10 Metropolitan areas: the new face of urban Pakistan
17 From Tashkent to Karachi: What does Uzbekistan’s billion dollar tech giant Uzum want in Pakistan?
22 Blood and billions: Inside Pakistan’s drug trade
28 The Real Problem Isn’t Cholistan —It’s Pakistan’s Shrinking Water Supply Mohsin Leghari
31 Local governments could be game-changers in countering extremism Dr Javed Younas
33 What has Ignite achieved?
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By Farooq Tirmizi
The easiest way to know that something big is changing in Pakistan’s urban geography is by looking at what happened to Raiwind.
In the 1990s, Raiwind was famous for being the sight of the Tablighi Jamaat’s annual ijtima. As a young boy, whenever I asked somebody where Raiwind was, the answer was always: “It is somewhere outside Lahore”.
Raiwind today is not outside Lahore. It is very much a part of Lahore and feels like it, even though it was once so far out that it was described as not being part of the city at all. And the numbers show exactly why that is. In the 1998 census, Raiwind had a population of just over 27,000 people. As of the 2023 census, it had 1.1 million people. Raiwind alone is as big as Islamabad, and bigger than Sialkot or Bahawalpur.
In sheer scale, it is one of the largest and fastest growing parts of urban Pakistan. But it is far from being alone. Parts of Pakistani cities that were once deemed to be “the outskirts” of cities or even rural areas are now completely connected parts of those cities and changing the very definition of what it means to be from those cities.
They are introducing to Pakistan something that was first invented in post-World War II United States: the metropolitan area.
The boundary between city and village is never completely sharp, but up until the late 1990s, that boundary used to blur in favour of the village. City limits would extend far beyond the denser neighbourhoods that characterize urban areas and significant portions of the jurisdiction of “municipal” governments would actually consist of farmland. And indeed even now, it is possible to see cows walking on the side of streets in the middle of even the largest cities in Pakistan, and not just before Eid ul Azha.
But the nature of that boundary is now changing, and it appears that cities are claiming a larger share of the physical space of this country. And more specifically, while it was once the norm for the city to end and be immediately abutted by farmland, now it is much more common to see suburbs, followed by perhaps a small green belt followed by the suburbs of another city that is so close as to feel functionally an extension of the larger city in its vicinity.
This blurred sense of place for urban locations is a metropolitan area, something that functionally did not exist prior to the Musharraf Administration. As recently as 25 years ago, Pakistan had cities, towns, and
villages. Now, it has metropolitan areas, each with dense urban cores, with suburbs and exurbs. Some of these metropolitan regions are even part of the one (and a half) mega regions in the country.
In this story, we will take a look at how the geography of urban Pakistan is changing, specifically not just which cities, but which areas within each metropolitan area are growing the most rapidly (and a handful of the ones that are shrinking). We will look at why these changes are happening and what the implications are for the economy’s future. We will examine what it means for how to find opportunities to invest in real estate. And finally, we will look at the rise of both of Pakistan’s mega regions (with one considerably bigger than the other).
The fastest growing cities (and neighbourhoods) in Pakistan
Comparing the population data for cities and sub-division jurisdictions within cities from the censuses between 2017 and 2023, one can arrive at a picture of what are the fastest growing urban localities in Pakistan, and which ones are rapidly declining.
Almost all of the localities that have grown by an average annual growth rate in the double digits is an outer lying area of a major city or metropolitan area. These include places like Mauripur in Karachi (20.81% average annual growth between 2017 and 2023), Kunjah in Gujrat (18.7% per year), Dijkot in Faisalabad (16% per year), Quetta Cantt in Quetta (10.3% per year), and so on. And, of course, the heavyweight that is Raiwind.
Strictly speaking, Raiwind is not the fastest growing part of Pakistan, since there are many smaller urban areas that had faster growth (too small to be identifiable as part of a clear trend), but Raiwind stands out in being a 1-million-person urban borough effectively sprouting out of thin air. The scale of what has happened there has simply not happened at quite that speed anywhere else in Pakistan. It is the closest Pakistan has come to the Chinese miracle of major global cities emerging out of the rice paddy.
(Census data will also, inexplicably make it look like Rawalpindi doubled in size over six years. This is likely due to a redefinition of the district’s boundaries to include the rapidly expanding Islamabad suburbs. There is likely a lot of growth there, but exactly how much is more difficult to say, given the inconsistency of the data.)
Among the larger parts of existing cities, some of the most impressive growth has come in Ferozabad (7.4% per year), Manghopir,
Gulshan-e-Iqbal, and Lyari in Karachi and the urban cores of the cities of Gujrat, Okara, and Sargodha.
The growth in Gujrat and the broader Gujranwala region is impressive enough that it will be the subject of a future story that we will be doing on the rise of the Gujranwala metropolitan area.
And these places are not just around the major cities in central Punjab and Karachi either. South Punjab’s towns are also consolidating into metropolitan areas. Some of the fastest growing parts of Pakistan are the suburbs of Bahawalpur and Rajanpur.
Why is growth coming in these areas?
So why is the growth coming in areas like Raiwind or Mauripur?
There is not yet good mapping between the census data and other survey data around income and professions, so a full analysis of who precisely is moving into these neighbourhoods is not yet visible. But if one drives out into these neighbourhoods, the nature of the construction – and a quick survey of Zameen.com for prices of real estate in these areas – gives one a reasonable guess as to what might be happening.
What these neighbourhoods have in common is mass produced suburban housing made cheaply and at scale to allow people of a specific income bracket to be able to move in. These are houses with the basics, no fancy fittings, but all the necessities of what used to pass for luxury in the Pakistan of 1980. They are in neighbourhoods connected by road to both industrial areas for blue collar jobs and to commercial districts for white collar jobs.
The connections comprise of roads to be driven over on motorcycles or small Suzuki cars, or for those with less means, the bus going towards the factories or offices. How long it takes to get to work depends on how much income you have. If you have your own motorcycle, or more luckily, a small car, then probably about an hour to get to work, assuming no morning rush hour traffic. If on the bus, probably significantly longer.
These are people who are able to afford this kind of life on their own financial resources for the first time, perhaps ever, in the history of their families. It marks their arrival – hopefully permanently – into the ranks of what will become Pakistan’s growing middle class.
One other aspect that may be interesting: these are all people who are in the same part of the country and therefore are likely the same – or closely related – ethnic group, and since these developments go on the market at the same time, are all people who are going through a similar phase of their family’s economic evolution. It would be difficult to
South Asia at Night
measure this, but one suspects that the social cohesion levels in a place like this would be relatively higher, given the depth of common experiences shared by the residents.
Data on where they moved from is not directly available, but other government data sources indicate that a substantial portion of the people moving to these parts of the country are coming from rural areas, as well as smaller towns within the surrounding district. Metropolitan areas are not just reshaping the structure of urban Pakistan, they are also making it somewhat more compact by moving people closer to the urban cores.
Why are people moving to these areas? It is better than what they had where they are coming from, and they can now afford it because of jobs they now have access to thanks to Pakistan’s – haltingly – growing economy. (Year-to-year, Pakistan’s economy is highly volatile, but zoom out to longer term horizons and the trend line is unmistakably upwards.)
What this means for Pakistan’s economy
One of the most important consequences of this is that the nature of where you are from has changed. If you live in Jaranwala, for instance, it is not inaccurate for you to describe yourself as “from Faisalabad” because you live in the second largest city in the Faisalabad metropolitan area.
The analog here is of Americans who will say, for example, that they are “from Chicago” but when you ask them where in Chicago, the response will be “I am from Naperville”, which is not a part of the city of Chicago, but is a suburb.
In the case of Lahore in particular, the definition is being stretched quite a bit. Sheikhupura and Nankana Sahib are both cities with their own identity and their own histories. But at this point, their connectivity with Lahore is so deep that they are functionally large suburbs of Lahore now. You would probably still say that you live in Sheikhupura, but make no mistake: you are a resident of the Lahore metropolitan area.
Why is this the case especially in the case of Lahore? Because – thanks to the Sharif Brothers’ 40-year dual obsession with physical infrastructure and Lahore – Punjab’s capital has the best road network, and its surrounding cities therefore have the best road connections into Lahore.
