The Darwinian Biology of Aristotle's Political Animals Author(s): Larry Arnhart Reviewed work(s): Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 38, No. 2 (May, 1994), pp. 464-485 Published by: Midwest Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111413 . Accessed: 26/03/2012 18:59 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
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The Darwinian Biology of Aristotle's Political Animals Larry Arnhart,NorthernIllinois University Recently, somepoliticalscientists, suchas JamesQ. WilsonandRogerMasters,have arguedfora Darwinian socialtheory thatwouldsupport a revivalofAristotelian naturalism in the social sciences.As a contribution to thisproject,I arguethatDarwinianbiology confirms Aristotle's of politicalanimals.ThomasHobbes's critibiologicalunderstanding cismsof Aristotle'spositionreston dichotomies-nature versusculture,instinct versus learning, animality versushumanity-that havebeenrefuted bymodern biological research. Rejecting thesefalsedichotomies wouldpermit a unification ofthesocialsciencesandthe naturalscienceswithDarwinianbiologyas thecruciallink.
Arehumanbeingsby naturepoliticalanimals,as Aristotle claimed? Or was ThomasHobbes warranted in denyingAristotle'sclaimand asthatpoliticalorderis an utterly humanconstruction? serting artificial Is life rooted somehow in nature? Ordoespoliticsrequire political biological a humanconquestof nature? Recentdevelopments bothinAristotelian scholarship andincontemporarysocialtheorysuggestthatnowis a goodtimetoreopenthisdebate. toAristotle's scholarshavebeguntoturntheirattention ManyAristotelian ofpoliticalanimalsin biologyin generaland hisbiologicalunderstanding particular(Cooper 1989; Keyt 1991; Kullman 1991; Gotthelf1985; and Lennox 1987;Miller1989).1Some of thisscholarship Gotthelf sug"ethics that for Aristotle and are in a gests politics way biologicalsciences" (Salkever1990, 115). At the same time,manysocial theorists have been applyingDarwinianbiologyto the social sciences(Axelrod 1984; Barkow,Cosmides,and Tooby 1992; Corning1983; Daly and Wilson1988;Degler1991;Frank1988;Maxwell1991),and someofthese theoristshave concludedthatDarwinianconceptionsof humannature in the social sciences(Arnhart1990, naturalism supportan Aristotelian 1992;Fox 1989;Masters1989,1990;Wilson1993a,1993b). The positionsof Aristotleand Hobbes represent two fundamental inpoliticalscienceand thesocialsciencesgenerally. alternatives Hobbes assumesa radicalseparationbetweenanimalsocietiesas foundedon ISomeofAristotle's readershavescornedhisbiologicalnaturalism becausehe seems to use it to justifytheexploitation of womenand slaves. Some scholars,however,have noticedambiguities in whatAristotlesays aboutwomenand slaves thatsuggestsubtle criticisms of howtheyweretreatedin ancientGreece.See, forexample,Arnhart (1993c, 58-60),Lear (1988,196-99),Levy (1990),Nichols(1992),and Salkever(1990). AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience, Vol. 38, No. 2, May 1994, Pp. 464-85 ?) 1994 by the Universityof Texas Press, P.O. Box 7819, Austin,TX 78713-7819
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naturalinstinct and humansocietiesas foundedon social learning.Humanbeingscannotbe politicalanimalsby nature,Hobbes believes,because "man is madefitforsocietynotby naturebutby education"(De themodernnotionofcultureas theuniquely Cive,chap. 1). Thissupports humanrealmofsociallearning through whichhumanbeingsexpresstheir rationalhumanity by transcending theirnaturalanimality. This concept ofcultureas separatedfromnaturehas becomedubious,however,inthe faceofmounting evidenceinthebiologicalsciencesthatsomenonhuman animals(suchas chimpanzees)have capacitiesforlearning and teaching thatallowforculturaltraditions, and therefore theHobbesianantithesis betweeninstinct (or nature)as completely fixedandlearning (or nurture) as completely flexibleis false. UnlikeHobbes, Aristotle sees no unbridgeable gulfbetweenanimal instinct and humanlearning.Rather,likemanybiologiststoday,he believesalmostall animalshave somenaturalinstincts forsocial learning, and some are intelligent enoughto live as social and politicalanimals. Whatdistinguishes humanbeingsis thattheyaremorepoliticalthanother animalsbecause of the humanbiologicalcapacityforlanguage,which allows humanbeingsto organizecommunallifearoundsharedverbal conceptsofexpediencyandjustice.Aristotle's positionwouldthussupportthe recentrevivalof Darwiniansocial theoryby rootingpolitical science in biological science.
I shallarguethatAristotle was correctandthatmodernbiologydoes indeedsustainhisbiologicalaccountofpoliticalanimals.I beginbycomparingAristotle's politicalbiologywithmodernbiologicaltheoriesofsocial behavior.I thendefendAristotle'spositionagainstsix criticisms madebyHobbes.I concludebyshowinghowan Aristotelian understandingofpoliticalanimalsleadsus awayfromthemodernHobbesiandichotcultureas a compleomyofnatureand culture,and I suggestredefining tionand expressionof nature. The PoliticalAnimals
to Aristotle, someanimalsare solitary andothersgregariAccording ous. Of thegregarious animals,someare political.Some of thepolitical animalshaveleaders,butothersdo not.The distinguishing characteristic ofthepoliticalanimalsis thattheycooperateforsomecommonworkor function (koinonergon).Humans,bees, ants,wasps,and cranesare all politicalanimalsin thissense (HA 488a7-14).2 21 use thefollowing works:De forAristotle's abbreviations
Anima(DA), Eudemian
Ethics (EE), Generationof Animals (GA), Historyof Animals (HA), Metaphysics (Meta), Movementof Animals (MA), Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Parts of Animals (PA), Physics (Ph), Politics (Pol), Rhetoric(R). All translationsfromthe Greek are mine.
