Political Parties in the UK sample chapter by Macmillan International Higher Education

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CONTENTS

List of Tables

List of Figures

List of Abbreviations

xii

Acknowledgments xiv

Introduction: The Development of the UK Party System

Understanding Party Systems The British Party System, 1945–1970 The British Party System, 1974–2017 Classifying Party System Change in Britain The Structure of the Book

5 7 11 17 19

The Role of Political Parties in the UK

Defining Political Parties The Functions of Political Parties Parties in the Electorate Parties as Organisations Parties in Government Conclusion

21 23 25 30 34 40

The Conservative Party

Ideology and Policy Leadership Candidate Selection and Representativeness In Office Conclusion

42 48 57 61 65

The Labour Party

Ideology and Policy 67 Leadership 74 Candidate Selection and Representativeness 83 In Office 87 Conclusion 90

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The Liberal Democrats

Ideology and Policy 92 Leadership 99 Candidate Selection and Representativeness 105 In Office 107 Conclusion 110

The Scottish National Party

112

Ideology and Policy 112 Leadership 118 Candidate Selection and Representativeness 122 In Office 124 A Tale of Two (or Three?) Referendums 128 Conclusion 130

Beyond the Mainstream

132

Non-mainstream Parties in the UK 133 UKIP 134 Respect 140 The Green Party 141 The British National Party 144 Explaining the Rise of Small Parties in the UK 146 Problems Maintaining Small-Party Success 150 Conclusion 154

The UK’s ‘Multi-Level’ Party Systems

156

Parties and Territorial Politics in the UK Plaid Cymru The Northern Irish Parties The Democratic Unionist Party Sinn Fein The Ulster Unionist Party The Social Democratic and Labour Party Assessing the UK’s Multi-level Party Systems London, Mayors and Local Government European Elections Conclusion

156 156 159 160 162 165 166 167 172 175 177

Parties and the Media

179

Approaches to Political Communication Partisanship and the Structure of the Media in the UK

179

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182

Copyrighted material – 9781137577092 CONTENTS Parties and Political Communication 189 Parties and the Internet 195 Media Effects 199 Conclusion 201

10 Developments in Party Organisation and Funding

202

Organisational Structures 202 The Conservative Party 203 The Labour Party 205 The Liberal Democrats 208 Other Parties 210 Grassroots Organisation and Membership 211 The Funding of Political Parties in the UK 217 Party Income and Expenditure 217 The Regulatory Framework 220 Developments 222 Conclusion 225

11 Party Campaigns and Elections Voting Behaviour in the UK Election Campaigning Constituency Campaigning Conclusion

12 Conclusion: Political Parties in the UK The UK Party System: A ‘Dead Man Walking’? Decline or Adaptation? The Challenge to Parties Comparative Perspectives Conclusion

227 227 233 242 247

249 249 255 257 262 265

References 267 Index 296

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INTRODUCTION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UK PARTY SYSTEM

The UK has experienced a number of remarkable electoral events in recent years. Some of these have had profound constitutional consequences. They have all suggested a UK party system in flux, revealing a political class and political parties in disarray, struggling to interpret the result of unclear public opinion. They have undermined leaders, and left parties often looking unable to adapt to events. They have challenged the UK’s political parties in a multitude of ways that would have been unexpected only a decade before. They ultimately left Britain’s place in the world in some doubt on a number of occasions. First, on the morning of Wednesday 12 May 2010, Conservative Party leader David Cameron stood with Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg on the steps of Number 10 Downing Street. After an election campaign conducted against the backdrop of the most serious economic crisis for decades, the Conservatives returned to power for the first time in 13 years. While the Conservatives’ electoral recovery from their 2005 position had been impressive, the party had not done well enough against an unpopular Labour administration to achieve a majority in Parliament and form a single-party government. Claiming that an unstable minority government might have led to a further economic crisis, the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats negotiated a coalition agreement after both sides had made a number of concessions. Later that afternoon, the two leaders gave a press conference in the garden of Downing Street, commented on widely for the congeniality with which it was conducted. While the relationship between the two parties later soured, this had been a stark contrast to the traditionally competitive and oppositional debate of British party politics, epitomised in the public mind by, for instance, weekly jousting at Prime Minister’s Questions. Second, just over four years later, the UK came within a whisker of breaking up in the Scottish independence referendum of 18 September 2014. This referendum had been granted by Cameron after the Scottish National Party (SNP) had won a majority in the 2011 Scottish Parliament 1 Copyrighted material – 9781137577092