This means that many people can and do live in Nankana Sahib or Sheikhupura but work in Lahore. The Ring Roads that started off with Lahore but have since spread to other cities in the capital make it easier for people to drive or take the bus into the urban core, increasing the economic linkages between Lahore and its surrounding cities, further
rendering them into its suburbs.
It also means that labour markets – and consumer markets – are far more integrated now than ever before. Drawing talent from a wider pool is obviously helpful to employers and is likely to improve their productivity, but also set up a flywheel effect: more employers are likely to find employees who help them grow their businesses faster, which in turn would mean that the relative economic attractiveness of the region would grow, attracting more people to move there, and thereby making it easier for yet more businesses to continued to scale and grow there.
This is especially important in a country like Pakistan where the economic elite have a tendency to think that the country only has three major cities: Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad.
What this means for real estate investment
The ring roads in particular are a major driver of real estate development. The main purpose of ring roads is to enable cross-metropolitan area travel: allow people who live in any part of the metropolitan area the ability to quickly get onto a highway, and then drive at high speed to even the opposite side of the metropolitan area in a relatively short period of time, making a daily commute possible.
One would think that improving road access raises real estate prices – and yes it does relative to the historical average price before the road was made – but actually it may end up having a stabilizing effect on prices.
Consider, for example, the following fact: on average, for a similar income-bracket neighborhood, houses in Islamabad and Karachi are more expensive than those in Lahore. Does that make sense? Lahore, with its high quality infrastructure, should be a more desirable place and therefore cause people to bid up prices there. But there is a countervailing factor at work.
Because Lahore’s infrastructure has seen so much investment, that means that the supply of high infrastructure quality neighbourhoods is large, which means that people have a lot more choice than they would in a city like Karachi, where everyone with money wants to live mostly either in Clifton or DHA (with some old money exceptions), which causes the prices of those areas to be bid up sharply, and making them more expensive to live in than even the most well developed par of Lahore. What does all of this mean for a real estate investor?
It means that the potential for price appreciation is higher in parts of the country where there is accessible space to build affordable housing for the up and coming
middle class. The play of “build near the ring road” is obviously something that many people have deployed with great success, but what the middle class really wants and needs is open space for housing that gives them the basic needs at an affordable price, which means that if the land is a bit further away from the closest highways, it is likely being undervalued by the market for its growth opportunities.
It also means in investing in the outer regions of a metropolitan area. If you are a Lahore-based investor, for instance, it may be time to consider markets further out from Lahore where you can get lower prices but still likely serve the needs of the demographic and population pattern shift taking place in the country.
The emerging mega region
While this is a subject we will return to in a future story, for the moment, we do want to introduce the concept of a mega region, and then talk about the fact that Pakistan has at least one, and possibly a second such region.
A mega-region is a large network of metropolitan areas that are economically, socially, and infrastructurally interconnected. These regions often extend beyond city or provincial boundaries and share common industries, transportation systems, labour markets, and cultural ties. They are sometimes referred to as megapolitan areas or super-regions.
It is increasingly clear that Pakistan has at least one such region that is centered around Lahore. We would like to call it the Lahore Crescent. It is a crescent-like belt that starts in Peshawar, passes through the GT Road belt to Lahore, and then towards Multan. Take a look at a picture of the region at night and it is obvious that this region is densely and brightly lit up, meaning it is not just these major cities, but several smaller cities and suburbs that link this broad region, which has be described as the core of the Pakistani economy.
A second such region is beginning to emerge in the south of the country, with Karachi as its anchor and stretching up the Indus River from Hyderabad and all the way to Sukkur. This is a smaller, more nascent region, though, and it is unclear whether or not it will end up becoming an economically significant agglomeration.
What is clear from the data and from driving around the country is that the urban –and suburban – geography is changing rapidly, and it is changing because more people have more opportunities to produce and consumer goods and services. Suburban American bliss, this is not. But it may be the beginnings of how Pakistan gets there. n
From Tashkent to Karachi:
What does Uzbekistan’s billion dollar tech giant Uzum want in Pakistan?
Uzum has a clear playbook that brought them great success in Uzbekistan: by positioning themselves at the intersection where eCommerce and fintech meet. Could they pull it off in Pakistan too?
By Taimoor Hassan
At the beginning of this February, a delegation of top executives from Uzum, the Uzbekistani eCommerce and fintech powerhouse, landed in Lahore. Within Lahore’s tech sector scene, the arrival from Tashkent had caused quite the stir, as some of Pakistan’s biggest players in logistics, fintech, and eCommerce lined up for meetings.
A team from Zindigi, the digital financial services application created by JS Bank, was at the airport to receive them. The courtesy was a sign of the deep partnership forming between the two organisations. After all, this was not the first visit by Uzum representatives to Pakistan. Sources close to the matter
have told Profit that Uzum had first explored Pakistan’s market in 2024. The initial visit had been driven by conversations between their sponsors and those of JS Bank. These high-level discussions planted the first seeds of collaboration, sparking Uzum’s interest in Pakistan’s rapidly growing digital economy.
What began as an exploratory visit turned into a serious pursuit of opportunity, leading to this most recent trip—one that carried with it the momentum of a carefully cultivated plan for Pakistan. From the moment they landed, Uzum’s leadership had a jam packed schedule, meeting with the leadership of Zindigi, Leopards Courier, PostEx, Bazaar, GrocerApp, Rozee, and Bykea. This is only the list Profit could confirm, but there might have been other meetings as well. The agenda was clear: the delegation wanted to meet with
companies that could give them the lay of the land, and potentially be partners in building a next-generation eCommerce ecosystem in Pakistan.
But what exactly does this Uzbekistani unicorn want from Pakistan? Sure, on paper Pakistan is a very lucrative potential market. Internet penetration has grown in recent years and is set to grow even more, the population is fairly young, there is a clear appetite for tech, and the market is far from saturated. However, the Pakistani market comes with its own baggage and challenges, a fact that Uzum will be keenly aware of. Despite any deterrents, they have their eyes set on Pakistan beyond just meetings and handshakes.
Behind this visit is a vision. A vision in which the world of eCommerce and fintech are merged in a way that no one in Pakistan has
seen before. It is a model Uzum has followed in Uzbekistan, and will now be looking to replicate in Pakistan. As we go from behindthe-scenes discussions to tangible plans, this latest visit could be setting the stage for one of the most transformative digital partnerships in the region.
The Rise of Uzum
In the heart of Tashkent, where a blend of tradition and modernity creates a unique backdrop, a group of visionary founders set out on a mission that would forever change the landscape of eCommerce and fintech. This is the story of how Uzum, the country’s first billion-dollar startup, emerged from humble beginnings to become a powerhouse that now has its sights set on expanding beyond Central Asia, starting with Pakistan.
Unlike many startup success stories that stretch over a decade, Uzum’s rise has been swift. Founded in 2022 by entrepreneur Djasur Djumaev and a group of Uzbek partners, the company emerged at a time when Uzbekistan’s digital economy was rapidly evolving. Internet and smartphone penetration were climbing, and consumers were growing more comfortable with digital transactions. Yet, the country’s eCommerce infrastructure remained underdeveloped, and access to financial services was still limited. The environment in which Uzum was born was not wholly different to other comparable markets in the region, including Pakistan where internet penetration has led to a growth in eCommerce activity and financial services.
What sets Uzum apart not just in Uzbekistan but the entire region was their understanding of how eCommerce and financial services are interlinked. Djumaev and his team saw an opportunity—not just to build an online marketplace but to create an entire ecosystem where fintech and eCommerce worked hand in hand. They understood that the real challenge wasn’t just getting people to shop online; it was about creating a financial environment where online shoppers could trust the system, make easy payments, and have access to financing options. This realization led to the birth of Uzum — an integrated platform that combined eCommerce with Buy Now, Pay Later (BNPL) options, bank accounts opened directly during checkout, and even special discounts tied to their unique fintech features.
The road was not easy. Uzbekistan, like many emerging markets, is still a cash-dominated economy, and winning over consumers requires more than just a well-designed platform. To overcome this, Uzum’s founders embedded financial solutions directly into the shopping experience. They introduced Buy Now, Pay Later (BNPL) options, enabling customers to make purchases without imme-
diate financial strain. This approach didn’t just make shopping easier, it reshaped consumer behavior.