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Humanbeingsare morepolitical,however,thantheseanimalsbecause oftheuniquelyhumancapacityforspeech(logos). Otheranimals can sharetheirperceptions of pleasureand pain. But humanbeingscan use speechto sharetheirconceptionsoftheadvantageous, thejust, and thegood (Pol 1253al-18).Humanbeingsare themostpoliticalanimals, it seems,because through speechhumanbeingscooperateforcommon endsin waysthatare morecomplex,moreflexible, and moreextensive thanis possibleforotherpoliticalanimals.Throughspeechhumanbeings can deliberateaboutthe "commonadvantage"(koinonsumpheron) as thecriterion ofjustice(R 1362al5-63b5).A just politicalcommunity can bejudgedto be one thatservesthecommonadvantageofall itsmembers as contrastedwithan unjustpoliticalcommunity thatservesonlythe privateadvantageof its rulinggroup(NE 1160a13-14;Pol 1279al7-19). Aristotleexplainsthatpoliticallifesatisfiesvariousnaturalhuman impulses(Pol 1253a30-31,1278bl7-31).Humanbeingsdesireto livetogetherevenwhentheydo notneedmutualaid. Theyarebrought together forthecommonadvantageinsofaras communal lifesatisfies theirnatural needsformoraland intellectual development. Theyalso come together merelyto preservetheirlivesbecause mosthumanbeingsfinda natural sweetnessin simplybeingalive. all socialcooperation Furthermore, ultimately arisesas an extension ofthenaturalimpulsesto sexualcouplingandparentalcareoftheyoung. Butthemoresocial Some animalsprovidelittlecare fortheiroffspring. and moreintelligent animalscare forthecompletedevelopment of their young.Humanbeingsand theotherpoliticalanimalsare characterized of parentalcare,whichincludesnot by thegreatdurationand intensity theyoungbutalso passingon thehabitsand onlyfeedingand protecting knowledgerequiredforlivingin groupswithcomplexsocial structures (HA 588b23-89a9;GA 753a8-14;NE 1155al-33,1159a27-37,1160b2362a29). Whilethe strongest bondsof commonadvantageariseamongindividualsrelatedby kinship,othersocial bondsarisefrommutualism and Sometimes individuals benereciprocity. cooperatebecauseitis mutually ficial.At othertimes,individualscooperatein helpingotherswiththe ofsomereciprocalreturn inthefuture. Social conflict expectation occurs whenpeople thinkthese relationships of mutualbenefitand reciprocal exchangehave not been maintained(NE 1132b33-33a5,1155b34, 1159b25-62a34; Pol 1270b21-23,1281b26-31,1318blO-19a6).The social normsof mutualaid and reciprocalcooperationare enforcedby moral passions and the concernfor reputation(R 1361a25-61b2,1364b3765a10, 1366a34-68a27, 1371a7-23, 1380b35-82a18,1383bl1-85al5; Arnhart 1981,102-05,120-21,114-34).
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Although humanbeingsdisplaya complexity in theirsocialbonding through nepotism,mutualism, and reciprocity thatindicatestheunique ofhumanspeechand cognition, complexity Aristotle believesotheranimalsshowtracesof all thepsychicdispositions and capacitiesthatare moreclearlymanifested in humanbeings(HA 588al5-89alO).He sees evidencein nonhuman animalsof memory(mnesis),thought (dianoia), judgment(sunesis), art (techne), and prudence (phronesis),so thatsome animalsdevelopsocial behaviorthroughhabituation and learning(HA 589alO-633b9;PA 648a6-8,650b24-26,686a24-87a23). WhileAristotle generally deniesthatnonhuman animalshave "intellike lect" (nous),he impliesin at leastone passagethateven something intellect mightbe foundin some animals(HA 610b22;PA 656a6-8; NE 1178b22-33).And whilehe generallyassertsthat"speech" (logos) and "language"(dialektos)are uniquelyhuman,he recognizesthe powers of otheranimalsforcommunication (DA 420b5-21a7;HA 488a30-35, 504b1-6,535a28-36b24, 608a10-18;PA 659b28-60b1,664a18-65a6;GA 786b6-88a32).Some birdsteachtheiryoungto sing,and thelanguages localitiesin a mannercomparableto the theyteach differin different diversity of humanlanguages,whichsuggeststhatamongbirds"language is not naturalin the same way as voice but can be trained" (HA 536bl8-20). In hisbiologyof socialbehavior,Aristotle does notseparateanimal and humanlearning.In varyingdegrees,all social animalshave instinct naturalinstincts forsocial learning.Of course,in thecapacityforlearning,humanbeingsfarsurpassotheranimals.Still,it is as truefornonhumananimalsas itis forhumanbeingsthatsociallifeemergesas a joint productofnatureand nurture. Justas somebirdsare predisposedby natureto sing,humanbeings are predisposedby natureto speak; and yet,in bothcases, a natural is fulfilled sociallearning. Herenatureandartare predisposition through but cooperative,Aristotlebelieves,because "generally notantithetical artin somecases completeswhatnaturecannotcarryout to an end; in others,it imitatesnature"(Ph 199al6-17). In the same way, Aristotle can saythatpoliticallifeis bynatureforhumanbeingswhileacknowledgand maintenance ofpoliticalorderdependson ingthattheestablishment art(Pol 1253a29-31,1325b33-26a6).Politicallifeis natthestatesman's uralforhumanbeingsbecauseitpromotes theirnaturalendsandbecause itarises,at leastin part,fromtheirnaturalpotentials, thecomalthough and pletionof those naturalends and potentialsrequireshabituation learning (Miller1989). Muchof thelearningnecessaryforthesocial lifeof animalscomes fromparentsteachingtheiryoung.But muchis also learnedfromthe