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election and claimed a mandate for an independence poll. The result saw 55 per cent of Scots vote to remain in the UK. Yet, the effect of the campaign had been to increase the proportion of those Scots prepared to leave the UK from around a third in most pre-referendum polls to 45 per cent willing to become an independent country. The UK political parties appeared panicked towards the end of the campaign after a poll put the pro-independence camp marginally ahead. The result had profound consequences for Scottish and UK politics. The SNP a year later became the third-largest party at Westminster on the back of a remarkable surge of Scottish public opinion. Labour’s consequent decline in Scotland had consequences across Great Britain, restricting its ability to win a majority. Considerable further powers were eventually given to the Scottish Parliament. Third, on Friday 8 May 2015, the UK awoke to the surprise news that the Conservative Party had been returned to office with a small overall majority in the House of Commons. This was a considerable triumph for Conservative Party leader David Cameron, after a seemingly tumultuous period of political and economic developments. The Conservative-led coalition government had been much criticised, not least for an economic strategy that sought to make large cuts to public spending, perceived as hitting the most vulnerable and benefiting the well-off. The Liberal Democrats endured much unpopularity after some major policy U-turns. Opinion polls in the run-up to the 2015 general election had consistently suggested that another hung parliament was the likely result. A further round of coalition or minority government looked all but inevitable. A Conservative majority government was therefore quite a surprise. Shockwaves from 2015 went further. Another major development, predicted by few, saw the veteran left-winger and serial rebel, Jeremy Corbyn, elected as Labour Party leader in September 2015, in a move that had profound consequences for the party. Corbyn had struggled even to be nominated as a candidate, and was seen as a rank outsider. Yet, due to a change in how the party elected its leader, a remarkable movement got behind him, electing him by the largest winning margin at that point in the party’s history. Rarely had British party politics seemed so unpredictable. The unpredictability only increased when Cameron called a referendum on the UK remaining a member of the European Union (EU) to be held in June 2016. This fulfilled a promise made in a speech in 2013 to hold such an in-out EU referendum by the end of 2017. This promise was meant to satisfy demands from many of the Conservative Party’s highly Eurosceptic MPs for such a vote. The assumption was that the status quo would prevail, Britain would vote to remain in the EU and the party’s Eurosceptics would be silenced, making the party more manageable with its small majority. This gamble failed spectacularly, providing a 2 Copyrighted material – 9781137577092

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major shock to the political system. The UK voted to leave the EU by 52 per cent, against 48 per cent who voted to remain. Cameron effectively resigned the next day, triggering a Conservative leadership contest. A constitutional crisis also developed because Scotland and Northern Ireland had both voted to remain in the EU, while England and Wales voted to leave. Consequently, the threat of a second Scottish independence referendum returned. Theresa May succeeded David Cameron as leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister after a bizarre leadership contest which saw the frontrunners and other competitors fall, leaving May acceding to the leadership uncontested and unelected. The complications of disentangling the UK from decades of EU law only gradually became apparent. Conservative ministers looked ill-prepared for the magnitude of the task before them. The result of the referendum had an impact on other parties too, triggering a major revolt by Labour MPs and another leadership contest in the Labour Party, and considerable infighting and more than one leadership contest in the UK Independence Party (UKIP). Convinced that the Conservative Party would romp home with an increased majority against a supposedly weak Labour leader and opposition, Theresa May called a wholly unnecessary general election in June 2017. This will be remembered as one of the great misjudgements of British electoral history, a seminal moment in the study of campaigning and also Britain’s preparations for leaving the EU. The claim was that an increased majority would give the UK greater negotiating power in its discussions with the EU. May promised a ‘strong and stable’ government, against the ‘coalition of chaos’ that would ensue were Labour under Corbyn returned as the largest party. The result was that May and the Conservative Party lost their majority, ending up dependent on the 10 MPs of Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in a formal ‘confidence and supply’ relationship, which fell well short of a coalition. May looked a weak Prime Minister after a dismal and repetitive campaign which showed her limitations as party leader. Corbyn’s Labour Party defied predictions by performing far better than most expected, although it still fell well short of forming a government. The SNP, while remaining the third-largest party, also lost 21 seats, hit by a negative reaction to attempts to link a second Scottish independence referendum to the aftermath of the Brexit referendum. 2017, then, was an election with no real winners. May’s minority government appeared anything but ‘strong and stable’, and was divided on various issues around Brexit and the EU. These changes caught many by surprise. Nevertheless, the British party system had been gradually changing in nature for several decades. These changes were not necessarily immediately obvious to casual onlookers, having been downplayed not only by media coverage but also largely suppressed by the first-past-the-post electoral system used for elections to Westminster. 3 Copyrighted material – 9781137577092

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In his seminal volume British Political Parties, McKenzie (1963: p.3) argued that ‘party is now the overwhelmingly dominant factor in British politics’. Despite the volatility of the events described above, the centrality of parties to political life remains, although whether they are ‘overwhelmingly dominant’ is at least now open to question given that they command fluctuating loyalties among electors and struggle to appear in control of events. To assess whether or not McKenzie’s claim remains the case requires an up-to-date understanding of the role played by parties across the UK. Yet, as Heffernan (2009: p.457) observes, the literature comparing political parties in the UK is much thinner than that which focuses on just one party at a time. The aftermath of the significant and novel period from 2010, the 2016 EU referendum and 2017 general election is therefore an opportune time to be examining developments in UK party politics, both within individual parties and comparatively across parties. There are a number of important questions to answer to understand how British party competition arrived at this juncture. What have the challenges that parties have faced in the UK been, and how have they responded and adapted to meet these challenges? Continually the topic of political dissatisfaction among voters, to what extent can we say that political parties are fulfilling their democratic functions in the UK? As one academic asked ‘are British political parties in decline?’ (Webb, 1995). Alternatively, to what extent do political parties in the UK remain ‘fit for purpose’? This book is dedicated to these questions, each of which is discussed in the chapters to come. To provide context for the discussions to follow, this chapter introduces debates about the party system and party competition in the UK. The first section provides an understanding of party systems and the various criteria by which they might be understood. It introduces the idea of political ‘cleavages’, and outlines the cleavages around which party systems are said to have developed and become ‘frozen’. It then builds upon this to briefly introduce a number of ways of classifying party systems, and understanding and categorising the nature of party system change. The second section begins to apply these ideas to the main features of the British party system from 1945 to the early 1970s. Discussion revolves around the dominant cleavages structuring party competition, primarily class, but also stable partisan loyalties, and the post-war British party system is placed firmly in the stable, ‘two-party’ category. The third section begins to assess the nature of change in the British party system from the early 1970s onwards. Discussion relates to the increasing importance of different cleavages, for instance the centre–periphery and sectoral cleavages, and the increasingly dealigned British electorate and its impact upon party competition. The consequences of this for the classification of the British party system are then discussed. 4 Copyrighted material – 9781137577092