By July 2023, Uzum had scaled at an unprecedented rate. The platform was fulfilling 1 million orders in a month, offering millions of SKUs across diverse categories — from electronics and fashion to groceries and furniture. By the end of 2023, Uzum had consolidated all components of its ecosystem into two superapps: Uzum for individuals and Uzum Business for legal entities. The ecosystem had grown to 10 million monthly active users, generating a net profit of nearly $100 million. Uzum’s retail banking and fintech operations ranked among the most profitable in the country, while its eCommerce platform had become Uzbekistan’s largest by both user base and order volume.
The past year has been nothing short of extraordinary for Uzum. In 2024, the company cemented its position as a leader in Central Asia, delivering record-breaking growth across multiple fronts. The company scaled to 16 million users across Uzbekistan for shopping, saving, and investing. The company disbursed a staggering $421 million in microloans and installment transactions. 19 million orders were placed on Uzum Market, with 60% coming from regional customers, showcasing the company’s expanding national footprint. Over 1,000 pickup points were established, extending Uzum’s reach to even the most remote areas.
In 2024, the company reported a net income of $150 million. According to Uzum, over 40% of Uzbekistan’s 36 million population uses Uzum now. Its rapid growth attracted the attention of major investors in early 2024, and soon, Uzum had secured funding from international backers, including Russian and Uzbek investors. In March last year, the company raised $114 million and reached a $1 billion valuation, making it Uzbekistan’s first tech unicorn.
As Uzum’s customer base began to grow, so did its operational capacity. The company invested heavily in infrastructure, building a logistics and warehousing network to support fast delivery times and handle an increasing volume of orders. Over time, Uzum transformed from a small start-up into a market leader, becoming a symbol of innovation and ambition in Uzbekistan.
However, the founders didn’t just rely on their technical expertise; they also understood the power of strategic partnerships. This is where figures like sponsors of JS Bank played a crucial role. Sources say that initial interactions between founders of Uzum and JS Bank paved the way for Uzum to enter the Pakistani market.
The decision to enter Pakistan is the
next step for Uzum ahead of its planned IPO. Pakistan’s rapidly growing digital economy, coupled with a significant demand for seamless eCommerce and payment solutions, made it an ideal market for Uzum’s eCommerce and fintech model.
Uzum’s potential plan for Pakistan
According to sources, Uzum isn’t just exploring Pakistan—it’s planning to build something big. Much like in Uzbekistan, where it has developed what is now called the Uzum Ecosystem, the company is eyeing a full-fledged digital commerce and financial network in Pakistan.
One needs to appreciate that eCommerce is more than just listing products online. Rather, it is a carefully orchestrated process that starts with sellers stocking their goods, moves through warehousing and fulfillment, and ends with last-mile delivery to customers’ doorsteps. The success of any major eCommerce platform hinges on this smooth flow—where orders are processed efficiently, payments are seamless, and customers receive their items on time.
The question is, if Uzum intends to build its own eCommerce marketplace in Pakistan, much like it did in Uzbekistan, how will it handle fulfillment and delivery?
The company has multiple options. They could operate their own warehousing and fulfillment centers, controlling logistics from end to end. Another possibility is partnering with local delivery and fulfillment providers, leveraging Pakistan’s existing supply chain infrastructure. Or they might want to adopt a hybrid approach, where some operations are in-house while others are outsourced to key players in the market. This would also explain why the meetings with Leopards Couriers and PostEx would have been vital.
Of course, the full picture here goes beyond just eCommerce. Financial services are equally crucial. The natural partner for them would be Zindigi by JS Bank. After all, the JS group has been instrumental in bringing them to Pakistan. And if they follow the same plan as they did in Uzbekistan, they will likely integrate digital wallets, BNPL options, and microloans into its Pakistani ecosystem, ensuring seamless transactions for both buyers and sellers.
The secret sauce: eCommerce meets fintech
The world of eCommerce has always been filled with challenges: shipping delays, payment headaches, and unsatisfactory customer experiences.
Uzum, however, has cracked the code in Uzbekistan — and now, Pakistan would be next.
In Uzbekistan, Uzum has seamlessly integrated fintech solutions through Uzum Bank into its eCommerce platform, changing how people shop and pay. Imagine shopping online, adding your favorite products to your cart, and right at checkout, you can open a bank account and get an Uzum card. With the Uzum account, you can access discounts and even choose a Buy Now Pay Later option — all without leaving the site. This removes the payment bottlenecks that plague traditional eCommerce sites.
Seamless payments can make or break a business. Customers want instant checkouts, merchants need reliable cash flows, and platforms must ensure security at every step. For Uzum, which has built its billion-dollar empire by integrating fintech into its eCommerce operations, the choice of a local partner in a new market isn’t just about logistics or tech — it’s about financial infrastructure. And in Pakistan, that means a fintech with the backing of a bank stands out as the strongest ally.
Imagine an eCommerce platform that allows customers to not just shop but also access buy now, pay later (BNPL) financing, open digital wallets instantly, and merchants to secure microloans in real-time — all without leaving the app. This isn’t just a convenience; it can be a game-changer, particularly in markets where many consumers are still unfamiliar with digital finance. In Uzbekistan, Uzum solved this challenge by embedding fintech into its platform, allowing users to transact, save, and invest within the same ecosystem.
But to replicate this success in Pakistan, Uzum needs more than just a fintech firm. It needs a fintech company that has the muscle of a licensed bank behind it. With the regulatory approvals and capital reserves of a bank can give Uzum access to a wider network of customers, established banking channels, and the ability to offer licensed financial services like lending.
For Uzum, this means it can offer instant financing options to Pakistani shoppers, just as it did in Uzbekistan. A fintech backed by a bank can approve BNPL loans faster, issue co-branded digital cards, and provide a secure payment gateway that merchants and customers can trust. On the merchant side, a fintech company with a bank on the back can offer instant credit lines to these sellers, allowing them to grow alongside the platform.
All of this is why a deal between Zindigi and Uzum would make sense. Zindigi is a fintech company that operates separately from JS Bank, but leverages the strength and financial backing of a licensed institution to
offer payments, saving and investment options to customers. As of now, no final terms of such a partnership have been reached and there are many intricacies to figure out. Discussions are still ongoing. However, such a partnership could be very beneficial. Uzum could unlock a seamless, fully integrated eCommerce and fintech ecosystem in Pakistan as it did in Uzbekistan without going for a banking license itself. Such an integration could bring Pakistan’s logistics, eCommerce, and digital financial services sectors to life.
The delivery equation
In the fast-moving world of eCommerce, speed is everything. A great product and a seamless checkout experience mean little if customers are left waiting for days—or even weeks—for their orders to arrive. Uzum understands this better than most and has transformed the delivery landscape in Uzbekistan with its next-day delivery system.
Uzum has established an extensive logistics network in Uzbekistan to ensure fast and reliable deliveries across Uzbekistan. A centralized fulfillment center in Tashkent that manages inventory and processes orders for its marketplace, Uzum Market, over 200 pickup locations which serve as offline hubs where customers can conveniently collect their orders and a dedicated transportation fleet ensure timely and efficient next day deliveries.
In October last year, Uzum introduced a new model called Fulfillment by Seller (FBS), allowing sellers to store, package, and manage their own inventory while Uzum handles the logistics. When an order is placed, the seller
has 48 hours to pack and send the product to an Uzum warehouse. Once it arrives, Uzum ensures next-day delivery to the customer. On average, customers receive their orders within three days, a dramatic improvement in a region where eCommerce logistics have historically been slow.
This speed is what matters. In eCommerce, faster delivery times increase customer satisfaction, reduce cancellations, and boost repeat purchases. When customers know they can trust a platform to deliver on time, they buy more frequently and are less likely to shop elsewhere. For businesses, faster fulfillment means better inventory turnover, higher sales, and improved cash flow.
Bringing the same level of efficiency to Pakistan is going to be Uzum’s next big challenge in the Pakistani market. According to sources, Uzum’s leadership has already held meetings with major delivery companies in Pakistan, exploring ways to establish pickup points at courier service outlets for faster and more convenient order fulfillment. In a country where logistics can be complex due to traffic congestion and infrastructure challenges, using existing delivery company networks as collection hubs could significantly streamline the process.
