseyns ist, ueberhaupt, Idee im Elemente des der philosophischen sondern auch der Entwicklung ... und so erscheint im Denken die reine Philosophie Denkens als eine in der Zeit fortschreitende Existenz" (GW 18:52-3).
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
27
METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS in which now
consciousness
has
its own
so that it diremptions as having been all along also as a taken the move whole,
sublated
its initial
recognizes
substantiality remarks that, in the Phenomenology described but seemingly parallel contrary then
subjectivity. Hegel ment of consciousness in two proceeding consciousness aliter,
as substance
must
to be
appears directions.
Re
of as preceding nature must be
be
thought consciousness that (in the same way self-knowing as or as preceding con of the natural soul spirit, thought preceding sciousness substance is there in actuality and mind): "Now, knowing
earlier
than
or conceptual itmust contain
its form
at all, self-develop movement. of its ciple
From
to But for a substance shape."68 from the beginning the internal prin
a logical
perspective, then, substance's for knowing and then self-knowing, its subjective capacity dynamis or "conceptual consciousness in the substantial precedes shape," or truth of mode. This arch? the concept is, in Hegel's terminology, consciousness, of the principle
self-consciousness. namely or concept of consciousness
or concept, principle movement that knowing the for-itself of substance the
into object
Spirit is the dynamic with that of which
unity it is
substance: namely is?the transformation
"is in itself the spirit of that in-itself into of the object of consciousness
into subject, of self-consciousness, that is,... a form of spirit, self-consciousness
into the Concept.'"69 is a process, not a state
Being is and not hexis). It consists of the permanent (it metabol? recapitula and preservation, of all stages of know tion, that is, acknowledgment past forms of conscious ing that lead up to it. In absolute knowing, ness
are
not
present only but also always curiosities) of consciousness's ponents denies definitiveness Hegel stores
validity which each by
to every one is overcome.
in their in their
in-itself for-itself
own
grasp of to each stage
of them
precisely
mode mode
(as
archeological (as stages and com In this way, while
itself). of consciousness, in the
logical
he
re
transitions
68 "In der Wirklichkeit ist nun die wissende Substanz frueher da, als die Form oder Begriffsgestalt derselben" (GW 9:428). 69 ... ist an sich die die das Erkennen ist?die "[Der Geist] Bewegung, in das Fuersich, in das Subject, des der Substanz jenes Ansichs Verwandlung des Bewusstseyns in Gegenstand des Selbstbewusstseyns, d.h. Gegenstands ... in den Begriff (GW 9:429).
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ALLEGRADELAURENTIIS
28 This
from
a substantial
concrete
form
movement
entire
and
subjective creasingly if the possibility of the latter were as telos: its intrinsic namely logically,
place
and
of not
abstract
spirit included
that knows itself as Concept Thus, in the Concept earlier than the fulfilled whole whose becoming in consciousness those moments. Contrarywise, is earlier than the moments.70 conceptualized,
to an never
could
in the
in take
former
the moments emerge is the movement of the whole, though un
that the logical and real developments thesis phenomenological as movements of consciousness and contrary while appear parallel in the 1820 Introduction to explain the same, reemerges being realiter
The
the definition states
here
verse
as unfolding
of philosophy
of absolute
spirit.
Hegel
"on a seemingly in philosophic proceeds thinking to that of its historical The inversion unfolding. seeming
that
path"71 from the
that the philosopher circumstance the real studying to has of the "already bring along philosophy knowledge progression as to in the the Idea order of the process of development recognize to knows the Idea thanks The his his Idea."72 philosopher privileged arises
torical This
He
position.
unfolding
can
is what
look
makes
the concept of philosophy. two self, it fulfills moments appear
roles to
back
Idea's
As
it as preceding As subject,
object
of
present
to its own
embodiments are
"fulfilled
unfolding. whole")
of
is thought that thinks it its past phases the subject thought, itself,
however, from resulting
as principles of systems, of the the logical elements present, of systems In this sense, the series
their cess
historical
(the
Since philosophy
at once.
philosophic knowing. state (the unity its grasps present as intelligibility moments) lending
losophy.
at the
up the content
philosophic the sublation
or of
thinking of those
In past in the first place. the moments of this pro concrete of phi concept in the history
of philo
70"In dem treten hiemit die Momente der sich als Begriff weiss, Begriffe, die Bewegung frueher auf, als das erfuellte Ganze, dessen Werden jener Mo aber mente ist. In dem Bewusstseyn ist das Ganze, unbegriffne, dagegen frueher als die Momente" (GW 9:429). 71"auf anscheinend umgekehrtem Wege" (GW 18:45). 72 "um . . . ihren der Idee zu [der Philosophie] Fortgang als Entwicklung der Idee schon mitbringen" erkennen, muss man freylich die Erkenntnis
(GW 18:50).