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Understanding Party Systems The idea of a party system relates to more than the sum of the number of parties evident in a country. While some countries – notably authoritarian regimes – can be run by one party, the notion of a one-party system is at least problematic since there is no meaningful democratic competition between different party options. In short then, the idea of a party system relates to the patterns of conflict, competition and co-operation between different parties (Sartori, 2005 [1976]). A historical distinction is often made between parties that formed through co-operation of representatives within Parliament, and those parties that initially formed by organising in society to challenge established interests, before being elected to Parliament. The roots of party systems are therefore often traced back to the development of social and political conflicts within societies. The classic statement of this is by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), who identify four major cleavages, or sources of political conflict, in the development of West European party systems. Simplifying their argument considerably, the initial conflicts involved in consolidating the nation-state as a political entity revolved around church–state and centre–periphery issues. Somewhat later, the second major juncture related to the Industrial Revolution. Economic interests were central to political interests and the two key cleavages to emerge were the urban–rural (sometimes called land–industry) cleavage and the owner–worker class cleavage. In different countries, different parties formed around these cleavages. Lipset and Rokkan’s argument was that the widespread extension of the franchise in the early twentieth century essentially ‘froze’ these political conflicts and the party options that had been dominant at that moment in time. Indeed, writing in 1967, they noted how these party options remained dominant more than 40 years after the extension of voting rights in most countries. Party systems, their argument went, were thus more stable than changing. Early approaches to understanding party systems used numerical criteria to differentiate between different types. Duverger (1964) makes a simple distinction between two-party systems and multi-party systems i.e. systems with more than two parties. Blondel (1968) attempted to include the relative strength of parties, thereby distinguishing between two-, two-and-a-half and multi-party systems. What these accounts lacked, however, was an emphasis on how parties interacted with each other. The seminal classification was provided by Sartori (2005 [1976]). He argues that parties should only be counted as ‘relevant’ if they have either coalition potential, or can hold the business of government and government formation up through what he calls ‘blackmail’ potential. Sartori innovates by introducing the concept of ideological distance, or left–right polarisation, into his classification. He therefore proposes four different types of party 5 Copyrighted material – 9781137577092

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system. Predominant party systems are those where one party has governed alone for a considerable period of time, winning at least three if not more elections. Two-party systems are marked by minimal ideological distance on the left–right spectrum, centrist competition and alternation in office. Moderate pluralist systems also operate in a centrist manner, have a low degree of ideological polarisation and involve between three and five parties competing for a position in governing coalitions. Finally, extreme or polarised pluralism is multi-polar, characterised by a high degree of ideological distance and the presence of anti-system parties at both ends of the ideological spectrum. The centrifugal pressures, pulling outwards to the ideological extremes, that such a configuration brings result in radical and bilateral oppositions to the centre-placed governing party or parties. Five main sources of party system change can be identified. First, institutional or constitutional changes can lead to party system change. These can take various forms, but might most often be seen in the adoption of a new electoral system and electoral laws with different thresholds of representation. Second, changes in social structure can lead to changes in support for parties. Third, value change can impact upon party c ompetition. Thus Inglehart (1990a) highlights a move towards values concerned less with material security and more with quality of life issues. Fourth, the combination of social and value change has led to a weakening of political cleavages as electorates become increasingly dealigned. Finally, the strategy adopted by parties themselves can also contribute to party system change (Wolinetz, 1979). Smith (1989) endeavoured to combine both stability and change by defining this in relation to a party system’s ‘core’. The core consists of the features of that system which appear most resistant to change. This means the party, or parties, that have been in leading positions for a considerable period, and the party alignments, particularly in coalition and government formation that have emerged and endured (Smith, 1989: p.161). He goes on to propose four potential degrees of change in party systems. These are: • temporary fluctuations; • restricted change; • general change; • transformation (Smith, 1989: p.166). A three-election time span is suggested to be necessary to distinguish temporary fluctuations from restricted change, while the difference between restricted and general change is not clearly specified. Transformation, while rare, need not mean the wholesale establishment 6 Copyrighted material – 9781137577092

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of a new party system. Instead, it may be highlighted by one of the major parties going ‘into a steep and irreversible decline’ (Smith, 1989: p.167). Assessing developments in any party system must therefore take into account a range of features before it is possible to classify the nature of the change that has occurred. In other words, classifying the party system, identifying which of these elements has changed, and returning to how this has impacted upon patterns of party competition are crucial areas of investigation for party scholars.

The British Party System, 1945–1970 There has been some debate about the origins of the British party system and parties. Some trace the development of British parties back to the seventeenth century (Ingle, 2008: ch. 1), while others date the development of parties to the mid- to late nineteenth century (Fisher, 1996; McKenzie, 1963). Prior to this, two groupings could be found in Parliament. The Tories were supportive of the monarchy and the Church, while the Whigs aimed to restrict monarchical powers and were religious nonconformists. Both groups were loosely organised in Parliament with little or no party discipline as we understand it today. The Reform Acts of 1832 and 1867 ushered in the beginning of the extension of the franchise and saw parties begin to organise outside Parliament for the first time in an attempt to gain support from the newly enfranchised electorate. This also saw the two parties become more disciplined in Parliament, and the development of now standard elements of party competition such as election manifestos and campaign activity (Fisher, 1996; McKenzie, 1963). The Liberal Party of the late nineteenth–early twentieth century claims descent from the Whigs, while the modern Conservative Party traces its history from the Tories of the seventeenth century. Regularly portrayed as a stable two-party system through much of the twentieth century, there has nevertheless been more change in the British party system than many popular accounts suggest. Bogdanor (2004) highlights a number of permutations of party competition in Britain from the beginning of the twentieth century. The first he dates to between 1906 and 1914 when a multi-party, two-bloc system existed, with the Conservatives supported by Liberal Unionists on one side, and the Liberal Party supported by the nascent Labour Party and Irish parties on the other. Between 1918 and 1931, the rise of the Labour Party meant that, despite other smaller groupings being relevant, there were effectively three main parties in competition, the Conservatives, Liberals and Labour. The extension of the franchise in 1918 contributed considerably to the decline of the Liberals and the rise of Labour. His third 7 Copyrighted material – 9781137577092