Whether Uzum partners with third-party couriers or develops its own logistics network, one thing is clear: speed will be a priority. Just as it transformed eCommerce fulfillment in Uzbekistan, Uzum is looking to reshape Pakistan’s online shopping experience—and next-day delivery might be the key to winning over millions of customers. n
Blood and billions: Inside Pakistan’s drug trade
How do drugs get into Pakistan, how are they marketed, sold, and eventually consumed?
By Shahab Omer
The heinous killing of 23-year old Mustafa Amir is familiar in many ways. This is not the first murder to take place in an up-scale neighbourhood, nor the first to be sensationalised in the news media, and not even the first to shock an entire nation because of the sheer brutality of this act.
Which is why the way it is playing out is not surprising in the least. Some crimes are so shocking, so unexpected, and so out of place that they capture the attention of an entire population. The initial shock comes from the connection between the brutality of events and the victim. Any murder is shocking, it is doubly shocking when it takes places with cold-hearted intent and violence, and it is almost unimaginable when it happens in places like DHA. The shock leads to a morbid fascination.
Who was this victim? What kind of trouble did they get mixed up in that led them to this point? Just how innocent were they in all of this? The same sequence of events has played out in the Mustafa Amir case. It began with shock over his disappearance and the baseless reports that he had been dismembered and fed to lions. Eventually, it began to emerge that the murder had taken place in the midst of drug deals and romantic jealousies. And finally, the victim himself was cast as some kind of linchpin in Karachi’s drug economy.
To understand this story in a fair and judicious way, it is important that we lean into this familiarity and admit some difficult truths. The police would like you to believe that the deceased was a drug dealer, and they point towards a case against him registered by the Anti Narcotics Force a few years ago. The reality is that most universities in Pakistan probably have a few students attending that have gotten in trouble with the ANF or other law enforce-
ment authorities over drugs. That does not mean they are dealers, they could simply be users that got caught at a bad time.
Mustaaf Amir’s parents insisted that he used drugs but did not sell them. It is entirely likely their story is true. What we must confront, however, is the reality that there is an entire economy that exists around illegal substances all over the country as well as in educational institutes. Over time, preferences in substance have also changed, but the demand for them has continued. The question is, what does the drug economy look like in Pakistan now?
The demand that we know of
Drug dealers and suppliers are not exactly lining up to tell the world about their production numbers and sales. We can, however, get an idea
of illegal substances and how in demand they are through the sale of alcohol in Pakistan. In a recent report, Euromonitor points out that nearly 30 million litres of alcohol were sold in Pakistan from 2023-24.
These are conservative numbers since a lot of this business is undocumented and has very few players. Due to the niche nature of the industry in Pakistan,alongside legal restrictions on the production and distribution of alcoholic beverages, the competitive environment may not accurately reflect overall market trends.
Murree Brewery is the oldest brewery in South Asia, with its shares being listed on the Pakistan StockExchange (PSX).The company is still the largest manufacturer of alcoholic drinks in Pakistan, with limited competition from local manufacturers such as Quetta Brewery,and Hui Coastal Brewery and Distillery Limited,alongside international players such as Carlsberg A/S, Grolsch Koninklijke NV,and the like. Murree Brewery has a strong distribution network that is unmatched by any other local company, Despite this, demand has been high enough that China’s Hui Coastal Brewery and Distillery Limited started operations in 2021 and is one of the Chinese companies which launched operations in Pakistan under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Framework.
Understanding the works
Even when it comes to alcohol, understanding this under the table business is all about understanding where the substance comes from, how it is packaged, and how it is delivered. In the case of alcohol, some hotels and wine shops have licenses to purchase alcohol from major manufacturers. These hotel bars then sell to people with liquor permits who act as dealers and sell the product ahead at a markup.
In the Mustafa Amir case, substances other than alcohol have been at the centre of the controversy. One of the most shocking arrests was that of Sahir Hasan, the son of renowned Pakistani actor Sajid Hasan. On February 21, police apprehended Sahir from Karachi’s upscale Defense area. According to law enforcement, Sahir admitted to supplying drugs to Armaghan, and at the time of his arrest, he was found in possession of a large quantity of high-value foreign narcotics. The ATC subsequently placed Sahir on physical remand for further questioning, and later, he was sent to jail under judicial custody.
Police investigations revealed that Sahir Hasan, who was also involved in modeling, had been operating as a well-connected drug dealer, supplying narcotics to Karachi’s elite circles.
The interrogation of Sahir Hasan has uncovered shocking details, further unraveling the dark web of Karachi’s elite drug trade. Investigators revealed that Sahir admitted to dealing drugs for the past two years. He confessed to sourcing narcotics from suppliers named Basil and Yahya before distributing them to wealthy clients in Karachi’s upscale neighborhoods—one of whom was Armaghan Qureshi, the main accused in the Mustafa Amir case.
The supply and distribution networks
The Mustafa Amir case has made one thing abundantly clear—there exists a well-established and structured drug network that caters to the elite class in Pakistan’s major urban centers, particularly Karachi. Profit spoke to high-ranking officials from the police and intelligence agencies, who wished to remain anonymous due to the sensitivity of this high-profile case, to understand the economic cycle of narcotics, their types, pricing, supply chain, and distribution within Pakistan.
According to these officials, Pakistan’s geographic location places it at the heart of the global narcotics trade—particularly for opium and heroin. Neighboring Afghanistan is a world-renowned producer of these drugs, and according to the United Nations, approximately 40% of Afghanistan’s heroin is smuggled through Pakistan. While a significant portion of this heroin is trafficked internationally to Europe and Asia, a substantial amount also infiltrates Pakistan’s local markets.
They stated that traditionally, hashish (charas) and opium have been the most commonly used drugs in Pakistan. Hashish, a concentrated form of cannabis resin, is primarily cultivated in the tribal areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, particularly in the Tirah Valley and surrounding regions, which have long been known for producing high-quality hashish. As a result, hashish is relatively cheap and widely available, especially among lower and middle-class youth. While technically illegal, hashish has not been considered as taboo as heroin or synthetic drugs in many circles.
They further revealed that over the past decade, a new wave of synthetic drugs has rapidly infiltrated Pakistan. Methamphetamine, commonly known as ICE (Crystal Meth), has emerged as the dominant stimulant drug, particularly in major cities like Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad. They noted that ICE has partially replaced heroin as the preferred narcotic in urban centers.
According to these officials, ICE is an extremely powerful stimulant that induces an intense and immediate high. A study on
Karachi’s drug trends found that ICE has now become a “universal drug” consumed by both the rich and the poor, surpassing traditional substances like heroin and hashish.
Several factors contribute to ICE’s growing popularity as it is usually smoked through a glass pipe rather than injected, leading many to falsely believe it is less harmful. It provides a stronger and longer-lasting high than heroin. Its street price now exceeds that of heroin, with a gram of ICE in Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad costing between PKR 500 to 800, making it an expensive but highly sought-after drug.
Worryingly, these officials indicated that even high school and college students are increasingly found consuming ICE at drug-fueled parties, raising concerns about its growing influence on Pakistan’s youth.
They also informed Profit that another dangerous trend is the rise of club drugs or party drugs such as MDMA (Ecstasy), LSD (Acid), Ketamine and GHB (Date Rape Drug).
“These drugs, which come in pills, tablets, or blotting paper forms, are not produced in Pakistan. Instead, they are smuggled from international sources, primarily the United States, Europe, and Southeast Asia. The elite youth in Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad have fueled the demand for these drugs, which are now common at private parties and underground clubs.”
During the investigation, Karachi police seized “foreign-branded narcotics” from Sahir Hasan’s possession, which forensic reports suggested were imported club drugs. According to a senior investigation officer, the drugs seized from Sahir originated from California, USA, confirming that these substances are being trafficked into Pakistan from international suppliers.
How Do These Drugs Enter Pakistan?
Law enforcement sources claim that over the past few years, multiple incidents have exposed how party drugs enter Pakistan. Parcels shipped from the U.S., Europe, and Asia often contain hidden narcotics. Dark web transactions enable Pakistani buyers to order party drugs online, which are then shipped via major courier services—a method similar to what was revealed in the Amir Mustafa case.