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and cooperationof individualsin the widercommunity. competition Some politicalanimals-such as bees, wasps, cranes,and humansbetweenleadersand followers (HA 488a8-14,553a26-54b26, distinguish by directing 614bl9-26,623b26-29a30).Leaders can helpa community whenthey itto itscommonends,butleaderscan also harma community lead factionsthatdivideit (HA 553bl5-19,615bl7-28,625al-26bl5). to The mostsuccessfulindividualsare thosewho have theintelligence theirwaythrough thecomplexsocialinterplay ofconflicts and maneuver ofinterest. confluences does notrecognize Darwinianbiologistsmight wonderwhyAristotle of those animalsmostcloselyrelatedto human the social intelligence Aristotle does however,thatalthough beings-theapes. It is remarkable, themas politicalanimals,he believesthatapes identify notspecifically speciesclose to humanbeingsinthatthey"share belongto intermediate in thenatureof bothmanand thequadrupeds"(HA 502a16).Fromhis ofmonkeys andapes, whichincludedissections anatomical comparisons, internal their and he concludesthatin parts, feet,legs,hands,face,teeth, theapes are manlike(HA 502al7-b27;PA 689bl-35). In 1699 Edward Tyson,an Englishdoctor,wrotea book on the anatomyof a chimpanzee,whichbegan withan extendedanalysisof Aristotle'sstudyof monkeysand apes. Concludinglike Aristotlethat thisape was halfwaybetweena monkeyand a human,Tysonshowed and resemblances to a to a monkeyin 34 characteristics resemblances In thebrain,"the seat of thesoul itself," humanin 47 characteristics. close resemblanceto humanbeings(Tyson1699, he saw a surprisingly 3-15, 54-57,92-95). Tyson'sbook has beenpraisedby Darwinianslike ThomasHuxleyas "the firstaccountof a man-likeape whichhas any to scientific accuracyand completeness"(1894,7:11). Modpretensions ernprimatologists citethebook as thefirstrigorousworkin commonly theirfield. Not onlyAristotle'sstudyofprimates butalso manyotherpointsof hisbiologyhave been confirmed by modernbiologicalresearch,despite originof species.One thefactthathe had no theoryoftheevolutionary prominent biologisthas even declared,"All of biologyis a footnoteto uses theterm Aristotle"(Moore 1993,33). If we recognizethatAristotle to ouruse oftheterm "politicalanimal"in a broadsensecorresponding "social animal,"we can see thatthemodernbiologyof social behavior largelysupportshis politicalnaturalism. Like Aristotle, Darwinwas fascinatedby thecomplexsocial lifeof someinsects(1936b,193-202).Todayentomologists various distinguish levelsof socialityamonginsectsfromthe solitaryto the eusocial,detheydisplayone or moreofthreetraits:cooperative pendingon whether
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care of theyoung,reproductive divisionof labor,and overlapbetween generations so thatoffspring assistparents(Wheeler1928;Wilson1971). The eusocialinsects,whichpossess all threetraits,includeants,bees, and wasps. These animalsdisplaymanyformsofcomplexsocialbehavior:childcare,eugenics,class structures, socialdivisionoflabor,fighting oversocialdominance, grouphunting, warfare, slavery,agriculture, aniand the second mostcomplexlanguagein the animal mal husbandry, world. In explainingthe naturalcauses of social cooperation,not only amonginsectsbutalso amongbirdsand mammals,Darwinianbiologists have developedevolutionary theoriessupporting Aristotle'sinsight that social bondingarisesfromnepotism,mutualism, and reciprocity. "The feelingofpleasurefromsociety,"Darwinbelieved,"is probablyan extensionoftheparentalor filialaffections, sincethesocialinstinct seems to be developedbytheyoungremaining fora longtimewiththeparents" (1936a,478). Ethologistshave shownthe importance of parentalcare, especiallyforprimates, as therootofall socialbonding(Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1989;Kano 1992; Goodall 1986; Wilson 1975,chap. 16). Throughthe conceptsof "kin selection"and "inclusivefitness,"biologistscan also explainwhysomeanimalsin somecircumstances are inclinedto helpnot butalso theoffspring ofcloserelatives onlytheirownoffspring (Hamilton 1964).Throughtheconceptsof "reciprocalaltruism"(Trivers1971)and "indirectreciprocity" (Alexander1987),biologistsexplainhow it might be advantageous foranimalstohelpevennonkinifthereis someexpectaWhentheadvantagesof cooperationare directand tionof reciprocity. immediateforthe cooperativeindividuals,we could call this "mutualism" (Corning1983,84-88, 103-20,254-58). Darwinianbiologistsunderstand, however,thatbecause of human thepatternsof humannepotism,mutualism, speechand cognition, and are morecomplexand moreextensivethanthoseof other reciprocity animals.Comparedwithotherprimates, forexample,humanbeingsare uniquein maintaining withdispersing lifelongrelationships offspring of bothsexes (Rodsethet al. 1991).Symboliccommunication and conceptualabstraction allow humanbeingsto sustainrelationships in the absenceof face-to-face proximity. Similarly, althoughotheranimalsshow some sense of social reciprocity, onlyhumanbeingscan translatetheir into formalrules and institutions expectationsof reciprocity (Boehm 1992;Goodall 1983;Scott 1989;de Waal 1991).Justas Aristotlesaid, humandeliberationabout the commonadvantageof the community makeshumanbeingsmorepoliticalthanotherpoliticalanimals. Nevertheless,the special characterof humanpoliticscannotrest on any sharpseparationof humanlearningfromanimalinstinct.The
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bewhichassumesan antithesis dichotomy, Hobbesiannature-nurture learning, is untenable.All animalbehavand flexible tweenfixedinstinct andenvironmenofgeneticpredispositions iorarisesfromtheinteraction (Marlerand Terrace 1984; Brauthet al. 1991).The tal circumstances and nervoussystemmediatesbehavior,and learningaltersthestructure ofthenervoussystemat all levels(Black 1991;Diamond1988; function more we might andlearning, instinct Rakic1991).Ratherthanseparating properlysay thatanimalbehaviordependson "instinctsforlearning" (Gouldand Marler1984). the Humanslearningto speak and birdslearningto singillustrate 1985;Kuhl 1991; forlearning(Bakerand Cunningham naturalinstincts Marler1991a,1991b).Bothhumansand birdsare inclinedby natureto ways at particular kindsof verbalsignalsin particular learnparticular periodsin theirlives.Butexactlywhattheylearnwilldependupontheir willnotcomThosedeprivedofthepropersocialtraining