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period, 1935–1970, equates to what he calls the ‘heyday of two-party competition’, with Labour having cemented its position to become the main alternative to the Conservatives. It is the post-war period from 1945 to 1970 which has become the epitome of the British party system in much political science and popular literature, and from which any change tends to be measured. While this approach has been rightly criticised (Bogdanor, 2004; Dunleavy, 2005), it nevertheless marks an important juncture from which to understand recent developments. The British party system was presented as the foremost example of a two-party system as defined by Sartori (2005 [1976]). The Conservative and Labour Parties alternated in office in this period. Labour governed in the immediate post-war period from 1945, narrowly winning the 1950 general election before being defeated, at least in terms of seats, by the Conservatives in 1951. The Conservatives then governed for a 13-year period until defeated in the 1964 general election by Harold Wilson’s Labour Party, who went on to increase their majority in 1966 and governed until 1970. This period was also notable for the centrist direction of political competition. In particular, the idea that two-party systems are marked by minimal ideological distance was highlighted by a consensus between the two main parties over the aims of public policy. Labelled ‘Butskellism’ after two prominent Chancellors – R. A. Butler for the Conservatives, and Hugh Gaitskell for Labour – this consensus revolved around the defence of the welfare state, which had been set up by Labour after 1945, the pursuit of full employment and Keynesian demand management economic policies. This consensus notwithstanding, some still presented the British party system as an exemplar of strictly competitive political interactions (Dahl, 1966a). This two-party system was supported by twin pillars. The first was stable party loyalties brought about through socialisation within the family. The argument was that political attitudes were transmitted through family allegiances. Thus, Butler and Stokes (1969: ch. 3) show that voters’ early party preferences were affected by their parents’ partisanship. Where both parents were Conservative, 89 per cent of their respondents also initially identified with the Conservatives. Similarly, where both parents were Labour, 92 per cent of respondents initially identified with Labour. While these preferences weakened with age, this was only by a relatively small amount. Political socialisation within the family therefore had a lasting effect, leading to essentially stable political attitudes. Consequently, party identification was at high levels, with around 80 per cent identifying with either the Conservative or Labour Parties during the 1960s (Denver, 2007: p.62). The second pillar related to the cleavage structure of political conflict. The centre–periphery and land–industry cleavages had been evident in 8 Copyrighted material – 9781137577092

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the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These were ultimately superseded by the rise of the worker–owner cleavage and the increasing political organisation of the working class. For instance, the trade unions played a large part in the formation of the Labour Party. Class therefore became increasingly important, and, underlining Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) suggestion, the extension of the franchise was central in cementing the role of the Labour Party as the main party of opposition to the Conservatives. Indeed, in the post-war period, class was regularly found to be a major explanation for party choice, and the influence of the class cleavage had steadily increased (Butler and Stokes, 1969; Pulzer, 1967). Butler and Stokes (1969) found that in the early 1960s, 72 per cent of the working class identified themselves as Labour supporters, a figure which rose to 77 per cent for the lower working class. By contrast, more than 75 per cent of the middle classes, and 100 per cent of the upper class, identified themselves as Conservative. Other methods of measuring the effects of class on voting similarly found class a dominant factor in explaining party choice in this period (Denver, 2007). Combined with the influence of stable political attitudes and identifications, such class-based voting led to stable patterns of party choice in British general elections. Changes in government could not have happened, however, without at least some voters changing their party preference during elections. Nevertheless, elections in this period were low-volatility contests, with the most net volatility being evident in the swing back to the Conservatives in 1951 (see Table 1.2). The result of these essentially stable voting patterns was therefore a stable two-party system, rooted in the class cleavage. Indeed, as can be seen from Table 1.1, Labour and the Conservatives dominated British party competition, the C onservatives achieving more than 49 per cent vote share in 1955 and 1959, and Labour achieving 47.9 per cent and upwards in 1945, 1951 and 1966. This two-party dominance is underlined by examining the combined vote share for the Conservatives and Labour (Figure 1.1). Between 1951 and 1959, the two parties accounted for upwards of 93 per cent of the UK vote. While this had weakened slightly during the 1960s, the twoparty share nevertheless remained at high levels of around 87–89 per cent. During the same period, the vote share for parties other than the main two was at its lowest in 1951–1955 and averaged around 9 per cent between 1945 and 1970, with most of that being accounted for by the Liberal Party. In terms of representation, this two-party dominance was reinforced by the first-past-the-post electoral system, which militated against smaller parties such as the Liberals gaining extensive representation. As Figure 1.1 demonstrates, from 1950 to 1970, the Conservative and Labour Parties held between 98 and 99 per cent of the seats in the House of Commons. 9 Copyrighted material – 9781137577092

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39.8 43.5 48 49.7 49.4 43.4 41.9 46.4 37.8 35.8 43.9 42.4 42.3 41.9 30.7 31.7 32.4 36.1 36.8 42.3