The same officials informed that the price of a drug depends on its type and quality. Locally produced drugs like hashish, opium, and low-quality heroin are relatively cheap. “A gram of heroin can cost just a few hundred rupees. High-quality hashish is available for under Rs 1,000 per gram. In contrast, imported synthetic drugs and chemically manufactured substances are far more expensive. ICE (Crys-
tal Meth) now costs over Rs 1,000 per gram, with prices rising due to increasing demand. A single Ecstasy (MDMA) pill can cost Rs 3,000–5,000, depending on quality and supplier and LSD (Acid) blotter paper is sold for Rs 2,000 or more.”
A Two-Tiered Network
According to these officials, the drug trade in Pakistan operates on two levels, the one is international & inter-provincial trafficking. Large quantities of drugs (heroin, hashish, ICE) enter Pakistan through the Afghanistan border via tribal areas and Balochistan. Traffickers use trucks, buses, trains, even camel caravans, to transport the drugs across the country. Smugglers also utilize maritime routes, hiding narcotics in shipping containers bound for global destinations.
They informed that a recent bust in September 2024 revealed 100 kg of cocaine and 411 kg of methamphetamine hidden in onion sacks exported from Karachi to Malaysia—proving that Pakistan serves as both a transit and consumption hub.
“Karachi’s Lyari, Rawalpindi’s Dhoke Ratta, and Lahore’s Heera Mandi serve as key drug hubs where low-cost narcotics like heroin and hashish are easily available. In contrast, high-end drug markets operate discreetly in posh areas using modern technology,” they said.
According to these officials, using postal and courier services for drug trafficking is not a new phenomenon—criminals worldwide have exploited delivery systems for decades. However, Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies have recently observed an alarming rise in such cases. In September 2024, the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) raided a courier office near Nursery, Karachi, where they discovered 1.2 kg of hashish concealed inside an electronics package. The same parcel also contained illegal firearms, including pistols and bullets, which had been smuggled from Peshawar to Karachi. Similarly, in 2021, Islamabad Airport officials intercepted a parcel from Malaysia containing Ecstasy (MDMA) pills, which had been ordered by a Pakistani student via an international postal service.
These officials stated that drug traffickers prefer courier services because parcels do not undergo the same rigorous inspections as border checkpoints or airports. This makes smuggling through courier companies a low-risk, high-reward operation. To evade detection, traffickers use various deception techniques, such as hiding narcotics inside common household items like electronics, books, clothing, machinery parts, or food containers. They also manipulate sender
Big money
The global drug trade is one of the most profitable illegal industries in the world. According to United Nations estimates, the annual revenue of the global drug market is approximately $320 billion—a figure higher than the GDP of many countries and one of the largest sources of black money in organized crime. The massive wealth generated by this illegal industry has allowed several notorious criminals to accumulate extraordinary power and influence throughout history.
One of the most infamous examples is Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar, who is often considered the richest criminal in history. By the 1980s, Escobar’s net worth was estimated to be $30 billion, and he remained on Forbes’ list of the world’s richest billionaires for seven consecutive years. His cartel, the Medellín Cartel, made so much money that warehouse storage became a problem. It was reported that millions of dollars were lost annually to rats chewing through banknotes or humidity damaging stored cash—an estimated $2 billion per year simply wasted.
Similarly, Mexico’s Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, the Ojedas (Oaxaca family), and other Mexican cartel leaders amassed billions of dollars from the drug trade. In Asia, Khun Sa (the “King of the Golden Triangle” in Myanmar), Afghan drug lords, and Albanian and Serbian cartel leaders in Europe have also gained immense wealth through narcotics trafficking.
The incredible wealth from drug trafficking has allowed many criminals to live extravagant lifestyles. Famous drug lords such as Escobar, El Chapo, and others owned lavish mansions and private islands. Luxury cars, yachts, and private jets. Gold-plated guns and diamond-encrusted watches. Exotic pets—Escobar famously had a private zoo with hippos, zebras, and giraffes.
This “untouchable” attitude makes drug traffickers feel above the law, allowing them to operate parallel criminal empires. However, history shows that this lifestyle is usually shortlived—either law enforcement eventually catches up, or rival gangs eliminate their competition.
From Latin America to Asia, most major drug lords have met violent ends. Pablo Escobar was killed in a police shootout in 1993. El Chapo Guzmán is serving a life sentence in a U.S. supermax prison. Afghan drug kingpins have been assassinated or arrested over the years. In Pakistan, multiple drug traffickers were neutralized under Interior Minister Nasirullah Babar’s anti-narcotics campaign in the 1990s.
The drug trade offers unimaginable wealth—but it also comes with constant danger, law enforcement crackdowns, and violent rivalries. While drug traffickers enjoy power and influence, history shows that very few escape justice. In the end, nearly all major drug lords meet the same fate—either imprisonment or death.
and receiver details, using fake identities or temporary addresses to avoid tracking. In some cases, drugs are hidden inside children’s toys, artwork, sealed food packages, shoes, and even paintbrushes to bypass security scans. Another method commonly used by traffickers is exploiting darknet drug markets, where buyers purchase narcotics using cryptocurrency and receive shipments through postal services. Since cryptocurrency transactions are banned in Pakistan, payments are typically made through cash deposits or bank transfers, making it harder for law enforcement to trace illicit activities.
Following the Amir Mustafa case, Pakistani authorities have issued strict warnings to courier companies, directing them to strengthen their monitoring systems. Law enforcement agencies are now investigating the foreign courier company and two local firms involved in the suspicious shipments of Armaghan Qureshi and Sahir Hasan. Authorities are examining
whether company employees were knowingly involved in drug smuggling or if these companies failed to implement strict security protocols, unintentionally facilitating drug trafficking. In response, courier firms have defended their screening processes, claiming that all parcels are scanned and suspicious shipments are reported to authorities. However, evidence suggests that traffickers frequently succeed in bypassing these security checks, raising concerns about gaps in Pakistan’s logistics and security frameworks.
Is law enforcement toothless?
The officials stated that Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies face an uphill battle in combating the drug trade due to the difficulty in monitoring smuggling routes, as the country’s borders with Afghanistan and Iran are vast and rugged.
They explained that local drug networks are often shielded by influential figures, making arrests challenging, while some police officials are alleged to be complicit, protecting drug dealers in exchange for monthly kickbacks or bribes.
They further highlighted that Pakistan’s major cities are witnessing an alarming rise in drug addiction, particularly among the youth. According to them, social media platforms have amplified drug culture, making access to narcotics easier than ever before. Additionally, increasing economic disparity and mental health issues are pushing many young people toward substance abuse. They emphasized that the drug trade is no longer confined to slums or impoverished neighborhoods—it has infiltrated elite circles, as evident in this case.
While the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) and local police have carried out several major crackdowns, the officials acknowledged that the demand for drugs remains high. As long as there is a market, new suppliers will continue to emerge, making the fight against narcotics an ongoing struggle for law enforcement.
Drug laws and penalties vary significantly across different countries. Generally, the substances mentioned in the Amir Mustafa case—including heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine (ICE), ecstasy (MDMA), and LSD—are illegal in almost every country, with strict penalties for possession, distribution, and trafficking. However, cannabis (marijuana or hashish) remains an exception, as its legal status varies widely across nations, with some allowing limited use.
In Pakistan, all types of narcotics fall under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act (CNSA) of 1997, which criminalizes possession, sale, and trafficking of drugs. The severity of punishment depends on the quantity and intent. Personal use of a small amount may result in rehabilitation programs (for firsttime offenders) or 1–2 years of imprisonment with fines. Large-scale distribution or drug trafficking, however, carries life imprisonment or even the death penalty. Possession of over 10 kilograms of heroin can lead to capital punishment or a life sentence, along with heavy fines. While the death penalty is rarely enforced, lengthy sentences of 20–25 years are common in drug trafficking cases. Even though hashish and cannabis remain illegal in Pakistan, their enforcement varies.
Over the past two decades, several countries have adopted more lenient drug policies, particularly regarding cannabis (marijuana). Nations such as Canada, Uruguay, Thailand, Malta, and several U.S. states have fully legalized marijuana for recreational use. In 2018, Canada became one of the first countries to legalize cannabis nationwide, allowing adults to possess and consume regulated amounts. In the United States, although federal law still
prohibits marijuana, more than 24 states and Washington D.C. have legalized or decriminalized its use. The Netherlands (Holland) has a tolerant approach—while cannabis is not fully legal, individuals can possess up to 5 grams and consume it in designated “coffee shops” without facing criminal charges.