socialtraining. inthenormalway.Andjustas humanslearndiverselanguages, municate and it was conbirdslearndiversedialects.This was seen by Aristotle, by Darwin(1936a,462-63, 704-14), who presentedthisas evifirmed tendencyto acquire an art is not peculiar dence that"an instinctive to man." We oftenassumethathumanbeingsare uniquein theirdependence of theirnature.Thatis forthefulldevelopment and artifice on nurture nottrue.Chimpanzees,forexample,acquirehabitsand skillsthatvary to another.The use of tools is highlyvariable.In fromone community mothersteach theirchildrenhow to some chimpanzeecommunities, inothercommucracknutsusingstonessuitableas anvilsandhammers; nities,thisis notdone,althoughboththenutsand thestonesare easily available(Boeschand Boesch 1989;Boesch 1991;Goodall1986,560-64; McGrew1992).In somegroups,chimpanzeeshavelearnedto eat plants containing drugsto treatparasitesand disease (Gibbons1992b;Nishida animalshave 1990).ThissupportsAristotle'sclaimthatsomenonhuman discoveredthemedicinaluse ofdrugs(HA 611b21-12a8). Some primatesare by naturesuch intenselysocial animalsthat theirnaturaldevelopment dependson social learning.For thisreason, to say thata Kohlerconcluded,"It is hardlyan exaggeration Wolfgang chimpanzeekeptin solitudeis nota realchimpanzeeat all" (1927,282). dewithrhesusmonkeys experiments HarryHarlow'sfamouslaboratory howsocialdeprivation impeded bondingdemonstrated privedofmaternal ofsuchanimals(Harlow1986;Kraemer1992).And theemotional growth of wildchimpanzeeshave shownthesame JaneGoodall's observations social needs. To satisfytheirnaturaldesiresand developtheirnatural capacities,chimpanzeesmustacquire social habitsand social intelli-
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gence.Theymustlearnfromtheirmothersand othermembersof their ofsocialskills."The infant community an intricate repertoire is notborn withbuilt-in responsesthatwilldictatehis behaviorin complexsocial situations," Goodallexplains,"he learnsbytrialanderror,socialfacilitaand imitation, and practice"(1986,568). For example, tion,observation whethera youngmale succeeds in risingto the top of the dominance hierarchy willdependon how well he has learnedthe tricksof clever withinan intricate social network. maneuvering The success of a chimpanzeein the dominancehierarchy is never thatis immerelya consequenceof superiorphysicalstrength, although ofinnatedispositions, portant. Rather,a combination acquiredskills,and allow onlya fewindividualsto becomean advantageousopportunities mustmove alphamale(oralphafemale).The dominant malechimpanzee indealingbothwithotheradultmaleswhocouldtakehisposition adroitly and withtherestof thecommunity influenced by his leadership,which intheformation requiresshrewdness ofcoalitionsandalliances(Harcourt 1992;Harcourtand de Waal 1992).Primatologist Fransde Waal interpretshis observations of suchpoliticalbehavioramongchimpanzeesas Darwiniancorroboration forAristotle:"WhenAristotle to man referred as a politicalanimal,he couldnotknowjust hownearthemarkhe was. Ourpoliticalactivityseemsto be a partoftheevolutionary heritagewe sharewithourclose relatives"(1982,211). The Hobbesian Critique
Accordingto JamesMackintosh,in his Dissertationon theProgin controversies ressofEthicalPhilosophy(1836),all ofthefundamental modernethical philosophywere initiatedby Hobbes. In criticizing Hobbes's claim thathumanbeingsare by natureasocial and amoral beings,Mackintosharguedthathumanbeingsare endowedby nature witha moralsensethatapprovescertainactionswithout regardto their consequences,althoughtheessentialtendencyof suchactionsis to promotethecommonadvantageor generalhappiness.WhenDarwindevelhe was decisivelyinfluopedhistheoryofhumansocialityand morality, book(Darwin1987,537-38,558,563-64,587-89, encedbyMackintosh's 618-29;1936a,471-95).He wentbeyondMackintosh, however,in showinghowthemoralsensecouldhave arisenin humannatureas a product ofnaturalselection. DarwinagreedwithImmanuelKantandotherwriters "whomaintain thatofall thedifferences betweenmanand theloweranimals,themoral senseor conscienceis by farthemostimportant"; butunlikeKantand couldbe studied"exclusively others,Darwinbelievedhumanmorality fromtheside of naturalhistory."His generalclaimwas thatany social
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animalwithnaturalcapacitiesforspeechand reasoningcomparableto thoseofhumanbeingswoulddevelpa moralsense(1936a,471-72).This has led one Darwinianscholarto conclude: "Aristotlebelievedthat menwerebynaturemoralcreatures.Darwindemonstrated it" (Richards 1987,612). Darwin's ethicalnaturalism revivedan Aristotelian traditionthat Hobbes had challengedin his denialthathumanbeingswereby nature politicalanimals.AgainstAristotle, Hobbes contended, bothin De Cive (chap.5, par. 5) and theLeviathan(chap. 17),thatthereweresix differences betweensocial animals(like bees and ants) and humanbeings. First,unlikesocial animals,humanbeingscompeteforhonorand prestige.Second,amongsocial animals,thereis no conflict betweentheprivate good and the commongood, as thereis amonghumanbeings, becausethenaturalappetitesofthesocialanimalsinclinethemas individuals to do whatis good forall. Third,social animalslack reason,which humanbeingsuse to criticizetheadministration ofcommonbusinessand thuscreatecivilconflict.Fourth,social animalslack the artof words, whichhumanbeingsuse to argueaboutwhatis good and evil and thus fallintoseditionandwar.Fifth,socialanimalsdo notdistinguish between injury(breachof covenant)and damage;and therefore, unlikehuman beings,theyare notoffended withone anotherso longas theirphysical In thesefiverespects,uniquelyhumanattributes appetitesare satisfied. createsocialconflicts notfoundamongthesocialanimals.A sixthdifference betweenhumanbeingsand social animals,accordingto Hobbes, followsas a consequenceoftheotherfive.Sixth,"lastly,theagreement ofthesecreaturesis natural;thatof men,is by covenantonly,whichis artificial: andtherefore itis no wonderiftherebe somewhat else required, besidescovenant,to maketheiragreement constantand lasting;which is a commonpower,to keep themin awe, and to directtheiractionsto thecommonbenefit"(Leviathan,chap. 17). Hobbes' six arguments presupposetwofundamental premises(compareDe Homine,chap. 10). First,amongthe naturally social animals, social cooperationis completely harmonious because thereare no conflictsof interestto createcompetition. Second, natureand instinctare antithetical to artifice necessarily andlearning, so thatsocialordercannot be naturalor instinctive ifit dependsin anyway on artificial or learned Darwinianbiologistswoulddenybothpremises. activity. Hobbes's firstpremisemightbe supported by theidea advancedby somebiologists thatan insectcolonyis a "superorganism": theindividual insectscooperateforthegoodofthewholecolonylikethecellsina single organism(Wheeler1939;Wilson1971,chap. 16; Seeley 1989).Thereis growingevidence,however,thatthisanalogydoes not hold formany
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speciesof social insectsthatshow severeconflicts of interestwithina of reproductive colony.One shouldexpectconflicts interestsin social insectsbecause,unlikethesomaticcells in a singleorganism, themembersofa socialinsectcolonydo notpossess identicalgenomes. If theworkersof a colonycannotreproduce,and ifthecolonyhas thecase formanyspeciesof onlyone queenat a time,whichis typically socialinsects,itmayservethereproductive fitness ofall members to act forthereproductive ofthewholecolony.Yet forthosespecies efficiency inwhichtheseconditions arenotalwaysorusuallysatisfied, reproductive betweenindividual competition insectscan createaggressiveencounters and dominancehierarchies.Thereare manypossiblelines of conflict: betweencolonies,betweenqueens,betweenworkers, orbetweenqueens and workers(Brockmann1984;Cole 1988;Holldoblerand Wilson1990, 209-26;Jeanne1991). Consider,forexample,the eusocial paperwasps of thegenusPolistes(Reeve 1991;Roseler 1991). Althoughthe workersare generally sterile,theyare potentially fertile;and whenconditions permitthemto lay eggs,theycompetewiththe queen forreproductive opportunities. Queensalso competewithone another.A queencan founda newcolony or she canjointlyfounda colonywithanotherqueen,or she byherself, can usurpcontrolof a colonyfoundedby anotherqueen. Aggressive encountersbetweenqueens can createdominancehierarchies. ConsePolistessocietiesmanifest quently, a shifting balanceofcooperation and thatemergesfromtheopportunistic behaviorof individuals competition seekingto promotetheirselfishinterests. Moreover,thePolistessocial as each colony systemvariesin responseto local ecologicalconditions The architecture of the nest,for adaptsto its peculiarcircumstances. example,is highlyvariable.One biologistdescribesthesocial wasps in the followingway: "Intelligent,adaptableecologicalgeneralistsand skilled makers of artifice,they are, above all, political animals . . . for
whomthe tensionbetweencooperationand self-aggrandizement is the conditionofdailylife"(Seger 1991,804). overriding Not onlyis Hobbes wrongin assumingthatinsectsocietiesare free he is also wrongin assumingthatthese societiesarise by of conflict, naturalinstinct without individual learning.In a socialinsectcolony,no twoindividuals are the same in theirbehaviorovertheirlifetimes. The of each insectreflectsindividualhistoryas well as innate individuality Some biologistswould arguethat"how an individual predispositions. colonymemberbehaves is influenced by manyfactors,includingits geneticmakeup,trophichistory,age, experience,social environment, and externalenvironment" (Jeanne1991,390). Antsrearedin isolation wouldlearntheirsocial duringsensitiveperiodsin whichtheynormally
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behavior cannotperform thatbehavior whenreturned tothecolony(Jaisson, Fresneau,and Lachaud 1988).Like othersocial animals,the social insect's naturalpotentialforsocial lifecannotbe fullyactualizedwithout social learningand habituation: its naturemustbe nurtured (Papaj and Lewis 1993). Although thecapacitiesofthesocialinsectsforlearning are impressiveconsidering theirsimplenervoussystem, theyobviously fallfarshort oftheintelligence displayedby mammalsin theirsocialbehavior(Gould 1984;Holldoblerand Wilson1990,365-70; Wilson1971,215-24). As I have alreadyargued,some mammals,and particularly the higherprimates,showa socialintelligence thatsuggeststheyare thepoliticalanimalsclosestto humanbeings.The evidencethatsomechimpanzee communitiesneed a stabledominancehierarchy, in whichthe alpha male assumesthe role of an impartialmediatorin settlingconflicts (Boehm 1992; Goodall 1986; de Waal 1982, 1986),indicatesthat,contraryto Hobbes,humanbeingsare nottheonlyanimalswho need "a common power,to keep themin awe, and to directtheiractionsto thecommon benefit." Hobbes was right,of course,about the centralizedstatebeinga uniquely humancontrivance sincelegalinstitutions requirehumanspeech and-abstraction. And yetit is as trueforhumanbeingsas forotherprimatesthatsocialregularity arisesas "orderwithout law"; mostdisputes are resolvedthroughinformal social normsbased on nepotism,mutualism, and reciprocity(Boehm 1983; Ellickson 1991; Goodall 1983; de Waal 1991).Hobbes concedesthatevenin thestateofnaturepriorto formal therewas socialorderfrom"thegovernment government, ofsmall families,the concordwhereofdependethon naturallust" (Leviathan, chap. 13,p. 83). Furthermore, mostofHobbes's "laws ofnature,"which dictatetheestablishment of government, reflectthenaturalinclinations tomutualism andreciprocity thathumanbeingssharewithotherprimates (Leviathan, chaps. 14-15).