213 299 321 345 365 304 253 330 297 277 339 397 376 336 165 166 198 307 330 317

48.3 46.1 48.8 46.4 43.8 44.1 47.9 43 37.1 39.2 37 27.6 30.8 34.4 43.2 40.7 35.2 29 30.4 40.0

393 315 295 277 258 317 363 288 301 319 269 209 229 271 418 412 356 258 232 262

Seats 9.1 9.1 2.5 2.7 5.9 11.2 8.5 7.5 19.3 18.3 13.8 25.4 22.6 17.8 16.8 18.3 22 23 7.9 7.4

Vote share % 12 9 6 6 6 9 12 6 14 13 11 23 22 20 46 52 62 57 8 12

Seats

Lib (Dems) 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.3 2.6 3.5 2 1.5 1.7 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.2 5.3 3.6

Vote share % 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 14 4 4 6 7 10 9 9 9 59 39

Seats

Nationalists 2.5 1.2 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.8 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.1 2.6 3.5 6.8 6.8 8.2 9.6 19.6 6.7

Vote share %

Others 22 2 3 2 1 0 2 5 14 12 12 17 17 17 20 20 21 19 21 20

Seats

Sources: Data from: Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016: Appendix 1; Tetteh, 2008; Apostolova et al., 2017.

Note: Nationalists refers to the Scottish and Welsh nationalist parties, while the Liberal column refers to the Liberal Party, the Liberal-SDP Alliance and the Liberal Democrats.

1945 1950 1951 1955 1959 1964 1966 1970 1974 Feb 1974 Oct 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 2015 2017

Vote share %

Seats

Lab

Con

Table 1.1 UK general election results, 1945–2017

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Two-party vote share

Two-party share of the electorate

40 20 0

1945 1951 1959 1966 1974 1979 1987 1997 2005 2015 Feb

Figure 1.1 Two-party vote, seat and electorate share, House of Commons, 1945–2017

The British Party System, 1974–2017 Bogdanor’s (2004) fourth period of party competition dates from 1974, when voters had the unusual experience of two general elections being conducted in the same year. The February 1974 election was a watershed moment for the British party system. This contest recorded the third-highest net volatility (14.5) of all post-war UK elections, only behind 2015 and 2017. As Figure 1.1 highlights, the two-party share of the vote fell from 89.4 per cent in 1970 to 74.9 per cent in February 1974. Aside from 1979, when the two-party share of the vote was 80.9 per cent, this proved to be the beginning of a lasting erosion in the combined ability of the two main parties to command the British vote. Between 1979 and 2017, this was never higher than the 1992 figure of 76.3 per cent. By the tightly fought election of 2015, the combined two-party share had fallen to 67.2 per cent, with the Conservatives on 36.8 per cent and Labour, despite losing seats, increasing its share to 30.4 per cent. However, the electoral system still ensured that the Conservatives and Labour dominated the House of Commons, commanding more than 90 per cent of seats up to 1992, and between 86 and 88 per cent since 1997. In 1974, the corollary was a rise in the vote for the non-mainstream parties, particularly the Liberals and the Scottish and Welsh nationalist parties, the SNP and Plaid Cymru (Table 1.1). Thus, Liberal vote share jumped from 7.5 per cent in 1970 to 19.3 per cent in February 1974 and the party increased its number of seats from six to 14. Similarly, nationalist vote share doubled and the nationalist parties’ representation increased from one MP to nine, rising to 14 in the October 1974 11 Copyrighted material – 9781137577092

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election. In 1983, the Liberal-SDP Alliance achieved 25.4 per cent of the national vote, and after the Liberals and SDP merged to become the Liberal Democrats in 1988, the party demonstrated a steady increase in both its vote share, peaking at 23 per cent in 2010, and its number of seats, winning 62 in 2005. After a decline in their representation in the 1980s, the nationalist parties elected ten MPs in 1997, stabilised at a combined 9 MPs between 2001 and 2010, before the SNP took all but three of the seats in Scotland in 2015. This gave nationalist parties 59 seats in total and led to the SNP becoming the third-largest party in the House of Commons, a position it continues to hold despite losing seats in 2017. The rise of third and other party votes and the decline of the mainstream party votes between 1974 and 2015 highlighted a weakening in the position of the two main parties. This was underlined further when election turnout is taken into account. Voters had been decreasingly willing to vote in general elections, with turnout falling to 59.4 per cent in 2001. Despite rising slightly in the four subsequent contests, the 68.8 per cent turnout achieved in 2015 was still well below the 77.7 per cent achieved 25 years earlier in 1992. As the population and electorate has grown, this means that the two main parties competing for office in B ritain have been commanding the loyalties of an ever-smaller proportion of the declining numbers of people who cast a vote. Indeed, as Figure 1.1 shows, the two-party share of the electorate declined from 79.9 per cent in 1951, to only 44.5 per cent in 2015. It rose slightly to 56.6 in 2017, still well below its post-war high. Even accounting for the rise of the Liberal Democrats up to 2015, the three-party share of the British electorate only averaged 53.9 per cent in the four elections between 2001 and 2015. As Mair (2009) observed, this was hardly a mark of a party system comprised of strong or thriving political parties. Three large Conservative victories under Margaret Thatcher in 1979, 1983 and 1987, followed up by a much narrower Conservative victory in 1992, led to speculation that the two-party system had been replaced by a predominant party system, where one party governs alone for a period of three elections or more. Analysts pondered after the Conservatives’ fourth win in 1992 whether that had that been ‘Labour’s Last Chance?’ and suggested that if the Conservatives won again it would ‘no longer be realistic to describe Britain as a two-party democracy’ (Heath et al., 1994: p.275). When the Conservatives were replaced by Labour in 1997 a similar pattern was evident, Labour winning three successive large majorities in 1997, 2001 and 2005 and leaving commentators considering the ‘Conservatives in Crisis’ (Garnett and Lynch, 2003). Both 1979 and 1997 changes of government were marked by large-scale vote switching, 1997 in particular being the fourth most volatile post-war election after 2015, 2017 and February 1974. In short, from 1979 to 12 Copyrighted material – 9781137577092

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2010, the British party system was marked by the extended predominance of the governing party, heralded by a sharp change of direction for voters first in 1979, and then in 1997, in what has been termed ‘alternating predominance’ (Mair, 2009: p.288; Quinn, 2013). The 2017 general election was important for many reasons. Not least among these was that it seemed to herald the return of two-party politics at W estminster. Together, the Conservatives and Labour accounted for 89 per cent of seats, only a small increase from 2015. The two-party share of the vote was, however, up considerably to 82.3 per cent, while the two-party share of the electorate was also up sharply to 56.2 per cent, a level not seen since the late 1980s–early 1990s (Figure 1.1). Equally, turnout also rose to 68.8 per cent in the febrile post-Brexit referendum atmosphere. Votes for parties such as UKIP and the Scottish and Welsh nationalists appeared to have peaked in 2015. While the Conservatives and Labour remained central to government formation after 2017, one thing had evidently changed. For the second time in three elections, voters elected a hung parliament. Far from the ‘strong and stable’ single-party government that had been promised by the Conservative Party during the 2017 campaign, and often promoted as a benefit by advocates of the first-past-the-post e lectoral system, a hung parliament puts constraints on any party seeking to anchor an administration. In 2010 it necessitated coalition between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. In 2017 a looser ‘confidence and supply’ arrangement was agreed between the Conservatives and Northern Ireland’s DUP. Even in the intervening period from 2015 to 2017, the Cameron-led government had only achieved a small and vulnerable majority. Far from ‘alternating predominance’ in the party system, this looked like mainstream parties struggling to achieve any form of d ominance or advantage in party competition. It also looked likely to continue unless one party made a decisive breakthrough. As Curtice (2015) argued after 2015, the potential range of outcomes which could lead to a hung parliament are now larger than they have ever been. Table 1.2 tracks net electoral volatility, measured through the widely used Pedersen index (Pedersen, 1990), from 1950 to 2017. This shows that the most volatile British general elections were February 1974, 1983, 1997, 2015 and 2017. Indeed, 2015 was most volatile due to a large fall in vote share for the Liberal Democrats, and a sizeable rise for UKIP, coupled with the SNP’s success at Labour’s expense in S cotland. 2017 was similarly volatile because much of this shifting between parties in 2015 was unwound in 2017, particularly in the decline of UKIP and the rise of the two main parties’ vote. This notwithstanding, volatile contests are generally followed by low-volatility elections as in October 1974, 1987 and 2001. The popularity of governments declines the longer they are in office. From 1974 it appears that once the British 13 Copyrighted material – 9781137577092

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electorate have changed direction sharply, they appear to be broadly satisfied with the outcome until circumstances conspire to lead to a desire for change. When this desire for change appears, between 1974 and 2015 it did so at higher levels of volatility than in the immediate post-war period. Table 1.2 also tracks the effective number of parties at both the electoral (ENEP) and the parliamentary (ENPP) level. These measures provide an indication of how fragmented or concentrated party competition is at each level and as such are commonly used as an indicator of the number of relevant parties at electoral and parliamentary levels (Lijphart, 1999: pp.67–9; Webb, 2000: pp.36–7). Between 1983 and 2015, there have never been fewer than three relevant parties in electoral competition, although ENPP remains well below that, with effectively two-and-a-half relevant parties in Parliament between 2005 and 2017. Even if ENEP fell to 2.89 in 2017, both measures add further evidence to the case that the British party system has become increasingly fragmented since the 1970s. Table 1.2 Net volatility and effective number of parties: British general elections, 1950–2017

1950 1951 1955 1959 1964 1966 1970 1974 February 1974 October 1979 1983 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 2015 2017

Net volatility

ENEP

ENPP

3.65 7.2 2.35 3.3 5.95 4.15 5.95 14.5 3 8.2 11.6 3.4 5.15 12.25 2.5 5.8 5.65 17.7 15.2

2.44 2.13 2.16 2.28 2.53 2.42 2.46 3.13 3.15 2.87 3.46 3.33 3.06 3.22 3.33 3.59 3.71 3.92 2.89

2.08 2.06 2.03 1.99 2.06 2.02 2.07 2.25 2.25 2.15 2.09 2.17 2.27 2.13 2.17 2.46 2.57 2.53 2.48

Sources: Data for net volatility, author’s calculations; ENEP and ENPP, Gallagher, 2016 and author’s calculations. ENEP refers to the effective number of electoral parties, while ENPP refers to the effective number of parliamentary parties.