In contrast, many Asian, Middle Eastern, and African nations enforce the death penalty for drug-related offenses. Malaysia has one of the strictest drug laws, where possession of more than 15 grams of heroin, 200 grams of cannabis, or 50 grams of methamphetamine results in mandatory execution. Even small amounts can lead to heavy fines, long prison sentences, or deportation for foreign nationals. Singapore, known for its zero-tolerance drug policies, mandates the death penalty for anyone caught with over 15 grams of heroin or 30 grams of cocaine. In recent years, individuals have been executed for smuggling even small amounts of cannabis, drawing international criticism.
Similarly, Indonesia and Thailand impose the death penalty for large-scale drug traffickers, though Thailand has recently legalized medical and partial recreational cannabis use. In Vietnam, possession of over 600 grams of heroin automatically results in execution. China also enforces capital punishment for drug traffickers, often carrying out public executions by firing squad.
In the Middle East, drug-related crimes carry some of the harshest penalties in the world. In Saudi Arabia, drug dealing almost always results in execution by beheading, while even minor drug possession can lead to flogging, imprisonment, or heavy fines. Similarly, in the United Arab Emirates (UAE/ Dubai), testing positive for drugs (even without physical possession) can lead to a four-year prison sentence. Many common medications, including sleeping pills and painkillers, are banned, and foreign travelers have been arrested for carrying legal medicines without proper documentation.
Across Africa, nations such as Egypt, Sudan, and Nigeria strictly criminalize drug possession and trafficking, though the death penalty is less common than in Asia. Many of these countries enforce long-term imprisonment for those convicted of drug-related offenses.
Complex operations
According to these officials, the drug trade operates through a well-structured supply chain, much like a legitimate business. It is not just a few individuals smuggling drugs—it involves an entire network with distinct roles at every level. A typical drug cartel or trafficking network consists of multiple layers, starting with
producers—farmers or underground laboratories responsible for growing opium poppies, cannabis, or coca plants, or manufacturing synthetic drugs such as methamphetamine. The drugs are then transported by couriers and smugglers, who move them across borders or within cities. At the top of the hierarchy are the drug lords, major suppliers who handle large-scale shipments, distributing them to regional wholesalers. These mid-level figures manage bulk sales in specific territories, supplying street-level dealers, also known as retail pushers, who ultimately sell the drugs to consumers.
At each stage of distribution, the price of the drug increases dramatically. For instance, an Afghan farmer selling raw opium may earn only a few hundred dollars, but once the same quantity is processed into heroin and trafficked to Europe, it becomes worth millions. The bulk of the profits is captured by cartels, traffickers, and middlemen, while those at the lower end of the chain remain highly dispensable.
To protect their business, drug traffickers routinely employ bribery, intimidation, and extreme violence. Maintaining smuggling routes often requires paying off border officials, customs officers, and law enforcement personnel. In some cases, traffickers secure political protection, ensuring their operations remain untouched by crackdowns. Those who refuse to cooperate—including police officers, whistleblowers, or rival gangs—face serious threats, forced transfers, or even assassinations.
Officials further revealed that drug traffickers use various money laundering techniques to legitimize their illicit earnings, converting “dirty money” into legitimate assets. One of the most common methods is investing in real estate, where traffickers purchase luxury properties with cash, making it difficult for authorities to track illegal funds. Another widely used strategy is setting up front businesses, such as restaurants, nightclubs, and import-export companies, which serve as legitimate covers for laundering profits.
To further obscure financial trails, traffickers engage in “smurfing”, a process where large sums of cash are broken down into multiple small transactions to avoid detection. In addition, many traffickers move funds overseas into offshore accounts and shell companies, ensuring that their wealth remains protected from scrutiny. These sophisticated laundering techniques allow the drug trade to thrive globally, making it one of the most profitable illicit industries in the world.
Globally, many major banks have been caught laundering drug money. One of the biggest scandals involved HSBC Bank, which was fined $1.9 billion in 2012 after U.S. authorities found it had helped Mexican cartels move at least $881 million through its financial system. n
OPINION
Mohsin Leghari
The Real Problem Isn’t
Cholistan —It’s Pakistan’s Shrinking Water Supply
The Cholistan Canal controversy is not simply about Punjab versus Sindh. It is a symptom of Pakistan’s chronic failure to expand its water infrastructure to meet growing demand.
It would be an understatement to say the Cholistan Canal Project has triggered outrage. The project, which aims to dig six new canals intended to irrigate barren lands in South Punjab, particularly Cholistan, has been met with widespread public outcry. The loudest voices against the project have come from Sindh, where protests have erupted across the province.
Demonstrators accuse the government of neglecting their water rights. In Karachi, Hyderabad, and multiple rural districts, farmers and activists have taken to the streets, warning that their already fragile agricultural system cannot withstand additional water shortages.
At its core, however, the Cholistan Canal controversy is not simply about Punjab versus Sindh. It is a symp-
The writer is a former irrigation minister of Punjab.
tom of Pakistan’s chronic failure to expand its water infrastructure to meet growing demand. Instead of engaging in political battles over existing allocations, Pakistan must recognize the real problem: there simply isn’t enough water to share when needed. Decades of inaction have led to a situation where provinces are forced to fight over a stagnant water supply rather than focusing on increasing availability through better storage, conservation, and management.
The 1991 Indus Water Apportionment
Accord: A Forgotten Vision
The 1991 Indus Water Apportionment Accord was a landmark agreement designed to ensure the fair distribution of Pakistan’s most precious resource. However, over time, discussions around the Accord have become narrowly focused on Clause 2, which deals with water apportionment, while neglecting the broader, forward-looking provisions aimed at securing Pakistan’s water future.
This agreement was never meant to be just a water distribution formula. It laid out a comprehensive vision for water management, addressing storage development, surplus distribution, ecological sustainability, provincial autonomy, and efficiency in water use. Unfortunately, delays in implementing key provisions, especially the construction of new reservoirs, have turned water allocation into a source of conflict rather than cooperation.
To truly understand the significance of the Accord, we must go beyond Clause 2 and explore its holistic framework, clause by clause.
Clause 2: Not the Whole Accord
Clause 2 of the Accord established provincial water allocations from a total of 114.35 Million Acre-Feet (MAF). These allocations were based on provincial demands and needs. However, at the time of the Accord, 102.73 MAF was already in use, creating a gap between existing usage and the newly allocated shares. The agreed allocations were as follows:
Despite being a cornerstone of the Accord, Clause 2 was never meant to define the entire agreement. It was always intended to function alongside other key provisions, par-
ticularly those related to storage development (Clause 6), surplus distribution (Clause 4), ecological protection (Clause 7), and efficiency improvements (Clause 14). Unfortunately, the failure to implement these provisions has led to recurring disputes over water shortages, overshadowing the broader vision of the Accord.
Clause 4: Managing Surplus and Future Storage
Clause 4 provided a mechanism for fairly distributing surplus water, particularly during the Kharif season, among the provinces:
•Punjab: 37%
•Sindh: 37%
•Balochistan: 12%
•Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: 14%
However, without adequate storage, this clause remains ineffective. The Accord envisioned that additional reservoirs would allow provinces to better manage seasonal surpluses and prevent wastage. Yet, because planned reservoirs were never built, surplus water often flows unused into the sea, while shortages continue to spark inter-provincial disputes.
Clause 6: The Need for Storage Development
One of the most crucial but overlooked provisions of the Accord is Clause 6, which explicitly recognized the need for new reservoirs:
“The need for storages, wherever feasible on the Indus and other rivers, was admitted
and recognized by the participants for planned future agricultural development.”
Had this clause been fully implemented, Pakistan would have been far better equipped to manage water distribution. Sindh, in particular, stood to gain the most from additional storage:
The Way Forward: Fulfilling the Accord’s Promise
The 1991 Water Accord was designed to promote cooperation and ensure long-term water security. However, its incomplete implementa-
Despite this intended increase, Sindh and other provinces remain water-stressed due to the failure in building new storage facilities.
Clause 7: Ecological Protection
The Accord also recognized the importance of minimum downstream water flows to prevent sea intrusion and protect Sindh’s delta. Sindh initially proposed a 10 MAF minimum flow, but further studies suggested:
A minimum annual release of 3.6 MAF, split evenly between Kharif and Rabi seasons, along with an additional 25 MAF over five years to be released during Kharif. The continued degradation of the delta region shows that this provision has not been effectively implemented, leaving coastal communities vulnerable.
tion has led to disputes rather than solutions. In order to realize the full potential of the Accord, Pakistan must take urgent steps to address its shortcomings. The construction of new reservoirs must be prioritized to meet the country’s growing water demands. Additionally, fair surplus distribution mechanisms should be reinforced by improving flood management and infrastructure.
Ensuring ecological protections is also crucial to prevent further environmental degradation, particularly in Sindh’s delta region. Furthermore, provinces should be empowered to develop their own water resources as originally envisioned in the Accord. Finally, agricultural needs must be prioritized over hydropower generation to support national food security.
The 1991 Accord is not outdated—it is an untapped solution for Pakistan’s water challenges. By shifting the focus from conflict to implementation, Pakistan can secure its water future for generations to come. n
OPINION
Dr Javed Younas
Local governments could be game-changers
in countering extremism
Pakistan’s counter-terrorism strategy cannot rely solely on military operations. Part of the solution is service delivery and a strong relationship between the electorate and local government representatives.
Pakistan’s fight against terrorism and extremism is often centered around military operations and intelligence-based policing. However, an often-overlooked but crucial factor is local governance—specifically, a well-functioning, administratively and fiscally independent local bodies system.
There is ample evidence from across the country pointing towards the benefits of decentralization. Local governments not only enhance service delivery, they are also very effective in addressing minority concerns and facilitating peaceful conflict resolutions through community engagement and inclusive governance. Unfortunately, there seems to be no tangible plan or motivation within
The writer is a Professor of Economics at American University of Sharjah. He is also affiliated with the Centre for Economic Research in Pakistan and Mahbub Ul Haq Research Centre at LUMS.
the corridors of power to move in this direction, and thus the entire nation suffers.
Local governments could be an astute solution to a very pertinent problem. In recent years, Pakistan has witnessed a troubling resurgence in terrorism. The Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies reported over 800 militant attacks in 2024, resulting in more than 1,100 deaths and 1,200 injuries. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan have been particularly affected. The former experienced 308 attacks with 331 fatalities and 244 injuries, and the latter witnessed 293 attacks with 404 fatalities and 569 injuries.
Why do we need a well-functioning local body system to counter extremism in Pakistan? Take the example of one of the most notable terror attacks from 2024, where gunmen targeted a convoy of Shia Muslims in the Kurram District, killing at least 54 and injuring 86. This attack intensified existing ethnic tensions in the region, leading to further retaliatory violence that claimed more lives and closure of the main road for several weeks. The prolonged blockade imposed severe economic and financial costs, disrupting trade, livelihoods, and local markets. Empirical research across different countries provides ample evidence of the significant economic and financial losses such events entail. Pakistan is among the worst-affected cases with effects ranging not only from lower actual investment and economic growth, but also on deteriorating individuals’ subjective financial well-being. If areas such as Kurram were governed by empowered and duly elected local representatives, there could be many interventions that could stop such attacks from taking place. A decentralized governance system brings government institutions closer to the people. Local representatives–elected mayors, councilors, and community leaders are in direct contact with the population. As such, they can detect early signs of radicalization. They can intervene, for example, through the following step-by-step process:
1. Identifying at-risk individuals and referring them to rehabilitation programs.
2. Encouraging religious scholars and civil society groups to counter extremist propaganda.
3. Reporting suspicious activities and persons to police, who are also legally answerable to the elected mayors.
We have one example of such interventions working to ease the pressure of extremism in Swat. During the crisis of 2010-12, local elders with tribal authority played a key role in identifying and opposing militants who were attempting to re-establish their foothold after the military operation. Their grassroots knowledge of the locals helped security forces conduct targeted operations, preventing the resurgence of terrorist groups there. Nevertheless, the terrorist organization remerged after some break. And this was a significantly less organized system of local governance than properly elected local governments. Take another example. One of the biggest drivers of extremism is the feeling of
marginalization, injustice, and lack of economic opportunities. When people, especially the youth, feel abandoned by the state, they become easy targets for extremist recruiters (local or foreign). Local bodies system can counter this by ensuring fair and timely service delivery, including education, healthcare, and infrastructure. It resolves local disputes before they escalate into sectarian or ethnic conflicts. Furthermore, it provides employment opportunities through local development programs. Balochistan’s insurgency is often cited to be fueled by political exclusion and economic neglect. Empowering local bodies with real decision-making power and financial autonomy can help address local grievances and reduce the appeal of separatist and extremist groups.
A strong local community policing system, integrated with the local government, can significantly improve counter-terrorism efforts. Such a policing system can more effectively monitor radicalization trends in schools, mosques, and community centers. They can work with religious leaders to promote counter-narratives against extremism. The KP Police’s Dispute Resolution Councils have successfully mediated local conflicts, reducing the influence of extremist groups that often exploit disputes to gain support.
Extremist groups thrive where the governance is absent or ineffective. When local governments are functional and responsive, people are less likely to turn to violent groups for justice. Local representatives, being closer to the people and answerable to them, can organize interfaith and inter-ethnic dialogues to prevent sectarian divisions. They can ensure that minority communities are not left out of development programs. They also act as a bridge between communities and the provincial government to ensure fair representation. The Liyari Peace Initiative in Karachi is an example of how community engagement helped curb gang violence.
Pakistan’s counter-terrorism strategy cannot rely solely on military operations. The above piecemeal examples demonstrate that local governance and community engagement, when applied on a larger scale with full autonomy, can effectively counter extremism and terrorism in Pakistan. A well-functioning local bodies system ensures that citizens feel heard, included, and served, thereby reducing the space for extremist ideologies to grow. Therefore, to achieve this, local governments should be granted financial and administrative autonomy, rather than partial and nominal ones, and controlled by provincial authorities. Counter-extremism policies can be integrated
into local governance to create mechanisms for addressing grievances and promoting peacebuilding through collaboration with religious scholars, rehabilitators and community policing.
By prioritizing local governance reforms and empowering local bodies, Pakistan has the potential to build a more resilient, peaceful, and inclusive society. These reforms could strengthen democratic processes at the grassroots level, promote accountability of the locally elected representatives, and ensure that public resources are allocated in a manner that addresses the needs of the local population. However, for such a transformation to take place, the stakeholders who benefit from the current system—those entrenched in power and with vested interests—must be willing to relinquish their personal and short-sighted group gains. Only by moving beyond narrow political self-interests and embracing the long-term welfare of the country can Pakistan pave the way for meaningful change. The real challenge lies in whether these stakeholders can rise above their pecuniary and nonpecuniary gains and develop a consensus for the greater good of the nation. The rest can be achieved by designing policies that align incentives and the rules of doing business for the greater benefits of the public. n
What has achieved?Ignite
How effective has Ignite’s multiple initiatives been in the light of recent bureaucratic constraints?
By Hamza Aurangzeb
The Ignite Technology Fund, managed by the Ministry of Information Technology and Telecom, has ground to a halt due to prolonged board inactivity. Since his appointment in September 2024, Chairman of the Board and Secretary IT, Zarrar Hasham Khan has failed to convene a single board meeting. This administrative paralysis has stalled several critical projects essential for IT sector advancement, undermining Pakistan’s ambitious $25 billion IT export target.
The board’s inaction has directly impacted flagship initiatives including the CODISKILLS Initiative, the Center of Excellence in Gaming and Animation, the Virtual Production Studio, and the DigiSkills program. Compounding these challenges, Ignite lacks permanent leadership, operating under interim CEO Adeel Aijaz Shaikh, GM (Corporate Affairs), since January 2024. Shaikh’s authority to approve strategic projects remains unclear, further hampering organizational effectiveness.
Profit examines the current state of the Ignite Technology Fund and evaluates the impact of its initiatives on Pakistan’s entrepreneurial ecosystem—a critical foundation for both startup growth and achieving national IT export objectives.