Thesebiologicalrootsforhumanpoliticswereimportant to Richard who in 1672wrotethe firstdefenseof Aristotle'sunderCumberland, of politicalanimalsagainstHobbes's critique.Cumberland standing argued thatall the naturalcauses thatinclineanimalsto social cooperation-such as parentalcare, mutualaid, and reciprocalexchange-are just as strongin humanbeingsas theyare in some otheranimals.He saw thedistinctly humancapacitiesforspeechand reasonas thenatural instruments bywhichhumanbeingsbecomemorepoliticalthantheother politicalanimals(Cumberland 1727,chap.2). Fromhissurveyofcomparativeanatomy, whichindicatedthatmonkeys andapes made"thenearest
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approachesto humansagacityand passions," Cumberlandconcluded ofthehumanbrainandnervoussystemshow thatthesize andcomplexity of thathumanbeingsare formedby naturefortherationalorganization social cooperationto servethe commonadvantage(1727, 143-59).Recent biologicalresearchsupportsthisby showinghow humanneural capacitiesactingon social emoallowcognitiveand linguistic structures tionsto createa naturalmoralsense (Lieberman1991;McLean 1990). Nature and Culture
In themodernhistoryofthesocial sciences,theHobbesiandichotof natureand culture. became a dichotomy omyof natureand artifice is a classic stateAlfredKroeber'sessay of 1917,"The Superorganic," mentof theconceptof culture.Kroeberinsiststhereis an "abyss," an "eternalchasm,"betweentheorganicand thecultural.To theorganic whichhumanbeingssharewithother and instinct, realmbelongheredity whichare and learning, animals.To the culturalrealmbelongtradition uniquelyhuman.Culture,Kroeberdeclares,is "the thingin manthatis (1917,205). He evengoes so faras to claimthatthe"sosupra-animal" calledsocialinsects,"suchas bees andants,arenotreallysocialanimals thatis possessed at all becausetheylack thecapacityforsociallearning onlyby humanbeings(1917,176-77).In a lateressay,he acknowledges primatesbutinsistson the "total of thenonhuman thehighintelligence absenceofculture"amongthem(1928,340). In theearlydecadesofthe who adoptedthisconceptof culture twentieth century, social scientists opposedany attemptto applyDarwiniantheoriesof humannatureto againsttherecentrevivalof thesocial sciences(Degler1991).Similarly, Darwiniansocialtheory,opponentshave appealedto theconceptofculture(Sahlins1976). andhubetweenanimalinstinct Kroeberclaimedthathisdistinction manculturehadfoundits"mostcompleteandmostcompact"expression in Aristotle'sdeclaration,"Man is a politicalanimal"(1917, 180). SigKroeberomittedthephrase"by nature,"and he ignoredthe nificantly, whensocialsciento otherpoliticalanimals.Almostinvariably, reference tistsquoteAristotle'sremark,theymakethesame changesas Kroeber of natureand culture,biologyand to preservethepresumeddichotomy politics. The ultimatesourceof thisradicalseparationof natureand culture but Hobbes. Despitethemonismof Hobbes's materialis notAristotle ism,his politicalteachingpresupposesa dualisticoppositionbetween animalnatureand humanwill:in creatingpoliticalorder,humanbeings and conquernature(Strauss1952,7-9, 168-70).Thisdualism transcend
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was explicitly developedby ImmanuelKant,who originally formulated themodernconceptof culture(1983,1987,secs. 83-84). Cultureis that uniquelyhumanrealmof artificein whichhumanbeingsescape their naturalanimality to expresstheirrationalhumanity as the onlybeings whohavea "supersensible faculty"formoralfreedom. Through culture, humanbeingsfreethemselves fromthelaws ofnature.Although culture has becomea vague conceptin the social sciences,it retainsall of the centralfeaturesprescribedby Kant. First,cultureis uniquelyhuman. Second,itis uniquelyhumanbecauseonlyhumanbeingshavetheunderandthewillto setpurposesforthemselves standing byfreechoice.Third, cultureis an autonomoushumanartificethattranscendsnature.And fourth, cultureis thenecessaryconditionforforming moralvalues. Thisunderstanding ofcultureenteredEnglishanthropology in 1871, whenEdwardTylorinPrimitive Culturedefined cultureas "thatcomplex wholewhichincludesknowledge,belief,art,law, morals,custom,and anyothercapabilitiesand habitsacquiredby manas a memberof society" (1871, 1:1). Now textbookson "cultural"anthropology can begin withTylor'sdefinition as having"establishedcultureas a separatefield forinvestigation thatcould be studiedapartfrompsychologyor biology,since culturalphenomenawere believedto have theirown laws" (Barnouw1978,4). Beyondanthropology, thisconceptofculturesupportsthecommon viewof the"social sciences" in generalas separatedfromthe "natural sciences."The "sciencesofthespirit"(Geisteswissenschaften) mustbe separatedfromthe "sciences of nature"(Naturwissenschaften). This sameseparation as thehumantranscendence supportstheidea ofhistory of nature.Thus,AlexandreKojeve, speakingforHegel,can say, "The Aristotelian systemexplainsman'sbiologicalexistencebutnothistruly human-i.e., historical-existence"(1969,115). Darwin'sargument forthe continuity betweenhumanbeingsand otheranimalsdeniestheconceptof cultureby denying thedichotomies on whichit rests:biologyversusculture,natureversusnurture, instinct versuslearning,animality versushumanity, factsversusvalues. Some Darwinians, however,have triedto accommodate theconceptofculture as a uniquelyhumanrealmof activitythattranscends biology.Thomas reHuxley,in hisfamouslectureon "Evolutionand Ethics,"implicitly jected Darwin'sethicalnaturalism by denyingthatethicscouldbe "applied naturalhistory"(1894, 9:74) because Huxley had adoptedthe Kantianconceptof culture(Paradis1989).Interpreting Darwin's"struggle forexistence"as a Hobbesianwar of all againstall, so thatthere was no naturalgroundforsocial cooperationor moralconcern,Huxley