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How might these changes be explained? The first potential set of explanations revolve around party performance in office. In the late 1960s–early 1970s there had been numerous policy and economic crises in British government, culminating in Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath calling the February 1974 election against the backdrop of considerable industrial unrest, ostensibly on the theme of ‘Who Governs’? Significantly, both parties had been involved in these various crises, Labour from 1964 and the Conservatives from 1970. Thus, poor performance in office can be highlighted as a reason for the sharp decline in two-party vote share in February 1974. A similar dynamic has continued through to the present day, with analysts noting the seeming inability of political parties, from both sides of the political spectrum, to resolve some of the most pressing public policy problems when in office as an explanation for the decreasing popularity of parties (Clarke, 2014; King and Crewe, 2013; Webb, 1995). Whiteley (2009a) similarly observes that British government continued to decline in effectiveness between 1996 and 2007. Second, gradual changes in the social structure had begun to impact upon the stability of the class cleavage in a process of political dealignment evident through the late 1960s–early 1970s (Sarlvik and Crewe, 1983). Indeed, a weakening of class-based voting had already been noticed in early election studies (Butler and Stokes, 1969) and while absolute class voting remained at 60 per cent or above in the 1960s, this had fallen to around 49 per cent in the 1980s and around 40 per cent in 2005 (Denver, 2007: p.69). The decline of the class cleavage is therefore a major explanation for the weakening of party support. In part this reflected the decline of traditional working class occupations in heavy industry. However, it was also partly due to a process of embourgeoisement, with manual workers becoming more affluent and, as a consequence, their political attitudes changing. Other explanations include increased levels of education and television reporting increasing political knowledge and thereby undermining traditional loyalties and political socialisation processes (Denver, 2007). With a weakening class cleavage, other political conflicts increased in prominence. Dunleavy (1980) highlighted a split between the public and private sectors among voters, arguing that those who worked in and depended on the public sector for services and housing were more likely to vote Labour, while those more dependent on the private sector were identified with the Conservative Party. The centre–periphery cleavage also reasserted its importance with the SNP and Plaid Cymru both electing MPs after notable by-election wins in the late 1960s, and following this up by winning a combined total of 14 seats in October 1974, the SNP in particular winning over 30 per cent of the Scottish vote in that election. Moreover, voting patterns increasingly diverged geographically, 15 Copyrighted material – 9781137577092

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with Conservative representation in decline in the north of England and Scotland, with these areas overwhelmingly electing Labour MPs ( Johnston et al., 1988). This geographical pattern weakened in the 1990s (Curtice and Park, 1999). However, by 2010–2017 geographical divisions in party choice had again become sharper, as demonstrated by the SNP’s rise from 2007 onwards. Recent work has detected a new cleavage beginning to structure party politics, which is rooted in experiences of the effects of globalisation. On the one hand it is argued that there is a so-called ‘cosmopolitan’, university-educated, urban-dwelling elite who are comfortable with immigration, relatively liberal in their values and pluralist in outlook. By contrast, a more provincial and rural electorate, not university educated, is less liberal, less comfortable with immigration, more traditional and nostalgic about national identity (Goodhart, 2017; Jennings and Stoker, 2016; 2017). This division certainly worries party strategists. Nonetheless, the extent to which this is merely the latest manifestation of some of the cleavages highlighted by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) remains unclear. The argument is that this is qualitatively new because it exists against a backdrop of widespread cynicism about politics. Moreover, such differences in cultural outlook are perceived to be less amenable to political compromise and agreement (Jennings and Stoker, 2016). Important though they may be, none of these cleavages – public/private, globalisation’s winners and losers, geography – has been able to underpin the structure of state-wide political loyalties and party preferences in the same way as the class cleavage did, serving instead to fragment rather than unify. The grounds of political debate also shifted rightwards away from the ‘Butskellite’ social democratic consensus of the 1950s and 1960s. This was the result of policies followed by Conservative governments of the 1980s. One of the aims of the Conservatives’ privatisations of various state-owned industries and giving council tenants the ‘right to buy’ their council houses was to encourage voters to become small-scale owners and capitalists in the hope that this would undermine collective working class identities and turn such voters towards the Conservatives in the longer term (Norris, 1990). Conservative Party policy therefore attempted to engender value change in society. Indeed, Bartle et al. (2011) show how the centre ground of party competition can move over time, changing due to government activity. Prior to Labour returning to office in 1997, it had to adapt itself to these realities, abandoning many of its previously held positions, not least Clause IV of its constitution, which many understood as committing the party to nationalisation of industry. Labour did little in office between 1997 and 2010 to change these underlying values (Toynbee and Walker, 2010). A leftwards movement can, however, be detected in the aftermath of the 2016 EU referendum. 16 Copyrighted material – 9781137577092

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Conservative leader Theresa May has talked of helping those who are ‘just about managing’ in an apparent move towards working families, while the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn presented a more left-wing profile than it had in decades. Finally, institutional change has also undermined the party system at Westminster. Parties must now operate in complex multi-level environments. The devolution of power to the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly in 1999 means that the structures of party competition in the devolved institutions differ from those found at Westminster (Bennie and Clark, 2003; Dunleavy, 2005; Massetti, 2008). This has also been the case in elections to the European Parliament, although when the UK leaves the EU, this will be removed as an arena of electoral competition for the UK parties. Mair (2009) argues that the structure of British party competition is therefore no longer reinforced in these important institutions. Instead, the focus of voters and parties in the devolved countries is increasingly focused on the new institutions, thereby undermining the claim of the Westminster-based party system to represent the UK as a whole.