Success of Ignite and its Initiatives
Ignite – National Technology Fund was founded as the National ICT R&D Fund by the Ministry of IT & Telecom in November 2006, to advance research and development activities in the sphere of Information Communications Technologies (ICT). The National ICT R&D Fund was rebranded to Ignite - National Technology Fund to focus on funding startups, research, and skill development programs, which are essential for fostering a knowledge economy in the country. The fund is financially supported by the federal government which collects stipulated contri-
butions from various telecom players in the country including cellular operators, fixed line operators, and data service providers.
Ignite has a diverse range of initiatives but two of its most successful initiatives have proven to be National Incubation Centers and Digiskills programs.
Ignite has set up a network of National Incubation Centers (NICs) across 8 cities of Pakistan, which include Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar, Quetta, Hyderabad, Faisalabad and Rawalpindi. NICs have played a crucial role in raising awareness about entrepreneurship among the masses and serving as hubs of innovation, propelling the local tech ecosystem towards future advancements. Over the past five years these NICs have incubated 1,300 startups, where 660 startups graduated successfully. Cumulatively, these successful startups have employed over 126,000 individuals, while raising investments worth $79 million and generating $49.7 million in revenue. Moreover, the NIC programs empowered around 2,300 women.
Digiskills program has also had a significant impact on the IT sector in Pakistan. The program has been designed through a collaboration between Ignite and the Virtual University, providing 15 free online courses to train youth in freelancing. It has been successful in creating a skilled labor force cognizant of technological advancements and the evolving landscape of the gig economy. Since its inception in 2018, it has trained more than 4 million individuals from 300 cities in Pakistan.
Fund through the lens of Numbers
When examining Ignite’s financial trajectory over the past five years, a pattern of significant volatility emerges. Grant income fluctuated dramatically from Rs. 1.15 billion in 2020, dropping to Rs. 0.85 billion in 2021, before rebounding to Rs. 1.16 billion in 2022 and peaking at Rs. 1.73 billion in 2023. In 2024, funds marginally decreased to Rs. 1.67 billion, supplemented by an additional Rs. 0.96
million PSDP government grant.
Historically, Ignite has allocated its capital across four core areas: National Incubation Centers (NICs), the DigiSkills Program, technical R&D projects, and industry events including conferences and seminars. The 2024 fiscal year marked a strategic expansion with the introduction of two new initiatives: the Pakistan Startup Fund (PSF) and Bridgestart. While these new programs warrant comprehensive analysis in subsequent sections, let us first examine the performance patterns and impact of Ignite’s established funding categories.
If we look at NICs, the expenditure of Ignite on its programs imitated its grant income in general, where it started off with 418.64 million in 2020, declined to 343.91 million in 2021, increased again to 550.02 million in 2022 and 864.2 million in 2023 before plummeting to 617.6 million in 2024. The expenditure on NICs oscillated significantly due to change in number of NICs and varying program activity. Similarly, Digiskills Program and technical research and development projects followed a similar trajectory, which was dependent on pursuits and ventures undertaken.
However, one segment, which has consistently witnessed an increase in its expenditure is conferences, seminars, and scientific events. Ignite spent paltry sums of Rs. 6.94 million and Rs. 5.61 million on the category in 2020 and 2021, but afterwards its expenditure on the category has risen consistently to reach 234.22 million in 2024, a CAGR of 246.8%.
This is the case because Ignite has been spending extensively on providing international exposure to startups, recently. It is enabling startups to participate in international events like GITEX Global in Dubai and LEAP Tech Conference in Riyadh.
Missing Links in Ignite’s Programs
While one can’t deny the fact that Ignite’s programs have played a pivotal role in boosting the entrepreneurial and freelance culture in Pakistan, there are
fundamental gaps in their programs, which must be addressed and rectified.
The programs of NICs are designed in a manner, where startups regardless of their domain have to undergo a standardized curriculum in a classroom setting. Moreover, each cohort of NIC encompasses around 25 to 50 startups, which could be quite overwhelming. While the standardized curriculum provides a foundational understanding of startups and the related ecosystem, it is unable to provide customized advice to founders that is congruent with the business models and domains of their startups.
Such programs need to harness more of a collaborative environment by following a cluster based model where no more than 10 founders with similar business models operating in the same domain can develop a discourse by discussing their ambitions, philosophies, impediments, and much more, to improve their startups.
When it comes to funding, NICs are vulnerable themselves as they are primarily dependent on the grants of the government for their operations. Hence, there is an increasing need for NICs to diversify their funding sources. This diversification could be achieved by persuading local corporates and institutional investors to contribute funding towards the program of NICs.
Lastly, NIC programs prove to be largely inefficacious for startup founders when it comes to raising funds, particularly from foreign investors. Moreover, these programs have historically ignored training startup founders for negotiation of investments and valuation of startups. This also plays a key role in the depressed and abysmally low valuations of startups in the ecosystem, which keep foreign investors at bay, hindering the development of a favorable outlook for a bustling startup scene in the country.
While we are on it, let us also assess the DigiSkills program, the initiative although has proven to be effective but fails to empower a significant chunk of the population, particularly in underdeveloped and rural areas, which don’t have access to the internet and laptops. It is a pressing issue, where the government must launch schemes to augment accessibility to the internet and laptops of such segments.
Furthermore, there is a dearth of courses in the Digiskills program on advanced concepts such as Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Blockchain, which have enormous demand, particularly in freelance markets of developed regions like North America and Europe. However, the program doesn’t train students in such fields, preventing them from taking on projects that could help them amass a fortune.
Although, the Digiskills program en-
compasses courses, which impart key IT skills among students but it doesn’t mentor students on how to bid and acquire their online gigs for freelancing. As a result, students struggle to obtain projects regularly, while some students even strive for several months just to grab their first project. Hence, Ignite must include mentorship workshops in their program to guide students on acquisition of digital gigs.
Ignite’s Response to Shortcomings
It is conspicuous that there are deficiencies in the programs of Ignite but the encouraging part is the fund is aware of most of them and is actively making an effort to limit their impact or eliminate them completely.
Take for example, some of the most pressing issues like not effectively facilitating startups in raising funds and investments and augmenting their international exposure.
Ignite in order to deal with these issues have recently launched the Pakistan Startup Fund (PSF) and Bridgestart. The PSF and Bridgestart have collectively been granted Rs. 3 billion for the next two years under the PSDP project “Prime Minister’s Initiatives - Support for IT Startups, Specialized IT Trainings, and Venture Capital.”
The mandate of the PSF is that it will expedite the process of raising funds for startups through de-risking the transaction for investors by providing non-dilutive grants instead of taking equity stakes in the company. This is an incredible strategy in two ways: firstly, it boosts the confidence of foreign investors to invest in the country; secondly, it allows founders to close deals that were in limbo due to investor’s reluctance.
However, one thing to note here is that the PSF will only invest in deals, where the
startup has an anchor or a lead investor but is unable to close the round due to insufficient pledges. This is when PSF will invest the final cheque to help the startup conclude its round, with the cheque size varying between 20% and 30% of the investment round. The Pakistan Startup Fund will support all kinds of startups ranging from early stage to growth stage startups, however it prefers growth stage startups.
As far as Bridgestart is concerned, it will assist startups in funding their journey to global incubators and accelerators while simultaneously supporting capacity building. This initiative will provide an opportunity to startups to develop an understanding of foreign markets and network with foreign investors, paving the way for their global expansion.
While National Incubation Centers (NICs) have traditionally operated on a standardized curriculum framework, they are now making significant strides toward personalized support models. These advances include connecting startups with experienced entrepreneurs for tailored mentorship, implementing robust KPI-based progress tracking systems, and forging strategic academic partnerships with universities and colleges to incorporate scholarly insights.
Additionally, NICs are actively engaging startup founders in curriculum development to ensure programming directly addresses real-world entrepreneurial challenges.
For the DigiSkills Program, however, Ignite must substantially elevate its approach. Despite launching numerous initiatives demonstrating commitment to fostering entrepreneurship and freelancing opportunities, fundamental structural weaknesses persist across its programs. Addressing these systemic flaws is imperative if Pakistan is to maintain momentum toward its ambitious $25 billion IT export target. n