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
29
FOUNDATIONS METAPHYSICAL sophic series
can be interpreted as being thinking of the Idea. of self-determinations
as the
"the same"
logical
Ill the central claim from the 1820 Introduction has seriously Taking in far reaching and evalua one's consequences grasp, interpretation, as systematic tion of Hegel's of science of conception philosophy truth. Only one such consequence, understand upon Hegel's bearing can of the of be discussed here. history philosophy, ing A widespread view attributes to the function with phy's regard to and is presses responds purely
that
philoso it ex reality
in part, the is strengthened charac by the paraphrasing a to the of famous passage from the Preface
of this reading popularity ter of English translations
1821Philosophy
to Hegel the thesis cultural and political recollective.
At
least
of Right. Hegel speaks here of philosophy
its appearance
as making
has completed its formative process Translations the reflex usually ready."73 disregard a common ive form of sich fertig that means "to machen, expression as actu make oneself and the that ready," interpret phrase indicating "after
and has made
ality pletion ceding Hegel's should phases since
actuality
itself
form implies both com in the pre is preparedness. completion expressed has completed its formative and phrase ("actuality process"), connotation is seldom the of prose redundant, "preparedness"
is "finished"
But
(fertig).14
and
be
in translation.
stressed
and the
the reflexive
Since
has made of
subject
Actuality for the ready the phrase is actuality, itself
odds with
consistently Hegel's that by definition does
tivity translations
neglect
simultaneously
here
anticipatory
use
Aristotelian not
attain
to convey function
one of its completed More importantly, the translation is also at
has
next.
any
as an ac of "actuality" state." "completed Thus, idea of a recollective and
Hegel's of philosophy.
Indeed,
73 "nachdem
if the
die Wirklichkeit ihren Bildungsprozess vollendet und sich hat" fertig gemacht (W 7:28). 74 sich fertig gemacht hat with Knox, Philosophy of Right, paraphrases "is already there cut and dried" (12); Nisbet, Elements, with "has attained its state" (23). completed
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ALLEGRADELAURENTIIS
30
history of philosophic
thinking follows
the logic of the Idea, then
as much
determined by those they as yet only implicitly. As in in the causes implicit they in
must philosophic principles as by the ones have sublated causal effects chains, where
be they must
contain be
turn sub?ate, or as in a chain of syllogisms at invokes (the image Hegel as "Idea to illustrate the end of the system75 the concept of philosophy the sublation of earlier into later principles also thinking itself'),76 the immanence of the latter in the former. it is implies Thus, while a true that for Hegel in sublating the principles of all previous system, an do whose life is it is equally ones, express cycle epoch concluded, a new same true that these anticipate principles epoch. Prima
facie
this appears
to contradict
the
"owl of Minerva"
alle
gory from the Preface to the Philosophy of Right. But the allegory (often quoted out of context) intends to highlight only one of the func to philosophy. It is embedded in a passage tions Hegel attributes vig a or the idea of directed gener orously moralistic, against ideological, vocation of philosophy and philosophers. ically normative Hegel's concern the assumption main here is to criticize that philosophers' not normative criteria aright by positing one more in it: of word about ready present "By way giving adding as to how the world to at rate struction be: any philosophy ought too to arrives If late do the of is so."77 ways history philosophy role
is to set
the world
al in al the
of self-knowing, the owl alle of spirit's process expression cannot to the whole of functions. be taken capture gory philosophy's of one decaying the final wisdom epoch, philosophy By expressing to grasp to go beyond it. full of But is always the first grasp provides outward
is Uebergreifen).78 is being grasped (Begreifen of the it at is "the world."79 says Hegel, thought Philosophy, Though at the end of an epoch, it thinks beyond tains systematic completion to of from the Preface this end. The historical conception philosophy the
limitations
of what
75E, ??575-7. 76E, ?574. 77 "Um noch ueber das wie die Welt sein soll, Belehren, so die immer zu spaet" kommt dazu ohnehin Philosophie sagen, 78 Compare n. 35. 79"der Gedanke der Welt" (W 7:28).
ein Wort (W 7:27-8).
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
zu
31
FOUNDATIONS METAPHYSICAL the Philosophy we
find
of Right
is indeed the same as the conception
at its conclusion:
The history of the spirit is its ... of making deed consists ... This comprehending is its one comprehending is at once Thus, spirit
of spirit
each and
deed, as spirit is only what it does, and its itself into the object of its consciousness. of being and principle, and the completion its externalization and transition.80
an epochal both system grasps philosophic new it has "made itself for which the beginning
State University
closure
of
ready."
ofNew York at Stony Brook
80 "Die Geschichte is seine Tat, denn er ist nur, was er tut, des Geistes zu machen. und seine Tat ist, sich ... zum Gegenstande seines Bewusstseins ... Dies Erfassen ist sein Sein und Prinzip, und die Vollendung eines Erfas sens ist zugleich seine Entaeusserung und sein Uebergang" (W 7:?343).
This content downloaded from 129.105.215.146 on Tue, 03 Mar 2015 14:53:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions