1999/2000 Yearbook of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media by OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media

REPRESENTATIVE O N FREEDO M O F THE MEDIA

Freedo m an d Respon sib ility

YEARBO O K 19 9 9 / 2 0 0 0 Vienna 2000

The cover is a draw ing by the Germ an author and Nobel Prize laureate (1999), Günter Grass, “Des Schreibers Hand” (The w riter’s hand). He gave his kind perm ission for its use as the logo of the publications of the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media. The draw ing w as created in t he context of his novel Das Treffen in Telgte, dealing w ith the literary authors at the tim e of the Thirty Years War.

© O rganization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (O SCE) O ffice of the Representative on Freedom of the Media 2000 Kärntnerring 5/7, Top 14, 2. DG A-1010 Vienna, Austria Tel. +43-1 512 21 450 Fax +43-1 512 21 459 pm -fom @osce.org The authors retain rights on the essay texts. Design: WerkstattKrystianBieniek, Vienna Printed by Eugen Ketterl, Vienna

Freedo m and Respo nsibility What w e have done, w hy w e do it â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Texts, Reports, Essays, N GO s

Co ntents Knut Vollebæk – Preface 7 Freim ut Duve – Introduction 9

I. Essays o n the Balkans - Writing, Po litics and Media: In Defence of the Future Ivan Lovrenovic Five Fragments about Implosion 19 Baton Haxiu Kosovo - W here the Dead Speak 35 Dragan Velikic W hich W ay and Back 43 Branko Sbutega A Q uestion about Boka, A.D. 1993 59

II. View s and Co mmentaries - Events, Challenges and Co nflicts Deyan Anastasijevic A Swallow, N ot The Spring 75 Ivana Zivkovic and Lidija Popovic Report on the M edia in the Federal Republic of Y ugoslavia 81 Anatoli Pristavkin Chechnya - a Country at W ar 105 Freim ut Duve There is a war going and everyone is watching 115 Katharina Hadjidim os The Role of the M edia in Greek-Turkish Relations 125

III. Tw enty-five Years o f the Helsinki Pro cess: 1975 - 2000 A Personal Rem inder by Roy Gutm an 149

IV. O ur Wo rk – What We Think, Why It Matters Reflections by Staff Members Stanley Schrager N one of Y our Business 157 Alexander Ivanko Damned if Y ou Do and Damned if Y ou Don’t 1 6 5 Hanna Vuokko M inority M edia: The Case of the Swedish-Speaking Finns 171 Mihaylo Milovanovitch The Forbidden Language 177 Katarzyna Cortés A Child of ‘Solidarity’ 181

V. O verview – What We Have D o ne The Mandate 189 1. Reports - Regular Reports to the Permanent Council 193 - Urgent Reports on Current Issues to the Permanent Council 214 - Report to the Standing Committee of the O SCE Parliamentary Assembly 226 - Report to the O SCE Review Conference 232 2. Projects 1999/2000 - Protection of Journalists 236 - The M edia in Central Asia: The Present and Future 239 - School N ewspapers in Central Asia 240 - O ther Projects 247 3. Current Media Situation in Ukraine 249 4. Visits and Interventions in 1999/2000 275

VI.Where to Find Tho se Who Help The Media NGO s in the O SCE Wo rld The Authors 318

283

Knut Vo llebæk Preface In 1999, the O rganization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (O SCE) h ad to face som e of the m ost serious and difficult challenges in its history. Looking back brings to m ind som e unforgettable scenes. In Ja n u a ry, I w as w arm ly w elcomed by crow ds of Kosovar Albanians w ho, thanks to the O SCE Mission, had been able to return to their homes and villages. In April, I stood on the border betw een Kosovo and Albania and saw the despair and fear of the Kosovar Albanian refugees, driven from their hom es by the Yugoslav authorities. In July, the sight of the burned-out houses and villages and the destruction of Serb churches and m em orials appalled m e. In Decem ber, on a hillside near Grozny, I met exhausted Chechen refugees w hile artillery shells rained dow n on the suburbs only a few kilom etres aw ay. We all need these rem inders that there is only one yardstick by w hich all our activities should be m easured – w hether or not w e have improved the lives of ordinary people. This m ust apply to all our w ork: to the efforts to reconcile people of different backgrounds, to the building of dem ocratic institutions an d practices, to giving each other advice on legislation that w ill protect the individual and ensure the freedom and prosperity of our societies. We m ust foster societies that tolerate and prom ote pluralism in ideas, opinions and cultures. O ne of the m ajor objectives for the O SCE during the last decade has been to support and nurture the large num ber of new dem ocracies that em erged out of form er totalitarian regim es. O ne feature com m on to them all w as th e n eed to develop free and independent media. In this respect, the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media plays an invaluable role. His task, to assist governm ents in the furthering of free, independent and pluralistic m edia, is crucial for fostering a clim ate of tolerance, openness and accountable governm ents. The role of the m edia w ill continue to be a vital one as w e deal w ith the challenges ahead – in the Balkans, but also in the Caucasus and Knut Vollebæk

other parts of the form er Soviet Union, including Central Asia. O ne of the main challenges for the O SCE right now is the acute need for democratic reform in Serbia, as w ell as in Kosovo, w h ere hate speech is hardening the divisions betw een ethnic groups. During m y year as Chairm an-in-O ffice, I m et w ith independent m edia representatives every tim e I visited Belgrade. Their courageous struggle to provide objective information to the people of Serbia made a deep impression on m e. The efforts of the regim e to silence these brave m en and w om en are totally unacceptable. In his capacity as O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Freim ut Duve has done his utm ost both to im prove the m edia situation in Serbia and to com bat hate speech in Kosovo. His w ork w ill undoubtedly be a key elem ent in the struggle tow ards a dem ocratic Serbia. Mr Duve and his team have provided significant and constructive assistance in m any of the issues that con fronted the Norw egian Chairm anship during m y term of office. I am convinced that the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media w ill continue to play an im portant role in helping to build stable and open dem ocratic societies throughout the O SCE region. O slo, February 2000

PREFACE

Freimut D uve Introduction During this year, the year 2000, the O SCE w ill be celebrating its 25th birthday. The relevant declarations of intention, w hich is w hat President Ford of the United States of Am erica called the agreem ents contained in the Final Act of the original Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, w ere signed in Helsinki in 1975. O ut of these intentions developed the m ost radical changes in the political w orld in the second half of the century, and finally the end of the Soviet system . O ne of the declarations of intention concerned the “third basket”: im proved access to inform ation, an area in w hich Helm ut Schm idt, the then Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germ any, described w hat w as achieved as “not com pletely satisfactory”. How e v e r, a first step in th e direction of freedom of opinion and media diversity w as taken at that tim e. The appointm ent of the Representative on Freedom of the M edia, w ho began w ork in 1998, w ould not have been possible w ithout the Helsinki process. His Mandate 1 is the result of this process. In a broad sense, such an agreement on journalistic freedom s and diversity of inform ation has its roots in the basic m otivation of the West: the overcom ing of dictatorship not through violence, in w hatever form , but through increasingly open discussions concerning the basic rights of citizens. Seen in this light, Helsinki, 25 years ago, began a historic process w hich can perfectly w ell be com pared w ith th at leading up to th e French Revolution in the 18th century: a process aim ed at putting an end to all form s of authoritarian dictatorship, w hether based on m onarchist or ideological principles. Authoritarian leaders alw ays act in a similar w ay; they allow no criticism of their actions, and seek to keep control over published com ments on their exercise of pow er. Helsinki w as a first step tow ards replacing the “self-aristocratization” of th e ideologically select1

The Mandate, see page 189

Freimut Duve

ed ruling cadres by a discussion w hich led in Poland to the trade union Solidarity and later in Russia to “glasnost”. A politically, but also culturally, revolutionary process. It w as th us only logical that th e comm unity of states kn ow n today as the O SCE w ould be the first regional organization to establish an office w ith the task of protecting the freedom of journalism . Whereas discussions concerning security in 1975 w ere concerned mainly w ith questions of disarmam en t and the joint planning of détente, the basic questions of com m on security focus today, a quarter-century later, on other issues: above all, on how the alw ays latent danger of ethnically m otivated propaganda, and the instrum entalization of the m edia for that purpose, can be countered. The three w ars in the states that m ade up the former Yugoslavia have show n how the danger of w ar can suddenly becom e acute as a result not of the accum ulation of m issiles in the opposing cam ps, but of quite different causal processes. During the Cold War period, discussions concern ing security w ere necessarily concerned in the first instance w ith th e number of w eapons at the disposal of the “tw o cam ps” – the East and the West. Security m eant guarantees against m ilitary attacks from the other side. Both sides w ere considered “stable” - th e dem ocratic West and the authoritarian East. In ternal conflicts w ere seen as part of this dualism : th e dem ocratic protests in Hungary in 1956 w ere w elcom ed in the We s t and brutally repressed by the East, and the same happened w ith Prague in 1968 and Gdansk in 1979. The dictatorships foun d it m ore difficult to identify them selves w ith the students’ dem onstration s in th e We s t in 1968, but the dem onstrations of the 1980s – in Germ an y, for exam ple – in favour of disarm am ent and peace w ere seized upon in Moscow and in w h at w as th en East Germ any as a chan ce to encourage insecurity in the West. Th is proved counterproductive, because the movement in fact contributed to the collapse of the com munist dictatorships and the end of the Cold Wa r. Since the beginning of the 1990s, conflicts have developed in a completely different w ay, w ith out an y counting up of tanks and missiles: organized hatred betw een ethnic groups, and so-called “ethnic conflicts”, 10

INTRO DUCTIO N

often instrum entalized by the m edia, have led to m ilitary confrontation. The media have played a particular role as instrum ents for such h a t r e d – an d also, in the case of indepen dent, professional m edia, for example in Sarajevo, in resistance to it. After m any decades of dictatorship, th e freedom of the m edia has had and w ill continue to have a key function to perform in the process of peaceful dem ocratization. The 54 O SCE States that drew up the m andate for m y office in 1997 w ere therefore right to bear in m ind the issue of ethnic hate propaganda as an aspect of the question of freedom of journalism . There can be no freedom w ithout civility and no civility w ithout freedom . 1. In 1999, w e took th e initiative of asking journalists and authors from various post-Yugoslav States for a contribution to the Defence of the Future – in other w ords, the defence of th eir future. Some of th ese texts, w hich w ere published in a book, have been reproduced in this new Yearbook. The language of hate, experiences of suffering, the traum as of the fam ilies of terror victim s – all this endangers peace and has left behind, in spite of the fact that the w eapons have becom e silent, a m in ed area – and not only mines on roads and paths. In the established democracies of Europe the w arnings against organized xenophobia, and against electoral cam paigns in w hich racist im ages are used, w ill attract particular attention. In regions w here the incitem ent of ethnic hatred has led to terror, citizens thirsty for peace look closely at Europe’s older dem ocracies. None of the countries of the European Union, nor Canada or the United States of Am erica, are hom ogeneous states from an ethnic point of view . They m ust rem ain an exam ple of peace for other m em ber States of the O SCE, none of w hich have an ethnically hom ogeneous citizenry, as som e of the m edia claim. Hence the special responsibility of journalists for basic dem ocratic rights. 2. Th is Yearbook m akes clear how intensively m y Office has been able to develop its activities in the past year. And it gives an overview of new issues concerning m edia freedom that have arisen out of current political developments. The protection of journalists in military conflicts has Freimut Duve

been a particular concern for us. How do dem ocracies cope w ith w ar w hen each side tends to see in vestigating journalists as traitors to their ow n cause, agents of the other side or actual soldiers of the other side w ithout uniform ? The deaths of several journalists in Kosovo led us to pay particular attention to this subject, as w e w ill contin ue to do in the course of the current year. This Yearbook m akes clear how intensively m y O ffice has been able to develop its activities in the past year. And it gives an overview of new issues concerning m edia freedom that have arisen out of current political developm ents. As in the first Yearbook, I have invited colleagues to w rite ”subjective” contributions – reflecting their experiences and their convictions w ith regard to freedom of the m edia. Readers of our Yearbook w ill thus be able to see that freedom of opinion has its place even w ithin this sm all team , and in our official annual publication. From the outset, Stan Schrager, an author and diplom at seconded by the Governm ent of the United States of Am erica, has been a m em ber of the staff of this O ffice. He has been particularly active in prom oting the developm ent of independent m edia in Central Asia. He is leaving the O SCE at his ow n w ish to take over the leadership of the anti-drug cam paign in Bolivia, on behalf of his Governm ent. Vienna, February 2000

I NTRO DUCTIO N

I. Essays o n the Balkans – Writing, Po litics and Media: In Defence of the Future

Ivan Lovrenovic Five Fragments about Implosion Baton Haxiu Kosovo - W here the Dead Speak Dragan Velikic W hich W ay and Back Branko Sbutega A Q uestion about Boka, A.D. 1993

The Essays are from the book In Defence of the Future – Searching in a M inefield, published in Serbo-Croatian, Germ an and English by the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Freim ut Duve and Nenad Popovic, a pu blisher from Zagreb and co-founder o f the Group 99. “After the fall of the Berlin Wall, after the end of the totalitarian system s… in Eastern Europe, in our part of the continent w e lived throu gh a w ar, thro ugh horrible violence and num erous violations of hum an rights. The cultural scope fell apart. It is necessary to build a new cultural w orld… We oppose to the greatest possible extent the political and cultural chauvinism that turned the political borders into borders betw een cultures.” Group 99 Frankfurt, O ctober 1999

Law s and Freedo m ‘There shall be liberty of the Press. No person m ay be punished for any w riting, w hatever its contents, w hich he has caused to be printed or published, unless he w ilfully and m anifestly has either him self show n or incited others to disobedience to the law s, contem pt of religion, m orality or the constitutional pow ers, or resistance to their orders, or has m ade false and defam atory accusations against anyone. Everyone shall be free to speak his mind frankly on the adm inistration of the State and on any other subject w hatsoever.’ Article 10 of the N orwegian Constitution ‘Everyone has the right, w ithin the lim its of the law , to freely express his opinion by w ord of m outh and in w riting, print, or pictorial representation. The Press m ay be neither subjected to censorship nor restricted by the licensing system . Adm inistrative postal distribution vetoes do not apply to inland publication.’ Article 13 of the Basic Law of Austria on the General Rights of N ationals, adopted on 21 December 1867 ‘All persons on the Federation territory shall enjoy follow ing rights: fundam ental freedom s; freedom of speech and press; freedom of opinion; conscience and conviction; freedom of religion, including private and public religious rite; freedom of gathering; freedom of association, including freedom of establishing and mem bership in trade unions and also freedom of non-association; freedom of w ork’ Article II: Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina

‘The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall recognise and guarantee the rights and freedom s of m an and the citizen recognised under international law. Freedom of the press and other form s of public inform ation shall be guaranteed. Citizens shall have the right to express and publish their opin ions in the m ass m edia. The publication of new spapers and public dissem ination of inform ation by other m edia shall be accessible to all, w ithout prior approval, after registration w ith the com petent authorities. Radio and television stations shall be set up in accordance w ith the law. Freedom of speech and public appearance shall be guaranteed.’ Sections I and II, Art. 10, 36, 39 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Y ugoslavia ‘Freedom of thought and expression of thought are guaranteed. Freedom of expression specifically includes freedom of the press and other m edia of com m unication, freedom of speech and public expression, and free establish ment of all institutions of public com m unication . Censorship is forbidden. Journ alists have the right to freedom of reporting and access to inform ation. The right to correction is guaranteed to anyone w hose constitutionally determ ined rights have been violated by public com m unication.’ Chapter III, Part 2 [Personal and Political Freedoms and Rights], Article 38 [Expression] of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia

Ivan Lo vreno vic Five Fragments about Implosion True religion, false religion. To d a y, there is not a single politician in the pow er establishm ents from any of the “national bodies”, at any level of government, w ho does not declare himself a hard-line believer of one of the three religions that, practically, act as if th ey w ere state religions, each one of them in “its ow n space”. Bosnia-Herzegovina has never been so full of pious party-political officials. It is the sam e w ith custom s. Catholic, O rthodox and Muslim clergy carry out appropriate religious rituals at almost every econ om ic, m ilitary, educational or civic event, jubilee or celebration, and the m edia conscientiously record and transm it them . That is w hat one hears and sees. How great, then, is that unofficial, sem i-public coalescence of ethnic, political and religious structures because of w hich the borders betw een their areas of com petence have been erased? Here today, a politician proved to be corrupt w ould bear the consequences m uch m ore easily than one w ho dared, even in a civilised w ay, publicly to dem onstrate his indifference to religion. Th at this n ew w ave of dem onstration of adh erence to ch urch and mosque is not motivated by any authentic spiritual need, but represen ts an old feature from the repertoire of social D arw in ism does not need a lot of provin g. In all th ree Bosn ian varieties, it is in prin cip le precisely the sam e, but its origin in profane politics can be seen brillian tly in a com bination of som e of th e leitm otivs of President Alija Iz e t b e g o v ic ’s m essages: Th ey say: “We (i.e., party, m ovem en t, n ation…) h ave m ore need of the loyal than th e h on est; everyth in g is in God’s h an ds; ath eism is on th e oth er side m orality; on e h as to distin guish betw een the national and nationalism …” Practised in synthesis, in everyday politics these m essages can act in no other w ay than a kind of prom pting of one’s ow n people to a kind of m oral laxity, as a liberation from any individual critical attitude and Ivan Lovrenovic

view point, and they com e from the top of the ethnic and political structure. They lead people into a new kind (w ouldn’t it be m ore precise to say, take them back to the old?) collectivism , different from the socialist and atheist version on ly in nam e and externals, but not at all in terms of m entality and social substan ce. For unscrupulous abuse of the sacred, ruthless careerism and cynical religious and ethnic nationalist exclusivism , there is no better environm ent. The chief of the Southw est comm un e in Mostar, a certain Mr Stipo Maric, w ill not allow the m osque on Balinovac to be restored. But he calls him self a Croatian m an and a Christian, and w ill, then, allow at least som ething: “As for the w all of the harem , m y view has alw ays been, that it has never been in Croatian m an and a Christian to allow (original gram m ar) stray dogs to w ander over the graves or cars to park…” A w all around the graveyard, then, perhaps, a m osque, no. Why do I mention these exam ples of the chauvinist bigotry and lack of civilization that cause a m inor local governm ent official to stop – very likely feeling the w hile a mighty sw elling of the breast from the m agn itude of his services to the people and having stood on th e bulw arks of Christianity – the restoration of a m osque, alongside the political and para-theological m essages of Izetbegovic? Yes, indeed, there is an enorm ous in tellectual difference betw een th e tw o exam ples. But this is a question of difference on ly w ithin th e sam e system , to w h ich both of them belon g, for the endurance of w hich both of them are accountable. In brief, this is a system (perhaps it w ould be better to say unsystem or antisystem , or quite sim ply, absence of system ) in w hich an unprecedented, sometimes perfectly blasphemous, distortion of religion and its m anifestations is perm itted. When , for exam ple, a dreary toleration – in w h ich (good heaven s!) there are tw o Cath olic in stitutions of h igher education in Sarajevo, and th e O rthodox church h as been restored – is h eld by Izetbegovic to represen t an ideal m odel, th is m ean s n oth in g but: we could easily not have allowed even that. Just as it w ould be stupid an d unjust not to com m end the sense of the point of view and the ch oice, as against destruction, it w ould be again st the logic of one better and 20

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m ore civilised, more com patible w ith the con tem porary w orld, not to see th at the arrogance of such view s is n ot very far from that kind of perm issiven ess that alw ays presupposes on e side having greater and the other lesser righ ts. And w hen this is dressed up in religious con cepts, relation s, sym bols and values, th en it is the m ore dangerous. O ur entire history has given us abundant, th ough it seem s, taking it all in all, totally useless lesso ns about th is. The believers w ho are now close to pow er and find it hard to restrain from the revanchist view that “our tim e has com e”, put the em phasis of their critique on the past, on the harassm ent and repression of religion and religious people in the Red system. It is quite unclear and illogical w hy they do not come out against today’s abuse of religion, its exploitation in a w ay that is not a w hit less disgraceful than that of the previous atheist regim e, w hich is after all dead. Considering these dangers, precisely in the context of relations betw een Islam and Christianity, the Germ an theologian, Hans Küng, w rote: “In the postmodern paradigm, religion does not need… restoration but a transform ation that w ould look to the future: religiousness in secularism, one m ight say. In this, Christian believers are at once w ith Muslim believers: if th ere is a w ish to avoid som ething falsely religious (le a d e r, party, nation, science) m aking the fundamental point, suprem e value and ultim ate standard of humanity, of w hich a slave is made, then instead of belief in the false deities of the m odern period m ust com e belief in the one true God!” Who has the truth about Bosnia? O nly the truth, all the truth, can help Bosnia! cried Aija Izetbegovic in Strasbourg, opposing the intim ation that one of the conditions for Bosnia-Herzegovina getting into the Council of Europe w ould be a certain m oratorium being imposed on the study of history in schools. As far as the truth is concerned, Bosnia-Herzegovina is in a seriously disabled state, and is really in need of assistance. The European proposal and Izetbegovic’s reaction represent tw o opposite m odes of thinking and acting. Ivan Lovrenovic

The European m odel is practical, oriented to a likely and good result, based on tried experience. The Franco-Germ an exam ple is the best know n, implem ented after World War II in w hich the German s an d the French experienced the terrible clim ax of a century-long hostility, and, so it seem ed, ineradicable national hatreds. O n an ideal and abstract plane, there is nothing easier th an to agree w ith Izetbegovicâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s statem ent. Yes, finally all the truth â&#x20AC;&#x201C; th at is w hat Bosnia-Herzegovina is cryin g out for, like clean air! That in w hich everyon e w ould know h im self, in good an d in evil, and especially in th e tendency to replace th is sad and sorry truth , for the com m on benefit, as soon as possible, by som e differen t, good life in the future. What is the truth h ere in our society? Who determ in es it, on the basis of w hat facts? Con cretely, if it is to do w ith an in terpretation of th e recent w ar (and of history in general), in school an d in textbooks, but even w ider, in th e m edia, books, political agitation , it is reduced to a caricature, to ethnic self-glorification and ordinary party political propagan da. C riticism , as eith er approach or m eth od, as a basic m eth od in arrivin g at an y kin d of truth, does not exist, an d if it does m ake an appearan ce in som e diffiden t form , it is branded (at best) as w an t of national feeling, m ore frequen tly as treason. And h ere, in fact, th ere are no differen ces of principle am on g the Serb, Croat an d Bosn iak sides. Th e design ers and ow ners of such truths are, of course, th e political an d eth nic elites, party leaders, their m edia trum pets. They have laun ched a psych ologically an d existentially un usually effective m eans for killing th e w ill to criticism , threatenin g to apply the label of equating the blame. Th ey did not see that it is precisely th rough this kind of suspension of criticism that they them selves rein force this idea about equality of blam e, rein forcing three autistic perspectives w ith no relation to the truth, having in them selves only an evil energy to recede further from the real w orld and those w ith w h om they share this real w orld. The situation of truth is w ell described by the ever-lucid cynicism of Selim ovic in The Dervish and Death: â&#x20AC;&#x153;There are m any truths, w hich 22

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do not get on w ith each other”, and only am ong rare individuals is it possible to find that im practical passion that Krleza defines sim ply as: “truth is w hat it is not opportune to say”. The construction of any truth starts from sim ple circum stances that w ill not go aw ay. In our m ilieu, w hat is characteristic is the system atic contem pt of such facts. O f m any exam ples, I w ill cite just one of the w orst. In the fourth year after the end of the w ar, w e still do not know the m ost im portant num ber: the num ber of the dead. Well, fine, this is still very difficult to ascertain. But m uch w orse is the m orally scandalous w illingness of our m ost im portant politicians, party leaders, “com m itted” intellectuals, clergym en, journalists… to peddle such num bers as they see fit. And w hat is m ore, this is a habit apt to constant am plification. They do not understand that, speaking rather rigorously, every such m agnification m ight be treated as an act of sym bolic m urder. It is dreadful that this should be happening in a country that has been anyw ay hard hit and sent dow nhill by all kinds of victim s and losses, hum an and m aterial, but in a country in w hich the alarm ingly adm onitory experience of that dreadful fraudulence after 1945 ought to be still alive – the fraud of 1.700,000 victim s (produced for the benefit of the international reparations conference). The part played by that fraud, and by the w hole of the m align spirit that it delivered forth, is not at all so insignificant in our recent trials as not to oblige us to remember and to learn the lesson. Those politicians, of course the national leaders and benefactors w ho facilely repeat such necrophiliac and pathetic matrices of useful behaviour to the people, are certainly throw ing sand in its eyes, leading it tow ards a bad future, a direction ever m ore distant from the truth. In th e said m eetin g in Strasbourg, th e official and unofficial Bosnian No. 1, Carlos Westendorp, a little b it Pythian ly “reconciled” th e tw o opposing points of view, sayin g that alth ough it w as true that a certain num ber of textbooks w ould h ave to be ditched as the price of entry into th e CE, this w ould not be to the disadvan tage of the truth about everything that had happened in Bosnia-Herzegovin a betw een 1992 an d 1995. Ivan Lovrenovic

There is no doubt that in our current circum stances there are no real chances for establishing an objective all-the-truth, because the kind of aw areness capable of internally overcom ing both the traum as of w ar and the triple ethnic and political autism is still in its infancy. Is this not enough reason for the European solution to be accepted, if unw illingly, w ith the argum ent that Bosnia ought to be helped. Minority Bosniaks. There is a test that I often have to give m yself, to test the liveliness of m y ow n reflexes, in both politics and, m ore elem entarily still, in basic civilization. It consists of m y alw ays checking how m uch I have got used to â&#x20AC;&#x201C; how m uch I have accepted as norm al, new , dem ocratic â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the political discourse, the political lexis. A great man y grotesque concepts have made th em selves at home, and th ey are relevant to the political and mental hygiene that I am talking about. O ne of them , how ever, is the m ost com m on, and the m ost portentous: minority nations, minority returnees. Faced w ith these political phrases, w hich are deeply offensive to every person w ith roots in Bosnia and to every politically literate person, I cannot refrain from thinking of the history of the Bosnian refugees in World War II. O h, yes, then too, there w ere ethnic m urders and persecutions and all kinds of loss and suffering, and m any tow ns and villages w ould be com pletely em ptied. Neither did that w ar end w ith any kind of ideal justice. There w ere m any disguised fiends am ong the conquering angels, m any suffered unjustly on the defeated side, and the w hole thing w as not at all devoid of ethnic and religious im plications. And there w as a great deal of savagery in the trium ph. But it is this that is crucial for our com parison: those people w ho w ent back to their hom es in 1945 w ere not subject to any kind of ethnic co-efficients, they w ere not ethnically classified or quantified. When my grandfather w ent back in 1945 from Banja Luka - Zagreb refugeedom to his house Mrkonjic-Varcar, it is true that he arrived to see his house in ashes and the new pow ers that be unfavourable to him, and it is true that he w as very soon deprived of his hard-w on assets, but nevertheless he cam e as an individual, as a citizen, w ith all his virtual 24

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and real rights before the new law . His neighbours the Varcar Serbs, w hom the Ustasha regim e had driven to Serbia, returned in just the same w ay to their ow n hom es, just like the Muslims w ho hid w ith their friends an d fam ilies from all those armies, w herever they could, in safer Bosnian tow ns. And then, too, there w ere various form s and reasons for people, especially in the first post-w ar period, to feel insecure and vulnerable, but they w ere not categorised as a minority national group, nor w ere th eir rights and status defined according to this, nor w ere the fates cut and sow n accordingly. My grandfather lived out the w hole of his long life in Varcar, in w hich his people, as faith and ethnos, had never m ade up m ore than ten percent, and yet he alw ays had the proud and robust psychology of som eone w ho knew he w as on his ow n ground, both w hen he had and w hen he had not. He never at all felt him self a m em ber of som e kind of minority nation. Now one thinks and talks about returning refugees and displaced person s exclusively in terms of their ethnicity, and the suprem e principle and criterion is derived from the fact, that in any given place to w hich people return, the w ar installed a certain ethnic party in pow er, that is, created a situation in w hich a certain ethnos w as num erically in the m a jo rit y. Thus, as has been man y tim es h elplessly stated, in BosniaHerzegovina the absurd situation has been created in which all, in a given situation, m ight be an ethnic minority â&#x20AC;&#x201C; in their ow n country! Th e absurdities crying out to heaven th at appear in th e process are w ell know n, but I am not sure that anyone still cares about them . Sarajevo, claim those in the know , w as until this year the biggest Serbian city after Belgrade. Q uantitatively, the Croats did not figure so much, but from a qualitative an gle there w asnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t a bigger or m ore important city in Bosn ia-Herzegovina for th em. Now both of them are in the sam e position, that of m inority returnees, m inority nations. Is it necessary to point out to w hat extent, and precisely how, Banja Luka w as both Croatian and Bosniak? Not long w ill be required before it w ill becom e alm ost in decent to men tion their right to return, so much Ivan Lovrenovic

has the pragm atic etiquette in w hich there is tacit acknow ledgem ent only of the right of the m ajority and the m inority num ber, i.e., the real balance of pow ers. How , and to w hat extent, Mostar w as an em inently Serbian city can be seen today only in the Serbian cem etery. Cham pions of a socalled realistic approach, today m ention only the Croat and Bosniak claim s to the city, and w onder how , at the entrance to the 21th century, a city can be so artificially divided. Stolac stopped being a city, stopped being that m asterpiece of urbanity th at it w as for centuries, by being de-Muslim ised and reserved only for Croats. If the Bosniaks of Stolac are not deserted by their desire to go back, they know very w ell that, for the m om ent, they cannot go back even as a m inority but only, if they are extrem ely lucky, as s17thrate citizens. In Livno (w hat a piece of good fortune!) they say the situation has been a bit better recently. And in Ljubuski too. As if som eone ought to receive a decoration for hum anity as a result! Croats today are a minority nation in Bugojno an d Vares, to w h ich for hundreds of years they gave the colour, tone and content, to the cities and the life. And w hat could one possibly say about the Bosnians from Foca, Zvornik, Visegrad, Rogatica Srebrenica? Srebrenica! And so on, and so onâ&#x20AC;Ś The w hole of Bosnia is a sickening scene of such situations and relationships, all of them belonging to the precivilization period. But the point of this discussion is in the incredible fact that this mean, stupid and offensive term â&#x20AC;&#x201C; minority returnees, m inority n ations â&#x20AC;&#x201C; has m ade itself at hom e in the language of politicians, public figures, the m edia, w ithout any respect to religion, nation, party or entity, and it has been equally accepted by the O ffice of the High Representative and all the representatives of the international com m unity w ho deal w ith Bosnian affairs in order to civilise us and take us into Europe and the third m illennium . An old, th ousan d-tim e con firm ed thesis says th at the political lexicon of th e rulin g elites is an expression of th ose values that they 26

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create and stand for. If that is the case, then it is w ith abhorrence that it can be stated that all the official factors of Bosnian political reality, to state it specifically: th e Bosniak, the Serbian and the Croat, and many of those w ho claim they are in opposition, and all the international – are com pletely in accord in practising the sam e, not only anti-Bosnian but also deeply retrograde, politics. Bosnian, Cath olic, Croat – m y grandfather did not know w hich of the three h e w as m ore; but the th ing w as not that he did not know, but that he did not need to. He sim ply w as all three. Lying in the old graveyard of Varcar for som e 30 years now , he is neither m inority nor m ajority. It looks as if it is only in this place that these days you can be just yourself. The Noose of Nation. When William Jefferson Clinton (as he w as called as an en dearm ent in Sarajevo during th e h olding of th e Stability Pact summ it, w hile h e charm ed Sarajevan s, especially the w om en, w ith “collateral” appearances) says th at h e is particularly im pressed and encouraged by th e fact that now “the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina speaks w ith a single and un ited voice”, th is is the kind of m ellifluousness that can be taken seriously only by those ears it is, after all, intended for – th ose of Clinton ’s Am erican public and his electorate. As far as the dom estic public is concern ed, I don’t believe that a single livin g soul in Bosnia, w ho cares th e slightest little bit about h is ow n hard-w on experien ce, can believe that there is – in this unlooked-for and ostentatious unan im ity of Izetbegovic, Jelavic and Radisic – even a drop of sin cerity, or any gen uine ch an ge in their “n ation al ph ilosoph y”. That is, in th e philosophy of those structures that th e three of th em both sym bolize and, in differen t degrees, have th em selves both created and con tin ue to direct. The speeches that Bosn ia-Herzegovin a politician s uttered at the Stability Pact sum m it, w h en com pared w ith their overall practice, sound as if th ey w ere sim ply voiceovers, w ritten by som eone com p le t e ly different, w ith a totally different political vision and conception of society in general and Bosnia-Herzegovina in particular. If, that is, Ivan Lovrenovic

som eone w ere to judge according to these speeches, he w ould say that he had in front of him people w ho put universal social and human in terests and values first and forem ost, and that th ey w ere in absolute agreem ent about this. But at the summit they had to talk like this, because they knew very w ell that a different kind of discourse, their norm al, vernacular discourse, w ould sim ply not h ave passed at a m eeting like this, on the contrary, it w ould be out of place and insulting, not to say politically counter-productive. The only one of all the Balkanites at the sum m it w ho did not shrink from speaking w ith his ow n tongue, w ho stayed true to him self and his w eird integrity, his phantasm s of “civilization”, w as Franjo Tudjm an. But that is another topic all together. The system atic insincerity of the speeches of the Bosnian representatives pro foro externo derives, then, from the very heart of their concept of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, their fundam ental fallacy about the “solution of the national problem ” that boils dow n to a sim ple-m inded, com m on-sensical cliché – that in societies like that of Bosnia-Herzegovina it is possible to solve the national problem (in all of its three variants) apart from the question of the state and the question of society. For the error to be the m ore tragic, in their hierarchy of concepts, the national question is alw ays and in all things at the top. After Bosnia-Herzegovina survived in a political and territorial sense, and after Kosovo and the Stability Pact, this fact becom es less and less in doubt and m ore real, this m odel of the nation as holy of holies, the nation as absolute, the nation in the abstract (and in addition in its vulgar ideological coalescence w ith religion) becomes every day a heavier ballast, a fatal brake on any kind of developm ent. For those w ho are sensitive to any “equalisation of the three sides”, and im agine them selves ch am pions of the fight for a w h ole and dem ocratic Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is w orth stating very precisely: in this m atter all three sides really are the sam e. Both alija and ante and zivko (em blem s of a certain politics, not persons) are equally far aw ay from Bosnia-Herzegovina as a harm onious society and a functioning dem ocratic state, actively w orking against such a vision and such an objec28

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tive, w hen each of them in his w ay places the interest of his ow n people over the needs of the state and the society. And the ultim ate irony of this policy is that it very clearly and m easurably harm s precisely the people on w hose behalf it is being carried out. Not to speak of religion, for it is hum iliated and profaned, reduced to the position of handm aid to the ruling structure. Thus, actually, w e arrive at th e general Bosn ian paradox: w hoever thinks that the nation al an d religious problem can be solved h ere as a nation al m atter, just for itself, m akes of it an in soluble riddle, tw ists it like a n oose around th e neck of the w hole social structure, turns it in to th e nightm are of every politics. The national question (as effective nation al equality, dem onstration of cultural identity an d so on) cannot be solved here as a national m atter, but only as one of society as a w h ole. And nothing show s this better than history, though only if it is p r o p e r ly, i.e., critically, read. Ever since the n ational question, so called, has existed, and that m eans for a century and a half, in w hat social circum stances has it been raised and addressed, and w hy has it n ever been able to be effectively solved? With crude sim plification, because it has alw ays occurred in ideological and ideologically repressive, and never in genuinely dem ocratic, societies and circum stances. From the degraded O ttom an confessional system , through the unsuccessful national engineering during the tim e of Austro-Hungary, Alexander’s Yugoslavianism based on the cult of St Sava and a police and m ilitary dictatorship, the short interlude of “integral Croatianism ” in a varian t of bloody provincial fascism during the Indepen dent State, to com m unist Yugoslavia w ith its tw o half-tim es: rigid unitarism and “self-m anaging socialism ”, inclusive of the trium ph of national quasidemocracy of 1990 (along w ith th e w ar and the post-Dayton status quo) – during the 150 years of its m odern history, Bosnia-Herzegovina has not had a day of genuine dem ocracy. At the end of the eighties, for a couple of years or so, w e felt just the odd breath of som ething of the kind, far-off and unreal, w hen the old regim e had practically abdicated and the blood had not yet started to flow … Ivan Lovrenovic

In one thing alone are the one-tim e com m unists and their current successors, the Bosnian national or ethnic leaders in accord. They sw ore, and these sw ear, that Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be either happy or stable un less there is a “proper settlement of the national question”, and the first, just like these today, claim ed to be the very ones to settle it. Who know s w hat kind of an opportunity from this point of view the Stability Pact w ill bring. In w hat w ay, how effectively and rapidly, w ill its mechanism s encourage democratic processes, the only ones that can put th e collective phantom s and phan tasm s in their righ t place and thus resolve them – w ho could talk of this w ith any kind of certainty? O ne thing is certain. If everything goes on under the current interpreters of national interests, the bad history of these regions w ill be repeated like a perpetuum mobile, in spite of all offers and prom ises, w hether they are called a Stability Pact or som ething else. The Crimes of the Victims. What is required for the post-Yugoslav spiral of ethnic evil to touch bottom and com e to a stop? Milosevic’s plan, after m any years of m ainly unpunished violence in Croatia and Bosnia, to w age one m ore chauvinist w ar in Kosovo, resulted in the appalling losses of the Albanians and their exodus, and in the final decision of the West to put an end to it. Milosevic w as repulsed from Kosovo, NATO troops entered the province, and the Albanian population, previously driven out, returned in vast num bers, un paralleled since the United Nations High Com m issioner for Refugees started system atizing data and keeping statistics. We follow ed the spring agony of the Kosovo Albanians, horrified at the repetition of a pattern still so fresh in our ow n m emory. For every voice of vengeance, of gloating over the NATO bom bing of Serbia there m ight have been, there w ere at least five here of the sober and restrained: nothing good accrues to an yone from another’s m isfortune. Then, the first reports started arriving of cases of retaliation against the Serbs and other non-Albanians, of a kind of ethnic counter-cleansing of Kosovo. At a m ajor international conference on Kosovo in Berlin early July 1999, Baton Haxhiu, the Editor of the Albanian paper, Koha 30

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Ditore, spoke precisely and w ith im placable logic: there w as no justification for Albanian crim es against Serbs to be found in the prior Serbian crim es against the Albanians. Every crim e is just as m uch a crim e. In evident consternation at the events, the distinguished Kosovar intellectual and publisher, Veton Surroi, expressed his capacity to feel compassion for the Serbs and stated that he felt ashamed at the fact that, “for the first tim e in the history of Kosovo, the Albanians w ere capable of committing atrocities” and th at “, for the first tim e our moral code about the inviolability of w om en, children and the elderly w as shattered”. He w arned of the terrible m oral consequences for, he said, the shame and the guilt w ould “fall on all of us, w ho had for several month s filled television screens round the w orld w ith our sufferings”. Surroi particularly took up the attitude tow ards the Roma w ho, he said, “are being driven out on openly racist grounds”. In the case of the Kosovo Albanians, there is a repetition of the sinister phenom enon that, w ith som e dreadful ineluctability, attends all the lands and nations that w ere the victim s of the prim ary aggression of the Yugoslav National Arm y (YNA) and Belgrade. When it sw ooped dow n on Croatia, this aggression w as the m ore terrifying in that it w as the first, if the 13 day “w arm -up” in Slovenia is not counted. Croatian defended itself as w ell as it could, and the poignancy of that aspect of the w ar for the hom elan d w ill certainly stay morally imm aculate and historically vital. But at the same time, still having the status of th e victim , of the attacked party, Croatia (the con crete structures of m ilitary and political pow er are m eant) turned a blind eye to the ethnic retaliation and the sheer looting in Pakracka Poljana, in Gospic and, later on, during the Storm and Flash operations. Holders of political and judicial office show ed their blatant m oral and political incapacity w hen they justified and covered up these crim es, form ulating the crass but still operational stance that in a w ar of defence, in defence against aggression “a Croat could not possibly perpetrate a w ar crim e”. The sam e m oral and legal narcotic, in a slightly m odified form , has been officially applied to the crim es that an arm y and a policy w ith Croatian features com m itted in Herzegovina and Ivan Lovrenovic

Bosnia against the Muslims and the Serbs, and to the repellent and criminal deeds done in the nam e of Croatia ever since Dayton. In principle, th ere is not a great deal of difference betw een this and the official standpoint of Bosnian political structures. To this very day, the dim ensions and brutality of the crim es that the Serbian nationalist policy and m ilitary m achine com m itted in Bosnia are inestim able and incomprehensible. To deny th is fact w ould be a brazen act of negation. But it is also futile to deny the crimes that, most often com pletely unnecessarily, like that typically irrational surplus of evil, are done by the victims (Kazani in Sarajevo, Grabovica, Brajkovici, Neretvica, Vares, Bugojno and so on), and, as in Croatia, have still not stopped (the exam ple of “creepin g terrorism ” in th e Travnik area speaks w h ole chapters about this). It is sheer politicking, how ever, w hen, by a cheap sw itch of subjects, any objective and critical reference to such cases is alw ays angrily seized upon by Bosniak politicians w ith their intolerable propaganda catchphrase about equalising aggressor and victim . With all the other many kinds of loss and atonement, the w ars (or rather: the Wa r, the one and only) for the reconstruction of the postYugoslav space on the ethnic principle, have entailed one more confirmation of the old and macabre experience that a victim can also be a crim inal. Expressed in dry legal terminology, this w as, precisely for the Bosnian public, explained w ith consum mate clarity by the form er International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia Chief Prosecutor, Louise Arbour. “It is possible to com mit w ar crim es in defence against aggression”, she said during her stay in Sarajevo in the summer. Morally, though, and psychologically, the thing is much more com plex and, one might say, more dangerous. The most misguided w ay of dealing w ith it is that employed by the political structures: the cover-up, the obtuse hope that it will be outlived, forgotten… As I w rite out these gloom y lines, I sim ply cannot shake off Surro i’s Rom a. A hilarious paradox com es to m ind. The w hole Balkan phenom enon that this article describes, including the attitude to th e Roma in Kosovo, is directly related to th e question of ethnic identity. This has rem ained the banner under w hich all the bloody and pointless events of the last decade have taken place in our region. 32

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When these much-vaunted identities, how ever, are looked at a little harder, turned up and dow n and inside out, they are as alike as tw o eggs. You cannot tell w here one begins and the other ends. And so, because it is uncertain of itself, each one is vulnerable, and susceptible to the other, neighbouring identity… The only people in the Balkans w ho do not have this problem are the Rom a, a people w ith the clearest and m ost stable ethnic identity. True, this also goes for the Albanians. But in an opposite w ay. “The conception of nationalism w ith the Rom a is not connected w ith territory or a nation state, rather w ith obtaining from the non-Rom a w orld the recognition that the Rom a are a special non-territorial people…” as it says in a reference w ork. Like the Rom, the Albanians are com pletely one of a kind in the Balkan ethnic kaleidoscope, absolutely identifiable, but, opposite to the Gypsies, crucially determined by the “territory and nation state” fixation. The latest new s, w hile I w rite this, is of the m ass drow nings of poor devils of Gypsies w hile they try, plundered and cheated, to m ake their w ay to Italy from Montenegro in all kinds of rotten, leaky boats. Dow n they go to the bottom of the Adriatic, m em bers of a m arvellous extraterritorial nation that, it seem s, has no other m ission in the w orld than to constitute for all others a projection of their ow n collective phantasm s and phobias.

Ivan Lovrenovic

Baton Haxiu Ko so vo - Where the D ead Speak Kosovo is a place w here the dead speak aloud, as if they w ere alive – perhaps m ore so. The dead are somew here and now here, some w ill never be found, m any of the bodies are scattered in nam eless graves, bones piled up below the ruins of once handsom e village houses. Their last m om ents are w ritten only in their m em ories, and in the faces of those w ho have lived through all that has happened. It w ould seem that all have some intimate relations w ith the dead. Alm ost every village and ham let, every fam ily has, in one w ay or anothe r, experienced th ose savage assaults an d the m urders, the dimen sions of w hich are now becom ing apparent w ith the NATO peacekeepers being deployed over the w hole of Kosovo, and the exiled Albanians com ing hom e. Com ing hom e, though, the Kosovars find only ruins and ashes. Military officials and Western aid organizations estim ate that in their orchestrated cam paign of murders the police and the Serb param ilitary forces killed 10,000 people. Som etim es, those returning find the bodies of their loved ones on the thresholds of their devastated houses. Surrounded by corpses that still lie in the family w ells an d in the sites of the bloodshed, they get on w ith their regular tasks – cooking dinner, or even w atching television. “Murder is the national art”, w rote a w riter of Yugoslav origins, Charles Sim ic, in the book O rphan Factory, a collection of poem s and essays printed last year. “The m urderers continue perfecting their art, although they are alw ays dissatisfied w ith the results”, he says, w hile one peasant from Velika Krusa thinks that his eyes are constantly turned tow ards the scene of the crim e: “It is really hard”, he said recen tly, “just being here.” “And the dead too, in a w ay, have survived.” Som e children w ander around like little zom bies – they are not Baton Haxiu

grieving, rather they are em otionally em pty. The old w eep, and the lives of girls w ho have been raped, alth ough I th ink th ey w ill never speak of it, have been ruined for ever. Men feel terrible, having been incapable of saving their families the horrors. Almost all th e w alls are w ritten w ith Serbian graffiti: “Die!” And one desperate Albanian com m itted m urder. But it has to be said that crim e does not alw ays have the sam e face: it is not quantity but quality that m akes it punishable. Som e are terribly hurt and can not forgive. Perhaps they are killing the in nocent. This is Kosovo today. So m any cities have been bom barded. Vukovar has been razed to the ground, Sarajevo destroyed, Mostar alm ost devastated… This all happened in a single cycle of w ar, and I cannot now determ ine w hat w as the w orst. I also felt terrible w hen the Serbs bom barded Sarajevo, Vukovar and Srebrenica, but Kosovo hurt m e m ost. Belgrade m ade no response to the horrors, and the w orld, it has to be said, for m any years thought that this w as going on far aw ay and that no one needed to cudgel his brains about it. It w as said, too, that all the Albanians had to go over Prokletija, but I took this as just a prim itive, idiotic piece of verbalism , never believing that such horrors w ould happen. I don’t believe that crim e is equivalent to m any years of repeated verbalism s. A few w eeks ago, NATO finished bom bing Serbian targets, but it could not be said that the w ar is over. As soon as international forces stepped foot on the soil of Kosovo, for the first tim e after World War II, in this troubled region, in consequence of the anxiety and the reign of terror, new conflict began, though not in the open. Below the surface, KFO R is not yet effective. Assassinations and semi-assassinations are done half-underground. It w ould seem that both sides have started the final battle. Against this kind of background, the international com m unity is som ew hat out on a lim b w ith its concept of a m ulti-national, civil and tolerant society. The Kosovars, w ho have lost their nearest and dearest in this barbarous violence, are being asked and begged to live in peace w ith their 36

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neighbours; but they think of this as sim ply a replay of the past, w hen laconic appeals for “brotherhood and unity” w ere m ade. The international com m unity, of course, m eans som ething different. But how are ordinary people to understand this message w hen, returning from their forced exile, they find a black hole on their once-rich properties. It is natural that the w ish for revenge should be w elling up in their breasts. For this reason, the desire for vengeance again st one’s n eighbours – said the President of the United States, later repeated by the Germ an Foreign Minister – surprises no one. The question of w hether there is collective guilt, w hether it exists at all, is very debatable. If there is no collective guilt, is there, nevertheless, collective responsibility? After World War II, the Germ ans frequently opposed accusations of collective guilt. It is true that m any w riters, such as Thom as Mann, Berthold Brecht and others, artists, intellectuals – the m ind of society that is – had sought safety in other countries. That is w hy, in the Germ an public today, there are m any w ho w ould vote against charges of collective guilt against the Serbs. The Germ ans perhaps, in the nam e of w ho know s w hat Hitlerian gangs th at comm itted such heinous crimes, best know w hat collective guilt is. Can Serbia learn anything from the experience of post-w ar Germ any? O f course it can. The German Parliam ent recently adopted a plan to construct a m onum ent to the victim s of Nazism close to the Reichstag, an im portan t place in German national history, there having been several years of discussion before the decision. Intellectuals of all fields of the mind h ave researched into w hether it is possible to sh ow pain for victim s w ith concrete. Some hold that you can, some are against it. The discussion about the crimes comm itted by the Germ ans is still not over. O f course, the w orld has been w arning for 50 years that it m ust not be forgotten, although som e say that it is perhaps tim e for the discussion to be brought to a close. But after the process of purgation, after the real purgation, the Germ an public is aw are that only a steady gaze, w ith regret and penitence for the crim es com m itted, helps to avoid their being repeated. Baton Haxiu

Durin g the NATO bombing, one Serbian w riter, a literary critic, voiced the idea that the necessary steps had been taken in Serbia for com prehending and facing the crim es com m itted in the past, for a book about the truth of the w ar in Bosnia-Herzegovina had been published. But can purgation of crim es com m itted be achieved so sim ply? Four or five books about the truth of the crim es – and, the w ar is over, Serbia can set off on the path to Europe again, w here it w ill be greeted w ith w elcoming cheers? O n the other hand, German experience show s 50 years of inten sive con frontation of the crimes of Hitler, an d th e debate about the Holocaust in Germ any w ill perhaps not finish in the next tw o or th ree generations. In Serbia, though, the question has deserved four or five books! O f course, the ideas of the Serbian critic, w ho is actually extrem ely clever and calculating, are far from the reality. Thirteen years have passed since the publication of the infam ous Mem orandum of the Serbian Academ y of Sciences and Arts. Last w eek, the Serbian O rthodox Church, on behalf of its com m unicants, published a com m uniqué that sought forgiveness from the Albanians for the barbarous crim es of Serb param ilitary, m ilitary and police forces. Archbishop Pavle said that after the terrible crim es, “it is n ecessary to look for forgiveness if w e w ant to save our souls”. And that is just the first step – after 13 years. O ther, m ore convincing steps rem ain to be taken . This must not be forgotten: the Serbian O rthodox Church for a full 13 years, to put it m ildly, tolerated th e crim e and kept quiet. Kept disgracefully quiet. Th en , th e syn od of th e Serbian O rth odox Church, also not long ago, called upon Milosevic to step dow n , “for the good o f th e Serbian people”. I analyzed this new s: these are the sam e people, the sam e priests, that carry the bones of King Lazar around eastern Serbia and w herever they com e, villages burn, w ar starts. The soul of Serbia is full of sin for the even ts in form er Yugoslavia, and the Serbs now deny them and unload them onto Milosevic. And he is, of course, full of guilt but – that is the confession of the sacrificed. Milosevic has doubtless been sacri38

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ficed: there is no doubt that he is the guilty party, nor any doubt that the Serbian O rthodox Church and the Serbian Academ y of Sciences and Arts and the intellectuals are also to blam e: the story about expiation of sins and of the sacrificed seem s to m e to be excessively distorted. It is true that Slobodan Milosevic did not personally burn every house in Kosovo. But individuals did. And they did so voluntarily, often w ith m urderous satisfaction – the survivors bear w itness to this and speak of the horrors to journalists, w ar crim es investigators an d NAT O peacem akers. Most of the Serbs w ho system atically set fire to their neighbours’ houses are now on the run. But their houses are now burning at the speed of the Albanian refugees’ return. The Serbs w ho are on the run from Kosovo are not the victim s of new eth nic cleansing, or any unlaw ful dem and for some collective guilt – as apologists often claim . They are the victim s of continued support for Milosevic and consent to the w ar. As individuals, they can be innocent. But the Serbs did th e attem pted m urders in Kosovo w illingly; it w as an essential national act, institutionalised and im plem ented by their national leaders w ho stayed in pow er. The cam paign com pletely to subjugate Kosovo Albanians led the chief political w ill of Serbia to its fourth loss, and the Serbs are suffering the consequences. Milosevic is the person w ho set everything in m otion, did it all, but he w as alw ays listening to someone else. He did w hat Mirjana told him, or the Academ y of Sciences, or the Serbian O rthodox Church. He had no great ideas. He alw ays seem s hypnotised, asleep. Milosevic w as incited to do evil. He is a crim inal, but he need not bear the guilt alon e; it w as a w ide circle that com m itted all those crim es in the last decade. And w hat is m ost ridiculous is that these sam e Serbs are now celebrating their victory. Som e of them cam e back to Pec w ith their three fingers raised in victory, proud of the crim e they had com m itted. I do not know how to live together w ith people w ho celebrate crim e. Who celebrate m urders in the presence of priests and Serbian officials, and in the face of the international com m unity… Baton Haxiu

The Battle of Kosovo w as a sm all one, nothing rem arkable, not one of the great Turkish battles, like that on the Maritsa, for exam ple. Furtherm ore, it is not even clear w ho w on it. At the beginning, it w as thought that the Serbs w ere the victors, but the Serbs desperately celebrated this battle that w as not a defeat for 500 years. An d n ow, w hen they have really lost it, the defeat could not be clearer or cleaner. And that show s that w e are living in a crazy w orld, a w orld of crazy evaluations. After the aggression of lies, the inhabitants of Serbia, there is no doubt, w ent crazy, because in the w hole of Milosevic’s rule there is th e madness factor. Which m eans that Serbia is not Milosevic’s product, but vice-versa – Milosevic is a Serbian product, because in a single decade the Serbs com m itted crim es that finished w ith m ass graves in Kosovo. And therefore “living togeth er” cannot come so soon; at the best, there can only be co-existence, by the side of each other. The Serbian cam paign of terror did n ot begin on M arch 24, 1999, w hen NATO started bom bin g Serbia, nor on February 28, 1998, w hen the D renica m assacre took place, nor in 1989 nor in 1981. This w as a w hole period of h atred, an age of the cultivation of Nazism , the stim ulation of th e false idea that th e Serbs are a superior race to th e Albanians, w hich has lasted ever since 1912. It is natural, in the tem pest of physical and psych ic terrorism , for almost the w h ole century, for the Albanians to have accum ulated a vast deal of hatred for the Serbs inside th em. But it w as the hatred of th e oppressed, the disparagem ent of the victim of arbitrariness for th ose w ho inflict it, w h ich is the Serbian state. And that is th e essen ce of the difference betw een the hatred of the Serbs for the Albanians and vice-versa. The hatred of the victim for th e occupier cannot be com pared w ith the hatred of the occupier for the victim . Th e representatives of the international com m un ity, w ho are n ow m assively deployin g in Kosovo for the sake of the difficult process of keeping th e peace, should be aw are th at it is not possible to go at once from all those horrors to everyday life, as if noth in g had happen ed. At th e m om en t joint co-existence is perhaps a good illusion that w ill even perh aps succeed, but only if Serbia changes its pol40

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itics, as w as done in Germ any in the seventies by Ch ancellor Willy Bran dt, w h o, as a m ark of respect an d pen iten ce, kn elt before the m onum ent to th e victim s of the Warsaw ghetto. So, in their souls, did 99 percen t of Germ an s. The Germ an s needed three decades for this gesture. How long w ill it take Serbia to purge itself of these crim es? An d w h en w ill a Serbian politician seek forgiven ess for the crim es com m itted by his fellow countrym en? The Serbian O rthodox Church, at least, could seek forgiveness, w hich it actually gave an indication of. And it should do this in front of one of the m ass graves, or on one of the spots of the crime, like Ve lika Krusa, w here m ore than 120 Albanians, m en, w om en and children w ere burned. The tragedy that took place in Kosovo is so appalling that it can hardly be described in w ords. It is h ard to im agine that the people w ho endured it can live in a Serbian state, or in the Federal Republic of Jugoslaw ia (FRY). If the w orld had the courage to divide Germ any and the Germ ans â&#x20AC;&#x201C; to punish a state and a people for their crim es, I do not see w hy it should now unite Kosovo w ith Yugoslavia and Serbia; is it perhaps because of crim es and collective silence? And after everyth in g, bridges are being built in Serbia, w h ile there is silence about the crim es. I do not believe that Kosovo can live w ith this crim e, or w ith people w ho keep the sw ord of death under the pillow , for Albanians. For 120 years, the Serbs had a chance to live w ith Albanians, but they perpetrated thousands of m assacres and deportations. The Albanians cannot w ipe out their m em ories every 20 years. This tim e they h ave to forgive, but not forget. Th e crime has to be punished, for the sake of future co-existence. Serbia does not have the moral right to rule Kosovo. For foreign countries and for the Albanians, every Serbian engagem ent is actually just a n othing, w h ich only puts off th e national reevaluation th at Serbs have to do for their ow n sakes and that of their ow n society. Th e w ar and the absence of opposition in Serbia sh ow that their political fram ew ork w as not based on police terror, but on voluntary Stalin ism . Baton Haxiu

Cen sure and propagan da cannot explain the general indifference to the Golgotha of Kosovo. Individuals feel free to criticise Milosevic in front of Western politicians, but Serbian political parties have never discussed the sense and the m orality of the w ar. Their m inds w ere closed, and their hearts as hard as stone; otherw ise it is very difficult to im agine all this at the end of the 20th century. For this reason, all nations should find a w ay to express their m oral anger, w hich the actions of the regim e have thorough ly deserved. O n ly this w ill have en ough effect on Belgrade to provoke a start to change. The Serbs do not need to be left to suffer in solitude, em bittered. But the w est has to base any relations w ith them on changes, and not on a reconstruction of their guilt. They can have either a leader befouled w ith blood, or Western help for th e reconstruction of th e econom y and co-existence w ith other peoples. They cannot have both.

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Dragan Velikic Which Way and Back 1. Som e tim e ago, I w as attem pting to explain the situation in Serbia to som e acquaintances from England. They seem ed like people w ho w ere w illing to m ake som e effort to understand w hat I w as trying to tell in an extrem ely intelligible form . After som e tim e, m y m onologue w as interrupted by a Hungarian acquaintance; until that tim e she had been silen t. “You’ve complicated things too m uch,” she said, “and in fact they are extrem ely sim ple. Slobodan Milosevic is another Hitler and you in Serbia have a com m on or garden dictatorship!” Everything, of course, w ould be extrem ely sim ple if w e did have, as m y Hungarian acquaintance (she is a sociologist) said, “a com m on or garden dictatorship” or even an “untypical dictatorship”, w hatever that m ight be. The w hole problem is that in Serbia, quite sim ply stated, there is no dictatorship and no dictator. After all, I said, Slobodan Milosevic w as elected president “by dem ocratic m ethods”, there w ere elections, people voted and, there should be no illusions about it, they voted for him. “Yes, but that doesn’t chan ge my analogy,” said m y Hun garian friend, “Hitler too w as elected dem ocratically”. There, I thought to m yself, at last the parallel has been enunciated, the favourite of all those w ho w ill not understand anything of everything that is going on in Serbia, the parallel w ith the dem ocratically elected Hitler. I had just been w aiting for it, and said: “Then that changes everythin g in your analogy, it annuls your analogy, because unlike Hitler Milosevic w as chosen three tim es in the course of ten years, and I am not sure that he w ouldn’t be elected again.” When, then, the representatives of the West say that it is up to the Serbian people to “overthrow ” the Milosevic regim e, then they overlook the fact that the regim e w as not im posed upon the country, and that it could very easily happen that Milosevic m ight stay in pow er for quite a long tim e to com e. Finally, Milosevic never dissolved the parliament, and there have been several elections. Dragan Velikic

Here, how ever, is the entire difference. And the novelty. From n ow on, probably, one has to bear in m ind “perverse” dictatorships that are the effect, not of m ere w ishing, but perhaps of political w ill and that, hence, paradoxically, perversely, rely on the electoral m achinery to stay in pow er. It is necessary to think through this difference w hich sum s up all the m adness that cuts across Serbia: the m adness of a totalitarianism th at is elected, w anted, desired, and that, judging all in all, w ill persist. The entire m ess of the political delirium that has occupied Serbia lies precisely in this free election of the totalitarian. Hence, all those evaluations of the situation in Serbia predicting the “overthrow ” of Milosevic are m istaken, or all those that say that the West should do everything possible to help in the toppling of Milosevic. They are m istaken because they overlook the fact that Milosevic w as not im posed but w ished, that to topple Milosevic m eans to topple the dom inant w ish, to annul the dom inant craving to be ruled in a totalitarian w ay. And this w ish to be transform ed into non-w ish, this very desire that elects the totalitarian rule of the political w ill, this political w ill that chooses that kind of rule that w ill annul it as w ill – it is precisely this that is the perverse difference that urges us to reform ulate the understanding of totalitarianism . It is high tim e to understand that totalitarianism does not m ean the w ay in w hich the m inority rules the m ajority against the w ill of the m ajority. Totalitarianism is the rule of the m ajority. 2. O f course, the key problem is located in this turnabout. There is a political organ ization that is, at bottom, highly criminal, all w rapped up in a m ouldy old tale about justice and equality (w hich, of course, to be quite clear about things, has no connection w ith the left at all); a hegem onic organization, of petty, sordid Balkan im perialism , the effects of w hich have com e out constantly over the last ten years; an organization built on the logic of constant fear of om nipresent enemies, on constant lam entation about isolation, because there are no friends anyw here, they have all betrayed and abandoned us, and now w e, all righteous and innocent as w e are, have been left alone, and have to defend 44

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ourselves, before they attack us, and they w ill attack us any m om ent, perhaps, and so w e have to start moving as soon as possible, an d so on . This insane dialectics has outlived a thousand deaths in Yugoslavia in the last ten years. This insane dialectics, then, enforces a single question: if th ere is n o dictatorship in Serbia, an d if the Serbian people do not need to be charged w ith collective guilt for everything that has happened in Yugoslavia, w hy then does this people not stop voting for Slobodan Milosevic? This question, often asked, reposes on tw o elem entary oversights. Above all, it only derives from an extrem ely nationalist point of view , in line w ith w hich one can talk of a people or a nation as such. Th is is discourse th at produces the national or the nation as a hom ogenous entity, an undivided identity, w hich is, to cut things short, an extrem ely problem atic point of departure, its politics at base not differing from the politics it condem ns. And then, even m ore concretely, even if w e agree to this Nazi talk about the nation as such, som ething does not fit. Because, in fact, the Serbs for som e tim e have not been voting for Milosevic, at least not in such a w ay that he can rule him self, and certainly in such a w ay that the other tw o large parties, if they w ere to com bined, w ould have absolute pow er. This is also a piece of inform ation that, on its part, rebuts the uninform ed thesis about a dictatorsh ip. But this is a fact that requires undertaking a w hole psychopathological analysis of political life in Serbia, and politics that is not the politics of Milosevic so m uch as the politics of the opposition, as it is called. An analysis of this psychopathology w ould show how ultim ately pointless it is today to ask the question of the future of Serbia w ith the opposition. 3. This question (w hy then have the citizens of Serbia not ceased voting for Slobodan Milosevic?) is poin tless because above all it overlooks the key difference that during the last ten years has been installed betw een the opposition and the alternative. The fundamental madness that has cut across th e political scene of Serbia in the last ten years, the sam e m adness that the West refuses to com prehend and analyse, Dragan Velikic

inheres in the fact that the opposition is not at all in opposition but, on the contrary, the opposition is the position, that the opposition, together w ith th e “position”, that is w ith Milosevic’s party, constitutes w hat the West calls “the Milosevic regim e”. Those w ho understand the Serbian political scene as the scene of a dictatorship in w hich one party rules w ith violent m eans and the others, exposing them selves to danger, resist it and fight for “freedom from an authoritarian regim e”, are not, there is absolutely no doubt, talking about Serbia at all. In Serbia, that is, th e thing is com pletely different, and completely deranged. Because the so-called Milosevic regim e is a m ixture of the position and th e opposition . And how ever paradoxical it m ay sound, this m ixture of position and opposition in pow er has enabled Milosevic to stay in pow er, w hich is clearly show n by the fact that at the last elections he got no more than 19 percent of the vote, and that his party is still in pow er because, at th e level of Serbia, it has gone into a coalition w ith the extrem e nationalists, w hile at the level of “Yugoslavia”, it has brought into the governm ent the biggest “opposition” party, the Serbian Renew al Party. Hence it is this party, led by Vuk Draskovic, w hich the West, absolutely fallaciously, imagines to be the opposition, that is the party that rules together w ith Milosevic. The sam e thing goes for the New Dem ocracy, and also for several sm aller opposition parties in Serbia created as a result of their leaders having split w ith Milosevic. And today, w hen the leader of one such “quasi-positional” party seeks Milosevic’s resignation, then he does not do it because his political allegiance is different from Milosevic’s, but, on the contrary, because his political allegiance is given over still m ore to the savage darkness of nationalism , and because, from this darkness, he still considers the nationalist option in Serbia to have a chance, on condition that Milosevic goes: to simplify – everything is going on as if Beria had decided to depose Stalin, and as if the West flapped its hand in content, as if convinced that Beria w as som ehow fundamentally different from Stalin. How ever, precisely because this essential difference is w anting, it is pointless to ask w hat the chances are in Serbia of the opposition com ing to pow er. The opposition is in pow er. Serbia is ruled by the position and the opposition, together. 46

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Looked at in term s of substance, the differences betw een the position and the opposition are minor, and relate m ainly to the question of the monarchy and the republic and to various questions of reading Serb history. O therw ise, from the point of view of all the other “Serb questions”, they are both knee-deep in the mire of Serb nationalism (w hich also goes for th e grey eminences of the Serbian governm ent, the Serbian O rthodox Church an d th e Serbian Academy of Sciences). Precisely in consequence of these system atic identities of the position and the opposition, a so-called alternative political scen e has com e into being, the “O ther Serbia”. This alternative has com e out of the insight that in Serbia there is no essential difference betw een position and opposition, and has constituted itself as an alternative to one and the other, that is, to the sam e nationalist and hegem onist political option. It is an alternative w ith respect to the position and w ith respect to the opposition, w hich presents itself as an alternative to Milosevic w hile ruling everything w ith him . This O ther Serbia is O ther w ith respect to this O ne and the Sam e, w ith respect to that w hich is fighting for the unity and sam eness of the Serbian nation. It is, then, O ther insofar as it represents values different than the values of a militarist and nationalist opposition and position, insofar as it represents the values of civil society, hum an rights, insofar as it carried through a criticism of nationalism , patriarchalism , racism and so on. It is O ther, too, in that it has adopted different m eans of political com bat. Although it is true that there h ave been political parties im ported into the netw ork of this alternative – of the like of, for example, the Civil Alliance of Serbia and the Social Dem ocratic Party (of Zarko Korac), parties that, today, after the NATO bom bing, hardly exist any longer, the O ther Serbia, nevertheless, started from the supposition that in Serbia, through fundam ental and elem entary educational w ork, it is the scale of values that needs, above all else, to be changed, so that som e politically different values m ight be able at all to find them selves in a position of pow er. Th at is w hy the O ther Serbia w as constituted primarily around Radio B92, w h ich has developed a w hole urban sub-culture, prom otin g a w ay of living an d thinking, and then aroun d certain w eekly and Dragan Velikic

daily papers, the Alternative Un iversity, th e Association of In dependent In tellectuals – a Belgrade circle, th en, of different and num erous instances the effect of w hich has increasingly expanded and given hope (particularly since the last public opinion polls, don e just before the beginnin g of th e NATO bom bing, show ed that M ilosevic en joyed no m ore th an 17 percent support amon g the electorate) th at th e regim e is approach ing collapse. 4. O f course, after the first day of the bom bing, there occurred w hat Milosevic m ight have w anted, but w hich he could not have done outside the context of a “state of w ar”, w hich he could not have done precisely because of the strength of the alternative political scene in Serbia: Radio B92 w as literally confiscated, all the papers w ere censored, political gath erings w ere banned, and all prom inent figures in the alternative political scene – because of w hat is called in Serbia their w estern orien tation – w ere roundly condem ned by position an d opposition together for the betrayal of the Fatherland. A few days ago, th e Serbian parliam ent m ade a decision according to w hich som e of the provisions that w ere in force during the state of w ar rem ain on the statute book. This m eans: papers are still censored, political gatherings are still banned, the extremely repressive law about the University rem ains in pow er, in a w ord and quite crudely: the repression is greater than ever, and those w ho w ould resist it are proscribed as traitors, and now have to use the w ord Europe w ith a w h ole string of footnotes. To sum up: the key question that relates to the political future of Serbia should not at all ask about the future of the Serbian opposition, because th e Serbian opposition is a ghastly nationalist m onster, alw ays in joyful thrall to the Milosevic regim e. And this in other w ords m eans that the Serbian opposition is nothing but the Serbian position. Hence the key question one h as to ask is about the future of the Serbian alternative, about w hether there is indeed an O ther Serbia, w hat the chances of the O ther Serbia becoming Serbia Proper are, of th is O ther, an d Different Serbia, structuring the relations of pow er and governm ent. 48

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The w ay things stand, and to a large extent thanks to the NATO bom bing, w hich has enabled Milosevic to take off all the brakes and liberate all th e (unguessed at) repressive potentials of his rule, the O ther Serbia is just w here it w as ten years ago, and is looking at the w ay it has already travelled, and to a large extent already covered. This m eans that the values of the civil w orld have to be explained all over again, but now w ith an additional burden: it is necessary in Serbia still to refer to Europe, and show that the European values are those that Serbia ough t to take over as the dom inant ones in its political life, in spite, how ever, of the fact that Europe, just like the president of Serbia, Milosevic, thinks that arm s bode w ell for the truth. From this point of view, th e situation of the O ther Serbia is w orse today than it w as even ten years back. When, then, the question is put today about the future of the opposition in Serbia, but opposition in th e sen se of a genuine altern ative to th e regim e, then on e is really asking, in fact: w h at are th e chan ces that in the near future Serbia w ill return to its recent past, w h at are th e chan ces that in the very near future at least w hat there w as until six m on ths ago w ill be re-established in Serbia – an uncen sored press and the right to political gatherin gs? It w ould be good if w e could answ er: yes, in the very near future th ere is som e hope for Serbia, there are chances th at Serbia w ill return to its recent past. But, alas, even this kind of m inimally good outcom e is far aw ay today. 5. It seem s that the infeasibility, the unlikelihood of this return to the past as a step into the future is proved by a land having been established inside the land of Serbia. Th at is, on March 26, 1999, tw o days after the bom bing of Serbia had started, in Pozarevac, the “capital” city of the Milosevic family, Milosevic’s son started building an enorm ous am usement park. Th is park, w hich man ifested the w hole of the delirium into w hich the Milosevic fam ily has fallen, the w hole nature of the necrophiliac revelling in death and defeat, occupies great hectares of land for various fun and entertainm ent facilities. In a w ord, a real SerboDisneyland, w hich is not called Disneyland, how ever, but Bam bi Dragan Velikic

Park, and it is called Bam bi Park because it could not be called Bam biland, as the builders originally intended, because land, unlike park (!) is an English w ord, i.e., a w ord of the aggressors. This entertainm ent park w as opened a w eek after the ending of the bombing, w ith the explanation that the opening of this land, this country, w as late because of the w ell-know n situation, because of the difficult conditions of the building, conditions that are otherw ise, m ore precisely, know n as bom bing. While the bom bing w as on, then, w hile various arm ies m ade out of Kosovo a Horrorland, w hile NAT O ’s bom bing made a Ruin edlan d out of Serbia, Milosevic’s kid w as building, and the capital of the w hole Serbian governm ent being invested in, this Bambiland, this land of h appiness and merrym aking, joy, a bright future and youth. But the perverse logic of this Bam biland is com pletely the reverse of the logic of Disneyland. For if Disneyland has been set up to hide how m uch Am erica is, a ct u a lly, just one D isneylan d, as som e interpreters w ould have it, then Bam biland has been set up extremely literally and banally to show that Serbia is, in fact, not a land of happiness and m errim ent, but the opposite, a land of pure unhappiness in w hich only the m oronic can be happy, on condition they go to Bam biland and go dow n the slide into the Pozarevac sand. But if it did, thus, literally show Serbia as a place of the absence of contentment, Bam biland w as, sym bolically speaking, crucial to the political regim e in Serbia to conceal the fact that Kosovo, de facto, w as no longer a constituen t part of Serbia, an d to cover up this crucial circum stance for the political fate of Milosevic w ith the additional claim, in accord w ith w hich Serbia today “embraces” several different lands: Kosovoland, Bam biland, Pozarevacland… In a w ord, Milosevic has understood that, in fact, it is all in a name, in the sym bolic organization of reality. 6. I shall endeavour to d em on strate th is w ith th e exam ple of Kosovoland. The regim e in Serbia has presented its absolute, total and irredeem able defeat as its absolute and totally unblem ish ed victory. The idea beh ind th e sick train of reasoning given by th e Serbian regim e 50

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is as follow s: it w as not NATO troops, but international forces that w en t in to Kosovo. The Albanians have lost the righ t to a referen dum that m ight h ave led to in depen dence for them an d thus “w e”, of course the Serbs, h ave preserved our sovereign ty over Kosovo, an d so the territorial in tegrity of th e country, and th us again , and of course, w e h ave preserved our ow n integrity, or, to use th e w ord that is th e favourite of Presiden t M ilosevic, th e Serbian people has thus preserved its “dignity”, because of w hich , in th e first place, it actually w en t to w ar. In a w ord, Kosovo is som eth ing like Bam bilan d. It is ours, just a little bit fenced around. The w hole perverseness of th is argum en t, w h at m akes it acceptable at all to the great m ajority of the Serbian people, rests on th e conviction of Presiden t Milosevic, a conviction that w ould be w orthy of Lacan ne, is th at language m akes the reality, th at b eh ind lan guage, or indepen den t of language, th ere is n o oth er reality. M ilosevic h as, as few people h ave n oticed, w aged a w ar for nam es an d because of titles: it is all right for NATO troops to com e in as lon g as they are n ot called NATO but in ternational forces. It is all righ t for Serbia de facto to lose Kosovo, as lon g as the w estern govern m ents un anim ously say th at Kosovo h as rem ain ed w ithin the borders of Serbia, to let som e 200,000 Serbs m ove out of, or be ethnically cleansed, let’s say, from Kosovo, as lon g as NATO guarantees iden tical security for all eth n ic com m un ities or, in other w ords, just to let th at security be stated, put in to th e reality of lan guage, w hatever actually happens to real-life Serbs, an d so on . Put succinctly: w hen the w estern governm ents agreed to Milosevic’s dem and that things should be referred to w ith different nam es, they behaved w ith alm ost traditional m odernity, starting from the prem ise that there is som e reality outside and beyond language, that there is the thing itself that is not m ediated by language, som e truth outside language. w hich is the delusion, and that the Serbian people w ould know how to stick to reality and see through this seductive delusion of language. And it is in this, actually, that the essential failure of the West lies in its behaviour to Serbia, in that it does not understand, to Dragan Velikic

use an analogy, that the Serbian people has actually been “subjectivised”, on a vulgarised and trivialised Lacannian couch, by the technique of a frenzied “psychoanalyst” that has explained to it that, outside and beyond language, absolutely nothing w hatever exists, in any event nothing that can be signified. A few exam ples: w h en, in the m idst of th e m ost appalling econom ic m isery, during th e electoral cam paign , th e Serbian regim e explained to th e Serbian electorate that it sh ould vote for Slobodan M ilosevic o nce again, precisely because h is govern m ent w as im proving the econom ic conditions of life, this w as a propaganda cam paign th at w as based on th e assum ption that there w ould be enough electors w ho w ould, in spite of w h at th ey could see and experience, w hich rem ained unstated, believe only w hat w as stated. At that tim e the regim e, th en , started from th e presum ption th at it w ould find en ough voters to stick to the th esis that beyon d lan guage there w as nothing, not even w hat they could see w ith th eir ow n eyes, feel on their ow n skin . Wh en th e regim e of an other fren zied fien d, th e Croatian, th at is, in 1995 drove 300,000 Serbs out of Croatia, th en the Serbian regim e explain ed th at th e Serbs h ad finally m ade peace w ith th e Croats, an d that th is w as “our” victory, because w e had gon e to w ar to force th e Croats to m ake peace. T he m ost recen t, an d perhaps m ost extravagant, exam ple: a few days after th e cessation of th e N ATO bom bin g, Slobodan M ilosevic h eld a speech in fron t of on e of the ruin ed bridges in Novi Sad, saying that h is go vern m ent w ould rebuild th e bridge in less th an 4 0 days. O f course, n o bridge can be m ade in 40 days, w en t on M ilosevic, but I sh all tell you a big secret, w e started repairing this bridge as soon as it w as knocked dow n, and w e h ave to a great exten t repaired it, an d the w orks h ave gon e so far ahead that w e shall m an aged to fin ish off th ese repairs in on ly 40 day s. Alth ough you can n ot see an y of th ese w orks, n ot a trace of these w orks, alth ough you don ’t see anyth ing at all to suggest th e bridge is bein g repaired, I sh all tell you a secret: w hat you see is not w hat you see, b eh in d th e visible is th e in visible w h ich is, h ow ever, 52

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utterable an d stateable, and it is of this that I am n ow talkin g to you, revealing th is secret to you in a frien dly an d alm o st broth erly w ay – I am con stituting reality in language. In short, the Serbian regim e governs as long as it does because it changes the nam es of things and because it sticks insanely close to the idea that only w hat is said exists, that things are the only w ords. Although today it is ruling a ruined land, although it is ruling the only land that, for quite a long tim e, has been in every sense terribly defeated, Milosevic, this grotesque fiend, this ruining ruler of ruins, preach es his tale of victory, mooching, together w ith his w ife, around the ruins of the country, like a vam pire relishing his m urderous victory. And here, in th is skill in producing reality in language, w h ich is far from being a m ere propaganda machine, w h ich is not propaganda, because propaganda supposes an object that is propagated, w hile Milos e v ic’s procedure from just w ords and statem ents makes all, and th e o n ly, objects, thus, here, in this skill, one needs to seek th e reason for M ilo s e v ic’s rule, the on ly rule that rests on a paradox that, in spite of its ow n totalitarianism , it is alw ays in pow er again “the dem ocratic w ay”. 7. Th ere is n o doubt that th e absolute defeat of Milosevic’s victory w ill som e time be seen in all its horror to the staring w ide-open eyes of that part of the Serbian people th at did not see the visible, and there is no doubt that this w ill occur w hen the citizens of Serbia get up off the couch of this paranoiac psychoanalyst. The only question, of course, is w hat w ill happen then. If w e w anted, on the basis of the experience of the last ten years, to predict the political events in the next few months or years, then w e w ould be able to say: this getting up from the couch w ill not happen un til the citizens of Serbia discover the bottom below the bottom to w hich they have come; until, in other w ords, they have come up against bare reality, or until th is reality breaks th rough the harmonic netw ork of th eir language. The citizens of Serbia w ill discover this double-bottom ed catastrophe w h en the acts of th e Serbian regim e appear in the midst of reality like a pure trauma. Th e on ly question is how long this last journey betw een the tw o catastrophes is goin g to take. Dragan Velikic

8 . Could, how ever, the so-called Serbian intelligentsia, that from the altern ative, of course, w hich is, anyw ay, the only in telligen t on e, do anyth ing to bring dow n Milosevic’s governm ent? It w as particularly durin g th e NATO bom bing of Serbia th at such an d sim ilar questions w ere raised on all sides. This question w as persistently accom panied by the realisation th at precisely “n ow ”, during the bom bing, it w as revealed that in Serbia th ere is n ot an d never h as been an altern ative to th e Serbian regim e; that, in on e w ay or another, all Serbian intellectuals are nationalists, insofar as th ey all cam e out, m ore or less, against the bom bin g. Th is point of view, w hich, unfortunately, is n ot alone, is for several reasons totally misguided. Above all, the view poin t th at holds it against Serbian intellectuals, from the alternative, that they did nothing to get rid of Milosevic show s itself to be, as a view point, in essence, undemocratic. Because for ten years the Serb alternative has done n othing else but w ork at overthrow ing the Serbian regime, doing it w ith the only m eans it considered acceptable – various forms of political activity. O f course, som eone might have tried to overth row the regime w ith violent means, but certainly not those w ho considered that dem ocracy could be established on ly w ith dem ocratic m eans of behaviour. Apart from th at, an y possible violent overthrow of the regim e, w hich n o one in the alternative had the m eans to do anyw ay, w ould necessarily have called their legitimacy into question, the question of the credentials of those w ho, by an act of violence, w ould prove themselves democrats, overthrow ing w hat had been elected, and not imposed. From this point of view, to claim that the Serbian intelligentsia did nothing m eans simply to say – you acted only politically, you w rote, you spoke, you dem onstrated, and that is nothing, because you should have acted non-politically, violently, you should all have becom e little Milosevices, behaved like him and so rem oved him from pow er. In this argument, only the point is not clear: for transform in g your ow n mind into the Milosevic type, to get rid of Milosevic, means, in fact replacing the same w ith the same. But w hy? Apart from that, there is one key thing that m ust not be neglected if you w ant to interpret conditions in Serbia, and particularly the w ay 54

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resistance is offered: during the last ten years alm ost half a m illion people have left Serbia. Sociologists claim that this is very largely to do w ith an urban and h ighly educated population, a young population , that, not ready to devote its life to politics, and, still m ore im portant, unw illing to offer any kind of support to Milosevic, unready to go into the arm y and fight for illusions from Milosevic’s insane brain, sim ply packed its traps and left. Leaving, how ever, is also an act. Half a million people did the act of departing; this w as their resistance, their w ay of saying no irrespective of the w ay in w hich they resisted being actually Milosevic’s vict o ry, actually the kind of thing he could only dream about: the decent people w ill simply go, they w ill not com plain too m uch, and then there w ill be no one left to articulate the resistance in Serbia, and I shall easily get the better of any unarticulated sym ptom s of rebellion. Perhaps this inarticulacy of the resistance is the biggest problem of th e Serbian political scen e today. An en ormous force of resistance evidently exists and is on the m ove, h ow ever, it is equally clear th at th ere is n o one any longer to articulate the dem ands of this resistance, to organise the protests against Milosevic’s mafia rule. An d this articulation is today, perhaps, the m ost essential thing, m ore urgent than ever in the past, for today, unlike the years before, everyone in Serbia is dissatisfied, but dissatisfied for extrem ely dissim ilar reasons. Som e are dissatisfied for th e sam e reasons they have alw ays been dissatisfied, let us say because of Milosevic’s squalid nation alism and the general descent of everything and everyone into crim inality, but there are, of course, m an y of those w ho w ere un til quite recen tly very content w ith M ilosevic’s disgusting and m oron ic politics, but w ho are now in despair that Kosovo h as been given aw ay, or in general because all sorts of other thin gs have been given aw ay that they considered “theirs” an d not to be given. I do n ot w ish to get in to an y kind of predictions, but w h en I am actually talkin g about the necessity of articulation , I have to ask this question: w hat if th e resistan ce, w h at if th e articulation is first articulated by th ose w ho are dissatisfied because M ilosevic, as th ey see it, h as betrayed th e n ation al objectives an d ideals? In a w ord, w h at Dragan Velikic

if th e im probably large m ass of dissatisfied nation alists m oves to articulate its objectives? I am tryin g to say th at th ere is in Serbia today a m ood, judging from every th in g, th at is very sim ilar to th e m oo d in Germ an y after World War I, an d w e all know w h at th at m ood led to… 9 . A few days ago, in d ifferen t society, I on ce again tried to explain w h at h ad happened w ith Serbia. In the last few m on th s, because of the bom bing, everyon e h as been askin g m e w hat has gon e on , or w hat w ill go on, as if I, b y the m ere fact of living in Belgrade, had privileged in form ation about even ts in th e city or in the land of Serbia. Th is tim e I tell a som ew hat differen t story. I narrate to m y acquaintances w hat has happened (am ong oth er things than ks to the bom bin g) to the Belgrade intelligentsia, explain to them that an enorm ous num ber of people h ave gon e from th e city, th at, probably th ey are still not thorough ly aw are th at th ey are in exile, or th at th ey sim ply w ill not return, that they still think they w ill return to “their” city next year, and that they have, actually, gon e for ever, and n ot, to m ake th e paradox the greater, because they w ere driven o ut, not because they w ere in danger, but because, at th e very m om ent they left, th ey w ere consigned to absolute oblivion. I try to articulate this somew h at in articulate thought, this feelin g, through exam ples. I tell m y friends th e nam es of Belgrade w riters or artists w ho are living at various points of the globe an d w hom no on e in Belgrade m entions any m ore. But th is oblivion they are reduced to is of a particular kind. They have n ot been driven out, no one forbids their books or w ritings to be published, on the con trary, th eir books are prin ted regularly an d in an orderly w ay, but noth ing actually happens, there are no review s of th ese books, th ere is n othing, n o one talks about them , n ot on ly n ot th e “position” but, in fact, not anyone. They are not, th en, exposed to any kin d of accusations for this or that, th eir life is n ot in danger. O n th e contrary, things are, it seem s to m e, m uch more terrible: they are not exposed to an yth ing, they sim ply are n ot, it is not even forgetfulness, but a pure and absolute in difference 56

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w ith resp ect to th eir existence, to everything they w rite dow n or th ink. Indifference, that is perhaps the righ t w ord, the w ord that m ore or less exactly describes th at affect aroused by all those w ho h ave gon e, an effect w ithout effect, a n othing, som e kin d of void. Th ese people are n o lon ger asked anyw here, not even by th ose w h o m igh t ask them , th ose w h o are close to th em aesthetically and politically, n o one talks of them an y m ore, any tim e, ever, an d even w h en their articles appear in the opposition new spapers, m ore or less nobody reads them . Indifferen ce. Total lack of in terest. They can have n o in fluen ce on anything an y m ore, least of all sh aping public opinion in Serbia. Th at is w hy I say th at they all w ent aw ay totally, m uch before they un derstood, or w ere ready to adm it it. “Will you go back?” asks a friend w ho, as far as I can see, is unsuccessfully trying to figure out th e reasons for this forgetfulness, this avid indifference. And before I m anage to reply, before I can form ulate the a n sw e r, I hear the question of an Irishw oman w ho has been sitting w ith all the time, and w ho, probably though th at it w as the right tim e for her to say som ething. “Excuse m e, I don’t w ant to interrupt you,” is w hat she says, “but w here actually w ould you go back to, w here are you actually from ?” At first, understandably, I thought that the girl had m issed the several-tim es m entioned nam e of the city in w hich I live and sim ply replied that I w as from Belgrade. “You didn’t understand m e,” she explained to m e, “I asked you w here Belgrade actually is.” “Belgrade? Well, Belgrade is the city that has just been bom bed, d o n ’t you know that NATO has bom bed th e city?” is w h at m y friend says n ow, w ho feels aw kw ard, th ough I do n’t know w hy. “I though t th at NATO h ad bom bed Serbia, not Belgrade, I didn ’t know that Belgrade w as a city in Serbia.” So finish ed this talk about Belgrade and Serbia, after w hich w e talked about En glish hum our, and M r Bean , about w h om m y friend h as just fin ish ed a book, com paring h im and Beckett. And w hile m y friend w as explaining th at M r Bean, just like the Beckettian hero, came from now here and w as goin g now here, an d somehow n evertheless m anaged to organise, for a momen t, the w orld around him , w h ile h e w as explaining that it w as this rift betw een Dragan Velikic

nothing and everything that w as funny, I w as thinking that perhaps that girl from Ireland w as right. The poignant idea occurred to m e that Belgrade perh aps really no longer existed and that now, perh aps, th e m ost im portant thing w as to build a city. To com e, like Mr Bean, from now here at all, and start organising the w orld around oneself. But didnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t m y friend say that it w as just this that w as so funny?

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Branko Sbutega A Q uestio n abo ut Bo ka, A.D . 1993 The recent interest of the m edia in Boka Kotorska is the consequence of events in w hich the lines of com m unications in the southern Balkans w ere drastically severed. For the first tim e after World War II, Croatia, w hich had been lopped into pieces, became aw are of itself, seriously, concernedly and painfully in the parts that had been am putated. Wh at about “our” Boka? Th is q uestion h as been too frequen tly and seriously asked for it to be un derstood as a m ere fash ionable figure of speech . I think that a deeper analysis of “our Boka” w ould show a high degree of ignorance about the very conception of Boka, w hile nevertheless the “our” and the “m y” express a consciousness and con viction about belonging, about possession and characteristics. I heard this phrase “our Boka” being sent out for m any years from Belgrade, loudly, and w ith no dilem mas, w hile in Zagreb it w as spoken rarely and in w hispers, a past perfect of a fact, rather as the Greek colonies on Sicily m ight be for Athens. For us few w ho w ere born in the area, there w as just confusion at the space being defined by others; w e ourselves w ere no longer capable of determ ining it. The loss of any clear present left only the possibility of turning to the past, seeking our lost point of reference, discovering a new reason for being and remaining, a point that w ould outgrow the sheer necessity of staying for sheer w ant of alternatives. For many, w ith its cosmopolitan character, communism represented a kind of salvation, a shorin g up of points of reference that w ere unsure. Even w hen it w as discovered to be a depleted political and spiritual energy, it constituted, to the very end, a slender thread capable of bein g grasped at by the insecurity of people w ith an eroded sense of identity. Boka was increasingly becoming a Baedeker story translated into shaky English and German. The enclave of the Boka people w as being reduced to just a few rural milieux. The middle class had melted in the fire of the tim e, Branko Sbutega

both as a class and biologically. The Catholic Church w as the only remaining domain of continuity, and the proximity of the bishop in Kotor w as the only sign that imparted Boka the dignity of the European space. The landscape did not w ield any great form ative pow er; anyw ay, centuries are needed before geography can accustom humanity to itself, and here it w as decades that had been at w ork. Betw een the practicality of adjustm ent and the courage of obstinate persistence in the m aintenance of a given state of civilization, w hich w as anyw ay defenceless, w eakness necessarily w on, if it is w eakness at all to adjust in order to survive. O f course, m em ory suffers, it is repressed, com pressed into the space of the personal and the intim ate, turns into Christm as Eve codfish; the rest is the cosm opolitan average, the drabness of the ordinary, m im icry tending to m etam orphosis. All thatâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s left is som e denunciatory Anto, Tripo, Gracijela and O zana as the nom inative clue to the different and the special. There is still a preference for boiled beef and chard instead of cabbage and pork. Burek m ade itself at hom e in tim e, though the cakes of Perast and Dobrota m anaged to survive as w ell. Tripunj days, Lode, O ur Lady of Skrpjel, the votive cerem onies, birthdays and baptism s, funerals and obituaries in Latin script had no alternatives. This w as viable, or nothing; the painting of eggs for May 1 w as an attem pt that lasted no longer than a couple of years. O ld people w ith no children had no one to comm un icate w ith; the young w ith no grandparents had no one to learn from . Public education associated all the values of civil society w ith outmoded and dem onized circumstances: the C hurch, the bourgeoisie, the occupier and foreign pow ers. Political eligibility cut out m iddle class courtesy; m iddle class courtesy enjoined political obedience. The circle cam e to a close at the point at w hich a seal w as definitely put upon the breakdow n. Local culture m elted in the fire of revolutionary changes like a Pleistocene glacier straying dow n to the Equator. O f course, this is a little destiny com pared w ith the fate of the w orld, little but old. Arenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t big fates but a set of sm all ones linked together? Boka died out because it w as divorced, politically, and so of 60

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course, culturally, from its original historical nexus. It could not survive just in and for itself. Neither could Florence, or Venice, or Dubrovnik. And yet, they did m anage to install them selves into the broader context, losing som ething it is true, but getting som ething in return still. Who did w e have to give to? Get anything from ? The Monten egrin context of today is actually just the Serbian context of Montenegro. This is not dogm atic, just a realistic fact about w hich people take to little heed, although they have to settle their accounts w ith it. Historical arguments m ean nothing, studies of culture still less. Ruthless Chronos acknow ledges only statistics and the sheer mechanics of events. No oth er meanings concern him , none of the poetic, aesthetic and spiritual derivatives suffuse him . Hum anity, people, they are not asked here; Chronos turns round the w heel of tim e, blind to the form of the m an that gets in betw een its teeth, often to be m angled. Fragile, em otional m an sets his face against the principled indifferen ce of tim e: a w eakling in front of a stalw art, a slave before his m aster, David w ithout a sling, a dissenter w ith no pow er. Are w e just children, resisting the process of grow ing up w ith childish naivety? There are historical points of reference from w hich it is difficult to see the m orrow, but there are also those from w hich som e things of the future can probably be ascertained. Hum an desire is a variable determ inant, but generational upbringing is not. The continuity of a civilization in Boka has been used up and snapped. In the concept of Yugoslavia, the historical doors opened w ithout reserve, letting the m ountain and the still m ore distant hinterland dow n into the narrow coastal strip. The w istfully hom eless and then the tourist too discovered all the technological advantages of stone palaces and the clim atic advantages of the m ild Mediterranean clim ate. Th ey cam e upon a considerable number of old inhabitants, people of a like m ind in religion and national sym pathies. Perhaps w hat w as found seem ed like the fruit of the synergy of sun, stone and sea, but it w as not like that, not ever. Th e painstaking w ork of centuries, sincerely and yet com batively opting for the course of European civilization, the Branko Sbutega

internalization of the cultural and spiritual codes of the Christian and Mediterranean zone, these w ere the recognisable sources of the Boka consciousness. O therw ise, w hence that gap in civilization betw een Dobrota and O rahovac, Perast and Risan, Morinje and Kam enar? Whence those oscillations of quality at distances of m etres? This propinquity of different continen ts of civilizations that had for centuries chafed and at the end w ashed aw ay the rem aining Boka Croats and Catholics. Consigned to Yugoslav freedom , they w ere quietly, and not w ithout dignity, extinguished at the gathering place that becam e, in the end, the site of their execution. Not recognised as the rem ains of the rem ains, seen rather as a historical intrusion and m isunderstanding, they found them selves on the other side of the line that, to the uninitiated European, seem ed but the sheer thread of a provisional political division, but w as in fact a broad and deep abyss in the tectonics of events of centuries, and, I w ould venture to say, especially in the shudders of this century of ours, the last in the m illennium . A w orld of bridges has no feeling for a w orld of ravines. In this other w orld, close and far depend on the depth of the lines that keep apart tw o geographical points and tw o people and their w orlds. The majestic Rom anesque and Baroque churches of Boka become ever more like each other, in spite of the differences of styles, become like the pyram ids – stone shadow s of a faded historical glory. Weeds are already beginnin g to spring up over our graves; there are few er and few er of those rem ain ing to pull them out. O n e lovely European dream , in w hich a good part of Europe, after the appalling w akin g of World War II, sought the paths forw ard, it seem s, died out at th e line that from Prevlaka to Vukovar cuts sinuously across the m ountainous Balkans, locating it once again in its old historical enclaves. The old said: “Wet your finger in the sea and you’re a citizen of the w orld”. But this gets difficult if you don’t know how to sw im . The last sw im m ers set off on the voyage to Croatia, Italy, Australia and Am erica. They sw im via Budapest to Zagreb, via Tiran a to Rom e, some of them even sw im across Debeli Brijeg. Th e Atlanteans of Boka go on their w ay, accom panied by th e satisfied sm iles of th e 62

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m a n y new com ers. Why not, w hen of their poetic patrim ony they still have freshly in their heads that phrase: â&#x20AC;&#x153;It very m uch seem s to m e, it very m uch seem s, that the Latins are w orse than the Turksâ&#x20AC;?. From Boka th ey sail in the brigantines and luggers of the present day to new shores. They take w ith them a few m em ories, lots of nostalgia and a m elancholy resignation to their fate. The signs they leave behind them still bear the traces of the one-time opulence and of the belief that existence w as a sure fact. Sentim en tality is excluded from this process, th e tim es are too cruel, the isolation is com plete, the outlook darkened so the energy for pained sentim ent should rem ain. Does this m ean the total loss of pow er to dream of som e new future for Boka in w hich the relict remains of the Croatian presence w ill be able to survive, protected in its specialness and individuality? Are there, above and beyond our psychological need, any footholds for optimism ? Are w e condemn ed to archival rem embrance? What are the pledges for survival? The pledges for death need not be m entioned, for they are too w ell know n. Survival does not necessarily im ply preserving oneâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s personal biological continuity in descendants. Man does not transm it to m an only his genes, but the w holeness of his identity. The elim ination of this possibility becom es historical death. The uses of civilization entail dialogue, acceptance of the differen t an d the other, and w e are w itnesses how m uch this culture nullified the other, and how strong the im pulses to protect the identical are, w hatever the cost to the other. Today, this does not only m ean m arginalisation, being declassed, placed on the periphery; today, it mean s bein g literally driven into the killing fields, exterm ination, ethnic cleansing, genocide. To be different an d w eaker gives the sign for the firing squad. The minority becom es an enclave of fear or desperate spasm, unto cruelty, for the sake of survival. In Boka this m eans the silence of w aiting, the fear of im potence. Neverth eless, som eth ing has rem ain ed as a livin g sign of existence and vitality. Religion h as remained, and so has belonging to a faith, w ith all that m eans and radiates. The m orning bells still announce the new day and bring to a close the Boka tw ilights w ith their pealing. Branko Sbutega

Christenings include the few , but still there, still real, children in the com munity of the Church . More than the finger in the sea, th is drop of baptismal w ater introduces them to planetary citizen ship. The sign s of religion by w hich the Croatian people w as once recognised, by w hich it acquired kin, are still there. The doorsills of the churches of Boka becom e w hat the church threshold has alw ays been in hard tim es, not th e border betw een heaven and earth, but a line across w h ich the law s of enforced constraint do not run. The exhausted reserves of topics for political and social dialogue h ave not at all broached the treasury of life topics and proposals that the Church has stored and is once again reviving. When situations are reduced to such clarity, w h en th ey are bared to such essences, then th is n o lon ger sounds like an apology for the faith, but sim ply as the eviden ce of the phenom enon. The Catholic en clave in Boka is a space in w hich , today, the Boka Croat and th e European survives. It is an enclave in w hich those cultural signs and codes th at can once again becom e th e property of th e w ider historical space to w h ich Boka m ight w ell belong in the future are alive. That is w hy it is w orthw hile suffering and bein g patient, as long as there is som e footing to keep the door open for hope. And th e keys for th e door are not in the possession of an yon e of historical im portance; th e key-h older is out of reach of politics, scholarship, even h um an logic sometimes. Tw o thousand years of onslaugh ts w ere in vain. The guardian of the keys in Rom e is just a sign of th at one in heaven . Boka still bears w itn ess to the existence of spaces that resist, even if painfully, in its last gasps, the onslaught of m an on th e values he h im self proclaim s, puts in to practice and th en attem pts to overturn. Som etim es, in deed, h e succeeds, but this kin d of su ccess is n o sign of eith er hum an pow er or om nipoten ce. We are not left alone on ly w h en politics turns its back on us, but w e are alon e w hen, w ilfully, con sen tingly, w e turn aw ay from the signs of self-know ledge. O nly the spiritual area, am ong all other categories of life, h as m anaged to ensure som e kind of con tin u it y, the others are m ere chim aeras of the extent of th e “glorious” an d the “eternal”, and then again are ghostly. 64

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Not lon g ago I w as w alking around Venice. It w as a hum id, rainy day. The rather un usual m ist m ade it appear as if th e form s and outlin es of the city w ere dissolvin g, not only in the reflection of th e sea, but in the asthm atic blue greyness of the atm osphere. Th e Serenissim a m elted in fron t of m y eyes, as n on-existent and lovely as a spectre. O n St M a r k ’s Square, n o tourists and n o pigeons. Th ey had all found a dry nest for th em selves for the afternoon sleep. Th e sadn ess I felt did not w ell up from the feeling of lonelin ess, but Thom as M ann ish , from th e presence of transien ce, w hich w as outlin ed not less in the th oughts than in the h eart. The dying beauty of the city did not give w ay to the reasons of m y heart. I gave w ay to the analogy im posed, w earing out my shoe leather on the Q uay of the Slavs. And everything is not analogy; actually I recognised m any th ings that w ere the same. This Venice w as our capital city for alm ost four centuries. Th e w orld still goes to see it, for th e m em ory, for the beauty. Boka is hardly touched upon by a thought astray. O nly th e sun is just, for it heats w ithout paying attention to th e fate of the earth an d th e earth m en . Ven etian s an d Bokelian s w ere nevertheless m ore of the sea th an of th e earth . Th e Ven etian s w ent by th e long bridge to Mestre an d beyon d, becom ing o f th e earth , the people of Boka sailed off on e d o e s n ’t know quite w h ere and so it is h ard to know w h at th ey becam e. It seem s it is easier to state w hat th ey left. But w ho is interested in accounts any more? Haven’t w e yet detached ourselves from y e s t e r d a y ’s w ay of experien cing h istory? Th e m yths left those moun tain s as far back as later Antiquity, so that som e n eom ythology could be planted today. The last legends w ere told at the end of the last cent u r y. Both Marquez and Borges w ould have com e out losers. N eith er Sparta n or Athen s, neith er Prom eth eus n or O rph eus. In Boka, life w as different and m ore ordinary, m uch too ordinary for today’s plans. Collective in terest in it ceased. It is th ere still on ly in rare individuals w h o are m utually linked by sadn ess th at th e accursed gift of recogn ition alw ays bestow s. Branko Sbutega

Nostalgia for the small-scale and intimate background made itself heard only w hen w e had m anaged to lose it. Dante so long ago w arned of the danger an d the greatness of the loss of the intim ate hom e country. The w isdom of the exile is acquired w ith expulsion , coming, then, too late, like Hegelâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ow l of w isdom . It com es w hen you have already forgotten the taste of salt and iodine m ixed in the gusts of the autum n sirocco, it com es w hen you are no longer capable of calling up a picture; only the unspeakable feeling of recognition m ediated by the m ost banal of details. O h yes, everything in Venice is getting identifiable, here are the m odels, your little Atlan tises. But it brings no com fort. O ur grandfathers arrived strutting on the decks of brigantines cram packed w ith all kinds of titbits and fancies. Holds full of Montenegrin livestock, Greek cheese, tallow candles, Tivat cattle, silk from Istanbul, Kotor rifles, heavy w ith silve r. Th e purses full of ducats and thalers they w ould drop in at their school, St George and St Tripun, to pay som e Don Pero or Don Marko from Perast or Prcanj for a fat candle or a mass. And on the Square of St Mark, everyone looked w ith respect at these captainly figures in their strange suits of black silk w ith gold embroidery, the obligatory ring in the left ear. But w hat it m ust have been like w hen the aw e-inspiring Perastians cam e to receive or return the banners of w ar. The doges them selves w ould be impressed. To d a y, th e new com er of a little Venetian looks at groups of Asians decorated w ith all kinds of electronic marvels, bags full of cheques and yen. Who, in this crow d, w ould be capable of picking out the descendants of the once respected captains, allies in once hard and vital battles, from Lepanto to the Morea. Who? There is no continuity w here there are just w ishes, rather w here life is undergoing renew al and confirm ation. There is com fort in the thought that, if you donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t have the continuity, at least you have the exclusivity of death. That at least has stayed, irrespective of changes of consciousness in history, an exclusive m om ent of incontestable dignity. The dignity of death is a point of crucial vitality. In the concept of the genesis of barbarism , it is com pletely clear on w hich side the advantage lies. Neither Attila nor Genghis Khan w as saved by the concept. 66

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Neither them , nor their w orks, w hich do not exist anyw ay, save for som e lines on m aps of history. Perhaps in Atahualpa’s death there w as more historical meaning than in their campaigns of conquest. If life w ere clear in its barbarian genetics, w e w ould have no need of literary or cultural questioning. The dénouement to the South Slav (Yugoslav) story, no matter how great the price, has nevertheless ascertained certain characteristics of people and their level of civilization th at w ere unclear a short tim e ago. These characteristics are mutually exclusive as poetries, invalidating not their ow n but others’ poetical points of reference. This is w hy th ey w ere im possible in term s of unity, though n ot of neighbourhood. Yes, for it is precisely in the poetic source, in w hat conditions mem ory, w hich gives shape to the perception of time, the flickering of em otion, in this source the ability to m ix and combine should be sought. Perhaps by ch urning oil and w ater you can, over a long period of time, get som e new em ulsion , but the unprofitability of the experim ent is show n by the unw illingness of anyone to date to em bark on the hundreds and thousands of years of effort for the sake of som e un certain an d perhaps com pletely w orthless result. Com m unication among different histories is possible only w here there is com m unication am ong different poetics. In th is intellectual context, Boka entered into its historical paradox. This paradox is the fruit of political violence, as are m ost historical paradoxes. There is little com fort to the short duration of biography in the idea of tim e as the great physician of history. Patience is nourished properly only on dream s, and the strongh old of dream s is that childish poet in us, to w h om the w orld, in spite of the assorted odours of life, is nevertheless fragrant of the ozone of extrem e youth. That is w hy it is possible to walk forward going backwards – that is w hy it is perhaps only possible to travel through life this way – Amarcord-st yle. Boka Kotorska has a peripheral position w ithin the w orld of Mediterranean and w estern civilization. At the beginning of our century, it had all the characteristics of a country that com bined the heritage of Venice and the orderliness of Austro-Hungary. In the context of the great agendas of civilizations an d states, Boka did not in the least Branko Sbutega

lose its ow n local colouring, its distinctiveness, or the characteristics of its provincial civilization. The unifying design of Yugoslavia, and then of com m unist Yugoslavia, show ed itself totally incapable of recognising and preserving the plurality of civilizations that it found. Q uiet death w as the only dignified choice, the exodus of an entire civil perspective. House after house closed dow n, and in the end not even m ost of the graves could look forw ard to new arrivals. The sensibility of the tim e does not suit the little, and so the sm all rem nant plods on from day to day, reduced and reconciled to the fate that has long ago announced its w ork. And so… on Piazza San Marco and Vienna’s Stefansplatz, it is still possible to feel som ething of the intellectual atm osphere, that ethereal fragrance, that through the m illennia instilled into the hum anity under those m ountains one of the m ost m iraculous of Adriatic consciousn esses, taught th rough the gen erations, expanded and refin ed in trials no less than in joys. Life w as an enterprise, an enterprise of virtues. The ethics of living w as also its aesthetics. The future is by definition an unknow n quantity, the only credit w e can draw on it is hope. The geographical future of Boka is provided by geology – the quality of the stone and the sea – but the future in term s of civilization is an unknow n w ith no credit term s. Hope’s point of reference is the dream , m em ory the nourishm ent of dream s. Those w ho retain the m em ory are sm all in num ber, w hich leaves the question of Boka unresolved. The seclusion of the bay that w as haven and refuge becom es the seclusion of a local history that its builders have left, setting off over the seas like Tolkien’s elves to lands on the other side of the great w aters. There is no longer anyone to knot the dow ry m azes of Dobrota lace; oblivion has deafened Stoliv’s churches, in w hich the charm ing local coral tw ined; the torte of Perast is hardly put onto tw o tables; the last artichokes of Tivat died out in the gardens a year or tw o ago; the num erous linguistic varieties and local speech colour have been m ade all one in the hillm an’s heavy ph rase; Italianisms have melted into Serbianism s; the cellars into garages; the ponte into bathing places. 68

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In the now long-gone thirties, Katalinic-Jeretov w rote in a little poem on the them e of Boka: The palaces are empty, step by step are collapsing into our new and free days. O n the Church is standing a record of your soul and praying to the Lord that the sun comes out for you. Com pared w ith the questions that the end of this m illennium is asking us, compared w ith such en ormous questions and uncertainties, perhaps som eone m ight think m y question about Boka is insign ificant and w ithout any personal m eaning. Meaning is in the end after all a question of interest. More than once it has been necessary for som eone or som ething to be dying, or actually to die, for the interest of the w orld to be aw oken. Perhaps this conceals the answ er to the m eaning of the slow dying of Boka. Perhaps in this recognition it w ill be justified. In the indifferent chronicle of historical events, the only m eaning that is added rem ains, w hether w e w ant it or not, our personal intervention on behalf of unforgetfulness. Postscript, 1999. Looking into m y ow n w riting, I have attempted to w ork my w ay through to the nostalgia and pain that prompted it. Eight years of swimming through the ocean of Balkan blood and tears have redirected my thoughts and feelings tow ards the hills; the Mediterranean horizon has closed. Nothing has come from there, nothing put out to sea. Everything has gone along the hills. The stone and the dove, the karst of Bosn ia, of Montenegro, the geological substrate of Kosovo. Who has the time to deal w ith quiet deaths an y m ore? Does the barbarian have its ow n aesthetic? If it has, w e have forgotten , w e h ave not learned to recognise it. The on ly thing w e know is that the bottom has various levels, and isnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t it all th e sam e w hen above you there is a slab that hides every cosm ic scope? Branko Sbutega

There is no longer any help in the sam e shape of the landscape, the sam e spur of the ozone after the rains of April and O ctober. The sm ell of iodine in the m orning w alk along the shore no longer brings Tripoli or perhaps Barcelona to m ind, only blood. There is no apprehension, nor is there reconciliation; for peace, surrender is required, for apprehension, fear. Deprived of one and the other, I can only look from the bottom of m y grave up to the darkness of the slab. And it is only a few vague feelings of curiosity th at can annul the total despair of this sojourn in th e gloom . I donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t know w hether they are directed to the bottom on w hich I stand, w hich can be still deeper, still m ore abyssal, or tow ards the firm crag that has set itself dow n on the peaks of the m ountains of Boka and turned the fiord into a grave. The only artefacts inherited are bones, parental bon es, it is true, or grandparental, but the bon es of form er fates, oneâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ow n fate is no longer found there, no longer even sought. O nly the colours and scents resist the state of affairs, it seem s quite all the same to Flora; red is still red, green is green, from the maquis the w orm w ood stirs ruthlessly an d recalls w ith its rough scents the passions that it once aw oke. The cellular phones, m onitors, com puters, pale draw n fashion details from the m arketplaces of Paris and Milan, the phoney McDonalds hamburgers w ith the dash of Bulgarian ketch up do not manage to recall that th ere is som e planet Earth, on the con trary, it is as if they make it furth er than it is, flickering on the vaulting of this darkness like the stars of some unknow n galaxy. And the flaccid h ands they touch do not express any conviction that som e other life is possible any m ore. Is it possible? Will stum bling through the dusty collections of archives reveal the truth , an d are the docum en ts w ritten to bear testim ony or to pull the w ool over our eyes? Words are spoken, sen tences form ed, but only as som e sonic sensation in the structures of exhausted sense and faded meaning. We look each other in the eyes and sham elessly pretend to believe in w hat w e hear and to understand w hat w e utter. And yet it is all just sound, language is a sonic backdrop w ith no intention of m eaning anything, only of radiating its static and rem inding us that w e are not yet dead, but not alive in that sense of the w ord life they once taught us. 70

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There is still w eepin g at th e fun erals, an d it is only in the grim aces you discover the pain is not quite sincere, as if th ere is som e kin d of relief, th e flash of a thought that dem ise is the only genuine state that is still available to you. Pain is being increasingly tran sform ed, as oncological or psychological case, into a m ere m edical category. Where w e once believed, w e can now recognise only a calm w ithout reflection or im age, uncertain w hether it is a m atter only of tem porary anaesthesia, oversaturation, or perh aps som e false assum ption or theorem that the soul could suffer as w ell, and not only dully bear. That sophisticated tech nological birds flew our skies and that tents w ere pitched on our fields by thousan ds of starvin g refugees has not in the least chan ged th e geograph y of the grave, still less have the visits of Martian s got up as journalists and politicians. O nly som eone w ho is in the grave know s that he is there. To th e w orm and the fly he is just a space of passage. As corpse, no one h as th e question of life forced upon him ; no on e is m ore deprived of answ ers than th e dead. That is w hy they are dead. No sin gle eth ical category is present in death, i.e., in it, they are all p rĂŠcised, sucked into the black gravitational hole of Thanatos. Is there any point in askin g w hat lies on the other side? An d yet can one keep silen ce w hile the throat still keeps on articulately em itting a, e, i, o, u ? We put together vow els an d con sonan ts in osten sible thought-sets, w anting and h oping that they w ill in time become them . With out a care that our w orn -out soul m ay or m ay not recognise them . And this articulation, this desire for it, is the on ly energy that rem ains w hen all the processes of history con verge upon crim e. Wh ether it w ill be enough for som eth ing n ew, if even perhaps som ething w orse, w e cann ot answ er from this position. Waiting is our only form of existence an d th e ten sion it produces is the only testim ony that w e are not com pletely dead. This w ould be enough for a poignant ch iliasm , but som eone once said that the future is n ot w hat w e kn ow and expect, but th e un know n that is expectin g us, and it is on to th is th ought that w e fasten all our h opes. Kotor, August 20, 1999 Branko Sbutega

II. View s and Co mmentaries â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Events, Challenges and Co nflicts Deyan Anastasijevic A Swallow, N ot The Spring Ivana Zivkovic and Lidija Popovic Report on the M edia in the Federal Republic of Y ugoslavia Anatoli Pristavkin Chechnya - a Country at W ar Freim ut Duve There is a war going and everyone is watching Katharina Hadjidim os The Role of the M edia in Greek-Turkish Relations

Dejan Anastasijevic A Sw allo w , No t The Spring Transition in Croatia and its impact on stability in South-East Europe

After Tudjm an, the new , pro-Western Governm ent w as elected, along w ith the new President, set on dem ocratization and reform s. And, reform s are already on the w ay. Rigid authoritarianism , crony capitalism , nationalism verging on racism – these pillars of Tudjm an’s policy – are being dism antled day by day. How ever, the viability of the new government and its benevolent policies are far from bein g secured. The im pact of Croatia’s dem ocratic upsurge over the other countries in the region also deserves som e deliberation. Let us deal w ith the region al im pact first. Tu d jm a n ’s absence, and the subsequent meltdow n of the ruling party, is most strongly felt in the neighbouring Bosnia-Herzegovina, w here Zagreb-sponsored Bosnian Croat nation alists have resisted or obstructed the full im plem entation of th e Dayton peace accord for years. Not only have these hardliners – assem bled in th e Bosnian branch of Tu d jm a n ’s Croatian Dem ocratic Union (HDZ) and concentrated in w estern Herzegovina – preven ted the return of Muslim and Serb refugees into their territory and obstructed the activities of the International Criminal Tribunal for War Crim es; they have also used their veto right in central executive and legislative authority to block an y m oves tow ards Bosnia’s centralization, thus creating their ow n – albeit illegal – statelet in Herzegovina. Without Zagreb’s political and financial backing, Bosnian Croat resistan ce to reform s w h ich w ould make Bosnia a viable state is expected to w eaken. H o w e v e r, it w ould be too m uch to expect th at the Bosnian branch of the HDZ w ould sim ply break up to pieces, just like its m other-party in Zagreb. Unlike their brethren in Croatia, Bosnian Croats are politically and ideologically com pact, and now, under threat, their first m ove w ill be to m ove closer together. They m ay have enough stam ina – and m oney – to do w ell at the local elections in Bosnia, scheduled for April. Som e say that all politics is local, and now here it’s m ore true than in Dejan Anastasijevic

Bosnia, w here the cum bersom e and ineffective central authorities – both Bosnian and international – often fails to address local problem s. Eventual victory in w estern Herzegovina could easily help the local HDZ to hold on for at least another year. Meanw hile, additional sources of funding can be obtained, m ost notably am ong the Croatian diaspora in Western Europe, USA and Australia. The em m igrants – m any of them originating from Western Herzegovina – m ostly share the HDZ ethnically exclusive cause; they are also rich enough to provide th e necessary funding to keep the HDZ in the field for quite a w hile. Moreover, the Bosnian HDZ can also count on tacit support of hardliners from tw o other ethnic groups – Serbs and Muslim s – in its tim e of need. Even during the w ar, Bosnian Croat and Serb separatists w orked together to destroy w hat they believed w as the Islam ic state in the m aking. After Dayton, a political alliance the HDZ and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) w as carefully main tained in order to keep the Muslim s at bay. The SDS has succesfully survived the rem ovalof Radovan Karadzic from Bosnian political scene and severance of ties w ith Belgrade. There is no reason w hy HDZ w ould fail to do th e sam e. And as for the Muslim ethnocentric party, the Party of Dem ocratic Action (SDA), they nom inally stand for unified, m ultiethnic Bosnia. In real life, how ever, many elements w ithin the SD A are perfectly content w ith being the top dog w ithin the Muslim -dom inated part of Bosnia, and they feel reluctant to break the existing ethnic lines. They, too, w ould be delighted to see the continuing HDZ dom ination in We s t e r n Herzegovina, so th at it rem ains a plausable excuse not to make any concessions on their part. O f course, m uch depends on the policy of international com m u nity in Bosnia, m ost notably the O ffice of High Representative (O HR), the chief supervisor of the Dayton accord. So far, the O HR’s attem pts to break the m onopoly of nationalist parties in Bosnia w as only partly succesfull, and an effort to put Bosnia’s corruption-ridden econom y on its feet has largely failed. The change in Croatia opens a w indow of o p p o rt u n it y, but it can only be used as a part of a broader, strategic plan to dism antle the “unholly alliance” of the nationalists. Cracking dow n 76

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on sm uggling and other illegal sources of funding for the nationalists m ay prove to be a better tactics than high -profile political m eddling into local affairs, such as rem oving the HDZ candidates from election lists or shutting dow n their m edia. O therw ise, Bosnian Croats m ay rally even tighter around the HDZ, at least for a w hile. The effects on Croatia’s oth er neighbour – the rump Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro - are of less direct nature. Con trary to official lines of both Zagreb and Belgrade, the relationship betw een Tu d jman and Slobodan Milosevic w as a com plicated form of symbiosis. It is now w idely know n that both m en w orked together on dismem bering Bosnia, but their partnership ran deeper than that. They both shaped their political beliefs w ithin the Com munist party of Yugoslavia, and they shared the sam e contem pt for dem ocracy, basic h um an rights, an d even com m on decency. They both struggled to m ake their respective countries regional pow ers, and they used largely sim ilar methods to achieve it. The only basic difference w as that Tudjm an w as a true believer in his ow n “historic mission” in Croatia, w hile the more cynical Milosevic on ly used history and nationalism as a veh icle to cling to pow er, but they still deeply understood and respected each other. If Tu d jm a n ’s death w as a blow to anyone in Serbia, it m ust have been Milosevic. Yugoslav governm ent’s reaction to Croatia’s election result w as a textbook example of hysteria: denial, follow ed by rage. At first, the government refused to even com m ent the event. “Croatian elections are of no concern to us,” said Goran Matic, the Yugoslav Inform ation Minister. The silence w as soon replaced by vicous attacks against Croatia’s new govern ment, aimed mostly to discouridge the Serb refugees to seek repatriation in Croatia. Serbian opposition took the new s enthusiastically, seeing it as an om en of sim ilar scenario in Serbia. How ever, even leaving aside the fact that Milosevic is unlikely to depart from this w orld any tim e soon, the change in Serbia is far from being im m inent. Despite sim ilarities betw een Milosevic and Tudjm an, the internal structures of their regim es w ere fundamentally different. O ne of the reasons that the transition in Croatia w as possible is that it had already happened ten years ago, Dejan Anastasijevic

w hen Tu d jm a n ’s party replaced the com munists after first fair elections. There w as no such chan ge in Serbia: Milosevic has m ore than 50 years of com munist rule behind him , as h e h as in herited the w hole structure that w as there before him . As a result, the Serbian ruling party is m uch m ore deeply entrenched in society that the HDZ ever w as, and is less likely to be rem oved so easily. Milosevic has already dem on strated that he is ready to use any am ount of force in order to stay in pow er. And even if he him self w as gone, his im m ediate inharitants – m ost notably Milosevic’s pow er-hungry w ife, Mira Markovic, and his ultranationalist partner Vojislav Seselj – w ould not refrain from bloodshed in order to avoid the transition in Serbia. How ever, it w ould be rash to conclude that the change in Croatia is of no consequence to Serbia. Although the effect is largely sym bolic, sym bols play an im portant role in politics. Croatian opposition has proved that it is possible to m ake a change provided they’re run ning w ithin a single block. This is a pow erful incentive for the fragm ented Serbian opposition, w hich has recently undertook steps tow ards a m ore unified approach. Th e fact th at the Serbian opposition leaders have already established relationship w ith Croatia’s new adm inistration is also an en courging sign, although the fruits of this effort may take som e tim e to becom e visible. In Montenegro, w here the pro-w estern governm ent of Milo Djukanovic has already established links w ith Croatia, even m ore w arm ing-up can be expected. Croatia and Montenegro have com m on interests of resolving the issue of the disputed Prevlaka Peninsula, and also in joint developm ent of tourism , since they hold adjacent stretch es of the Adriatic coast. How ever, considering the sm all size of Mon tenegro and the considerable presence of Milosevic’s troops there, anything m ore w ould have to aw ait better tim es. At last, let us exam ine the prospects of Croatia itself. Although the new governm ent of Ivica Racan, and the new President, Stipe Mesic, both enjoy popular support, dem ocracy in Croatia is not yet cem ent-

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ed. Much is expected of the new adm inistration, both w ithin and outside the country, and these expectations w ill be hard to meet. Racan and Mesic inherited a huge foreign debt and the unemployment rate of some 20 percent; sw itching from Tudjm an’s crony capitalism to real m arket econom y w ill likely be painful, and alm ost certainly unpopular if it includes m ore layoffs and reduction of social spendin g. Repatriation of Serbian refugees – som ething that Racan an d Mesic h ave both pledged to facilliate – w ill m eet som e resistance as w ell. And finally, the enchanced co-operation w ith the w ar crim es tribunal, w hich likely includes delivering some celebrated “w ar heroes” to the Hague, may rub additional salt into a w ounded national pride. It is unlikely that the new adm inistration – w hich is com posed of tw o large and four sm all political parties – can stand such pressures w ithout substantial foreign backing. If Western w ords of praise are n ot follow ed by some serious investm ent program mes and w ith em ergency aid for Croatia’s social services, the the ruling coallition m ay fall apart at first signs of public discontent, paving w ay for yet another reversal of policies. In that case, the region shell be dealin g w ith a younger, more virulent version of Tudjman, and those gloom -and-doom prophets m ay turn out to be right, after all.

Dejan Anastasijevic

Ivana Zivkovic and Lidija Popovic Repo rt o n the Media in the Federal Republic o f Yugo slavia S um m a ry : 1999 w as clearly the toughest year for the independent m edia and journalists in Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, one has to add “so far.” The Belgrade regim e w as, undoubtedly, aw are that the Kosovo conflict w ould be fought and w on in the m edia arena. Silencing all the domestic and foreign critical voices and entrenching the state-controlled propaganda m achinery, w as therefore of utm ost im portance for the regim e to create enough m aneuvering space to explain, in its ow n w ords, the politics of repression in Kosovo and the negotiating strategies of the Governm ent. The introduction of an unprecedented Public Inform ation Law in O ctober 1998, the draconian fines under its provisions and the deliberate denial of frequency-licences to the m edia dedicated to objective and professional reporting, w as just a “legal” preface to w hat w as to follow after the declaration of the state of w ar and the beginning of NAT O air strikes against Yugoslavia, both in the fields of hum an rights and freedom of expression. The shutdow n of the electronic m edia, the im prisonm ent of journalists, the intim idation of individuals, forced m obilization, censorship, the com pulsory leasing of frequencies to the staterun m edia, th e overall atmosphere of fear, the strict ban on using reports from foreign media and the expulsion of foreign journalists, can be considered alm ost m ild m easures, com pared to the assassination of the publisher and ow ner of Dnevni Telegraf Slavko Curuvija and the crippling of the Editor-in-Chief of the Republika Srpska-based N ezavisne N ovine, Zeljko Kopanja, in a bom b blast. The perpetrators of these crim es, w hich targeted journalists know n for their criticism of the Belgrade regim e, still “rem ain unknow n.” According to the annual report of the Association of Independent Electronic Media (ANEM), five journalists received jail sentences for crim inal offences during 1999 (on e of them is still serving h is senten ce) Ivana Z ivkovic and Lidija Popovic

and several others received jail sentences for m isdem eanours. Fines im posed under the provisions of th e Public Inform ation Law add up to m ore than 16.5 m illion dinars (2.750 m illion DEM at the official exchange rate: 6 dinars per DEM). Ten radio and television (RTV) stations w ere banned and Belgrade independent stations have been jam m ed for alm ost six m onths. The fact that independent m edia still exist in Serbia is close to a m iracle, given the circum stances. The forecasts for 2000 are grimmer than ever, judging by statements from regim e officials and the broad im plem entation of the Public Inform ation Law against the m edia. The stakes in the Information war are high. The repression of the media and the different tools the regim e used to gain exclusive access to the m inds of the people, in accordance w ith political developm ents in the co u n t r y, are divided in th is report in to th ree parts: 1. The pre-w ar period (before the beginning of NATO air strikes on March 24), 2. State of w ar in the country and 3. The post-w ar period. Given the fact that it w ould not be possible to list and analyze all cases of repression, w e w ill highlight som e of the m ost characteristic strategies. 1. Preparation for the war. The signing of the Milosevic-Holbrooke agreem ent on Kosovo (13 O ctober 1998) and the introduction of the O SCE Kosovo Verification Mission in the province w as soon follow ed by the decision by the Serbian Parliam ent to adopt the draconian Law on Public In form ation on 20 O ctober 1998. President Milosevic pushed it through Parliament, using the threat of possible NATO air strikes as an excuse to crack dow n on the independen t m edia. The vote w as 170-5, w ith O pposition legislators staying aw ay in protest. O n 30 O ctober, an independent union of 600 Serb judges denounced the m easure as â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;unconstitutional ...rem iniscent of the tim es of violence and law lessness,â&#x20AC;&#x2122; as Associated Press reported. Prior to the adoption of the Public Inform ation Law , the Serbian Governm ent had already stepped up its assault against the independent media. Police staged raids on at least three new spapers and several radio 82

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stations, confiscating their equipment and shutting them dow n. D eputy Prim e Minister Vojislav Seselj, president of the ultranationalist Radical Party, threatened to arrest journalists and seize foreign hostages if NATO bom bed the country. He also identified specific Editors as ‘collaborators and traitors’. State-run new s w as extended by an hour during w hich patriotic songs and jingles on Kosovo w ere broadcast. Behind the scenes, both sides w ere preparing for w ar. Affecting only Serbia, not Montenegro, the Public Information Law is considered to be the m ost repressive in Yugoslavian history. Major provisions call for the censorship of all media, a ban on all local rebroadcasts of foreign new s programm es an d heavy fines. Broadcasting w ithout a licence can bring a penalty equivalent to $10,000. The law generally offers only vague guidelines as to w hat constitutes an offence, and judgem ent is sw ift. A Serbian magistrate can bring a new s organization to trial – arbitrarily deciding that, for instance, a report on fighting in Kosovo m ight disturb the populace or threaten national security – w ith 24 hours’ notice. The organization has another 24 hours to prove its reporting has not violated the law . If convicted, the organization m ust pay $41,000 to $82,000 for each individual accused of having com m itted a reporting offence. In the independents’ w orld of low or no profits, these are im possible fines. If unpaid, they result in closure and the seizure of all assets. In an overview of th e first five m on th s of the im position of th e inform ation law, the FREE 2000 Com m ittee, an in tern ational NGO for the protection of m edia freedom s in FR Yugoslavia, reported that th e overall sum of fin es against the m edia in FRY durin g th is period am ounted to 14,321,500 din ars (2,386,917 DEM ). The com m ittee em phasiz ed th at th e publish er an d Editor of the daily Dnevni Telegra f an d the w eekly Ev rop lja n in, Slavko Curuvija, h ad to pay the follow ing fines for articles published: 2,400,000 dinars on 24 O ctober, 1998 (Ev rop lja n in), 1,200,000 din ars on 9 N ovem ber (Dnevni Telegra f) an d an addition al 450,000 d in ars on 9 D ecem ber (Dnevni Telegra f). Th e late Mr Curuvija and tw o other journalists w ere also sentenced to five m onths im prison m ent, according to Serbian crim inal law . O n 7 Ivana Z ivkovic and Lidija Popovic

Novem ber th e M onten egrin w eekly M on itor w as fined th e h igh est possible pen alty according to the Act, totalin g 2,800,000 dinars. Th e Kosovo Albanian daily Kosova Sot w as fin ed 1,600,000 dinars (12 M arch , 1999), and the other dailies Gazeta S qiptare and K om bi on 16 March an d 21 M arch, respectively. The Alban ian Daily K oha Ditore w as fined 520,000 din ars on 21 M arch, just a few days before the begin ning of the bom bing. According to the sources of Slobodna 2000, all these n ew spapers h ave declined to pay th ese fin es, w h ich h as h an ded th e regim e th e excuse to stop furth er distribution of th ese publications in Serbia. Since its official introduction, this Public Inform ation Law h as been sharply criticized by almost all international organ izations active in th e field of freedom of expression and hum an rights, includin g the UN Security Council, w hich called it “in com patible w ith the standardized guarantees for the freedom of speech, treated in the In ternational Charters regulating this issue.” Again, unfortunately, w ith n o concrete results. 2. State of War. (Excerpts from the 1999 Annual Report of ANEM w idely used in this section) O n March 24, NATO launched its air strikes against Yugoslavia. Wartime decrees w ere imposed. Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians fled Kosovo. Follow ing the 24-hour air raids, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic accepted the status of de facto international pro tectorate for Kosovo. The then NATO Secretary General, Xavier Solana, officially halted the air strikes on June 20. With the beginning of the NATO bom bing cam paign, the Kosovo and Yugoslavian crisis entered its m ost calam itous stage. In the m edia sphere, the Public Information Law w as fortified w ith w artim e decrees. The Serbian Ministry of Inform ation issued “Instruction s for th e operation of n ew s agencies and m edia outlets in the circum stances of th e im m inen t th reat of w ar”, im po sin g substantial lim itations on th e w ork of journalists. Am on g other things, Editors-in-chief of all the m edia w ere ordered to attend daily briefings w ith officials, w hile all 84

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journalists w ere called upon to “serve the curren t interest of the state.” N ATO forces w ere to be referred to as “th e aggressor” and it w as strictly forbidden to report on casualties am ong th e arm y and police. Despite the fact that these lim itations w ere to be expected, considering the situation, and w ere introduced on the basis of the constitutional provisions accordin g to w hich “th e freedom of expression m ay be restricted in a state of w ar and a state of an im m ediate threat of w ar”, the instructions w ere extrem ely vague and the consequences of non com pliance w ere unclear. The m ost sh ocking and terrifyin g event occurred in Belgrade on O rthodox Easter Sunday (April 11), w h en the w ell-kn ow n journ alist Slavko Curuvija w as m urdered under circum stances that still rem ain u n cle a r. State-run Serbian television , RT S , failed to report on this m urd e r. Shortly before th e assassination, Curuvija w as called a “n ation al traitor” by a hardline pro-govern m en t daily, Politika Ekspres, along w ith som e oth er opposition journ alists. Regardless of “w ho gave the order” for this assault, the fact rem ains that the regim e often used “the case of Slavko Curuvija” in order to “discipline” all other independent journalists. Serbia w as w h isperin g about the alleged existence of the “death squads.” In Kosovo, the last rem aining independent daily Koha Ditore w as forced to shut dow n after a violent police raid (March 25). According to the ANEM 1999 Annual Report, the once powerful public opinion in Serbia, w hich protected independent media on many occasions, lost any interest in any topic apart from the bombing, and a test case for the regim e w as the closing dow n of Radio B92, the most influential independent broadcaster from Belgrade and the arrest of Veran Matic, its frontm an and the chairman of ANEM. The event took place only hours after the NATO Secretary General announced that he had given the com mand for the air strikes to commence in the night from 24 to 25 March. Radio B92 staff continued w orking on its Internet site, w hich had one million hits per day, until the station’s complete closure on 2 April. The bannin g of B92 and Veran Matic’s arrest, w hich only lasted for several hours, w ere intended to be a strong m essage from the regim e Ivana Z ivkovic and Lidija Popovic

to all independent media, especially broadcasters, ANEM con tin ues. By closing the biggest radio station and arresting the “NATO general”, as he w as referred to by the state-run m edia, the regim e left no hope of survival for smaller independent m edia outlets unless they “co-operate” in som e w ay. The only possible m om ent w hen the regim e w as able to do such a thing w as the daw n of the NATO ’s w ar against Yugoslavia, and th e regim e seized that mom ent. Most of the foreign reporters w ere expelled from Yugoslavia. They w ere soon allow ed to return an d report under the strict control and guidance of the authorities, w hich excluded their presence in Kosovo. Arresting journalists w as also on e of th e techn iques of in tim idation . Th e Editor-in-Ch ief of TV Soko from Soko Ban ja, Nebojsa Ristic, a m em ber of ANEM , w as sen ten ced to on e year’s im prisonm ent for hanging a “Free Press” poster again st th e Public Inform ation La w, after his RTV station w as sh ut dow n because of, officially, not having a licen ce for its tran sm itter (26 March). He w as senten ced by Soko Ban ja D istrict Court for “dissem inating false in form ation” under article 218 of the Serbian penal code. As th is report w as bein g conclu ded, despite num erous appeals, Mr Ristic w as still servin g his sentence. The Editor-in -Chief of th e N in w e e k ly, Stevan Niksic, and colum nist, D ragoslav Ran cic, w ere h eld in solitary confin em ent for som e 30 h ours (26 March), b ecause “som e very influen tial people” w ere angered by an article w ritten by M r Ran cic, despite the fact the M in istry of In form ation had approved the entire issue of th e m agazin e. Both journ alists w ere released an d later received an apology from the Min istry. Anoth er form of repression w as draftin g independent journalists into m ilitary service. No on e can claim th at all journ alists from independent m edia w ere drafted on ly because th ey w ere journalists, but for som e there is no doubt that the fact that they w ere in that profession con tributed to the m ilitary deciding to draft them . The strongest evidence for this is th at regim e m edia journalists w ere rarely drafted, because “they served their country th rough th eir journ alism ”. Failure to com ply w ith th e draft in Serbia m eant an alm ost certain prison sen86

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tence (m easurable in years, n ot m onths) if an d w h en a conscript w as caugh t, an d th at only after servin g in the m ilitary, i.e. the w ar. The average percen tage of drafted journalists w orkin g for ANEM affiliated radio stations w as 30 percen t. This method w as broadly used against journalists in Montenegro. The Belgrade governm ent w as infuriated w ith the fact that, follow ing the strong condem nation of Milosevic’s policy in Kosovo by the proWestern governm ent of President Milo Djukanovic, NATO targeted only a few Army installations in this sm all Yugoslavian Republic, w hile Serbia w as heavily bom bed. Nebojsa Skenderi, journalist of the Podgorica-based independent radio station Antena M explains: “Indepen den t media in Mon tenegro w ere alm ost ‘out of reach ’ for Belgrade governm ent. Nevertheless, Montenegrins w ere also obliged to go to the Yugoslavian Arm y, if called on to do so. The arm y attem pted to draft almost every male journalist. Antena M w as reporting professionally and in accordan ce w ith the situation at the tim e, so w e had no serious problems, apart from the com mon ‘cat an d m ouse’ gam es w ith the m ilitary police trying to draft m y colleagues and m yself. How ever, som e media, like Free M ontenegro, w ere too precise in their reporting on the positions the Yugoslavian Arm y troops w ere holding around the capital, w hich w as perceived by th e army as ‘giving aw ay confiden tial inform ation’ ”, Skenderi explained for this report. According to an overview of media repression in Yugoslavia , published in the International Press Institute (Ipi) book The Kosovo N ews and Propaganda War, on 14 May, a military court in Podgorica brought charges against tw o journalists from Radio Free M ontenegro: its Editor-in -C h ie f, Nebojsa Redzic, and Miodrag Perovic, founder of the w eekly magazin e M onitor and Radio Antena M . “The tw o had to leave the country. Redzic even applied for asylum in Italy. They returned to Montenegro w hen the situation w as no longer critical”, Antena M explained and continued: “It is im portant to em phasize th at th e Montenegrin Government w as trying to calm the situation and not provoke the Belgrade authorities. How e ve r, police loyal to President Milo Djukanovic w ere sometimes “sent to ‘gu a rd’ the media from the Army”, Nebojsa Skenderi said. Ivana Z ivkovic and Lidija Popovic

O ne of the regim e’s m ethods of repression against indepen dent m edia w as the com pulsory lease of frequencies and broadcasting equipm ent from in dependent broadcasters on behalf of the state broadcaster, RT S, as w ell as com pulsory broadcasts of RT S new s bulletins on all electronic m edia in Serbia. Both of these restrictive measures – illegal even w h en takin g all w artim e decrees into consideration (the rebroadcasting ord er cam e either from th e m ilitary or from th e Federal Governm ent) – w ere a con sequence of NATO targeting state television transm itters, w h ich could n ot h ave been repaired during the bom bing cam paign , an d, un fortunately, also the RT S studios in Aberdareva Street in Belgrade (23 April), w hich claim ed the lives of at least 16, m ostly young, RT S w orkers. NAT O ’s explan ation that media can be considered a legitim ate military target, sparked num erous reactions w orldw ide. The O SCE Representative on Freedom of th e Media, Freim ut D uve said: “In m y opinion , it’s disputable w hether transm itters should be destroyed, but journalists and civilians, of course, should not be targeted”, Mr Duve stated. Since the regim e turned to th e transm itters of independent broadcasters, they w ere placed in a very poor position – to choose betw een being closed dow n , having equipm ent seized, or giving som e of its frequencies w ith equipm ent to RT S. Som e station s w ere shut dow n because they didn’t have licences, the others for not having paid frequency fees (even though som e station s didn ’t h ave licences, it didn’t stop the Ministry requestin g fees), and some due to “the use of equipment again st the interest of national defence”. Generally speakin g, the regime closed dow n all stations w hich did not agree to compromise w ith it and w hich remained on a strong in dependent course of reporting, informing th e public on the Kosovo tragedy of th e eth nic Albanians, rebroadcasting foreign program mes and using new s supplied by foreign new s agencies (Reuters, AP, France Press etc). The cam paign, w ith some exceptions, began at the very onset of the w ar. According to ANEM data, beside Radio B92 , the follow ing station s w ere closed dow n during the w ar: Radio 021 from Novi Sad, VK I and VK II Radio from Kikinda, Radio S enta from Sen ta, TV Soko from Sokobanja (27 March), TV Cacak fr o m 88

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Cacak (3 April), Radio Jasenica from Smederevska Palanka, RTV Device from Smederevska Palanka and RTV from Lisovic. Som e stations decided to close dow n them selves, because there w ere absolutely no conditions for the usual course of th eir independent reportin g and because experience sh ow ed that equipment seized from banned broadcasters w as (illegally) given to RTS, and used for the dissem ination of state propaganda. Radio O zon from Cacak (2 April), STV N egotin (18 April) and TV Glas Obiliceva (22 March) w ere among the stations w hich m ade their ow n decision to close dow n in order to keep their equipm ent safe. Also, on 2 June, FoNet new s agency decided to cease w ork because of “unbearable conditions m ake any kind of professional w ork im possible”. Concerning the problems of printed media, at the beginning of O ctober 1999 a conference in Mon tenegro, sponsored by the O SCE, w as intended to allow Serbian, Montenegrinian and few Albanian journalists to discuss their coverage of NAT O ’s bombing w ar over Kosovo, its causes and its afterm ath. Dragoljub Zarkovic, Editor of the independent weekly, Vreme, answ ered these critics: “Refusing to publish w ould be considered defiance under the circum stances”. Government threatened to close dow n any paper that did not publish It w ould have been a terrible mistake if Vreme had been killed‘”, Zarkovic said. Veselin Sim onovic, Editor of the independent daily Blic stated that independent m edia, even under state-im posed censorship, did not indulge in the hysterical, jingoistic and aggressive lan guage that state-run media w ere using. “Independent journalists drew a distinction betw een popular, patriotic anger about the N ATO bom bing campaign an d support for Milosevic,” Simonovic said. He added that: “These outlets w ere publishing NATO statem ents and Western reports about events in Kosovo, including stories about m ass graves and Western estim ates of the number of dead.” Given the dram atic financial situation even of those independent m edia (above all broadcasters) w hich contin ued to w ork throughout the w ar, w e dare conclude that the period of the NATO air cam paign devastated the independent m edia scene in Serbia, leaving it in desperate need of any aid it can get. According to the data released by the IndeIvana Z ivkovic and Lidija Popovic

pendent Journalists Association of Serbia (NUNS), 70 percent out of its 1.100 m em bers have factually lost their jobs and incom es since the Law w as in troduced (O ctober, 1998) till the State of War w as in pow er (June, 1999). The situation w ithin state and pro-regime media is not much better, since a lot of people w ere fired or suspended for financial reasons during the NATO air strikes. According to NUNS reports, 80 percent of those freelancing in Serbia earn less then 200 DEM per month and their honorars are usually late for m ore then three m onths. The rem aining 20 percent, w ho can earn their living from their journalistic experience are m ostly those w ho had started w orking for the foreign crew s, due to th eir good con nections and th e know ledge of foreign languages. “Situation is gettin g w orse and w orse, journalists are cornered, but according to m y opinion, the w orst is yet to com e”, says Gordana Janicijevic, a m em ber of NUNS Executive Board. 3. The post-war period. (Excerpts from the 1999 Annual Report of ANEM w idely used in this section) M edia, censorship and the state: w hat lessons can be learned from the 78-day period of controlled inform ation, and w hat is the purpose of “victory” if there w as no feeling of freedom am ong the people, even on the very day peace w as sealed (betw een NATO and the Yu go sla v ia n Arm y in Kum anovo on 9 June, 1999). At the time, media reporting w as still in direct connection w ith the national interests of the country. The m edia had been devastated, bom bed, exhausted in term s of finances and staff, w hile the general public w as im poverished. The m edia now faced almost insurmountable problems, and traumas w ere deep. The people have had to lick their fingertips to determ ine w here the w ind w as com ing from . Everyone has had to find their ow n an sw ers as to w hat happened in Yugoslavia, w hat the reality of the Kosovo situation w as and is, w hat course Yugoslavia’s renew al and reconstruction process w ill take, and how broken ties w ith the w orld w ill be repaired. Censorship implied general rules and patterns for the media, w hile the state propagan da, trying to turn d efeat into victory w as un stop90

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pable, illegal and even m ore dan gerous then the censorship itself. At th e poin t w hen the Yugoslav people needed an overall and deep consideration of its past, “destiny” and future, the regim e still h ad a free han d to m ake such statem ents as, “Yugoslavia is continuing its developm ent” or to refer to General Sir Michael Jackson as a “UN general”, in stead of calling h im a “com m ander of the NATO -run peacekeeping troops” (although UN Resolution 1244 did give a Security Council mandate to KFO R troops). For independen t media, th e process of data collecting on w hat really occurred w as as risky as w alkin g through a m inefield durin g the period in w hich the state of w ar rem ained in force for almost a month after the air strikes w ere halted: the reasons for caution w ere m ore than obvious an d referred to th e fact th at th e regim e – fighting for its survival w ith all its resources and m ight – con tin ued to choke the independent an d free m edia an d bombard dom estic public opinion w ith its propaganda. The m ain propaganda pillar of the regim e, the new s program m es of the state-run RTS (above all its prim e-tim e evening new s) w as crucial to the Governm ent. Despite the fact that the bom bing had ended, all RTV stations in Serbia received a directive from the Ministry of Telecom m unications and Inform ation that they had to carry on rebroadcasting th e central information show s of TV Serbia. Th e best illustration of h ow far th is w ent, is the fact that even Radio Belgrade’s third program me (for decades reserved only for in tellectual debates and classical music), the audio version of the daily new s program m es w as introduced. During the w ar, nobody w as able to publicly express their disapproval. But once the bom bing w as over, at tim e the state of w ar should had been called off, the num ber of stations w hich w ere m eeting this obligation w ith unease w as increasing. The m edia w ere desperate to regain freedom as soon as possible. The Belgrade RTV Studio B, under control of the city governm ent of Vuk Draskovic’s Serbian Renew al Movem ent (SPO ), dared to break this im posed “co-operation” w ith RT S, but w as soon “asked” to renew it for as long as the state of w ar w as in pow er. It did so w ith a certain am ount of appropriate grum bling. Ivana Z ivkovic and Lidija Popovic

The confiscation of the Banja Luka-based N ezavisne N ovine daily at the Bosnian-Yugoslav border, equipm ent expropriation, the ban on TV M ladenovac broadcasts and m isdem eanour proceedings against the ow ner of Radio Senta and VK Radio Kikinda, Zoran Malesevic, are also exam ples of the regim e’s repression during the state of w ar situation. As w e already em phasized, only several w eeks after NATO air raids ended, did the regim e finally revoke the state of w ar decrees on the m edia. Despite the psychological change, along w ith som e easing up of the legal possibilities for repression, the m edia situation did not “norm alize” to a state in w hich freedom of expression w as duly respected. And aw areness of the n eed for “inform ation pluralism ” in the postw ar m edia landscape w as low. During th e w ar, the authorities appointed th eir men in Radio B92 (usin g th e Achilles h eel of m an y m edia in post-com m un ist societies: un resolved and vague ow nersh ip status), so that the people w ho had m ade this station a globally recognized phen om enon an d sym bol of indepen dent journ alism in Eastern Europe are faced w ith the ch aotic and politically arbitrary legal system of Milosevic’s Serbia as they try to claim back the radio station they had created th em selves. But, not believin g too much in a favourable outcom e w ithout serious political ch an ges, and a political de-blockin g of th e judiciary, they h ave m anaged to find an alternative route for operating. The B2 - 9 2 p r o je ct w as agreed w ith Studio B in Belgrade and the real B9 2 crew started producin g their broadcasts on 2 August, 1999. Soon thereafter, on 4 August, the AN EM Radio and Television Netw ork w as establish ed again. TV Sok o reopened, along w ith Radio Jasenica from Sm ederevska Palan ka, Radio 021 from Novi Sad an d Radio VK from Kikinda. T V C a ca k , RTV Devic and even TV Pirot, the first of th e ANEM stations to be sh ut dow n in April 1998, are broadcasting a g a in . In d e p e n d e n t new spapers are back to pre-w ar circulationlevels, w ith a strong indepen dent editorial policy. Am ong the n on-regime m edia w hich survived and w hich could be heard in Belgrade, the m ost trusted electronic m edia among th e citizens w as Radio Pancevo, because even during the m ost difficult w artim e cir92

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cum stances – w hich w ere indeed even m ore difficult in this industrial city, targeted m ore heavily during the bom bing than any other city in Serbia outside Kosovo – this radio station proved that it w as both professional and that it had civil courage by distributing relevant inform ation from all sides and all sources. Radio Pancevo survived too and reinforced its position and reputation am ong its listeners. O n e of the side-effects of the past w ar is the “emptying” of th e air over Serbia due to the to destruction of num erous transm itters an d th e in terruption of the electric pow er system : in the lon g w ar nigh ts w ith out electric pow er, the citizen s of Belgrade could listen on their transistor radio sets to various stations from Croatia, Bosn ia an d Herzegovina, Hungary, Rom ania and Bulgaria. The fact that com petition on the air is a very serious business is proved by th e fact, that som ew here in the vicinity of Serbia, a pow erful FM radio transm itter w as installed w hich made available to the citizens of w estern an d north-w estern Serbia, and a considerable part of Voivodina and Belgrade a high-quality reception of program m es by the BBC, Voice of America, Radio Free Europ e, Deutsche W elle, Radio France International and other internation al stations. This, of course, w as not at all agreeable for the regim e, because it is n o secret that these station s w ere relatively popular during the w ar, w h ich m arred the im age of the w ar the authorities “claim ed to have a m onopoly on”, the prescribed im age of its causes, its course an d its consequences. That is w hy the official new spapers w ere full of enraged com m entaries that these station s w ere “dinosaurs of th e Cold War”. A large num ber of citiz en s of Serbia – bom bed from w ithout an d opp ressed an d robbed from w ith in – appeared not to care to listen to anyone’s “truth” anym ore. That is w hy they sought delusive oblivion in “ligh t en tertain m ent”, but th at is w h ere the regim e in frastructure aw aited th em again : the authorities in charge of en tertainm en t in th e m edia, that is, the m usical and film stations such as TV Pink a n d TV Palma (ow n ed by high officials of th e rulin g party) a n d RTV Kosava (h eaded by Marija M ilosevic, daugh ter of th e President of FRY). After NATO h ad bom bed the skyscraper of th e form er Ivana Z ivkovic and Lidija Popovic

Cen tral Com m ittee of th e Com m unist Party (w h ich is n ow ow ned by Milosevic’s post-com m unists) at the top of w h ich w ere th e transm itters of th ese stations, their program m es could not be seen or their ran ge w as significantly reduced. But they have put up n ew an tennas on top of th e destroyed buildin g w h ich m eans that the “production of oblivion” w ith ch eap Latin Am erican TV soap-operas and easy-listening m usic w ill con tin ue. At the sam e tim e, people living in inner Serbia, w ho w ere dissatisfied w ith the presen t overall situation , began to spontaneously direct their discontent at the regime in Belgrade. In Cacak, an important industrial city in central Serbia and stronghold of the dem ocratic opposition, local authorities and citizens dem anded of the telecom m unications authorities that they enable broadcasting of TV Cacak again, or else, they said, they w ould do it on their ow n. What the citizens of Cacak w ere announcing had already happened further south, in the tourist resort of Sokoban ja. The local authorities there – also mem bers of Serb dem ocratic opposition – rem oved the seal off the prem ises of TV S ok obanja and restarted free and uncensored broadcasts. V K 1, the first indepen dent radio station in northern Vojvodin a also started w orking. There w ere sim ilar exam ples in Nis, Kraljevo, Bajina Basta and other cities and tow ns around Serbia. A spon tan eous rally, atten ded by th ousan ds, for exam ple, w as provoked in Leskovac by Ivan Novkovic, an em ployee of RTV Leskovac, a regim e-controlled local m edia outlet in southern Serbia. Leskovac suffered a lot due to th e NATO w ar w ith Yugoslavia, for m an y sold iers from th at region w ere killed an d crippled in Kosovo durin g air raids. Public dissatisfaction grew en orm ously once th e bom bing en ded an d people began to question w hether these losses could have been avoided. M r Novkovic w as w orking as a technician in TV Leskovac, an d during a basketball gam e transm ission (Yugoslavia w as playing Germ any in th e European ch am pionship in Fran ce), in the h alftim e interm ission , h e broadcast a pre-recorded statem ent in w hich he open ly said w hat he th ough t about th e catastrophic situation in Leskovac region an d w h o w as to blam e. He also called on the peo94

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ple from Leskovac to gath er for a public rally a couple o f days later, an d a huge crow d of 20,000 people gathered for a rally on a scale n ever seen before in the city. The m ost dangerous aspect of the rally for the regim e w as the fact that it w asn ’t organ iz ed by any political p a r t y, but w as rather spon tan eous. The public in vitation issued by M r Novkovic via local TV w as enough for a h uge crow d to gather on th e streets. He w as fired from TV Leskovac even before th e rally, an d regim e people from that tow n publicly labelled him a “NATO m ercenary”. Th ose atten din g the rally ch eered h e said: “I am not an yb o d y ’s m ercen ary, I am n o m ore than a ordinary, poor citizen !” Protests an d rallies in Leskovac continued, and the police arrested M r Novkovic th e n ext day. A m isdem ean our judge sen tenced h im to 30 days im prisonm en t for “organizin g an un approved public m eeting”. M r Novkovic served h is sen ten ce an d rejoin ed protesters after 30 days. Crim in al proceedings h ave been initiated against him by Leskovac district auth ority for th e “m isuse of official post”. It is n ecessary to stress a potentially great danger for all independent broadcasters – an action by the Federal Min istry of Te le co m mun ications, w hich is requesting paym ents of frequen cies fees for the postw ar period, th reaten ing that all stations w h ich do not pay w ill be closed dow n . M oreover, th e Federal Governm en t has passed a decision after th e w ar th at all stations w h ich “con tributed to n ation al defence” durin g th e w ar sh all be relieved of th e obligation to pay th ose fees. The com pilin g of a list of such station s is left to th e Min istry itself. Th is h ands the M in istry a pow erful w eapon for disciplining the station s since, during the w ar perio d, if a station h ad com prom ised, it w ould be relieved of its debt; if n ot, th e fee w ould be charged an d th e station ban ned. At the end of Septem ber 1999, repression against th e in depen dent m edia n ot on ly continued but picked up pace and brutality as protests organized by th e (opposition ) Allian ce for Ch ange spread. The first case of repression in Septem ber w as a break-in and th eft at Radio Globus, an ANEM affiliate from Kraljevo, on 11 Septem ber. During th e night, unkn ow n perpetrators broke in to its prem ises an d Ivana Z ivkovic and Lidija Popovic

took aw ay the station ’s equipm en t. Th e burglary w as clearly politically m otivated – absolutely no equipm en t belon ging to Radio Plus, a station w hich shares its prem ises w ith Radio G lobus, w as stolen. O n th e sam e day tw o new spapers – Cacansk i G las a n d Kikindske N ovine – stood trial un der th e Public In form ation Act. Cacanski Glas w a s fined 200,000 (35,000 DEM ) but the charges again st Kik indske N ovine w ere dropped. O n 18 Septem ber, th e Serbian Min istry of In form ation issued an appeal (in fact, m ore of a w arnin g) to all m edia outlets, caution in g them not to publish any inform ation w h ich could “h inder the con fidence of th e people in the actions of the Governmen t”. These instruction s w ere obviously m eant to scare th e m edia off before th e beginning of the Alliance for Change protests. Durin g the sam e period, the jam m in g of TV Studio B’s sign al com m enced. Nam ely, w henever a prim e tim e political broadcast w as bein g aired, the TV Studio B s ign a l w as jam m ed from an unknow n location . O n 22 Septem ber, all copies of that w eek’s issue of the Banja Luka Rep orter w ere seized at the border betw een Bosn ia and Serbia. The auth orities explain ed th at th e issue h ad “slan derous conten ts” regarding top Serbian officials and w as therefore seized. O n Septem ber 29, the Belgrade daily G la s Javnosti received a first-tim e 200,000 dinar fine (aroun d 35,000 DEM) for a m edia m isdem eanour listed in the Public In form ation Act. The very n ext day, sin ce the paper w as able to pay the fine, it w as closed dow n for 15 days by the fin an cial police, w hich began a tw o-w eek inspection of Glas Javnosti’s business practices, failin g to find anythin g illegal. Alon g w ith the new spaper, th e printin g facility of ABC Grafik a, on w hich Glas Javnosti w as prin ted, w as also sealed for 15 days, w ith a sim ilar explanation. Th e real reasons for th e shutdow n of G las and its prin ting facility is, in the w ords of Slavoljub Kacarevic, A BC’s ow n er and general m anager, the fact that it printed the protest bulletin for Alliance for Chan ge. According to ANEM ’s m edia report, durin g clashes betw een the police an d th e protesters in Belgrade on th e nigh t of 29 Septem ber, at least six journ alists w ere beaten, an d their equipm ent destroyed 96

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or dam aged. The repression gained pace in O ctober, an d th e auth orities turn ed back to usin g th e Public In form ation Act in order to disciplin e th e press. These developm ents give reason for concern about the im m ediate future of th e in dependen t m edia in Serbia. A crackdo w n on the m edia h as in th e past signalled that the regim e m igh t be preparin g for yet an oth er w ar situation or the introduction of an open tyran ny. Another n ew spaper is th e daily D anas, w hich w as fined 280,000 din ars on 27 O ctober. Th is penalty w as follow ed by a law suit brought again st th e paper by th e D ep uty Prim e M in ister of Serbia, Vojislav Seselj (an d Head of SRS). In th is case, a n ew spaper has been drastically fin ed for accurately reporting a statem en t o f a h igh state official, w h ich is par excellence a public m atter. Th is goes again st th e guarantees of the free press an d high lights the repressive n ature of Serbian m edia law . Apart from ABC Grafika, publish ers of G las and D anas, som e smaller new spapers w ere also fined under the same law durin g the month of O ct o b e r. O ne of them is Kikindske N ovine, for w hich th e fine am oun ted to 200,000 dinars (35,000 DEM). Anoth er local new spaper, N isk e N ovine, w as fined 200,000 dinars on 20 O ctober for publishing an article stating salaries of the DIN tobacco factory m anagem ent (all of them being regim e party m embers). O n e of the biggest single attacks on free journalism occurred on 22 O ctober in Republika Srpska, w h ere Zeljko Kopan ja, ow ner an d Editor of th e daily, N ez avisne N ovine, w as th e target of a car- b o m b blast in w hich he w as seriously in jured. Mr Kopanja lost both h is legs in th e explosion and is still recoverin g as he undergoes m edical treatm ent in Ban ja Luka. This terro rist attack is believed to have been largely m otivated by a series of texts dealing w ith w ar crim es com m itted by Serbs in Bosnia â&#x20AC;&#x201C; th e first of its kind in th e Bosn ian Serb press, w hich disturbed som e pow erful circles both in Republika Srpska an d in Serbia. Compared to the situation in O ctober, one m ight conclude that the repression in this phase had reached its peak. In Novem ber, legal proIvana Z ivkovic and Lidija Popovic

ceedings betw een the Government and S tudio B and the B2 - 9 2 s t a t io n , the jam m ing of Radio Index, and the fining of publications like Glas Ja vn osti contin ued. As dem ocratic opposition demonstrations lost their pace during Novem ber, the harshest cases of journalists being beaten up w ere not reported. How ever, the practice of deporting foreign journalists and im prisoning them , very “popular” during the w ar, contin ued in Novem ber, indicating that the regim e w as up to som ething and the presence of foreign m edia w as undesirable. ANEM launched its “Silence Is Not Hum an” cam paign on 24 N o ve m b e r. The cam paign consisted of a series of open debates an d concerts all over inner Serbia, aim ing to raise public aw areness of the problem s the independent m edia face in their everyday w ork. O n the sam e day, there w as a w orrying statem ent from JUL, the political party led by the w ife of President Milosevic, in w hich it announced that Yugoslavia “needs a decontam ination in the field of m edia and journalists”. JUL is know n to be influential in the m edia sphere – most high officials responsible for the media are JUL m em bers. Sim ilar statements in 1998 preceded the Law on Public Inform ation, so it is only reasonable to fear that the repression w ill grow in the im m ediate future. Milosevic’s w ife has referred to th e in dependent m edia as “the biggest enem y”, but since then, JUL has openly advocated propaganda and criticizes fair and im partial reporting. Threats began to become reality in Decem ber. The regime signalled it intended to bring the “ordinary” level of repression even higher and to continue w ith repressive m ethods w hich have in the past proved “effective” (such as the frequency jam m ing of TV Studio B and Radio B2–92) and to end som e pending cases (ABC Grafika printing facility and Glas Javnosti). The first recorded case of the sw ift im plem entation of JUL’S “decontam ination” statem ent w as fining TV Studio B, and the daily new spapers Blic and Danas. This as a result of charges brought against them by Deputy Prim e Minister Seselj, and Aleksandar Vucic, Minister of Inform ation of Serbia, and a high-level SRS official. Three m edia outlets w ere fined a total of 970,000 dinars on 8 Decem ber for m erely publishing a statem ent by the SPO , the largest parliam entary 98

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opposition party, in w hich high state officials w ere accused of being involved in terrorist activities. Governm ent pressure on ABC G rafika and Glas Ja v n osti began at the end of September/early O ctober and had its epilogue in Decem ber. First, the financial police blocked the account of ABC Grafik a on 10 D e ce m b e r. This prompted a protest from Slavoljub Kacarevic, A BC ge neral manager and the Editor-in -Chief of G las Javnosti. O n 12 Decem ber, w ithout previous w arning, the financial police and the IRS confiscat ed som e of ABC Grafika’s printing equipm ent as part of a forceful execution of the m isdem eanour penalty. In addition to im posing its Public In form ation Law, oth er m ethods have also been applied by the regim e again st m edia outlets, as w as the case w ith th e w eekly publication, Rep orter, w hich w as subject to n ew bans and con fiscation . Rep orter, originally from Ban ja Luka in Republika Srpska, w as ban ned through the revocation of an im port licence in O ctober, but it registered in M ontenegro an d reappeared on the Serbian m arket in late November. How ever, starting from 18 D e ce m b e r, th e police began confiscating copies of the m agazin e all over Serbia, and in Vranje even the colporteurs w ere sum moned by the police for questioning. O n 21 December the Federal Minister of Telecom munications, Ivan Markovic, a high JUL official, gave a statement saying that his Ministry, “shall not allow Yugoslav sovereignty to be breached”, after a num ber of international organizations publicized their plan to aid the independent broadcasters w ith equipm ent. With no explanation as to how the legal import of con tem porary broadcastin g equipment could breach the sovereignty of Yugoslavia, Markovic threatened independent broadcasters, openly ann oun cing th at, in the year 2000,” order w ill finally be in troduced in th e frequen cy sector”. How ever, th e m ost dan gerous statem ents are th ose m ade by Aleksan dar Vucic. First, on 11 D e c e m b e r, th e Serbian M inister of In form ation stated th at “NAT O servan t m edia sh all no t be allow ed to poison Serbian people in th e future”, and, usin g th e sam e rh etoric as JUL’s notorious statem en t from late Novem ber, he openly discarded the freedom of speech Ivana Z ivkovic and Lidija Popovic

con cept, “w hen it com es to patriotism an d defen ce of th e country”. Apparen tly seeing th at h e w ent too far w ith h is statem en t, h e corrected him self th e next day by saying th at th e state shall defend itself “w ith the truth” an d n ot “by repression ”. Th e repressive ideas and goals of M ilosevic’s w ife an d her party are executed by th e extrem e-righ t SRS, th e Radicals, w h o are form ally “in charge” of m edia in Serbia. Th eir action s started to b e felt in Decem ber. In addition to th e continuing repression of th e m edia, cases of a dan gerous denial of th e freedom of speech, unrelated to th e m edia, w ere reported that m on th, the m ost grave bein g th e rem oval of th ree judges headin g the Society of Judges of Serbia, an NGO gatherin g of all judges in favour of th e in dependent judiciary con cept. Thus, the regim e show ed very clearly that all cases of repression against the civil sector are inspired by the sam e general idea and concept: the gaining of com plete and utter control over all social processes an d especially all tools of pow er w ithin Serbia. Whether Milosevic’s regime needs public disciplin e in Serbia in order to make a m ove against Montenegro or sim ply because it is the only w ay for it to survive, is yet to be seen in year 2000. O n 30 Decem ber, in an interview given to Politik a d a ily, Presiden t Slobodan Milosevic stated that the media in Serbia w ere free, but also that there are some traitorous m edia w ith w hich the State w ould deal in the follow ing year. Som e say that this statem ent represented Milosevic’s approval of the so-called “decon tam ination” of the media, inspired by JUL an d carried out by the radical SRS as a strategy for the year 2000. C onclus ions . Given the circum stan ces, the fact that independent m edia still exist in Serbia is close to a m iracle. H o w ever, the independent m edia are still the healthiest part of civil society in Serbia, and they w ill, w ithout a doubt, do their best to keep w orking professionally despite any, old or new, methods of repression the regime m ay invent and implement. We emphasize that the free and unhindered operation of independent Yugoslav m edia, is essential for the realization of a peaceful solution to the crisis and for the rebuilding of trust and mutu100

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al tolerance among ethnic groups and among opposition political factions. In the near future, free media are a crucial pre-condition for free and fair elections and democratization in Serbia. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to establish co-operation betw een m edia outlets and opposition movements in Serbia w hose goal w ould be the creation of a democratic environment, w hich w ould enable truly free and independent media over the long term. O ne should also pay more attention to recomm endations by the independent media regarding the conditions for free and fair elections. At the end of this report, in order to w arn the public that the forecasts for the year 2000 could be w orse then ever for those intent on doing their job in accordance w ith their professional and personal ethics, w e hereby attach the transcript of an argum ent betw een the hardline Serbian Deputy Prime Minister, Vojislav Seselj, and a senior B2 92 journalist. At the press conference held on 10 February, Seselj accused journalists from a num ber of Belgrade m edia of involvem ent in the m urder of Yugoslav Defence Minister Pavle Bulatovic, w ho w as gunned dow n in Belgrade earlier that w eek: (source: B2-92 w ebsite) B2-92: What m easures w ill the State take against state terrorism from the West? Seselj: O ur response w ill be adequate, based on the Constitution and the law , w ith the use of every instrum ent w e have at our disposal for the defence of our country. B2-92: Against w hom ? Seselj: Against all w ho are instrum ents of Western countries. Against them all. Perhaps against your paper as w ell. You’re from Novosti, right? B2-92: B2-92. Se s e lj: Ah! From B2-92! What’s that? I’ve not heard about that. Is it registered? Minister, is there anythin g like that? (Ed.: he was speaking to his close aide, Aleksandar Vucic, Serbian M inister of Information who was also present) Against all those w ho act on instructions from the West, w ho receive m oney from the Am ericans and their allies to act against Yugoslavia. In an adequate w ay. You are going to experience this adequate w ay in practice. The gloves are off. Now it’s crystal clear: he w ho Ivana Z ivkovic and Lidija Popovic

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lives by the sw ord m ay die by the sw ord, and all of you should bear that in m ind. Don’t think that w e’re going to let you kill us off like rabbits, or that w e’ll be coddling and caring for you like potted plants. Be careful! You from B2-92 and the other treacherous outlets. You can’t really believe that you’ll survive if w e’re executed. You’re very w rong. Any m ore questions? B2 - 9 2: Sin ce this thing h appened w ith Mr Bulatovic – this tragedy and crim e – are you personally afraid, bearing in m ind w hat you have said about the state terrorism currently being carried out by other countries? You’re a prom inent politician. Se s e lj: You should know by now that I am afraid of nothing. Absolutely nothing! B2-92: A few w eeks ago, rum our had it that you’d been injured in an accident. Seselj: Well you can see that I’m not hurt! Why w ould I be afraid? It’s you w ho should be afraid. You w ork for a treacherous m edium . B2-92: It’s not a treacherous m edium . Seselj: Ah! It’s not a treacherous m edium ! All right! You can prove afterw ards that it isn’t. B2-92: After w hat? Seselj: After som ething. You’ll see w hat. The gloves are off. You kill statesm en off like rabbits here, thinking you’re safe. You’re m aking a m istake. You’re m aking a big m istake. Now the gloves are off. Anyone w ho w orks for the Am ericans must suffer the consequences. What consequen ces? The w orst possible. You’re w orkin g against your ow n country; you’re paid Am erican m oney to destroy your country. You’re traitors, you’re the w orst! kind! There’s nothing w orse than you! You’re w orse than any kind of crim inals! B2-92: That’s not true, Mr Seselj. Seselj: It ’s very true. It’s com pletely true. You’re traitors because you take m on ey from the Am ericans and you alw ays have. You’re the sam e, the on es w ho took m oney to kill the Defence M inister and you w ho are paid to spread propagan da against your country. You’re th e same, the sam e crim inals. I’m quite certain about th at because they 102

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subm it official reports about h ow m uch m oney they give you. And you’re the same. B2-92: Are you looking am ong journalists for the m urderers? Se s e lj: We’re looking for the murderers among those of you w ho w ork for foreign intelligence services. You’re accom plices in the m urder. You’re the same. You journalists think you’re some kind of sacred cow s? Som e of you are cow s, allright, but not sacred. You’re murderers. Yo u ’re m urderers of your people and your country, potentially. Yes, those of you w orking for the Am ericans: you from Danas, you from B92 (Seselj w as refering to B2-92), you from Glas Javnosti, from Novosti, you from Blic. You’re traitors to the Serbian nation. You’re deliberately w orking in the interests of those w ho w ere killing Serbian children. You’re doing it deliberately. You’ve sold your souls. That’s w hat you are!

Acknowledgements and References: We hereby wish to thank all the people who worked hard in the field and made the compilation of this report possible, especially the legal team of the Association of Independent Electronic M edia (AN EM Annual Report on Repression against the M edia in FRY ), as well as: FREE 2000, M EDIA CEN TAR, the Independent Journalists Association of Serbia (N UN S) and the International Press Institute (IPI) whose data were also used in this report.

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Anatoly Pristavkin Chechnya - a Co untry at War1 The most terrible cold is the cold of a soldier’s death. “Well, w hat kind of w inter can w e expect”? I asked the driver. It w as late autum n and w e w ere on our w ay to the dacha. “Mmm w hat kind …” he answ ered. “Watch the w ay the aspen leaf falls to the ground: face up, it’ll be on the w arm side; face dow n, you can expect cold”. I didn’t have tim e to w atch the w ay the aspen leaf fell, and anyw ay w e are not so m uch afraid of cold w inters as of uneasy ones. At such tim es, even on w arm days, people w rap them selves up in hope; frayed nerves hold no heat. And there are reasons to be uneasy – one know s that stability, even the shakiest, is better than an y changes. An d now on top of all our other “joys”, w e have bloody terrorism , w hich is striking fear into the hearts of the inhabitants of Russian cities and w hich has ended w ith a new w ar in Chechnya. Perhaps if w e w ere able to puzzle out the root causes of w hat is happening in Chechnya, w e w ould also be able to understand som e thing about Russia and w hat is lying in store for it tom orrow. But I can tell you right aw ay, w ithout any reservations, that this new w ar in the Caucasus is a new and m ajor calam ity for this country. O ne day, in a Sw edish prison, I saw an inscription on the w all, evidently w ritten by a prisoner: “Everything has three sides – your side, my side and the side that counts”. I am trying to look at each event from tw o sides, let us say from the Chechen and Russian side. The third side I’ll leave to the reader, to make up his ow n mind w here the truth lies. Thus … Russia. The phrase is not m y invention, it’s w hat people are saying today – “the second Chechen w ar” – the idea being to distinguish it from the earlier one, although neither w as referred to as a w ar in the 1

From : Moskovskie Novosti, 16-22 Novem ber 1999

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official reports. Even in our Com m ission for Mercy the “first” w ar is referred to in official docum en ts as the “establishm en t of constitutional order” in the case of form er com batants in Chechnya w ho, follow ing the Afghan vets, have begun arriving in droves in connection w ith all m anner of crim inal offences. But if w e take a deeper look, w e ought to begin at the beginning of the last century, w hen the Caucasus, in the w ords of a chronicler of that tim e, V.A. Potto, w as regarded as: “… a w ild and m ysterious land, w here w ar w as constantly raging and to w hich w ave after w ave of troops departed, a land perceived by the people as a country of m urk and m urder from w hich no one ever returned, and to w hich the people gave the nam e the ‘deadly Caucasus’”. At the end of the last century, the sam e V.A. Potto, the author of a book dealing w ith that (really the first) Caucasian w ar, poignantly reported: “… can there be m any Russian fam ilies on w hom the Caucasus, through its long w ars, has not visited irretrievable loss and w ho unfailin gly recall that loss w ith a proud aw areness of a duty carried out to the great Motherlan d, w h ich sends its sons to the mountain ous confines of Asia, not for the purpose of w arfare and devastation but for the eternal pacification of the land? Th e Caucasian w ar has en ded, a n oble goal has been achieved …”. But has it been achieved? Th ose w ords w ere spoken m ore th an a h undred years ago, but in predictin g th e ach ievem ent of th e “n oble goal of pacification ” (an d y ou and I h ave seen how th at h as com e about), th e author could n ot h ave foreseen th at w ar, “w ith in com m en surate losses”, w ould contin ue to the en d of th e n ext century, an d th at even Stalin an d Beria, w h o resettled th e un ruly peoples of th e Caucasus – h alf a m illion persons – to th e sn ow y steppes of Kazakhstan an d Siberia (w ith th e loss of the lives of h alf of th ose deported, m ain ly children , elderly person s an d w om en ), w ould be un able to bring about th e lon g-aw aited pacification of th e Caucasus. In stead, th e C hech en s’ hatred an d resistance to an y form of force, w h ich h ad already been n urtured th rough years of persecution , grew even stron ger. 106

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Chechnya. I do not w ant to tell at great length w hat w e, the children w ho arrived here in that tragic 44th year of the enforced resettlem ent of the original inhabitants (anyone unable to be taken out w as killed, am ounting to som e 7,000 persons) personally experienced w hen w e saw this blessed land, w hich had been devastated and put to the torch as a result of the pun itive actions of the Red Arm y (involving more than a 120,000 Interior Min istry an d security apparatus forces). Enough has been said about this in the docum ents of that tim e and to som e degree in m y short story (N ochevala tuchka zolotaya). But now here has anyone described how the Chechens, after having survived the repressions, return ed from exile to their desolate lan d, carrying in their suitcases the bon es of their com patriots w ho h ad perish ed far from home; how they dug holes in the ground for them selves in the courtyards of w hat had been their ow n houses but w ere now occupied by persons w ho had been resettled there; and how they began a new life in places w here there w as nothing, w ith neither m oney nor assistance from our great State. Chechnya survived, but it rem ained a sem i-feudal country, and by th e tim e th at Djokhar Dudaev cam e to pow er, three-quarters of the young and active population w ere unem ployed – a sufficient reserve for the fighters of the future. Russia. It is not only the fate of tiny Chechnya but w hat is more the fate of Russia in all its vastness that is being decided today. Indeed, the fate of Russia has com e to be directly linked by a “bond of blood” (in the w ords of V.A. Potto) w ith the fate and life of the nations of the Caucasus, w hich Russia m ay suddenly lose. The Caucasus is a unique region in the w orld. Misha Glenny, the English translator of my book, found in Shakespeare the follow ing graphic definition w hen searching for a poetic analogy: “O , who can hold a fire in his hand By thinking on the frosty Caucasus?” The first impression follow ing th e start of hostilities, after the crossing of the Terek River (the crossing of the Rubicon) w as that the State and th e people – i.e., th e army, the politicians, public opinion and the press – had for the first tim e in m any years closed ranks and w ere united in Anatoly Pristavkin

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a single front against a com m on enem y. The m ain thing is that that enem y had to be identified (and nam ed). We w ere also told that our enem y w ere terrorists, that is Chechens, and that Chechens w ere terrorists. O ne need not take seriously all the references to the peaceful objectives of our forces (remember the w ords about “pacification”). A single shell landin g on a market place in Grozny is quite capable of erasing even the finest w ords. By the w ay, the start of the “first” Chechen w ar w as sim ilar. This is w hat I w rote in 1994: “Politicians, alm ost to a m an, all became patriots, and the m ilitary, from the young generation to the retirees, could be seen on our television screens resplendent in their officers’ insignia and w ith their reborn spirit of combat. The militarization of the national consciousness w as plain to see.” To d a y, too, as far as th e army is concerned, everything is obvious: the ambitiousness of our generals, w ho even externally resemble the inspired and self-satisfied faces of the NATO w arriors show n tim e and again on television; their irrelevance to the political life of Russia; the limited resources allocated for arm am ents (now they’ll get them !); and simply the com plexes of not particularly talented m ilitary men w ho suffered a sham eful defeat in the previous Chechen cam paign – from a form er colonel of artillery to poorly educated field com manders. The situation as regards the politicians is even sim pler. In their fight for pow er in M o sco w, they are using as paw ns not only Chechnya and the Caucasus, but even their ow n local regions. Having given their support to the struggle against terrorism, they are attempting to explain to us, intricately m ixing lies w ith lies, how helicopters and tanks can be used to seek out and destroy these very terrorists on the roads and passes of Chechnya. The only exception has been Grigori Yavlinski, w ho has openly w arned Russians about the peril of em barking on a reckless w ar. O n the eve of elections, this is undoubtedly an act of civil courage, given that our electorate, w hich is still in a bellicose m ood, (and at the sam e tim e frightened, as som etim es happens), m ay in fact not forgive him his defeatist sentim ents. It is a paradox that extrem ism m ay also take root in the com plexes of national inferiority. 108

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The m ost difficult thing for m e to talk about is the so-called society involving those thought to be the country’s best people – m em bers of the intelligentsia, defenders of hum an rights, cultural figures, and the like. I cannot understand their stubborn silence. The isolated voices behind the gen eral televised chorus celebrating the made-t o-order successes are virtually inaudible. There is the occasional sharp statem ent by the group “Com m on Cause” (L.M. Alekseeva, Z. Krakhm alnikova, L. Ponom arev, E. Bonner and tw o or three others) and there is this fellow Popkov, an eccentric and alm ost exotic personality, w ho has, as a sign of protest against the w ar, declared a hunger strike in the public garden near the “Mem orial” Centre. To these exam ples w e m igh t also add a handful of journalists, but that w ould be about all. But w here are the “Com m ittees of Soldiers’ Mothers”, w hich during the first w ar so desperately w aged their unequal struggle w ith the generals for the lives of their sons? Where is the renow ned Sergei Kovalev? Why is the “Russian PEN Centre” silent and w hy is nothing to be heard from m y fellow w riters, brave front-line veterans, w ho know the true cost of any w ar? And is not Lev Tolstoy, w ho during a tim e of no less a crisis raised his lone voice against the Japanese cam paign, a m oral exem plar of resistance to the braying of the crow d? But on the other hand, there has been a notew orthy statem ent by a w ell-know n w riter, w ho came to know the “truth” about the w ar from the radio during a holiday in the Greek islands. Referring to the innocent souls w ho alw ays m ake up the m ajority in any nation, he has virtually given his approval to the actions of the Russian arm ed forces, w ho are fighting not, as it w ere, against the people but against its “hard core”, w hich is, according to him, “infected” w ith “absolute evil”. Th e auth or does not explain how our forces m anage to distinguish betw een the “evil hard core” and the “innocent souls” w hen they are shelling and bom bing. But he is firm ly convinced that the battles are being w aged along a “true fault-line”. What he m eans by that is clearly Chechnya. Im agination can som etim es be a substitute for inform ation, but it is n ot for the w riter to scoff at a fem ale corresponden t w ho risked travelling to Chechnya to report from a foxhole about the truth of the w ar Anatoly Pristavkin

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there. If, in fact, she is to be refuted then that should be done in the w ay real m en have done it – say Hem m ingw ay – that is, by travellin g to th e scene of the events and confronting the hard truth. Com rade Dzhugashvili also called sm all nations “bandits” (the vocabulary of our w riter and of the “leader of all peoples” is in rem arkable agreem ent), but he w ent m uch further and, having sensed (a class perception!) the sam e “hard core of absolute evil” in our intelligentsia, lost no tim e packing them off on journeys of m isery to labour cam ps and exile in Siberia … . In all probability, the “true fault-line” may lie both in Chechnya and everyw here, betw een those w ho have forgotten about the victim s of Stalinist terror and those w ho rem em ber it. Chechnya. I happened to be in Chechnya and Grozny during the last – the “first” – w ar and had occasion to see the kind of suffering w ar inflicts on ordinary men and w om en. In retaliation for th e m isfortunes that terrorists in flicted on our w om en and children (I use the term “terrorists” w ithout referring to their nationality sin ce in my opinion th ey have none), w e are striking not at th e terrorists (they – if they are the ones – are sitting it out som ew here in th e m ountains, or perhaps the w riter mentioned earlier w ill meet them on the beaches of the Mediterranean), but rather at the w omen an d children of another, sim ilarly unfortunate nation. I personally w itnessed th e results of precision strikes in 1995 – a children’s home w here all that rem ain ed of the children w ere traces of blood on the ground. And as for the highly-publicized precision bombing of pow er stations or oil depots, is this n ot also a strike against the population, w ho w ill sim ply die w ithout heatin g and electricity? Even our now docile television, w hich is filtered and edited by the m ilitary censors, is unable to conceal the suffering of the hundreds of thousands of refugees crow ded into the tent cities that have been erected in Ingushetia. What is actually happening there? These refugees are bluntly telling international observers (and more often than not scream ing it into their faces) that they are not fleeing from bandits or terrorists, but from the w ar. 110

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It is understandable that no referen ces by our h um an itarian s in cam ouflage to a new life – free of fighters – in the liberated areas w ill lure these w om en , n ow that their fath ers, h usbands and sons have in fact been branded as those very fighters. An d w hen a sen ior m ilitary figure, to th e accom pan im en t o f artillery salvos, an n oun ces for all to hear over all th e country’s television ch annels: “We have com e never to leave again!”, th is sim ply serves as th e best argum en t fo r th ose local in h abitan ts w h o h ave so far n ot inten ded to resort to arm s to do just that. Russia. So w hat is in store for us? Shall w e aw ake from this deafness and indifference that have afflicted us, having suddenly rem em bered that such elem entary notions as legality and hum anity and som ething called conscience do exist? The last w ar devoured $7 billion. We could have rebuilt the econ om y for that amount. And how m uch w e w ill fork out from your pocket and m ine this tim e? A veil of military secrecy h as already been draw n over the true cost of the w ar and the w eapons being used to fight it, but it is, in any case, quite clear that the current increase in old-age pen sion s is m erely a crum b from the banquet table of the m ilitary. I very m uch fear that it w ill not be that easy to stop the w ar. The m om entum of a w ar is like that of a train hurtling dow n a steep slope; the further it travels the more irreversible its movement. And som etim es pensions and m edals are handed out to the very persons w ho have caused the derailm ent, w hile the problem s of dealing w ith the disaster fall on the shoulders of different people altogether. O f the boys sent to fight, already today, even according to official figures, 280 have been killed and 600 w ounded. Perhaps these figures seem a little low to you, but they hide hundreds of lives cut short, and each and every one of them is priceless. During the last Chechen w ar, one of the generals, referring to the casualties is said to have blurted out that they had turned out to be m uch few er than planned. It w ould be interesting to know how m any have been planned for the current “anti-terrorist cam paign”. And shall Anatoly Pristavkin

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w e not soon come to believe that for the life of each terrorist – on w hom w e have yet to set eyes – w e are already paying too high a price? O n one occasion, D udaev made the follow ing statement: “You are w rong in thinking that it is w e w ho w ill take vengeance on you. The vengeance w ill be taken by your ow n boys w ho return from this w ar.” His prediction has turned out to be true. We have a flood of crim inal cases involving veterans from the Afghan and Chechen conflicts. The m oth er of on e of them h as w ritten to us. V.N. Sh evch enko fought in Afghan istan , first as a sn iper and later as a scout. He th en w ent to w ork as a forester. While h unting a stag, somethin g that is proh ibited, he sh ot an d killed tw o persons instead, for w hich he w as sentenced to death. The m other has w ritten to us as follow s: “For m ore than 25 years, I h ave w orked w ith children in school, guidin g th em , helping them and encouragin g them to follow the proper path . I have th ree children of m y ow n an d n ever h ad cause to w arn th em against doing an yth ing, particularly in th e case of th e o lder on e, Vladim ir, the on e now sen tenced to death . M ore th an an y o f th e oth ers, he w ould sit at m y bedside w hen I w as ill, began to h elp h is fath er even before he w ent to school an d later alw ays did his sh are of th e w ork.” Then cam e the tim e for him to serve in the arm y and he w as sent to Afgh anistan. We – m y husband and I – could do nothing to prevent it. We did not m ake a deal w ith our ow n con science sin ce w e knew that other parents also loved th eir children an d w ere suffering as w ell. And so he w as in hell there for m ore than a year. His father and I learned that, during the three years after his return from the w ar, h e suffered terrible sleepless n ights, w ith his eyes alw ays open and h is body like a taugh t spring ready to uncoil at any m om en t, n ot at the sound of a plane, m ind you, but merely of som e birds flyin g overhead. Th e events in Chechnya turned Vladim ir’s life upside dow n again. His atten tiveness and considerateness even tow ards th e girl he loved faded. He used to com e to us, sit dow n in fron t of the television, turn on the new s and say nothin g. The terrible even ts w ere beginning in Chechnya – Decem ber 1994 and Jan uary 1995. His on ly w ords w ere: 112

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“Why? Why children and peaceful civilian s?” He w ould go out in silence, upset, and w hen I asked: “Why don’t you talk to m e?” He w ould reply laconically: “What’s there to say?” “He w as extrem ely upset durin g that time and this is the reaction you get from a man w ith a gun pointed at an Afghan veteran”. At the trial, Shevch enko, w hile not denying the fact that he had com m itted the killings, explained that he h ad so acted w hen one of the victim s pointed a sub-m a ch in e-gu n at him , Shevchenko. “At the trial I w as reproached for not h aving sought m edical help to sort out m y son’s mental problem s. Until my last breath, I shall do everyth in g I can to heal his w ounded soul. I beg you only to save m y son from a slow or instantan eous death ”. It’s late autum n. I am w andering through a snow -covered forest, trying to m ake out under my feet w hich w ay the aspen leaf is lying. But none is to be seen. Nothing is to be seen. And it is already getting cold.

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Freim ut Duve There is a w ar go ing and everyo ne is w atching I. The media trap in the K osovo conflict. “If w e disregard the visit of th e British Prim e Minister to Brussels, then the 28th day of the NATO air operation against Yugoslavia did not achieve anything special. The bom bing of strategic targets and Serb troops continued. Pictures of burning industrial plants and aerial photographs of installations that had been directly hit w ere show n at the NATO press conference. The NATO press spokesm an also gave accounts of Serb atrocities in Kosovo, based on the personal experiences of refugees.” After starting off in this run-of-the-m ill fashion, the lead article from th e Neue Z ürcher Z eitung of We d n e s d a y, 21 April 1999, then shifts directly from a reportin g style to a com m entary. “The television im ages beam ed out daily suggesting som ething bordering on desolation leave little hope that the reports of crim es against Albanian civilians are perhaps groundless after all.” NATO announced and began m ilitary actions against Yugoslavia on 24 March. Tw o days later, on 26 March, Serb officials visited the studios of B92, the only independent radio station, and took dow n the nam es and addresses of all em ployees and journalists. They confiscated the broadcasting equipm ent and detained the founder and director of the station, Veran Matic, for around eight hours. The w ar declared against the independent m edia, w hich had been under w ay since autum n 1998, had becom e a real w ar. Radio B92 is now broadcasting governm ent new s on the old frequency but w ithout its old crew.There are no longer any in depen den t m edia in Yugoslavia, and foreign reporters are subject to the strict con trols that states w agin g w ar feel them selves en titled to. Belgrade justifies its action by referrin g to the h istory of journ alism in w ar (Tan jug, 11 April): “The history of journalism tells us that official m ilitary censorsh ip of journalistic reports w as first introduced by Great Britain in 1854 durin g the Crim ean Wa r. At th at tim e, th e British had Freimut Duve

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suffered a h eavy defeat at the h an ds of th e Russian s.” Th e official govern m ent statem en t of 13 April th en goes on to cite the Am erican exam ple in the Iraq con flict, w h ere correspon dents’ w ork w as also subject to strin gent restriction s. In this w ay the Belgrade Governm ent justifies m easures that it had introduced long before the w ar. The Government has thus been caught in the m edia trap set by w ar – as in all the other m ilitary actions of the 1990s that w e can bring to m ind. What is w anted, w hat is allow ed and w hat should be reported? These three questions are held in check by the sim ple journalistic logistics of w ar, w hich have now becom e m uch m ore im portant than the endeavours of the w arring partners to exercise control: w hat can be reported? Where is there a journalist still able to broadcast? The tremendous speed of technological change and the increased ease, particularly in outside broadcasting, has not freed journalistic reporting on m ilitary conflicts from the m edia trap of w ar. Even the then C N N r e p o r t e r in Baghdad could only report w hat he saw from his hotel w indow and w hat the controllers allow ed him to broadcast. This w as nevertheless sensational, in view of the total silence of all the other journalists. The m ost im portant item of new s w as – look, here I am in Baghdad reporting for CN N . It w as the sam e story alm ost every evening. I clearly rem em ber the World War II bom bing of Ham burg, but there w as no television and m y m other didn’t have a radio. The BBC couldn’t be received easily w ith the Volksempfänger, the official “w ireless” of the time, and yet it rem ained the only additional source of inform ation for critically-m inded Germ ans. We learnt of the crim es of “our ow n side” through rum ours. The Klem perer diaries show how m uch w e could know even in extrem e isolation w ithout the m edia. Today again, 50 years later, it is still the journalists an d their media that provide the only access in the difficult search for truth about the realities of w ar. The dram atic, understated article w ritten from Pristina by Spiegel correspondent, Renate Flottau, w ho had been missing for days, tells a story experienced at first hand of the m edia crim e against the Kosovo politician , Ibrah im Rugova. Rugova, a virtual prisoner, h ad 116

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been Belgrade’s m edia sen sation a few days earlier. This is perhaps the m ost im portant piece of reporting to have escaped from the m edia trap of the Kosovo conflict. II. The media war within. Hitler’s propaganda chief Goebbels w as the first person to use m odern radio successfully for the w ar at hom e. A Germ an diplom at h ad been shot dead in Paris and a few days later synagogues w ere burning throughout Germ any. Goebbels had m anaged to shift th e blam e of one person to a w hole people, nam ely h undreds and thousands of the Jew s (the assassin had a Jew ish nam e). The act of an individual becam e the collective crim e of a large num ber of citizens, w ho had been system atically hum iliated and excluded from public life since 1933. The telephone – to instruct local party officials – and the radio ensured a rapid and com plete dissem ination of inform ation. War creates a betrayal syndrome – anyone w ho passes on inform ation that w as not form ulated by the governm ent is a traitor to “the cause”. Therefore, anyone w ho publishes discrepant information is suspected of w orking “for the other side”. In tim es of w ar, things are easier for authoritarians and dictators, w hereas dem ocrats find life difficult. They thrive on debate, they exam ine conflicting inform ation and they need people w ho speak the truth. In the 1990s, the expulsions in the form er Yugoslavia dram atically intensified the problematic role of the media in the conflict. The interests of the “parties to the conflict” w ere m uddled w ith the im ages that European schoolteachers of the previous generation had left behind in the heads of w riters. Because so little w as know n about the reality of the old Yugoslavia, the im prints of earlier conflicts cam e back w ith a ven geance. When there w ere still around 15 per cent of Catholic Bosnian Croats serving in the hastily cobbled together Bosnian arm y and, according to figures at that tim e, around one per cent of th at army w as made up of O rth odox Bosnian Serbs, all Western journalists called this arm y the “Muslim ” arm y. The 1990s also introduced a new protagonist into the m edia w ar: the assertion by “both sides” that the “other side” w as w orking w ith Freimut Duve

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Western new s agencies. Friends of Belgrade and Sarajevo had both called upon the services of an agency in the United States. This provided an ideal w ay for crim es associated w ith th e expulsions to be denied. When an yon e m entioned the m urder of civilian villagers, it w ould be intim ated im m ediately that a h ighly paid private press agency h ad spread the assertions. For years th e civilian s in th e en circled city of Sarajevo w ere fired upon an d sn iped at from th e surroun ding m ountain s. Som e streets w ere too dan gerous to go dow n and som e districts in range of the m arksm en an d gun s w ere com pletely destroyed. But w hen a deliberately placed bom b in a m arket square exploded and killed dozen s of citizen s, som e journalists in th e We s t w ere sayin g that it h ad been plan ted by the Bosnian s th em selves to m obilize public opin ion against the Serbs. This w as supposed to put the shooting of all th ose people in th eir h ouses an d on the streets of Sarajevo into perspective. To this day the truth rem ain s un kn ow n. The agency’s assertion of a bom b allegedly deton ated by th e Bosnians them selves h as at all even ts allow ed th e m em ory of th e m urder of m ore than 14,000 citizens of the city to fade. III. Ethnic terror. In a w ar, truth becom es a luxury an d it is only w ith very great effort that it can be uncovered. An error in establishing the existence of a m ass grave – th e n um ber of people killed or the status of the dead – can be stylized as horrific proof of propaganda being used by the “other side” an d th ereby enable other crim es to be hush ed up m ore easily. The Kosovo conflict has been accompanied by media errors from the very beginning. In 1989, at a mass demonstration at Kosovo Polje, w hen Milosevic rhetorically declared Serb citizens of Albanian descent to be Serbia’s enem ies because the Serbs “had lost a battle against the Turks 600 years ago”, this hostile declaration, w hich w as then follow ed by numerous administrative acts depriving ethnic Alban ians of their rights, passed alm ost w ith out com m ent. A person responsible for the citizen s of his country had declared the vast m ajority of these citizens in Kosovo to be historical enem ies. Im agine a Germ an politician w ho sudden118

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ly declares the Peace of Westph alia invalid and the Catholics or Protestants non-citizens because â&#x20AC;&#x153;theyâ&#x20AC;? had committed this or that scandalous deed 350 years earlier. Months ago, the strategy fam iliar from the Bosnian w ar w as em ployed again: in Pristina houses w ere m arked to show soldiers or param ilitaries the w ay, just as they had been in Banja Luka in 1992. What is going on in Kosovo at the m om ent is not a reaction to NATO , but rather a policy w hich began ten years ago. O n 28 June 1989, Slobodan Milosevic sum m oned a m illion Serbs to a national m ass rally at Kosovo Polje. O n this day, Party Secretary Milosevic m ade him self an ethnic national socialist. He declared th at th e Albanian citizen s, for w hom he bore political responsibility, had alw ays been enem ies. And he said that Kosovo w as sacred ground that had been settled by enemies of the people. That w as a declaration of w ar against citizens of Yugoslavia of Albanian descent and Muslim belief. Not a peep w as heard from Belgradeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s opponents in Slovenia and Croatia, and even in Sarajevo there w as no outcry over this absurd resort by a declared Marxist to a bogus national m yth, w hich divided the population into those w ho belonged and those w ho had to be disposed of. Yugoslav intellectuals did not express criticism that ethnic Albanians had been politically deprived of citizenship. Unlike the citizens of Croatia and Slovenia, the Albanians kept quiet. They did not take up arm s w hen their schools w ere closed and their teachers dism issed. Until 1998, they hoped that, through negotiations, they w ould be able to recover the original status they had enjoyed under Tito. O nly then did som e begin to arm them selves. H o w e v e r, w ar an d terror also pose n ew (age-old) questions about journalistic ethics. New s about raped w omen is very credible. But w hat is to be don e w ith it? We German s know th at th ousands of w om en w h o w ere raped by soldiers in 1945 could n ot an d w ould not speak about it, in many cases for the rest of th eir lives. No one should be allow ed to take it upon them selves to m ake public th e iden tity of a w om en w h o has been the victim of this traum atizing crim e. The crim e Freimut Duve

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has traumatized her soul and its publication could jeopardize her future existen ce w ithin the fam ily. The interview ers w orking for the O SCE are trained in psych ology to deal cautiously w ith the refugees’ testim onies, w hich are also prepared for The Hague International Crim inal Tribunal for former Yugoslava. Journalistic ethics dem and that the media also deal w ith this material differently than it is som etimes treated in “peaceful” daily business. This appears to be a lesson from the Bosnian experien ce – care w h en publishing reports by victim s of th ese terrorist w ar crim es against w om en . IV. What next? The subject of media ethics in times of war w ill have to be discussed w ith the dem ocratic governm ents of the NATO m em bers. The journalistic dram as of these last few m onths w ill have to be reappraised – w ith the involvem ent as soon as possible of those in Belgrade w ho w ill bear responsibility for their country in the future. Western m edia have learnt someth ing from earlier conflicts of the 1990s. According to observations by the m edia authorities in Sarajevo, the Serbian television of the Bosn ian Republika Srpska has also gone back to objective reporting to a large extent, w hile Serbian State television has rem ained an instrument of pure propaganda. Serb and American, British and Germ an journalists w ill sit together after this conflict to learn lessons from it. How ever, this w ill not be enough to overcome the scars of terror – particularly those born by the Kosovo Albanians, w ho w ere once Yugoslavian citizens and now do not even have identity papers, regardless of how they return and w hat the new political situation looks like. We Germ ans have m any memories of the efforts to establish peace after 1945, after dictatorship, after Auschw itz, after the crim es, after the bom bs and after the deportations. Possibly the m o st im portant project in the Germ an po st-w ar era (under th e Allied m ilitary govern m en t) for the future d em ocratic peace w as the rapid revival of critical and investigative journ alism , the return of journ alists from the w ar, from captivity an d from o th er coun tries. Th ey w rote about th e truth of w ar that th ey had experienced but had been unable to describe in detail, even in postcards to 120

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th eir fam ilies. Th ey stood up for a culture of discussion an d dem ilitarized public debate. Th is w as particularly true of authors. We Germ an s have a story to tell about the post-w ar period. Perhaps, even in th is era o f the m edia, it w ill be of in terest in th e 21st century an d now in th e post-Yugoslav regions. Perh aps it can give a little h ope to th e w ar-torn coun tries and fam ilies. As early as 1947, authors cam e together from the zones left over fro m the Reich – n ot, h ow ever, to discuss political plan s an d strategies. Th eir country lay in ruins. At the start of the terror, pictures had been ban ned an d books burn t. Th e targets w ere free-t h in k in g authors, an d artists an d sculptors. N ow th e country had been burnt. Th e G ruppe 47, w h ich these authors form ed, becam e a literary em blem in th e true sen se of th e w ord an d the sym bol of truth in th e refoun d Germ an self-respect. Even before, literature w as already being printed again at breathtaking speed and published in slim booklets on coarse paper. Free speech w as bubbling over. Thirty years later, Günter Grass in vented a similar meeting in 1648 in Telgte after the Thirty Years War. He recorded the exciting proof of how m any authors, publishers and printers in Prague and in Ham burg had also w orked and published during the terrible w ar – in a com m on language in that w ar-torn land. Since 1991, the Zagreb publisher, Nenad Popovic, has been for th e shattered Yugoslavia of the 1990s w hat Hans Werner Richter becam e for our country after 1947 – convener, adm onisher and publisher. He w as already building a literary and political Gruppe 47 for his country during this w ar of terror. And now , w hile the expulsions rage and the bom bs fall, he is com m itted once again to the future and is com m unicating in order to establish the truth and to influence reality w ith authors and journalists w ho have fled. Som e authors have collaborated in the ethnic m adness that is at the root of these conflicts, and have encouraged it by w riting about it, but many others have been silent because they know w hat the ethnic dom ination, sought by a political elite, signifies for a large cultural space w ith a com m on language, even if it is not w ritten in the sam e alphabet. Freimut Duve

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We are quite happy to call this the “Balkans” and then read about the atrocities of the past in the w onderful tales w ritten by great authors. We are less often aw are of the cultural pow er of civility, w hich the citizens, journalists and authors are cultivating, m ethodically and courageously, in the post-Yugoslav States. What does dem ocratic civility m ean? We all need the discussion and debate on the very divergent points of view . We also need civil opposition, w hich stim ulates dem ocracy. How ever, anyone w ho calls th eir opponents “enem ies”, w ho m akes critical journalists an d authors into “traitors”, destroys dem ocracy. It w ould be a pleasant surprise if Peter Handke, the Austrian w riter, had understood at least once, perhaps only for one day, w hat the invitation to this then young auth or had truly m eant to the G rup p e 4 7. The authors, w ho had returned from w ar and had survived expulsion, w anted to turn their back forever on the ethnic classification that had led to the destruction of their ow n country and to th e Holocaust. Peter Handke ought to have been one of the first to recognize that ethnic classification of this kind – Milosevic and his w ife determ ining w h o is classed as a Serb – also applied im placably and dam agingly to journalists and authors w ho express them selves in the com m on language. M any Albanian authors an d journ alists from Kosovo w ho fled to M acedon ia an d Serb journalists w ho are now obliged to live abroad look in horror as their form er friend has now becom e a national h ero, w h ile th ey – M ilosevic’s critics – are declared enemies of the State. The ethn ic nationalism , w hich Handke h as raised to m ythical status, replaces the civil patriotism of m any young Serb journalists and auth ors w h o have tried to keep th eir ow n discussion alive w ith h um our and iron y. A G ruppe 99 of authors from all five States of th e form er Yugoslavia should m eet soon som ew here for tw o or three days. Perhaps th ey sh ould n ot talk so m uch about th e w ar, or even about th e sh ared shock and w oun ds, but rath er about th e tales they have to tell – in their com m on language w ith its tw o alph abets. Wr itten stories kn ow no borders, how ever old or n ew. Literature tells of w hat divides us, just as it tells of w h at w e have in com m on. 122

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O n 6 April, the Spiegel correspondent, Renate Flottau, returned to Belgrade from Pristina by bus. She had to pretend to be a Sw iss journalist (Sw itzerland is not a NATO country). â&#x20AC;&#x153;The radio w as turned to full volume in the bus. Clinton w as being compared to Hitler and NATO to terrorists. Every item of propaganda, w h ether it w as about destroyed Serb houses or dow ned NATO aircraft, w as m et w ith cheers or sighs.â&#x20AC;? Perhaps the expulsions and m ilitary attacks w ill soon be over. But the m edia w ar threatens to continue. Reconstruction and hum anitarian and econom ic aid w ill be necessary and w ill be offered. How ever, contem plation on the truth and the search for reality w ill be key elemen ts of civil peace. After this w ar, everybody must escape from the media trap, and democracies must find out how they can help avoid this trap the next tim e there is a conflict. April 2000

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Katharina Hadjidim os The Ro le o f the Media in Greek-Turkish Relatio ns This analysis is based on research of the role of media in Greek-Turkish relations during stays in Turkey and in Greece between February and August 1999. Since then, Greek-Turkish relations have begun to improve, and this has had a positive effect on the media coverage in both countries. O n 5-6 February 2000, the first major conference of Greek and Turkish journalists took place in Athens. During that conference which was opened by the M inisters of Foreign Affairs of Greece and of Turkey the journalists present committed themselves to closer media co-operation and to a different approach in their coverage of the neighbouring country. This analysis of the role of media describes the starting point of the recent “rapprochement” as well as a number of structural elements fostering bilateral conflicts through the media. The basic questions at the beginning of the research were the following: How is it possible that nearly all journalists in one country hold the same opinion and use the same language about the neighbour? How can media reports deal mainly with politics and security issues without informing about the ordinary aspects of life in the neighbouring country? How in fact is it possible that most Greeks know as little about Turkey as West Germans used to know about East G ermany – Turk ey being little else than just a blank spot on the map and enemy number one?

I. Changes in Greek-Turkish relatio ns In February 1999, the Turkish new spaper M illiyet ran the headline “U ltimatum ... last warning to Athens” and threatened to m ake use of Turkey’s right to “self-defence”1. In July 1999, the daily H ürriyet, under the headline “Bravo Yorgo” 2 , expressed praise that w as directed at new Greek Foreign Minister Georgios 1 2

M illiyet, 23 February 1999 Hürriyet, 28 July 1999

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Papandreou. Curiously enough, a period of six m onths, from February to July 1999, lay betw een the th reat of w ar and th is praise of the Foreign Minister of Greece. Without doubt, Greece and Turkey w ere on the brink of a serious conflict in February 1999, w hen the Kurdish leader, Abdullah Ö calan, w as kidnapped from the Greekem bassy in Nairobi. The fact that it should have been Greece, of all countries, that played host to Turkey’s nom ber one enem y – a m an regarded by the Turks as responsible for the death of som e 30,000 people during th e 15-year-long w ar – brought years of tension in Greek-Turkish relations to a clim ax. The sudden and unexpected turn in events, the unexpected praise for Greece’s ch ief diplom at, is due to the fact that the former Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theodoros Pangalos, h ad to resign over the Ö calan affair and w as succeeded by George Papan dreou. In th e m eantim e, Papandreou ackn ow ledged the existence of a Turkish m inority in Greece. Turkish-Greek round table talks started, an d Athens sent generous help to victim s of the Turkish earthquake in July – revolutionary and unprecedented even ts in Greek-Turkish relation s. For m any decades historic traum ata, conflicts and disputes over a variety of issues dom inated bilateral relations. Therefore, the détente ca n only be expected to last if it is backed by popular w ill in both countries. The headlines in the press m irror the em otional atm osphere surrounding bilateral relations – extrem e em otions sw itching from aggression to praise in the space of six m onths. Thus, the process of rapprochement needs to be supported by changes in m edia coverage and a better inform ation policy in both countries. Where the media co me in Few fact-based reports. Neither country’s governm en t w orks in a vacuum . Th ey are guided by n ational opin ion an d vice versa. National opinion , h ow ever, is m oulded by th e m ass m edia. Com pared to oth er Western European countries, the m edia in Greece an d Turkey play an especially im portant role. Th is is due m ain ly to tw o factors: the lack of pluralism in the structure of th e m edia lan dscape 126

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an d the dearth of factual reportin g. Th e app roach of th e m edia is often far from bein g a sober reflection of reality or an objective assessm ent of realistic dan gers. Th e effect is th at political an alyses are ill th ough t out an d decisions are not taken on th e basis of factual assum ption s. Media as a ‘watchdog of democracy ’. Moreover, the role and im portance of the m edia should also be view ed in a m ore general, but equally im portant, con text: their often-quoted role as “w atchdogs of dem ocracy”. Media have the task of informing the population, of providing the people w ith facts on the basis of w hich they m ay m ake a responsible political decision in electing their governm ent. In a dem ocracy, the m edia are also indispensable as a forum of discussion and public debate betw een political adversaries. Hate speech. Hate speech is a common phenom enon both in Greece and Tu rk e y. Diatribes are usually directed against ‘the other’, that is the Tu rkish or Greek State or aim ed at national m in orities in their ow n country. Alkis Kourkoulas, correspon dent of the Athens New s Agency in Istanbul, rightly observed that there is no respect for the oth er in the Ba lk a n s 3 . In Greece there is th e general notion of the Turks as “barbarian”, uncivilised people, w hile th e Turks perceive the Greeks as greedy for ‘lost territories’ and still supportive of the “Megali Idea”, the big idea. Th ere is n o respect for the culture, traditions and ach ievem en ts of the other – in fact, people are com pletely ignorant of w h at is th e culture of th e oth er country. Few Greeks are inform ed about Islam , th e great arch itect Sinan , contem porary Turkish literature or m usic. The Turkish people are m ore open concerning contem porary Greek m usic and w riters, but the Turkish State cares little about ancien t Greek sites and Byzan tine churches or villages deserted by Greeks during the 20th century. Nationalists have desecrated Muslim cem eteries in Greece an d Greek O rthodox cem eteries in Tu r k e y. 4 3 4

Interview w ith Alkis Kourkoulas, 4 May 1999 Süddeutsche Z eitung, 12/13 May, 1999

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It is th is lack of respect an d th e n eed to stick to historic stereotypes for th e purpose of definin g one’s ow n nation state that m ake the initiation of a dialogue so difficult and m ake it so easy for the m edia to follow in these old footsteps and to m aintain the sam e stereotyped n otion of the other. The role of the m edia is tw ofold: it both reflects and feeds public opinion, thus creating a vicious circle concerning the perception of “the other”. Decade-old stereotypes have not failed to m ake their m ark on a w hole generation of journalists. The view s of the sam e people find their w ay back into society through their articles. Hate speech, how ever, is also directed against in tellectuals in the h om e coun tries. Th is observation w as con firm ed in a letter from the prom inent journ alist, Ricardos Som eritis, addressed to th e Athens Journalists Un ion in March 1999, during th e Kosovo w ar. Som eritis w rote: “...Many Greek journ alists, m ainly on radio and television, beh ave like soldiers on the front: th ey have chosen th eir cam p, theire uniform , their flag. If they are colum nists, it is their righ t to do so. Nevertheless, h ow com e th at even th e Patriarch is censored by m any m edia? ...” An d he con tin ues in the sam e letter: “... All journalists w ith a poin t of view different from th e dom in ant one or w ho h ave dared to offer the in form ation that others refused to give are being threaten ed or hum iliated (e.g. a n ew spaper agreed to publish an interview in w h ich I am called a ‘Fr a n co -Le v a n t in e’). 5 O th ers have lost the right of exp ression (our colleague Manolis Vasilakis w as fired by the new spaper Exousia...).” The example o f the Imia/ Kardak crisis The crisis over the island of Im ia (its Turkish nam e is Kardak) in 1996 is a m ost convincing exam ple of how the m edia brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of w ar. Had Am erican President Clinton not intervened, the populist action of a m ayor and of som e journalists w ould have resulted in m ore than one casualty. The “story” runs as follow s: 5

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Letter by Richardos Som eritis to Nikos Kiaos, President of ESIEA, dated 31 March 1999

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In late Decem ber 1995, a Turkish m erch ant vessel ran agroun d on th e coast of th e rocky islet of Im ia/ Kardak in th e Aegean . Th is in cident w as follow ed by a sm all and relatively unobtrusive dispute betw een Greek and Turkish auth orities on w h o w as to rescue th e sh ip, th e Turkish captain dem anding to be rescued by a Turkish tugboat. T he Turkish Governm ent argued in a n ote verbale th at Im ia/ Kardak w as Turkish territory, w h ich w as d isputed by Athen s. After an exchan ge of n otes, Greek auth orities fin ally sen t a Greek tugboat to th e aid of th e vessel. This incident, taking place on an islet of a size that w as appropriate only for keeping goats but hardly for any other use, w ould have gone unnoticed, had the Greek TV station, AN T1, not aired the exchange of diplom atic notes nearly four w eeks after the incident occurred. O nly one day later, 25 January 1996, the m ayor of Kalym nos (an island situated next to Im ia in the Aegean) took action and put the Greek flag on the rocky soil of the island. This w as the spark that inspired the Turkish new spaper, H端rriyet, to fly in a helicopter w ith a team of journalists and photographers to the tiny islet, asking them to remove th e Greek flag and hoist the Turkish on e. The action took place and H端rriyet could not refrain from trium phantly publishing the pho tograph of the journalists rem oving the Greek flag on its front page th e very next day. As m ay be expected, things took a m ore serious turn from that m om ent on: the Greek Navy changed the flag w ithin 24 hours and by 30/31 January, Greek and Turkish naval forces w ere opposing each other in the Aegean. 6 A Greek helicopter crashed causing the death of its pilot. If it had not been for the intervention by the President of the United States, the situation w ould have escalated into a m ilitary con frontation betw een NATO allies. In January 1999, the journalist Stratis Balaskas published an interview in the Greek daily Eleftherotypia, w ith a photo-reporter of the new spaper H 端rriyet, the very person w ho had raised the Turkish flag on 6

T he facts of the incident stem from Hate speech in the Balkans, edited by Maria Lenkova an d Internationals Helsinki Federation for Hum an Rights, ETEPE, Athens 1998

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Im ia/Kardak. The interview is w orth reading for its revelations about the m otives of the young reporter, then in his early tw enties, and about the ignorance of those w ho sent him . It w as not an “invasion of Turkish forces”, as the Greek m edia had presented it in great exaggeration, but the greed of the m edia that sparked off the crisis. 7 It w ould be too m onoton ous to cite h ate speech in both the Greek and the Turkish press, w hich accom panied the coverage of this crisis. Interm ingling facts and opinion achieved am ple exploitation of em o tions. The term s used in the reports w ere not intended to describe the event accurately, but w ere solely chosen to evoke anti-Turk or antiGreek stereotypes in the m inds of the general public. While the Greek press depicted the “landing” of Turkish journalists using vocabulary such as “agents assault”, “invasion”, “provocative action by Ankara”, the Turkish press indulged in praise of the country’s strength – “Turkey can overw helm Greece in 72 hours”(Sabah).8 The dangerous consequence of this media coverage w as that public opinion, inflam ed by the m edia, put considerable pressure on both governm ents to react “tough”. “Let’s stand up at Therm opylae” and “Ciller for Im ia? Us for Con stantinople” w rote Greek new spapers. The Turkish equivalent w as “Soysal: There m ust be w ar”.9

II. Features o f Greek and Turkish mass media The Structure o f Turkish Media Media structure dominated by holdings. The m ost striking feature of the Turkish m edia sector is th e fact that it is dominated by a duopolist structure: the Sabah/Bilgin Group and the Milliyet/Dogan Group. These tw o groups hold about 70 percent of the market share in national daily new spapers and are the ow ners of AT V, Kanal D a n d CNN Türk 1 0 . In 1998, 7

Stratis Balaskas in Eleftherotypia, 19 January 1999: Interview w ith the form er Hürriyet photo-reporter Cesur Sert 8 Vasiliki Neofotistos and Ferhat Kentel in Hate speech in the Balkans, ibid. 9 Hate speech in the Balkans, p. 67, ibid. 10 M edien in der Türkei, Publikation der Deutschen Botschaft Ankara, 1998

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the tw o television channels together w ith Sh ow TV, ow ned by Erol Ak so y, w ere considered the m ost im portant private television channels. For both the Dogan an d th e Sabah Group, the m edia business is just on e sector of th eir in vestm en ts. Both holdings are en gaged in a num ber o f other businesses. The fact that television and the big national dailies are in the hands of a num ber of holdings h as im portant im plications for the m edia coverage. Th e com panies or groups con cerned are greatly involved in public w orks and depend to a great exten t on w orks com m issioned by th e State. It is an open secret th at form er Prim e M in ister, Mesut Yilm az, gave lucrative energy con tracts to m edia bosses w ho w ere also involved in the electricity m arket. These contracts are n ow bein g disputed in th e Suprem e Court. 1 1 M o r e o v e r, the holdin gs receive a considerable num ber of public loan s. Experts believe that several m illion dollars w orth of loan s origin ating from the State w as directed to the m edia sector via banks in th e 1990s. The m edium w ith the greatest im pact on public opinion is television. Although the history of private television in Turkey is not even yet a decade old, today television is a prospering sector w ith 17 national and som e 360 regional television stations. Radio plays a lesser role in providing inform ation. Many of the estimated 2000 private radio stations throughout Turkey are tin y am ateur stations providing just m usic program m es. The impact of print media in Turkey is fairly low. The average daily new spaper circulation of four m illion serves a population of 64 m illion.12 This is partly due to the fairly high price of new spapers. O ne new spaper costs m ore than tw o loaves of bread. These figures also show that profits in the print m edia m arket do not com e from the sale of som e four m illion issues per day, but m ain ly from advertisem ent revenues. Som e 41 percent of the countryw ide expenditure on advertising is invested in new spaper adverts.13 11 Ilnur Cevik in Turkish Daily N ews, 11/12 April 1999 12 World Association of New spapers WAN, World Press Trends 1999, Turkey 13 WAN, World Press Trends 1999, Turkey

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Due to the dependence on state-com m issioned w orks and public loans, press reports w ill never take an adversary position on State interests. In order to guarantee that this remains un changed, the State ensures that the duopolist structure in th e prin t m edia rem ains un to uched. Accordin g to observers of Turkish prin t m edia, th e best proof of th e silen t and m utual understandin g betw een State and the m edia w as th e case of the building contractor and ow ner of Türkbank, Korkm az Yig it .1 4 The readership of new spapers has continuously declined since the 1980s. An alarm signal for the print media sector w as a further decline in new spaper circulation even prior to the national elections in April 1999. Professor Sezer Akarcali of the Comm unication Faculty in Ankara University explained this trend by reference to the big media scandals of the past years. “How can I trust papers to give im partial and unbiased information, when I’m pretty sure that some of their columnists are lobbying on behalf of their bosses, w hile others are involved w ith political parties?”.15 Headlines and contents designed by sales experts. When trying to answ er th e question as to w h y the view s expressed by m ost big dailies are rather nationalist, especially on relations w ith Greece, som e additional non-economic factors m ust be taken into account. O ne, for exam ple, is the fact that subscription to new spapers is rare and single copy sales am ount to 90 percent of ciculation.16 This m eans that a new spaper cannot count on a guaranteed num ber of readers but has to “conquer” its readership an ew every day. To attract the attention of the public, there is a continuous search for headlines proclaim ing either scandals or raising nationalist issues in foreign affairs. As regards the latter, Greece, the Republic of Cyprus and the relation s to the European Union are a never-ending source of attraction. Such headlines are not w ritten by the investigating journalists but by professional headline w riters, aim ing at increasing the day’s single copy sales. 14 Turkish Daily N ews, 8-9 April 1999; 15 ibid. 16 WAN, World Press Trends 1999, Turkey

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Contents: hard policy and opinions issues prevail. Moreover, and just as in Greece, opinions prevail over fact-based reports in journalism . In Turkey, all new spapers have a num ber of so-called “köse” (”corner”) w riters. These corners are exclusively designed for opinions, and journalists or academ ics publishing them on a regular basis enjoy a high reputation and high fees. As to the contents of coverage, issues of hard politics prevailed from February to August 1999: the capture of Ö calan, Greece’s support for the Kosovo Liberation Arm y (KLA), the resignation of Rahm en Koc from the Greek- Turkish Businessmen ’s Association, the crises over the islands of Lim nos, Agathonisi/ Esek adasi and Plati and so on. Sources of information. Follow ing the Turkish and Greek press, one gets the impression th at only a limited number of sources of information are used by journalists. Such sources are rarely quoted, and, in many cases, even interview partners are not nam ed. Nevertheless, neither in Tu rk e y nor in Greece could the possible sources of inform ation be described as limited. Apart from th e n ew s agencies, all kin ds of international new spapers, m agazines and other sources are available to journalists. It seem s, how ever, that these sources are not fully exploited by journalists, m ost of them relying on inform ation from national sources, especially national press agencies. This practice is not only due to the generally insufficient training of journalists. Especially in Tu rk e y, m any journalists w ho do not belong to the professional elite have no com m and of English or of other foreign languages. Legislative restrictions. Self-censorship is a common feature of both Greek and Turkish journalism . In both countries there are specific factors that encourage the practice of self-censorsh ip on the part of journalists. In Turkey, regulations of the Penal Code, of the Anti-Terror Law and of Law No. 5816 concerning crim es com m itted against Atatürk restrict the right to freedom of expression. Thus, articles are forbidden that make people unw illing to serve in the army. Insulting the m oral personality of Turkish ness, th e Republic, Governm ent and State m inisters Katharina Hadjidimos

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as w ell as the m ilitary are a crim e according to the Penal Code. Article 8 of the Anti-Terror law forbids propaganda against the indivisibility of the State. Insulting the m em ory of Atatürk in a single sentence m ay incur a prison term of up to three years. 17 It is obvious that the w ording of the above-m entioned stipulations is very much open to interpretation. Thus, ow ners of new spapers, Editors and journalists can never clearly anticipate w h ether a critical report w ill trigger charges from the State prosecutor or not. State prosecution does n ot on ly take place in cases w h en journalists express their ow n view s th at are in con flict w ith State in terests, but also w hen they publish interview s w ith , or statem ents by, th ird persons. Th is w as th e case w ith the journalist O ral Calislar (C u m h u riy et) w h o w as sentenced to im prisonm ent an d to large fin es for publish ing an interview w ith Abdullah Ö calan an d th e KLA activist, Kem al Burkay 1 8 . Another exam ple w as the im prison m ent of Ragip Duran, w ho w orked for the BBC an d th e French new spaper, Libéra tion, for publishing an in terview w ith Ö calan in 1994 (another interview w ith th e KLA leader published in 1991 got through w ithout prosecution by public authorities).19 Th e most recent example are the charges again st Nadin e Mater in autum n 1999 for h er book M ehmetin k itabi w h ich contains interview s w ith soldiers based in south-east Tu r k e y. The High Council on Radio and Television (RTÜK ). An im portant role is played by the State institution, RTÜK, the High Council on Radio and Television consisting of n ine mem bers, five of w hom are appointed by the Governm ent and four nam ed by the O pposition parties. The RTÜK not only issues licences to private broadcasting com panies but also controls the contents of program m es. According to the Radio and Television Law of 1994, program m es contradicting “the 17 Hum an Rights Watch Report, April 1999; Reporters Sans Frontieres 1998 Report 18 O pen letter of Article XIX Director Andrew Puddephat t to Minister of Justice Hikm et Sam i Tu r k , dated July 8, 1999; Hum an Rights Watch Report, April 1999 19 Hum an Rights Watch Report, April 1999

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national and spiritual values of society” and “the general m orality, civil peace, and structure of the Turkish fam ily” are forbidden. If radio or television do not com ply w ith the provisions, the RTÜK m ay either issue a w arning or decide on a tem porary closure of the relevant station. Thus, any view er of Turkish television soon gets used to a blank screen. In a report covering the period from 20 September to 4 Novem ber, 1999, the n on-governm ental organization , Reporters sans frontières, counted nin e television station s an d eight radio stations th at had been cen sored by RTÜK. Several stations w ere suspen ded for periods lasting from one to 180 days. O n 6 O ctober, 1999, five television and four radio station s w ere reported to have been forced off the air for a total period of 225 days, an d on 13 O ctober, four television and four radio stations w ere suspended for a period of 311 days. 2 0 Th is practice of RTÜK ten ds to force sm aller station s to give up their activities, altogether due to losses in advertising revenues an d m arket shares. Implications for freedom and standards of reporting. Thus, political new s un dergo a process of m ultiple stages of selection : at the first level, in the stage of pre-selection , n ew s item s are elim in ated w hich are not considered to be exciting en ough for th e m arket. Although th is elim in ation is a norm al process, it seem s that, in Turkey an d Greece, m ost of the new s con cernin g cultural or academ ic issues is already elim in ated at this stage. O n th e secon d level, self-censorsh ip com es in: i.e. th ose n ew s item s th at risk provokin g a negative reaction on th e part of the Editor or of state officials are excluded. In a third step, even if th e issue itself rem ains untouch ed, the lan guage an d the presentation, the headlines for exam ple, are changed in order to increase the sin gle copy sales for the day. O n ce the n ew s h as passed these stages, little of its original ch aracter w ill be left. An d new s on civil society issues or intern ation al relation s usually do not even en ter th is selection procedure. 20 IFEX/RSF, Com m uniqué de presse no.8: violations de la liberté de la presse en Turquie, 4 Novem ber 1999

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As to direct pressure put on journalists by their Editors or by politicians, inform ation rem ains contradictory. Som e observers and journalists confirm such pressure. Many journalists are charged w ith some offence and receive prison sentences or heavy fines. There are num erous cases w hich are reported by Reporters Sans Frontiers, Human Rights Watch, Ifex Action Alert and others. O n the other hand, very critical articles can be found at tim es in new spapers. When the journalist O ral Calislar w ent to prison for conducting and publishing interview s w ith Abdullah Ö calan 21 in spring 1999, lengthy interview s w ith a law yer of the KLA leader appeared in Turkish Daily N ews w ithout any legal consequences for the journalists. Prosecution is som ew hat unpredictable. Ahm et Altan, a novelist and colum nist is quoted in a report from Human Rights W atch: “You can say there is no freedom of expression, you can say there is press freedom , and you are right in both statem ents. It’s not like in a typical dictatorship – the borders are not clear, you can’t know w here they are.”22 O n 26 July, 1999, Ilnur Cevik entitled his editorial in the daily Turkish Daily N ews: “As w e mark 91 years of life w ithout censorship... Is this a bad joke?”. In his comment, he analysed the situation in Turkey: “So 91 year ago, the authorities decided that they w ould no longer apply censorship to the press. Ever since then, censorship has been applied in the press in various forms in Tu rk e y, and press freedom in recent years has become a meaningless phrase, as the authorities have imprisoned so many journalists and w riters for expressing their view s.... Authorities have sum m oned Turkish journ alists to various state departments and told them w hat is taboo and w hat is not, and thus many new spapers have applied self-censorship. New spapers that have refused to toe the official line on certain sensitive issues, like th e Kurdish problem or religion, have faced official harassm ent and financial pressure.” Referring to the media landscape, he continued: “Another form of censorship has been the result of monopolistic trends in the media. If you resign from one new spaper you w ill not get a job in a rival new spaper because the bosses have agreed not 21 Hum an Rights Watch Report, April 1999, online edition 22 HRW Report 1998, online edition

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to hire such journalists. So, many prom inent journalists have to stay w ith their new spapers and do w hat they are told. Then, of course, there is the notoriously conservative establishment in Tu rk e y, w hich is used to intim idating journalists w ho decide to speak their m inds on taboo subjects such as religion, secularism , ethnic problems and the military. If a journalist steps out of line, he is punished w ith character assassination, and if that has not deterred the person, they create an excuse to put him behind bars...â&#x20AC;?.23 The Structure o f Greek Media Media concentration in Greece. There are currently som e 22 national dailies and 17 Sunday edition s published in Greece. A dow nw ard trend in the circulation of daily new spapers has been recorded since 1990, th e average circulation of Athenian dailies dropping from 930 000 in 1988 to only 420,000 in 1998. 2 4 As in Tu rk e y, n ew spaper sales to subscribers are a negligible figure amounting to only 5 percen t, w hile 95 percent of the new spapers are sold as single copies. The Greek print media m arket is less concentrated than in Tu r k e y. Nevertheless, only five publishers account for m ore than 65 percent of new spaper sales and absorb three-quarters of advertising. Lam brakis Press and Tegopoulos Publications show the h ighest profits. Both com panies are also shareholders in Teletypos, a group of publish ers running the TV channel, Mega, one of Greeceâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s most important private channels. The m edia m arket in Greece is highly com petitive. A total num ber of 124 private TV stations (12 operating nationw ide), 1,200 radio stations (300 broadcasting n ationw ide) and 22 national dailies com pete in a country w ith a population of only 10 m illion. It is obvious that the profits do not com e from sales but rather from advertising revenues. About 50 percent of new spaper and 80â&#x20AC;&#x201C;90 percent of m agazine revenues come from advertising. 2 5 But, because competition for adverts is sim ilarly high, it is suspected that the ow ners of new spapers are less interested in profit m aking than in politically m otivated factors. 23 Turkish Daily N ews, 26 July 1999 24 Hermes, m onthly m agazine, February 1999 25 WAN World Press Trends 1999, Greece

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With readership of prin t m edia declining, the operation of TV channels has becom e a boom ing m arket for investors in the m edia sector. The private television m arket lacks regulation. The absence of legislation and regulation of this sector has been w idely criticised. Until 1990, Greek television w as com pletely in the hands of the State. Television started in Greece in the 1960s under the dictatorship of the colonels. Since then, it has alw ays been under state control and linked to the Governm ent’s interests. It w as only in 1989 that the first private channel started broadcasting, follow ed by a burgeoning of other TV stations. Private channels and business interests cam e to dom inate the m arket. Public broadcasters lost audience. But th e TV market w as still subject to the interests of day-to-day politics and could be m anipulated easily through aw arding or refusing licences. In 1994, for exam ple, w hen the Pasok party w on back pow er from the conservative party, licences w ere aw arded to Sky TV and 902 TV w hich had been denied by the form er Governm ent because of the televisions’ support to the Socialist O pposition.26 Implications for reporting. As in Tu rk e y, m ost new spaper reports do not distinguish betw een fact and opinion. Reports on Turkey are usually restricted to political m eetin gs and to security issues. There seem to be tw o reasons for the one-sidedness of reporting: First, journalists argue that new s on issues other than h ard politics or security problem s “w ould not sell” regarding Turkey. As outlined above, the m edia m arket is highly competitive and, w ith 95 percent single copy sales, new spapers have to “w in” their readership w ith exciting headlines on a day-to-day basis. Nationalist slogans are a relatively strong selling factor. The second reason is the trend tow ards strong nationalism in Greek society over the past years, fuelled by the disintegration process of form er Yugoslavia, the coming into existence of the form er Yu go s la v Republic of Macedonia, imm igration of Albanians and a stream of 26 Stylianos Papathanassopoulos, The Politics and the Effects of the Deregulation of Greek Television, in European Journal of Com m unication, 1997, Vol. 12(3), pp. 351-368

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refugees, the w ar in Kosovo an d territorial disputes in the Aegean. During the w ar in Kosovo, representatives of the Greek O rthodox church kept reminding th e Greek people of its comm on religious roots and traumata w ith its Serb â&#x20AC;&#x153;brothersâ&#x20AC;?. Journalists are part of this society, of course, and cannot stay im m une to these perceptions. U n fo rt u n a t e ly, professionally skilled journalists w ho conduct thorough investigations are still lacking, although m ore than 58 percent have a university degree 27 . Most journalists rem ain content w ith the new s offered by the national agencies and only a few m ake an effort to check facts and consult additional sources of inform ation. This m ay be one explanation as to w hy there are so few dissenting voices on subjects regarding Turkey. Those journalists speaking in favour of a m ore constructive approach tow ards Greek-Turkish relations w ere subject to verbal attacks and even threats from their colleagues and com patriots. It seem s that the m ain source of inform ation on Turkey is the Athens New s Agency (ANA). Considering the fact that Turkey plays the m ost im portant role in Greek foreign policy, it is rem arkable how few sources of inform ation there are. Apart from the correspondent of ANA, only four to five journalists report from Turkey on a regular basis (w hile 20 correspondents w ork for Germ an new spapers and TV stations). Defining the structural problem s in Greek m edia contributing to the unbalanced reports on Turkey is m uch m ore difficult than analysing the Turkish m edia structure. This is probably due to the fact that, in Greece, there are few er legislative instrum ents restricting freedom of expression (w ith the exception of libel law s) and that the National Broadcast Council has far less com petence than its turkish counterpoint, RTĂ&#x153;K. The phenom enon of hate speech in Greek m edia, how ever, is the sam e. O nly very few deviating opinions can be found, and this raises concern. Greek journalists face m uch less pressure from outside, but the need to be accepted w ithin their ow n professional group seem s to be extrem ely important. As a journalist, it is easier to survive sw imm ing w ith the m ainstream . 27 Interview w ith Stylianos Papathanassopoulos, Athens University, Departm ent of Com m unication and Media Studies

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III. Fo rms o f hate speech Perception of ‘G reeks’ and ‘Turks’ as collectives. It is one of the m ost harm ful factors in bilateral relations that Turkish m edia usually talk about “Greece” or “Athens” and Greek m edia cite “Turkey” or “Ankara” w hen talking about hostile actions. This creates the im pression that it is the Turkish or Greek State, that acts in a hostile m anner. A closer look at specific constellations of inner-state organizations or even the com position of th e Governm ent or of rulin g parties sh ow s that this im pression is not accurate. In the case of the Im ia/ Kardak crisis, the planting of the Turkish flag on the island by a group of journalists w as w rongly attributed to the Turkish State by calling it “invasion”, “landing”, “agents assault” in Greek m edia. The sam e applies to reports in the Turkish press on the Ö calan scandal. Although the antagonism w ithin the ruling Pasok party, and even w ithin the Foreign Ministry, w as a w ell know n fact to close observers, the action of hosting Ö calan in Greece and later in the Greek Embassy in Nairobi w as ascribed to the Greek Governm ent w ithout any differentiation. “Athens supports terrorism ” and “Kivrikoglu: Athens caught red-handed” w ere the headlines in the new spapers, C um huriy et and Turkish Daily N ews28 . Use of stereotypes. The use of stereotypes is obviously w idespread. Nevertheless, in South-East Europe and especially in Greece and Tu rk e y, this use of stereotypes has som e specific aspects, probably due to the history of the Balkans. Both Greece and Turkey tend to define their national identity in its opposition to “the other”. The Greeks spent som e 400 years under O ttom an rule, from 1453 to the declaration of indepen dence in 1822. Turkey, therefore, can still be regarded as the historic enem y. The 1923 Treaty of Versailles and the corresponding convent io n 2 9 provided for th e “exch ange” of th e Greek and Turkish population 28 Cumhuriyet, 23 February 1999; Turkish Daily N ews, February 27 1999 29 Lausann e Treaty of July 1923 in Article 142 and the Convention concerning the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations, signed by Greece and Turkey on 30 January 1923

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– except for the Greek inhabitants of Constantinople and the Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace. The atrocities during this “exchange” inflicted enorm ous national traum a on both sides. Except for a short period of détente during the era of Eleftherios Ven iz elos and Mustafa Kemal in the 1930s, the historic animosity betw een the tw o peoples continued. In 1955, riots in Istanbul broke out and a mob attacked Greek houses, shops and churches, demanding the annexation of Cyprus by the Turkish Government. In 1973, the Greek Junta intiated a coup against the Cypriot Government of Archbishop Makarios and replaced him by an old enemy of Tu rk e y, Nicol Sampson. In 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus, arguing that this w as necessary in order to protect the Turkish population. In 1996, there w as the territorial dispute over the island of Imia/Kardak and, in 1999, Tu rk e y ’s national enemy number one, the KLA leader Ö calan, w as kidnapped from the Greek Em bassy in Nairobi. All these crises that take place at regular intervals keep the old anim osities and prejudices alive. The Greek Press does not fail to remind the Greek people of the atrocities comm itted by the Turks during the expulsion of the Greek population from old Smyrna (present day Izmir) and the invasion of Cyprus by the Turkish army in 1974. The Turks, on the other hand, keep alive the m emory of the aggression of the Greek army invading Anatolian territory in 1919 and the attempted coup by the Greek Junta on Cyprus in 1973. When Ö calan w as captured and brought to Turkey in 1999, Prime Minister Ecevit, w ho had been responsible for the operation in Cyprus in 1974, w as once more celebrated as the one that caused the “Cypriot defeat” and now “Apo defeat as w ell” in the daily S abah30 . The repetition of such stereotypes has the “advantage” that the media no longer have to make an effort to explain political in cidents to their readers, but that catchw ords such as “Cyprus”, the “Catastrophe of Sm yrna” or the “Megali Idea” of the Greeks trigger off the appropriate association in the readers/view ers. This seem s to be one of the reasons w hy the articles and reports in both countries are becom ing m ore and m ore stripped of facts. 30 Sabah, 19 February 1999

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O ther fo rms o f hate speech O mission of information/ Silencing of non-nationalist voices. In late M ay 1999, the ecum en ical Patriarch of th e Greek O rth odox ch urch , Ba r t h o lo m e w , stated in an in terview w ith Stratis Balaskas in Istan bul th at “n ation alism is a h eresy an d a th reat to O rth odoxy ”. Th is statem en t soun ded fairly unusual in the ears of Greek O rthodox citizens, w h o are used to m o re nation alist com m en ts on th e part of th eir ch urch. The interview w as an nounced on th e front page of th e daily Elef th eroty p ia 3 1 an d prin ted in full len gth in th e sam e edition . This in terview w as, h ow ever, not m en tioned by oth er Greek m edia. Th e n on -govern m en tal organization, Greek Helsin ki M on itor, observed: “...A th orough look at th e m edia in Greece, in cludin g th e State new s agen cies, w ould show that these statem ents w en t un noticed and usually totally unreported, except for th e Patriarch’s appeal for a ceasefire...”. 3 2 Another example of om ission of inform ation is th e press coverage of a m eeting of a prom inent group of Greek and Turkish w om en, Win Peace in spring 1998. Zeynep O ral, a founding m em ber of WinPeace and a senior journalist, com plained that w hile the m eeting got abun dant press coverage in Tu r k e y, hardly any Greek new spaper had taken notice of this event 33 – a phenom enon that must have seemed like sabotage to the Turkish initiators. O pinions rather than facts. Editorial w riters enjoy a high reputation and even higher salaries. The so-called “köse” w riters in Turkey receive salaries that m ost West European journalists can only dream of. “Köse” w riters and their Greek counterparts have the advan tage that th eir readers are aw are of reading com m ents, not reports. A m ore disagreeable point is that in m ost factual reporting facts are m ingled w ith opinions and could easily be m istaken for com m ents – except that they are not labelled as such. 31 Interview in Eleftherotypia of 29 March 1999 32 Report of Greek Helsinki Monitor of 1 April 1999 33 Interview w ith Zeynep O ral, 8 April 1999

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The use of opinions disguised as facts and the attribution of plenty of adjectives in factual reporting is one of the greatest blemishes in the journalism of both countries. This especially applies to the misleading coverage of certain incidents disregardin g standards of international law. An incident concerning the Greek island of Lim nos m ay serve as an example of how attributes chan ge the perception of w hat really happened. O n 19 March 1999, a Turkish F 16 fighter reportedly flew over Lim nos, w as detected and follow ed by Greek defence fire. The Turkish daily, Hürriyet, reported the incident as follow s: “The cool-headed pilot preven ted w ar. O ur F-16 pilot, m erely doing a test flight, behaved very rationally. Without h itting th e autom atic fire battery, he called h is headquarters. The headquarters gave instructions to the pilot to ‘keep cool, and return im m ediately’...”34 . Hürriyet added that in violation of the Lausanne Tr e a t y, Greece had installed a m ilitary base on the island. This inform ation is incorrect; Article 13 of the Lausanne Treaty only provides for the dem ilitarization of the islands of Mytilene, Chios, Sam os and Ikaria, but does not m ention the island of Lim nos.35 Unspecified allegations on hostile incidents. Mutual suspicion about acts of sabotage is common in the media of both countries. When w oods are burning in Greece, which happens every summer, Greek media tend to suspect Turkish agents of causing the fire. 36 In turn, w hen the Canadian scientist, Karl Bucktought, predicted a major earthquake in Thrace in mid-July 1999 also comprising the European part of Istanbul, his Turkish colleagues rejected the warning. The Turkish m edia found out that he w as of Greek origin and accused him of trying to harm the Turkish tourism business. 37 False information – a w edding ceremony shakes bilateral relations. Anoth er m ixture of tragedy and com edy, alth ough rather a tragedy as to the quality of journalism , w as the assum ed crisis over the islan d of 34 35 36 37

Hürriyet, 29 March 1999 Lausanne Treaty of July 1923 Stuttgarter Z eitung, 7 July 1998 Stuttgarter Z eitung, 21 August 1999

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Platia (in Turkish Keci) in M ay 1999. Inform ation on a plan ned w edding ceremony of a Greek fisherm an w ith his Italian bride on the island of Plati in th e Aegean caused h ot tem pers and harsh accusations against Greece in the Turkish press, since Ankara considered the sovereignty of the said island to be un determ ined. 3 8 The incident m ight have h ad m ore serious repercussions but, in fact, it turned out to be not an inciden t at all. A Turkish official had con fused the n am e and location of the islands ‘Pla t i’ and ‘Pla t ia’, the latter being disputed by Tu r k is h authorities. It turned out that the cerem ony took place on ‘Pla t i’. Nevertheless, there w ere serious tension s. Greek and Turkish patrol boats w ere sum m on ed to the area, an d journ alists lingered in th e neighbourhood, w aiting for ‘their story’3 9 . Greek officials could not w ithhold their m ockery: “Why don’t you look at a map ?” suggested Greek new spapers, citing Greek Minister of Defence, Akis Tzochatzopoulos.40 Q uoting officials: vague terms and outspoken insults. Hate speech is hardly disguised w hen used by governm ent officials. Media in both countries w ould not m iss a chance to pick up strong statem ents and they w ould do so w ithout scrutinising their justification, softening their criticism or criticising their ow n politicians. “Grey zones”, for exam p le, is an attribute given to a num ber of Greek islan ds in th e Aegean by Tu r k e y ’s Presiden t, Süleym an D e m ir e l, 4 1 im plying a th reat of action over th ese territories, sh ould th e n eed arise. The daily Kathimerini quoted Prim e Minister Sim itis, w hen referrin g to Ankara in a conversation w ith Romano Prodi, thus: “foreign policy cannot be m ade by idiots ....”.42 M o r e o v e r, Turkish m edia, as w ell as govern m ent officials, accuse Greece of blocking Tu r k e y ’s access to the European Union. Alth ough 38 39 40 41 42

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Hürriyet, 15 May, 1999; Cumhuriyet, 16 May 1999; Turkish Daily N ews, 17 May 1999; Turkish Daily N ews, 17 May 1999; Cumhuriyet, 16 May 1999 Eleftherotypia, 17 May 1999 Turkish Daily N ews, May 17 1999 I Kathim erini, 18 May 1999

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Greece has opposed Tu r k e y ’s access to th e EU, this does not m ean th at Turkey is n ot yet a m em ber of th e European Union just because o f objection s by Greece. Such accusations, w ithout m ention of other relevant factors in the EU’s policy tow ards Tu r k e y, should be also regarded as open hate speech. The form er Foreign M inister, Th eodoros Pan galos, w as even m ore explicit. All those claim in g the existence of a Macedon ian minority in Greece w ere in sulted as “perverted in tellectuals an d perverted journalists”, “m onkeys and anim als”. In January 1999, he stated, “Greek journalists are the w orst enem ies of the Greek Governm en t”. Th ese rem arks led Ludm illa Alexeyeva and Aaron Rhodes, respectively President and D irector of the In ternational Helsinki Federation , to express their serious con cern over such statem en ts in an open letter of 25 Jan uary, 1999. A Greek Archbishop w ho en joys overw helm ing respect am ong the Greek people does not lag behind M r Pan galos. He com m en ted on th e situation in Kosovo th at: “our O rth odox breth ren are being bom barded” and that th e w hole situation “has its origin in the M uslim elem ent”. 4 3 Whenever leading personalities go to extrem es, the m edia do not m iss the opportunity to quote them .

IV. A step to w ards a new understanding: a pro gramme w indo w co -pro duced by Greek and Turkish jo urnalists During interview s con ducted w ith Greek and Turkish journalists in the context of this research, their sincere interest in discussing the role of the m edia in bilateral relations becam e clear. They show ed openness and sensitivity on this issue. A practical result of the research w as the bilateral m edia project, aim ing at better m utual understanding and reduction of hate speech elem ents of m ainstream journalism . 43 GHM Report, 1 April 1999

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The co-production of a programm e w indow by Greek an d Turkish journalists is m eant to create a forum for all those journalists and intellectuals in both countries w ho take a differen t stand from the main-stream journalism of the m edia. This programm e w indow w ill take the shape of a series of six documentaries on issues of civil society w hich are of interest to both Greece and Tu r k e y. The docum entaries w ill not touch “hot spots” in bi-national relations, but deal w ith issues on w hich a dialogue betw een civil societies m ay be developed. The characteristic of this initiative is that, for each docum entary, one Greek and one Turkish journalist w ill w ork together: th ey w ill travel together, conduct the relevant investigations and interview s, collect the sam e facts and – m ost im portant – interpret the facts together. Thus, they w ill be forced to deal in detail w ith the perceptions and the view point of “the other” and are encouraged to cross-check facts and figures com ing from national sources of inform ation (national new s agencies, history textbooks, etc.). The journalists them selves w ill determ ine the subjects of the docum entaries. Given the political delicacy of such a program m e, only those journalists have been asked to participate w ho have already some experience w ith Greek-Turkish issues and w ho have show n a nonnationalist and constructive approach. The docum entaries w ill be produced by tw o independent com panies in Greece and in Turkey. To ensure their editorial independence, half of the production costs w ill be funded by the MEDA program m e of the European Comm ission. The programmes w ill be broadcast by private television stations in both countries in both languages.

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III. Tw enty-five Years o f the Helsinki Pro cess: 1975 – 2000

“The participating States w ill respect hum an rights and fundam ental freedom s, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all w ithout distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.” Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-O peration in Europe, 1 August 1975 147

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In a cavernous auditorium in central Belgrade, legislators from all over Europe and the United States assembled in mid-1974 to debate and publicize an unprecedented initiative then being negotiated in Helsin ki. The idea w as to produce an accord the follow ing year that w ould detail basic hum an rights in Europe, in exchange for Western acquiescence to the Soviet-im posed post-w ar borders. As the resident correspondent in Yugoslavia of a m ajor We s t e r n new s agency, I listened carefully. In th e afterm ath of th e Wa r s a w Pa c t ’s in vasion of Czech oslovakia in 1968 an d th e crush in g of th e reform m ovem ent, I th ough t un iversal acceptan ce of th e h um an righ ts provision s — th e so called “third Basket” w as th e on ly w ay to ach ieve peaceful ch an ge in Europe. I w rote a feature th at w en t aroun d th e w orld. I learned during the parliam entarian’s assem bly that the participants at Helsinki intended to im prove conditions for the Press as w ell. Indeed, the final text prom ised to exam ine reporter’s visa requests in a favourable spirit and w ithin a suitable and reasonable tim e-scale and to provide multiple entry and exit visas for perm anently accredited journalists. It also stipulated that journalists should not be expelled or penalized for going about “the legitim ate pursuit of their professional activity.” This w ould be a real change, for w e all knew the pressures put upon reporters by totalitarian regim es, starting w ith Russia. Little did I realize that, follow ing an unsuccessful attem pt to obtain a Russian visa, I w ould becom e perhaps the first “Basket Three case.” O f course, m y ow n encounter w ith the Helsinki Final Act w as m odest and fleeting, but if m ultiplied m any, m any tim es, it helps explain the im pact that process had on the late Cold War period. No one could have anticipated, just 15 years after that Belgrade m eeting, the end of the Roy Gutman

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Cold Wa r, the peaceful collapse of Com munist pow er in Europe, the end of the Russian Em pire, the opening of European borders, and the democratic transform ation that is still under w ay. Nor could anyone have an ticipated that Yugoslavia, the m ost free an d open Com m unist state in Europe an d the case study in socialism w ith a hum an face, could becom e th e m odel for pernicious nationalism and th e setting for the w orst atrocities com m itted on European soil sin ce the Holocaust. M y story began in late sum m er 1974, w hen m y th en-em ployer, the Reuters New s Agency, asked m e to becom e deputy bureau chief in M oscow. At the tim e, I w as daily breakin g elem ents of a stran ge story about the reputed m ach inations of the Russian , Czech, and Hungarian governm ents to support an orthodox Comm unist party challenge to the Tito regim e. I w orried th at m y high profile coverage w ould hurt m y ch ances of getting to M oscow, but saw no alternative to reporting the story. In triguingly, the letter of assignm ent never arrived in the Yugoslav post, and I received a photocopy six w eeks late. Wit h trepidation I agreed that Reuters subm it my visa application in D ecember 1974. A sh ort tim e later, I w ent through the custom ary “processing,” w hich in those days consisted of bein g visited by a Russian “reporter” in Belgrade, w ho interview ed m e about m y in terests, language capabilities, and ethn ic and fam ily background. I departed Belgrade early in March 1975 to begin a Russian lan guage refresher course in London. As I began it, the Soviet Em bassy form ally rejected m y application “for reasons that are know n,” an d asked Reuters for “anoth er applicant.” There w as no further explan ation. My career suddenly plunged into the deep freeze over an arbitrary an d capricious, but fam iliar, abuse of pow er. I decided to try an d convince Reuters to fight the rejection. My colleagues in Moscow, London, and Eastern Europe threw their support beh in d m e. For one thing, I w as the fourth Reuters reporter to be “blackballed” in a sh ort tim e from M oscow. Tw o reporters h ad been th e victim s of official sm ear cam paigns w hile in Moscow or upon departing, and a third w as denied a visa before m e. I detailed this for Gerald Lon g, the Reuters general 150

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m a n a ge r. But the context w as broader, and I com piled a docum entation of 15 cases of expulsions of Western journalists and 17 of harassm ent in the previous decade. The pattern I detected w as that organ ization s like Reuters, w hich tried to keep a low profile and tended to suffer in silence, received ever-w orsening treatm ent. Mr Lon g m ulled it over and decided on a comp lete reversal of previous practice. The centerpiece of the new approach w as a lengthy letter of com plaint to the Foreign Minister, Andrei Grom yko, dem anding an end to the harassm ent of journalists. The m ethods Russian authorities used to intim idate journalists – detention by the police, threats of expulsion, personal and sexual sm ears – “w ould be unw orthy of an y country having strangers in its m idst,” he said in it. He decided it should be delivered to Grom yko during the Helsinki Sum m it on 30 July. The Russian Em bassy w ould not accept it . So Long subm itted it to the CSCE Executive Secretary, sent copies to 175 other new s organizations w ith reporters in Moscow , and had an article published on the m ain Reuter new sw ire. Reuters also asked the In ternational Press Institute in Zurich to collect data on harassm ent and expulsions from then on. Back in London, the Russian Em bassy routin ely invited Reuters to staff press conferences. O n at least tw o occasions, m y nam e w as put forw ard, and each tim e, the Russian Em bassy refused to allow m e in. The th en-Editor, Jonathan Fenby, protested in letters, in person, and on the w ire. When the Russian Em bassy Press Coun selor replied that th ey had not prevented m e from com ing, Mr Fenby fired back a letter and w ire story that they indeed had. The confron tation continued un til the Em bassy signalled a ceasefire. Reuters pressed my case for nearly a year, but I never received a visa and ended up in Washington instead. I could not pursue m y interest in East-West relations. While m y ow n encounter w ith the Helsinki Final Act did not end satisfactorily, the fact there w as a norm that could be referred to and elaborated upon in a follow -up procedure provided m y new s organization a veh icle for protest, and a point to rally th e profession. I understand that after the public confrontation, the Reuters bureau in Moscow w ent a good 10 years w ithout harassm ent or visa delays. Roy Gutman

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During th e five years I covered th e State Departm ent for Reuters, I visited Moscow frequently, travelling w ith the US Secretary of State, and kept tabs on the efforts m ade by the US delegation, led by Max Kam pelm an, to push and develop hum an rights under the CSCE rubric. Possibly because I w as m ore sensitized than m ost reporters to the possibilities of the Helsinki process, I became con vinced th at th e Carter and Reagan adm inistrations, in their very different w ays, gave sustenance to a dynamic process. For m any colleagues and politicians alike, the role of the CSCE in bringing about Europe’s greatest revolution, w as a little-know n fact of international life. The assessm ent of former CIA director, Robert Gates, published in 1996, parallels m y analysis. In From the Shadows (Sim on & Schuster), Gates notes ironically: “The Soviets desperately w anted the CSCE, they got it, and it laid the foundations for the end of their empire. We resisted it for years, w ent grudgingly, (thenPresident Gerald) Ford paid a terrible political price for going, perhaps re-election itself, only to discover years later that CSCE had yielded benefits to us beyond our w ildest im agination.” After m ore than decade of covering everything but the “East bloc,” I h ad the fortun e to be assign ed to Europe by New sday in 1989, and reported the peaceful revolution s in Poland, East Germ an y, and Czech oslovakia. After th e Wall cam e dow n, I w as convinced th at th e CSCE process held the key for the security of a Europe, w hole and free, and that NATO w ould have to begin w orking together w ith the CSCE to uph old the principles of the Helsinki Act. In Novem ber 1990, on th e eve of th e Paris Summ it, I w ent to Vienn a to test the theory, and learn ed from CSCE am bassadors about an internal dispute, centerin g on the creation of a proposed Conflict Prevention Cen ter (CPC), to address future security challenges. Th e th en Germ an Foreign Min ist e r, Hans Dietrich Gensch er, envisioned the CSCE becom ing an um brella over NATO , and the CPC a perm anent forum for discussion s of political disputes betw een European States. Russia, seekin g to end N AT O ’s m ilitary structure, backed Germ any, as did the Eastern European States, w hose m ain concern w as the opposite of Russia’s: nam ely, the security vacuum created in their neigh bourhood by the demise 152

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of the Warsaw Pact and NAT O ’s d raw dow n. The United States and Britain w orried out loud th at th e CSCE forum might supplant NAT O , and insisted on a w eak CPC. They carried the day. So despite President George Bush’s proclam ation of a New World O rder in Paris, there w as n o underlyin g con cept or mechanism . In retrospect, I cannot help thinking that the failure to grasp and build upon the cen tral role of the CSCE w as a key factor in the calamitously shortsighted decision s m ade by th e US and other governm ents in addressing the Balkans. M onths later, con flict began in the form er Yugoslavia. It took my colleagues an d m e som e tim e to determ ine that this w as an attempt to change borders by force, using th e m ost savage m eans to carry the d a y. In so doing, Slobodan Milosevic stood on its head the entire order built aroun d Helsin ki, w ith the tacit agreem ent of th e Un ited States, its allies, an d Russia. No instrument w as available to address effectively w hat he had done. O nly neutral Austria and the leaders of som e of th e new ly in dependent East European states, in particular the Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel, sounded the alarm . The Bosn ia conflict w as, in retrospect, an enorm ous crim e against h u m a n it y, masqueradin g as a w ar; it w as on e of Europe’s darkest hours. Every security structure — the UN Security Council, NATO , and the European Defence Community failed, and even the CSCE w as now here to be seen. To a large extent, reporters, hum anitarian aid w orkers, and som e hum an rights organizations becam e the keepers of the Helsinki standards. Massive and system atic w ar crim es w ere not the only factor that drove the new s m edia to investigate, develop, and stick w ith the story. The other w as th e sense th at govern ments had w alked aw ay from the principles that had transform ed Europe, and to cover their tracks, they consistently m isled the public by claim ing nothing im portant w as at stake. In tim e, prod ded by such bodies as the US Congression al CSCE Com m ission, states rediscovered CSCE. At the Budapest Sum m it in Decem ber 1994, the intern ation al com m un ity tried to revive it by ren am ing it O rgan ization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (O SCE) and providing it a role in resolving som e of th e conflicts in the Roy Gutman

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form er Soviet Union ; but m y m ain memory of Budapest w as the public battle betw een Russia and the United States and a brave attem pt by Ch ristine von Kohl un d Libal, a colleague from m y Belgrade days an d n ow a Helsin ki Watch Group organ izer from Vienna, to engage th e th en Germ an Chancellor, Helm ut Koh l, on w hy Europe w as closing its eyes to Bosnia. O th er than servin g as a sparring forum , the O SCE w as seem ingly irrelevant to th e conflict in Bosnia. N evertheless, I th in k because th e CSCE h ad been at the centre of the m ost m om entous events of th e late 20th century as a sort o f constitution for m odern European h um an rights, th ere w as no alternative to it resum ing its role as keeper of standards. Hum an rights, at the core of the O SCE s principles, are still not observed in one part of Europe. This time the rum p Yugoslavia is denying journalists visas (including, incidentally, m y ow n), am ong w holesale other hum an rights violations, and the O SCE actively protests this. Yet the long-term outlook is positive. If one recalls the late Cold War era, the Helsinki Fin al Act acquired enormous impact as a result of governm ents, new s m edia, and independent non-governm ental organizations continuing to ham m er aw ay at violations of the agreed norm s. I believe a dem ocratic opening in this last European holdout is also only a question of tim e.

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IV. O ur Wo rk – What We Think, Why It Matters Reflections by Staff M embers

Stanley Schrager N one of Y our Business Alexander Ivanko Damned if Y ou Do and Damned if Y ou Don’t Hanna Vuokko M inority M edia: The Case of the Swedish-Speaking Finns Mihaylo Milovanovitch The Forbidden Language Katarzyna Cortés A child of ‘Solidarity’

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Stanley N. Schrager No ne o f Yo ur Business At an O SCE-sponsored con ference late in 1999, I began m y address by posing a series of questions: I asked first, can toads hear? Why or w hy not? Write an essay referring to Elvis Presley, the m oon, a snow storm , and electrical current. If you w ere w riting your 300-page autobiography, w hat w ould page 217 look like? O bviously, this w as not your typical O SCE-type address, and I am certain that m ore th an a few m em bers of the audience w ondered from w hat local psychiatric hospital I had escaped, or perhaps I w as sim ply at the w rong conference. But I later explained, to the best of m y ability, that these questions w ere taken from recent university adm issions applications in the United States; that the former intructions to students asking them to tell a little about them selves and w hy they w anted to attend Such-and-Such a University had been overtaken by m ore thoughtful subjects for essays designed to get th e students to “think outside the box,” as they say, to be more creative, to find new answ ers to new questions. All of w hich led to a discussion on m y part on how the O SCE today needed n ew answ ers to new questions; and I ventured so far as to say that, if th e OSCE O ffice of the Representative on Freedom of the Media w as w riting its autobiography, here is w hat page 217 m ight look like. Back in Chicago w here I grew up, schoolyard bullies w ere fond of telling the sm aller kids to m ind their ow n business. This w as particularly true w hen one w as trying to interfere w ith a discussion betw een a bulky young fellow and his new high school girlfriend. “Mind your ow n business” w as the inarticulate young m an’s w ay of saying that this particular affair did not concern the other person. (O ccasionally, if the situation got out of control, the contretemps w as often punctuated w ith a poke in the eye, but this could usually be avoided, given either a strategic sense of how to avoid such entan glements or quick feet to run aw ay w ith). Today, the stage is m ore sophisticated, and the “partly-dem ocratic” country (alw ays, it appears, in som e kind of transition or other) Stanley N . Schrager

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rather than blurt out that w hat it is doing is none of our business, m ight be m ore likely to invoke w ords that suggest that its actions are “not in your m andate.” While that m ight have been a good argum ent, and w as certainly a com m on one 25 years ago w hen this O SCE w ork-in-progress began under another nam e, it has, now , becom e overtaken by events. About a decade ago, an Am erican w rote a book called The End of History, w hich received acclaim and controversial discussion not so m uch for its content as for its title; the presum ptuous idea that history w as at an end, the ideological battle w as w on, “We” had w on, and “They” had lost. Perhaps the celebration w as a bit prem ature, but certainly the handw riting w as on the w all for the few rem aining really repressive regim es in the w orld. The tired old clichés, along w ith their tired old rulers, w ere crum bling. This century w hich began w ith the draw ing and reshuffling of national boundaries, ch aracterized by invocations of national sovereignty, the inviolability of national borders, and allusions in diplom atic language to m inding your ow n business, and suggestions that such forays w ere “not in your m andate” have now given w ay to a clear loss of national sovereignty, at least in the realm of ideas. In fact, if the 20th century saw the zenith of national sovere ign t y, the 21st cen tury m ay perhaps be the century that w itnesses the dem ise of national sovereignty as w e know it, and as history has seen it over the past hundred years. No longer can governm ents say “None of your business,” or “This is n ot in your m andate.” Because w h at govern ments do internally now IS our business, and our m andate covers it. Now here is this transition from national sovereignty to the sovereignty, not of borders, but of ideas, m ore clear than in the continuing struggle for freedom of the media in the O SCE and elsew here in the w orld. This fight is in the forefront of this new ideological struggle betw een the former forces of repression an d those w ho w ould w elcom e citizens into the 21st century, free of the constraints of the past. As I conclude m y tw o years in the O SCE O ffice of the Represen tative on Freedom of the Media for reassign ment w ith the D epartment 158

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of State, I feel more strongly than ever that the media w ill have to show the w ay in this transition to dem ocracy, this process that seem s to be endless to both governm ents and its citizens. The picture I take aw ay is a m ixed one. We are told that a healthy dem ocracy m oves in lockstep w ith a h ealthy m edia. Eigh ty years ago the em in ent Am erican journalist, Walter Lippm ann, suggested that, “the present crisis of Western dem ocracy is a crisis in journalism,” claim ing quite a bit for him self and his colleagues. Hubris aside, one m ight suggest that the present crisis in the transition to dem ocracy is a crisis in the m edia as w ell. What w e continue to be m issing is a clarity of purpose and civility of m anner am ong journalists and politicians. We need to find answ ers to the question of w hat precisely is the proper place for the m edia in the contem porary life of the O SCE countries moving tow ard dem ocracy. How can w e break dow n the barriers of m istrust and of distrust betw een politicians and the m edia? It should be said here that I am not suggesting forgoing w hat is know n in the United States as the “adversary relationship” betw een governm ent and m edia; for the m ost part, w ith the occasional exception, this adversary relationship has served the United States w ell. “Adversary” is okay, “antagon istic” is not, and w e need to m ove further aw ay from the chronic distrust w hich seem s to so characterize so m any governm ents and m edia representatives in the O SCE area. But how to do this? I so often hear how journalists need “train ing,” as if train in g w ill solve the problem . It w on’t; if carried to its logical conclusion, “training” w ill only produce more effective spokesmen for repressive regim es. I w ould rather have an untrained journalist trying to m ake propaganda for a repressive governm ent than a “trained” journalists w ho know s only too w ell h ow to sw ay public opin ion in the w ron g direction. If train in g is to h ave any productive effect at all, it w ill com e from creatin g enough “train ed” – and h ere I m ean “responsible,” but n ot in th e term s that repressive govern m ents m ean “responsible”– journ alists that they form a critical m ass th at th ey w ill no longer tolerate being pushed around by governmen ts w ho pay on ly lip service to dem ocracy. Stanley N . Schrager

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Politicians, too, share a heavy responsibility for cheapening the public life. We need a rapprochem ent betw een the media and politician s. This raises the question of w hat is the proper place for the media in the con tem porary life of the O SCE? The tw o years of existence of this O ffice has attem pted, to som e degree, to an sw er this question . What h as becom e em in en tly clear is that th is is n ot an O ffice O N Freedom of the M edia, but an O ffice FO R Freedom of th e M edia. Th is is of m ore than academ ic in terest; “on ” freedom of the m edia suggests an objective assessm ent of the situation ; “for” Freedom of the Media more clearly connotes the reality of th e situation of the past tw o years – an active advocacy FO R Freedom of th e Media throughout the O SCE region. But w e still n eed to an sw er the question of w h at is th e best w ay of advocatin g and ch am pioning th at cause. Ten years or so ago, a handful of journalists around the United States consorted to establish a movement called “public” or “civic” journalism , w hich sought to expand, even reconfigure, journalism ’s presum ption of reporting objectively on the new s. The lines com m only separating the reportorial and editorial functions w ere to be, if not crossed, certainly thinned. No longer, for example, w as the local new spaper idly to report the goings-on in city hall; it w as to stir up its readership to act, for example, by sponsoring evening forums on local problem s and perhaps forcing the governm ent’s hand to solve them . I suggest w e extend that concept of “civic journalism” to the O SCE region. In stead of the usual training courses about objective reporting, the h allow ed lectures on the differen ces betw een fact and opinion , w e n eed th e m edia in the O SCE region actively engaged in “civic” journalism . Let them com e dow n strongly on the side of advocacy journalism , let them beat the drum s for com m unity involvem ent in the issues th at concern the everyday lives of their citizens. Wh at w e need are not the traditional “training” courses on objective accurate reporting, but sem in ars on advocacy and civic journalism. Som e governm en ts w ill, of course, not particularly appreciate this new m edia activism I suggest, but it is a w ay of m oving th is glacial-like process of 160

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dem ocratization along. It essentially skips a ph ase in th e evolution of th e m edia, an d seeks to ch annel the enthusiasm an d com m itm ent of the abundant num ber of youn g journ alists throughout the O SCE region w h om w e have m et on our visits. Th is idea, of course, if realized, w ill mean increasing involvem ent of this O ffice in the “sovereign ” in ternal affairs of som e coun tries; actively en couraging the m edia to becom e involved in civic affairs, to w rite about th em , to generate public interest and support for solving the problem s w hich concern the citizens of th ose countries. It m eans a localization of th e profession of journalism; w h y is there no electricity? Why are the roads in such poor condition? (More im portantly, w h at is the governm ent doing or not doin g about it?) Why are the schools overcrow ded, and, often, unheated? Why are people afraid to go out at night? What is th e govern m ent doing to create jobs? And so on. It is the role of the m edia to hold governm en ts accoun table. If w e are to localize the profession of journalism , then w e need to look, too, for specific instances w here w e can bring together govern m ent and m edia to resolve a problem . We need to take on a m ediation function as w ell as advocating freedom of the m edia. For exam ple, in m y opinion , governm ents take action against the m edia and th en occasionally have second thoughts about w hat they have done. They generally have to defend these actions for political reasons, but often look for a w ay out, particularly if their actions have precipitated negative publicity from this O ffice and NGO s. We can w ork w ith governm ents and m edia to resolve these issues, on a selective basis. We need a w illingness both on the part of the government and the presumably aggrieved m edia to sit dow n and talk, w ith this O ffice acting as an interm ediary to resolve specific issues. O SCE governm ents should be able, and w illin g, to come to us and say: help us out of this situation; play a m ediating role and help us resolve this issue w hile it is still resolvable. Many of these issues w ill be lingering in the judicial system of the country and it w ill be easy for govern ments to say that it is a legal m att e r, that w e can’t interfere w ith th e judiciary, etc. Let’s face it, in a number of countries th e “in dependent judiciary” is m erely a preten ce, Stanley N . Schrager

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but an easy one for a govern ment to fall back on . Mediation, how ever, w ill seek to circum vent the tim e-con sum ing and usually intensely partisan process. It w ill seek political solutions to the tim e-con sum ing an d often inh erently p rejudicial legal process. But Govern m ents w ill have to be w illing to look for a resolution outside the legal system . O ur first attem pt at volunteerin g our O ffice as a m ediator, in a specific instance of a conflict betw een an O SCE govern m ent and a media outlet that had been closed, led to a letter to us from the h igh governm en t official involved, stating, th at, first, this w as a legal issue and fell under the mandate of the Min istry of Justice, the court system , etc. Th en w e got the desired conciliatory paragraph that said som eth ing like, despite th is, “m y office, defen ding the righ ts an d in terests of the m edia, is w illing to provide assistance to you in resolvin g the problem . In that respect, I w ould be h appy to m eet w ith your adviso r or w ith you personally as w ell as w ith any other people th at you recom m end.” We take th e official at his w ord. Th e concept of m ediation is a localized, individualized w ay of dealin g w ith conflicts betw een governm ent and m edia in th e O SCE region . It is tim e-consum ing, and w ith no assurance of success. The role of advocacy is a w ell-know n on e for this O ffice; it can now turn the in fluence and official prestige it enjoys am ong the O SCE governm ents and m edia in the direction of m ediating specific conflicts betw een media and governm ent. Intrusive? Perhaps, but again in an era w here national sovereignty gives w ay increasingly to transnational ideas of hum an rights and freedom s, and free m edia, the opportunity is there. It is n ot th at I am insen sitive to w h at struggling governm ents are going th rough. I have been the recipient of a n umber of often em otion al statem ents by governm ent officials of how difficult it is to deal w ith th e “irresponsible” m edia, and how the development of dem ocratic traditions takes tim e, In fact, for the past year, every tw o w eeks I h ave delivered statemen ts to orien tation s of new O SCE individuals on the w ork of this office. Most, by the w ay, w ere bored since they failed to see any relevance of this O ffice to th eir w ork w ith the O SCE; try as I m ight, I could never really con nect our w ork w ith th eir in ter162

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ests, outside of that sm all group of O SCE individuals w ho w ere either in terested for on e reason or another in th e m edia or w hose jobs com pelled them to know som ething about the m edia. Th e only technique that seem ed to w ork at all w as w hen I asked them to put them selves in the role of som eone else. Im agin e yourself, I said, as the presiden t of an em ergin g dem o cracy goin g th rough a difficult transition from autocratic rule of som e sort to a dem ocratic w ay of life. You, as the president, understand how difficult it is to m otivate your people, to brin g their expectation s in lin e w ith w hat your governm en t can realistically h ope to accom plish. You recognize that in th is new en viron m ent it is crucial to gain the support of your people. Letâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s even assum e you are a benevolent ruler, and n ot a form er apparatchik eager to hold onto pow er. You kn ow that to en gender support, the best w ay to do it is th rough the m edia. Your average journ alist is youn g, new to th e profession , poorly train ed, an d, fran kly, often a pain in th e n eck. You know, too, that w ithout the support of your people, you w ill be un able to succeed. Even un der the best of circum stan ces, frankly, the last thing you w ant is an in dependen t, or opposition (for m any such presiden ts th ey are th e sam e th ings, unfortunately) m edia; you w ant a supportive m edia that w ill reflect your actions positively. That is normal, but w hat is one to do? While w e believe in the relentless pursuit of a free m edia as a positive developm ent in the evolution of a dem ocracy, your short-term needs can easily outw eigh the philosophical concepts of th e role of a free media in society (nearly alw ays a topic of â&#x20AC;&#x153;trainingâ&#x20AC;? seminars). We are dealing here, you say, w ith the difference betw een a philosoph ical concept and the reality of governing a fragile nation in transition to dem ocracy. A free m edia can w ait, you say; in fact, a free m edia at this particular tim e in th e developmen t of this country w ould be detrim ental to the progress of dem ocracy, an d the need to gain popular support for the initiatives of the governm ent. I understand, I sym pathize; if I w ere the president of this particular country, I w ould feel the sam e w ay. It is, perhaps, too m uch to expect that these developing dem ocracies be led by enlightened leadStanley N . Schrager

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ers w ho see not only the long term benefits, but also the short term advantages of a free m edia. I have no easy solutions, except that occasionally these governm ents w ill have to be figuratively dragged kicking and scream ing into this new m edia w orld. And so as w e reach the bottom of page 217 of this continuing story, it w ill no longer be enough to tell m e that w hat happens in your count r y, an d w ith your m edia, is no longer my business. Because n ow it is.

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Alexander Ivanko D amned if Yo u D o and D amned if Yo u D o n’t Reporters Defending a Cause: Advocacy Journalism at its “Best” and W orst In 1995, a senior United Nations official w orking in Sarajevo labelled the Western m edia corps covering the Bosnian w ar from the besieged cit y, as “reptiles.” His scorn w as aimed at these reporters because he perceived them to be th e Bosnian Government’s “public relation s officers,” projecting an im age to the w orld public that it w as only the Bosnian Serbs w ho w ere com m itting all the crim es in the country. This senior UN O fficial, an Am erican, failed to grasp one fundam ental change th at has quietly crept into journ alism over the past years, especially in areas in conflict. Although objectivity w as still applauded, subjectivity becam e the “nam e of the gam e.” No longer w ere journalists reporting on a conflict, they w ere taking m oral stands, often supporting one out of m any w arring parties. In Sarajevo during the 1992-1995 w ar, objectivity led to accusations of “pro-Serb” bias, not only by the Government but by one’s ow n colleagues, w ho could not perceive how can anybody be “objective” am ong all this m ayhem . M isha Glenny, on e of th e best British reporters covering th e Balkan w ars of th e 90s, is a classic exam ple. He tried, w h enever it w as possible, to be objective, h e gave all sides th e ben efit of the doubt, h e reported on w h at h e h eard and saw, but he avoided being the m oral judge w ho know s best. As a result, h e w as th row n out, at various tim es, from Belgrade and Sarajevo, threatened by local heavies, Bosniaks and Serbs alike, an d ostracised by m any Western journalists w orkin g in Sarajevo. Why? Because he did not advocate a cause that m any though t w as th e “right one.” Th e Bosnian Governm en t d id have th e moral high ground. Th e Bosnian Serbs w ere besieging Sarajevo, killing off its citizen s like scared rabb its. Con centration cam ps w ere establish ed in 1992 by th e Bosnian Serbs on territory that they controlled. And journalists coverin g these stories w ere often appalled to a poin t Alexander Ivanko

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w hen th ey could no longer take it. The crim es com mitted by the Bosnian Serbs w ere so horrific that on ly a com pletely h eartless person could not feel compassion for the Bosniaks. Western journalists, many of th em of very liberal view s, w ere n o exception . They sym path ised and they tried to h elp the on ly w ay they kn ew – through th e m edia. Professionalism is a different m atter. Can a reporter, w hen w orking in a w ar zone, be expected to be fully objective, giving a clinical review of events, avoiding an y comm entary and high m oral grounds? When civilians are killed, children tortured and w om en raped, how can one avoid becoming an advocate for the “right” cause, w ith “right” defined by every journalist usually in lin e w ith the view s of one of th e w arring parties. Kurt Schork, the Reuters co r r espondent in Sarajevo through out th e w ar, spent most of 1993-94 helping w ounded civilians, using his car as a m akeshift ambulance, w hile UN cars sped by ignoring their pleas. Back in 1994, he told m e that at one point he ran out off clean clothes; everythin g he had w as covered in blood. Mr Schork w as also one of the biggest advocates of the Bosniak cause, as w ell as one of th e UN’s fiercest critics. The UN official I m en tioned in the beginning – his name is Philip Corw in – w as finally declared persona non grata by the Bosnian Governm ent, mainly because of the stories w ritten about him by the Sarajevo press corps, including Kurt Schork. The end result w as a positive one, sin ce Mr Corw in openly supported the Bosnian Serbs. But is it up to journalists to m ake these calls? In 1994-98, I w orked as the United Nations Spokesm an in Sarajevo. Before com ing to Bosnia, for ten years I w as w ith Izvestia, a leading Moscow daily. All the exam ples I am m entioning here I have com e across personally in m y professional life. John Bosnic, a Canadian of Serb origin, covered the Bosnian w ar m ostly for the Japanese m edia. He also advocated a cause, albeit a different one. Working out of Pale, the Bosnian Serb stronghold, Banja Luka and Belgrade, he insisted, through th e m edia, that th e Serbs w ere the on ly victim s of this w ar, and that the alleged crim es perpetrated by the Bosnian Serbs w ere a hoax cooked up by the “pro-Muslim ” Western m edia. His cause m ay have been despicable, but w ere his m ethods 166

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any different? Just like his colleagues from the “other side of the barricade,” he w as using the m edia to propagate rather then inform . The audience did not alw ays know and understand the difference. When this article goes to print, hopefully, the case of An drei Babitsky w ill be resolved. As of m id-February, Mr Babitsky, a Russian reporter for Radio Liberty, w ho initially w ent m issing in Chechnya and later re-surfaced in the custody of Russian troops, w as, at som e point, allegedly exchanged for five Russian soldiers. The Russian Governm ent insisted that Mr Babitsky w as “alive and w ell” and currently somew here in Chechnya held by local Chechen com m anders. His case has gained w orld-w ide attention. His plight is being follow ed by dozens of international governm ental and non-governm ental organizations. What had happened to him has cast doubt on the Governm ent’s dedication to freedom of expression. How ever, th e Russian press, even the most liberal editors, has reacted to Mr Babitsky’s exchan ge rather coolly. Many journalists see him as an advocate of a cause that is, in their view , fun dam entally “anti-Russian.” Iz vestia quoted one of Mr Babitsky’s reports, w here h e said that the Chech ens slit the throats of Russian soldiers “not because they w ere sadists but to raise the aw areness of their cause.” A highly charged issue, em otionally an d historically, th e Chech en w ar has turn ed m any professional journ alists into advocates, in cluding Andrei Ba b it s k y. The cool response am ong his colleagues to all the outrages Mr Babitsky w as subjected to by the Russian authorities is a clear result of advocacy journalism at w ork. Not only Mr Babitsky is a “public relations officer” in this w ar. Man y others, reasonable people, support the Russian o ffensive w h oleheartedly, dem anding, through the m edia, m ore blood. Their loud ch orus drow ns out the few voices, like Mr Ba b it s k y ’s, w h ose sym path ies are w ith th e Chechen rebels. But all of th em do not inform the public, they try to lead it. Be it in support of Russian hegem onism or Ch echen separatism . Western reporters covering the Chechen w ar are not m uch different. They side w ith the underdog – the Chechens, w hom they see as the proud defenders of a just cause. Why the Russian forces started the Alexander Ivanko

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offensive last year is n ot alw ays mentioned. Sham il Basayev, one of the leading Chechen comm an ders, w hom the Russian govern ment brands as a “terrorist,” is portrayed as a heroic w arrior, a sort-off m odern Che Guevara, fondly rem em bered by m any Western journalists w ho grew up in the 60s. All the kidnappings, all the terrorist acts, com m itted by people loyal to Basayev, tend to m iss the front page. Reality ends up being im paled on the view s of the reporter, w ho is stuck in som e Godforsaken hole, trying to get in touch w ith his offices in London, Paris or New York. Satellite phone breaks dow n, food and w ater are scarce, if any, and the airforce is bom bing the area. Try being objective. Advocacy journalism is on a roll. In today’s New World Disorder, w ith local w ars springing up left and right, reportin g the new s takes on a new , and som e w ould say im proved, m eaning. Dow n w ith objectivity, dow n w ith the facts, here is w hat I think and you better listen! These are the “good guys” and these are the “bad guys,” and w hoever thinks otherw ise is com placent to crim es against hum an ity, if not genocide. We saw this approach to reporting very clearly in Bosnia, and w e are seeing it today in Chechnya. The causes m ay the noblest in the w orld, but defending them is not exactly w hat journalism is all about, at least not w hat they teach in college. Reporting the facts as one sees and understands them just seem s so boring. In my view, one of the reasons that advocacy journalism is dom inating the airwaves is, that because of a proliferation of conflicts, there is a proliferation of freelancers w illing to cover them. Major networks, new spapers, magazines prefer not to send their star reporters to areas w here one could get easily killed. Insurance com panies also have a say. At one point in 1995, Peter Jennings from A BC w as prevented from coming to Sarajevo by his insurance company that refused to cover his trip. As a result, people straight out of journalism school end up going to w ar zones to make a name for themselves. And often they do. Joel Brandt, a 17-year old kid, landed in the Balkans wars in the early 90s and left in 1995 as a seasoned w ar reporter filing for T he Times in London and C N N, highly respected by his peers and senior international officials. His success pushed many other young people into the Balkan fire, som e of them never came back alive. 168

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When a w ar ends up being your first profession al assign ment, you ten d to im mediately take sides. The “good guys” are usually th e side you are reportin g from. O nce associated w ith it, you w ill rarely get a chance to see life across the “front-line.” You have now surren dered your “objectivity credentials” and becam e an advocate of a cause. The sam e “syn drom e” also affects the senior, m ore seasoned reporters, but they usually end up being a m inority in a conflict area. The freelancers rule. Brent Sadler of CN N and John Sim pson of the BBC covered the N ATO bom bing cam paign against Yugoslavia from Belgrade. Both tried to be objective, both tried to give their view ers the other side of the story. John Sim pson w rote about his experience in the book The Kosovo News and Propaganda War, published by the International Press Institute. Here is w hat he had to say: “…O fficials at the British Ministry of Defence began to let it be know n that I w as pro-Serbian, and that m y reporting w as outrageously biased. Tony Blair’s press secretary, Alistair Campbell, briefed the lobby journalists at Westm inster to th e effect that w hat I w as saying from Belgrade w as unbalanced and im possible to believe. Worse, Tony Blair h imself told the House of Com m ons that my reports ‘w ere com piled under the instruction and guidance of the Serbian authorities.’ Had this been repeated outside the Com m ons, I should have sued the Prim e Minister for slander.” Not all of Sadler’s an d Simpson’s colleagues w ere very supportive as on e w ould have hoped. A prom inent journalist com plain ed to m e about Mr Sadler in basically th e sam e w ords that had been used by Mr Blair in the Com m ons. O bjectivity w as seen as accomm odating th e “w rong” side. In the end, journalists rallied behind John Simpson, he w as too w ell know n and professional to be considered a “Serb stooge.” How e ve r, Misha Glenny still has to fight off the pro-Serbian bias he is accused off, even today, m ore than four years after the w ar in Bosn ia ended. A proliferation of advocates, in reality, tends to increase pluralism and decrease independence. This is especially true in Russia, w here there is plenty of pluralism , every view represented, from extrem e left to extreme righ t, but very little, if any, independent journalism that just gives you the facts. Nothing m ore and nothing less. Even such bastions Alexander Ivanko

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of free journalism as Iz vestia and M oscow News tend to add com m entary w hen it is not needed. Most reporters, w orking for these new spapers, do not see them selves as “just plain reporters.” They fight for “just” causes, they stand in elections, both local and national, they shout from the pages demanding this and that. Th ey have view s on everything and they use the m edia to ensure that the rest of the public know s their opinions. But they rarely inform . When the legendary US television anchorm an, Walter Cronkite, decided to m ake an editorial com m ent on the evening new s program me, basically against the Vietn am Wa r, the C BS m anagem ent had to approve. He w as m aking public his personal view s and not just reporting the facts. Those days are long gon e. Comm en tary has become an integral part of new s program m es and has ended up on the front pages of the m ost respected new spapers. O ften it is the facts that are difficult to find, w hen one has to go through lines and lines of com m entary before one gets to the basic new s story. The op-ed pages are not enough anym ore. Still, the situation is not as bad in the West as it is in the new ly em erging dem ocracies, w here there is pluralism in abundance and straight new s rarely found. As a former media professional, spin-doctor for the United Nations and new s junky, I m iss a good new s story. Dow n w ith all the com m ents, num erous debates and talk-show s. Give m e new s, facts, as one sees them . Not as one perceives them to be. Maybe the good-old-days of factual journalism w ill com e back and once again w e w ill be spoonfed facts and not opinions. The likes of Mish a Glenny, Brent Sadler and John Simpson are out there an d I look forw ard to th eir reports from the m any local conflicts w e w ill see in the 21st century.

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Hanna Vuokko Mino rity Media: The Case o f the Sw edish-Speaking Finns In addition to having the m ost m obile phones per capita in the w orld and being the biggest coffee drinkers, the Finns are also excelling in som ething else: new spaper readin g. When you com pare the population, a mere five million people, to the circulation, the Finns reach third place w orldw ide, after Norw ay and Japan. The circulation is 455 new spapers per 1000 inhabitants. In 1999, 207 new spapers w ere published. O f these, 30 w ere published seven days a w eek (a feat unusual even for European standards), and a quarter at least four tim es a w eek. O ne of the differences from m any other countries is that the new spapers are m ainly subscribed by the fam ilies to their hom es, arrive early in the m orning, and are read over breakfast before the w orking day begins. Another interesting feature in the Finnish m edia landscape is the Sw edish m inority m edia. The Sw edish-speaking minority is often used as a textbook exam ple of m inority status and conditions, and this applies for the m edia situation as w ell. Strictly speakin g, how ever, th is m inority is not a m inority at all, as both the Finnish and the Sw edish languages have equal constitutional status as national languages. To explain the Sw edish-speaking population, one has to look back briefly on the historical context. Finland w as a political vacuum until th e neighbouring Sw eden and Novgorod (Russia) started to push th eir in fluen ce on it. Sw eden w on th is com petition an d, in th e peace treaty of 1323, it acquired all of Western and Southern Finland, w hereas only the Eastern-m ost areas fell under Russian rule. During these cen turies of Sw edish dom ination, Finland w as imm ersed w ith the Sw edish legal, social an d religious system s, as w ell as th e Sw edish culture an d lan guage. Accordin g to som ew hat uncertain statistics, about 20 percent of the population w as Sw edish-speaking in the 18th cen tury. This group included, n aturally, Sw edes w ho m oved to Finlan d to deal w ith th e adm in Hanna Vuokko

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istratio n in the provin ce, as w ell as Finn s w h o needed to speak Sw edish for various reason s, in cluding em ploym ent, education , and com m erce. In addition to these tw o categories, a th ird group in cluded foreigners w ho m oved to Fin lan d and learned the official language of th e state. Although this third group w as not necessarily a very large on e, it w as quite in fluential w hen it com es to “conten t”, i.e. th e foreign ers brought w ith th em especially n ew business ideas an d started m any com panies – m any of the products and trade m arks are today c o r n e r-ston es of the Finnish busin ess m arket. When Sw eden w as losin g influence in Europe and lost its status as a great pow er, it also lost Finland. In the peace treaty of 1809, Finland becam e an autonom ous Grand Duchy of Russia. The Russian Em peror Alexander I originally gave Finland extensive autonom y, w hich included retaining Sw edish as the official language. During the century-lon g Russian period, the Finnish nation al m ovem en t gained mom entum . The Finnish language culture had experienced a first w ave during the Reformation, w hen w ritten Finnish w as created and the Bible translated. In 1863, Em peror Alexander II finally m ade Finnish into an official adm inistrative language alongside Sw edish. And then, in 1917 w hen Finland gained its independence, both Finnish and Sw edish w ere confirm ed as national languages in the Constitution. Today the Sw edish-speaking m inority has shrunk to six percent, com prising about 300,000 individuals. O f th ese, 25,000 live in the Åland Islands, w hich are an autonom ous Sw edish-language island group betw een Finland and Sw eden. To d a y, th e Sw edish-speakers can pretty m uch be seen as a mirror image of the population as a w hole and can be found in all sectors of society and in all professions. Tw o-thirds speak Fin nish to some exten t, w hereas a third can be characterized as unilingual. The Sw edish-speaking population has a “double identity”, i.e. they clearly identify themselves as Finnish citizens, but as Finnish citizens w ho speak Sw edish. This can be seen in the Sw edish name for the group, “finla n d ssve n sk a r.” An answ er to a commonly asked question is that, yes, in an ice hockey gam e betw een Finland and Sw eden the “finlandssvenskar” w ould certainly support Finland. The reason for this is, as w as men172

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tioned earlier, that the background of this group is varied and most do not have roots in Sw eden at all. Therefore it w ould also be incorrect to use the term “Sw ede” as this w ould link the group to a foreign state. Perso n a lly, w hen asked w here I am from , I am reluctant to give an “incom plete” answ er such as only saying I am a Finnish citizen, and I w ill therefore most likely add that I belong to the Sw edish-speaking minority. There are several building blocks in the system to m aintain and support the possibilities of this m inority to use its language and develop its distinct culture. The Sw edish-speakers can use their language before the official authorities and the court system , and they w ill get service in Sw edish w hen needed, e.g. in hospitals. A Sw edish-speaking child can first go to a Sw edish-speaking kindergarten, then to a Sw edish-speaking elementary and high school, and finally to un iversity w here the language of instruction is Sw edish. Language is at the very core of self-identity for any individual, no m atter w hether the person belongs to a m inority or a m ajority. How ever, m ore effort is needed in the case of minorities, to defen d and preserve the language. O ne of th e corner-stones in the struggle to affirm a cultural and lingual identity is, quite naturally, the m edia. Not only does the m edia reinforce and support the language in itself, it also adds to the social identity of the m inority group and strengthens the feelings of kinship. As there are som e different characteristics betw een the Sw edish spoken in Finland and the one spoken in Sw eden, one of the w ays to distinguish a special identity is to keep the tw o separate, and also in this task the m edia is at the forefront. The m inority m edia thus interlinks the individuals all over “Svenskfinland”, the m ythological “Sw edish Finland” w ithout visible borders but w ith substantial content. Bertold Brecht has said, w hen com m enting on Finland, that it is a country w here the people keep a bilingual silence. Considering that this preconception of the m ute Finn, and according to Brecht also a m ute Sw edish-speaking Finn, w ho prefers to keep his space is w idespread and w ell know n, it m ust be said that the m edia m ust be breaking all the rules. The Sw edish minority media is certainly alive and kicking, in both its printed and broadcast form . Hanna Vuokko

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The main new spaper in Sw edish is H ufvudstadsbladet w hich is published seven days a w eek and has a circulation of about 60,000. In addition to this national paper there are m ore than a dozen regional and local new spapers that are published betw een one and six tim es per w eek. Furtherm ore, th ere are m ore than 200 Sw edish periodicals an d close to 300 bilingual Sw edish-Finnish periodicals. Apart from spreading the new s, one of the m ain side-effects, m aybe especially for the local and regional m edia, is to act as a kind of glue, holding the Sw edish-speakers together as a group. The Finnish Broadcasting Com pany is the state-ow ned national public service broadcaster. It has tw o TV channels, a dozen national radio channels and tw o dozen regional radio channels. The Act regulating the Company h olds that it has â&#x20AC;&#x153;to treat in its broadcasting Finnish and Sw edish speaking citizens on equal grounds.â&#x20AC;? There has been Sw edish broadcasting for 40 years, from the very beginning, w hen the Sw edish share constituted half an hour of TV broadcasting. Today, it is close to 20 hours a w eek. Furtherm ore, TV program m es in Finland are not dubbed but subtitled, w hich m eans that m any Finnish program m es are accessible to the m inority because of the Sw edish subtitles. This of course also applies vice versa: th e Sw edish programm es are accessible to the Finnish-speakers, w hich should prom ote understanding and tolerance. Additionally, there are tw o com m ercial TV ch annels w ith only Finnish programm ing. The w atching habits are supplem ented by the broadcasting from Sw eden w hich can be seen in m any Finnish hom es, just as the reading habits are com plem ented by Sw edish m agazines. The Sw edish minority radio has experienced a surge in the last couple of years. This is a result of the creation of tw o new Sw edish radio channels tw o years ago, Radio Extrem and Radio Vega. Generally the num bers are very good: the radio reaches 80 percent of the population every day and 95 percen t listen w eekly. What is really positive, though , is that the num bers are going up especially for the Sw edish-speaking channels. The average listening tim e to the Sw edish channels has increased in tw o years from 90 m inutes to 130 m inutes per day, w here174

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as the Finnish channels have decreased from 70 to 60 m inutes per day. This is largely due to the fact that the Broadcasting Com pany has succeeded in attracting new listeners am ong the young people and m anaged to keep them from sw itching channels. In this context, the Internet should not be forgotten, especially since this is a cause of pride for the Finns. Finland has been leading the statistics concerning internet for m any years in having m ore Internet users per capita than any other location in the w orld. Here, how ever, I can’t provide you w ith separate statistics for the different language groups. That the com m unications sector is one of the fastest-grow ing sectors in Finland can also been seen in the fact that it has the highest per capita m obile phone netw ork in the w orld. This em phasis put on the information society should reap ben efits for all its differen t sectors. Brecht w ould not recognize the country anym ore, w ith over sixty percent of the Finns happily chatting aw ay on their m obile phones… Th is positive picture of the m in ority m edia m ust also have a deep significance for th e m in ority population. It is, n everth eless, quite in terestin g to n ote how th is is expressed. Wh en w riting th is article, I asked aroun d am on g fam ily an d friends w h at th ough ts Sw edish m in ority m edia brough t to their m in ds. It is a telling sign that it w as very difficult to get an y concrete an sw ers, even th ough practically everybody adm its to readin g th e m ain papers an d w atch in g th e Sw edish TV new s. Th e m edia is so m uch a part of our everyday lives, so intertw ined in “norm ality,” th at it is difficult to defin e w h at it m ean s to us. We take it for granted. Wh at do you feel about brush ing your teeth in th e m orn ing or about takin g th e bus to th e office? Wh en confronted w ith a follow -up question , about w h eth er it w ouldn’t be just as w ell to survive w ith out it, everybody w as appalled. Th is is w h en th e stron g em otions w ere sh ow n . O bviously everybody w an ts to be able to brush th eir teeth in th e m ornin g, and everybody w ants to be able to read th e m orn in g paper over breakfast, an d it is n ot the sam e if you h ave to do it in an other lan guage. Wh y it w ould not be th e sam e is a very abstract n otion an d very difficult to put in m ore con crete term s. Hanna Vuokko

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The Sw edish-speaking m inority obviously differs from m any other m inorities in Europe and elsew here, w hose history is filled w ith bloody battles and repression by the majorities. The Sw edish -speaking m inority has not had to struggle fiercely for th e existence of a specific m inority media, and the m inority programm es are com monly accepted by the m ajority and read, w atched and listened to by them as w ell. Even so, the situation in Finland can serve as a m odel and som ething to strive for in other countries and for other m inorities. In a w orld w here m ost of the conflicts can be traced to m inority-m ajority relationships, the trend should be tow ards preventing issues from becom ing problem s, rather than solving conflicts afterw ards. O ne of the basic rights for a language-based m inority is, naturally, the right to use its language, and w hat better w ay to support this than through a living and vital m edia.

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Mihaylo Milovanovitch The Fo rbidden Language Pristina, O ctober 1999. A Group of Kosovo Albanians asked a Bulgarian United Nations m ission m em ber in front of a bar visited m ainly by internationals at the UN HQ ’s in Pristina about the tim e. They asked in Serbian. Being Bulgarian he understood the question and threw a look at his w ristw atch . Several m om ents later one mem ber of the group shot him dow n. He m ade the m istake of dem onstrating com prehension in the w rong language, a language considered to be “forbidden”. Pristina, one w eek later. A Kosovo Albanian told m e the story of his brother’s fam ily that lived in a village near Pristina. He w itnessed how the Serb forces urged his brother to pay for his life and his fam ily to speak Serb and not Albanian. His brother w as a poor m an and the children never learned any other language than Albanian. As consequence he w as decapitated together w ith h is entire family. He made the mistake of speaking the w rong language, a language w hich at th at tim e w as “forbidden”. A “forbidden” language. Your language. It is the language of your m other and your forefathers, w hich all of a sudden threatens to kill you. But you cann ot be silent, nobody can . You alw ays n eed to say to yourself and to the others w h o you are and w hat you h ope, w h at you w an t and w here you go. Maybe you can hide the truth about yourself from yourself and from the oth ers. Maybe you can let the falsehood rule your thoughts and deeds. But you are and stay a prisoner, an unjustly sentenced prisoner, a hostage robbed of everything: of his personality, of his free expression, individuality and being – of his language. It is the basic need of expression that threatens to kill you. People today seem to be ruled by the conviction that one can be inform ed on everything, even on the sm allest part of life at any tim e and any point. Th e tim e w e live in threatens to overw helm us w ith a seem ingly endless stream of information about alm ost everythin g. But there is no gaining of inform ation w ithout expressing inform ation. Even the M ihaylo M ilovanovitch

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choice of the inform ation source is an act of expression, an act of declaring som ethin g more or less importan t. We comm unicate. And w e, especially the Western and Western-oriented people, are deeply convinced that free com m unication and expression is som ething to be taken for granted – like having electricity or breathing. To d a y, most people don’t need to experience the fear of thinking the w ay they think an ymore. Few people rem em ber and even less really kn ow this peculiar conviction that som eone might see w hat you thin k, the fear born of the know ledge of being in mortal danger for being w hat you are, for feeling the w ay you feel, for thinking the w ay you think. Th ere have been different periods in the history of the O ld Contin ent w hen, as in the present day, language an d expression as such had been raised or better – low ered to the level of a simple but very reliable instrumen t for the classification of people into groups. Even in groups to be exterm inated. And at that tim e, like today, there w ere tw o m ajor feelings that dominated this phenom enon: those of hate and fear. The Albanian m an w itnessed his brother’s death. He know s this fear. When you see the blood on the sidew alk w here the UN m em ber got killed, and w hen you get official instructions to be silent and nonreacting on the streets of Pristina w hen addressed in one of your m oth er tongues – Serbian – you know this fear too. The only thing left after experiencing this feeling is the need to understand, the painful, aching need of answ ers to one single question: w hy? But w ho should understand? Th e in ternational staff mem bers? O r m aybe the people w ho returned to their places or those that left their homes – all of them forced to m igrate and still m igrating through a country w hich all used to call “hom eland”? Maybe it is exactly this single w ord w hich has the pow er to forbid a language and incite a killing? Maybe it is just some deviated w ay of in terpreting this single w ord that m akes the gift of m ultiethnicity and the free exchange of thoughts in to anathem a for a w hole region? The w ord hom eland is one of the bloodiest w ords on the Balkans, just like the w ords “nation”, “history”, “neighbour” and “identity”. These are crucial w ords for the peninsula. These w ords nurture you, 178

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they accom pany you in your everyday life as an om nipresent, tem pting alternative to excuse yourself through som ething else, they n ail you dow n to a certain and very specific point of view till the end – the “w e – they” coloured w orld. “We” are better then “they”. All these w ords are very often the beginning, and the m eaning and the end of every rational attem pt to explain the social, political and even the personal dim ensions of life, for the Balkans are ethnically and linguistically one of the m ost m ixed regions in Europe. It is true and it is precious that this m ixture m akes the bi- or even trilinguality appear as a norm al ph enomenon and deprives it of its exclus iv it y. But it also puts th e toleran ce as such to the test of life – a test seldom passed. All the Balkan countries suffered constant invasions from each other and from their neighbours throughout their entire history. The Balkans w ere never ever really united against somebody, they never represented a unified w hole sim ply because each of the small countries there pursued its ow n interests at the cost of the others and each of them w as often supported by som e of the Great Pow ers. The Balkans don’t have any tradition in the m atters of tolerance. The presence of som e other ethnic group speaking som e other language and expressing itself in som e other w ay w as alw ays a threat. The Balkans have experienced a lot of bloodshed in the past 20th century: the liberation w ar of the Greeks, the Bulgarians, the Serbs against the Turks, the tw o Balkan w ars, the Bulgarian - Serb w ar, the First World War, the Yugoslavian w ars… And all of them have som ething in com m on, som ething very specific and tragic, w hich m akes them notorious. They w ere not m erely political w ars for territory or for influence. No, they w ere m ore than this. They w ere all the personal w ars of en tire nations against other nations, they w ere carried out w ith a lot of emotion an d devastating hate against the neigh bour. They w ere also deadly consistent, aim ing at the com plete exterm ination of the alien population as such. Th ese w ars took place first of all in the hearts of the people, m otivated through the deep conviction th at th e achievem ent of historical and geographical safety m ust go through the elim ination of th e “w e – they” relation. “They” should either change in order M ihaylo M ilovanovitch

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to becom e “w e” or “they” should be throw n out, expelled, elim inated. D uring each w ar and after it the first thing to do w as to rob the m inorities of their freedom to express them selves as such by forbidding their language, religion and tradition. For to w ork for the future in order to m ake it better, often m eant to look at the past and to change the present in a w ay that supported the illusion of security w hich these states longed for. And they longed for it because they longed for freedom . There are n o m ore bombs fallin g in Kosovo anymore. There are no m ore refugees cam ps. There is no m ore fighting. The w ar is over and the province liberated. But the w ar in Kosovo w as also a Balkan w ar. It w as a w ar of the heart, a w ar for freedom from the others and not w ith them . It w as a w ar m aking the past m ore pow erful than it should be, a w ar that crucified the people to the pain of the m em ories, to the tom bstones of their relatives. And this w ar still lasts. As long as there are people killed for w hat they are, for speaking the w ay they speak, th in kin g the w ay they think, the w ar still lasts. Because there is a much higher freedom then the one guaranteed by institutions – it is the freedom to feel the w ay you are, the freedom to express yourself. It is liberation from the fear of the past and the hate of the present. Not until people becom e free to express them selves w ill the killing stop. Not until this w ill the w ar end. Because it is a w ar of the heart, killing not only the others but you as w ell. You must have your language back. The lan guage of your m other and your forefath ers. The language you are aching to speak w hen your heart is speaking. The language in w hich you say: “Forgive me”, and really m ean it. The people there m ust have their freedom back. All of them . Their real freedom .

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Katarzyna Cortés A Child o f ‘So lidarity’ Rain. In a com partm ent of a train going from Munich to Vienna there are three passengers; a young m an beside m e is reading a com puter m agazine, an older w om an opposite is reading Die Z eit. I have got the best seat by the w indow an d am tryin g to take myself back to my childhood and adolescence in Poland (I have just turned 30). Just as I am rem em bering about m y childhood, the young m an starts talking to m e, w ith the clear intention of chatting m e up. This is slightly inconvenient, since, first, I am m arried, secondly, he is at m ost 20 years old, and thirdly, I have an im portant task ahead of m e: I have to w rite a contribution for the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the M e d ia Yearbook 2000. And the five hour journey from Munich to Vie nna is slipping by very quickly. Salzburg. Fortunately, the young m an and the older w om an get off. I barricade m yself into my com partm ent and once again look out of the w indow to try and get inspiration. In the m eantim e, night has fallen, and only the distant lights are glow ing; the lights of m y life… Wh y am I travelling to Vienna w h en m y fam ily an d h om e are in Poland an d m y husban d and m y journalism studies are in M un ich? O n ly one thin g can h ave brough t m e here: an intern sh ip at th e O ffice of th e O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media. This O ffice w as set up in 1997 w ith a m an date from 54 m em ber States of th e O SCE. Its task is to cam paign for press freedom an d to protect journalists in m ilitary conflicts, an im portan t an d respon sible task. If a person w ish es to becom e a journalist, then the leitm otiv s h o u ld be freedom . A journ alist should question critically, report objectively, cham pion ideas an d prom ote toleran ce, freedom and cosm opolitan attitudes, follow ing th e exam p le that C oun tess D önhoff, th e c o-foun der of the w eekly m agazin e Die Z eit and the drivin g force behin d the publication , set for us. How ever, on e also sh ould n ot forget one’s roots; she did not forget hers. Through her prom otion of Katarzyna Cortés

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un derstanding and reconciliation w ith th e neighbours of the East and West, above all, w ith Polan d, sh e did great service to dem ocracy. She is a true role m odel for m e. It w as the hour of birth of the CSCE, the later O SCE: on 1 Au gu s t 1975, th e Helsin ki Final Act w as signed by th e th en 35 Heads of State and Governm ent. The so-called Helsinki process led to a new era of co-operation and dialogue in a divided Europe. The CSCE became a security forum in w hich the struggle for hum an rights, long a taboo subject in East-West relations, could no longer be objected to as interference in dom estic affairs. The Helsinki process paved the w ay for the em ergence of S olidarity in Poland and to glasnost and p erestroik a in Russia. At the tim e I w as only five years old. I spent m y childh ood in Poland un der socialism and w as a teenager during the tim e of the Solidarity m ovem ent and the radical political changes of 1989. What w as life like in socialist Poland? Although I w as only a child, If I rem em ber w ell th e period w hen Poles w ere preven ted from travelling abroad, m y fam ily h ad th e im pression that w e could on ly travel to other socialist countries, and that w as only if our paren ts h ad enough m oney an d w ere m em bers of the C om m un ist Party. Th e older I got the m ore un acceptable th is fact w as for me, since I w as curious about other countries and other cultures. I therefore started to becom e m ore involved. I joined a dem ocratic youth organ ization, at first only so th at I could travel abroad, but later, also out of interest an d conviction. The organization â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s w ork interested m e greatly an d I tried to w in m y friends over to it. It w as m y ow n little struggle for democracy. I felt that I w as on th e right path as I had experienced the hypocrisy of socialism . Solidarity w as already an un dergroun d m ovem ent at th at tim e. Poland had never voted for socialism ; it had had socialism forced on it follow ing the Second World War. People in Poland reacted in different w ays; som e w ent underground and tried, m ore or less, to w ork as agitators, others â&#x20AC;&#x153;w ent w ith the flow â&#x20AC;? and secured good jobs and a com fortable life for them selves by co-operating w ith Moscow . O thers 182

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still w ere fascinated by Marxism , w h ich they saw as a counter-d o ct r in e to fascism. Many of these had a change of heart follow ing the exposure of the Stalinist horrors in 1956 and the uprising in Hungary, and w ith drew from the Party follow ing the invasion of Prague in 1968. The collapse of the Soviet system of rule in Eastern Europe began in Poland. The year 1975 saw the beginnings of the protest m ovem ent w hen “Friendsh ip w ith the Soviet Union ” w as en shrined in a draft constitution. This w as follow ed a year later by price increases, strikes, reprisals against w orkers and the founding of the Com m ittee for the Defence of Workers (KO R), one of the forerunners of Solidarity. The dem ocratic protest in 1979, in Gdansk, w as the first in the process leading to th e overthrow of the com munist dictatorship. At the time of Pope John Paul II’s pilgrim age to Poland in June 1979, I w as n ine years old, but I knew that it w as im portant, since it w as much discussed in m y fam ily. With the founding of Solidarity, w hich w as the first free trade union in the Wa rsa w Pact, Poland opened up the first crack in the Eastern bloc in 1980/81. The beginnings in Poland of the Solidarity trade union m ovem ent represent the beginning of the end of com m unist rule in Poland and Eastern Europe. Th e sh ipyards of the Polish Baltic coast an d, in particular, th e Len in sh ipyard in Gdansk w ere at th e epicen tre of th e n ation w ide strikes durin g the sum m er of 1980 w hich ro cked all of Polan d. O ut of the w ave of strikes in m any Polish cities, supported by w orkers an d in tellectuals, developed th e first dem ocratic m ass organization in Eastern Europe, w h ich succeeded in w restin g m ore political rights an d econom ic con cession s from the bankrupt system . I follow ed the developm ent of th e strikes w ith great in terest on television . The prot ra cted n egotiation s to en d th e strike w ave led to th e Gdan sk Agre em en t of 31 A u g u s t 1980 , w h ich laid th e ba sis fo r in depen den t an d auto n om ous t ra de un ion s in Pola nd. “Solidarity ” recogn ized the foundation s of th e Polish post-w ar order, but called for a differen t organ izatio n of society an d th e im plem en tation of basic h um an an d civil righ ts. Katarzyna Cortés

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Led by Lech Walesa and supported by the Polish Catholic Church and Po p e Jo h n Pa u l II, w ho originally came from Poland, “Solidarity” w as successful in forging an alliance betw een socialist reformers and religious forces w hich accelerated the freeing up of political society from the com munist system . This w as the first step in th e struggle for an opposition . In a short tim e, “Solidarity” had m ore than ten m illion m em bers. The appointment of General Jaruzelski in the w inter of 1980/81 as head of the Com m unist Party and of the Governm ent, the first “Solidarity” congress in Septem ber of th e sam e year, th e social struggles and political crises culm inated in the state of em ergency of 13 Decem ber 1981. General Jaruzelski’s televised speech that day in w hich he declared m artial law in Poland, rem ains etched in m y m em ory, as children’s cartoons w ould norm ally have been broadcast at this hour. Instead, General Jaruzelski cam e on the air, in his dark glasses. For an 11-year-old that w as quite a shock and the w ord m artial law w as also quite difficult for m e to com prehend. Un til then, I had experienced neither w ar nor m artial law . Now I w as told that I had to be cautious and alw ays get hom e as quickly as possible. The declaration of martial law, the banning of “Solidarity” and the detention of its leaders, including Lech Walesa, did not spell the end for this movement; quite the contrary, the ideas spread in the underground and m oral support for Walesa and “Solidarity” increased in the West. The Polish Pope and his “pilgrim ages” to Poland, especially his visit of June 1983, played a key role in this. Martial law w as lifted one m onth la t e r. There w as a further visit by the Pope in June 1987, w hen he called for a return to the Gdansk Agreem ent. Many intellectuals fled abroad for fear of reprisals or im prisonm ent, but those w ho had the courage to stay in Poland during this tim e have m y fullest adm iration and respect. There then follow ed the m urder of Father Popieluszko, a partial am nesty and a full am nesty. Radio Free Europe used to broadcast its program m es and w e listened frequently, for w e knew that this w as the m ost reliable source of inform ation. How ever, there w as also an underground press and Polish intellectuals w ere also active in the underground. 184

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The m edia in Eastern Europe played a key role in the collapse of com munist pow er. Reports of mass demonstrations in Leipzig, scenes of th e police fighting w ith students on the streets of Prague and scenes of protest in Bucharest contributed to strengthening the im pression of change and accelerating it. How ever, the m edia w ere not entirely free from State influence. People became experts in the art of “reading betw een the lines”. As they w ere aw are of the inconsistencies and vagueness in the in formation that they got from the m edia, they tended to be sceptical about everything they heard, saw or read. The m edia, how ever, provided an outlet for the intelligentsia to guardedly criticize the Governm ent. The patriotic m otives for Jaruzelski’s declaration of m artial law w ere questioned by m any Poles. From his m emoirs w e have learnt that, on the one hand, th e Soviet Union w as concerned about the developm ents in Polan d and demanded counter-measures but, on the other hand, w as ready to give generous financial and econom ic help to rem edy the syst e m ’s most serious defects. Almost ten year’s of stagnation and transition resulted from the temporary state of emergency that Jaruzelski w ished to establish. Gorbachev’s assum ption of pow er in 1985 altered the external political conditions in favour of the Polish opposition. A fresh w ave of strikes in the early sum m er of 1988 once again brought matters to a head. There follow ed the roundtable negotiations, w hich resulted in the “historical com prom ise”, a form of co-existence of the old pow er elite w ith the pow er m onopoly of w hat w as now the Workers’ party. The first sem i-free elections w ent in favour of Walesa and Mazow iecki, w ho in August 1989, becam e the first non -co m m u n ist Prime Minister in a socialist country since 1945. The election the follow ing year of Walesa as President com pleted “Solidarity’s” victory. Follow in g “Solidarity’s” en try in to govern m ent in 1989, m ore th an 600 new spapers appeared in Polan d. Many of th ese new ly foun ded publications either w ere form erly S amizdat publications or un dergroun d publications now published in the open. Still others had given them selves a makeover follow ing their closure or banning w hen the Com m un ists took pow er. Katarzyna Cortés

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Shortly after its triumph, the “Solidarity” movement splintered into rival groups. The Polish electorate voted them out of pow er and entrusted pow er to the post-com munists. In 1995, Walesa narrow ly lost the presidential elections in the second round against Alexander Kw asniew ski of th e Democratic Left Alliance. The parliam entary elections of 1997 brought a conservative electoral coalition, that w as registered under the n ame of “Solidarity”, a relative m inority in Parliamen t w ith 33 p e r ce n t of votes. The current Government includes Bronislaw Gerem ek, a leading light of “Solidarity” as Foreign Minister. From July to December 1 9 9 8 he w as the O SCE Chairperson and an interm ediary in Kosovo. Th e democratization of the form er Eastern bloc also brough t about favourable conditions for negotiations on German reunification, w hich becam e m ore likely follow ing the fall of the Berlin w all on 9 Novem ber 1989 and becam e a reality on 3 O ctober 1990. That is how the “revolution of aw areness” w h ich prepared the w ay for Poland’s entry into the European Union (EU) cam e about. The Germ an Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, has said th at Poland’s entry into the EU w as the natural outcom e of this revolution: “It is not a generous present from the curren t EU m embers but rather a joint objective”. The form er headquarters of Radio Free Europe in Munich is now hom e to, am ong others, the Institute for Journalism and Com m unication Studies, the institute w here I study and w ork. I have had the fortune to be able to study in Germ any and to com plete m y internship w ith the O SCE in Austria. I ow e all of this to “Solidarity” and to those people w ho had the courage to fight for a free and dem ocratic Poland. They secured freedom for the young generation, m y generation. By w ay of thanks, I w anted to describe once m ore their struggles and ups and dow ns and show how the seem ingly im possible could becom e reality. I am very proud that Poland contributed so m uch to the changes of 1989.

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V. O verview â&#x20AC;&#x201C; What We Have D o ne The Mandate 1. Reports - Regular Reports to the Permanent Council - Urgent Reports on Current Issues to the Permanent Council - Statement to the Standing Committee of the O SCE Parliamentary Assembly - Report to the O SCE Review Conference 2. Projects 1999/2000 - Protection of Journalists - The M edia in Central Asia: The Present and Future - School N ewspapers in Central Asia - O ther Projects 3. Current Media Situation in Ukraine 4. Visits and Interventions in 1999/2000

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D ecisio n No . 193 Mandate o f the O SCE Representatio n o n Freedo m o f the Media PC.DEC No. 193 O rganization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 5 Novem ber 1997 137th Plenary Meeting PC Journal No. 137, Agenda item 1 1. The participating States reaffirm the principles and com m itm ents they have adhered to in the field of free m edia. They recall in particular that freedom of expression is a fundamental and internationally recognized human right and a basic com ponent of a dem ocratic society and that free, independent and pluralistic m edia are essential to a free and open society and accountable system s of governm ent. Bearing in m ind the principles and com m itm ents they have subscribed to w ithin the O SCE, and fully com m itted to the im plem entation of paragrap h 11 of the Lisbon Sum m it D eclaration, the participating Stat es decide to establish, under the aegis of the perm anent Council, an O SCE Represent ative on Freed om of the Media. The o bjective is to stren gthen the im plem entation of relevant O SCE principles and comm itm ents as w ell as to im prove the effectiveness of concerted action by the participating States based on their com m on values. The p articipating States confirm that they w ill co-operate fully w ith the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media. He or she w ill assist the participating States, in a spirit of co-operation, in their continuing com m itm ent to the furthering of free, independent and pluralistic m edia. 2. Based on O SCE principles and com m itm ents, the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media w ill ob serve relevant m edia developm ents in all participating States and w ill, on this basis, and in close co-ordination w ith the Chairm an-in-O ffice, advocate and prom ote full com pliance w ith O SCE principles and com mitments regarding freedom of expression and free m edia. In this respect h e or she w ill assum e an early-w arning funct ion. He or she w ill address serious problem s caused by, inter alia, obstruction of m edia activities and unfavourable w orking co nditions for journalists. He or she w ill closely co-operate w ith the participating St ates, the Perm anent Council, the O ffice for Dem o cratic Institutions and Hum an Rights (O DIHR), the High Com m issioner on National Minorities and, w here appropriate, other O SC E bodies, as w ell as w ith national and international m edia associations. The M andate

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3. The O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media w ill concentrate, as outlined in this paragraph, on rapid response to serious non-com pliance w ith O SCE principles and com mitm ents by particip ating States in respect of freedom of expression and free m edia. In the case of an allegation of serious non-com pliance therew ith, the O SCE Represent ative on Freed om of the Media w ill seek direct contacts, in an appropriate m anner, w ith the participat ing State and w ith other parties concerned, assess the fact s, assist th e participating State, and contribute to the resolution of the issue. He or she w ill keep the Chairman-in-O ffice inform ed about his or her activities and report to the Perm anent Council on their results, and on his or her observations and recom m endations. 4. The O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media does not exercise a juridical function, nor can his or her involvem ent in any w ay prejudge national or internatio nal legal proceed ings concerning alleged hum an rights violat ions. Eq u a lly, national o r international proceedings concern ing alleged hum an rights violations w ill not necessarily preclude the perform ance of his or her tasks as outlined in this m andate. 5. The O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media m ay collect and receive inform ation on the situation of the m edia from all bona fide sources. He or she w ill in particular draw on inform ation and assessm ents provided by the O DIHR. The O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media w ill support the O DIHR in assessing conditions for the functio ning o f free, independent and pluralistic m edia before, during and after elections. 6. The O SCE Representative on Freedom o f the Media m ay at all tim es collect and receive from p articipat ing States and other int erested parties (e.g. fro m organizations or institutions, from m edia and their representatives, and from relevant NGO s) requests, suggestions and com m ents related to strengthening and further developing com pliance w ith relevant O SCE principles and com m itm ents, including alleged serious instances of intolerance by participating States w hich utilize m edia in violation of the principles referred to in the Budapest Docum ent, Chapter VIII, paragraph 25, and in the Decisions of the Rom e Council Meeting, Chapter X. He or she m ay forw ard requests, suggestions and com m ents to the Perm anent Council, recom m ending further action w here appropriate. 7. The O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media w ill also routinely consult w ith the Chairm an-in-O ffice and report on a regular basis to the Permanent Co uncil. He o r she m ay be invited to the Permanent Council to present reports, w ithin this mandate, on specific matters related to freedom of expression and free, independent and pluralistic m edia. He o r she w ill report annually t o the Im plem ent ation Meeting on Hum an Dimension Issues or to the O SCE Review Meeting on the status of the implementation of O SCE principles and com mitm ents in respect of freedom of expression and free media in O SCE part icipating St ates. 190

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8. The O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media w ill not com m unicate w it h and w ill not acknow led ge co mm unications fro m any person or organization w hich practises or publicly condones terrorism or violence. 9. The O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media w ill be an em inent international personality w ith long-standing relevant experience from w hom an im partial perform ance of the function w ould be expected. In the perform ance of his or her duty the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media w ill be guided by his or her independent and objective assessm ent regarding the specific paragraphs com posing this m andate. 10. The O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media w ill consider serious cases arising in the context of this m andate and occurring in the participating State of w hich he or she is a national or resident if all the parties directly involved agree, including the participating State concerned. In the absence of such agreem ent, t he m atter w ill be referred to the Chairm anâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;inâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;O ffice, w ho m ay appoint a Special Representative to address this particular case. 11.The O SCE Represent ative on Freed om of t he Media w ill co-operate, on th e basis o f regular co ntacts, w ith relevant int ernat ional o rganizations, including the United Nations and its specialized agencies and the Council of Europe, w ith a view to enhancing co-ordination and avoiding duplication. 12. The O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media w ill be appointed in accordance w ith O SCE procedures by the Ministerial Council upon the recom m endation of the Chairm anâ&#x20AC;&#x201C;in-O ffice after consultation w ith the participating States. He or she w ill serve for a period of three years w hich m ay be extended under the sam e procedure for one further term of three years. 13. The O SC E Representative o n Freedo m of the M edia w ill be established and staffed in accordance w ith this m andate and w ith O SC E Staff Regu lation s. Th e O SCE Rep resen tative on Freedom o f the Med ia, and his or her O ffice, w ill be funded by the participating States through the O SCE budget according to O SCE financial regulations. Details w ill be w orked out by the inform al Financial Com m ittee and approved by the Perm anent Council. 14. The O ffice of the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media w ill be located in Vienna.

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Interpretative statem ent under paragraph 79 (Chapter 6) of the Final Recom m endations of the Helsinki Consultations PC.DEC/193 5 Novem ber 1997 Annex By the delegation of France: â&#x20AC;&#x153;The follow ing Mem ber States of the Council of Europe reaffirm their com m it m ent to t he p rovision s relating to freedo m of expression, including the freedom of t he m edia, in the European Co nvention on Hum an Rights, to w hich they are all contracting parties. In their view , the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media should also be guided by these provisions in the fulfilm ent of his/her m andate. O ur countries invite all other parties to the European Convention on Hum an Rights to subscribe to this statem ent.

Albania Germ any Austria Belgium Bulgaria Cyprus Denm ark Spain Estonia Finland France United Kingdom Greece Hungary Ireland Italy

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Latvia Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxem bourg Malta Moldova Norw ay Netherlands Poland Portugal Rom ania Slovak Republic Slovenia Sw eden Czech Republic Turkey

1. Repo rts Regular Repo rts to the Permanent Co uncil First Repo rt to the Permanent Co uncil 25 March 1999 My Office has been increasingly engaged in various actions during the four months which have passed since my last comprehensive report to you here in the Permanent Council. Therefore, I w ould like to focus on our m ain concerns and activities. My O ffice actively m onitored the m edia situation in the Federal Republic o f Yugo slavia (FRY). The Belgrade authorities continued their onslaught on freedom of expressio n igno ring calls from the international co mm unity to guarantee a free and open debate on issues of concern to its citizens. Leading opposition new spapers, its editors and journalist s, w ere singled out for regular harassm ent at the hands of the authorities. Using the Serbian Law on Public Inform ation, w idely condem ned by journalists, experts and international organizations, independent publications w ere heavily fined and only recently the ow ner and tw o journalists from the daily Dnevni Telegraf received five-m onth prison term s. Last week, Serbian authorities have started to implement the Law on Public Information against Albanian language newspapers in Kosovo. Extremely high fees w ere imposed on Kosova Sot and Gazete Shiptare for dubious reasons, as a result K osova S ot closed down. As recently as Monday the authorities did the same to Koha Ditore, a well-respected Albanian-language new spaper in the region. I have said it on several occasions: this Law w as and is a declaration of w ar against independent m edia. Now , it is the w ar against the m edia in Pristina. According to the Association of Independent Electronic Media in FRY (AN EM), t he p ast w eeks â&#x20AC;&#x153;show ed a drastic peak in the ongoing w ave of repression against the m edia in Serbia.â&#x20AC;? I have continued to intervene w ith the Belgrade Governm ent dem anding that it rectify the current appalling situation. I am still aw aiting a positive answ er. All of us have been closely w atching the dramatic talks in Paris on the futu re of Kosovo. I do not w ish to go into the details of the negotiations but w ould like to m ake a few points regarding m edia developm ent in that region. If peace is reached, I believe that it w ill be im perative for the m ain civilian im plem enting agency, an d one assum es it w ill be O SCE, to establish executive authority over the m edia in Kosovo. The exam ple of Bosnia and Herzegovina has show n us that only through an assertive approach can hate speech be curtailed and m edia pluralism established. We should not lose tim e in Kosovo. First Report to the Permanent Council

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T hat is w h y I have su ggested that the post of a M edia Co m m ission er be established in Kosovo, reporting directly to the O SCE Chairm an-in-O ffice. The Med ia Com m ission er should have full execu tive authority o ver all media related m atters backed by a strong m andate. In m y view , this is the only w ay to ensure an open and pluralistic debate on the future of Kosovo w ithout hate sp eech that so often has histo rically distorted su ch debat es in the region . As to the recent action o f Serbian authorities against m edia in Kosovo, a Media Comm issioner w ith a strong m andate w ou ld theoretically had been able to overturn this decision by the authorities. I w ill now get back briefly to m y visits to Cro atia and to Azerbaijan. O n 11 February I spoke to you regarding m y concerns in Cro atia. Just to reiterate: At the meeting t he O SCE Heads of Instit utions had on 9 February w ith the Croatian Governm ent led by Prim e Minister Zlatko Matesa, I once again stressed the need for the authorities to re-consider the Law on Croatian Radio and Television (HRT). This Law as am ended last year did not take into consideration som e of the suggestions m ade by the Council of Europe and the O SCE Mission. I am also concerned w ith the re-broadcasting of HRT into Bosnia and Herzegovina, w here it favours one specific political party putting at a disadvantage all the other political players. In our m eeting w ith the Croatian Governm ent, Prim e Minister Matesa appealed to m y O ffice to help his country in developing freedom of the m edia and has stressed that his governm ent is w illing to fully co-operate w ith m y O ffice. This is a positive sign. I had the opportunity to review in this forum , m y visit to Azerbaijan, in late Feb ruary, w here I m et w ith President Aliyev and other governm ent au thorities as w ell as attending several roundtable discussions w ith both print and electronic m edia journalists. As I noted in m y report, I continue to urge the release from prison of the sole incarcerated journalist in Azerbaijan. I expect positive action to be taken in the very near future. My O ffice has continued to fo cus on the m edia situation in U krain e. In early March tw o of my advisers visited Kyiv preparing my visit to Ukraine in early May. They m et w ith governm ent officials, editors, parliam entarians and NGO s. I believe that w e have singled out the main problem that needs to be solved as soon as possible: high libel fees issued by courts against journalists and pu blications. T h ere seem s t o b e b ro ad agreem en t bet w een t h e execu t ive an d legislat ive branches of go vern m en t t h at t his issu e need s t o b e d ealt w it h u r g e n t ly. In Ukrain e, as in several o t her co u n t ries w ith w h ich w e d eal, d efam atio n law s are used t o p ro t ect o fficials fro m pu b lic crit icism esp ecially from rivallin g p o lit ical gro up ings. H igh lib el fees have t h u s b eco m e t h e surest w ay t o b an kru p t cy fo r m an y p ub licatio ns w h ich b arely m ake 194

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en d s m eet d u ring th ese d ifficu lt econ om ic tim es. Fro m m y co n t acts w it h t h e Ukrain ian au t h o rit ies I am o pt im ist ic t h at t h rou gh co -o p erat ion bet w een th e Governm en t an d Parliam en t an d w ith th e su pp o rt o f jo u rn alists th is p ro b lem co uld b e reso lved. T he Ukrain ian Go vern m ent ’s am b itio n t o un dertake refo rm s w it h a view t o reach in g Eu ro p ean st and ard s is prom isin g. As t o po ssible legal am en d m en t s, I b elieve th at th e Co u n cil o f Eu ro p e o f w h ich Ukraine is a m em b er co uld b e o f assist an ce t o law m akers an d t o Governm en t . My other concern is the overall situation regarding freedom of expression prior to the O ctober presidential elections. While there m ay be no overt censorship in Ukraine, m y O ffice receives an alarm ingly high num ber of reports of harassm ent of journalists usually by over-zealous local officials. I think that the Governm ent is capable to ensure a free m edia landscape at every level and I urge it to do so before the pre-election cam paign period starts. Last w eek I visited Minsk w here I addressed the sem inar on inform ation society organ ized by the O SCE Advisory and Monitoring Group. The Seminar w as another useful occasion to prom ote dialogue betw een Governm ent officials, m em bers of the opposition and the independent m edia. In add ition, I had tw o m eetings w ith Government officials, w ith the Deput y Head of the presidential administ ration, Mr Pashkievitch, and w ith Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr Pet ro v. I raised w ith th em th e practice of adm o nitions by th e State Com m ittee for the Press against independent new spapers. These adm onit ions are based on Article 5 of the Law on Press w hich entit les t he State Com mittee – an executive body – to check new spapers for informatio n causing intolerance or offending the dignity of citizens and officials and for violations of numerous other regulations. This practice of checking and w arning newspapers, as it is now , is nothing but a form of censorship after publication w hich is not in conform ity w ith Belarussian constitutional standards, nor w ith O SCE and other international standards. The adm onitions can lead to the loss of a new spaper’s licence and eventually to its closure. I have urged the Governm ent to reconsider this practice and to revoke recent adm onitions against the six independent new spapers in Febru ary. I believe, how ever, that the Law on Press, and in particular Article 5, as su ch needs to be amended to p revent the cu rrent practice as it is now. Furtherm ore, I have urged the Governm ent once again to undertake steps in order to transform the state TV and radio into public stations. Mr Pashkievitch agreed that the transform ation of state m edia into public m edia w as a norm al and a necessary procedure. Th e Govern m en t assu red m e of it s read in ess t o fully co o perate w ith m y O ffice. First Report to the Permanent Council

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I am also concerned w ith th e app ro val by the Russian Parliament of a b ill that creates so-called “high councils” to protect m oral standards in broadcasting. It is m y understanding that m any critical voices view this bill as a step back to a form of censorship. I urge President Boris Yeltsin not to sign the bill into law. Som e of m y concerns I w ill address in Moscow in April w here I w ill take part in a conference of regional TV netw orks. My O ffice w as inform ed about recent efforts of the Uzbek Go vernment to take control over providing Int ernet service to the public. We underst and that the only legitim ate provider under this system w ould be a State agency. In m y view this w ould be a violation of the principle of free flow of inform ation. Tw o final announcem ents now : My advisers and m yself w ill be visiting all five of the Central Asian republics early next m onth: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkm enistan and Tajikistan. I w ill, of course, report to this Council at the conclusion of our visits to this im portant region. The second anno uncement is about our first annual Ye arb o o k entitled Freedom and Responsibility. As you will see, this is not a stand ard yearbook that m any of you are accustom ed to and receive num erous copies of from international organizations. This is different. It not only docum ents our w ork over the past year but also provides a tribune to w riters, experts and m y staff to talk about freedom of expression, w hat it m eans to every one of us as individuals and to all of us as a society.

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Seco nd Repo rt to the Permanent Co uncil 12 May 1999 Today, m y report w ill focus on the O SCE m em ber States in Central Asia. My O ffice has m onitored the situation over several m onths. In April, I visited Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan; at the sam e tim e, m y Advisor, Stan ley Schrager, visited Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Let m e share w ith you at this stage the results of our w ork: our assessm ent of the m edia situation in the five countries m entioned, our concerns and our conclusions. Du rin g all five visit s, w e h ad m eetin gs w it h w h at I call th e “fo u r con stit uen cies”, w ith th e Governm en t, w ith Parliam ent , w it h m edia p eople an d w it h N GO s. In th is respect, I w ould like to ackno w led ge, first of all, the hospit alit y an d th e co -o p eratio n of t he resp ect ive go vern m ent s w h o w elcom ed us on every stop of ou r it inerary and w o rked closely w ith us in d evelo pin g a suit ab le program m e. Secon d, w e w ere im p ressed w ith th e w o rk o f th e O SCE represent ation s th ro ugh ou t C en tral Asia. O u r visit s co uld no t h ave succeeded w it ho u t t heir advan ce p reparatio ns an d th eir exp erien ce. O ur visits to Central Asia have confirmed that the O SCE, through its offices in place and its in stitu tions here in Vienn a, in Warsaw and The Hagu e, can play a role of the catalyst in speeding up the difficult transition to dem ocracy. But, to quote som ething w e heard quite often during our conversations w ith governm ent officials, the transition “cannot happen overnight.” The question then is, really, how long is “overnight?” How ever, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkm enistan and Tajikistan have voluntarily joined the O SCE fam ily of nations, and, as such, have obligations to fulfil. We need to contin ue t o urge them t o take these obligations seriously and m ove tow ard continued progress in the field of freedom of the m edia and freedom of expression. Alt ho ugh w e are t alking abou t a distin ct geograp hical region , w it h m an y histo ric an d cult ural sim ilarities am ong t he five co un tries, o ne w ou ld be m ist aken t o over-gen eralise ab out the st atus of m ed ia freed o m in th ese natio ns. We can go to Kyrgyzstan w ith co nsiderable m edia freed om ; to Tu r k m e n is t a n w ith a virtu al absence of m edia freedo m ; to Kazakh st an w hich unt il 1997 enjoyed a relatively h igh degree of m ed ia freedom ; to Uzbekistan w ith its particular problem s; to th e sp ecial case of Tajikistan , just co m ing out of a fiveyear civil w ar. Each coun try is different in h ow its go vernm ent s have dealt w ith , and are dealing w ith, th e issue of freed om of t he m edia. T h e econ om ic situatio n, t oo, varies fro m cou ntry to cou nt ry an d sh ould be taken in to accou nt , sin ce m ed ia ind ependent from go vern m ent and St ate can on ly exist if th ey are econ om ically viable. Second Report to the Permanent Council

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Let m e no w b riefly m ake a few co m m en ts abo ut each o f th e cou nt ries w e visited . Kyrgyzstan rem ains the exam ple of how there can be m edia freedom in Central Asia. Independent m edia clearly exist in Kyrgyzstan, large num bers of independent print and electronic m edia outlets function. The d etails are given in a report on m edia freedo m in Kyrgyzstan w hich w e distributed here early this year and w hich appears as w ell in our Yearbook. There is an ongoing debate over the lim its of m edia freedom in Kyrgyzstan, and, althou gh its record thus far is good , it is no t w ithout problem s as bot h m em bers of Go vernm ent and the m edia test the limit s o f freedom of the m edia in a series of potentially dam aging libel suits. I hope these judicial cases can be solved w ithout dam age to the record Kyrgyzstan has com piled thus far. This includes one high-profile court case betw een the Head of State TV and the new spaper Res publica. The Governm ent of Kyrgyzstan has suggested to m e that it host a conference on the m edia in Central Asia. I w elcom e and support such an initiative. I feel obliged, how ever, to provide a cautionary note, as w e receive occasional reports of prob lems w ith the independent media, and of attem pts by Parliam ent to legislate restrictions on m edia freedom . This confirm s that m oving tow ard freedom of the m edia is a process, one that needs constant nurturing. During a m eeting w ith President Akaev, I noted Kyrgyzstan’s achievements thus far and expressed m y hope that this kind of freedom of expression w hich he continu es t o cham pion could be institutionalised in the co untry so there w ou ld be no turning back. In Uzbekistan, I expressed m y concern about the country’s poor record regard ing the independ ent media and press freed om , no ting it w as still difficult to start and m aintain a new spaper, television or radio station truly critical or independent of the Governm ent. There is, in Uzbekistan, a near absence of independent m edia and, as w e had to note, a great divergence betw een Governm ent, Parliam ent and the m edia on their understandings of press freedom . I am still con cerned abou t t he Governm ent o f Uzbekistan ’s attem p t to m onopo lise an d control access to th e Intern et and have req uested fu rther clarification on th is m atter. A m ajor issu e in m y m eet ings w ith officials w ere th e insidio us effects of “struct ural cen so rsh ip,” a con cep t n ot u niq ue to Uzb ekist an, I m ight ad d. It in clu des difficu lties in licensin g and registration , discrim in ato ry t ax schem es, governm ent con trol over ow nership , office sp ace and rent al rates, prin tin g facilit ies and d ist rib utio n n etw orks. At t he sam e tim e, t he govern m ent represent at ives to ok issu e w it h som e o f m y con clu sion s, insist ing th at there had been progress in freedom o f the m edia since the co u n t r y ’s in dependence. 198

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Perhaps the m ost telling incident occurred after I w as assured that there w as no censorship in Uzbekistan. I w as inform ed of an official agency that did, indeed, practice day-to-day censorship. While paying a surprise visit to this office, I w itnessed government officials perusing new spapers paragraph b y paragraph for unacceptable coverage. Kazakhst an, u nt il its electio ns last year, had a relat ively en viable record regardin g p ress freed om and the exist ence of in dependen t m ed ia, but has not fu lly recovered fro m a pre-elect ion crackdo w n on the m edia. Unlike th e ot her Cen tral Asian Rep ublics, it offers econ om ic viabilit y t o t he in dep end ent m edia, w hich sh ould partake in th e cou nt ry’s fin ancial prosperity, bo th no w an d in th e fut ure. The pressure on Kazakh st an in dep end ent m edia w o uld appear to be m ostly in direct . The Govern m en t app aren tly seeks to in fluen ce m ed ia coverage through licensing requirem ent s, t ax inspect ion s and t he o ccasio nal sh ut-dow n. I un derst and th at pressu re o n t he m ed ia so m ew hat alleviat ed after th e elect ion, but th ere are co ncern s th at th is kind of pressu re m ight resurface in the days leading u p to the parliam ent ary and lo cal elect ions schedu led for later th is year. I u rged th e Governm en t to co nt in ue t o en cou rage in creasin g p ress freedom . A high -ranking Foreign Min istry official not ed th e vacuu m created aft er t he ab olitio n o f cen so rsh ip. He said h e did no t believe in “ab so lute freedo m ,” but rath er noted t hat th is vacu um sho uld be filled in w hat h e called, a “sop hist icated process.” H e urged u s t o try to un derst and th eir “m en tality,” as he called it, an d en gage in con st ructive dialogue, rather t han repeatin g t he sam e thing over and over again. At a m eeting w ith journ alist s, t hey expressed con cern abo ut a new proposed “law on m ass m ed ia” and t he interpretat ion of legislat ing restrict ion s o n m ed ia freed om . Th is law w ill be an im po rt ant st ep in defin ing th e relat ion sh ip b et w een Go vern m ent and m edia in Kaz akhstan . From discu ssion s w it h b oth parties, it is app aren t t hat w id e gap s rem ain. I have en co uraged a p arliam en t-sp on so red hearing on th is new ly drafted m edia law . I have also en cou raged th e O SCE O ffice in Kazakh st an t o h ost a one-d ay sem inar w hich w ould bring Govern m en t an d m edia represent atives t oget her to discuss issues of m ut u al co ncern. Tajikistan is a special case; it has just com e ou t a civil w ar w h ich too k thousands of lives. While the other cou ntries have alm ost a decade of independence, one m ight say that Tajikistan, as an independent country in a transition to dem ocracy, has had only tw o years’ experience to im plem ent these necessary reform s. O ne should not underestim ate the difficult security situation as w ell w hich prevails throughout the country. There is, how ever, a sem blance, the faint stirrings, of independent m edia in Tajikistan. Even in this difficult environm ent, there are several nom inally ind ependent (that is to say non-go vernm ent) new spapers and several television Second Report to the Permanent Council

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stations. But these are often independent in nam e only, and the dire econom ic situat ion of the country mitigat es against the grow t h, at least in t he very near futu re, o f independent m edia. Strangely enough, there is no ind epen den t Ta jik radio station, although several have applied. Even in a society w hich is apparently nearly totally dominated by television, there is room for independent radio and w e urge the Governm ent to m ove forw ard expeditiously w ith the licensing procedure of at least one of the stations w hich has applied. We found, too, journalists w ho w ere w illing to publicly air their grievances against w hat they perceived as governm ent control of m edia. Most striking w as the enormous econom ic difficulties the independent p rint m edia have in simply surviving in Ta jikistan today. The O SCE Mission in Dushanbe has secured funding to rehabilitate several independent new spapers. We praise such an initiative and hope it could be expanded. Unlike the other Central Asian countries, w here som e independent m edia exist, although they m ay be threatened, and journalists are w illing to discuss their concerns openly to som e degree, Turkm enistan offers no independent m edia nor any healthy debate on the issue. While the Constitution guarantees freed om of expression, w e co uld find no person w illing to avail him self of that privilege. Governm ent officials carefully qualified their statem ents; “We allow ,” said one Governm ent official, “only constructive criticism ”. “O ur concern, through the m edia,” said another, “is to bring about a positive perspective.” O ne journalist insisted that they “try to show the positive and good new s.” Another journalist engaged in a bit of psychoanalysis, noting that Turkm en society w as a “conflict-avoidance culture,” and that t he reluctance to criticise an all-pervasive go vernm ent structu re m ight be culturally ingrained. The m ost telling incident regarding m edia freedom in Turkm enistan cam e about as a result of a session w hich the O SCE O ffice arranged for m y advisor to m eet w ith journalists not em ployed by the state m edia, or unem ployed. As reported by the O SCE O ffice subsequently in a m em o to the CiO , nobody appeared. Som e journalists invited reported that they had been contacted by the State Security Service and urged not to participate. O ther invited journalists told O SCE representatives later that they did not attend the session because of their fear of governm ent harassm ent. We hold sim ilar m eetings w ith non-governm ent m edia representatives everyw here w e go; this is the first tim e that nobody attended such a m eeting because of their fear of harassm ent. We have expressed our concern regard ing th is incid ent to t he authorities in Turkm enistan. We are urging, too, that any gains regarding m edia freedom w hich w ould com e about through pending elections be institutionalised and that Turkm enistan begin to m ake progress on the issue of m edia freedom . 200

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O n the other hand, in a paradox w hich w e still do not understand, there is a proliferation of satellite dishes throughout Ashgabat, and there appears to be no restrict ions on the availabilit y of these apparently qu ite popular satellite d ishes. I w ould like to conclude m y report w ith som e observations and proposals for the region as a w hole and for our ow n activities. We h ave, in Tashkent, Uzbekistan and Alm aty, Kazakhstan, provided facilitat ive assist ance for t he est ablishm en t o f tw o in depend en t stu den t n ew sp apers. T he id ea is t o cu ltivate in youn g, h igh -schoo l-age stu d en ts th e sp irit of indep end ent thinking and jou rn alistic pro fessionalism .The student n ew spapers w ill receive fin ancial help in t he first year of th eir pub licatio n, so t hat th ey can p urch ase necessary office eq uipm ent and p ay print ing costs. Tw o stud ent -journalist s w ill travel fro m Europ e to t ho se coun tries in Sept em ber, before edit orial activities officially begin at t he stu den t n ew spap ers, to sh are th eir expertise on student new spapers w ith w ou ld-be st udent jou rnalists fro m th ose tw o sch ools. As is the case w ith m any of the countries in the O SCE region, virtually all the Central Asian countries are in the process of d rafting new m edia legislat ion. This legislation w ill provide the structural foundation for m edia freedom setting out the param eters of governm ent responsibilities and obligations. As an O SCE Institution w e have been asked to provide com m ents w herever w e go on the draft m edia law s, both by journalists and parliam entarians. We believe w e cannot neglect to becom e involved in som ething as im portant as the drafting of a m edia law , although in the past w e have been reluctant to engage directly in strictly legal issues. We are aw are that the Central Asian States m ay not have access to the kinds of legal and international expertise most ot her mem bers of th e O SCE enjoy. My O ffice w ill t herefore look into app ropriate w ays and mean s of serving as a ho nest broker in assist ing the Central Asian States in their efforts to reform the legislation. Another observation concerns the parliam entary or presidential elections w hich are foreseen in Central Asian States before the end of the year or early next year. I believe that these electio ns m ay provide a sm all w ind ow of opportunity for op ening up the media in this process. Turkm enist an, for exam ple, has assured us that t heir go vernm ent-co nt rolled m edia w ill be available d uring th e elections for all candidates to put their positions across to the public. We w ill w ant to look at w ays, in consultation w ith O DIHR, to capitalise on this sm all w indo w o f opportunity t hat w ill p resum ably arise, and seek to keep open that w indow of m edia liberalisation. My last observatio n is on th e dire econo m ic situat ion of in dependent m edia, particularly the prin t m edia, in all the Central Asian cou nt ries w ith th e p o s s ib le exception of Kazakhstan. Second Report to the Permanent Council

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We noted the initiative of the O SCE Mission in Tajikistan, w hich, for a sm all am ount of m oney, has been able to keep three independent new spapers from going out of business. I believe the O SC E could and sho uld u ndertake m ore such initiatives w hich w ould not involve large funds, but could help to save m edia w ith little m eans. We therefore propose to consider the establishm ent of a Media Fund for Central Asia. Working closely w ith O SCE Representations in the Central Asian countries and with our O ffice, mo dest funds w ould be designated to assist struggling independent m edia, m ostly the print m edia, through a difficult econom ic transition. This w ould be a partnership endeavour w ith contributions from the Central Asian m edia. Central Asia rem ains a great challenge for the O SCE, and for m y O ffice, part icu la r ly. I have t ried tod ay to outline som e of o ur concerns based on our recent visits, and to enlist the assistance of this O rganization w hen possible. I w ant to pledge to the Governm ents our desire to w ork closely w ith them and their indepen dent m ed ia to prom ote m edia freedom . We are of course w illing t o cooperate w ith the Chairm an-in-O fficeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Personal Representat ive p reparing a coordinated approach w ith respect to activities in Central Asia. Despite m y cautionary notes and m y candour, w hich I hope is taken in the spirit in w hich it is offered, I rem ain optim istic.

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Third Repo rt to the Permanent Co uncil 22 July 1999 This is m y third regular report to the Council during this year. I w ould like to inform you on the results of our w ork in the tw o past m onths. I shall, how ever, n ot focu s t oday o n m ed ia developm ents in Ko so vo . My O ffice h as m ad e several contribu tion s in t his resp ect and w ill co nt inu e, w it hin it s m andat e, to fo llow u p o n t he d evelo pm en t of jou rnalistic freedo m in t he regio n. My efforts and appeals to end the Serbian press law of O ctober 1998 and to support independent journalists in their strive for independent m edia w ill cont inu e. As you know, I have w ritten to all Foreign Ministers o f the O SCE Participating States encouraging them to use their influence, in w hatever m anner they d eem appropriate, to sup port t he repeal of this law w hich p revents the Serbian people from being inform ed about w hat is happening in their ow n count r y. I have received several positive responses. I also w ould hope that Europ ean parliam ents w ill support repeal of this law , and have asked NGO s and m edia to d o their part as w ell. I firm ly believe th at repeal o f this law is a key to a m o re dem ocratic Serbia. Good new s is the final release of Grigory Pasko, a Russian w ho w as arrested in November 1997 and charged w ith spying. I intervened in his case last year. Pasko had covered ecological problems of the Pacific fleet. His publications contributed considerably to a public debate on issues of m ajor concern such as nuclear safety and the ecological effects of toxic w aste. In spite of the Military C o u r t â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s decision to sent ence him to three years in prison, he is no w freed und er a general am nesty by the Dum a. O n the hand, the sim ilar case of Alexander Nikitin is still pending in St. Petersburg. N o w, I w ou ld like to focu s o n visits by my advisors to Rom ania and Moldova, and cite several concerns regarding negative trends in governm ent-m edia relations in Ukraine, Belarus, Turkey and Azerbaijan. My ad visers, Stanley Schrager and Alex Ivanko , have visit ed tw o countries for the first tim e â&#x20AC;&#x201D; Moldova and Rom ania. Rom ania has a flo urish ing and exten sive m edia environ m ent characterised by large num bers of print and electronic m edia, and governm ent officials extrem ely aw are of the need to maintain and enhance relatio ns w ith the m edia. Th e Governm ent, besides abolishing the VAT tax, a policy w e encourage of all go vern ments, is w orking hard to get its m essage acro ss an d cu ltivate a po sit ive relatio nship. Rom ania has come a long w ay in the past ten years, and w e salute its efforts. We encourage increased dialogue betw een m edia, governm ent and parliam ent, and w ill soon be putting forth a proposal to enhance this kind of Third Report to the Permanent Council

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co-operation through NGO s resident here in Vienna and in Bucharest. We w ould be pleased to attend such a conference and urge the Rom anian governm ent to participate actively. D uring its last sessio n th e Parliam en t rejected , in a close vo te, a prop osal to change several provisio ns of it s Penal Co de w hich crim inalize lib el and insult o ffences, and risk im prison ment fo r jo urnalists w ho have been convict ed of t hese offences. A sim ilar bill w ill soon be in trod uced in Parliam ent . We h ope fo r p ositive resu lt s an d en co urage Rom an ia to provide an exam p le fo r oth er cou nt ries in am elioratin g lon g-st and ing provisio ns in t he Crim inal Code w hich threaten journalists w ith im prisonm ent for exercising their right s t o freedo m o f exp ressio n. M y O ffice co nduct ed an assessm ent visit t o M oldo va earlier th is m o nt h. In general, t he curren t m ed ia sit uatio n in Moldo va is n ot m u ch different fro m th e oth er cou nt ries in the region . O nce again w e ru n into the sam e p ro blem s: lack of fu nd ing, lack of serio us indepen den t jou rnalism , ext ensive d om in atio n o f th e m edia by p olitical parties. Basically, the absolute m ajorit y of m edia are po litically affiliat ed. Ho w ever, becau se o f a proliferation of p olitical group s, m o st view s are represent ed in the m edia. Th ere is a genu ine p ub lic debat e in M old ova on issues of con cern t o th e co un try, includin g t he re-in tegration of t he Tran s-Dniestrian region. Jo urnalists w ere refreshin gly op en and frank in t heir co nversat ions w ith m y O ffice. Th e Foreign Min istry rep resentat ives un derlined that a lack of reso urces ham p ered freed om of expressio n an d t hat oft en go vern m ent st ru ctu res pressu red m edia th rough lib el su it s, a ph eno m eno n n ot un com m o n t o th e region . In a country that is in the process of transition, there w ill be problem s: certain sensitivities m ay be overlooked and a tendency exists am ong m any governm ent officials t o be overly intrusive in m edia m at ters. Fully appreciating the need for the developm ent of the state language, I w ould ask the authorities in Mo ldova to avo id for the tim e being any strict regulation o f the Mo ldovan and Russian percentage of broadcast program m ing. The assessm ent trip also included a visit to the Trans-Dniestrian region to specifically loo k into the case of N ovaya Gazeta, a local new spaper harassed by the regional authorities. This case w as raised at the 18 June O SCE Perm anent Council. As to the background of this case, w e w ere inform ed in Tiraspol that the situation in Trans-Dniestra “w as unique” and that in som e other regional conflicts in the O SCE region, for exam ple, one could not even have a conversation on freedom of expressio n and that in those places these issues “w ere usually resolved w ith tw o shots behind a barn.” We w ere told that the people of Trans-Dniestria w ere in the process of building a “hom ogeneous dem ocratic society,” how ever, a so-called ‘fifth colum n’ w as underm ining the unity of the people. The editors of N ovaya Gazeta w ere specifically nam ed as being part of 204

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the ‘fifth column’ and by their w ork “p ro moted reintegration w it h Mold ova and th is p osition is no t supp orted b y the peop le”. T hat is w hy the Ministry of State Secu rity had to take action against N ovaya Gazeta. The fact that recent ly a local court issued a decision in favour of N ovaya Gazeta w as m ostly brushed off. To say the least , su ch attit udes to w ards one of t he b asic hu m an righ ts do no t prom o te dem ocracy nor a clim ate of reconciliation . Wh ile Moldova is trying t o m ove ahead, one of its regio ns is still firm ly stu ck in a ‘tim e w arp’ of preglasnost t im e . O n the other hand, it w ould be in the spirit of reconciliation and reintegration if journalists from Trans-Dniestria could b e regularly accredited w ith the country’s Parliam ent. I have suggested this already to the Moldovan m em bers of the O SCE Parliam entary Assem bly in St. Petersburg w ho prom ised to raise this m atter w ith the Chairm an of the Parliam ent in Chisinau. We rem ain concerned about recent develop m ent s in ot her co untries w hich continue to occupy a great deal of our attention: Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan and Turkey. In May, I paid an official visit to Ukraine follow ing tw o previous visits of m y O ffice. I had the opportunity of having substantive talks w ith the Governm ent, w it h Parliam ent, w ith the Sup rem e Court and w ith a num ber of jou rnalists. In addition, I w as invited to give a keynote speech at a conference on Ukraine and European integration. During m y visit, I also had the occasion of meeting tw o editors and founders of regional new spapers outside Kyiv who suffered from strong harassm ent by local authorities. These authorities used defam ation law s and arbitrary m easures to reduce the tw o editors and their new spapers to silence, thus m aking an open discussion on th e urgency of basic reform s in the region im possible. As a matter of fact, the various attempts to change the defam at ion law s have not yet led to any concrete result. Since there seem ed to be a w idespread conviction that things m ust change, I suggested to hold a roundtable on this issue in Kyiv later t his year. Represen tat ives of t he d ifferen t stat e instit utions as w ell as of the m ed ia and so m e intern atio nal experts sho uld m eet to discuss t he current situation and options for change in accordance w ith international standards. My interlocutors agreed w ith m y suggestion. I have to state at this poin t that t he m edia situ ation has not really im p roved over the p ast m onths. In this respect, I have recently ad dressed the President on several cases, includin g the h arassment of TV chan nel STB. In view of the up com ing presiden tial elections end o f O ctob er, t he D irecto r of O DIHR and I recent ly w rote a jo int letter t o the Presid ent raising our co ncerns w ith consistent reports in dicat ing int erference, som etim es even harassm ent and intim idation by the execut ive branch in the w ork o f private m edia regarding their coverage of the upcom in g election s. Third Report to the Permanent Council

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As t o develop m ent s in Belarus, m y O ffice w as info rm ed of the h idin g of t w o jo u rnalist s, t h e ed it o r of Belorusk aya D elovaya G az eta and of Im y a w h o b ot h felt ap p arent ly un der p ressure fro m stat e secu rit y service. I m ade a p ub lic st atem en t on this of w hich yo u are aw are an d I w ould like to u rge your Governm ent s represent ed in Belarus t o take t his m atter up w it h t he Governm ent o f Belaru s. A short tim e before, both new spapers had been officially w arned by the State Comm ittee for the Press for their coverage. Therefore, I w ro te another letter to the Foreign Minister and to the Chairm an of the State Com m ittee to ask for an end to this practice of “w arnings” and to change the relevant articles of the Press Law in accordance w ith international standards. There are currently efforts by the O SCE at various levels to engage all p olitical forces in a dialogue on parliam entary elections in the year 2000. I believe that free and fair elections next year w ould be an im portant achievem ent that could, how ever, not be realised w ithout m ajor changes in the field of m edia. Again, I w ant to stress that the constitutional fram ew ork of Belarus contains a num ber of sufficient provisions guaranteeing free, independent and pluralistic m edia as w ell as freedom of expression. The m ain requirem ent for im plem enting these provisions is the political w ill to do so. Concerning Azerbaijan, I w ould first like to express m y appreciation to President Aliyev for his recent grant of am nesty to the journalist Fuad Q ahram anli. As you know , I visited Mr Q ahram anli during m y trip to Baku in February, and have called, in this forum and in others, for his release. I have com m unicated on several occasions w ith President Aliyev and I am pleased that Mr Q ahram anli, Azerbaijan’s only im prisoned journalist, has been released. How ever, I am obliged to express m y concern over recent developm ents regard ing free jo urnalism . I have com m unicated w it h t he Foreign Minister o ver these issues in considerable detail. My concerns revolve, first, around a series of recent reports of violence directed against m edia. The President him self seem s to have criticised these acts of violence, and I urge the Governm ent to initiate investigations of these acts of violence. Second, I have highlighted several times the lack of licences for independent television stat ions. While m ost of them are broadcasting w ithout licences, w ith the consent of t he Go vernm ent , I un derst and that, th ree m onth s b efore scheduled m unicipal elections, the head of th e frequency com m ission in the Ministry of Com m unications has apparently sent letters to local prosecutors dem anding that t hey shu t dow n any station broadcasting w ithout a licence. In fact, several w eeks ago, one such provincial station w as closed by the police. Finally, I w ant to express m y concern about the new m edia law w hich has passed its first reading in Parliam ent . This law seem s t o place undue restrictio ns on the m edia and to lim it access to inform ation. 206

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In Turkey, w e understand that a relatively broad and unhindered coverage of the Ă&#x2013; calan trial has been possible. I am convinced that free coverage of this event w ill continue. O n th e oth er hand, how ever, w e are again receiving repo rt s o n alleged violations of journalistic freedom . These individual cases, w hich I have detailed in a recent let ter to t he Turkish Foreign Minister, refer to co urt decisions against journalists, w riters, editors on su ch charges as, for exam ple, insu lts of th e arm y and separatist propaganda. In this context, I w ould like to rem ind this Council of several binding judgem ents of the European Court on Hum an Rights in Strasburg in early July. This Court stated in several cases a violation by Turkish jurisdiction of Art. 10 of the European Convention on Hum an Rights dealing w ith freedom of expression and decided in favour of the plaintiffs. The series of new cases I have just m entioned seem to com e at a particularly bad m oment as w e prepare for t he O SCE Sum mit in Istanbul later this year. This Co un cil w ill un derstand th at th is series of attacks on jo urnalistic freed om cannot go unnoticed. I intend to follow up on this in the next m onths.

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Fo urth Repo rt to the Permanent Co uncil 25 Novem ber 1999 Com ing back from the Sum m it in Istanbul, I w ould like to underline that m y O ffice is satisfied w ith the com m itm ents in the Sum m it docum ents. In particu la r, I am referring t o th e positive com m itm ent in th e European Security Charter “to take all necessary steps to ensure the basic conditions for free and independent m edia and unim peded transborder and intra-State flow of inform ation”. This w ill be a good basis for our future w ork. Another general com m ent : free m ed ia and responsible journalism are com m on requirem ents for any dem ocracy throughout the O SCE area. Jam es D. Wolfensohn, the Presid ent of t he Wo rld Bank, said t he o ther d ay: “A free p ress is not a luxury. A free press is at the absolute core of equitable developm ent, because if you cannot enfranchise poor people, if they do not have a right to expression, if there is no searchlight on corruption and inequitable practices, you cannot b uild t he public consensus needed to brin g about change.” Wo lfe nsohn’s point, and one I have repeatedly returned to over the past tw o years, is that w e need a free press t o fight corruptio n, that developm ent is inevitably tied t o th e abilit y of a free press t o expose issu es. Freedom of expression is not only a fundamental human right in and of itself, but it has ram ifications fo r econom ic developm ent as w ell. Freedo m of expression an d pu blic d ebate are also essen t ial fo r reco nciliatio n in an y post con flict situ ation , Tu rkey b eing no exceptio n. I w ou ld like to m ent ion here th e case of t he Tu rkish bo ok en tit led M ehmedin Kitabi. Th e boo k con tains int erview s w ith soldiers w h o fo ugh t in th e sout heast an d w as w ell received b y th e p ub lic. Ho w ever, it w as b ann ed in Jun e u po n req u est fro m th e Turkish Arm ed Forces. Th e edito r, N adire Mat er, w ill go on trial to m o rro w for “insult ing th e m ilitary” accordin g t o art icle 159 o f t h e Tu r kish Penal Co d e an d face on e to six years in priso n. I b elieve th at t his is no t a righ t step in a process o f recon ciliatio n. Let me now brief you on our m ain activities du ring t he p ast three m o nths since m y last report. In late O ctober, my O ffice organised together w ith the O SCE Centre in Bishkek and the Union of Kyrgyz Jo urnalists the first-ever regional conference on ‘The Media in Central Asia: the Present and the Future.’ The Government of Kyrgyzstan, w hich remains in the forefront in the region in its commitment to democracy and a free media, hosted the conference. I w ould like to express our great appreciation to the O SCE Chairm an-in-O ffice and the Governm ent of the United States for their genero us contributions to the fund ing of this conference. 208

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Nearly 200 representatives from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakstan , Uzbekistan and Ta jikistan attended the opening session, and nearly 80 of them participated actively in the w hole conference held in Bishkek. We noted w ith regret, how ever, t hat the Governm ent of Turkm enistan refused perm ission to allow a delegation to attend the conference. The conference w as a successful at tem pt to generate regio nal co-o peration on freedom of the m edia issues and galvanize an exchange of view s betw een like-m inded journalists from the four Cent ral Asian Republics represented. President Akaev confirm ed to m e in Istanbul that the conference helped in developing freedo m of expression in the region and com m ended our O ffice for a very productive co-operative effort. O ne of the results of the m eeting w as the signing of a docu m ent betw een the particip atin g co untries at the conference for an exchange of inform ation am o ng themselves, the p recurso r, perhaps, to a m ore form al new s agency for Central Asia. A m ajor result w as the com m itm ent t o hold such a conferen ce on an annu al basis at different sites in Central Asia. Seizing on the desire to institutionalize such m eet ings, Kazakstan m edia representatives have offered to host a sim ilar con ference next year. We hope t hat the Govern ment of Kazakstan w ill su pport this im portant project. Another prom inent issue w as the favourable reception by all participants to this O fficeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s initiative of a Media Fund for Central Asia. This fund, as I have noted previously, w ould enable m y O ffice, in close collaboration w ith the O SCE Centres, to assist struggling independent m edia w ith sm all project grants of assistance for such elem ents as new sprint, paper, com puters, and so forth. O ften the quick disbursal of several thousand dollars can m ake the difference betw een survival going out of b usiness. Therefore, w e ask th e Perm anent Council to give us the ability to w ork closely w ith the O SCE Centres in Central Asia to fund these valuable projects. Let m e finally inform you that the independent school new spapers w hich m y O ffice has in itiat ed in Tashken t and in Alm at y after m y visit to Central Asia in May have had a successful start. Liceum Life, an independent school m agazine in Tashkent, and School M atters, a m agazine of school no. 159 in Alm aty, are now b eing pub lished and n ew sp rint w ill be provided also in the year 2000. We have continued to m onitor developm ents in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Recently I w rote to the Contact Group raising m y concerns w ith the neverending cam paign by the Belgrade regim e against independent m edia. I have noted num erous cases w here media w ere being subjected to harassment, w hich is in contradiction to the m ajor political developm ents in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the tenth anniversary of w hich w e just celebrated. Fourth Report to the Permanent Council

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Most of these actions w ere taken under the Serbian Law on Public Information. O n 25 June, I appealed to all O SCE Foreign Ministers to bring about a repeal of this Law. The Law, w hich I once described as a “declaration of w ar” against independent journalists, is still in force. Now it is aggressively used against those w ho are trying to bring change to their country. I reiterate my call for us to join together to continue to highlight the necessity to bring about a repeal of this draconian Law. I w ould also like to stress that no progress is being reported in the investigation, if there is one, into the 11 April m urder of Slavko Curuvija, a leading independent editor. In addit ion to this, m y O ffice has received again co m plaints abou t the denial of visas to foreign journalists including, inter alia journalists from the Z DF and a delegation from the International Press Institute in Vienna. Such behaviour, w hich is not in line w ith basic Helsinki com m itm ents, contributes to a clim ate of self-isolatio n. In th e case of recen t d enials of visas, I h ave asked the UN Secretary General and som e m em ber States of the O SCE to use their good offices in Belgrade in order to solve these problem s. O ver th e last w eeks w e saw t w o attacks against jou rn alists in Rep ublika Srp ska. O n 22 O cto ber, Zeljko Kopanja, the edito r of th e in dependen t n ew spaper N ezavisne N ovine, w as serio usly injured in a bo m b att ack an d lost b oth legs. His new spap er recently p ublish ed a series of articles o n w ar crim es com m itted b y Serbs again st Bosniaks. O n 3 N ovem ber, th e jo urnalist Mirko Srd ic w as at tacked b y D o bo j m ayo r, M irko Stojcin ovic. T he at tack fo llow ed th e bro ad cast of a repo rt by Srd ic o n local corrupt ion . Bo th jo urn alist s are described by so m e po lit ician s as “trait o rs.” Th e “t rait o r syn dro m e” is th e great est dan ger t o cou rageous an d pro fessio nal jou rnalist s. The develo pments in the Balkans this year, but also in o ther O SC E regions, have co nfirmed our assessm ent that it w ill be necessary to look into w ays and means to protect journalists in conflict areas. After the m urder of t w o jo urnalists in Ko so vo , on 14 Ju ne, I suggest ed that o ne o f the w ays to prot ect journalists w o uld b e by clearly identifyin g them as m edia professionals. A sym b ol co uld be developed th at w ould act as a ‘Sign of Protection’ for journalist s, just as th e Red C ro ss sign ifies t o th e m ilitary a m edical facility. O n 22 Septem ber, m y O ffice, together w ith the non-governm ental organization, Freedom Forum , held a roundtable in London on protection of journalists in conflict areas. The debate ended up focusing on the broader aspects of protecting journalists. Participants agreed that one of the w ays to protect journalists w as by ensur210

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ing that alleged killers w ould be brought to justice either throu gh national courts or through an international one, along the lines of the International Crim inal Tribunal in The Hague. My O ffice w ill continue looking for new w ays that could be utilized to ensure the safety and security of m edia professionals, and I plan to continue the debate w e started in London. I w ould like to use this opportunity to announce that in the year 2000 m y O ffice plans to invite O SCE participating States to take part in this discussion. I hope that together w e w ill be able to develop a joint O SCE approach in trying to solve this im portant problem . It is m y view th at m ore m edia o rganiz ations should follo w t he example o f the BBC in organizing special courses for journalists travelling to conflict areas. These should be specific courses tailored to the needs of m edia professionals and not just an extension of sim ilar courses held by the m ilitary. Here the O SCE as a regional organization can help. I w ould like to appeal once again to your governm ents: letâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s w ork on this together. The current conflict in Russia has im plications also on the w ork of journalists w ho try to cover it in Chechnya . My O ffice notes that in spite of severe difficu lties, Russian and international jo urnalists seem to be generally able to cover the m ilit ary action as w ell as the h um anitarian aspects of this conflict . It is very im portant also w ith regard to a political solution that a free flow of inform ation is not im peded. I have addressed Foreign Minister Ivanov on 4 Novem ber on a num ber of alleged cases of harassm ent of journalists covering the w ar in Chechnya. My O ffice received a prom pt reply on 17 Novem ber. It stressed that all the cases dealt w ith â&#x20AC;&#x153;underground trips by journalists to the region.â&#x20AC;? This highlights a dilemm a: journalists w ill try t o enter the area any w ay they can, eventually disregarding the form al requirem ents for such visits.Given the situation as it is now , I believe that form alities should not be the first priority of the Russian authorities, but rather the security of the journalists. I am also aw are t h at t w o jo urnalists w ere killed in C hechn ya: Supian Ep e n d iy e v, a correspo nd ent w it h t he n ew sp aper Groz nensk y Rabochiy, and Ramz an M ezhidov, a freelan ce co rresp o nden t w it h t he M osco w T V co m pany T V C ent re. O n a different matter: Alexander N ikitin, w ho w as arrested in February 1996 for w riting a report to the Norw egian environm ental group Bellona on the Russian fleet in t he Arctic Sea, is o nce again facing charges in a St. Pet ersburg Cou rt for espionage and divulging inform ation on state secrets. I hope that this issue w ill be resolved soon and in favour of freedom of expression. Fourth Report to the Permanent Council

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The presidential elections in Ukraine are over now . As to the m edia situation, preliminary statements from the O DIHR on the period of the elect ion campaign seem to confirm som e of our fundam ental concerns on freedom of the m edia, w hich I have addressed here earlier. O ne m ajor problem w ith regard to ensuring freed om of media in Ukraine and elsew here, is the w idespread abuse of libel cases against m edia. For exam ple, the ind ependent w eekly Z erkalo N edeli has been sued for over $1,5 million USD, the opposition daily Den is being sued for libel by governm ent officials and, in addition, harassed by num erous tax inspections. Therefore, m y O ffice together w ith the Council of Europe and w ith IREX/ProMedia w ill hold a roundtable on free m edia and libel legislation in Ukraine, in Kyiv, on 2-3 Decem ber. It w ill be att end ed by represent atives fro m all the three branches of the governm ent o f Ukraine, by journalists, and by local and international experts including those from the Council of Europe. The objective of this meetin g is to discuss the lib el issue and t o develop concrete recom m endations on w ays to bring this situation into com pliance w ith O SC E co m m itm ents and Europ ean stan dards. We have taken into acco unt the Governm entâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s basic com m itm ent to undertake reform s w ith respect to adhering to European standards and, in particular, earlier initiatives of the Governm ent, the Suprem e Court and Parliam ent for im provem ent on the libel cases. The tim ing of this roundtable after the presidential elections should add to a productive debate and operational conclusions, w hich w ill be m ade know n to you in due course. The Istanbul Su mm it Declaration stressed the necessity of rem oving all remaining obstacles to a real political dialogue betw een the Government and the opposition in Belarus including also resp ect for rule of law and freed om of the m ed ia. My O ffice w elcom es the beginning of a dialogue betw een Governm ent and opposition in Minsk under the auspices of the O SCE Advisory and Monitoring Group w hich has led in early Novem ber to the renew al of licences revoked earlier under the Press Law as w ell as to a prom ising first agreem ent on the access of opposition to state controlled m edia. H o w e ve r, w e learned in Istanbul that this agreement on access to state m edia is again threatened by President Lukashenkoâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s apparently negative attitude t ow ards t he o pen ing of th e state m edia to t he O ppo sition. The O pp osition , on th e ot her hand, view s this agreem ent as a conciliatory ploy by the Governm ent prior to the sum m it. I have therefore urged those involved in the political dialogue and in particular the Government to pursue this issue in an open and public debate instead of hindering the process, w hich has just started. As you know, my O ffice has outlined our concerns on the abuse of libel law s, on the de facto censorship thro ugh w arnings acco rding to the Press Law, and on 212

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a num ber of presidential decrees in the PC here as w ell as in Minsk. We hope that the beginning of a political dialogue w ill also contribute to solving som e of the structural problem s of m ed ia freedom in Belaru s and w e are ready to p rovide the app ropriate support. In this regard, upon a request of the Foreign Minister of Belarus in August, w e have already m ade available to the Governm ent a num ber of m odel law s and other relevant expertise on the transform ation of state m edia into public m edia and on the existing legal fram ew ork in Belarus. Let m e now conclude m y report by tw o announcem ents: Later today, on the occasion of a Sem inar, organized by Article 19 in London, I shall m eet the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of O pinion and Expression, and the O AS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression. I hope w e w ill be able to agree on certain joint approaches and activities that w ill help strengthen freedom of expression throughout the w orld. O n 30 Novem ber, m y O ffice w ill present a publication here in Vienna entitled Defence of the Future. The book, available now in Serbo-Croatian and Germ an, contains a num ber of articles from journalists of the form er Yugoslavia on th e perspect ives of creating stability and dem ocracy in the Balkans. The SerboCroat ed ition w ill be present ed in Sarajevo in early Decem ber. The English version w ill be available to you also in early Decem ber.

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Urgent Repo rts o n Current Issues to the Permanent Co uncil

Statement at the Permanent Co uncil 25 February 1999 I w ould like to d raw you r at tent ion to the current sit u atio n regardin g freed om of t he m ed ia in Belarus. I w as inform ed that t he Stat e Com m it tee for Press last w eek has add ressed prelim in ary w arnin gs against six ind ep end ent new spapers abou t th eir coverage of t he o ppo sit io n’s p lans to ho ld presidential elections this M ay. These new spap ers w ere accused o f allegedly “calling fo r t he seizu re o f pow er. ” Th e six p ublication s, N aviny, Beloru ssk a y a D elovay a G a z eta, N arodnay a Voly a, Beloru ssk a y a G a z eta, Beloru ssk y R y n ok and Im y a, risk to h ave th eir licence revoked aft er tw o ad m o nit ion s b y th e St ate Co m mit tee fo r Press and could then be even tually closed. Th e pract ice of this Co m m ittee h as certain ly never prom ot ed freedom o f th e m edia, bu t rath er favou red tenden cies tow ards self-cen so rship am ong in dep end ent jo urnalists. Th e Co m m it tee checks p ublication s for vio lation s of th e law and of n um erou s financial regulatio ns. It issues formal ad m on itio ns, if it con sid ers t hat info rm atio n could cause in tolerance w ith in t he society o r defam e the ho nour of govern ment officials. Th e Head of the State C om m it tee claim s to sign ab o ut a doz en ad m onition s a w eek. I h ave not iced w it h in terest that t he State C o m m itt ee agreed in Novem b er 1998 t o form a tripartit e w o rking – gro up w ith th e O SCE Advisory and Mo nitoring Group and w ith a representative of the indepen den t m edia t o discuss it s d ecision s. This tripartite group is expected to m eet for the first time tom orrow in Minsk. T here is in m y view an u rgent need to review t he p relim inary w arnings against t he indep end ent new spapers durin g th is m eeting. I therefore urge the Governm ent of Belarus to ensure the success of t his m eeting w hich I ho pe w ill be an im portant step in safegu ard ing freed om of expressio n in Belarus. I am int end ing to go to Min sk in m id-M arch and t o raise t hese an d ot her m att ers w ith the Governm ent . 214

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Statement at the Permanent Co uncil 11 March 1999 I w ould like to draw your attention today to three country related issues: The first one concerns Turkey. My O ffice received inform ation that the Turkish Minister of Justice recently instructed the authorities to strictly im plem ent all law s and decrees leading to th e interdiction of the so -called “separatist propaganda” w ithin an otherw ise liberal and pluralistic m edia landscape in Tu r k e y. These law s and d ecrees are often used to restrict the freedom of m edia to cover m ajor polit ical issu es, inclu ding deb ates and con flict s w ithin the cou ntry. Since the arrest of Mr Ö calan, certain issues have becom e of great public interest in Turkey and in the international com m unity. Under the given circum stances, excessive interpretation of constitutional and legal prescriptions co ncerning the use of m ed ia cou ld only lead t o prob lems w ith the nation al and international m edia com m unity asked to cover events and incidents in connection w ith the trial against Mr Ö calan. I w ould t herefore urge t he Turkish Governm ent to adopt a m ore liberal attitude in order to facilitate the public debate on the above-m entioned issues. T he second issue is A z e rb a jia n. At the end of February, I have p aid an official visit to Baku follow ing an earlier invitation of the Governm ent. T he situ ation in Azerbaijan is more com plex than it might be assumed. C ensorship w as officially abolished six m onths ago. The hunger strike of editors late last year, in w hich then Chairm an-in-O ffice of the O SCE, Minister Gerem ek, and m yself intervened, w as settled peacefully. I had occasion to address this question to a large class of aspiring journalists at Baku State University: Is there m edia freedom in Azerbaijan? O ne third said yes; one third said no, and one t hird said “Yes-and-No.” This is not the tim e to go into the details of w hy these students journalist said w hat they said, but I rather bring it to your attention to em phasise the com plexities of how an em erging dem ocracy com es to grips w ith the idea of freedom of t he m edia. Even the fact that one third of the journalists w ere w illing to publicly declare that there w as, in their opinion, no m edia freedom , is enlightening as w ell. If it is not clear to those involved in the profession w hether m edia freedom exists or not, it is difficult to draw easy and definite conclusions. President Aliyev told m e that he is deeply com m itted to freedom of the m edia, the m edia has total freedom to express their opinion, but it is not easy, he said, to im plem ent this process. I have encouraged the Go vernm ent to take steps in ord er to change the libel law s w hich are st ill used to punish critical journ alists and to tran sfo rm t he stat e Statement at the Permanent Council

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television int o a public b roadcast station. Furthermo re I have p romoted the idea of establishing press councils as a useful instrum ent of self-regulation. These issues w ill be part of the continued co-operation betw een the Governm ent of Azerbaijan and m y O ffice. In t his respect , I w ould like to com mend t he Azerbaijan Governm ent for the effective dialogue it has already establish ed w ith m y O ffice. Fin a lly, M r Chairman , I am very glad to give you an info rmation th is m o rning w hich w as not included in my statement originally. In Baku, I had the opportun ity of visiting the on ly journalist in p rison. I appealed to President Aliyev to release this young m an. This m orning, I w as inform ed that President Aliyev is favourably considering my appeal and that I am free to info rm you about it now. I w ould like to thank the President and the Governm ent for this gesture. T he t hird issue is Se rb ia . I have received info rm at ion th at on 8 M arch the o w n er and tw o journ alist s from t he d aily Dnevni Telegraf w ere senten ced to five-m on th prison term s fo r publish ing an article against Serbian Vice -Pr im e M inist er Milovan Bojic. I have in tervened w it h Yugo slav Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovano vic urging th e Belgrade aut ho rities to use their influence to en sure th at th e th ree jo urnalists are no t in carcerated and th at their sen ten ces are overt urned . Fin a lly, I w ou ld like to draw your attention t o tw o special co untry re po rts w hich m y O ffice has produced w ith the support of external experts: one is on the m edia situation in Croatia, the other one on the m edia situation in Kyrgyzstan. These are tw o of a series of periodic reports w e have com m issioned to p rovide a broader perspect ive on how particular cou ntries deal w ith freedom o f the m edia in their part icular en viron m en ts. Both reports are availab le to you as of today. I look forw ard to your com m ents and suggestions.

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Statement at the Permanent Co uncil 22 April 1999 I w ould like to raise a num ber of m edia issues related to the current crisis in Kosovo. Under Paragraph 6 of the M andate, the O SCE Rep resentative on Freedom of the Media has a responsibility to m onitor com pliance w ith relevant O SCE principles and co mm itm ent s, inclu ding alleged serious instances of intolerance b y participating States. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) is su spended from the O SCE, ho w ever, it is still a signat ory to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. That is w hy I believe that certain broadcasting practices of Serbian State Television (RTS) are of relevance to this O rganization. Som e of the RTS program m es are regularly re-broadcast in Europe and North Am erica. Here is a quote from a Belgrade jou rnalist: “The vo cabu lary of the m edia for N ATO and the international co m m unity (for exam ple, “degenerat e crim inals”) has becom e the natural w ay of com m unication w ith the rest of the w orld.” But this d oes no t hold t rue for all the reports pu blished or broadcast by Serbian journalists. The Independent Media Comm ission in Bosnia and Herz egovina (IMC) has follow ed the program mes of the Republika Srpska Television and has observed that since the m ilitary conflict started the “style of new s presentation has becom e m ore professional and credible. Presenters have resum ed a norm al, detached dem eanour.” (IMC Assessm ent of 1 April 1999). Point tw o. I w ant to draw your attention to a developm ent w hich I find extrem ely disturbing: the use of terrorist tactics against individuals in order to be able to m isuse them for w ar propaganda purposes in the m edia. I am disturbed by the use of t he RT S in w hat might in the fut ure be called a m edia-w arcrim e: utilizing a citizen and one of Kosovo’s leading politicians, Ibrahim Rugova, as a m ed ia ho st age. Th ere are cred ible reports from foreign corresp onden t Renat e Flott au th at Ru gova w as fo rced to take part in th e so-called M ilosevic sh ow broad cast on RT S w hile his ch ildren and his w ife w ere un der co nstant t hreat from p olice fo rces t hat con trolled his h ouse in Pristin a. Belgrade d enies th at. The only w ay to find out the truth is for Rugo va and his fam ily to be allow ed to leave the coun try, and I urge t he FRY Governm en t t o do so . Point three. I continue to be concerned for the safety of journalists, both local and foreign, w orking in FRY. In late March-early April, the Belgrade authorities w iped out all independent m edia – the few ones that continued to operate despite the num erous restrictions of the Serbian Law on Public Information. T he lead ing independent broadcaster B92 w as closed dow n and a radio Statement at the Permanent Council

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station under the sam e nam e has restarted broadcasting, how ever w ith new staff. Slavko Cu ruvija, a leading independ ent edito r and p ublisher, w as gunned dow n on 11 April in Belgrade. His w ife w as assaulted. This is another case of w hat I refer to as “censorsh ip b y killing.” T he offices of the Association of Independent Electronic Med ia (ANEM) were raided and all em ployees expelled from the prem ises. Num erous foreign correspondents w ere h arassed , detained, expelled , their eq uipm ent co nfiscated. Here are a few exam p les from April alon e: Ru ssian TV corresponden t Gleb O vsyanniko v – expelled. Germ an TV journalist Pit Schnitzler – m issing after leaving Belgrade en route to Zagreb. Italian reporter Lucia Annunciata – detained, threatened and questioned by the authorities before being allow ed to leave the country. I w ould like to em phasise that this is only the tip of the iceberg. Those w ho are still allow ed to w ork in FRY have to file their report s through the RTS netw ork and are subject to num erous restrictions including their freedom of m ovem ent. Acco rding to the Com mittee to Protect Journalists, the Russian NTV netw ork has com plained about being subject to m ilitary censorship. They are not alone. The current m edia situation in FRY is very disturbing – voices of reason have been silenced, the open debate on issues of concern to the country’s citizens, w hich I have been urging for m onths, never m aterialised. After a political settlem ent is finally reached in Kosovo, the international com m unity, and especially the O SCE, w ill have to look for new approaches in support of dem ocratic m edia in Serbia. Viable independen t med ia are p aram ount to any dem ocratic p rocess and to a civil society that, one hopes, w ill be established sooner rather than later in Serbia. I believe this w ill be one of the O SCE’s biggest challenges in the near future w here all its m em ber States, especially the new European dem ocracies and the Russian Federation, w ill play an im portant role. To d a y, Russia has a free, dem ocrat ic and lively m edia scene, something t hat is totally lacking in Serbia. In this as in other fields O SCE’s and especially Russia’s contribution could be vast.

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Statement at the Permanent Co uncil 12 May 1999 During the first w eek of May, I visited the Form er Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia w here I m et w ith editors, journalists, w riters and other representatives of the cultu ral elite from both t he Macedonian and Albanian comm unity as w ell as journalists and w riters from Kosovo. I also travelled to Tetovo w here I visited the offices o f Koha Ditore, a leading Kosovo Albanian daily new spap er, that recently restarted publication and is being d istributed among the refugees from Kosovo. Those journalists w ho w ere able to flee Kosovo inform ed m e about the destruction of their offices in Pristina. I have asked them to provide additional inform ation on this m atter to m y O ffice. The issue I focused on during m y trip w as how can the O SCE as an organization and its m em ber States support the independent m edia professionals w ho fled Kosovo and also how w e can support the Form er Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. O ne thing that is absolutely clear: m ost of our interlocutors put it t his w ay: “If yo u w ant to help the Albanian d eportees you have to help Macedonia.” Relief agencies are extrem ely busy setting up cam ps for refugees, providing the basic necessit ies, bringing in food, w ater, other supplies. But people need m ore. When the first issue of Koha Ditore w as distributed in the refugee cam ps there w ere small riots – everybody tried to get a copy. There is a definite hunger for intellectu al food am ong the refugees and w e should try to address this issue. I believe there are four w ays this can be done by utilizing relatively sm all financial grants from O SCE m em ber States and NGO s: • By p ublish ing boo ks o n the Macedonian m arket, including children’s books, for further free distrib utio n in the refugee cam ps. This w ill provide additional fin ancial support to the local p ublishers, an d their situation is dire, and m uch needed reading m aterial for a restless population. • By extending the free distribution of n ew spapers t o the refugees. Koha Ditore brings 10,000 copies to the cam ps. This is not enough. More copies should be printed by independent new spapers, and for that they need additional funding. O ther publications should also be encouraged to distribute am ong the refugees. How ever, they w ill also need funding. • By publishing texts now w ritten by deportees, including fiction and poetry, in the local Macedonian m edia through international financial support. • By buying advertising space in local Macedonian new spapers t hat can be used for discussions am ong the intellectuals from the Form er Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo. Statement at the Permanent Council

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These are all sm all things that could m ake a huge difference not only am ong the refugees but also am ong the Macedonians w ho are som ew hat frustrated w ith, w hat they refer to, as a lack of substantial support for their country. I urge the O SCE m em ber States to consider these proposals.