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concludedthat"the thiefand the murderer follownaturejust as much as thephilanthropist." Social progresscouldarise,therefore, onlyfrom a checkingof the "cosmic process" by the "ethicalprocess" and thus worldwithinthecosmos." "The ethicalprogress building"an artificial of societydepends,not on imitating the cosmic process,stillless in running awayfromit,butincombating it," whichwould"set manto subdue natureto his higherends" (1894,9:80-83). In recentyears,other thatmorality Darwinians havefollowedHuxley'slead inarguing requires a humanconquestof nature.GeorgeWilliams,forexample,hopesthat as a culturalinventioncan provide"the humaneartifice that morality fromhumannature"(1989,213). can save humanity OtherDarwinians,however,have deniedthisclaimthatmorality withno rootsinbiologicalnature.Adhermustbe a culturalconstruction ingto Darwin'soriginalposition,theyhave arguedforinvestigating the "naturalhistoryof value," in which"value" wouldbe understoodas thesatisfaction ofanimalneeds(Herrick1956,136-57).To someextent, ofnaturalneedsis controlled thissatisfaction byrigidinstincts, butmany social learning animals,to varyingdegrees,satisfytheirneeds through and flexiblebehavior.In thecomplexity of theirlearningand behavior, humanbeingsdiffer in degreebutnotin kindfromotheranimals. JohnBonner,in The Evolutionof Culturein Animals,definesculture
as "the transfer of information by behavioralmeans,mostparticularly andlearning,"incontrast to "thetransmission bytheprocessofteaching of geneticinformation of genes from passed by the directinheritance one generation to the next" (1980, 10). This corresponds to Kroeber's distinction betweenthe culturaland the organic,but unlikeKroeber, Bonnersurveystheevidencethatsome nonhuman animalsexhibitculturalbehavior.Amonggroupsofprimates, and particularly chimpanzee bands,theevidenceofcultural diversity-for example,intooluse,botanical knowledge, and hunting thatsomepritechniques-is so impressive now speakof theneed to developa "culturalprimatology" matologists (Boesch 1991;Caro and Hauser 1992;Gibbons1992a,1992b;McGrew 1992;Nishida1987;PetersonandGoodall1993).Bonnerdeniesthetraditionaldichotomy of biologyand culture."Culture,as I have definedit, is a property achievedby livingorganisms. in thissense it is Therefore as biologicalas anyotherfunction ofan organism, forinstance,respirationor locomotion.SinceI am stressing is transmitthewayinformation ted,we could call one culturalevolutionand the othergeneticalevolution
withthe understanding thattheyare bothbiologicalin the sense they bothinvolvelivingorganisms"(1980, 10-11). If cultureis the flowof information betweenanimalsabouttheirphysicalenvironment and their
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thenhumanculturediffers social relationships, fromnonhuman culture onlyin thedegreeto whichhumanlanguageextendsand formalizes this flowof socialinformation (Quiattand Reynolds1993). Nurturing Nature The evidencethatsome nonhuman animalshave naturalcapacities forsocial learningthatsupportwhatlook likeculturaltraditions forces us toredefine bothnatureandculture.Howeverwe definethem,we need to see themnotas antithetical, butas complementary. If we defineculturein a broadsense as thetransfer of information by social learningas opposedto thetransfer of information by genetic inheritance, thenwe wouldhaveto conclude,as Bonnerdoes,thathuman in degree,butnotin kind,fromculturein otheranimals, culturediffers becausehumancultureis morecomplex.Ifwe definecultureina narrow senseso thatit dependson symboliclanguage,we couldplausiblyargue thatcultureas symbolism is uniquelyhuman,andtherefore humansocietin kindand notjust in degreefromotheranimal ies in thisrespectdiffer societies(Lieberman1991;Noble and Davidson1991).This latterpositionwouldbe controversial, like however,amongcognitiveethologists Donald Griffin (1984, 1992) who believe some nonhumananimalsare capableevenof symboliclanguage.The broaddefinition wouldconform to Aristotle's occasionalremarks abouttheanimalcapacitiesforlearning and teachingthateven includesomething like language.The narrow definition wouldconform to Aristotle's morecentralclaimthat,although otheranimalscan learnand teach,onlyhumanbeingshave symbolic speech (logos or dialektos).
If cultureis definedbroadly,it is clearlynaturalforhumanbeings because it is a naturalattribute sharedwithotherculturalanimals.But evenifwe adoptthenarrowdefinition ofcultureas linguistic symbolism uniqueto humanbeings,we neednotconceiveofcultureas transcending nature.Everyanimalspecies is uniquein its behavioralrepertoire for and humanbeingsmaybe adaptingto variableecologicalcircumstances, is a crucialpartoftheirnaturalreperuniquein thatculturalsymbolism toireforbehavioraladaptation.Cultureis naturalforhumanbeingsbecause through culturetheydeveloptheirnaturalcapacitiesand satisfy theirnaturaldesires. "Nature"has manydifferent I assumea complexconcepmeanings. tionof natureas bothoriginalpotentialand developedpotential.While we commonly separatenatureand nurture or natureand art,animalnahumannature-mustbe nurtured ifitis to reachitsnatuture-including ralcompletion. Thisambiguity is evidentin thelinguistic history of "nature"and relatedwords(Klein 1985;Lewis 1967,chap. 2). We say the
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whatitis ifnothing natureofsomething is itsoriginalorinnatecondition, is itscharacteristic is doneto it. Yet we also say thenatureofsomething or normalstatewhenit has developedits matureform.Understanding betweennature natureas originalpotentialsuggestsa sharpdistinction natureas developedpotentialsuggestsconand art.But understanding thecompletion or imitation ofnature.A body ceivingofartas sometimes sense.A bodyhealingitself healingitselfon itsownis naturalinthefirst withtheaid ofa doctor'sartis naturalin thesecondsense. According to thefirst sense,a humanbeing'snatureis whatsomeone any or inclinations-before is at birth-someone'soriginalpotentialities habituation or learning.Accordingto the second sense, however,we could say a humanbeing'snatureis to becomea rational,ethical,and social ofsomeone'sinborninclinations, politicalanimalas thecompletion Darwinemploysthesecondsensewhen habits,andindividual judgments. forother he says thatan asocial humanbeinglackingany sympathy monster"(1871,1:90,1936a,483). humanbeingswouldbe an "unnatural Hobbes: "Mr. Leibnizdrawson thissame sense of naturein criticizing Hobbes calls thenaturalstatethatwhichhas theleastart;perhapsnot involvesart[porte takingintoaccountthathumannatureinitsperfection lart avec elle]" (Theodicy I, 221).
In thepursuitof theirnaturalends,all animalsseek theconditions thatwillsatisfytheirdesiresand developtheircapacities.For someaniandhabituation, so thattheirnature mals,thisrequiresextensivelearning of is fulfilled throughart. Humanbeingsdifferonlyin the complexity theirdesiresand capacitiesand in theirdistinctive capacityfordeliberatelyactingin the lightof some conceptionof a wholelifewell lived, whichAristotleand Darwinagreeis uniqueto humanbeingsas moral of humansocieties,humannature agents.Despitetheculturaldiversity manifests itselfas a universalpatternof desiresand capacities(Brown 1991;Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1989),whichallowsus tojudge culturalpractices thosenaturaldesiresanddevelopthosenatural as tohowwelltheysatisfy of social and physicalcircumstances capacitieswithinthe constraints (McShea 1990;Midgley1978;Nussbaum1990,1992). Conclusion
addressto theAmerican JamesQ. Wilson,in hisrecentpresidential PoliticalScienceAssociation(1993a),calledfora revivalofAristotelian naturalism foundedon a Darwinianbiologyofhumannatureas a replaceofsocialcontract mentfortheHobbesiantradition theory.As mycontributionto thatproject,I have offered a DarwiniandefenseofAristotle's viewofhumanbeingsas politicalanimalsbynature.I see thisas thefirst an ethicaland politicalnaturalism thatcouldbe stated stepindeveloping
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insixpropositions. First,humanbeingsarebynatureethicalandpolitical animalsbecausethespecies-specific behavioralrepertoire ofHomo sapiens includesinborndesiresand capacitiesthatinclinehumanbeingsto moralandpoliticallife.Second,thefulfillment ofthesenaturalpotentials requirescertainkindsof social learningand moralhabituation, and althoughthespecificcontentofthislearning willvaryacand habituation cordingto the social and physicalcircumstances of each humangroup, thenaturalrepertoire ofdesiresandcapacitieswillstructure thisvariability.Third,we canjudgedivergent waysoflifebyhowwelltheynurture thenaturaldesiresand capacitiesof humanbeingsin thecircumstances in whichtheyfindthemselves, butdecidingwhatshouldbe donein any case willrequirea prudent particular respectforthecustomary practices ofthegroup.Fourth,everyanimalspeciesis unique,andtheuniqueness ofhumanbeingsinthecomplexity oftheircognitive andlinguistic capacities shapes theirmoraland politicalnaturein distinctly humanways. Fifth,all animalspursueas theirgoodthesatisfaction oftheirdesiresand thedevelopment of theircapacities,butonlyhumanbeingscan pursue happinessas a deliberateconceptionof thefullestsatisfaction of their desiresand thefullestdevelopment oftheircapacitiesovera wholelife. Andsixth,modernDarwinianbiologysupportsthisunderstanding ofthe moralandpoliticalnatureofhumanbeingsbyshowinghowitcouldhave emergedby naturalselectionin evolutionary history. A fulldefenseofthesepropositions wouldrequirefarmoreevidence andargumentation thanI haveprovidedinthispaper(see Arnhart 1993a, 1993b).My concernherehas been onlyto cast doubton thosedichotomiesthathinderthedevelopment of a politicalnaturalism rootedin human biology:natureversusculture,instinctversuslearning,animality versushumanity. Myconclusionis thesameas thatdrawnbyRobinFox when he sketcheda researchprogramfor "biosocial anthropology": "The ultimatemessagein all thisis a responseto theultimatequestion of social anthropology and social philosophy: thequestionofthepossibilityof social order.And the responseis thatof Aristotleratherthan Hobbes: thatthenatureof orderis partoftheorderof nature.It is not thatmanis as culturedoes, butthatculturedoes as manis" (1975,7). In thusseeingourselvesas partof the naturalorderof theanimal it shoulddeepen world,we shouldnotfeelhumiliated. On thecontrary, oursense of awe beforethemystery of ourexistencewhenwe see that we are the onlypoliticalanimalswho wonderwhatit meansto be a politicalanimal. Manuscriptsubmitted24 May 1993 Final manuscriptreceived 6 July1993
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