Statement at the Permanent Co uncil 2 Septem ber 1999 I w ould like to draw you r at tention to m ost recent develop ments regarding freedom of the m edia in Ukraine. As the presidential election cam paign is picking up speed, the incidents against independent m edia are increasing. These cases show a pattern of harassment tow ards non-governmental m edia, w hich is especially alarm ing in light of the upcom ing elections in O ctober. The latest incident concerns STB TV channel. The bank accounts of STB w ere frozen on 26 August on request of the tax authorities mot ivated by alleged violations of existing tax law s. According to STB, the TV channel cannot subm it the docum ents required by the tax authorities as these are held by eight other state controlling agencies. Unless STB regains access to its bank accounts, the channel w ill have to stop broadcasting. This is not the first incident against STB. In June, I have addressed President Kuchm a concerning previous incidents against the channel, including theft, death threats, and assaults. The ot her recent distu rbing incident concerns four private T V and radio stations in Crim ea (the all-Crimean station C hernomorsk aya, and t hree regional stations: ITV in Sim feropol, Ekran in Dzhankoy, and Kerch TV), w hich w ere shut dow n on 26 July. The reason given by authorities for closure is the use of unlicenced transm itters. H ow ever, as this is not an unusual operating procedure and as other state-o w ned com panies are still u sing t he transm itters, the grounds for closing dow n the television stations do not appear convincing. In light of these and earlier reports indicating intereference and som etim es even harassm ent and intim idation by the executive branch in the w ork of private m edia regarding their co verage of the upcom ing elections, I have u rged the Ukrainian Governm ent, in a joint letter w ith the Director of O DIH R of 14 Ju ly, to take necessary steps to ensure that State officials at all levels understand t heir obligations w ith regard to freedom of the m edia. In addition to this intervent ion, I have turn ed to the Ukrainian Governm ent on several earlier occasions concerning problem s encountered by the m edia. My O ffice has nevertheless yet to receive an official reply. 220

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Written Statement to the Permanent Co uncil 30 Septem ber 1999 O n 22 Sep tem ber m y O ffice, together w ith The Freedom Fo rum , held a ro un dtable in London on Protecting Journalists in Conflict Areas. The roundtable w as organised as a follow -up to the suggestion I m ade on 14 June 1999 that one of the w ays to protect journalists in conflict areas w ould be by clearly identifying them as m edia professionals. This proposal w as m ade after the m urder of tw o journalists in Kosovo. The roundtable w as attended by TV and radio journalists, m agazine editors, NGO s, journalism professo rs and by M artin Bell, a Brit ish MP and form er BBC reporter. The debate ended up focusing on the m ore broad aspects of protecting journalists. T he p art icipan ts agreed t hat one of th e w ays t o prot ect jou rn alists w as by ensuring that alleged killers w ould be brou ght to ju st ice either thro ugh national courts or th rough an internat ion al on e, along th e lines o f t he Int ernation al C rim inal Tribu nal fo r t he Fo rm er Yu goslavia in T he H ague. O ne o f th e exp ert s not ed that suspending m em b ersh ip in int ern atio nal o rganiz ation s of co un tries t hat harbo ur th ose kno w n to have delib erat ely killed journalist s could act as a det erren t. M ost participants oft en referred t o train ing and aw aren ess, stressin g th e im po rt ance of do ing m ore in t ho se field s and t hat so m e degree of p ro tect ion th ro ugh sim ilar m eans sh ou ld be p ro vid ed to freelancers. O n e leitm otif th ro ughou t th e round t able: edit ors n eed t o take a legal and m oral respo nsib ility for freelancers w orking in w ar zon es, providing adeq uate t rain in g an d in su ran ce. O ne o f th e w ays of d oing th is cou ld be t hrou gh est ablishin g a relevan t co nvent ion . So m e particip ant s u nd erlin ed t he n eed fo r p olitical w ill am o ng go vernm ent s t o en su re accou nt ability sin ce m ost govern m en ts had signed relevant int ernat ion al co nven tio ns. Ho w ever, oft en it w as th e go vernm en ts t hat t hreaten ed jo u rn alist s. A num ber of concrete proposals w ere also m ade, including urging m edia outlets to lo wer the num ber of correspondents sent to war zo nes and to encourage the establishm ent o f poo ls along the lines of the Sarajevo Agency Pool (SAP). The participants agreed that m ore co-operation betw een different m edia, including pooling, could help in low ering the risks for journalists. The participants agreed that this debate should continue, possibly w ith senior m ilitary officers and that editors should be encou raged to im prove training and insurance coverage, especially for freelancers. Statement at the Permanent Council

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In view of the situation w hen journalists are still targeted in the O SCE region, I w ould like to invite the O SCE m em ber States to publicly re-em phasise their co mm itm ents to relevant international conventions and to ensure that any individual and/or individuals w ho m ight have com m itted crim es against journalists are brought to justice.

Statement at the Permanent Co uncil 7 O ctober 1999 The O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media is seriously concerned by a com m entary issued on 2 O ctober by Kosovapress, a new s agency in Pristina that calls itself a “state agency.” The com m entary targeted tw o Kosovo leading independent journalists, Veton Surroi and Baton Haxhiu, referring to them as “pro-Serbian vam pires.” T he author, Merxhan Avdyli, stat es that people like Veton Surroi and Bato n H axhiu “sho uld not have a place in free Kosovo.” By using th is radical w o rd in g, th e aut ho r is tryin g to destroy dem o cracy through t he so-called “traito r sy n d ro m e .” Kosovapress accused these tw o journalists of being “Serbian spies” and dem anded that they go to The Hague Tribunal. Kosovapress also stated that “it w ould not be surprising if they [Veton Surroi and Baton Haxhiu] becom e victim s of possible and understandable revenge acts...These ordinary Mafioso should not rem ain unpunished for their crim inal acts since their idiotic behaviour only helps the leading crim inal, Slobodan Milosevic.” The Kosovo politicians w ho received help from the international com m unity should unite to fight this dangero us path to self-destruction. They all should distance them selves from this com m entary and offer an official apology to Veton Surroi and Baton Haxhiu. The international com m unity m ust also react to this hate speech. The Representative expects UNMIK to take appropriate action to ensure that Kosovo has a fair chance for a dem ocratic future. 222

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Statement at the Permanent Co uncil 20 January 2000 Today, I w ould like again to focus on South-East Europe. First of all, I w ould like to introduce this book In Defence of the Future that I edited together w ith Nenad Popovic, a prom inent Zagreb intellectual. In a w ay it is the first product of the idea of a Stability Pact. The book is published in Croatian, Germ an and English. It can therefore be read in all the post-Yugoslav regions. It includes essays by leading journalists and authors from Sarajevo, Zagreb, Belgrade, Pristina and Ljubljana. Som e of the contributors are m em bers of Group 99, a circle of w riters from South-East Europe w ho united as a result of a proposal I m ade at the Leipzig Book Fair last year. The idea behind this book is to try to avoid referring to the past, to avoid m utual accusations, to avoid the old gam e of nam e-calling, as is very com m on in this region. T he id ea is to loo k to the fu ture, to discuss and debat e w ays that can help the region prosper. The leitmotif of In Defence of the Future is sum m ed up by Zagreb w riter, Miljenko Jergovic, w ho w rites in his essay that “life w ithout neighbourliness and w ithout an ethnic m ix is not possible in the Balkans. The cultures of the peoples of the area w ere created in a constant dialogue w ith others and in being m ixed w ith others.” I hope this book w ill con tribute to reconciliatio n in Sout hEast Eu ro pe. Croatia has already voted for a new generation, for breakin g w ith its nationalist past. Now it is tim e for the others, especially Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, to choose Euro pe and not the tribalism of the previous years. Here I w ould like again to draw your attention to the continued m edia repression in the Federal Republic o f Yu g o s lav ia, sp ecifically in Se rb ia. O n 21 O ct ober 1998, in line w ith m y early w arning function, I stressed publicly that the adoption on 20 O ctober of the Serbian Law on Public Inform ation basically institutionalised a state of w ar against independent m edia. O n 23 O ctober, I raised this Law w ith the Yugoslav Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic, and four days later I m et w ith journalists from Serbia to hear their view s. Since then I have been regularly appealing to the Belgrade regim e to repeal this Law . O n 25 June 1999, I w rote to all O SCE Foreign Ministers asking them to use their influence to bring about a repeal of the Law . In 1999, as predicted, w e saw our w orst fears materialise in Serbia. The Law has been used on num erou s o ccasions to silen ce independent m edia, to p rosecute those w ho have tried to inform the public on the state of affairs in their country. Here are som e recent facts: in the first year since the Law ’s adoption, 30 m edia outlets w ere sentenced to p ay fines to talling 18 m illion dinars. O nly last m onth, Danas, Blic and Studio B w ere fined a total of 970,000 dinars for carryStatement at the Permanent Council

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ing a statem ent by the opposition party SPO . According to the Independent Associatio n o f Jo urnalists of Serbia, of it s 1,100 registered mem bers, 70 percent lost their jobs since the adoption of the Law . I can spend here hours going case after case after case. Bu t n ot o nly t his Law is b eing used to harass m ed ia. O ut right int im idat ion and sab otage are also com m on. A few days ago , un kno w n perpet rat ors d am aged t he S tudio B transm itt er o n M t. Kosm aj. As a result , th e audien ce o f th is lead ing opp osition television st ation w as h alved . Accordin g t o Studio B m anagem en t it w ill take som e t im e to fix this problem . I assum e th at t he Belgrade aut ho rit ies, if they w ere no t in vo lved in t his act of sabot age, as is b eing im plied b y t he in dep end ent m edia, w ill take act ion and bring th e perpetrat ors t o justice. I w ould also like to m ention Milosevic’s interview to Politik a given this New Ye a r’s eve. Milosevic believed that the Serbian Law on Public Inform ation had not been used “sufficiently enough.” Milosevic told Politik a that there was complete freedom of the m edia in Serbia w hile in Western countries the m edia w as controlled by the state. It seems that Milosevic is living in his ow n world, a w orld that has very little to do w ith reality. How ever, his interview w ill once again have a chilling effect on media in Serbia, and not only on those w ho consider themselves in opposition to the current regime, but also on the m edia that tries to be apolitical. Media and universit ies are the last bastions of free expression in Serbia. They are now being strangled. We have an obligation to d o something about it. I urge your countries to unite in the struggle for civility in Serbia. Without a dem ocratic Serbia one can not guarantee stability in South-East Europe. T he challenges in this region w ill dom inate the w ork of the O SCE in the year 2000.

Statement at the Permanent Co uncil 10 February 2000 I w o uld like t o draw you r at t ent io n t o t he case o f An drei Babitsky, a Russian jo urnalist w orkin g fo r Radio Liberty, w h o h as b een m issing in C hechn ya since 15 Jan uary. Ru ssian au t ho rit ies in itially d enied any kn ow ledge regard in g h is w h ereab out s. Lat er t hey con firm ed th at h e w as b ein g h eld b y th e Russian Federal Forces o n su spicio n o f bein g a m em ber of an “illegal arm ed group .” W hile t he N GO s, m edia and m y O ffice w ere dem an din g t hat An drei 224

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Bab itsky sh o u ld be released, sud d enly t he Ru ssian auth orities in form ed th e pu b lic t hat he w as “exch an ged” for tw o Ru ssian so ldiers h eld b y th e Chech ens. Russian officials insisted t hat the “exchange” w as co nd ucted w ith Ba b it s k y ’s approval. As proof, a video tape o f the alleged “exchange” had been sh ow n o n Ru ssian televisio n. O n 7 February, w e learned that tw o m ore officers, Captain Andrei O stranitse and Lieu tenant Alexander Kazako v, had b een released by t he C hechens “in exchange for Andrei Babitsky.” According to Russian officials, t hey are currently recuperating in a hospital in Mozdok. How ever, no further inform ation had been provided to the m edia. A journalist and a citizen is being turned over to a group of people w ho the Ru ssian government only refers to as “bandits.” T his is being done secretly, w ith no law yers or hum an rights groups present. To add farce to tragedy, the State Prosecu tor is no w dem and ing that Andrei Babitsky sho uld report to his O ffice. If he fails to do so an arrest w arrant w ill be issued by the Prosecutor. O n tw o occasions I asked Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov, for clarifications: on 27 January and on 7 February. I have spoken p ublicly regarding this case, both in Austria and Germ any. I am still w aiting for an official reply from Minister Ivanov and w ith surprise I read the Minister’s com m ents of 8 February that “Babitsky’s problem s should not be overestim ated.” I h ave asked th e Ru ssian Foreign Min ister t o p ro du ce con crete in form at ion on Bab itsky by yesterd ay. A nu m ber of in divid uals an d organ iz at ion s h ad asked m e t o do so since t hey fear t h at And rei Bab it sky m igh t n o lo n ger be alive. I gave a dead lin e an d it p assed , n ow I h ave t o t ake fu rt her act ion . O n e o f th e few st eps I can take is to in crease int ern at io nal p u blic aw aren ess of t his case. I w ill co nt in ue p ublicly raisin g And rei Bab it sky’s plight if w e d o n ot get co ncret e info rm at ion . Radio Liberty inform ed m y O ffice of som e w orrying details: • They had been sold a tape that show s Babit sky alive, although looking somew hat uneasy, on, allegedly, 6 February. The tape is currently being review ed by Radio Liberty law yers. • Th ere are repo rt s t hat he h ad b een seen , badly b eaten, in Gu derm es o n 7 February. T here are also rep orts in t he Ru ssian m edia th at Bab itsky m igh t act ually be h eld by a C hechen co m m and er. H ow ever, t hese rep orts w ere not con firm ed by Ch echen President Aslan Maskh ado v. T he saga o f An drei Babitsky is gettin g m ore co m plicat ed an d co nt rad ict o ry, n ot only w it h every day bu t w ith every h our. That is w hy I u rge the Russian Governm ent to answ er just one question – a question that had been w orrying the w orld public for w eeks – w here is Andrei Babitsky? Statement at the Permanent Council

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Repo rt to the Standing Co mmittee o f the O SCE Parliamentary Assembly 13 January 2000 Durin g the m eeting w e h ad at t he Istan bu l Sum m it, th e President o f the O SCE Parliam entary Assem bly, Helle Degn, had asked m y O ffice to present to you today so me thought s and findings of m y O ffice on the dram atic sit uation of the m edia w hen O SCE m em ber States are involved in m ilitary activities. She asked us to m ake som e com m ents on the Kosovo crisis and on the ongoing w ar in Chechnya. First o f all, I wo uld like to m ake some general remarks on dem ocracies going to w ar. A dem ocracy has to overcom e the age-old saying that truth is the first victim of w ar. Regarding m edia freedom and access for journalists, all O SCE m em ber States have com m itted them selves to providing a fair and free environm ent for journalists. Dem ocracies at w ar are in an entirely different situation than authoritarian dictatorships. Soviet citizens w ho w ere critical of their country’s invasion of Czechoslovakia or Afghanistan often ended in prison or in a psychiatric w ard. The first dem ocrat w h o during a terrible w ar po inted out this difference very clearly w as Winston C hurchill in his speeches to the Brit ish Parliam ent in the early forties. Throughout t he last century, the citizens of the leading Western democracies w ere confronted w ith this entirely different situation as com pared to w ar reporting in no n-democracies. A critical journalist, or any citizen critical of t he p olicies of his governm ent, in any democracy canno t be labelled as a “t raitor.” H ow eve r, even in a dem ocracy a journalist can become the target of a government attack as has happened to John Simpson from the BBC during the NATO cam paign against the Federal Republic of Yu goslavia. British Prim e Minister Tony Blair told the House of Commons that Simpson’s reports “w ere compiled under the instruction and guidance of the Serbian authorities.” NATO spokesman Jam ie Shea once referred to the cam paign against FRY as the first “media w ar” and to journalists as “soldiers in this w ar.” This is a positio n t hat I cannot accept. There is a history to dem ocracies going to w ar. The British dem ocracy already had to deal w ith this challenge during the Boer War at the turn of last century. The French dem ocracy experienced this during the Algerian War, the United States had to face this sam e challenge of public scrutiny and criticism during the Vietnam War. I am m aking these general historical rem arks because these m entioned countries today are m em bers of the O SCE. The function of m y O ffice, am ong o thers, is no t to judge w hatever m ilitary d ecisions are m ade but t o co ncentrat e on potential repercussions to m edia freedom . 226

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To continue on the subject of FRY, already in the early nineties foreign corespondents had difficulty w orking in that country, especially w hen there w as a discussion during the Bosnian w ar that NATO m ight attack Belgrade. I w ould like to st ress, that adeq uate w orking co nditions for foreign journalists w ere o ne of the central points of the “third basket” of the Helsinki Final Act. We d o have am ple p ro of th at m o st governm en t-con trolled m edia in FRY, especially RT S, w ere used as propagand a m achines by t he regim e. T his became even clearer aft er th e ado p tion of t he Serbian Law o n Pub lic In form atio n in O ctob er 1998. N AT O ’s situ ation w as entirely differen t. Brussels h ad to deal w ith jo urn alist s w h o co uld d o th eir ow n research and d ecide t hem selves o n how to info rm the public. Mo st of w hat the NATO spokespersons adm itted and w hat t hey d enied w as a direct con sequen ce o f dem ocracies goin g to w ar. NAT O ’s m istakes w ere p ublic relat io ns m istakes of spo kesp erson s w h o t hem selves w ere no t adeq uately in form ed. Som et imes, these m ist akes, as w e have learned recent ly, w ere very serious on es. Th e sp o kesperson s in reality o ft en kn ew less th an th ey could adm it an d even less th an so m e jo urnalists. Som e of t hese issu es are still bein g d ebated pub licly. O n ly recen tly, NATO ad m itt ed to sp eedin g up a tape t hat show ed o ne o f its plan es m istaken ly att ackin g a train . Th is ad m itt an ce is proo f th at NATO , as an o rganizatio n o f dem ocracies, has t o be op en an d h as to ad m it its m istakes. Since all NATO m em bers at the sam e tim e also belong to the O SCE, I had to intervene on one occasion – after the m issile attack against RTS in Belgrade last April. I publicly voiced m y concerns and sent a letter to Xavier Solana, NATO Secretary-General at that tim e. I never received a reply. After m y public statem ent, there w ere som e critical com m ents m ade, but I take it that the decision to bom b a television station, housing journalists, by the leading dem ocracies of the O SCE is an issue w hich concerns m y O ffice. There is no dou bt, and I stressed that in April, that not only during w artime this station and its journalists w ere used as a propaganda instrum ent by the Milosevic regim e. But to d estro y a m edia bu ilding and to kill and aim at m edia w orkers under the pretext th at they are part o f the w ar-m achine could have, am o ng other things, resulted in considerable repercussions for foreign journalists wo rking in Belgrade. They could have been considered as belligerents and treated a cco r d in gly. O n 23 Ap ril 1999, sixteen m edia w orkers from RT S lost their lives. Dem ocracies, even at w ar, m ust alw ays accept and follow their basic internatio nal com m itm ents. Th ey are and they w ill rem ain the exam ple others use, or m isuse, w hen they go to w ar. T he corrective funct ion of the NGO s on t his m att er is param ount: The International Press Institu te published an imp ortant report The Kosovo N ews and Propaganda War, w ith texts w ritten b y journalists and experts from over t wo dozen Report to the Standing Committee of the O SCE Parliamentary Assembly

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cou nt ries. Its m ain theme is expressed by Peter Goff from IPI in the book’s introd uction: “T he w ar w as pu nctuat ed w ith accusat ions, both from th e m edia and against the m edia. Claim s of censorship, propaganda purveying, distorted and suppressed inform ation w ere m et by allegations of m edia treason, sensationalist reporting, cheerleading and appeasing.” This year Austria is heading our organization. That is w hy I w ould like to refer to so me tho ughts by Gerfried Sperl, Edit or-in-Chief of D er Standard, in the IPI book. Sperl w rote about discussions and even confrontations betw een journalists in Austria regarding the NATO action against FRY. The key w ord here is “discussion,” som ething that can only happen in a dem ocracy. A few w o rds on t he recent fighting in Chechnya. My O ffice has tried to follow the m edia aspects of this m ilitary operat ion as closely as one is able to from Vienna. I w as aw are of the difficulties facing local and foreign journalists trying to cover this conflict, of the generally unanim ous po sition of support of t he action taken by the Russian governm ent by the m ost influential m edia in the country. Initially, there w as a danger that the m edia m ight becom e part of a cam paign again st non-Russian m in orities in Ru ssia. As far as w e know, th is d id not happen. How ever, there is still a danger of anti-Russian propaganda m aterialising in the Caucuses as a result of this w ar. So me of these issues I have raised w ith the Russian governm ent. Related to the challenges of w ar is protection of journalists in conflict areas. After the m urder o f tw o journalists in Kosovo in June 1999, I suggested th at o ne w ay to provide journalists w ith additional prot ectio n could be by clearly identifying them as m edia professio nals. In Septem ber m y O ffice, together w ith Freedom Forum, an Am erican non-governmental organization, held a roundtable on this issue. I plan to continue t his discussion in 2000 and I urge O SCE participatin g States t o play a m ore active role in ensuring the safety an d security of journalists in conflict areas. I also w ould like to invite senior m ilitary officers to this debate. The im portance of this issue could no t be underestim ated, especially since last year w e had m o re arm ed conflicts in the O SCE regio n than in 1998. In D ecem ber I in tervened w ith the Russian authorities on behalf of a group of journalists w orking from Grozny w ho w ere unable to leave the city. In the end they m ade it out safely. Not all m edia professionals have been so lucky. Since the start of m ilitary activities in Chechnya, three journalists died as a result of the fighting. Their nam es were added to an already long list of reporters killed in 1999. This list is m uch longer than in 1998 and it us also up to us to ensure that in the year 2000 no m ore journalists w ill pay w ith their life for the right to do their job. I urge you to assist us in this noble endeavour. O ne o f the m ajo r issues th at co ncerns parliam ent arian s directly is in creased m ed ia repression in th e Federal Republic o f Yu g o s la v ia, specifically in S e rb i a. O n 21 O ctober 1998, in line w ith m y early w arning function, 228

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I stressed publicly that the adoption on 20 O ctober of the already m entioned Serbian Law on Public Inform ation basically institutionalised a state of w ar against independent m ed ia. O n 23 O ctober, I raised this law w ith the Yu go s la v Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic, and four days later I m et w ith journalists from Serbia to hear their view s. Since then I have been regularly appealing to the Belgrade regim e to repeal this law . O n 25 June 1999, I w rote to all O SCE Foreign Ministers asking them to use their influence to bring about a repeal of the law. In 1999, as predicted, w e saw ou r w orst fears m aterialise in Serbia. T he law has been used on num erous occasions to silence independent m edia, to prosecute those w ho have tried to inform the public on the state of affairs in their country. Recently I read Milocevic’s interview to Politika given this New Year’s eve. Milosevic believes that the law has not been used “sufficiently enough.” He also said that there w as com plete freedom of the m edia in Serbia w hile in Western countries the m edia is controlled by the state. O verall, Milocevic’s interview w ill once again have a chilling effect on m edia in Serbia, and not only on those w ho consider themselves in opposition to the current regim e. I w ould like to use this opportunity to appeal to your parliam ents to use their influence to try to p ersuad e Belgrade to repeal this d racon ian law . If Yu go s la v ia ever plans to becom e truly a part of Europe, this law should be abolished. I am also concerned for the fate of Flora Brovina, a Kosovo Albanian doctor and w r it e r, sentenced recently in Serb ia to 12 years in prison. Her case is yet another indication of the state of repression in FRY. Som e other points I w ould like to m ake today. Although, in general, I have not focused on the role of the m edia during election cam paigns, how ever the recent elections to the State Dum a (Parliam ent) in Russia have set a w orrying precedent that I hope w ill not be repeated during the March 2000 presidential elections. According to the prelim inary findings by the European Institute for the Media, the coverage of the elections in the m ost im portant sections of the Russian m edia w as biased. The Institute believes that this election cam paign in the m edia w as considerably w orse than during the previous parliam entary elect ions in 1995. Som e jo urnalists in th eir at tacks against th eir political op ponents lacked professionalism and even taste and often w ere slanderous and libello us. This has also been stressed by t he International Election O b servation Mission. Am ong other things, the Mission underlined that com m ercial m edia conglom erates have absorbed m uch of the independent m edia and have become m ajor st ockholders in the st ate-controlled m ed ia. I am aware that many Russian journalists and experts share this view . I hope that the discrepancies of the Decem ber 1999 elections w ill be avoided during the presidential ones. M an y of us have applaud ed the 3 January elect ions in C ro a t ia that have led the Croatian O pposition to victory. I had intervened w ith the outgoing governm ent on m any occasions defending free m edia, often to no avail. I believe Report to the Standing Committee of the O SCE Parliamentary Assembly

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that the change of governm ent gives independent m edia a new chance in Croatia and m y heart today is w ith those journalists in Zagreb, Split, Rijeka, and other Croatian cities and tow ns w ho have over the past years not yielded to pressure from the HDZ and continued to defend civility above ethnicity. I believe that the latest good new s from Croatia w ill breathe new life into the stale environm ents that w e often find in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. My O ffice has also closely follow ed the latest developm ents in Ko s o v o . My m ajor co ncerns tod ay are cases of hate speech t hat have been recorded by international observers in the region. O ne of these cases I highlighted on 6 O cto ber in a statem ent to the Perm anent Council. Hate speech in itself is an abuse of freedom of expression and is becom ing a problem for the future of Kosovo and I w ill continue to w atch closely the situation there, and, w hen necessary, intervene on behalf of journalists and in line w ith m y m andate, like I do throughout the O SCE region. O ne of the countries w e have fo cused extensively o n in 1999 w as U k ra in e. In early Decem ber, m y O ffice together w ith the Council of Europe conducted a rou ndtable in Kyiv o n Ukrainian libel legislation. The m isuse of libel suits has been identified by m y O ffice as one of t he m ain m edia problem s. Based on t his roundtable, w e issued specific recom m endations to the Ukrainian authorities, stressing that there is a need to properly im plem en t existing law s and to adhere to Ukraineâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s international com m itm ents. We have also intervened w ith the Ukrainian Governm ent on a num ber of occasions w hen m edia w ere attacked eith er by the central Governm en t, or, w hich is m o re com m on, by local authorities. This w eek m y office received a call from Irina H ro l, Editor of the Crim ean daily, Chernomorskaya Z arya. Her new spaper has been under a continuing on slaught from the local adm inistration. Despite my intervention on her behalf w ith the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry and the O ffice of the President, the onslaught continues. Here I w ould like to appeal to the Ukrainian Parliam ent to try to protect this courageous w om an and her new spaper from a cam paign of harassm ent w aged by the local authorities. Be la ru s h as also b een o n o ur agen da in 1999. With out going in to all th e details regardin g ou r activities in t his O SCE Part icipat ing St ate, w e have provid ed th e O SCE an d t he Go vern m ent in M in sk expertise on m edia-relat ed issu es in th e co nt ext of th e preparatio n o f parliam ent ary election s th is year. We h ave to stat e, ho w ever, th at n o progress has been m ade o n t he revisio n o f th e m edia law and on the transform atio n stat e m edia into p ublic m edia. I w ould like to stress o u r con cern w it h t he ab u se of libel law s and w it h t he d e facto censorship th ro ugh w arn in gs issued acco rd ing to t he Belarus Press Law . It is also w o rryin g th at last year app ro xim at ely 30 ind epen dent n ew spap ers h ave closed do w n du e to econ om ic d ifficult ies an d harassm en t by t he stat e. Th ere is an increased risk of self-cen sorsh ip b y th ose ind ependent m edia still 230

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operat in g b ecause of fear of b eing closed d ow n just b efore th e electio ns, sho uld t hey t ake place. We have been extrem ely active in Central Asia during the past year. I w ant to point out specifically our initiative, w orking closely w ith the O SCE Centre in Bishkek, to h ost, along w it h the Go vern m ent of Kyrgyzstan, a regional conference on the Media in Central Asia. We are grateful, too, for the financial assistance of the United States and Norw ay w hich enabled journalists from four of the five Central Asian countries to attend the tw o-day sem inar. Unfortunately, the delegation from Turkmenistan w as unable to attend. It soon becam e clear that this regional approach reaped significant dividends in encouraging a dialogue, heretofore absent , betw een jo urnalists of t he C entral Asian n ations. We advocated, from the beginning of this initiat ive, that a sim ilar conference be held on an annual basis in different Central Asian nations. We hope, based on prelim inary indications, that the second annual conference on Media in Central Asia w ill be held in the fall of this year in either Kazakstan or Tajikistan. Fin a lly, w e w ill soon be approaching selected O SCE states for voluntary contributions to w hat w e call our Media Fund for Central Asia. It has becom e apparent to us that sm all am ounts of m oney, carefully targeted to sustain the struggling ind ependent media in Central Asia, can go far in assuring the survival of financially troubled m edia. O ften, som ething like $3,000 or $5,000 to purchase paper stock, printing ink, or a com puter or tw o can spell the difference betw een survival or the dem ise of an independent m edia outlet. We w ould w ork closely w ith the O SCE Centres in Central Asia in identifying w orthy recipients and m oving the funds to them as quickly as possible.

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Repo rt to the O SCE Review Co nference o f 1 O cto ber 1999 From Freimut Duve, O SCE Representative on Freedom of the M edia Structural Censorship Some observations concern ing structural censorship efforts w ithin the OSCE area. It is clear that the conditions under w hich journalistic freedom can contribute to the dem ocracy of the country differ dram atically in the w orld of the O SCE. Conditions in Western Europe and in North Am erica are m uch easier com pared to those in other regions. The post -socialist and post-comm unist dem ocracies face a num ber of pro blem s and conditions w hich m ake free journalism a m uch m ore com plex challenge than m ost of us celebrating the original Glasnost period had expected. Direct govern m ent pressure on free m edia is still apparent in so m e areas. And, of course, w e still, unfortunately, have the occasional new spaper closed by a governm ent edict, w e have the occasional cases of police harassm ent or vio lence directed against journalists as w ell as cases of journalists in prison. My O ffice has intervened again and again. We have had som e fruitful discussions w ith responsive governm ents, and w e have noted som e signs of progress. H o w e v e r, th rougho ut o ur w o rk in 1998 an d 1999, w e foun d a w h ole set of unexpected form s of in direct pressure on m edia freedom related to the econo m ic and political structures of the past. I call this t he elem en ts of s t ru c t u ra l ce nso rship. These indirect struct ural pressures can be as nefariou s and h arm fu l t o free jo urnalism as direct repressio n. Unfortu nat ely, th ere is a lack o f th orough research an d academ ic stu dy of t his eco no m ic and p o litical reality w h ich affects n ot o nly m ed ia, b ut oth er fields as w ell. Alt ho ugh t hese ind irect structural pressu res are not nearly as dram atic as violence or h eavy-handed governm en t repression , they can som etim es be just as effect ive in killing jo urnalistic freed o m . We n eed, all o f us, to fin d answ ers to t hese struct ural deficien cies. Government-controlled and subsidised media have a readily available source of econom ic survival; independent m edia do not. We have identified at least five different instrum ents in the hands of com m unal, regional or state adm inistration, w hich enable them to exercise control over the functions of the m edia: • The governm ent has a m onopoly on new sprint; • The governm ent controls the im port of the paper stock; • The raising or low ering o f rent for office prem ises ow ned by the m unicipality; • The indirect control of distribution through m onopolistic control; • Governm ent-controlled business advertises only in “friendly” m edia, and w ithholds advertising from independent or opposition m edia. 232

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All these instruments w ould not have their radical effect in boom ing econom ies, but in poor econom ic situations and an extrem ely w eak print m edia m arket, these instrum ents have a significant effect, making it even m ore difficult for the independent m edia to survive econom ically. Besid es t hese in st ru m ent s, w e face an o t her serio u s p roblem w h ich can n ot b e called “cen sorsh ip.” It is, h ow ever, a m ain so u rce of con cern fo r m y O ffice: go vernm ent officials w ho again and again avail t hem selves o f ill-co nceived jud icial st atut es regardin g libe l and defam atio n . Po litician s are u su ally n o t at tacked by th e m edia as person s b ut as t h ose resp o n sib le for th e m o st im p o rt ant inst it utio ns of t heir co un t ries. T hey m u st th erefo re accept criticism for th e w ork w h ich th ey w ere elect ed t o p erform . C o nsid erin g on a legal b asis all pu blic crit icism as “person al insult s” m ean s n ot hin g else th an : to d est ro y th e basic fun ct ion of pu blic crit icism of an y go vernm en t act ion . Und er t hese circu m st ances, t he seco nd m ain ro le o f th e m edia, t h e “correct ive fu nction” to all im p ortant go vernm ent or business decisions affect ing th e fu tu re o f th e citiz ens of a cit y, a regio n , o r of an en tire cou nt ry, is in dan ger of b ein g silen ced. My O ffice encoun t ered m an y exam ples of th is silen cin g o f the “corrective functio n” of t he m ed ia th ro ugh the personal m isuse o f libel law s, b o th civil and crim inal. And, of course, a string of expensive libel suits by governm ent officials against free m edia outlet s can b ankrup t an enterprise, and the threat of im p risonm ent, w hether carried out or not, for crim inal defam ation can have a chilling effect on journalistic integrity and foster self-censorship. Given the extent of this problem , m y O ffice intends to organise next year a m eeting focusing on freedom of m edia and libel and defam ation. Let m e now pass on to some economic aspects regarding the independence of the m edia. A h igh VAT tax, im po sed on the ind ependent m edia based on the argum ent of econom ic fairness can bankrupt media w hich exist on th e bord erlines of econom ic survival. T he p resence of b usiness m onopo lies w hich control t he m ed ia clearly lim its the possibilities of m ed ia freed om . None of th ese elem ents is illegal, or against the law , and, often the law , w hether fair or not, is w hat offers the cam ouflage and protection for this indirect pressure on the m edia. But the real question is w hat w e, w hat anyone, can do to redress these im perfections w hich th reaten a p luralistic m edia environm ent and t he public’s right both to know and to choose am ong alternatives. O ne solution is to rely on the hope that the econom ies of the new ly em erging dem ocracies in our O SCE fam ily w ill gradually im prove. Western econom ists are fond of saying that “a rising tide lifts all boats,” that in a flourishing econom y there w ill be m ore m oney for advertising, m ore m oney to start up m edia outlets, everyone w ill benefit. Report to the O SCE Review Conference

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I am certain that, for the m edia industry, there m ay be som e truth in this nostalgic m arket dream . But for the journalistic role of the m edia as an indispensable corollary to dem ocratic and legal developm ent of an open society, these hopes are not enough to safeguard dem ocracy in its m ost crucial period of developm ent now . A period w hich in som e countries is m arked by a deteriorating econom y, at least over the short run. The task, it seem s to m e, is for the international com m unity, and here I include t he O SCE, to provide carefully d irected econ om ic assist ance to redress som e of the structural im balances w hich threaten freedom of expression and w eaken dem ocracy. O bviou sly, neither m y O ffice nor the O SCE as a w hole, has sufficient funding to deal w ith som e of these deficiencies. But there are w ays to start, actions w hich governm ents can take t o better the chances for econom ic survival of the threatened independent m edia: â&#x20AC;˘ I urge all governm ents w hich still im pose VAT taxes on the m edia to abolish or reduce this tax. I am , of course, aw are of the fairness argum ent, that everyone pays a VAT tax, and abolishing it for the m edia only w ould m ean to put the m edia in a favoured position. But quite a few countries have reduced or abolished VAT tax for m edia know ing that this is an indirect econom ic help to free journalism . â&#x20AC;˘ Governm ent officials need to restrain from continuing libel actions for large am ounts of m oney against the independent m edia, w hich do not have the funds to continue to com bat these legalistic assaults. My O ffice inten ds to do w hat it can to see that the libel penalties sought are reasonable and com m ensurate to the offences . My O ffice h as in itiat ed a p ro ject to d eal w ith t hese st ruct u ral deficien cies o n a m icro -econ o m ic level. Alth ou gh w e are no t a fu n din g elem en t , w e h ave, fo r t he first tim e, requ est ed a m o d est increase in o ur bu dget t o p ro vid e eco no m ic assist an ce t o st ruggling m ed ia, particu larly in Cen t ral Asia. T h is Med ia Fu n d fo r C en tral Asia, as w e call it, is pat t ern ed aft er an in it iat ive o f on e of ou r O SC E Cen t res in C ent ral Asia w h ich p rovid ed fu nd s fo r n ew sp rin t an d p ap er fo r an alread y existin g, bu t eco no m ically th reat en ed n e w s p a p e r. In th is con text, I w o uld also like t o m en tion th at m y O ffice h as set u p tw o schoo l new spapers in Kazachstan an d Usbekistan w it h t he financial sup po rt o f a privat e d on o r. Finally, I w ould like to address the industrial cro ss-o w nership o f media. The econ om ic sit uatio n o f the m edia prod uces an other problem at ic effect : seeking capital investm ent the m edia often end in the open arm s of big business w hich has the needed capital. Today, w e are confronted w ith a situation 234

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in a num ber of O SCE m em ber States , w here one or tw o pow erful econom ic conglom erates ow n m ost of the m edia and partly use it to prom ote their ow n int erests. Th ere is n ot hin g apparently illegal, bu t it clearly restrains altern ative view points from being discussed. O ne w ay to deal w ith this em erging phenom enon is for legislative bodies to pass law s against it. This w as done earlier in Turkey w here a com pany that ow ns m edia outlets is not allow ed to take part in public tenders. Ano ther w ay of dealing w it h t his prob lem is t hrou gh en couragin g foreign in vestm ent . W hile o ne u nd erst an ds that fo reign o w n ers m ay in fluen ce d iscussion s in a co un try w h ere they do n ot live an d o ne d oes prefer t hat local en trepren eurs o w n local m edia, th ere are som e p ositive exam p les. C ountries need t o at tract fo reign in vest m ent into the m edia, in vestm en ts that are m arket-orient ed bu t non -po litical. O ne p ositive exam p le is Bu lgaria w h ere foreign -o w n ed new spapers d om in ate the m arket, bu t th ere is no in terference in ed itorial po licy. Th is is cert ainly o ne w ay to com p ete w ith the local m ed ia m o n o p o lie s . These are only som e of the issues of indirect econom ic repression w hich have a negative effect on the developm ent of free m edia in the new ly-em erging dem ocracies.

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2. Pro jects 1999/ 2000

2.1 Pro tectio n o f Jo urnalists Ro un dtable o rgan is ed by th e O SCE Re pre se ntative o n Fre edo m o f the M e dia and ho s te d by Fre e do m Fo rum Euro pe an Cen tre in Lo ndo n , 2 2 Se ptem be r 19 9 9.

“In Bosnia p eop le on the Serb sid e w ould very often hold you resp onsible for the a ctions of your ow n governm ent.” - G eorge Eykyn, BBC C orresp ond ent “Ed itors ca n get together to d iscuss things like p a p a ra z z i or p riva cy. But for som e rea son they ap p arent ly ca n’t g et together on the issue of the sa fety of their ow n sta ff.” - C olin Bicker, Lecturer (Both quotes a re from the Freed om Forum Sem ina r on Journa lism Sa fety held on 2 6 Sep tem ber 1 9 9 7 )

The roundtable w as organised as a follow -up to the proposal m ade on 14 June 1999 by Freimut D uve, the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, suggesting that one of the w ays to protect journalists in conflict areas w ould be by clearly identifying them as m edia professionals. A sym bol co uld b e developed that w ould act as a ‘Sign of Prot ection’ for jou rnalists, just as the Red Cross signifies to the m ilitary a medical facility. T his pro posal w as m ade after the murder of tw o journalists from Stern Magazine in Kosovo. The roundtable w as attend ed by TV and radio journalists, magazine editors, NGO s, journalism p rofessors. What w as om inous w as that the print med ia had been only represented by the editor of the Guardian. Jo hn O w en , Freedom Forum Euro pean Director, pointed out that protectio n of journalists w as an issue that the print m edia avoided discussing publicly. The deb ate ended u p focusing on the m ore broad aspects of prot ecting journalists then just the ‘Sign of Protection.’ The sign itself w as fully supported by Reportiers san frontiers (RSF), how ever, other NGO s and journalists w ere either sceptical o r n on -com m ittal regarding th is p ro posal. Alex andre Levy from RSF 236

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stressed that his organization w ould be “happy” to w ork together w ith the O SCE on the design of the sign and that they saw the sign as a w ay of preventing “som e authorities from saying that they did not know that the killed person w as a journalist.” The participants seem ed to agree that one of the w ays to protect journalists w as by ensuring that alleged killers w ould be brought to justice either through national courts or through an international one, along the lines of the Internation al Crim inal Tribun al for the Form er Yugoslavia in The Hague. Jo h n O w en noted that suspending m em bership in international organizations of countries that harbour those that w ere kno w n to have delib erately killed journalists could act as a deterrent. M artin Bell, Brit ish MP and form er BBC Re p o r t e r, stressed that there w ere already num erous security m easures in place for journalists, including body arm our and special trainin g. He saw som e potential in lo w ering t he num ber of reporters covering w ar-zones (tw o BBC reporters in Sarajevo in 1995 as com pared to 19 in Kosovo in 1999) and through establishing pools along the lines of the Sarajevo Agency Pool (SAP). Som e participants agreed that m ore co-operation betw een different m edia, including pooling, could help. Mario D ietrichs, Deputy Foreign Editor for Stern, w as opposed to the sign saying that this w ould not have helped his m urdered colleagues in Kosovo. In his view, journalist s w ere safer w hen they w ere no t recognised. Andrew Kain (BBC Trainer) suggested that som e journalists m ight w ear a sign that could be “flipped on or off” w henever they saw a need for that. Most participants often referred to training and aw areness, stressing the im portance of doing m ore in those fields and that som e degree of protection through sim ilar m eans should be provided also to freelancers. O ne leitmotif throughout the roundtable: editors need to take a legal and m oral responsibility for freelancers w orking in w ar zo nes, providing ad equate training and insurance. O ne of the w ays of doing this could be through establishing a relevant convention. Malco lm Smart, Article 19 Deputy Director, noted that he supported the m otive for th e sign, how ever, in referen ce to the Red C ro ss, he und erlined that even it had been devalued by the internal nature of the current conflicts. In his v ie w, often danger to jou rnalists cam e from go vern m ents. Sm a rt also believed that the sign m ight lead to som e form of control of journalists. O n a num ber of o ccasions, Fre im u t D u v e asked th at w hat if th e m urder of a journalist w o uld be sp ecifically d efined as a w ar crim e, w o uld t hat offer m ore prot ectio n? So me p art icipants believed t hat this an gle w as w o rt h p ursuing and that relevant case law w as currently being developed in Ko sovo. O ne rep resen tative said th at future accountab ility co uld act as a deterrent . A num b er o f jo urnalists (Mario D ietrichs, An th o ny Bo rde n) disagreed. Sm a rt Projects 1999/2000

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b elieved that accountab ility co uld o nly b e ensured t hrou gh political w ill since m o s t governments had signed relevant international conventions. In D ie trich s ’ vie w, the accountability of individuals for comm itted crim es had often been sacrificed for p olitical purposes, such as, for exam ple, national reconciliation. D u v e count ered th at crim es again st jo urnalists “shou ld not b e pushed under the carpet of reconciliation.” Both Bell and Smart stressed that there w as also a m oral question in this d iscussio n: should jo urnalists have a higher level of protection than other civilian s? So me other questions raised during the debate: co uld international peacekeepers do m ore to prot ect jou rnalists in w ar zones? Was the issuance of presscards m ore a form of control then protection? Tw o w ritten papers w ere provided at the roundtable: by Aidan White, General Secretary of the International Federation of Journalists, and by Ahmad Faw zi, the Director of the United Nations Inform ation Centre in London. White underlined the opposition of his organization to the ‘Sign of Protection’ stressing, am ong other things, the “political” nature of such a debate. Faw zi suggested that the UN Secretary-General could, for exam ple, subm it a report to t he Security Council (along t he lines of the 8 Septem ber Rep ort on The Protection of Civilians in Arm ed Conflict), specifically on the question of protection of journalists and to ask the Council to propose to the General Assem bly to adopt a resolution on this question. Freimut D uve w ill continue this discussion in 2000.

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2 . 2 The Media in Central Asia: The Present and Future

Con ference o n 25-27 O cto ber, 1999 o rganized in co -operation w ith the OSCE Centre in Bishkek and the Government of Kyrgyzstan This conference w as the first regional meeting of the representatives of the media in Central Asia. Held through t he joint effort s of the O SCE Representative on Freed om of t he Media, t he O SCE Centre in Bishkek, the Union of Journalist s o f the Kyrgyz Republic, and the Governm ent of Kyrgyzstan, the conference brought to geth er over eighty journalists from fou r of the five C entral Asian Republics to discuss am on g them selves the current status and future prognosis of the m edia in Central Asia. O nly the Tu rkm en istan delegat ion failed to show. D iscussions, follow ing p anelistsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; view s from representat ives of the at tendin g coun tries, centered around a series o f topics w hich includ ed: freedom of the press as a fundam ental hum an right; problem s of safeguarding rights of journalists in Central Asian stat es; legislat ion and practice of m edia in Cen tral Asia and their conform ity w ith the principles of freedom of speech; m ass m edia in co nflict situations; p roblem s of access to inform ation ; role of independent jo urnalist unions and associations in safeguarding rights of m edia representatives; and principles of professional co-operation. It becam e apparent early on in t he conference that this regio nal approach, despite the stark differences in the development of the media scene in the different Central Asian countries, lent t he p articipants a unique opportunity t o exchange view s w ith their colleagues from neighbouring countries. In fact , the differences in the progress of freedom of the media from state to state w ere a m ajor issue o f discussion. Host country Kyrgyzstan, the Central Asian country that enjoys the mo st m edia freedom , w as an appropriate host for this conference. The O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media proposed that such a conference be h eld on an annual basis and th at the venu e shou ld rotat e am ong participating Central Asian states. This suggestion w as strongly endorsed and the Second Annual Conference on the Media in Central Asia is scheduled to take place later in 2000 in one of the Central Asian republics. O fficial representatives of Kyrgyz, Kazakh and Tajik inform ation agencies signed an Agreem ent on Co-operation and Free of Charge Exchange of Materials. It is hoped that the Uzbek governm ent new s agency w ould join such an agreem ent. There is clearly a lack of inform atio n in the Cen tral Asian cou nt ries abo ut w hat is going on in their neighbouring nations; such an exchange of inform ation, hopefully leading to the prospect of a Central Asian New s Agency, is a beneficial m ove tow ard increased sharing of inform ation on a regional basis. Projects 1999/2000

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2.3 Scho o l New spapers in Central Asia

The following report is from Christian Kolb (Junge Presse N ordrhein-W estfalen Landesarbeitsgemeinschaft junger M edienschaffender). Uzbekistan - The students. The student s at Tashken t International House are great ly int erested in our project. Altogether, 42 took part in our m edia training. The school is attended predom inantly by the children of w ealthy parents. Nevertheless, the studentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; ability to criticize shortcom ings is not very conspicuous. Since this point is very im portant for successful and independent w ork on a student new spaper, w e have m ade an effort to im part to the students som e grasp o f the social aspect s of such w ork in addition to technical know ledge. The ability of the stu dents to absorb linguistic and substantive material is very good. At t he b egin ning o f the sem inar, many student s w ere quite uncertain as to how far they w ould be perm itted to express their ow n opinion. This sit uation changed in the course of the program m e. Individual initiative and active co-operation on the part of the students increased. Uzbekistan - The scho o l administratio n. The school adm inistration also show ed great interest in our project. We w ere given com plete support, particularly at the technical level. At the personal level also, w e w ere treated in a friendly and co-operative m anner. Media training represented the focal point of school life during this w eek. Nevertheless, o n a numb er of occasions the Director att em pted to influence the content of the new spaper. During our presence, how ever, after attention had been draw n to the agreem ent w ith the O SCE, these attem pts w ere fully abandoned. O n the other hand, according to inform ation available to us, attem pts are b eing m ade to rep lace the elect ed Chief Ed itor by an ot her person. We shall continue to rem ain in contact w ith the editorial office in order to see to it that these designs are not carried out. Uzbekistan - The equipment. The school is relatively poorly equipped from the technical point of view . Nevertheless, thanks to the support of the school m anagem ent, it w as possible to operate t he O SC E co mputer as w ell as an overhead projector. It w as possib le to use the com pu ter ro om (DO S) belonging to t he school for w ork on articles. The equipm ent provided by the FES is in line w ith the 240

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requirem ents of the editorial office and is capable of being fully exploited. It w ould be better if the softw are w ere not only pre-installed but also delivered as an installation version, together w ith m anuals. As earlier planned, it w as possible to use the laser printer to produce high-quality copies. System atic printing of the new spaper m akes no sense for reasons of cost. Uzbekistan - Co -o peratio n w ith FES. The FES collected us from the airport and assigned a student to us as an interp reter-t ra n sla t o r. We w ere extremely satisfied w ith the professional skills and dedication of the interpreter. O ur accom m odation w as located at a considerable distance from the cen tre of tow n. Without question, the long tim e spent in com m uting could have been put to b etter use. We gained the im pression that the FES w as already very busy w ith m any o ther projects and that, accordingly, our com mon project could not alw ays be supported to the extent that w ould have been appropriate. U zbe kis tan - Pro spe cts . T he sem in ar an d t he first ed it ion o f t h e n ew sp aper deserve very h igh praise. It w as p ossib le t o p art ially finan ce t he m agazin e th ro ugh ad vert isin g an d t o fin d a co p y sh o p in t h e vicin ity o f th e scho ol t h at w as w illin g t o rep rod u ce th e m agaz ine at relat ively lo w co st . Con sidering th e m ed ia skills acquired d uring th e sem in ar and also th e ind ivid u al in it iat ive o f a nu m b er o f st ud ent s, it m ay b e assu m ed th at t h e ed itorial office w ill con tin ue t o pub lish t h e m agaz ine in th e fut ure. In t he n ext few m on th s, su p p o rt sh o uld be m ad e available t o t h e edit o rial o ffice, as plan n ed , to help w it h t he co pyin g co st s. For econom ic reasons, it w ould not be advisable to produce the m agazine using the laser printer because the expenses incurred through toner costs and w ear and tear on the printer itself w ould be too high. A laser printer designed to deal w ith the volum e of m aterial in question w ould cost about 10,000 German Marks and w as therefore deliberately not procured. Both the â&#x20AC;&#x153;Junge Presseâ&#x20AC;? and the O SCE should m aintain contacts w ith the editorial office, am ong other reasons in order to dem onstrate genuine support for its independent w ork. Kaz akhs tan - Th e stude nts . In t he cit y o f Alm aty, 17 st uden ts fro m sch o ol N o. 159 t o ok part in o u r p ro ject . Alt ho ugh part icipatio n o n t he p art o f th e stud ent s w as t o som e ext en t o ptio nal, m an y sho w ed great in terest in t he d evelo pm en t o f t he stu d en t n ew sp ap er. Sch o o l No . 159 h as th e rep ut at ion of being a very goo d an d w ell-establish ed sch ool, h aving st uden ts w ho are q uite capable o f ab so rbing lin guistic and sub st ant ive con cept s. It w as on ly after the sem inar had got under w ay that the stud ent s b egan to involve them selves act ively in t he w ork. Projects 1999/2000

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Kazakhstan - The scho o l administratio n. Since the school is involved in several international projects and has a student body of about 1,500 persons, the school adm inistration, w hile certainly interested in our project, could find only relatively little tim e for us. We w ere, how ever, treated in a friendly and helpful m anner. A num ber of the teachers at the school becam e so involved w ith the project that all out st anding questions w ere soo n answ ered. Fo r t he Director it w as a m atter of great importance that, contrary to the opinion of the editorial office, the m agazine should have a Kazakh nam e. Since, according to the Director, there are osten sibly law s to t his effect , w e agreed on a com p rom ise an d nam ed the m agazine in tw o languages. Kazakhstan - The equipment. The technical equipm ent available to the school is relatively good. There w ere no problem s in operating both the O SCE com puter and, in parallel, an overhead projector. It w as possible to use the com puter room (Window s) belonging to the school for the w riting of articles. The equipm ent provided by the FES is in line w ith the req uirements of the editorial office and can be fully exp loited . It w ould be better if the softw are w ere not only pre-installed but also supplied as an installation version, together w ith a m anual. As earlier planned, it w as possible to use the laser printer to produce high-quality copies. System atic printing of the new spaper m akes no sense for reasons of cost. Kazakhs tan - Co -o peratio n w ith the FES. Th e FES co llected us at the airport and assigned a fem ale student to us as interpreter-translator. Thanks to the studentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s good know ledge of English and the support received from a teacher of English, there w ere no problem s in conducting the sem inar. To the degree that they w ere able, the FES gave us their support. Kazakhstan - Pro spects. O ur assessm ent of the sem inar and the first edition of the stud ent new spaper is very posit ive. It w as possible t o reproduce the magazine w ith the assistance of the FES. It ought to be possible, how ever, to find a qualitatively better copy shop in the vicinity of the school. It may be assu m ed that the editorial office w ill continue in the future to publish the new spaper. O ver the next few months, the ed itorial office shou ld, as planned, be assisted in m eeting the costs of copying. To this end, w e w ould recom m end that direct contact w ith the editors be m aintained in the future as w ell. Summary and pro po sals. The course of t he p ro ject to date has been very successful. In addition to learning technical skills, the students in Uzbekistan and 242

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Kazakhstan have also acquired greater social insights. It is clear to us from our conversations and discussions w ith the students that the project not only brought joy to those taking part, but also opened up future prospects in term s both of their ow n choice of profession and of the developm ent of dem ocracy. The academ ic atm osphere w as very positive and constructive. The sem inar provided an opportunity for the st udents to learn about and com e to appreciate the w ork of the O SCE and, in particular, that of the Representative on Freedom of the Media. We regard this kind of active w ork w it h yo ung persons in countries in w hich a dem ocratic society is taking shape to be very im portant for the reason that the process of establishing dem ocracy and of form ing opinions begins w ith young m en and w om en and it is at that point that it m ust be prom oted. In this w ay, a project such as Dem ocracy Through Youth Media can help to strengthen the foundations of the next generation in dem ocratic states.

HELP IN PRO MO TING FREED O M O F THE PRESS IN UZBEKISTAN Young journalists from Essen launch student newspapers The luggage is already packed and w aiting. O n 12 Septem ber, Rüdiger van Hal and Christian Kolb w ill be t ravelling to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. There, the tw o journalists from Essen, both of w hom w ork for the Junge Presse N ordrhein-Westfalen, intend to help, as part of a project sponsored by the O rganization for Security an d Co-op eration in Europe (O SCE), in the developm ent of an infrastructure for student new spapers. Tw e n t y-o n e-y e a r-old Kolb is w ell aw are that this w ill be a difficult undertaking: “Freedom of the press is not in particularly good shape there.” In Tash kent and Alm aty, Ko lb and van Hal w ill pro vide eight h ou rs o f instru ct ion a day to st uden ts of b ot h sexes w ith an in terest in m edia in su ch su bjects as press eth ics, cen sorsh ip , fo rms of jo urnalist ic presen t at ion , edit orial office o rganiz atio n an d layou t. En glish w ill b e u sed as t he lan gu age of in struct ion . At t he en d o f th e sem inar a st uden t n ew sp aper sh ou ld be u p an d run nin g in bo th cities. For on e year th en, t he O SC E w ill con tin ue t o provide sup p ort t o t h e fledgling ed ito rs. Kolb sees in t his sup p ort a guaran t ee t hat , t han ks to t he au th ority o f t he in tern ation al o rganizat ion , freed om of t he p ress w ill con tin ue t o exist in th e sch ools. As h e sees it , p art ially con tradicto ry law s h ave so far created co n fusion en ablin g sch ool ad min ist rat ion s, in a kin d o f belated obed ience to a Soviet-st yle cen so rsh ip that n o lo nger exists, to b an con troversial articles. “Through this project w e are providing direct support for the dem ocratic expression of opinion by students,” is the hopeful view of the 24-year-old van Projects 1999/2000

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Hal. Follow ing the return on 27 Sep tem ber of the tw o st udents, w ho are studying econom ic sciences, the results of their w ork, perform ed w ithout rem uneration, w ill be presented.

“D EVELO PMENT AID WO RKERS” IN MATTERS O F D EMO CRACY Young journalists to spend two weeks in Central Asia Tom orrow tw o young journalists from Essen, Rüdiger van Hal and Christian Kolb, w ill be boarding a Lufthansa flight to Uzbekistan - w ith a slightly uneasy feeling in their tum m ies, as they both confess. For van Hal and Kolb, 23 and 21 years of age respectively, this trip to Uzbekist a n - to be follow ed by a w eek in Kazakhst an - is a b ig adventure, though God know s no adventure holiday. The tw o young journalists are flying to Central Asia on behalf of the O rganization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (O SC E) w it h a view to t eaching selected stu dents on the spot, in semin ars, how to produce student new spapers. “O ur w ork is designed to help strengthen dem ocracy in those countries”, explains Christian Kolb. The tw o econom ics students w ere chosen by O SCE project initiator, Freimut Duve, because they have for years been active in the Junge Presse N ordrhein-Westfalen, the umbrella organization grouping together student and you th new spapers, w hich has it s headquarters in central Essen. Thu s t hey have exactly t he right experience to give youngsters in the fo rmer Soviet Republics a hand in m astering m edia technology. In the capitals of the tw o co untries, Tashkent and Alm aty, van Hal and Kolb w ill offer instruction related to press ethics, censorship, layout and editorial organization for six to eight ho urs a day, using English as the w orking language. “In both countries the production of a new spaper w ill m ark the end of the w eek’s sem inar”, says van Hal. The tw o “developm ent aid w orkers” have assem bled a vast am ount of literature in advance to learn about these countries, about w hich they previously knew very little. This has not, how ever, enabled t hem to banish their uneasiness entirely. “After all, the farthest east I’ve been so far w as Berlin”, Christian Kolb recalls.

MED IA TRAINING IN A CO MPLETELY D IFFERENT WO RLD Students in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan “This w as a com pletely different w orld”, say Rüdiger van Hal and Christian Ko lb. For tw o w eeks the tw o m em bers of the bo ard of the Junge Presse w e r e on m ission for the O SCE in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, w here they gave instruction in m edia-related m atters at tw o schools. 244

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At the start the tw o developm ent aid w orkers had to confront the fact that things w ere very different from w hat they had been used to at hom e in m atters related to dem o cracy. The sim plest things, w hich at hom e w ould have presented no problem s at all, w ere fraught w ith unexpected difficulties. “How do w e get paper? Are there any double electric sockets? Such problem s had to be resolved for a start,” Christian Kolb recalls. And the basic at titudes of th e young people t hem selves p roved to be som ething of a hin drance at first . “The stu dents w ere not accusto med to vo icing criticism . For them everything that cam e from above had, in the first instance, to be regarded as good,” Rüdiger van Hal reports, adm itting that it had not been an easy m atter to overcom e this psychological barrier. At the end of the project, how ever, he felt that m ost of the Central Asian students had realized that free expression of opinion w as possible in their country, too. They only need to have confidence in them selves. In spite of certain unexpected repressive measures (one school Director tried to prevent publication of a staged photograph related to the drug problem ), the stud ent s had t he first new spap er produced by t hem selves in th eir hands at the end o f the w eek. “We achieved our initial goal”, says Christ ian Kolb . “How ever, it rem ains to be seen w hether this w ill develop into a long-term success.” T he students felt a certain amount of pride in the appreciation accorded their w ork. The O SCE project w as also covered on national television.

LYCEUM LIFE O N UZBEK TELEVISIO N A commitment to freedom of the press In the past Rüdiger van Hal and Christian Kolb have advised only young peop le in Germ any on how t o produce a school new spaper. Now these tw o representatives of the Junge Presse N ordrhein-Westfalen have been engaged in a quasidiplom atic m ission on behalf of the O rganization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (O SCE): in the course of tw o w eeks they set up in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) and Alm aty (Kazakhstan) the first free school new spapers those tw o countries have know n. These independent youth m edia are designed to m ake a contribution to the developm ent of dem ocracy in the form er Soviet republics. “Frequently the youngsters asked us, ‘Am I really allow ed to w rite this w ay?’” says Rüdiger van Hal in describing his experience of “m edia training” in Tashkent. What this m eant w as that the tw o honorary youth press representatives w ere called upon, in addition to im parting basic know ledge about journalism, to give th e local youngsters sp ecial co aching in m at ters o f freed om of opinion and of the press during their tw o one-w eek sem inars. “We introduced our young pupils to the Germ an press law s as a kind of m odel,” says Projects 1999/2000

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Christian Kolb. They also instilled a certain am ount of self-assurance into the young editors, the aim being to enable them to defend themselves against interferen ce and attempts to introduce censorship, n otably on the part of the scho ol authorities. “A threat to abandon the prestigious O SCE project alw ays helps w hen one is in doubt,” says van Hal. During t his “media training” the schoo l new spapers w ere them selves media events, and the “fam ous journalists from Germ any” w ere even interview ed in the m ain new s broadcast of Uzbek television. “Som et im es w e felt like the Backstreet Boys in all this com m otion,” rem arks van Hal w ith a laugh. After five days of w ork in each case the p ro ud ed itorial offices presented to their fellow students the first issues of their new papers - first Lyceum Life in Tashkent and, a w eek later School M atters in Alm at y. Ko lb and van H al returned to Essen quite sat isfied w ith w hat had been accom plished and are no w w atching the further developm ent of the projects from Germ any. Thanks to e-m ail and the Internet they are able to continue lending support to “their” editorial offices over thousands of kilom etres.

The tw o papers have in fact been published on the Internet at: w w w .jungepresse.de/taschkent bzw ./alm aty

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2.4 O ther Pro jects

Libel ro undtable in Ukraine. D uring visits by t he O SC E/ FoM O ffice t o Kyiv in 1999 it b ecam e clear th at t he ap plicat ion of cu rren t lib el law s in Ukrain e hin d er freedo m o f m edia an d freedom o f exp ressio n . Especially p oliticians take ad van tage o f th e lib el law s t o su e fo r st at em ent s t hat th ey find un acceptab le. Man y new spap ers an d journ alist s h ave been su ed m ultip le tim es. O n e of th e m ain problem s lies in t he fact th at t he co urts d o no t dist in gu ish bet w een p rivate and pu blic figu res, an d aw ard h igh libel fees again st new spap ers even t ho u gh th eir st atem en ts w ere issu ed w ith regard t o t he o fficial du t ies of po lit ician s and ot h er st at e officials. Earlier in 1999, t h ere w ere a nu m ber of in itiatives of th e Governm en t, Parliam en t an d Su prem e Cou rt to ad dress th ese issues w hich h ave no t yet p ro duced a resu lt. D uring his visit in M ay 1999, Freim ut D uve, w h ose m an d ate in clu des th e possib ility o f provid in g assist ance to O SC E m em ber States w ith a view to prom ot e com pliance w ith relevant com m it m ent s, suggested o rganisin g a rou n dt able o n th e to p ic. T he lib el ro u n dtab le w as organ ised to get her w it h t he C oun cil o f Euro p e and IREX/ Pro Med ia and in co-o perat ion w ith th e Govern m ent o f Ukrain e and th e O ffice o f th e O SC E Project Co-O rdin ato r. It w as held on 2 Decemb er 1999 in Kyiv and at tended by m ore th an 100 p ersons. The objective of th e libel ro u nd table w as to assem b le the resp on sib le Ukrain ian agen cies (executive, legislative an d ju diciary) as w ell as th e Ukrainian m edia t o provide an analysis of t he curren t situ ation and to p repare recom m end ations on possible an d co nstructive st eps forw ard . Int ern atio nal experts (fro m other O SCE m em ber St ates, from Co un cil o f Europe) provided advice as to in t ern at io nal stand ard s an d in form ed abo ut p osit ive exam p les. T he m ed ia covered t he rou nd t ab le an d p ro vid ed p u blicit y to t he effo rt s. T he reco m m endatio ns o f t he rou nd t able can b e fo un d in th e An n ex o f th e rep o rt on th e Ukrainian m edia situ ation . Childre n Bo o ks fo r Ko s o vo . In M ay 1999, t h e O SCE Rep resen t ative on Freedom o f t h e Med ia Freim u t D uve visited t he refu gee cam ps in FYRO M . Th ese cam ps h oused t ho usand s o f Ko so vo Alban ian s, am o ng th em m any child ren . Follo w in g t his visit Freim u t Du ve start ed th e p ub licat io n o f a set of bo oks in Alban ian fo r t he Kosovo child ren w ith fun din g from th e Germ an N GO Cap An am ur. Th e m ain aim o f th e project w as to h elp o verco m e th e traged y o f the past and, after 10 years o f int errup tion , to st art again the pub lishin g in Alb anian language fo r Koso vo. T he authors t hat co ntrib uted t o th e ed it ion are w ell-know n Alb anian int ellectu als as w ell as o ne w rit er fro m Projects 1999/2000

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FYRO M . T he p ro ject w as co -o rd inat ed o n-sit e b y Mirjana Ro bin -Cerovic from t he O SCE M ission in Ko so vo . T h e bo o ks w ere presen ted at th e Frankfurt Boo k Fair ’99 an d w ill be dist rib uted th ro ugh the O SCE M issio n t o every n ew ly reb uilt sch oo l in t he p ro vin ce. In D e fe nce o f th e Future . T he in itiat ive o f Freim u t Du ve, In D efence of the Fu tu re w as bo rn as an in vit ation t o int ellectu als from crisis region s t o co m e togeth er and m ed itate ab out th e futu re o f t heir regio n. T his in itiative is co nt rib utio n t o the process of o verco m ing th e cult ural sp littin g com m on to conflict areas t hat often lead s to hat e sp eech and resu lt s in t h e im po ssibilit y of free exchan ge o f opin ion s and id eas. In t his w ay th is in itiat ive is t h e first pro du ct o f th e idea of a St ab ilit y Pact for So u th – East ern Eu rop e. T h e first o u tcom e o f t he in itiat ive is th e b o ok In D efence of the Future – S earching in a M inefield, w it h con tribut io n s b y leading jou rn alist s an d au th ors from t he repu blics of fo rm er Yu goslavia. So m e of th e co nt rib uto rs are m emb ers o f th e Gro up 99 – a circle of w rit ers w ho un ited t oget her on th e suggest ion of M r D uve in o rd er t o t ry t o overco m e th e cu lt ural isolatio n an d t he h atred o f th e past years o f con st an t w ars in Yugoslavia. T he b ook w as edit ed by M r Duve an d Nenad Po po vic, a p ro m inen t Z agreb in tellect ual. It w as pub lish ed in Cro at ian - Serbian , Germ an an d English an d can th erefore be read in all th e po st – Yugo slav region s. O n 20 Jan uary 2000, t h e O SCE Rep resen tat ive o n Freedom o f t h e Med ia int ro duced it t o 54 O SC E p articip at in g St ates at th e O SC E Perm an en t C o un cil in Vie n n a .

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3. Current Media Situatio n in Ukraine Fourth Country Report1 The Office of the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the M edia has closely monitored media issues in Ukraine over the past two years. The Representative raised structural issues as well as specific cases with the Government of Ukraine in numerous interventions. In 1999, the O ffice focused on the use and abuse of libel laws against media: a public roundtable was held in Kyiv on 2 December 1999, together with the Council of Europe. As a result, a number of concrete recommendations were addressed to the Government of Ukraine (as outlined in Annex).

1. INTRO D UCTIO N When becom ing independent in 1991, Ukraine declared its intention to develop a civil society, guarantee freedom of speech and other universal hum an rights. These intentions w ere confirm ed in the 1996 Constitution of Ukraine and in the com m itm ents Ukraine m ade w hen joining the Council of Europe in 1995. Ukraine is a participating State of the CSCE/O SCE. During nine years of independence, the Ukrainian m edia w ent through a period of parting w ith com m unist dogm a and stereotypes, as w ell as establishing non-governm ental m edia. Many acts regulating the functioning of the m edia and the w ork of journalists w ere passed and they guarantee freedom of speech and non-interference by the Governm ent in the activities of the press. At the sam e tim e, the developm ent of the situation around the Ukrainian m edia during the transition raises serious concern. Ukrainian society is going through a deep econom ic crisis, accom panied by almost daily experienced cases of corruption.There are problem s in guaranteeing freedom of speech characteristic of both the capital, Kyiv, and the regions of Ukraine. The new ly re-elected President Leonid Kuchm a em phasised in his inauguration speech on 30 Novem ber 1999 that he “w ill devote special attention to establishing the political structure of the Ukrainian society, strengthening dem ocratic institutions, providing guarantees for the rights and liberties of persons and citizens.” He added that “this is possibly one of the m ost determ inant factors contributing to strengthening the State, the civiliced character of pow er, and the construction of a civil society.” It is clear that guaranteeing freedom of 1 The O ffice of the Represen tative on Freedom of the Media has so far publish ed country reports on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Kyrgyzstan. These reports are usually w ritten by experts from various NGO s. O leg Khom enok, IREX/ProM edia, Crim ea, Ukraine, contributed substantially to this report.

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speech is one of the m ost crucial elem ents in this endeavour and this fundam ental right should consequently be treated as a priority m atter by the Governm ent of Ukraine. As to international relations, The President also underlined the interest of his Governm ent to prom ote Ukraine’s integration into EuroAtlant ic structures. The European Union (EU), in its com mon st rategy paper o n Ukraine, adopted by the Helsinki Sum m it in 1999, put em phasis on the con solidation of democracy and good governance, human rights and the rule of law. The EU stressed t he need for developing the efficiency, t ransparency and dem ocratic character of its public institutions, including the developm ent of free m edia. The EU itself w ill und ertake efforts to foster t hese goals, inclu ding m easures for increasin g co -op erat ion am on g journalist s and relevant authorities in order to contribute to the developm ent of free m edia. 2. MED IA LEGISLATIO N 2.1. International and Domestic Media Law . Ukraine has considerable legislation regarding m edia, including both dom estic regulatory acts and ratified international conventions. In particular, Ukraine has signed and rat ified the European Convention on Human Rights and the Int ernational Covenant on Civil and Political Right s that outlay basic principles of freedom of speech and media. Furthermore, all the O SCE States, including Ukraine, m ade a political co mm itment co ncerning m edia during the Istanbul Sum mit. The Istanbul Security Charter holds that the St ates w ill “reaffirm the imp ortance of independent media and the free flow of inform atio n as w ell as the public’s access to inform ation. We com mit ou rselves to take all necessary steps to ensure the basic conditions for free and independent m edia and unim ped ed transborder and intra-State flow of info rm ation, w hich w e consider to be an essential com ponent of any democratic, free and open society.” The Constitu tion of Ukraine provides for internatio nal treat ies ratified by Ukraine to becom e part of national law, and Article 4 of the Information Act states that int ernational treaties and agreements, ratified b y Ukraine, as w ell as principles and standards of international law shall be part of the legislatio n on inform at ion. Article 50 provides also that in case of conflict betw een international treaties and provisions of national law of Ukraine, international law shall prevail. The Constitution of Ukraine guarantees freedom of speech, expression of view s and collection, keeping, use and dissemination of information (Article 34), it bans censorship (Art icle 15) and collection, keeping, use and dissem ination of confidential information regarding individuals w ithout their consent and guarantees legal prot ectio n and the right to refute untrue information (Article 32). These rights m ay be restricted “in the interest of national security, territorial integrity or public order, to prevent disturbances or crim es, to protect the health of the population, to protect the reputation and the rights of other peo250

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ple, to p revent the dissem inatio n of confidential inform ation, and t o safeguard the authority and im partiality of the judiciary” (Article 34). Media legislation of Ukraine com prises the follow ing acts: • The Information Act (2 Novem ber, 1992) regulat es collection, keeping, use and dissemination of information , types of inform at ion, the right to receive inform ation and t he p rincip les of access to it, issues regarding ow n ership of in form ation and its protection, as w ell as the liability m echanism in cases of infringem ents of the inform ation law ; • T he Print M edia Act (16 Novem ber 1992) provides the legal b asis for the operation of print m edia, the procedure for state registration of publications, the rights and obligations of the journalists as w ell as the relations betw een the m edia and the public and other organizations; • The TV and Radio Act (21 Decem ber 1993) provides the legal basis for the operation of TV and Radio broadcasters on the territory of Ukraine, sets forth the procedure for their incorporation and licensing, broadcasting rules, providing airtim e for pre-election cam paigns and for broadcasting official announcem ents and provides for liability for infringem ents of the law . This Act established a National TV and Radio Broadcasting Council; • T he N ational TV and Radio Broadcasting Council of Ukraine (23 September 1997) establishes the pow ers and com petence of the National Council; • The Information Agencies Act (28 February 1995) provides the legal basis for the operation of Ukrainian inform ation agencies and establishes the conditions for dissem ination of their inform ation products; • The Act on the Procedure for M edia Coverage of the Activities of Government Bodies and Local Authorities in Ukraine (23 Septem ber 1997) provides for com pulsory m edia coverage of the activities of the authorities; • The Act on Government Support for the M edia and Social Protection of Journalists (23 Septem ber 1997) provides the basis fo r legal and economic suppo rt by the governm ent for the m edia as w ell as for social protection of journalists; • The Advertising Act (3 July 1996) establishes general provisions for advertising and restrictions for advertising of certain types of products and services in the m edia. The act does not cover political advertising; • The Intellectual Property Act (23 Decem ber 1993) regulates and protects intellectual property rights; • T he State Secrets Act (1999) defines inform ation that is considered a state secret; • The Act on the Public Television and Radio Broadcasting System (18 July 1997) re gulates the operation of public broadcasting system s in the country; • T he C ivil Code establishes the legal principles for protection of hum an rights, h o n o u r, dignity, and the b usiness reputatio n of people and organizations, and the m echanism s for indem nification of dam ages; Current M edia Situation in Ukraine

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• The Civil Procedure Code establishes the procedure for litigation for the purpose of protection of t he h onou r, d ignity and busin ess reputatio n o f citiz ens; • The C riminal C ode provides for liability for public calls for nationalistic, racial and religious hostility, disclosure of state secrets, slander, persecution of citizens for criticism , etc. There are also additional decrees by t he C abinet of M inist ers, by t he President and by other governm ent agencies that regulate the w ork of the m edia. Regulations passed by the governm ent often change the rules of the gam e in the m edia m arket and allow for manipulating the m edia. For exam ple, in June 1999 the Cabinet of Ministers increased annual charges for using radio frequencies tenfold for the period 1 July – 31 Decem ber 1999. According to this d ocum ent , charges fo r usin g radio freq uencies w ere increased ten-fold as com pared to the current level, w hich had been d eterm ined in p aragraph 1 of Decree No 1135 of t he Governm ent of 17 Septem ber 1996 an d titled “O n the im provem ent of the m echanism s for use of radio frequencies”. Agency rules w ere also am ended for obtaining perm its for the use of transm itters. This led to several regional channels discontinuing broadcasting. In March 1999 the Cabinet of Ministers passed the decree O n the Im plem entation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Ukrainian Act on Governm ent Support for the Media and Social Protection of Journalists. In fact, this Decree provides that the journalists in state and municipal media are civil servants. For instance, the Editor-in-Chief of a print medium established (or coestablished) by the Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) or by the Cabinet of Ministers is equal to the Deputy Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, Deputy Premier Minister, etc., all the way dow n to the correspondent of a regional new spaper w ho is equal to a First and Second Grade Expert from the corresponding government authority. The Decree provides that the salaries of this category of journalists equal the salary of the senior staff and experts in the corresponding state or local authority that is the founder of the relevant m edia. There are also som e pension privileges provided for journalists. There are approxim ately 8,000 journalists in state and m unicipal m edia t o d a y. Golos Ukraini, Uryadoviy Courier, Rabochaya Gaseta, the new spapers of the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet of Ministers of the Autonom ous Republic of Crim ea and the Viche Magazine (published by the Verkhovna Rada), as w ell as new sp apers o f the local authorities are all state-ow ned pu blications. The N ew s Agency DIN AU-Ukrinform is also state ow ned. State-ow ned electronic m edia are broadcasting com panies in the system of Gosteleradio Ukraini, and in particular: the National TV and Radio com panies, State Broadcasting Com pany K ry m, t he Kyiv and the Sevast op ol St ate Regional Broad castin g Co m panies, as w ell as 23 district broadcasting com panies. 252

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To sum u p, t here are n o eq ual op port u nit ies fo r t he w o rk of jou rnalists at a legislative level and th ere is a p o ssib ilit y for th e st ate aut ho rit ies t o exercise con trol, in clud ing financial, o ver th e jo urn alist s w orkin g for the state m ed ia. Th is D ecree pu ts at a disadvan tage jou rn alist s w o rkin g fo r t he non -govern m ental m ed ia. O n the eve of the presidential elections in Ukraine, the Central Election Com m ittee issued a directive on the rules for the use of m edia for pre-election cam paigning during t he elections of the Presid ent of Ukraine in 1999. This regulation defines political advertising. The Ukrainian law establishes the right for individuals and legal entities, both from Ukraine and from other countries, to set up p rin t m edia. How ever, fo reign citizens are not allow ed to establish new s agencies â&#x20AC;&#x201C; they may only act as cofounders. As far as the electronic m edia are concerned, the law prohibits foreign legal entities and individu als from setting up TV and radio broadcast ing organizations and from ow ning m ore than 30 percent of the au thorised capital stock. As a result of the restrictions in the law and serious financial risks, foreign investm ent in Ukrainian m edia is both insignificant and com plicated. Recently there has been a trend tow ards decreasing w estern investm ent projects in Ukrainian m edia. The Norw egian com pany O rcla Media, w hich in 1998 bought m ajority stock in the new spapers Visokiy Z amok in Lviv and Industrialnoe Z aporozhie in Zaporozhie, has discontinued further operations and, in reality, has pulled out of the Ukrainian m arket. Ukrainian law prohibits the establishm ent of any barriers to the legal distribution of print m edia. At the sam e tim e, a special perm it is needed for distribution of foreign print m edia. The im port of new spapers and m agazines is subject t o du ties, determ ined by custom s law. In May 1998, the Cabinet of Ministers passed a Decree increasing by 20-30 percent custom s duties for im port of periodicals. This refers m ainly to Russian publications, since they account for 90 percent of the overall volum e of im ports. The current Ukrainian postal charges for delivery of Russian periodicals are several tim es higher than the charges for Ukrainian periodicals. 2.2. State Authorities Dealing with the Media. State authorities dealing w ith the m edia are: â&#x20AC;˘ The Verkhovna Rada Co mm ittee on Information and Freedom of Speech, t h a t drafts legislation in the area of m edia and m onitors the com pliance of state authorities w ith the law in Ukraine. Ivan Chizh, a deputy of the Verkhovna Rada, is chairing the Com m ittee. â&#x20AC;˘ The State Com m ittee on Inform ation, established in March 1999 replacing the Ministry o f Info rm at ion, w hich carries out registratio n of print media and new s agen cies and ou tlin es in form ation policy of th e st ate. It also deals w ith Current M edia Situation in Ukraine

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other issues of regulating the w ork of m edia. The inform ation com m ittees in the regions of Ukraine are subordinate to the State Com m ittee on Inform ation and they carry out registration of periodicals in the regions. O leg Bai w as appointed President of the State Com m ittee on Inform ation in April 1999. The National TV and Radio Broadcasting Council, that deals w ith issuing licences to broadcasting organizations, keeping the state register of broadcasting organizations, m onitoring com pliance w ith broadcasting legislation and the use of radio frequencies. It com prises appointees of the President (four m em bers) and the Verkhovna Rada (four m em bers). The term of office of the m em bers of the previous Council ended in Decem ber 1998. O n 16 March 1999 the Verkhovna Rada appointed four m em bers of the National TV and Radio Broadcasting Council. In Septem ber 1999 the Verkhovna Rada passed an am endm ent to the National TV and Radio Broadcasting Council Act. According to the new version, the Verkhovna Rada and the President have to appoint their representatives on the Council w ithin 30 session (for the Verk hovna Rada) or w orking (for the President) days upon expiry of the term of office of the p revious m em bers of t he Council. T he provisions of this act have not been com plied w ith - since the President has not appointed his representatives, the National Council is not operational. The State Com m ittee on TV and Radio Broadcasting m anages state TV and radio broadcasting and con trols th e operation of n ational and region al stateow ned TV and Radio com panies. O n 22 April, the Ukrainian parliam ent endorsed the appointm ent of Alexander Savenko as President of the State Com m ittee on TV and Radio Broadcasting. The State Agency on Intellectual Property, the Com m ittee on State Secrets and Technical Protection of Inform ation, the Radio broad cast, Radio links and TV Concern, w hich directly broadcasts the signal on the air, also deal w ith issues of m edia regulation. The State Com mittee on Telecomm unications and Information Te ch n o lo gie s replaced t he State Comm ittee on Telecom municatio ns, the State Com mittee on Information Technologies and the Higher Radio Frequency Directorate w ith the C abinet of Ministers. This agency controls the allo cation o f TV and Radio frequ encies in Ukraine and issues perm its for use of transmit ters.

2.3. The Stance of the Verkhovna Rada. The situation in the m edia in Ukraine w as repeatedly discussed in the Ukrainian Parliam ent in 1999. In February 1999 hearin gs too k place in th e Verkhovna Rada o n issues related to freedom of speech . Parliament establish ed a com m ittee to investigate the m edia situ ation after Presid ential Decree N o 1033/98 w as passed, as w ell as to look into cases of persecution of journalists and opposition m edia (Decree 254

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No 1033/1998 provides for the establishm ent of state joint stock com panies: Ukrainian TV and Radio Broadcasting and Ukrainian Publishing Society). O n 16 Feb ruary, the Verk hovna Rada adm itt ed that the activities of the Governm ent in securing freedom of speech and m eeting the inform ation needs of the population w ere not satisfactory. Parliam ent appointed an enquiry board to investigate the persecution of opposition m edia through the State Tax Adm inistration, the Chief State Prosecutor’s O ffice and the official executive authorities. This interim com m ittee of the Verkhovna Rada w ould also check claim s that the Security Council of Ukraine w as part of this persecution. The Decree indicated that Parliam ent should m ake am endm ents to som e law s in order to restrict some of the pow ers of t he State Comm itt ee on Te le co m m unications as far as licensing of broadcasters is concerned and to focus the licensing policy of the National TV and Radio Council. It w as also agreed to draft an Inform ation Code of Ukraine. O n 15 June 1999, the Verk hovna Rada appealed to som e international organizations expressing concern w ith regard to the situation of the m edia in Ukraine. The appeal indicates num erous infringem ents of freedom of speech by the executive authorities, influencing opposition and independent m edia. The Parliam ent noted, that “on the eve of the presidential elections, the execut ive structures established total control over the information sp ace o f Ukraine and gave advantage to the coverage of the cam paign of one candidate only – the current president in office – by means of subordinating the financial strap ped m edia to influential ow ners.” O n 23 Septem ber 1999, regarding the discontinuation of the coverage of the sessions of the Verkhovna Rada, the Parliam ent passed a decree “O n the inform at ion blockade of the w ork of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine”. It brings to the attention of “President Kuchm a, in his capacity as a guarantor of the Constitution of Ukraine, the anticonstitutional and illegal actions of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine – the inform ation blockade of the w ork of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the factual dep rivation of the peop le of their constitu tional right to inform at ion, as w ell as the necessity t o introduce measures not to allow such infringem ents in the future.” 2.4. Draft Laws. Draft law s are being prepared “O n Radio Frequencies in Ukraine”, “O n C able TV”, “O n In form ation Sovereignty an d Information Security of Ukraine”. Currently there is also a bill on am endm ents and an addendum to the Ad vertising Act, w hich provides a definition of the concept of political advertising and the m echanism s for its use. The Parliamentary Comm ittee on Freedom of Speech and Inform ation drafted a bill som e years ago on abolishing the system of state subsidies to m edia. Current M edia Situation in Ukraine

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The draft p rovides for a p rohib ition for state authorities and organizations subsidised partly by the state to set up m edia outlets. Gradual denationalisation is planned of the ones that are currently fully or partially ow ned by the state. The authors of this draft are planning to redirect all the m oney from the state budget used to subsidise m edia in order to support the sector as a w hole (to develop an inform ation infrastructure, publishing facilities, a system of distribution, reduce the price for transport, etc.) The state authorities m ay use budget funds exclusively for dissem ination o f official inform atio n (legal acts and regulatio ns, etc.) This inform ation w ill be published in new sletters and specialised publications and w ill be circulated am ongst a targeted audience. State subsidies w ould only be given to m edia providing inform ation about Ukraine abroad. St ate TV and radio should be reorgan ised as a p ublic broadcast er. Th is id ea has been introduced w ith the enactm ent of the “Act on the Public Television and Radio Broadcasting System in Ukraine”, but has not been im plem ented. The concept of denationalisation of the m edia is an alternative to the “Act on Governm ent Support to the m edia” and to the “Act on m edia coverage of the act ivit ies of governm ent b odies and local auth orities in Ukraine” as w ell as to a num ber of other legislative acts. 3. PRINT MED IA 3.1.Q uantitative Characteristics. O n 1 January 1999 there w ere 8,300 publications registered in Ukraine. O nly 4,018 w ere actually published. 3,463 are published regularly. 673 publications are state-ow ned - fully or in part, and all of them are published regularly. The overall circulation is 9,286,000. The circulation of nation-w ide publications is 2,541,000. The rest are regional publications. Tw o thirds of the publications are in Russian. Throughout 1999 the num ber of bilingual publications increased from 152 to 173, how ever, the num ber of the publications in Ukrainian w as reduced from 372 to 369. The follow ing new spapers have the largest circulation: Fakti I Komentarii - 2,000,000 Silski Visti - 548,000 Golos Ukraini (published by the Verkhovna Rada) - 236,700 Uryadovii Courier (published by the Cabinet of Ministers) - 128,200 Communist, published by the Com m unist Party, has a circulation of approx. 70,000. Local publications are very influential in com parison w ith publications as a w hole. According to opinion polls, 51.5 percent of the readers prefer local 256

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new spapers and 22.7 percent the regional ones. O n the other hand, the proportion of local to central new spapers, in rural areas, is 50:1. A significant part of national publications are distributed in cities. According to Socis-Gallup, only 18 percent of the citizens of Ukraine read new spapers on a regular basis. 14 percent do not read new spapers at all. Fakti I Komentarii form ally appears to be independent. It is controlled by Verkhovna Rada D e p u t y, Viktor Pinchu k, w ho is close t o th e fam ily of t he President. It directly supported Leonid Kuchm a during elections. Silski Visti is circulated m ainly in rural areas. This new spaper is left-of-centre and during the presidential elections supported the Speaker of Parliam ent, Alexander Tkachenko. Golos Ukraini supported the representatives of the Kanev Four, and in the second round the Com m unist leader. The policy of this new spaper is seriously influenced by the left-of-centre parliam entary m ajority and by the Speaker of Parliam ent, Alexander Tkachenko, w ho w as elected to the Verkhovna Rada by the Socialist and Rural Party Coalition. The Uryadovii Courier new spaper is published by the Cabinet of Ministers and is actively supporting the political forces that are loyal to the executive branch, supported by the NPD and the Z lagoda Union, controlled by form er Prim e Minister Valerii Pustovoitenko. Established in 1996, Den Daily is an opposition new spaper and one of the largest non-governm ental new spapers in Ukraine. During its first year, 3 m illion USD w ere invested into Den. Having rem ained sufficiently objective, at the start of the elections Den su pported Evgeni March uk op enly an d criticised the cu rrent Presid ent. Regardless of its circulation of 58,000, Den is believed to be quite influential since m ost of its readers are politicians and decision-m akers. After Evgeni Marchuk becam e Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council, D en shifted and becam e loyal to the authorities; as a result several journalists have left. Z erkalo N edeli Weekly (circulation 31,000) has a special place in t he Ukrainian market. T he new spaper offers a large num ber of analytical articles on political, econom ic and social topics and is quite an influential publication. Z erkalo N edeli is partly financed from abroad, and as a result it is relatively independent. Due to a lack of subsidies, the Fakti reduced its circulation to 600,000 after the presidential elections. The Ukrainian tax policy tow ards Russian publications resulted in the appearance of som e new spapers from Russia, that w ere form ally registered in Ukraine. They are Komsomolskaya Pravda - Ukraina (270,000), Argumenti I Fak tiU k raina (110,000), Izvestia - Ukraina, Trud - Ukraina (110,000), M oskovskii Komsomolets - Ukraina (101,500), Stolichnie N ovosti (52,000) (the Ukrainian version Current M edia Situation in Ukraine

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of M oskovskie N ovosti). Notw ithstanding som e local inform ation published in these new spap ers (10 - 30 percent of th e new spaper) they are essentially copies of Russian new spapers. These publications are popular in the eastern parts of Ukraine, w here Russian speakers prevail. These new spap ers, except for S tolichnie N ovosti, w hich is ow ned by Vadim Rabinovich, w ere used to a lesser extent by the authorities in the election cam paign. Still, m ost new spapers of Russian origin favoured Leonid Kuchm a. Except for a few exceptions, on e can hardly speak of an opp osition or a free press. All pub lications serve the interests either of authorities current ly in pow er or clans w ho are trying to com e to pow er. The situation of t he local press is sim ilar. It also is d ependent on the aut horities or on financial-political groups that end up controlling them . 3.2. Monopoly in the Area of Printing and Distribution of Publications. A significant num ber of printing facilities in Ukraine are state-ow ned. This allow s publishing houses to set extrem ely high prices for their services since there is no com petition. In 1999, this problem w orsened – in Septem ber 1998 the President signed a Decree ‘O n the Im provem ent of State Managem ent in the Area of Inform ation ’, w hich provided for the establishm ent of state-ow ned com panies Ukrteleradio and Ukrpoligrafizdat, w hich hold 100 percent of the shares in the state publishing enterprises and TV and radio com panies. A state m onopoly w as established in the printing sector. O n 23 Decem ber 1998, the Verkhovna Rada passed a Decree, urging the President to repeal his Decree of 16 Septem ber 1998. The Union of Journalists of Ukraine m ade a sim ilar appeal. The m ajority of experts believe that the establishm ent of state stock companies w as done to ensure that Leonid Kuchm a w on the elections. This establishm ent of a state m onopoly led to a situation w here Ukrpoligraphiz dat confiscated premises and property from local new spapers. Rental contracts and incorporation agreem ents w ere term inated unilaterally. The printing m onopoly allow s the state to influence the process of printing th e new spap ers. For inst ance, in Jan uary 1999 in Cherkassy, the state p rinting house, w ithout an explanation, changed the printing schedule of all the new spap ers in favour of N ova Doba, ow ned by the lo cal aut horities. As a result, the other new spapers w ere not supplied to the readers on tim e. At Ukrpoligraphizdat publishing house the m ore critically oriented new spapers (such as Politika in Kyiv and Dneprovskaya Pravda in Dnepropetrovsk) w ere refused publication. In O ctober 1999, on the eve of the elections, the publication of Veteran, Rakurs, N ashe Z avtra, and 21 Vek new spapers w as discontinued. The publish258

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er refused to print them . The editor of 21 Vek, Yuri Yurov, said that he w as w arned that the new spaper w ould not be printed unless its content w as changed. There w as a sim ilar situation in Sevastopol, w here Sevastopolskaya Pravda (supporting Piotr Sym onenko) w as refused by the local publishing house. There is yet another problem â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the distribution of the publications. This is concentrated in the hands of Ukrpochta and Ukrpechat (form erly Soyuzpechat). There are cu rrently no alternatives available fo r t he sup ply and distribu tion of new spapers in Ukraine. In April 1999, Soyuzpechat Retail Agency refused to sign a contract w ith Kyivskie Vedomosti because they published critical articles against Soyuzpechat. 3.3. State Publications - The Problem of Unfair Competition. The state m edia, and m ore specifically their financing from the state budget, is a serious problem for the developm ent of m edia in Ukraine. O ver 160 million hryvnia ($50 m illion) w ere allocated in the 1999 budget for financing state m edia. State publications are also financed through local budgets. T he Decrees, that the Cabinet of Ministers passes every year on subscript ion and distribut ion, provide privileges to m ore than 150 publications fou nded by state stru ctures. Compensation is provided from the bu dget. Annual budget subsid ies are also provided for smaller publications established b y the authorities. Becau se o f subsidies, state m edia are in a m ore favo urable po sit ion as com pared to private publications. They offer subscriptions at below m arket prices and also decrease the advertising rates. This u nfair practice seriously undermines the basis of the non-governm ental new spapers. 3.4. News Agencies. C u r r e n t ly, there are state and p rivately ow ned new s agencies in Ukraine. D IN A U is one o f the state-ow ned agen cies and und er t he Cabinet of Ministers. The Crimean Inform ation Agency is also state-ow ned and w as established by the Council of Ministers of this autonom ous region. They are also financed from the budget. Interfax - Ukraina, UNIAN and UN IAR are the largest privately-ow ned news agencies. There are also regional information agencies, among them Infobank (Lviv), S obor (Dneprop etrovsk), and AT N (Kharkiv). New s agencies are also subjected to pressu re and part of the political process. T he press secretary of Leonid Kuchma, Alexander Martinenko, w as previously the general manager of Interfax -Uk raina. S obor Agency was, until recently, controlled by form er PM Pavel Lazarenko. St ate agencies receive certain privileges. According to the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of 4 June 1999, executive authorities must provide a centralised subscription for D IN A U to all regional media, w hich w ere fou nded, or co-founded, by the state authorities. Current M edia Situation in Ukraine

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4. ELECTRO NIC MED IA: TV and Radio 4.1.Q ua ntitative Cha ra cteristics. T h ere are 830 broad castin g licences issu ed to TV and Radio o rganiz ation s in Ukrain e. T h ere are 253 TV co m pan ies, 211 radio com pan ies and 52 TV and radio com pan ies in t h e state regist er. 133 broad casters are o w n ed b y th e St ate or by t he m un icip alities and 282 are p rivat ely o w ned . According to the Natio nal Council in Ukraine, there are 107 active cable TV operators. O nly 52 have a licence. Ten operators have applied for a licence. The rest operate illegally. The total TV cable netw ork audience is approximately 3 million view ers, including 500,000 in Kyiv as w ell as in Donetsk region, 200,000 in the Lugansk region and 100,000 each in the regions o f O dessa, Lviv and Crim ea. Because of the difficult econom ic situation, television is the only source of inform ation for m any Ukrainians. O pinion polls show that 99 percent of the population of Ukraine have the possibility to w atch TV; 80 percent w atch TV every day and another 12 percent once or tw ice a w eek. The ratings of the channels are: Inter 49 percent, 1+1 48 percent and UT-1 33 percent. There are three nationw ide TV channels operating in Ukraine: UT-1, UT-2 and UT-3. U T-1 broadcasts program m es o f the National T V C om pan y and several private TV com panies (Era, Gravis, Alternativa, Studia Plus, M edia Show, etc.). UT1 broadcasts 18.7 hours a day. The channel has an audience of 50 m illion people. UT-1 becam e the m ain cam paigning tool during the presidential elections. The inform ation b roadcasts of UT-1 w ere used fo r cam paigning in favour of the current President and discredited other candidates. Most claim s for breaches of the election law w ere filed against UT-1. These claim s focused on Akcenti, 7 Dnei and UTN -Panorama program m es. UT-1 broadcasts program m es by TV com panies close to the President: G ravis – this com pany is controlled by Alexander Volkov (Parliam ent Deputy, form er assistant to the President), Era – a TV com pany controlled by Vadim Rabinovich (President of Rico Holding Group, Israeli citiz en), Viktor Pinchuk (Parliament Deput y, partner of Leonid Kuchm a’s daughter) and Andrei Derkach (Parliament Deputy, son of the head of t he Security Council of Ukraine). UT-2 broadcasts program m es of Studia 1+1 12 hours daily in the m orning and evening slots. The rest of the tim e is given to program m es from regional state TV com p anies. Th e aud ience of this ch annel is approxim ately 45 m illio n. Studio 1+1 is a joint venture. CME (Central European Media Enterprises) o w ns part of it. Recently the Russian com pany M edia M ost (ow ned by Vladim ir Gussinski) bought shares in Studio 1 + 1. Until autum n 1998, Studio 1+1 w as controlled by Vadim Rabinovich and gave exclusive advertising right s to Prioritet Advertising Agency, w hich w as p art 260

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of Rico Holding Group. In autum n 1998, the m anagem ent of 1+1 broke up w ith Rabinovich and his agency. According to experts, Alexander Volkov kept control over the com pany. The inform ation program m e T S N tried to stay im p artial and unbiased du ring the presid ent ial cam paign; h ow ever, t hey o ften sid ed w ith Leon id Kuchm a. T he m ain presidential candid ates w ere introduced in Vy a ch is la v Pih o v s h e k â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Epicentre - nesecretnie materiali. O n the eve o f the electio ns T S N p lann ed t o sho w d ebates betw een the can did ates live fo r five days. T he in ternational organiz ation, Freedom House, provided finan cial support fo r these deb ates. After th e first day of t he d ebates the anch or fell ill and th e debat es w ere discontinued . According to O pp osition m edia, t he debates w ere cancelled by the m anagem ent of Studio 1+1. UT-3 broadcasts program m es by the Independent Ukrainian TV Corporation (UNTC) Inter. Their au dience is approx. 35 m illion view ers. UNTC is a joint Russian-Ukrainian venture. The Russian TV channel O RT ow ns 29 percent of the shares. During the general elections Inter supp orted the SDPU (u ). T his w as because the Managing Direct or, Alexander Z inchenko, w as on the party list of the SDPU (u). After becom ing a Parliam ent Deputy, Zinchenko resigned as Managing Director and is now the honorary president of the Channel. During the elections, the program m es Podrobnosti and Podrobnosti N edeli openly supported the current president. S T B is the only TV com pany in Ukraine that broadcasts its programm es nation-w ide via satellite. Part of the shares are ow ned by N ork ros-corporation a ffiliated w ith the Russian oil com pany, Lukoil. S T B broadcasts in 23 cities. Du ring the elections, S T B was strongly pressu red by the execut ive autho rities. For six months it w as under the threat that its broadcasts w ould be discontinued, it w as subject to crim inal litigation, its accounts w ere frozen. As a result of this pressure, in early O ctob er, Vladim ir Sivkovich resigned from the Administrative Council of the S T B and so ld his shares to ano ther shareholder. After that the accounts of the com pany w ere cleared. Sergei Kutsiy, w ho w as the form er head of t he PressO ffice of the President, then joined the Adm inistrative Council. According to statements by a group of journalists from S T B, since Sergei Kutsiy joined the channel, the programm es of S T B are subjected to direct and open censorship. IC T V is a private T V channel and a Ukrainian-American jo int ventu re. T he audience is approx. 22 m illion view ers. Until O ct ober 1998, 50 percent of the shares of the channel w ere o wned b y the st ate. How ever, the state sold its share for 2,200,800 hryvn ia (approx. $1 m illion) and IC T V becam e a 100 percent private TV com p any. Analysts believe th at the sale w as related to the fo rthcom ing elections. During the presidential elections, Alexander Volkov controlled the channel. Th e info rm at ion program me N ovini zvidusil broadcast on IC T V is produ ced by the TV Comp any G ravis, a com pany controlled by Alexander Vo lk o v. Current M edia Situation in Ukraine

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4.2.Licensing. The National TV and Radio Broadcasting Council issues broadcasting licences. Cu rrently the Nat ional Council is not fully operational and cannot carry out its functions. This slow s dow n the developm ent of the TV and Radio m arket and creates conditions for adm inistrative abuse. No com pany has the right to broadcast w ithout a licence. Du ring t he p residential cam paign, the TV company Ulichnoe Televidenie, that cam paigned in favour of Leonid Kuchm a, carried out broadcasts on channels used by regional state TV and radio com panies w ithout a licence from the National Council In order to o btain a licen ce, fu ture broad casters m u st su bm it an app licat ion and enclose cop ies o f th eir inco rp oration pap ers. Th e app licatio n should contain basic in form atio n ab out th e foundin g m em b ers of t he com pan y and its broad casting plans. Th e licence is issued for a fee, the am ount determ ined by th e Cabin et o f Ministers. Curren tly t he fee is app roximately $2,000. Th e fee is 90 p ercent less w hen a licence is issu ed to a state TV an d radio com pan y. It is t w ice as m u ch if program m es from abroad m ake u p m ore than 20 percent o f the broadcasting tim e, and five t im es as m uch if such p ro gram m es take up m ore t han 35 percent. T he licence is issued fo r a p erio d of n o less th an five years fo r o n-the-air broadcast ers an d for ten years for cable o perators. TV and radio com panies also need to obtain a frequency licence issued by the State Electricity Inspectorate. Currently, TV and radio organizations m ust obtain a permit to use transmitters, even if they do not ow n them but rent them from the state radio and TV transm ission centres. T he legislat ion also regulates th e lan guage of broad castin g. Accordin g t o the cu rrent criteria, 85 percent of the program m es are expected to be in Ukrainian. Currently 87-91 percent of the b roadcasts of stat e TV are in Ukrainian. The m ajority of regio nal TV com pan ies in Eastern Ukraine do not com ply w ith this req uirem ent . Th ere h ave been no opp ressive m easures against th em alth ough the restrictions on th e volum e of broadcast s in ot her languages m ay also becom e anoth er too l for influ encing the m edia. 5. GENERAL PRO BLEMS FO R MED IA FREED O M There are a num ber of problems w h ich are characterist ic bo th for the print and the electronic m edia. O n e of t he m ajor pro b lem s is th e current econ om ic crisis th at led to a d eclin e in t he p urch asin g p ow er o f the pop ulatio n. T his no t o nly resulted in a sharp drop in n ew sp aper circulat io n, but it also hit the advert isin g m arket. Because of th e po or advert isin g m arket, m o st m edia cann ot d evelo p eco n om ically an d becom e self-sufficient . Th e sit uation gets w o rse because of the un favo urable t ax syst em . 262

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As a result, state-ow ned m edia exist on state subsidies and non-governm ental m edia are controlled by financial-political clans that â&#x20AC;&#x201C; depending on their loyalty to the authorities â&#x20AC;&#x201C; determ ine the policy of the publication. That is w hy all m edia in Ukraine are practically m ore or less politically involved and serve the interests of the authorities or political and financial circles supporting them , and not the interests of the readers or the view ers. The situation is also aggravated by the inadequate education and lack of professionalism of journalists. Many journalists served the ideological interests of the Com m unist Party and w ere part of the propaganda m achine. The years of relative independence the early 90s did little to change their m entality. There is a clear need for m ore professional education , vo catio nal t raining, and aw areness am ong journalists. The Council of Europe and national and international NGO s, am ong th em IREX/ProMedia, are w orking specifically in this field, giving further opportunities to journalists through num erous training courses. All m edia also face restrictions on access to inform ation from the Govern m ent, in spite of legal guarantees. O ne should note the extrem ely low level of legal aw areness, since few are aw are of civil servants taken to court by new spapers and journalists for violations of the Inform ation Law. 5.1.Violence and Death of Journalists. In recent years, m any journalists have been subjected to physical threats and crim inal prosecution. Forty journalists have died in tragic circum stances over the past years in Ukraine. A w hole series of incid ent s are related t o S T B. O n 4 March 1999, the Presiden t of t he S T B, Nikolay Knyazhickiy, an no un ced at a new s conference th at h e had groun ds to believe t hat th ere w ere att emp ts to exercise pressu re o n t he staff o f S T B. In p art icular, on 23 February, retired Leut .-C o l. of the M inist ry o f Int erio r, Alexan der D eneiko , adviso r t o M r Kn yazh ickiy, w as killed . O n 26 February, the cam co rd er an d t apes of on e of t he cam eram en w ere sto len. O n 1 M arch th e cellar un der Kn yazh ickiyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s flat w as set on fire. O n 3 March tw o peo ple w earing m asks broke into the flat of Dm itriy Dahno, co m m ercial direct or of S T B. Maryana Chornaya died under suspicious circum stances (the official version is suicide) on 24 June 1999. She w as a m em ber of STB staff and the Suspilstvo Centre Fund. She w as found hanging in a flat. Prior to her death, her flat w as broken into and robbed by unidentified persons. In July 1999, the m anagem ent of 1+1 Channel announced that there had been threats of physical retribution again st jo urnalists and m an agem en t of the channel since O ctober 1998. O bservers relate these threats to the fact that the m anagem ent o f the Channel broke u p w ith m edia-magnate Vad im Rabino vich. Current M edia Situation in Ukraine

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Igor Bondar, co-founder and director of the local AM T TV, and Boris Vihrov, President of the O dessa Court of Arbitration, w ho w ere in the sam e car, w ere killed in O dessa in May 1999. The assassins have not yet been found. In July 1999, officials from the local tax autho rities in Cherkassy th reaten ed and used violence against the Editor of Antenna new spaper, Valeriy Vorotnik. O n 5 O ctober 1999, the flat of the Editor of Lviv new spaper Postup, O rest Drul, w as broken into. The burglars threatened him if the new spaper did not stop publishing som e of its stories. The Editor him self adm itted that his new spaper had published several critical pieces against the Deputy Head of Lviv’s Regional Adm inistration. In autumn 1999, law enforcement authorities attempted to expel from the country the fam ily of the S imon TV comm entator, Zurab Alasani. S imon TV supported Evgeni Marchuk in the presidential elections and covered the other candidates. O n 26 January 2000, in the Crim ean Parliam ent, Deputy Alexander Ryab kov and several of h is assist ant s fo rcefully co nfiscated the cam corder and the tape (w ith footage of a conflict inside Parliam ent) from the correspondent of Crimean TV, O sm an Pashaev. 5.2. Inspections by Tax Authorities and other Regulating Bodies. O ne of the m eans of exercising pressure over opposition publications is through the use of tax and other regulating bodies to block the w ork of the m edia. Ukrainian law allow s for the operations of any organization to be suspended follow ing a resolut ion by th e Fire Safet y Depart m ent , th e Health and Anti-Epid em ic Service or any other governm ent structure. The past tw o and a half years, Den w as inspected m ore than 30 tim es by various state regulatory bodies. During the attem pts to close dow n STB in spring 1999, claim s against it w ere raised by the Healt h and Anti-Epidemic Service. The reason for the insp ection w as a com plaint by a group of students from the University of Economics regarding the p oor recept ion of STB TV and possible health hazards because of radio-m agnetic radiation. According to the Health and Anti-Epidem ic Sta tion, STB w as th e “source” of this hazard. These allegatio ns w ere p roven incorrect. Journalists from STB carried out an enquiry and established that this “initiative” did not com e from the students. In a m eeting w ith journalists, the “claim ants” w ithdrew their signatures. 5.3. Litigation. Court decisions. Another w ay of exercising pressure over the m edia, particularly the opposition one, w as through excessive claim s filed for p rotection of honour and dignit y of officials. T his h as already led to t he closure of a num ber of print m edia. Under Ukrainian law there are no lim its to the am ount of such a claim . As a result very high figures w ere dem anded w ithout any supporting evidence and courts often ruled against the new spapers. 264

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Claim s for protection of honour and dignity filed against the m edia com prise 99 p ercent of all claim s in w hich media are invo lved . In 1995, 980 claims against m edia w ere filed in court. In 522 cases the court ruled in favour of the plain tiff. The am ounts claim ed totalled 1,906,943 hryvnia and the am ounts aw arded by courts totalled 124,292 hryvnia. In 1996, 1,042 claim s w ere filed and in 582 cases courts w ere ruled in favour of the p laint iff. The am ounts claimed and aw arded w ere 138,363,922 hryvnia and 711,608 hryvnia respectively. In 1997, 1,257 claim s w ere filed and in 654 cases courts ruled in favour of the plaintiff. The su m s w ere excessive: a tot al of 90,388,344,951 hryvnia w ere claim ed , and 1,518,984 hryvnia w ere aw arded by courts. In March 1998, on the eve of the parliam entary elections, Vseukrainskie Vedomosti w as closed follow ing a ruling by the Court of Arbitration on a claim of 3.5 m illion hryvnia ($1,75 m illion) in favour of the Dinamo - Kyiv football club as com pensation for m oral dam ages for publishing inform ation on the sale of one of the players to the Italian M ilan. Vseukrainskie Vedomosti w ere critical to w ards the go vernm ent, they su pport ed the Hromada p arty and this w as actually the m ain reason for closing t his new spap er, according t o its Ed itor-in -C h ie f, Vladim ir Ruban. Sim ilarly, in 1998, the Minister of Interior, Yuri Kravchenko sued Kyivskie Vedom osti. Kravch enko claim ed 5 millio n hryvnia ($2,5 m illion ) from the new spaper because of a series of critical articles regarding his w ork as a m inister. According to the decision of the Starokiev District Court, the new spaper had to pay 5 m illion hryvnia, and the journalists Sergei Kiselyov and Genadiy Kirindyassov had to pay 20,000 and 7,000 hryvnia respectively. As a result, Kyivskie Vedomosti discontinued publication. In Decem ber 1998, the Suprem e Court o f Ukraine revo ked this ru ling and sent t he case fo r fu rther in vestigation. After that the new spaper started publishing again. In Decem ber 1998, the Prosecutorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s O ffice in Kyiv initiated crim inal litigation under Article 125 (slander) of the Crim inal Code of Ukraine against journalists from Z erkalo N edeli for publishing a satirical article w ith characters that did not exist in reality. Th e case w as filed w ithout defining the in divid uals that w ere slandered and w as closed after a public statem ent by the President that he did not see anything offensive in this article. O n 6 O ctober 1998, the Pechera District Court in Kyiv closed Politika after the article Spy Story - 2 w as published. The representatives of the new spaper w ere notified about the ruling as late as on 8 Decem ber in a regular Court session. O n 23 Decem ber 1998, O leg Lyashko, Editor-in-Chief of Politika, w as arrested and w as charged w ith slander (Article 125 of the Crim inal Code, w hen alm ost all other cases are brought to court under the Civil Code). O n 8 February the City Cou rt of Kyiv revoked the ruling b y th e Pechera District Court t h a t suspended the publication of Politika. Current M edia Situation in Ukraine

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In June 1999, Politika w as finally closed but until then it had to change printing houses seven tim es. More t han 20 crim inal claim s w ere raised again st it by officials overall am ounting to approx. 120 m illion hryvnia. O leg Lyashko w as finally acquitted on 23 Decem ber 1999. How ever, the p rosecuto r has appealed to t he C ourt of Cassation , so th e ruling is not yet final. Du ring visits by the O SCE/ FoM O ffice to Kyiv in 1999, it became clear that current libel law s and their application in Ukraine are im portant issues w ith respect to freedom of m edia and to freedom of expression of journalists. Earlier in 1999, t here w ere a num ber o f init iatives by th e Governm ent , Parliam ent and Sup rem e C ourt t o add ress th ese issues (especially the high libel fees) w hich have not yet produced a result. During his visit in May 1999, Freim ut Duve, w hose m andate includes the possibility of providing assistance to O SCE participating States w ith a view to prom ote com pliance w ith relevant com m itm ents, suggested organising a roundtable on the topic. The roundtable w as organised together w ith the Council of Europe and IREX/ProMedia and in cooperation w ith the Governmen t of Ukrain e and the O ffice of the O SCE Pro ject Co-O rdinator in Ukraine. It w as held on 2 Decem ber 1999 in Kyiv and w as attended by m ore than 100 persons. The objective of the libel roundtable w as t o assemb le responsible Ukrainian agencies (executive, legislative, judiciary) as w ell as th e Ukrainian m edia t o provide an analysis of t he current situ ation and to prepare recom m endations on po ssible and const ructive steps forw ard. Int ernational experts (from other O SCE participating States and from the Council of Europe) provided advice as to international standards and gave positive examples. The m edia w idely covered the roundtable. The recom m endations of the roundtable are in the Annex of this report. 5.4. O ut-of-Court Closure of Newspapers. In addition to open prosecution, there is a practice of out-of-court closure of newspapers by the executive authorities. In January 1998, follow ing a w ritten order by the Minister of Inform at ion, Zinovii Kulik, publication of Pravda Ukraini, w hich supported the Hromada Party, w as suspended. Breaches in the registration of the new spaper w ere announced as the official reasons for suspension. Prior to that, Pravda Ukraini published a series of articles o n corruption amo ng the executive branch. In Septem ber 1998, Alexander Gorobets, Editor-in-Chief of Pravda Ukraini w as arrested for “attem pted rape”. O n 24 May 1999, the court found Gorobets guilty of “attem pting to force into a sexual relationship in abuse of an official position” and sentenced him to seven m onths and 24 days im prisonm ent. But because the accused had already been det ained for m ore th an seven m ont hs during t he investigation he w as released in the courtroom . Pravda Ukraini m anaged to re-start publication only after replacing its Editor and becom ing loyal to the executive authorities. 266

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O n 13 January 1999, in Dnepropetrovsk, after an interview w ith the Ministry of Interior, the Editor of the new spaper of the Regional Council of Dnepropetrovsk, Vladimir Efrem ov, w as detained for tw o days. The newspaper w as supporting the Hromada party and Pavel Lazarenko. Such practices are not used against m edia loyal to the authorities. During the election cam paign and after the elections for President, candidates like Natalya Vitrenko, Piotr Sym onenko and others filed claim s for protection of their honour and dignity against various m edia. Natalya Vitrenko’s claim against D en and against journalist Tatyana Korobova am ount s t o 500,000 hryvnia ($100,000). 5.5 .Termination of Broadcasting. During the election campaign, out-of-court termination of broadcasting of TV channels w as practised . The reason w as the new rules regard ing perm its for operation o f transmitt ers and use of frequencies t hat w ere introduced by the Cabinet of Ministers. In add ition, as a result of inspections by the regulatory bodies, opposition TV channels w ere fined and sanctioned. In Decem ber 1998, Prime Minister Valeriy Pustovoitenko, w hile visiting t he National Radio and TV Com pany, asked w hether Channel 11 in Dnepropet rovsk, that supported Pavel Lazarenko, w as not yet closed dow n. O n the very sam e day the p olice searched the premises o f Channel 11 for reasons related to “the fight against organised crim e.” O n 9 March 1999, Channel 11 w ent off the air. The official reason given w as the ab sence o f a frequency licence fo r b roadcasting the signal on the radio relay netw ork. This TV com pany issued an appeal. They believed that the real reason for this closure w as the “opposition stance of the channel that offered its airw aves to political opponents of the current authorities”. After the channel fell under the control of Viktor Pinchuk, broadcasting re-started. As a result Channel 11 is now loyal to the authorities. O n 22 February 1999, the Visti tizhnya programme w as not broadcast on IC T V. Vecherni visti, the daily information programme of IC T V has not been show n since 15 March. Both program mes w ere produced by the TV information agency Vik na, headed by w ell-know n reporter Nikolay Kahishevski. The managem ent of IC T V explained t hat their refusal to w ork w ith TVIA Vik na w as for economic reasons. But this explanation raises doubts, since, according to statem ents in some media, the channel relied on the prod uction capacity of Vik na and offered them free advertising tim e. This is w hy it is likely that there may be political reasons for cancelling programm es by Vik na. N ikolai Kahishevski explained the cancellation because of t he influence of the new ow ner, Alexander Vo lk o v. In Sept em ber 1999, the tax adm in ist ration froze the accoun ts of Gravis T V. At t he sam e tim e t hey started inspecting IC T V due to th e fact that it had signed a co-production contract w ith Gravis. Current M edia Situation in Ukraine

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In sum m er 1999, STB w as threatened w ith closure. In late May and early June the m anagem ent of the channel received tw o instructions from the State Electricity Inspectorate. In the docum ents the inspectorate urged them to “im m ediately cease the op eration of the station u pon receipt of these instructions until a proper perm it w as issued”. According to the Head of the State Electricity Inspectorate, Valentin Kolom iyets, the reason for the sanction w as the fact that the channel’s licence had ended on 28 April 1999. In addition, STB changed the satellite broadcaster (from INTEL-SAT to AMO S-1) w ithout notifying the regulating body, Ukrchastotnadsor. The President o f S T B, Dmitrii Prikordo nnii, noted that the request to terminate satellite bro adcasting by S T B w as illegal, since the legal framew ork in this area w as not finalised yet. The law had no provisions as to w hat sanctions should be taken in these cases. Dm itrii Prikordonnii did not exclude t he possibility that this issu e w as related to the contract betw een STB and Verkhovna Rada for the production and broadcasting of the Parliamentski Vikna program m e, covering the w ork of Parliam ent. The conflict around STB could be explained because of the president ial electio n cam paign . Prikordonnii em phasised: “We are not going to suppo rt any o f th e candidates, b ut w e w ill give equal oppo rtunity to all candidat es w ho w ant to u se the airw aves of S T B.” In Septem ber 1999, a crim inal claim w as filed in court against STB for tax evasion and the accounts of the com pany w ere frozen. Follow ing the freezing of the accounts, STB cancelled the Parlamentski Vikna program m e. O n 17 June 1999, the accounts of Simon TV and Radio in Kharkiv w ere frozen follow ing an order by the police. According to the station’s director, it w as plan ning a series o f program m es on all the presid ent ial can didates. Let ters w ere sent to the candidates inviting them to take part in these program m es. Shortly before t he account s w ere frozen, S imon show ed a series of program m es about Evgeni Marchuk. In July 1999 after the new s conference by Evgeni Marchuk w as broadcast by TV studio ATB Studia-2, its licence w as terminated and the Arbitration Court im posed financial sanctions on the TV station. O n 26 July 1999, in Crim ea t he b ro ad casts b y t he n on -govern m en tal T V an d Rad io com p anies Chernomorskaya, ITV, Ekran, a n d K erch w ere t erm in ated. T he reason w as an ord er by t he regu lator U k rch a stotn a d z or t o th e Broad cast ing Cen tre in C rim ea (RTPC) stating t hat th ey had no perm its fo r use of tran sm it ters. The t hree TV stations re-started broadcasting (excep t Chernomorskaya) a ft e r their program m es turned loyal to the authorities and any criticism of the current president w as suspended. Chernomorskaya re-started just before the second round of elections w hen cam paigning w as prohibited. 268

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The suspension of broadcasting of these TV stations in Crim ea took place at a tim e w hen State TV and Rad io station K ry m did not have any licences and perm its, but its broadcasting w as not suspended. In O ctober 1999, the Editor-in-Chief of VIKKA TV, Viktor Borissov, w as dism issed after airing live presidential can didate Alexander Mo roz. He w as dism issed after the com pany changed ow nership. 5.6. Regional cases: Tw o cases can be presented to exem plify the situation in the regions of Ukraine. Th e O SCE Represen tative on Freedom of the Media has intervened on behalf of both cases. The case of the Crim ean Chernomorskaya Z arya illustrates a difficult situation w here a state-ow ned m edia finds itself betw een the legislative and executive branches of stat e pow er conflict ing w it h each o th er. T he C hernom orsk ay a Z arya is a sm all bi-w eekly district new spaper founded by the district council. In 1996, the new spaper shifted its polit ical support from the co uncil to a recently elected new Head of District Adm inistration. This m ove resulted in a serious conflict w ith the district council, as its understanding w as that the new spaper w as an organ of the city council and w as obliged to be the councilâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s m outhpiece. In Novem ber 1997, t he conflict had d eteriorated to the extent that the council decided to stop supporting the new spaper financially and established a com peting new spaper, Chernomorskiye Izvestiya. The district adm inistration financed Chernomorskaya Z arya for a short tim e, but after som e further ch anges in the adm inist rat ion , the new spaper w as left w ith no su ppo rt , w hich has led to the non-paym ent of salaries and accrued debt. In addition to financial problem s, the new spaper has been forced to stop publishing at the tow n publishing house and to find alternative publishing facilit ies in another city. The city council has also tried to evict the new spaper from its prem ises claim ing that Z arya w as using the premises as w ell as the eq uipm ent illegally. O ne of the most disturbing facts is that Zarya has been p ut under severe judicial pressure. Around 20 libel and other law suits have been filed against the new spaper. The situation has not im proved over the years, in spite of several interventions by the Representative on Freedom of the Media. In the second case, Petro Hois, the Editor-in-Chief of the opposition Uzhgorod new spaper RIO, w as arrested and jailed on 25 February 1999 for several days on alleged libel charges based on an article attacking Viktor Medvedchuk, a Deputy Speaker of Parliam ent. How ever, the article w as never published. The article included a statem ent from Serhy Ratushnyak, the form er m ayor of Uzhgorod, w ho fled Ukraine in 1998 after crim inal charges w ere brought against him . How ever, his statement w as not published in full, but edited for potentially libelous allegations and the final article did not include any nam es. Mr Hois w as fined 30,000 hryvnia in O ct ober and, as h e w as unable to Current M edia Situation in Ukraine

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p a y, the b ank accounts of t he n ew sp aper w ere closed do w n by the t ax authorities. Currently Mr Hois is w orking for another new spaper but expects to be unem ployed in the near future. 6. CO NCLUSIO NS AND RECO MMEND ATIO NS 6.1. The conclusions that can be draw n from this report are discouraging: The situation as a w hole is characterised by the executive authorities in Ukraine controlling the m ajority of t he governm ental periodicals and electronic m edia and being able to also influence the m ajority of non-governmental media, including through closing dow n publications or TV channels. The executive authorities determ ine the policy of the m ajority of the m edia in Ukraine and coerce them into being loyal through often hidden pressure w hich results in new form s of indirect censorship: The authorities exercise their pressure through judicial bodies as w ell as through econom ic leverage and fiscal organizations. There are m ajor problem s w ith the professional activity of journalists. The parliam entary and presidential elections of 1998 and 1999 had a serious impact on the Ukrainian media. The recent presidential elections took p lace w ith significant infringem ents of freedom of the press. The joint prelim inary statem ent (1 No vem ber 1999) on the observation of t he first roun d of the presidential elect ions by the O SCE/ O DIHR and the Parliam ent ary Assem bly o f the Cou ncil of Europe (PACE) stat es t hat : “Bo th the publicly funded electronic and print m edia, and private broadcasters com prehensively failed to m eet their obligations and it can be concluded that the m edia coverage of the cam paign and o f th e can didat es in th e first ro und did not live up t o the required legal provisions and O SCE com m itm ents.” The prelim inary statem ent regarding the observation of the second round (14 Novemb er 1999) sim ilarly stat ed that “The electronic and State-ow ned m edia com prehensively failed to live up to their legal obligation to provide balanced and unbiased reporting on the candidates and the cam paign in their new s coverage of the second round.” The O DIHR O bservation Mission also “received reports and allegations of pressure on cert ain m edia outlets to p ro vide bett er and greater coverage of the act ivities o f the incumbent. These outlets complained of an unw arranted num ber of inspections by num erous authorities including tax, fire and safety inspect ors.” O DIHR concluded that the 1999 elections show ed no im provem ent over the coverage in the m edia of the cam paign for the 1998 parliamentary elect ions. The final report of O DIHR is still pending. Even though censorship has been abolished , there is still no real free and independent journalist ic m edia landscape in Ukraine. This has to a great degree lim ited the possibility of public debate on m ajor social issues. The parliam entary elections of 1998 and the recent presidential elections of 1999 have high270

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lighted the deficits in the m edia sphere. The abuses by the executive authorities, especially through arbitrary m easures and pressure against m edia, w ere also exacerbated during the election cam paign period. The various state m onopolies that exist in the m edia sphere are hindering the developm ent of free and independent m edia. There is no lack of relevant law s, but there is still a lack of the non-partisan rule of law and of independence of the judiciary in Ukraine, as seen in m any m edia cases. The result is uncertainty and distrust in the courts and that the journalists and the m edia cannot count on them on issuing fair decisions. The judiciary is also not fam iliar w ith int ernatio nal legal standard s regarding m edia. This w as clearly seen in m any recent libel law cases in Ukraine. 6.2. Th e fo llo w ing r e co m m e n d a t i o n s can b e m ade to th e Govern m en t o f U k r a in e : • The Governm ent should undertake initiatives to enhance public aw areness of in ternat ional stand ards and obligations in th e field o f free m ed ia and press freedom . The culture of tolerance, pluralism and broadm indedness needed in a dem ocracy should also be prom oted. The Governm ent must ensure that executive authorities refrain from arbitrary m easures and other pressure against journalists and the m edia. • As there is a need for greater openness and access to inform ation for journalists, the Governm ent and other public authorities should provide greater access to inform ation on their activities and im prove their ow n public inform ation program m es. Such transparency could contribute to the quality of m edia coverage on official activities. • Th e Governm en t needs to t ake m easu res to strengthen the independence o f the judiciary to guarantee fairness and equality of all citizens. • The Governm ent should prom ote the lifting of m onopolies in the m edia sphere, e.g. in printing and distribution.

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Annex to the Current Media Situation in Ukraine

Free Media and Libel Legislatio n in Ukraine Roundtable in Kyiv 2 December 1999 Co nclusio ns and Reco mmendatio ns O n 2 Decemb er 1999, t he O SC E Represent ative on Freed om of t he M edia, t he C oun cil o f Eu rop e and Irex/Pro Med ia held in Kyiv a pub lic roun dt able on Free Med ia and Libel Legislatio n in Ukraine in co -op erat ion w it h t he Go vern m ent o f Ukraine an d w ith t h e O ffice of t he O SCE Pro ject Co -ordin ato r. T h e ro un dtab le at t h e Inst it u te fo r Foreign Affairs o f Kyiv Un iversity w as at tended b y over 100 participants, am ong th em Governm ent an d Parliam ent officials, ju d ges, law yers and jo urnalists (see p ro gram m e attached ). • Backgro und: Current libel law s and their application in Ukraine are im portant issues w ith respect to freedom of the m edia and freedom of expression of journalist s. Most of the m edia cases in courts are libel cases. High libel fees have becom e one of the m eans that lead the m edia into bankruptcy and foster a clim ate of self-censorship. Earlier in 1999, a num ber of initiatives w ere taken by Governm ent, Parliam ent and the Suprem e Court of Ukraine to address these issues. • The o b je c t iv e o f this round table p ro posed by th e O SCE Represent ative during his visit t o Kyiv in May 1999 was to assem ble responsible Ukrainian agencies (executive, legislative, judiciary) as w ell as the Ukrainian m edia to provide a detailed analysis of the current situation and to prepare recom m endations on possible steps forw ard. The participation of experts from the Council of Europe and from Poland provided inform ation on relevant international legal standards and practices. • Findings: The proliferation of libel cases seem s to be linked to the fact that many m edia o utlet s, at this stage, are closely affiliated w ith po litical interests or movements and often lack editorial independence. Libel suit s have becom e instruments that are used against p olitical opponent s behind the m edia. Such libel cases have led to bankruptcy of the m edia concerned and to the intim idation of journalists. Although there is no longer a state m onopoly on m edia, the concept of free m edia b eing essential for a public d ebate in a demo cracy is not w idespread. The old thinking approach to m edia as a m essenger betw een those in pow er and the people rem ains strong. The Governm ent’s ow n inform ation policy is considered to be rather restrictive. Governm ent o fficials often lack experience and 272

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tolerance in their relationship w ith the m edia and file cases against journalists w ho are understood to be frivolous. As to the court decisions on libel cases, rule of law is not generally guaranteed. This applies especially to the regions. Apparently, courts have often failed to uphold national law and are accused of being influenced by p oliticians and not by relevant legal standards. O n the other hand, th e legal basis fo r handling libel and defamatio n cases, the legislative framew o rk o f Ukraine, could be co nsidered to be gen erally sufficient, if applied in compliance w ith internatio nal legal standards applicable in Ukraine. • Euro pean le gal standards applicable in U kraine, a member o f the Co uncil of Euro pe since 1995: Ukraine’s legal practice (and to a lesser degree som e elem ents of its legislation) should be brought into line w ith European standards as stated in Article 10 of the European Convention on Hum an Rights (EC HR) and as interpreted in t he b inding decisions of the Eu ropean Court on Hum an Rights. The Convention is an integral part of Ukrainian law and directly applicable by dom estic courts. Th e case law, d evelo ped b y the Europ ean C ourt on H um an Right s o n libel and freedom of speech, im plies the follow ing specific guidance: - O pinion s and info rm at ion “t hat offen d, shock or disturb th e St ate or an y sector of t he p opu lation” are also protect ed by the European Co nvention on Hu m an Rights. - It is in the interest of dem ocratic society that m edia are enabled to exercise their rightful role of “public w atchdog” in im parting inform ation of serious public concern includin g o n con troversial political issues. The public has also a right to receive such inform ation and ideas. It w ould be unacceptable for a journalist to be debarred from expressing critical value judgem ents unless he or she could prove their truth. - T he limits of acceptable criticism are accordingly w ider as regards politicians than they are for a p rivate individu al. Public figures inevitably and know ingly lay them selves open to close scrutiny of their every w ord and deed by both journalists and the public at large, and they m ust consequently display a greater d egree of to lerance. In cases of ruthless an d abusive law suits filed b y public figures against media, the plaintiffs, i.e. the public figures, cou ld be convicted them selves. - The am ount of dam ages in any case of libel should be proportionate and it should not have a chilling effect on critical reporting. Instead of rew arding high am ounts of dam ages, it m ay be sufficient in m any cases to order the publication of a summ ary of the judgem ent in the media concerned, as is t he p ractice in m any European countries. Such solutions are preferable in situations w here econom ic resources of the m edia are lim ited. Annex to the Current M edia Situation in Ukraine

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• Reco mmendatio ns to the Go vernment o f Ukraine o n pro mo ting free media and reducing libel cases: - T he Ukrainian national Law on In form ation states the applicabilit y and precedence of int ernational con ventions over national regulatio n. T he Governm ent sho uld take actio n o n the basis o f its relevant internatio nal commitments as a Participating State o f the OSCE and as a member o f the Co uncil o f Euro pe to promote freedom of expressio n and free m edia. As one of the signatories to the O SCE Charter for European Security, the Government o f Ukraine has recen tly com mitted itself to “ensure the basic co nditions for free and indep endent m edia (…) as an essential co m pon en t of any demo cratic, free and open so ciety.” As a m em ber of t he Coun cil o f Europ e, Article 10 o f the Europ ean Convention on Hu man Right s as w ell as the case law of t he European Co urt on Hum an Right s are app licable in Ukraine and provide clear guidance also on handling of libel cases. - While the legal fram ew ork as such m ay be considered as basically sufficient, if correctly applied by the dom estic co urts and other pub lic autho rit ies in line w it h t he international standards m entioned abo ve, the provisions of the current civil and crim inal codes relevant to libel and defam ation could be review ed. - Apart from possible im provem ents of the legal fram ew ork, urgent actio n by th e Governm en t an d by oth er public authorities is required to ensure t h e pro per applicatio n by the co urts o f do mestic law in co mpliance w ith the abo ve mentioned European legal standards. The Government should make use of the assistance offered by the Council of Europe and other organizations concerning the training of judges, law yers, etc. - The Governm ent should undertake initiatives – in co-operation w ith the O SCE, the Council of Europe, other international organizations and w ith NGO s - to enhance public aw areness o f Euro pean standards in the field o f free media and press freedo m. The culture of tolerance, pluralism and broadm indedness needed in a dem ocracy should be prom oted. - Furtherm ore, Governm ent officials should be encouraged to set an exam ple in renouncing frequent and unjustified libel suits. - The Governm ent and other pu blic authorities should provide greater access to inform ation on their activities and im prove their ow n public inform ation program m es. Such t ransparency cou ld cont ribute to the quality of media coverage on official activities.

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4. Visits and Interventio ns February 1999 - February 2000 1 The O ffice of the Representative on Freedom of the Media visited or correspon ded w ith t he follow ing Governm ents of participating States o f the O SCE: Armenia Interventions - 10 Septem ber 1999 to Foreign Minister Vartan O skanian on the sentencing of the Editor-in-Chief of a daily new spaper to one year im prisonm ent for slander. Azerbaijan Visits - Visit of Freim ut Du ve an d Ad visor St anley Schrager to Baku , 22 – 25 Fe b r u a r y. Interventions - 14 Decem ber 1999 to President Haydar Aliyev expressing concern on several provisions of the new m edia law limiting the freedom of expression and the licensing of independent TV stations. - 16 Decem ber 1999 to Foreign Minister Vilayat Gouliyev regarding the closing of the independent SARA-TV , com m enting on the new m edia law and proposing a sem inar in Baku on Governm ent-Media relations. Belarus Visits - Freim u t Duve, accomp anied by Perso nal Adviso r, Beate Maeder-M e t ca lf, and Intern Bei Hu, attended a sem inar “Inform ation Society” on 15 –17 March 1999 concerning free flow of inform ation. Interventions - 26 May 1999 to Minister o f Foreign Affairs Ural Latypov regarding harassm ent against the independent new spaper “Naviny”. - 1 Ju ly 1999 t o t he Ch airm an o f th e St ate Co m m ittee fo r Press, M ikh ail V. Po dgain y, exp ressin g co ncern ab o u t t he con t in uin g execut ive ad m o n it ion s again st new sp apers in acco rd ance w it h Art . 5 of t h e Press Law and u n d erlinin g t h e im po rt ance for th e estab lish men t o f p ub lic t elevisio n an d radio . 1

This is a selected list of our activities during the year.

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- 28 Septem ber 1999 to Deputy Prim e Minister Ural Latypov on the possibility of providing expert opinions on legal am endm ents concerning the Law on the Press and on providing m aterial on the establishm ent of public television and radio in the neighbouring countries. - 4 O ctober 1999 to Ural Latypov on a case of libel filed against the opposition new spaper “Naviny”. - 8 Novem ber 1999 to Ural Latypov regarding the Law on Press. Bo snia and Herzego vina Visits - Visit of Freim ut Duve to Sarajevo on 9 –10 Decem ber 1999 for the presentation of the book In Defence of the Future published by the O ffice of the Representative on Freedom of the Media. Bulgaria Visits - Visit by Advisor Stanley Schrager and Intern Bei Hu 29 – 30 April 1999 to Sofia for a sem inar spo nsored by the International Press Institute on ‘Bu lgarian Free Press; Fair Press ’. Cro atia Interventions - 11 May 1999 to Foreign Minister Mate Granic on the case of O rlanda O bad, a journalist indicted by the public prosecutor for publishing inform ation about the Presidents’ bank accounts. Greece Interventions - 23 June 1999 to Foreign Minister Georgios Papandreou on crim inal pro secutions of tw o journalists for libel. Hungary Interventions - 31 August 1999 to Foreign Minister Dr. János Mártonyi about the arrest of the journalist Laszlo Juszt on charges of revealing state secrets. Kazakstan Visits - Visit of Freim ut Duve, accom panied by Intern Bei Hu, to Alm aty, 8 – 10 April 1999, includ ing m eetings w ith mem bers of the go vernm ent , w ith Parliam entarians and officials from governm ent television and m edia. 276

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Kyrgyzstan Visits - Visit of Mr Freim ut Duve, accom panied by Intern Bei Hu, to Bishkek, 10 – 12 April 1999, follow ing an invitation from the President. - Visit of Advisor Stanley Schrager to Bishkek, 25 – 27 O ctober 1999, for participation in a conference ‘The Mass Media in Central Asia ’. The conference w as organized up on the init iative of the Representative on Freedom of the Media by the Kyrgyz governm ent, the Union of Journalists of the Kyrgyz Republic and the O SCE Center in Bishkek. The conference w as, at the sam e tim e, the first regional m eeting of representatives of m edia of Kyrgizstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Lithuania Interventions - 19 August 1999 to the Chairm an of the Lithuanian Parliam ent Vytautas Landsbergis on the proposed am endm ents to the 1996 Lithuanian law on the m edia envisaging the creation of a Media Protection Com m ission. Fo rmer Yugo slav Republic o f Macedo nia Visits - Visit by Freim ut Duve and Advisor Alexander Ivanko to Skopie, 4 – 6 May 1999, fo r m eet ings w ith th e O SCE Kosovo Verification Mission leadership, Macedonian Albanian, Kosovo Albanian and Macedonian journalists, editors and w riters. - Visit by Advisor Alexander Ivanko and Intern Jordan Stancil to Skopie, 23 – 27 June 1999, to participate in a conference organized by the International Federation of Journalists. Interventions - 2 February 1999 to Foreign Minister Aleksandar Dim itrov clarifying the reasons for the dem otion of a reporter w ith Macedonian Radio and Television, MRTV. Mo ldo va Visits - Assessm ent visit by Advisor Alexander Ivanko to Chisinau, 30 June – 3 July 1999. Interventions - 18 August 1999 to Foreign Minister Nicolae Tabacaru regarding the illegal confiscation of the print run o f N ovaya Gazeta by the so -called “M inist ry of Security” of the Trans-Dniestrian region. Visits and Interventions

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Ro mania Visits - Assessm ent visit to Bucarest, 28 – 30 June 1999, by Advisor Stanley Schrager w here he m et w ith p arliam entary, go vernm ent al and president ial officials and m edia. Russian Federatio n Visits - Visit of Freim ut Duve to Moscow , 13 – 15 April 1999 Interventions - 4 Novem ber 1999 to Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov on alleged cases of harassm ent of journalists related to the situation in Chechnya. - 20 Decem ber 1999 to Igor Ivanov on statem ents from Russian defence and security officials, accusing foreign journalists in Chechnya o f esp ionage. - 24 January 2000 to Igor Ivanov, expressing co ncern abo ut the alleged harrassm ent of Alexander Khinshtein, a Russian journalist. - 24 January 2000 to the Head of Adm inistration of the O ffice of the Acting President, Alexander Voloshin, on the statem ent m ade by Krem lin spokesperson Sergei Yastrzhem sky. The letter stated that a journalist in a dem ocracy at w ar cannot be labelled as a traitor for his critical view s and expressed t he hope th at th e statem en t of Mr Yastrzh em sky w ill not lead to a policy change regarding the Krem lin’s relationship w ith the m edia. - 27 January 2000 to Igor Ivanov expressing concern regarding the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty correspondent Andrei Babitsky, w ho w ent m issing in Chechnya. Slo vakia Interventions - 28 January 2000 to Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan on potential difficulties w ith the distribution of new spapers. Tajikistan Visits - Visit by Advisor Stanley Schrager on 16 – 19 April 1999 for talks w ith m edia representatives, governm ent officials and Tajik journalists on the existing m edia situation. Interventions - 11 May 1999 to Foreign Minister Talbak Nasarov underlining the need for independent m edia in Tajikistan. 278

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Turkey Interventions - 20 May 1999 to Prim e Minister Bulent Ecevit expressing concern about the cases of Akin Birdal, a sentenced journalist and a of Metin Göktepe, a journalist killed by police officers. - 1 June 1999 to Foreign Minister Ism ail Cem urging m edia transparency in the trial of Abdullah Ö calan and protesting against the interdiction of so called “separatist propaganda”. - 14 July 1999 to Ism ail Cem on several cases of m edia repression against journalists. - 31 August 1999 to Ism ail Cem expressing concern about the banning of the Turkish television channel KANAL 6 because of its coverage of the August 1999 earthquake in an “inappropriate” w ay. - 3 Novem ber 1999 to Ismail Cem about the murder of the prom inent journalist and form er Minister of Culture Ahm et Taner Kislali. Turkmenistan Visits - Assessm ent visit by Advisor Stanley Schrager to Ashgabat, 13 – 14 April 1999 w here he m et w ith governm ent officials and m edia. Interventions - 11 May 1999 to Foreign Minister Boris Shikhm uradov expressing concern o n the lack of progress in d eveloping independent m ed ia and on the threats against independent journalists. Ukraine Visits - Visit by Advisors Beate Maeder-Metcalf and Alexander Ivanko to Kyiv, 3 – 5 March 1999, for meetings w it h m em bers of t he Govern ment and w ith journalists. - Visit by Freim ut Duve and Advisor Beate Maeder-M etcalf to Kyiv, 17 - 19 May 1999, for m eetings w ith governm ent officials and journalists. - Visit by Advisor Hanna Vuokko to Kyiv, 8-10 Septem ber 1999, for consultat ion s w ith O D IHR an d the Co uncil of Europe concerning forthcom ing projects. - Visit by Advisors Hanna Vuokko and Alexander Ivanko to Kyiv, 2 – 5 Novem ber 1999, for the preparation of a roundtable on libel in Ukraine. - Participation by Freim ut D uve and Advisors Beate Maeder-M e t ca lf, Alexan der Ivanko and H anna Vuokko in t he round table on lib el in Kyiv on 2 Decem b er 1999. T he rou ndtable w as organ ized by the O SCE Representative on Freedo m of Media, th e Council of Europe, IREX/ProM edia. Visits and Interventions

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Interventions - 11 March 1999 to Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk offering assistance in resolving the problem regarding excessive libel fees handed dow n by the courts against journalists. - 22 June 1999 to President Leonid Kuchm a on the case of harassm ent of the private TV station STB. - 14 July 1999 together w ith the Director of the O SCE/O DIHR to Leonid Kuchm a expressing concern regarding interference, harassm ent and intim idation in the w ork of private m edia during the coverage of the upcom ing presidential elections. - 11 Novem ber 1999 to First Deputy Foreign Minister, Evgeniy Bersheda, on the roundtable “Free m edia and libel legislation in Ukraine” organized by the O ffice of the Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Council of Europe and IREX/ProMedia. - 24 Novem ber 1999 to Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk inform ing him about the im pending roundtable in Kyiv on Decem ber the 2nd. - 15 Decem ber 1999 to Borys Tarasyuk protesting against the harassm ent of the local new spaper Chernomorskaya Z arya. United Kingdo m Interventions - 3 June 1999 to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Com m onw ealth Affairs Robin Cook on a recent governm ent proposal on the disclosure of inform ation. Uzbekistan Visits - Visit of Freim ut Duve to Tashkent, 5 – 8 April 1999. Interventions - 11 May 1999 to Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kam ilov sum m arizing the visit of Freim ut Duve, criticizing censoring of new spapers and adressing the G o ve rn m e n t ’s decree on re-routing all Internet traffic through a state-ow ned com pany. - 31 August 1999 to Abdu laziz Kam ilov urging the im m ediate release of six journalists im prisoned for insulting the President and for their ties to the banned opposition party. - 24 January 2000 to Abdulaziz Kam ilov em phasizing concern w ith the deteriorating health of the incarcerated Shadi Mardiev, a repo rter sentenced to an eleven year prison term for defam ation and extortion. 280

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Federal Republic o f Yugo slavia Interventions - 1 February 1999 to Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic on the prosecution of a local Serbian m agazine and its editor. - 9 March 1999 to Zivadin Jovanovic urging the release of t hree journalists sen tenced to five-m onth prison terms for having published an article accusing Serbian Vice-Prim e Minister Milovan Bojic of organising the killing of a m edical doctor. - 10 May 1999 to Zivadin Jovanovic urging the release of an arrested journalist from Montenegro on charges of â&#x20AC;&#x153;espionage and divulgence of m ilitary secretsâ&#x20AC;?. - 25 May 1999 to Zivadin Jovanovic urging t he release of Halil Matoshi, the editor of the w eekly Z eri, w ho w as arrested on 20 May in Pristina. - 21 June 1999 to Zivadin Jovanovic dem anding the release of Halil Matoshi.

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The O ffice participated in the fo llo w ing O SCE and o ther internatio nal meetings and co nferences : O SCE meetings: - O SCE Heads of Mission Meeting, O slo, 2-3 February 1999 - O SCE Heads of Institutions w ith Governm ent of Croatia, Zagreb, 8-9 February 1999 - O SCE Hum an Dim ension Sem inar, Warsaw , 27-29 April 1999 - O SCE Ministerial Troika, Vienna, 28 April 1999 - O SCE Conference on inter-agency co-operation in South-East Europe, Sofia, 15-20 May 1999 - O SCE Ministerial Troika, O slo, 24 June 1999 - O SCE Parliam entary Assem bly, St. Petersburg, 5-7 July 1999 - O SCE Hum an Dim ension roundtable on Media in FRY, Milocer, Montenegro, 10-13 Septem ber 1999 - O SCE Review of Im plem entation of O SCE Com m itm ents, Vienna, 20 Septem ber-1 O ctober 1999 - O SCE Review Meeting, Istanbul, 8-10 Novem ber 1999 - O SCE Sum m it, Istanbul, 18-19 Novem ber 1999 - O SCE Ministerial Troika, Vienna, 21 January 2000 O ther institutio nal meetings and co nferences: - 2+2 Ministerial Meeting of O SCE and of Council of Europe, Strasburg, 26 January 1999 - Tripartite high level m eeting O SCE-UN-Council of Europe, Strasburg, 11 February 1999 - UN Com mission on Human Rights, including talks w ith UN Comm issionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Special Rapporteu r on Freedom of Expressio n, Geneva, 12-14 April 1999 - Ministerial Conference on Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Cologne, 10 June 1999 - EU-CFSP-Meeting on O SCE, Brussels, 15 June 1999 - Regional Conference of Journalists, Skopje, FYRO M, 23-26 June 1999 - East-West Institute Conference on FRY, Budapest, 7-9 Septem ber 1999 - Round table o n Protection of Jo urnalists, London, 21-22 Sept em ber, 1999 - O SCE Working Table 1 of the Stability Pact, Geneva, 18-19 O ctober 1999 - C onference w ith Mediterranean Partners of O SCE on H um an Dim ension, Am m an, Jordan, 5-7 Decem ber 1999 - O SCE Working Table 1 of the Stability Pact, Budapest, 24 January 2000 - O SCE Working Table 1 of the Stability Pact, Budapest, 21-22 February 2000 - High level tripartite Meeting O SCE-UN-Council of Europe, Geneva, 25 February 2000 282

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VI. Where to Find Tho se Who Help: The Media NGO s in the O SCE Wo rld

Note: This is a list of N GO s with which we have established contact or whose materials h a v e proven useful to our work during the past year. However, this list is not an exhaustive one of all those N GO s who are doing valuable work on freedom of media issues in the O SCE region. 283

Accuracy In Media (AIM) Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

Jo hn Wessale 4455 Co nnecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite #330, Washingto n, D .C. 20008, USA USA English (202) 364-4401 (202) 364-4098 info @aim.o rg, ar@aim.o rg w w w .aim.o rg Mass media

Self description: AIM (Accuracy In Media) is a non-profit, grassroots citizens w atchdo g of the new s m edia that critiques botched and b ungled new s stories and sets the record straight on im portant issues that have received slanted coverage. We encourage m embers of the media to report the new s fairly and objectively— w ithout resorting to bias or partisanship. By advising them of their responsibility to the public, w hom they claim to serve, AIM helps to nudge the members of the new s media into greater accountability for their actions. AIM publishes a tw ice-monthly new sletter, broadcasts a daily radio comm entary, prom otes a speaker’s bureau and syndicates a w eekly new spaper column—all geared to setting the record straight on im portant stories that the m edia have botched, bungled or ignored. We also attend the annual shareholders’ meetings of large media organiz ations and encourage our mem bers to bom bard new srooms w ith postcards and letters about biased and inaccurate new s coverage.

Alternativna Info rmativna Mreza (AIM) Address: Country: Language: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

AIM, 17 rue Rebeval, F-75019 Paris Fo rmer Yugo slavia Serbian, Cro atian, Bo snian, English, Albanian admin@aimpress.o rg w w w .aimpress.o rg Mass media

Self description: AIM is a project of independent journalists from former Yugoslavia and the European Civic Forum . AIM w as established in 1992 and its netw ork of journalists now adays covers all the states of form er Yugoslavia and Albania. The m ain objective of AIM is penetration through the information blockade and offering unbiased highquality professional inform ation. AIM engages independent journalists enabling them to remain in the profession and to inform readers of independent media about devel284

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opments in their environm ent. AIM helps independent m edia by offering them objective information from the entire region free of charge. AIM encourages the foundation of new independent media providing them w ith a reliable source of information. AIM is not a classical new s agency since its productio n is oriented tow ards analytical articles, reportage, com m entaries and interview s aim ed at preventing m anip ulation w ith inform ation, offering a com prehensive picture and background of an event. AIM supports all initiatives leading to strengthening of dem ocratic processes in the region. In its editorial policy, apart from current political and econom ic to pics, AIM d evotes m ost of its attention to topics connected w ith civil so ciety, hum an and m inority rights, position of refugees, etc. AIM operates on t he principle o f a mail-b ox system . Information is exchanged via a central com p uter lo cated in Paris. AIM no w has edito rial offices in Bosnia & Herzegovina (Sarajevo and Banja Luka), Croatia (Zagreb), Yugoslavia (Belgrade, Podgorica, Pristina), Macedonia (Skopje), Slovenia (Ljubljana) and Albania (Tirana). Apart fro m the main project, AIM also has tw o special services w hich it offers to its users: BALKAN PRESS, a w eekly press review w hich refers to the issue of Koso vo, and IZBO RBIH, a service w hich offers short inform atio n, new s, com m entaries, analytical texts, interview s and reportage from the entire space of Bosnia & Herzegovina.

American So ciety o f New spaper Edito rs (ASNE) Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Em ail: Website: Topical focus:

Lee Stinnett, Executive D irecto r ASNE, 11690B Sunrise Valley D rive, Resto n, VA 20191-1409, USA USA English 703/ 453-1122 703/ 453-1133 stinnett@asne.o rg w w w .asne.o rg Mass media

Self description: The ASNE Editors is dedicated to the leadership of Am erican journalism. It is committed to fostering the public discourse essential to democracy; helping editors m aintain the highest standards of quality, im prove their craft and better serve their com m unities; and preserving and promo ting core journalistic valu es, w hile em bracing and exploring change. ASNEâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s priorities are: To protect First Am endm ent rights and enhance the free flow of information; To d rive the quest for diversity and inclusion in the w orkplace and new spaper content; To prom ote the n e w s p a p e r â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s role in providing inform ation necessary to the inform ed practice of citizenship; To encourage innovation and celebrate creativity in new spapers; To respect and encourage the involvem ent of all its m em bers. N GO s in the O SCE W orld

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Asso ciatio n o f Independent Electro nic Media (ANEM) Contact: Address: Country: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

Veran Matic, ANEM Chairman, Edito r-in-Chief Radio B92, Makedo nska 22/ V, 11000 Belgrade, Federal Republic o f Yugo slavia Yugo slavia +381 11 322 91 09/ 324 85 77/ 322 99 22 +381 11 322 43 78/ 324 80 75 matic@b92.o pennet.o rg, marija@b92.o pennet.o rg, anem@o pennet.o rg w w w .b92.net/ ; w w w .anem.o pennet.o rg Mass media

Self description: In 1993 a gro up o f lo cal ind ependent broad cast m edia in Serbia and M on tenegro — Radio B92, Radio Bum 93, Radio Antena M , Radio Bajina Basta, Radio S m ederovo, and N TV Studio B — founded the Associatio n of Ind epend ent Electronic Med ia (ANEM). To day that netw ork collectively reaches 80 percent of Yu go s la v ia ’s p opu lation and th e m emb ership h as increased to 32 radio an d 17 T vstations. AN EM ’s m em bership criteria are that any station that expresses interest in joining it an d proves that it s edito rial po licy is indep end ent m ay join as an affiliat e m emb e r. ANEM also b elo ngs to the Co mm it tee to Protect Indep end ent Media in FR Yu goslavia — Free 2000. From th e o utset , ANEM’s overarching aim has been t o bu ild a netw ork o f professio nal broad cast m edia across Yugo slavia w hich is eq uipp ed to provid e citizen s w ith tim ely, accu rat e and balanced new s, p olitical analysis and pu blic inform ation. Th is has been achieved throu gh pro viding lo cal station s w ith in-coun try and int ern ation al net w o rking op tio ns to enhance t he q ualit y of p ro gram m ing, by co ordinat in g th e effo rts of m em b er st ations to acquire, p ro du ce, and distrib ut e program m es t o est ablish h igher jo urn alistic standards. In ad dit ion , a key goal of th e Netw ork is to bu ild solid co m mercial m anagem en t stru ct ures for self-su staina b ilit y. AN EM also provides regular jou rnalism skills t raining, a p ro du ctio n facility fo r in-hou se train ing, eq uipm en t aid, free legal supp ort and political d efen ce for all affiliate m em bers. T he m em ber st atio n s are all u n ited b y a shared com m itm en t to the fu ndam ental principles of pro fessio nal jou rnalistic eth ics and standards, dem ocracy, resp ect fo r hu m an righ ts an d tolerance.

Amnesty Internatio nal (AI) Contact: Address: Country: 286

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Internatio nal Secretariat 1 Easto n Street, Lo ndo n WCIX 8D J UK

Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

English 0044171-413 55 00 0044171-9561157 username@amnesty.o rg w w w .amnesty.o rg Human rights

Self description: Am nesty International w as founded in 1961 in London and is a w orldw ide voluntary hum an rights m ovem ent that w orks im partially for the release of prisoners of co nscience and an end to torture, â&#x20AC;&#x153;disapp earancesâ&#x20AC;?, p olitical killings and executions. Am nesty International cam paigns to stop anyone being returned to a country w here they w ould be in danger of these abuses. The organization is fin an ced by its million-plus m em bers an d supporters aro und the w orld and accepts no m oney from governm ents.

The Andrei Sakharo v Fo undatio n (ASF) Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.:

Fax: E-mail: Website: Topical focus:

Ed Kline, President Alexey Semyo no v, Vice President 65 Park Ave, 5D , New Yo rk, NY 10128, USA; 57 Zemlyano y Val Street, bld 6 Mo sco w , Russia Russia, USA English, Russian. 1-212-369-1226 (NY, USA); 703-569-2943 (Wash., USA); 7-095-923-44-0l (20) (Mo sco w , Russia) 1-212-722-0557 (NY, USA); 7-095-917-26-53 (Mo sco w , Russia) anls@mail.w dn.co m (Alexey Semyo no v) w w w .w dn.co m/ asf Wo rk w ith archives o f Andrei Sakharo v and other histo ric do cuments related to So viet Unio n, building demo cratic society, general human rights, humanitarian assistance

Self description: T he Andrei Sakharov Foun d atio n is closely related t o several o rganizations in the United States and Ru ssia, all of them ded icated t o the preservation o f the m em ory o f An drei Sakh aro v, prom otion of his ideas an d the defence of hum an rights. T h e Sakh aro v Fo undat ion (Russia)/Public Co m m issio n w as o rganised sh ortly after his d eath o n Decem b er 14, 1989. Th e An drei Sakh arov Fou nd atio n (USA) w as o rgan ised in 1990 in order to sup po rt the Ru ssian Co m m issio n. Elena Bo nner, N GO s in the O SCE W orld

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Sa k h a r o v ’s w id ow is ch air o f t he An drei Sakh arov Fou nd at ion . Th e And rei Sakharov Found atio ns have sp on so red m issio ns t o Nagorno-Karab akh an d to In gu shetia to facilitate p eaceful settlem ent of ethnic conflicts. The Sakharov Foundat ion s have also assisted the reset tlem en t o f refu gees in th e successor st ates of th e form er So viet Un io n, sp onso red th e first visit o f Kirgizstan ’s Presiden t Askar Akaev t o t he Un ited St at es, an d defended t he righ ts of scien tists persecu t ed for their po lit ical op in ions.

ARTICLE 19 Contact: Address: Country: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

Ilana Cravitz, press o fficer Lancaster Ho use, 33 Islingto n High St., Lo ndo n N19LH, UK UK +44 171 278 9292 +44 171713 1356 article19@gn.apc.o rg w w w .gn.apc.o rg/ article19 Freedo m o f expressio n issues

S elf description: ARTICLE 19 (T he Internat ion al C en tre Again st C en so rship) t akes its nam e an d purpo se from the nineteenth article of th e United Nations’ Universal Declaration of H u m an Right s, w h ich st at es “Every on e h as th e righ t to freed om o f op inion an d expression ; t his right in clu des th e freed om to hold op inio ns w it hou t interferen ce and to seek, receive an d im p art info rm at io n an d id eas t hro ugh any m ed ia and regardless o f fro nt iers.” A RT IC LE 19 defen ds th e h um an righ t w h en it is t h reaten ed , op po ses govern m ent pract ices w h ich violate it an d w orks to id entify an d expo se censo rship in all co un tries. A RT ICLE 19’s m an date is to p ro m o te an d d efen d freed om o f expressio n , to co m bat censo rship an d to en cou rage action and aw areness at national and int ernat ional levels. The o rgan iz atio n ’s p rogram m e ad dresses censo rship in it s m an y form s an d in vo lves research, cam p aign in g, ed ucatio n an d ou t reach . In p art icula r, ARTIC LE 19 has active region al p rogram m es in Africa, Asia, M id dle East and N o rth Africa, an d C en tral an d East ern Eu rop e. Wh erever p o ssible, th ese pro gram m es are im plem ented in close collabo ration w ith local p artner organizations. Its law pro gram m e is en gaged in in ternational lit igation in favou r of freed om o f expression , an d t h e organ izat ion also focu ses o n key po licy issu es affect ing freed om o f expressio n, such as “hate speech ”, t he right t o privacy; rest rict ion s based on gro und s of n ation al securit y, and th e role of p ub lic service b ro adcasting d urin g electio n cam paign s. 288

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Canadian Civil Liberties Asso ciatio n (CCLA) Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

D . S. McLaughlin 229 Yo nge Street, Suite 403, To ro nto , Canada M5B 1N9 Canada English (416) 363-0321 (416) 861-1291 ccla@ilap.co m w w w .ccla.o rg Fundamental human rights and civil liberties

Self description: The CCLA w as constituted to promote respect for and observance of fundamental human rights and civil liberties and to defend, extend, and foster the recognition of those rights and liberties. The major objectives of the CCLA include the promotion of legal protections for individual freedom and dignity against unreasonable invasion by public authority and the protection of fundam ental rights and liberties. CCLA performs a w ide range of law and polity reform w ork, including court interventions, subm issions before legislative comm ittees and other public bodies, public speaking and education, and media w ork. CCLA is not a service agency how ever, and, as a general matter, does not provide m embers of the public w ith legal advice.

Canadian Jo urnalists fo r Free Expressio n (CJFE) Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Kristina Sto ckw o o d, Executive D irecto r 489 Co llege St. 403, To ro nto , O ntario , M6G 1A5 Canada English, French 00-1 416 515 9622 00-1 416 515 7879 cjfe@cjfe.o rg w w w .cjfe.o rg Freedom o f expression and press freedom, media ow nership concentration, journalistsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; training, access to information

Self description: T h e C an adian Journalists for Free Exp ression w o rks t o pro m ot e freed om o f expressio n w o rldw id e and circu lates in form at ion to its m em bers and the m edia in C anada abo ut violation s that take place in Canad a and the rest of the w orld. It ru ns training program mes fo r jou rnalists w orld w ide and lobbies Canadian

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an d fo reign Governm en ts t o take actio n again st freedo m o f expression vio lation s in C an ada and Int ernation ally. The CJFE manages the Internatio nal Freedo m o f Exp ression Exchange (IFEX) Clearing Ho use o n behalf of mo re than 30 IFEX m em b ers, w hich circulates freedo m of exp ression new s w o rldw ide. CJFE also pro vides jo u r-nalism training w orldw ide and operates a Journalists in Distress Fund . In add ition , C JFE o ffers an Intern at io nal Press Freedo m Aw ard an nu ally.

Co mmittee to Pro tect Jo urnalists Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

330 7th Avenue, 12th Flo o r, New Yo rk, NY 10001, USA USA English (212) 465-1004 (212) 465-9568 info @cpj.o rg, euro pe@cpj.o rg (Central and Eastern Euro pe) w w w .cpj.o rg Mass media

Self description: T he Com m it tee to Pro tect Jou rn alist s is a n onpart isan , non profit organ izat io n foun d ed by a gro up o f U.S. jo u rn alists in 1981 t o m o nito r ab u ses again st th e p ress an d prom ot e press freed om arou n d t he w o rld . C PJ dep en ds o n privat e d on atio ns from jou rn alist s, n ew s organ izat ion s, an d in d epend en t fo un d a t io n s . By pu blicly revealing abu ses against th e Press and b y act ing on beh alf of im prisoned and threaten ed journalists, CPJ effectively w arns journalists and new s organ ization s w h ere at tacks on press freed om are lik ely to occur. CPJ o rgan izes vigo ro u s p rot est at all levels, ran gin g from lo cal go vernm en ts t o t h e Unit ed Nat ions, and , w hen necessary, w orks behind t he scen es thro ugh o ther d ip lo m atic chann els t o effect ch an ge. C PJ also pu blish es articles an d n ew s releases, sp ecial rep ort s, a qu arterly new slett er an d t h e m ost com prehen sive ann u al rep ort on att acks against t he press aro u nd t h e w o rld. Through its ow n reporting, CPJ has full-tim e pro gramm e coordinators monitoring the press in the Am ericas, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. They track developments through their ow n independent research, fact-finding missions and firsthand contacts in the field, inclu ding reports from other journalist s. CPJ shares inform ation on breaking cases w ith other press freedom organizations w orldw ide through the International Freedom of Expression Exchange (lFEX), a glo bal Email netw ork. Usin g local con tact s, C PJ can int ervene w hen ever fo reign corresp ond ent s are in tro u b le. C PJ is also prep ared t o im med iately n o tify new s organ iz atio n s, govern m en t o fficials, and hu m an righ ts organ iz atio n s of p ress freedo m vio lat ions. 290

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C zech Helsinki Co mmittee Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Martin Palo us, Chairman; Jana Chrzo va, Executive D irecto r Jeleni 5, P. O . Bo x 4, 11901 Praha 012 - Hrad Czech Republic Czech, English, Russian. 420-2-24 37 23 34 420-2-24 37 23 35 mpalous@beba.cesnet.cz; chrzo va@helsincz.anet.cz w w w .helco m.cz Human rights in general

Self description: Czech Helsinki Committee is an NGO running the follow ing centres and programmes: Counselling Centre for Refugees: asylum seekers coming to CR; Citizenship Counselling Centre: the stateless, former citizens of CSFR; Human Rights Documentation And Information Centre: human rights library/international focus; Monitoring of legislation and human rights situation/CR; Educational programmes: publishing activities, organization of seminars and conferences; International programmes of co-operation.

Co mmo nw ealth Press Unio n (CPU) Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email:

Mark Ro binso n, D irecto r 17 Fleet Street, Lo ndo n EC4Y 1AA UK English 0044 171 583 7733 0044 171 583 6868 106156.333@co mpuserve.co m

D erecho s Human Rights Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Margarita Lacabe 3205 San Mateo St. 1, Richmo nd, CA 94804, USA USA English and Spanish are the main languages, also Italian, French, D utch and German. 510-528-7794 510-528-7794 rights@derecho s.o rg w w w .derecho s.o rg Human rights in general N GO s in the O SCE W orld

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Self description: Derechos Human Rights is an Internet-based organization that w orks to prom ote respect for hum an and civil rights, including the right to freedom of speech and the press, all over the w orld. We also w ork for the right to privacy and against im punity for hum an rights violations. Derechos understands hum an rights as those considered as su ch under internatio nal law -but does n ot accept lim itations to fundam ental rights im posed by international law.

EEBA Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax:

9010 Celo vec/ Klagenfurt, Spo nheimerstr. 13 Austria English, German 0043 463 5330 29 218 0043 463 5330 29 209

Self description: Rad io and Television have a crucial ro le to play in reflecting the tru e reality of m ultiethnic Europe. To enable this to happen they have to break dow n m yths, barriers of ignorance, stereotyped im ages and to begin to reflect the positive contribution that the minorities are making to the social, econom ic, political and, equally im portantly, to the cultural life of Europe. Therefore cultural and existential links betw een m edia experts are im portant and necessary. The integration of these lesser-used languages and cultures into m ayor com m uncation netw orks has finally been m ade possible w ith founding of EEBA, the Euro pean Broadcasting association of smaller nations and natio nalities 1995. Its first President is Mirko Bogataj, Ed it o r-Chief , Slovenian Programm es, O RF. There are 75o million European betw een the Atlantic and the Urals representing m ore than 2oo nationalities and including m ore than 1oo m illion m em bers of ethnic m inorities and m ore than 4oo Broadcasting Program m es. The EEBA is an Euro pean initiative w hich aims to pro mote the role of public broadcasting in the developm ent of Europe and to increase the participation of ethnic and linhuistic m inorities in broadcasting to preserve their cultural heritage. It strives for the good training of young ethnic journalists, responds to technical developm ents and encourages the exchange of program m es. O ne goal to w hich EEBA aspires is a national partnership betw een m inorities and m ajorities in m ultinational states in lieu of national confrontation in national states. Partnership thrives in relationships built on equal rights, m utual respect and trust. This is the key to both the substance and m ethods of integration.

Electro nic Fro ntier Canada Contact: Address:

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Jeffrey Shallit, Vice President 20 Richmo nd Ave., Kitchener, O ntario N2G 1Y9, Canada

Country: Language: Tel.: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Canada English (519) 743-8754 shallit@graceland.uw aterlo o .ca (Jeffrey Shallit) w w w .efc.ca Free speech

Self description: Electronic Fron tier Can ada is a small, all-volun teer non -profit organization d evo ted t o th e preservat io n o f “Ch art er” righ ts an d freedom s in cybersp ace. It condu cts ed ucation al and research regarding app lication o f Can ada’s “Charter of Rights and Freedom s” t o the Internet an d o ther com puter and com m unicatio ns technologies.

Euro pean Alliance o f Press Agencies Contact: Address: Tel.: Fax: Topical focus:

Rudi V. D e Ceuster, Secretary General c/ a Agence Belga, Rue F. Pelletier 8 B, 1030 Brussels, Belgium 00322 743 1311 00322 735 1874 Mass media

Euro pean Institute fo r the Media (EIM) Contact:

Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Juan Majó I Cruzate, President; Jo Gro ebel, General D irecto r; Mo nique Masius, Press Am Zo llho f 2a, D -40221 D üsseldo rf, Germany Germany English, German, French 49 211 90104-0 49 211 90104-56 info @eim.o rg w w w .eim.o rg Mass media

Self description: The European Institute for the Media (EIM) w as established in 1983, in Manchester, in co-operation w ith the European Cultural Foundation in Amsterdam. In June 1992, the EIM moved to at the invitation of the Governm ent of North RhineWestphalia and the city of Düsseldorf, and is now located in the Düsseldorf media-area. T he Institu te w as created to give expression to the grow ing interdependence of Europ ean countries in the field of co mm unication. N GO s in the O SCE W orld

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The EIM’s m ain activit ies are: the documentation and com parative analysis of developm ents in the European med ia, the provision of a fo rum for exchange o f info rm ation and opinions on m edia issues.

Fairness & Accuracy in Repo rting (FAIR) C ontact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical Focus:

Peter Hart 130 W. 25th Street New Yo rk, NY 10001, USA USA English (212) 633-6700 (212) 727-7668 PHart@FAIR.o rg (Peter Hart) w w w .fair.org Media bias, censo rship, co rpo rate o w nership and do minatio n o f mainstream new s o utlets, co nservative bias in the new s

S elf description: FAIR is th e n at ion al m edia w atch gro u p offerin g w ell-do cu m en ted crit icism in an effo rt t o co rrect bias an d im b alan ce. FAIR fo cuses pu blic aw aren ess o n t h e n arro w corpo rat e o w nersh ip o f t h e press, t he m edia’s allegian ce to official agen d as and t heir in sen sit ivity t o w o m en, lab our, m in o rit ies and o t h er pu b lic in terest con st it u en cies. FAIR seeks t o in vigo rat e t h e First Am end m ent by ad vo cating for greater m edia p lu ralism an d th e inclu sion of p ub lic in terest vo ices in n at ion al d ebat es. FA IR’s m ajor act ivit ies in clud e m edia an alysis & research , o u treach , lect u res, m agaz in e (EXT RA!) an d rad io p rogram m e (C o u n terSp in ).

Feminists fo r Free Expressio n (FFE) Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

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Jo an Kennedy Taylo r 2525 Times Square Statio n, New Yo rk, NY 10108, USA USA English (212) 702-6292 212) 702-6277 reedo m@w ell.co m w w w .w ell.co m/ user/ freedo m Freedo m o f expressio n issues, stressing the dangers censo rship ho lds fo r w o men

Self description: Fem inists fo r Free Expressio n is a grou p of diverse fem inist m en and w om en w orking to preserve the individu al’s right to read , hear, view and prod uce m at erials o f h er choice w it ho ut th e in terven tio n of th e state “fo r her ow n good.” FFE believes freedo m o f exp ression is especially im po rtan t fo r w o m en ’s rights. While m essages reflecting sexism pervad e o ur cu lt u re in m an y fo rm s, sexual and n on-sexual, su ppressio n o f su ch material w ill neit her red uce h arm to w o m en nor furt her w om en’s goals. Censorship t raditio nally h as been used to silence w om en and st ifle fem inist so cial ch ange. It never has redu ced vio len ce; it led t o th e im prisonm en t of b irt h co nt rol ad vocate, M argaret Sanger, an d t he sup pression of fem inist w ritin gs. Th ere is n o fem inist co de abo ut w h ich w ord s and images are dangerou s or sexist . Genuin e fem in ism enco urages in d ividuals to choo se fo r th em selves.

Freedo m Fo rum Contact: Address:

Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Chris Wells, Senio r Vice President/ Internatio nal; Jo hn O w en, Euro pean D irecto r The Freedo m Fo rum Euro pean Centre, Stanho pe Ho use, Stanho pe Place, Lo ndo n W2 2HH, UK; US headquarters: 1101 Wilso n Bo ulevard, Arlingto n, VA 22209, USA USA English 001 703 284 2861 001 703 284 3529 new s@freedo mfo rum.o rg w w w .freedo mfo rum.o rg Mass media

S elf description: The Freedo m Fo rum w as establish ed in 1 991 u n der t h e d irectio n of Found er Allen H. Neuh arth as su ccessor t o the Gan nett Fou ndation, w hich w as creat ed b y Frank E. Gan nett in 1935. It is a n on p art isan, int ernatio nal fo un dation ded icat ed t o free p ress, free sp eech an d free sp irit fo r all p eop le. T he fo un dat ion pu rsues its prio rit ies th rough co n ferences, ed ucat io nal activit ies, p u blishin g, b roadcasting, onlin e services, fellow ships, partn erships, trainin g, research an d o th er p rogram m es. O p erating p ro gram m es are th e New seum at T h e Freedo m Forum World Cen tre head qu art ers in Arlingto n, Va., t h e First Am en dm en t C en tre at Van derbilt Un iversit y in Nash ville, Ten n., th e Med ia St u dies C ent re in New Yo rk City and th e Pacific Coast Centre in San Fran cisco . The Freedom Forum also h as op eratin g o ffices in C oco a Beach, Flo rid a., Buen os Aires, H on g Kon g, Jo h an nesbu rg and Lon d on . N GO s in the O SCE W orld

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Freedo m Ho use Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

Leo nard Sussman 120 Wall Street, 26th Flo o r, New Yo rk, NY 10005, USA USA English (212) 514-8040 (212) 514-8055 frho use@freedo mho use.o rg w w w .freedo mho use.o rg Po litical rights, civil liberties, human rights, press freedo m, demo cratizatio n

Self description: Freedo m Hou se is a clear voice for demo cracy and freedom arou nd the w orld. Founded nearly sixty years ago by Eleanor Roosevelt, Wendell Willkie, and other Am ericans concerned w ith m ounting threats t o peace and dem ocracy, Freedom House has been a vigorous voice for democratic values and a steadfast opponent o f dictato rship of the far left and far right. No n-p artisan and bro ad-based, Freedom House is led by a Board of Trustees composed of leading Dem ocrats, Republicans, and Ind ependents; bu siness and labou r leaders; form er senior governm ent officials, scho lars, w riters and journalists. All are united in the view that American leadership in international affairs is essential to the cause of hum an rights and freedom. O ver the years, Freedom House has been at the Centre of key issues in the struggle for freedom . We w ere ou tspoken advocates of the Marshall Plan and NATO in the 1940s, of the US civil rights m ovem ent in the 1950s and 1960s, of the Vie t n a m e se bo at people in the 1970s, of Polandâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Solidarity m ovem ent and the Filipino dem ocratic opp osition in the 1980s, and of m any dem ocracies that have em erged arou nd the w orld in the 1990s. Freedom House has vigorously opposed dictatorships in Central Am erica and Chile, apartheid in South Africa, the su ppression of the Prague Spring, the Soviet invasion o f Afghanistan, genocide in Bosnia and Rw and a, and the brutal vio lation of hum an rights in Cuba, Burm a, China and Iraq. We have cham pioned the rights of religious believers, trad e unionist s, journalists, and free-market entrepreneurs. To d a y, w e are a leading ad vocate of the w orld â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s young democracies that are coping w ith the debilitating legacy of statism , dictatorship and po litical repression. We w ork through an array of US and overseas research, advocacy, education, and training initiatives that prom ote hum an rights, democracy, free market eco nom ics, the rule of law, independent m edia, and US engagement in international affairs. Through ou r w ork at hom e and abroad, w ith support foundations, labour unio ns, corporations, private donors, and the US governm ent, Freedom Hou se gives impetus to the remarkable expansion of p olitical and econom ic freedom that is transforming the w orld at the daw n o f a new m illennium . 296

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Free 2000 Self description: Because of continued and m ounting pressure on free m edia in Yu goslavia, the Association of Indep enden t Electronic Med ia (ANEM) initiated the establishm ent of the International Com m ittee to Protect Free Media in Yugoslavia - FREE 2000. Established in August 1998, FREE 2000 currently gathers individuals from 17 international and six local non-governmental o rganizations engaged in the protection of hum an rights. The aim s of FREE 2000 are: To help institutionalise successful defence and protection of independent media in FR Yugoslavia; To initiate continuous work to protect independent media in FR Yugoslavia against syst ematic repression; To insist on the democratisation of local inform ation- and telecommunications-related jurisdiction, in keeping w ith the international standards; To encourage governments of the countries participating in the resolution of the Balkans problems to bring sufficient diplom atic attention on authorities jeopardising independent media to stop doing so; To take part in direct actions initiated by independent m edia and associations in FR Yugoslavia; To encourage local journalists in their effort to make their w ork professional; To aid the flow of inform ation bet ween media and journalists in the countries of the former Yu go sla via , w hich makes an important elem ent for successful im plementation of peace in BosniaHerzegovina but also for resolution of the Kosovo crisis and a lasting peace in the region.

Glasno st D efence Fo undatio n Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Vladimir Avdeev 4, Zubo vsky Bul., ro o m 432, 119021 Mo sco w , Russia Russia Russian, French, English. +7 095 201 4974 +7 095 201 4947 simo no v@fo nd91.msk.ru w w w .internew s.ras.ru/ GD F Legal pro tectio n and training fo r jo urnalists.

Self description: The Glasnost Defence Foundation (GDF) is one of t he oldest and best organised non-profit media watchdogs in the former USSR. Its roots go back to 1991 w hen a decision by the USSR Confederation of Cinematographers Union gave birth to GDF. At that tim e it w as a source to w hich any journalist could turn to find solace and support. Th e act ivities o f GDF fo llow several fu n dam ent al pat hs. We p ro vid e legal assistance t o jo urnalists an d m edia in vo lved in an y kin d of con flict in w hich t h e po w er structu re o r any ot h er in fluence-w ieldin g bo d y m ed dles w it h th e legit imat e w o rk of t he press. GD F m onitors violatio n s of the Russian C onstitution and N GO s in the O SCE W orld

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press law, p ro vidin g legal consu ltatio n s and st aying u p t o date o n all legislat io n con cern in g t he m ass m ed ia. We p rovide h um an itarian aid to t h ose w h o need it . We try t o assist fam ilies o f jo u rnalist s killed on t h e job , ou r co lleagues w h o find th em selves o ut of w o rk becau se of p olitical m o tives and even new sp apers struggling to stay aflo at. GDF, w ith th e h elp of oth er hu man rights o rganizat ions, leads cam paigns in defen ce of o ur colleagu es in need. We organise p ress co n ferences, issu e p ress releases, take p art in picket s an d m ake ap peals to th e govern m ent . GDF leads sem in ars and co n feren ces designed t o m ake jo u rnalist s m ore fam iliar w ith t he law . In co-operat io n w ith the Ru ssian Pro secu t or’s O ffice w e st arted a series of sem in ars to provid e p art icipan ts w it h specialised kno w ledge of h ow t he law an d m ass m ed ia in teract in societ y. We have a team of qualified experts trained in media law, ready to travel to any region of Russia and the CIS. It’s a sort of “Rescue Squad” for journalists in trouble. These consultants work to inform persecuted journalists of their legal rights and help mediate conflicts. GDF has a regional netw ork in 10 regions of the Russian Federation w hich help to monitor press law violations in the territory of the Russian Federation. O ur experts have produced a number of useful publications that w e distribute free of charge to journalists or anyone w ho needs them. With the assistance of our colleagues w e started publishing Dosje na Censuru, the Russian version of the British publication Index on Censorship. The Russian version contains several articles concerning censorship in the USSR and in Russia, pressure on journalists and the m edia, memoirs of w riters and journalists and hum an rights activists. We are now conducting scientific and practical research into Mass Media and Judicial Pow er designed to show the main tendencies in court, its reflection in mass media, journalists and public opinions about the courts, to determine some possible steps to improve the legal system of the Russian Federation and the understanding between two professional groups – journalists and judges.

Glo bal Internet Liberty Campaign Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

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D ave Banisar 66 Pensylvania Ave, Ste 301 SE, Washingto n D C 20003, USA USA English, Spanish, French, German, Arabic, Sw edish (202)544-9240 (202)547-9240 info @gilc.o rg w w w .gilc.o rg Internet po licy, encryptio n po licy, freedo m o f expressio n o n the Internet.

S elf description: T he Glo bal In t ern et Libert y Cam p aign w as fo rm ed at t h e an nu al m eetin g o f t he Int ern et Society in M ont real. Mem bers of th e coalit ion in clud e t he Am erican C ivil Lib erties Union , th e Electro n ic Privacy In form ation Cent re, H u m an Righ t s Wat ch , t h e In t ernet Societ y, Privacy In t ernat io n al, t h e Asso ciat ion des Utilisat eurs d’In ternet, and o t h er civil libert ies and h um an righ ts organ iz at io n s. T he Global Internet Lib erty C am p aign advocates: pro hib iting p rior censorsh ip o f on-lin e com m un icatio n; requiring th at law s restrict in g th e conten t of on-lin e speech distinguish betw een the liability o f content providers and the liability of data carriers; in sistin g that on-lin e free expressio n n o t b e restricted b y indirect m eans such as excessively restrictive governmental or private contro ls over com puter hardw are or softw are, t elecom m unications infrast ructure, or ot her essen tial com p onen ts of t he Internet; including citiz en s in t he Global Inform ation Infrast ructu re (GII) development process from countries that are currently unstable econo m ically, have insufficient in frastructure, or lack soph isticat ed tech no lo gy; p ro h ib it in g discrim in ation on t he basis of race, co lour, sex, lan guage, religion, p olitical o r ot her opin io n, national o r social origin , prop erty, birth or o ther statu s; en suring that perso nal inform ation generated o n the GII for o ne pu rpose is not used fo r an unrelated purpose or d isclosed w ithout the p erson’s informed consent an d enabling individ uals to review p erson al info rm ation on the Intern et and to correct in accurate in form at ion; allow ing o n-line u sers t o encryp t their com m unicatio ns and in fo rm at ion w it ho ut restrictio n.

Greek Helsinki Mo nito r & Mino rity Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical Focus:

Panayo te Elias D imitras, spo kesperso n P O . Bo x 51393, GR-14510, Kifisia, Greece Greece Greek, English. +30-1-620 01 20 +30-1-807 57 67 o ffice@greekhelsinki.gr w w w .greekhelsinki.gr Religio us, linguistic, ethnic o r natio nal mino rities’ rights in the Balkans

Self description: Min orit y Righ ts Group — Greece w as creat ed as a Greek affiliat e o f M inority Righ ts Group Int ern atio nal in Jan uary 1992. It s m em bers foun ded Greek Helsin ki M onito r in late 1992, follo w ing the en co uragement of t he Internatio nal H elsin ki Federat io n for Hu m an Righ ts (IH F). A year later, in D ecem b er 199 3, th e latt er’s General Assem bly accredited it as it s Greek N atio n al Co m m it tee w it h an observer statu s; in N o vem ber 1994, th e Gen eral Assem bly elevat ed N GO s in the O SCE W orld

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Greek H elsin ki M onit or to full m em b ership. In Ap ril 1998, Greek Helsin ki M onitor also b ecam e m em ber of th e In tern atio n al Freed om o f Exp ression Exchan ge (IFEX). In 1994, Greek H elsin ki M onitor launched a project to p repare d etailed repo rts o n all n atio nal, eth nolin gu istic and m ajor religiou s m in orit y co m m unities in Greece (Macedo nian s and Tu rks; Arvan ites, Pom aks, and Vlach s; C at ho lics, Jeho vah Witnesses, Prot estant s, an d New Religiou s M ovem en ts), as w ell as th e Greek min orit ies in Alban ia and Tu r k e y, an d t he Albanian imm igran ts in Greece. Besid es the usual m o nit orin g o f hum an righ ts violatio n s and h u m an right s related trials, th e issuin g of p ub lic stat em en ts, alon e or along w it h o t her NGO s, and the m onitorin g of Greek and Balkan m edia for stereo types an d hate sp eech, Greek H elsin ki M onit or st arted in 1997 a Rom a O ffice in co-op erat ion w ith th e Euro pean Rom a Right s Centre.

Human Rights Center o f Azerbaijan (HRCA) Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

Elano r Zeynalo v 165-3 Bashir Safaro glu Str:, Baku 370000, Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Russian, Azeri +994-12-973233 +994-12-942471 eldar@hrcenter.baku.az w w w .ko an.de/ eldar Po litical priso ners, freedo m o f expressio n, refugees

S elf description: Th e H um an Righ ts C en ter of Az erbaijan is no n-governm ent al, n on -po lit ical, n o n-registered, n o n-p ro fit o rgan izat ion creat ed o n 29 April, 1993 b y freelan ce jou rn alist an d h um an righ ts activist , Eldar Z eyn alo v. The m ain m ot ives o f th at w ere th e d isagreem en t w it h t h e resto red p olit ical cen sorsh ip in Azerb aijan, w hich block ed the pu blicatio ns abou t t he h um an right s violatio ns in t he coun try, and t he necessity o f t he p erm an en t in fo rm at io n o f local an d glob al o rganiz at ion s on th e h um an right s sit uat ion in t he co un try. T h e m ain form of th e w ork o f H RC A is t he m o nit oring o f t he h um an righ ts sit uat ion w ith t he p ub lication o f the in form ation bulletin , th em at ic rep orts, lists of prison ers etc. O t her direct io n of it s w ork is th e re-print ing t he hu m an righ ts reports of ot her organ izatio n s w it h translat ion t o th e local lan gu ages. H RC A prop agat es also t he elect ron ic m ail in the info rm at io n exch an ge in th e h um an right s field . It provid es som e lo cal NGO s b y the e-m ail lin k w ith West ern co lleagues.

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The program mes carrying out by HRCA, are the following ones: Monitoring the hum an rights situation in Azerbaijan; Monitoring the forced migration in Azerbaijan; Monitoring of prison conditions; Monitoring of w om enâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s rights; Free translation office for local e-mail netw ork of NGO s. T h e w eek ly b u llet in of H RC A covers t h e current h um an righ ts situ atio n in Az erb aijan . Sin ce Decem b er 1996, it is divided int o tw o parts: Part 1 contains th e in fo rm at io n o n st ru ggle fo r t he po w er; pro b lem s of p ress an d t eleco m m u n ication s; arrests an d trials; m eet ings; strikes; social p ro blem s. Part 2 in clud es et hnic problem s; religion; w ar an d p eace issues; refu gees an d hum an itarian aid; en viron m en tal prob lem s.

Human Rights Watch Address:

Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

US headquarters: 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th Flo o r New Yo rk, NY, 10118-3299 USA; UK: 33 Islingto n High Street, N1 9LH Lo ndo n, UK; Belgium: Rue Van Campenho ut, 1000 Brussels, Belgium USA English, French, Spanish, Po rtuguese, Chinese, Russian, Arabic (212) 290-4700 (US); (171) 713-1995 (UK); (2) 732-2009 (Belgium) (212) 736-1300 (US); (171) 713-1800 (UK); (2) 732-0471 hrw nyc@hrw .o rg;hrw atchuk@gn.apc.o rg; hrw atcheu@gn.apc.o rg w w w .hrw .o rg Human rights

Self description: H um an Righ ts Watch is ded icat ed t o pro tectin g th e h um an righ ts of peop le aro un d th e w orld . We st an d w ith victim s an d activist s t o prevent discrim in at io n, t o uph o ld p olit ical freed om , to pro tect p eop le from inh um an e co n du ct in w artim e, and to b rin g offen d ers t o ju st ice. We investigat e and expo se h um an right s violat io n s an d ho ld ab users accou nt ab le. We challenge govern m en ts and th o se w h o h old po w er to en d abu sive p ract ices an d respect int ern atio n al h um an right s law. We enlist t he pu b lic and the intern at io nal com m u nit y to su pp ort th e cau se o f h um an right s for all.

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Index o n Censo rship Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email:

Website: Topical focus:

Ursula O w en, Edito r and Chief Executive; Michael Griffin, New s Edito r Index o n Censo rship, Lancaster Ho use, 33 Islingto n High Street, Lo ndo n, N1 9LH, UK UK English 44 171 278 2313 44 171 278 1878 co ntact@indexo ncenso rship.o rg, ursula@indexo ncenso rship.o rg, michael@indexo ncenso rship.o rg w w w .indexo ncenso rship.o rg Mass media

Self description: Index on Censorship, the bi-m onthly m agazine for free speech, w idens the debates on freedom of expression w ith som e of the w orld’s best w riters. Through interview s, reportage, banned literature and polemic, Index show s how free speech affects the political issues of the m om ent.

Internatio nal Center fo r Jo urnalists (ICFJ) Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Vjo llca Mici, Assistant D irecto r, Knight International Press Fellow ship Pro gramme 1616 H Street, NW, 3 rd flo o r, Washington, DC 20006 USA English (202)737-3700 (202)737-0530 edito r@icfj.o rg w w w .icfj.o rg Mass media

Self description: T he In tern at io nal Cent er for Jou rn alists (IC FJ) w as est ab lish ed in 1984 to im pro ve t h e q uality o f jo u rnalism in n at io n s w here t h ere is lit t le o r no t radit io n of indep enden t jou rn alism . IC FJ b elieves t hat a vigo ro us, in dep en den t p ress is o ne of the m ost p ow erful w eapo ns availab le in t he st ruggle for freed om and civil right s. IC FJ believes t h at w orkin g w it h o ur co lleagu es overseas — p ro vid in g jou rnalist ic, m ed ia m anagem ent and t echn ical exp ert ise as w ell as in form ation and suppo rt services —is crit ical to the d evelo pm en t of an effective, ind epend en t p ress t hat is et hically grou nd ed an d financially st able. 302

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The ICFJ provides professional developm ent program m es that prom ote excellence in new s coverage of critical com m unity and global issues. The Center offers m any fellow ships and exchanges, conducts a variet y of training sem inars, w orksho ps and conferences, and provides a range of consulting services. Internatio nal Co nso rtium o f Investigative Jo urnalists (ICIJ) (a project of the Center for Public Integrity) Address:

Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

ICIJ at The Center Fo r Public Integrity, 910 17th St, NW, 7th Flo o r, Washingto n, D C 20006, USA USA English 1-202-466-1300/ 3519 1-202-466-1101 info @icij.o rg w w w .icij.o rg Mass media

Self description: Fou n ded in Sep tem b er 19 97 an d h eadq uart ered in Wa s h in g t o n , DC, at th e C ent er fo r Pub lic Integrit y, its p arent o rganization. it is a w orkin g net w o rk of the w o rldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s lead in g investigat ive repo rt ers. It s m ission is to co ndu ct in vest igat ive report in g p ro jects across nat io n-stat e b orders on the prem ise th at an en lighten ed p op ulace is an em p o w ered o ne. It ident ifies intern at io nal investigat ive rep orters an d lin kin g th em via t he Int ernet, co n feren ces an d th ro ugh an in stit ution al sup po rt struct u re.

International Federatio n for Info rmatio n and D ocumentation (FID ) Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Martha Sto ne, President PO Bo x 90402, 2509 LK, the Hague, Netherlands The Netherlands English, French 00 3170 314 0671 00 3170 314 0667 secretariat@fid.nl fid.co nicyt.cl:8000/ w ho 1.htm Info rmatio n

S elf description: Sin ce 1895, FID Mem bers, represent ing o rgan izatio ns an d in d ividuals in over 90 n at io ns, h ave p rom o t ed best m an agem en t p ract ice of in fo rN GO s in the O SCE W orld

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m at ion as the crit ical resou rce for all so ciet y. FID aim s t o : advance th e fro nt iers of science and t echno lo gy; im pro ve co m petit iven ess o f bu sin ess, in d ust ry and n at io n al econo m ies; st rengthen po ssib ilities for d evelop m ent an d enhance th e qu ality o f life w herever po ssib le; imp ro ve th e ab ilit y o f decisio n-m akers to make ap prop riate d ecisio ns; stim u late edu cat io nal strategies an d life-lon g learn ing; m ake exp ression p ossible in all sect ors of th e In fo rmat ion Society in clud in g th e arts an d h um an ities and w ill strive and co ntin ue to be at t he lead in g edge o f th e develo pm ent o f t he m an agem en t o f in fo rm at io n .

The Internatio nal Federatio n o f Jo urnalists (IFJ) Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

Renate Schro eder (Euro pean Federatio n o f Jo urnalists) The General Secretary, Rue Ro yale, 266 B-1210, Brussels, Belgium Belgium English, French, German, Spanish (+32 2) 223 22 65 (+32 2) 219 29 76 ifj.safety@po pho st.eunet.be , ifj.pro jects@po pho st.eunet.be w w w .ifj.o rg Mass media

Self description: The International Federation of Journalists is the w o rld’s largest organization of journalists. First established in 1926, it w as relaunched in 1946 and again, in its present form , in 1952. Today, the Federation represents m ore than 400,000 m em bers in over 90 countries. The IFJ prom otes co-ordinated international actio n to defend press freedom and social justice through t he developm ent of strong, free and independent trade unions of journalists. The IFJ does not subscribe to any given political view point, but prom otes hum an rights, dem ocracy and pluralism . Th e IFJ is op po sed to d iscrim in atio n o f all kinds – w hether o n grou nd s of sex, creed, colou r or race – and con d emn s t he use of media as p rop aganda to p rom o te in tolerance and so cial co nflict . T he IFJ believes in freed om o f po lit ical an d cult ural expression an d defen ds trade u nio n and o t her b asic hu m an righ t s. The IFJ is recogn ised as t he organiz at io n w h ich sp eaks fo r jo urn alists at in t ern ation al level, n o tably w it h in t h e Un ited Natio ns system an d w ith in th e in t ern ation al t rade u nion m o vem en t . T h e IFJ sup po rt s journ alist s an d t h eir u n io ns w h erever th ey are su bject to o ppression and w henever t hey are figh tin g for t heir indu strial and p ro fessio nal righ ts. It has est ablish ed an Int ernat io nal Safet y Fun d to provide hu m anitarian aid fo r journalist s w ho are th e victim s o f vio lence. Th e IFJ sup304

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po rt s t rade un ion solid arit y int ernatio nally an d w orks part icularly closely w it h oth er in t ern atio n al fed erat ions o f unions rep resen tin g trad es related to jou rn alism an d th e m edia indu st ry. Its basic po licy is d ecided b y t he Co ngress w hich m eets every th ree years and w ork is carried o ut by th e Secret ariat b ased in Brussels und er t he direct io n of a ru ling 20-m em b er Execu t ive C o m m itt ee.

Internatio nal Federatio n o f the Perio dical Press Contact:

Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Topical focus:

Per Mo rtensen, President; Helen Bland - FIPP general manager; Greg Stevenso n - FIPP info rmatio n executive Q ueens Ho use, 55/ 56 Linco ln’s Inn Fields, Lo ndo n WC2A 3LJ UK English 00 44 171 40 44 169 00 44 171 40 44 170 info 1@fipp.co m, fipp.nemo @nemo .gels.co m: Mass media

The International Freedo m of Expressio n eXchange Clearing Ho use Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

89 Co llege Street, Suite 403, To ro nto , O ntario , Canada, M6G 1A5 Canada English +1 416 515 9622 +1 416 515 7879 ifex@ifex.o rg w w w .ifex.o rg Mass media

S elf description: IFEX w as bo rn in 199,2 w h en m any of t he w o rld’s lead in g freed om o f expressio n organizatio n s cam e t o get her in Mo n treal to d iscuss how b est t o furth er t heir co llective go als. At it s core, IFEX is m ad e u p of o rganizat ion s w h ose m em bers refuse t o t u rn aw ay w h en th ose w h o have th e co urage to in sist upo n th eir fu n dam en tal h um an righ t t o free exp ression are censored, b ru t aliz ed o r killed . It is co m p rised o f n early 40 d ifferent freed o m of expressio n grou ps — located everyw h ere from t h e Pacific Island s t o Euro pe t o West Africa. T he nerve-centre of IFEX is the Clearing House, located in Toro nto, Canada and m anaged by Canadian Journalists for Free Expression. N GO s in the O SCE W orld

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O ne of the central com ponents o f IFEX is the Action Alert Netw ork (AAN). M em b er organiz atio ns repo rt free exp ression ab uses in th eir geograph ic region o r area o f expertise to th e C learin g Ho u se w hich , in tu rn , circu lat es th is in format io n to o t her m em b ers an d in t erested o rgan ization s all over t h e w o rld. T h e AAN also p rovides u pd at es on recent d evelopm en ts in ongo in g cases an d circulat es imp ort ant freed om o f expressio n press releases. Em ail: alert s@ifex.o rg

Independent Jo urnalism Center, Mo ldo va (IJC) Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: W ebsite:

Co rina Cepo i, D irecto r; Angela Sirbu; Pro gram Co o rdinato r O PEN WO RLD HO USE, 20 Armeneasca St., 2012, Chisinau, Republic o f Mo ldo va Mo ldo va Russian, English (3732) 222507, 264225, 260040 (3732) 264050 w w w .internew s.ras.ru/ eng/ IJC_Mo ldo va

Self description: The Independent Journalism Centre is an NGO and as a constituent part of the O pen World House w as opened at start of 1994. The O pen World House’s goal is to facilitate the transition from a totalitarian regim e to a democratic society by providing training and other resources in these areas. The IJC is founded on the principles of a profitable, free and open press. Its intent is to p rovide professional new smen and w om en, journalist trainers, and journalism students w ith media instruction and resource materials; thus contributing to the independ ence of the m ed ia environment in Moldova. The roots of the IJC lay in the field of m edia training. The Centre’s tw o prim a ry sources of funding are the Soros Foundation-Moldova and the Eurasia Foundatio n. It also has received many in- kind and program m e-support co ntributions fro m other organizations. The IJC is overseeing m ore than 30 projects for 1995-1996, m any planned in co-operation w ith the O rganization of Security and Co-op eration in Europe (Warsaw ), the European Journalism Netw ork (Prague), the Freedom Forum , the PBN Com pany (San Francisco and Moscow ), Internew s (Moscow ), Am arc (London) and the Journalists’ Union of Moldova. T h e IJC ho sts a Press C lu b organiz ed in co-o perat io n w it h M o ld ovan C om m it t ee for t h e Freedo m of Press. An in dep end en t radio st at ion is b ein g est ablished an d a television pro du ction stud io is already function ing. Hop efu ll,y th ese asso ciat ed trainin g lab oratories w ill be usefu l fo r t he jo urn alist s. Th e IJC’s activit y also in clud es th e p ub licat io n o f a w eekly in fo rm atio n d igest fo r Mo ld ovan jo urnalist s an d oth ers, as w ell as a bi-an nu al research m agazin e o n actu al med ia situ at io n in t h e cou n try. 306

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The Internatio nal Press Institute (IPI) Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Jo hann P. Fritz Spiegelgasse 2, A-1010, Vienna, Austria Austria English (+43 1) 512 90 11 (+43 1) 512 90 14 ipi.vienna@xpo int.at, info @freemedia.at w w w .freemedia.at Mass media,

Self description: The Int ernational Press Institu te is a glo bal netw ork of editors, m edia executives and leading journalists from new spapers, m agazines, radio, TV and new s agencies in over 100 nations. IPI w as founded in New York in 1950 by an internatio nal gro up of edito rs fro m 15 countries. To d a y, the IPI is the w orld ’s leadin g o rganization for the defence of press freedom . To d a y ’s training activities are focused o n the countries of the form er Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. IPI has brought journalists together and allow ed them to learn from one another. IPI’s m ain office is in Vienna. National com m itt ees in several countries and Com m ittees of Experts (e.g. for public broadcasting, private broadcasting, new s agencies, etc.) support its w ork. As an international non-governm ental organization, it enjoys consultative status w ith the UN, UNESCO , the Council of Europe and the O SCE. Its m ain objectives are: to defend and prom ote press freedom ; to organize med ia camp aigns against press freedo m vio lations; to pu blish st udies of go vernm ental pressure on the m edia; to carry out on-the-spo t investigations in areas w here press freedo m ap pears to be end angered ; to prom o te th e free exchan ge of n ew s and th e free flow o f info rm at io n regard less of national b ou nd aries; to ensure t he safety of jou rnalist s and t o allow them to w ork w it hout int erferen ce; to p ro m ote co-o peration an d an exchan ge o f p rofessional experien ce am on g its m em bers to im prove the p ractice of jou rn alism . IPI’s activities include: formal protests to governm ent s and organizations restricting the free flow of inform ation; confidential interventions w ith governm ent leaders against infringem ents on press freedom ; on-the-spot investigation by IPI observers in areas w here press freedom appears to be endangered; publication of studies of governm ental pressure on the m edia; regular documentation of any attack on p ress freedom; con ferences, sem inars an d roundtab le meetings on hum an rights as w ell as a broad range of political, social and professional issues; publication of the quarterly IPI Report , the annual World Press Freedom Review and the Congress Report; IPI holds a World Congress in a different country each year, thus underlin ing its global perspective N GO s in the O SCE W orld

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IREX/ Pro Media Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

Nancy Hedin, D irecto r Pro Media IREX; 1616 H Street NW; Washingto n D C 20006 USA English 001 202 628 8188 001 202 628 5122 pro media@info .irex.o rg w w w .irex.o rg Independent media, demo cracy and go vernance

Self description: The Professio nal Med ia Pro gram (ProM edia) exist s to sup po rt the b usiness and pro fessio nal develo pm en t of in depen dent m edia in Eastern Eu rope an d Eu rasia. Fu n ded by USAID and im plemen ted b y the In ternat ional Research & Exch anges Board (IREX),* ProM edia h as four m ain aim s in each count ry w here it o p e ra t e s: 1 . Im prove the business performance of independent media partners 2 . Prom ote constructive change in legal and regulatory regimes im pacting free speech 3 . Raise the professional (journalism ) standards of independent media 4 . Strengthen institutio nal su ppo rt for free speech through association building am ong med ia, the legal comm unity, hum an rights NGO s, and o ther activists. ProMedia project staff include a Director and Deputy Director based in IREX/ Wa s hington, along w ith Program me O fficers assigned to each ProMedia country portfolio (Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bo snia, Bulgaria, Cro atia, Rom ania, Serb ia, Ukraine). A Resident Adviser having journalism and/or m edia m anagem ent credentials is placed in each country to be the lead designer and m anager of assistance to the independent m ed ia secto r. In this w ay IREX keeps the program m e flexible and demand-driven, tailoring activities in each country under each m ain aim to m eet specific needs. ProMedia also takes a “b ottom up” versus “top dow n” approach in delivering training and technical assistance. Change is not im posed by Washington; rather, initiative from our host m edia com m unity determ ines m uch of how reform of the sector is accom plished. Close collaboration w ith m edia partners is also a m ajor factor in the sustainability of ProMedia’s accom plishm ents. IREX believes that w hile there is still a role for w orkshop s and sem inars, East Eu rope and Eurasia are now in a phase of m edia developm ent that calls for long-term , sustainable partnerships underpinned by a com bination of grants (chiefly for equipm ent), on-site consulting, and institutional support, such as for m edia defence law yers’ bars and ind ependent television netw orks. Abo ve all, IREX w ishes to instill trust betw een East and West in order to transform their mutual com mitm ent to free speech principles into beneficial action. 308

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O ther divisions at IREX supporting democrat ic reform in Eastern Europe and Eurasia are the Partnerships and Training Division, specializing in civil society institution-building; and the Academ ic Exchanges and Research Division, specializing in promoting civil society through higher education. These Divisions can be reached at irex@irex.org.

Jo urnalist Safety Service Address:

Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Topical focus:

Jo urnalist Safety Service, Jo h. Vermeerstraat 22, 1071 D R Amsterdam, The Netherlands The Netherlands English +31 20 676 6771 +31 20 662 4901 jss@euro net.nl Mass media

Media Centre Belgrade Contact: Country: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Hari Stajner, General Manager Yugo slavia mediac@o pennet.o rg 207.10.94.56/ media-centar/ uvo d.html Mass media

Self description: Media Centre is a unique institution in Belgrade, founded on 1 July 1994, on the initiative of a group of independent journalists and their associations to soon becom e a true m eeting place for independent journalists and m edia in Yugoslavia. Media Center enables journalists unobstructed w ork including the use of the Centreâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s technical facilities. Foreign journalists are, in add it io n, o ffered other professional services â&#x20AC;&#x201C; briefings, interview s, meetings w ith com petent personalities, travels in the country, etc. The prem ises of Media Centre also house the seat of the Independent Journalists Association of Serbia (IJAS). IJAS has b een a mem ber o f the International Federation of Journalists since O ctober 1994. Activities of Media Centre include publishing, research and education. Media Centre has a com plete data base on all electronic and printed m edia in Serbia. Researchers of M edia Center are ab out to com plete a com prehensive project called Hate Speech w hich w ill try to give the answ er to the key question of the role and im portance of the m edia in initiating the w ar in the form er Yugoslavia. Educational activities of Media Centre in 1996 developed through three journalist schools: a school for journalists of printed m edia, organized w ith Press Now Am sterdam (June 1996) and tw o schools for reporters of Yugoslav radio stations, N GO s in the O SCE W orld

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organized w ith BBC World Training Service, London (June and O ctober 1996). In co-operation w ith Article 19 from Londo n Media Center organized tw o seminars on m edia in the Balkans. In parallel, Media Center continues to fulfil its m ain purpose: it remains the centre of comm unication, inform ation and solidarity of independent journalists, their m edia and associations.

Medienhilfe Ex-Jugo slaw ien Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

Medienhilfe Ex-Jugo slaw ien, PO Bo x, CH-8031 Zürich, Sw itzerland Sw itzerland English, German +41-1-272 46 37 +41-1-272 46 82 MED IENHILFE@quelle.links.ch, info @medienhilfe.ch w w w .medienhilfe.ch Mass media

S elf description: Med ien hilfe Ex-Jugo slaw ien w as fo unded in D ecem ber 1992 by a grou p of jo urnalists and o ther interested peo ple w ho w ere — and st ill are — co m m itted to t he stru ggle fo r in dep en den t m ed ia. All th e w ork is do ne on a voluntary b asis. Med ienh ilfe Ex-Jugoslaw ien financially and mat erially supp orts in all p art s o f form er Yu go slavia in dep endent m ed ia w hich con tribut e to this no ble aim . Further w e are int erested in know in g ou r ow n m edia an d how t hey com m ent on t he w ar. Medienh ilfe Ex-Jugoslaw ien sup po rts variou s rad io - and T V-st ations, n ew spap ers an d m agazin es. We are in clo se cont act w it h journalists in form er Yu goslavia and indep en dent p olit ical exp ert s b ot h in Sw itzerlan d and abroad . The su pp orted m edia m u st be in dep en den t from an y govern m en tal in fluence an d deny the po litics of w ar and ethnicity.

Natio nal Freedo m o f Info rmatio n Co alitio n Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax:

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Nancy Mo nso n, Executive D irecto r 400 S. Reco rd St., Suite 240, D allas, TX 75202, USA USA English 214/ 977-6658 214/ 977-6666

Email: Website: Topical focus:

username@airmail.net w w w .nfo ic.o rg First Amendment/ Freedo m o f Info rmatio n

Self description: A loose coalition o f (Am erican) state groups w ho com e to gether to share w hatâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s happening in their state and attempt to learn from each other. We would perhaps w elcome an international comp onent to our organization in the futu re.

No rw egian Fo rum fo r Freedo m o f Expressio n Contact: Address:

Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Carl Mo rten Iversen, administrato r No rw egian Fo rum fo r Freedo m o f Expressio n, Menneskerettighetshuset Urtegata 50, N-0187 O slo , No rw ay No rw ay English +47 22 67 79 64 +47 22 57 00 88 nffe@o nline.no w w w .ho me.so l.no / ~nfy/ Mass media

Open So cie ty Institute Netw o rk Media Program, Soro s Fo undatio n Contact:

Address:

Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Go rdana Janko vic, D irecto r Biljana Tato mir, Pro ject D irecto r Algirdas Lipstas, Pro ject Manager Netw o rk Media Pro gram, O pen So ciety Institute - Budapest, Nado r u. 11, 6th flo o r, Budapest, Hungary Mailing address: H-1525 Budapest 114 P.O .Bo x 10/ 25, USA English (36 1) 327 3824 (36 1) 327 3826 gjanko vic@o si.hu,btato mir@o si.hu, alipstas@mail.o si.hu w w w .o si.hu/ nmp Mass media

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S elf description: T h e Net w ork M edia Program acts as a co n su lt an t , resou rce, liaiso n and p artn er for th e m ed ia pro gram m es o f n at io n al fo un d at io n s as w ell as for o t h er net w ork en t it ies w orkin g on m ed ia-relat ed p ro ject s, an d fo r vario u s organ iz at io n s w orking in t h e m ed ia field in C ent ral and East ern Euro p e an d th e fo rm er So viet Un ion . N M P seeks to brid ge inform at ion gap s in t h e m ed ia field , bo ost co-op erat ion am o ng nat ion al fo un dat ion s, as w ell as bet w een n atio n al fou n dation s an d o th er m ed ia in st it ut ion s an d do n or/p art n er organ iz at io ns, w orks t o m inimise du p licatio n, fo st er co st -effect iven ess and m axim ise reco urses w it h in t he net w ork. NMP activit ies in clud e assist an ce to t h e n ation al fo u nd at io n s in sh apin g th e st rategies o f th eir m ed ia program m es, fin din g in tern at ion al p artn ers/d on ors for t h eir project s. T h e Program also in itiat es, facilitat es an d su pp ort s cro ss-cou n try m edia-related pro jects im plem en ted b oth by t he n atio n al fo un datio ns and /or o t her o rganizat ion s. Th ro u gh it s act ivit ies N MP offers a po ssib ilit y o f sup po rt (by net w orking independ en t d emo cratic media in th e region) to th e m edia w hich are w orkin g on po sit io nin g t hem selves in t h e em ergin g m arket s. Prim ary con cern o f t he Program is assistan ce in est ablishm ent of t he en viro n m en t favo urable to t h e viabilit y and fu rt h er develo p m en t o f free, in depen d en t an d respo n sible m edia in t h e regio n. Wo rkin g t ow ard s th is goal, N MP is co ncent ratin g o n t h e p ro jects ad dressin g t h e issu es o f dem o crat ic m ed ia legislation , m o nitorin g vio lation s o f m edia freed om , prot ectio n of jou rn alists, establish m en t o f m ed ia self-regu lat ion syst em s an d stro ng in dep end en t p ro fession al o rgan iz at io ns, raising p ro fession alism o f jou rn alist s an d m ed ia m anagers.

Press No w Contact: Address: Country: Tel.: Fax: Email: Topical focus:

Paul A. J. Staal, Executive D irecto r c/ o D e Balle, Kleine-Gartmanplantso en 10, NL-1017, RR Amsterdam, the Netherlands The Netherlands 31-20-5535165/ 67 31-20-5535155 pressno w @xs4all.nl Mass media

Self Description: Ever sin ce Ap ril 1993 Press No w stan d s fo r th e in dep end en t m ed ia in fo rm er Yugo slavia. Press No w w an ts: t o inform po lit ician s, p ress and general pu blic o n th e sub ject -m att er o f med ia in fo rm er Yu go slavia by m eans o f pub lic program m es an d cam p aign s; t o raise m on ey and t o gath er eq uipm en t fo r ind epen d ent m edia in form er Yu goslavia, an d t o deliver it to th ose p laces w here it is n eeded ; t o officiate as an in fo rm at ion cross-po int bet w een t he m ed ia in exYu goslavia, su pp orters in t he N et herlan ds an d Euro pe, an d t h e D utch m edia; to 312

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bring t he m ed ia t here in t o uch w it h th e m ed ia h ere, so th at t he Dutch m edia can p rovide a st ru ct ural su pp ort t o th e related new sp apers and b ro ad cast ers. Press N ow sup p o rts th o se m ed ia in Bosn ia-Herzego vin a, Kosovo , Croat ia, Maced onia, Mo nten egro, Serbia an d Sloven ia w h ere it is an est ab lished fact: that th ey are n o t st at e-ow ned ; t hat t h eir editorial p olicy is n ot influ enced by go vernm ent al structures; th at they are n ot co nnect ed to any po litical part y; th at th ey do not sp read propagan da; t hat they take a stan d again st w ar and ethnic co nflicts; th at t hey con tribu te to a recon struct io n of d em ocracy. Seven t een d ifferen t new sp apers and b ro adcasters w ere su pp orted . Wh ile in 1994 m ost h elp st ill con sist ed of em ergency aid, m o re at tent ion w as given to structu ral in vestm ent s fo r t he in d epen d en t m edia in 1995.

The Repo rters Co mmittee fo r Freedo m o f the Press Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Email: Topical focus:

Lucy D alglish, Executive D irecto r Suite 1910, 1101 Wilso n Bo ulevard, Arlingto n, VA 22209, USA USA English 703 807 2100 rcfp@rcfp.o rg We deal exclusively w ith legal issues (as distinguished fro m jo urnalism ethics) affecting the ability o f jo urnalists to gather and disseminate new s. We do no t deal w ith labo ur relatio ns o r emplo yer/ emplo yee disputes. We do no t lo bby.

Self description: The Repo rters Co mm ittee for Freedom of the Press w as created in 1970 at a tim e w hen the nation’s new s m edia faced a w ave of go vernment subpoenas asking reporters to name confidential sources. A group of prom inent American journalists form ed a com m ittee intervening in court cases. In the last tw o decades, the Comm ittee has played a role in virtually every significant press freedom case that has com e before the Suprem e Court as w ell as in hund reds of cases in federal and state co urts. The Com m ittee has also em erged as a m ajor national — and international — resource in free sp eech issues, dissem inating inform ation in a variet y of form s, including a quarterly legal review, a bi-w eekly new sletter, a 24-hour hotline, and various handbooks o n m edia law issues. Academ icians, state and federal agencies, and Congress regularly call on the Com m ittee fo r advice and expertise, and it has becom e the leading advocate for repo rters’ interest in cyberspace. Im portant as these activities are, the Co m mittee’s prim ary missio n remains serving w orking journalists — 2,000 o f them every year. N GO s in the O SCE W orld

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Repo rters Sans Fro ntières (RSF) Address:

Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

Internatio nal O ffice, Repo rters sans fro ntières, Secrétariat internatio nal, 5, rue Geo ffro y-Marie, 75009 Paris, France France French, English, Spanish 01.44.83.84.84 01.45.23.11.51 rsf@rsf.fr w w w .rsf.fr Mass media

Self description: RSF w as founded in June 1985 by Robert Ménard, a journalist w ith Radio France Hérault to report on disasters that the established m edia too often ignored. So for four years, from 1985 to 1989, it paid for coverage of w ars and countries that had been “forgotten” by the m edia. The m oney cam e from public funds (the Hérault departm ental council and the Languedoc-Roussillon regional authority) and from private contributions (sponsorship by com panies). Meanwhile, throughout those years a problem underlying the initiative taken by RSF became steadily more apparent: the difficulties faced by journalists trying to do their w ork in freedom . The sm all group supported by local charity gradually grew, broadening its contacts w ith similar organizations w orking for freedom of expression. It now has 15 permanent staff, 1,200 members in about 20 countries, 110 correspondents w orldwide, six national branches (France, Germ any, Spain, Belgium , Sw eden and Sw itzerland) and desks in Istanbul and Washington. It holds consultative status w ith the Council of Europe, the United Nations Com mission on Hum an Rights and UNESCO . Its goals are: to help im prisoned jo urnalists; to pu blicise violations o f press freedom ; to help media that are victim s of rep ression; to encou rage d ebate on problem s connected w ith press freedom .

Statew atch Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus: 314

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To ny Bunyan, Edito r PO Bo x 1516, Lo ndo n N16 0EW, UK UK English 00 44 181 802 1882 00 44 181 880 1727 o ffice@statew atch.o rg w w w .statew atch.o rg The State and civil liberties in the EU

Self description: Statew atch w as founded in 1991. It is a non-profiting making voluntary group w ith a netw ork of 34 contributors draw n from 12 European countries. It is now one of the leading sources of information on justice and hom e affairs in the European Union, the Council of Justice and Home Affairs, the Schengen Agreement, surveillance and civil liberties. In O ctober 1997 the Statew atch European Monitoring & Documentation Centre (SEMDO C) w as launched at the UK offices of the European Parliament. Seventy individuals and organizations signed up as supporters – law yers, MPs, MEPs, researchers, journalists, academics national and community groups from across the EU. In November 1996 Statew atch lodged six com plaints w ith the European O mbudsman concerning access to documents on justice and home affairs against the Council of Ministers. To date the first three com plaints have been w on. As a result of our complaints the right to put complaints concerning justice and home affairs w as written into the Am sterdam Tre a t y. O n 28 April, Statew atch’s Editor, Tony Bunyan, w as presented w ith a Freedom O f Information Award 1998 for our w ork on tackling secrecy in the EU. The prize w as presented by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine, a m ember of the UK Cabinet.

Wo rld Asso ciatio n o f Co mmunity Radio Bro adcasters (AMARC) Contact: Address:

Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Website: Topical focus:

Mrs Maria Victo ria Po lanco , President AMARC Internatio nal Secretariat, 3575 bo ulevard St Laurent, bureau 611, Mo ntreal, Q uebec, Canada, H2X 2T7; AMARC Euro pe, 15 Paterno ster Ro w, Sheffield S1 2BX, UK Canada English, French, Spanish (1-514) 982-0351 (Canada); (44-114) 221 0592 (Euro pe) (1-514) 849-7129 (Canada); (44-114) 279 8976 (Euro pe) amarcho @amarc.o rg, europe@amarc.org (Europe) w w w .amarc.o rg Mass media

Self description: AMARC is an international non-governmental organisation serving the community radio movement. Its goal is to support and contribute to the development of community and participatory radio along the principals of solidarity and international co-operation. AMARC’s international secretariat is located in Montreal, Canada. AMARC’s regional offices play an essential role providing training and other services and co-ordinating exchange projects. The Latin America office located in Q uito, Ecuador, offers on-site courses and evaluation for com munity radio projects and m aintains regular contact w ith the regio n ’s 300 members. A European office has been set up in co-operation w ith the Community Radio Association in Sheffield, England. One of the office’s current projects is O pen Channels, an exchange programme betw een broadcasters of Western, Central and EastN GO s in the O SCE W orld

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ern regions of Europe. A regional office for Africa w as opened in 1996 in Johannesburg, reflecting the grow ing presence of community radio on the continent. — InteRadio is a m agazine dedicated to community radio. Published bi-annually in French, English and Spanish, it features news and analysis on issues of concern to those interested in com munity radio and the democratization of communications. It is distributed to AMARC members and to a total of 4,000 individuals and organisations around the globe. — AMARC-Link is a new sletter about AMARC’s projects and activities. It includes new s from the international secretariat, regional offices, the Wo m en ’s Netw ork, the Solidarity Netw ork and more. AMARC-Link is published every tw o months in French, English and Spanish and is distributed free to AMARC mem bers. — AMARC has published a number of studies, conference reports, amides as w ell as a book featuring the stories of 21 community stations from around the w orld. Many of AM ARC ’s publications are available in French, English and Spanish. — Lobbying: AMARC represents the community radio sector at certain international forums dealing w ith issues ranging from the right to communicate to digital audio broadcasting (DAB). — AM ARC ’s Solidarity Netw ork exists to m ob ilise the w orldw ide co mm unity radio m ovem ent in solid arity w ith com m unity radio broadcasters w hose right to freedom of speech is threatened. The Solidarity Netw ork’s Regional and National Coordinators, distribute Radio Action Alerts and overall coordination of the Netw ork is provided by AMARC’s secretariat. — The w omen’s netw ork: AMARC’s Declaration of Principles makes specific recognition of the “Role of Women in establishing new comm unication practices”. Its objective is to promote exchange and solidarity among w omen working in alternative radio projects. The Network has published a directory of women w orking in community radio. The Wo m en ’s Netw ork has made a project “Starting point”, w hich is a series of radio program mes produced by w om en on multiple social themes. — AMARC has established a netw ork of skilled professionals w ho can provide training and consultation in all aspects of com munity radio. — AMARC organises regional and global conferences and seminars on community radio and the democratisation of comm u n ica t io n .

Wo rld Asso ciatio n o f New spapers Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: W ebsite: Topical focus:

Timo thy Balding, D irecto r General 25 rue d’Asto rg, 75008 Paris, France France English, French, German, Spanish (33-1) 47 42 85 00 (33-1) 47 42 49 48 co ntact_us@w an.asso .fr, tbalding@w an.asso .fr, w w w .fiej.o rg Mass media

Self description: Founded in 1948, the World Association of New spapers (ex-FIEJ) grou ps 57 new spaper pub lishers associations in 53 countries, individual new spaper 316

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execu tives in 90 nations, 17 natio nal and international new s agencies, a m edia foundation and 7 affiliated regio nal press organizations. In all, the Association represents m ore than 15,000 publications on the five continents. The World Association of New spapers has three m ajor objectives: defending and prom oting press freedom and the econom ic independence of new spapers as an essential condition for that freedom ; contributing to the developm ent of new spaper publishing by fostering com m unications and contacts betw een new spaper executives from different regions and cultures; promoting co-operation betw een its m ember organizations, w hether national, regional or w orldw ide. In pursuit of these objectives, the World Association of New spapers notably: represents the new spaper industry in all international discussions on m edia issues, to defen d both p ress freedo m and the professional and bu siness interests of the press; promotes a w orld-w ide exchange of information and id eas on produ cing b etter and m ore profitable new spapers; opposes restrictions of all kinds on the free flow of inform ation, on the circulation of new spapers and on advertising; cam paigns vigorou sly against p ress freedom violations and ob stacles; helps new spapers in developing countries, through training and other co-operation projects; channels legal, m aterial and hum anitarian aid to victim ized publishers and journalists;

Wo rld Press Freedo m Co mmitte (WPFC) Contact: Address: Country: Language: Tel.: Fax: Email: Topical focus:

Marilyn J. Greene, Executive D irecto r; Ro ny Ko ven, WPFC Euro pe, Paris 11690-c Sunrise Valley D rive, Resto n, Virginia 20191, USA U.S. English (703) 715-9811 (703) 620-6790 freepress@w pfc.o rg Mass media

Self description: The WPFC, w ith 40 affiliated journalistic organizations on six continents, is in the forefront of the struggle for a free press everyw here. It emphasizes monitoring and co-ordination, vigorous advocacy of free-press principles and practical assistance programm es. It is a w atchdog for free new s m edia at UNESCO , the UN, O SCE, Council of Europe, European Union, and at human rights and other interna tional m eetings considering free-press issues. Its Charter for a Free Press provides guideposts for press freedom w herever these are needed. It has been w idely endorsed and is available in seven languages including Russian, Chinese and Arabic. The Fund against Censorship, w hich WPFC administers in co-operation with other free press groups, extends selfĂ&#x; help legal grants to help new s media to fight back w hen governments move in. More than 150 WPFC training and related projects to date include publication of journalism m anuals in Africa and in 10 Central and Eastern European languages. The WPFC implements joint activities for a Co-ordinating Comm ittee of major w orld free-press organizations. N GO s in the O SCE W orld

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The Autho rs D eyan Anastasijevic – 38, a veteran reporter on the Yugoslav w ars. Born and raised in Belgrade. Senior journalist in the Serbian independ ent Vreme w eekly and a freelance Balkan correspondent for Time m agazine. He now lives in Vie n n a . Katarzyna Co rtés – a student of journalism , political science and slavic languages at Ludwig - Maxim ilians University in Munich. Born in 1970 in Poland. She is currently an intern w ith the O ffice of the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media. Freimut D uve – a German politician, human rights activist, w riter and journalist w as elected the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media by the O SCE Ministerial Cou ncil in Decem ber 1997. Duve w as born in 1936 in Würz burg and received his education in Modern History, Sociology, Political Science and English Literature at the University of Hamburg. He w orked as an Editor at the Row ohlt publishing house and w as a Social-Dem ocratic Mem ber of the Bundestag (Germ an Parliament) from 1980 to 1998, representing his city, Hamburg. Roy Gutman – a reporter in Washington, w on the Pulitzer and other journalism prizes for his reporting on “ethnic cleansing” during the conflict in Bosnia. He co-edite d Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know, a guide to the conflicts of the 1990s and beyond and to the Geneva Conventions and o ther instrum ents of international hum anitarian law. Katharina Hadjidimos – a German-Greek law yer. She has w orked on Greek and Turkish m edia issues including the co-production of a program me w indow from September 1998 to February 2000. In autum n 1998, she w as an intern in the O ffice of the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media. Her stays and her research in Vie nna, in Turkey and in Greece w ere m ade possible by the Graduate Program for International Affairs of the Rob ert Bosch Foundation. Baton Haxiu – a journalist and author from Prishtina. Born in 1965., w orks as Edit o r-in-Chief of the independent new spaper Koha Ditore. His book Kosovo und das Internationale Roulette (Kosovo and international Roulette) w as pub lished 1995 in Prishtina. Alexander Ivanko – a former Russian journalist w ho w orked for Izvestia d a ily, a leading Moscow new spaper, 1984-1994. From 1994 until 1998 he w as posted as the Unit ed Nations Spokesman in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ivanko joined the O ffice of t he O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media as an Advisor in O ctober 1998. Ivan Lovreno vic – an author, publisher and columnist. Born in 1943, lives in Sarajevo. From 1993 to 1998 lived in exile in Berlin and Zagreb. Autho r of a do zen books on Bosnia including tw o novels. Has also published a number of articles in international new spapers. 318

Mihaylo Milovano vitch – a graduate in anthropology and philosophy of the High Institute of Philoso phy in Munich, Germ any. Born in 1974. Lived in Sofia, Belgrade and Munich. Currently an intern w ith the O ffice of the O SCE Representative on the Freedom of the Media. Lidija Po povic – a journalist w ith the O RF program m e N eighbour in Need and correspondent for the independent Belgrade Radio B2 92 from Vienna. Born in 1973 in Belgrade, Yu go sla via. Anato ly Pris tavkin – a Russian w riter and p oet. He started his literary career in the 50s and w ent on to pub lish novels about Siberia. He is also w ell know n for his non-fiction w ritings abou t nature. His novel A Golden Cloud Passed By b ecam e a classic in the late ’80s and w as one of the first Russian novels to tell the story of Chechens w ho w ere deported to Kazakhstan and Central Asia in the ’40s. Branko Sbutega – a Catho lic priest, w riter and patron of the arts. Born in 1952, lives in Kotor, Montenegro. Author of numerous essays on the spiritual and cu ltural history of the Dalm atian area. O ccasional columnist in the daily new spaper S lobodna Dalmacija, Split. Stanley Schrager – a senior US diplom at w ho has been w orking in the diplomatic service and pub lic affairs fo r 25 years. He served in Rom ania, Philipp ines, several African countries and in 1993-1996 w as the US Embassy Spokesm an in Hait i. He briefly served as Public Affairs Advisor to the US Mission to the O SCE before joining from the outset as an Adviser in the O ffice of the O SCE Representative on Freedom of the Media. D ragan Ve likic – a narrato r, co lumnist and publisher of the series A patreidi. Born in 1953, lives in Belgrade and Budapest. Author o f five novels and num erous co llections of short stories and essays w hich have been translated into all m ajor languages. Knut Vo lle b ae k – Chairm an in O ffice of the O SCE in 1999. Born in 1946. Degrees in political science and econom ics. Employed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norw ay since 1973. Has been p osted in New Delhi, Madrid and Harare. Am bassad or to San José 1991-93. Positions as Head of Division and Director General. State Secretary for Kjell Magne Bondevik 1989-90. Assistant Secretary General for Developm ent Cooperation since 1994. Appointed Ambassado r to Paris 1997. Hanna Vu o kko – a hum an rights and international law expert w ith post-graduate degrees from universit ies in Finland and the USA. She has w orked as the Hum an Dim ension O fficer at the O SCE Mission to Ukraine in Crim ea and taught hum an rights and hum anitarian law at Åbo Akademi University in Finland. She is currently seconded by Finland to the O ffice of the Representative on Freedom of the Media. Ivana Zivko vic – a journalist w ith the O RF p rogram m e N eighbour in N eed and a correspondent to various independent media in Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. Born in 1970 in Nis, Yugoslavia. 319

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