Classifying Party System Change in Britain How might these changes to the British party system be classified? A number of accounts have argued that Britain has a suppressed or latent moderate pluralist party system (Webb, 2000: ch. 1; Webb and Fisher, 1999). As per Sartori’s (2005 [1976]) classification, moderate pluralism has between two and five parties competing for a place in a coalition government and is marked by both centrist competition and ideological moderation. The argument was that the first-past-the-post electoral system had restricted the ability of third and smaller parties to win seats in Parliament, thereby ensuring that the full consequences of the changes outlined above did not wholly feed through into the question of government formation at Westminster. While party competition at the electoral level may have become more fragmented, in Parliament the two-party ‘core’ of the system, Labour and the Conservatives were, until 2010 at least, able to continue operating as if little had changed. The dramatic outcome of the 2010 election, a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, would appear to suggest that change in the British party system was no longer suppressed and had become a moderate pluralist party system in practice. In the 2010 parliament, this was undoubtedly true. Nevertheless, caution is advised before jumping to longer-term conclusions. As noted earlier, Smith (1989) suggests a three-election time span to distinguish between temporary fluctuations and what he calls restricted change. Polling early in the 2010 parliament suggested that the Liberal Democrats would be severely punished by voters for joining a 17 Copyrighted material – 9781137577092

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Conservative Party embarking upon controversial cuts to public services. This came to pass in 2015, with the Liberal Democrats losing 49 seats and reduced to 7.9 per cent of the vote. Combined with the Conservative victory, this appeared to signal a resumption of two-party competition between Labour and the Conservatives, and two-party competition seemed also to be given a boost by the result of the 2017 contest. However, as noted earlier, hung parliaments remain a very possible, if not likely, outcome (Curtice, 2015). If coalition or minority governments become the norm over time, it would not be unreasonable to talk of restricted and eventually even general change in the British party system insofar as competition for office is concerned. Indeed, with at best a small Conservative majority between 2015 and 2017, the closeness of electoral outcomes since 2010 seemed to suggest this had come to pass. Nevertheless, it is possible to make the case that the British party system has already undergone a process of general change since February 1974, particularly at the level of electoral competition. There are three key reasons for this. First, as noted earlier, the processes of class and partisan dealignment that have resulted from social structural and value change are central to this. The importance of the owner–worker cleavage and the values associated with that therefore no longer support the British party system in the way they did. Evans and Norris (1999) term this process one of secular dealignment, suggesting that even the apparently sharp shift from Conservative to Labour in 1997 can be explained through this gradual process. Some have argued that this has led to longterm attitudinal scepticism about parties and politicians (for instance: Webb, 2009). Although 73 per cent trusted politicians not at all or not very much in 2010, it is difficult to make the case that this has changed; voters have always been sceptical about political parties (Hansard Society, 2010). They most likely always will be. Second, the devolved institutions have fragmented party competition across Britain, and this has been compounded by the geographical spread of the vote, with the Conservatives predominant again in the south of England, and Labour further north and in inner cities, with competition from nationalist alternatives in Scotland and Wales. Third, elections to these new institutions, and the European Parliament, have utilised assorted forms of proportional representation. This means that the dominance of the two main parties is no longer underpinned by an unproportional and unrepresentative electoral system. Voters can choose different parties in those systems and this opens up opportunities for other parties to build their representation in a way that they have seldom been able to do at Westminster. The consequence is that ‘the two-party system that the parties both create and depend upon is being isolated ever more effectively within the confines of Westminster, with little purchase beyond the core institutions’ (Mair, 2009: p.299). 18 Copyrighted material – 9781137577092

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Some parties have nevertheless seen a rise in those joining party organisations, sometimes substantially so. While this has to some degree provided evidence to counter the idea that party membership and activism is in decline, over the long term levels are still considerably lower than in previous decades (Keen and Audickas, 2015). This means that British political parties continue to appear rooted in the institutions of state, not in the communities they claim to represent (Katz and Mair, 1995; Whiteley, 2009b). Despite much talk from party politicians of the need to ‘reconnect’ with the public, it is difficult to see any of these developments being significantly reversed, hence it is both possible and appropriate to classify the British party system as having undergone general change from 1974 onwards. Whether the more recent experiences of hung parliaments and coalition government continue to be a regular part of this picture of general change in the British party system in the longer term depends on two things: whether either the Conservatives or Labour can break the broad deadlock between them which has led to hung parliaments; and whether or not parties other than Labour and the Conservatives can muster enough support, seats and policy overlaps to make them potential coalition partners for the two larger parties.

The Structure of the Book The following chapters investigate developments in British party politics in more depth. Chapter two investigates the democratic functions of political parties, outlining how these are, or are not, fulfilled by parties as organisations, in the electorate and in office. Chapters three through to six examine each of the major British parties – the Conservatives, Labour, the Liberal Democrats and the SNP – in depth. These chapters have a common structure to enable comparison. Party ideology and policy begins discussion and the extent of ideological and policy change in each party is assessed. Discussion then proceeds to questions of party leadership performance and selection, before going on to examine the representativeness and candidate selection processes of each of the three parties. The final sections of these chapters go on to discuss and assess each party’s performance in office. Subsequent chapters proceed on a thematic basis. Chapter seven analyses the rise, and fall, of small parties such as the Green Party and UKIP. These parties are introduced individually before discussion of the reasons for their rise and broader systemic impact. Chapter eight moves on to examine the question of Britain’s ‘multi-level’ party systems. The territorial party systems are outlined and classified and parties active only in the devolved systems discussed, before extending the analysis to party systems in local government and the European Parliament. 19 Copyrighted material – 9781137577092

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Chapter nine addresses the important question of parties’ relationship with the media, outlining a model of political communication, examining patterns of press partisanship, professionalisation of communication activity and the use of the internet. Chapter ten addresses the crucial issue of party organisation and funding, highlighting where power lies in the main parties as well as examining the sometimes parlous state of party finances. Most people associate political parties with campaigning for election. Chapter eleven therefore examines the structure of the British electorate in 2015, before analysing developments in party campaign techniques at both national and local constituency level. The final chapter reviews each of these themes and returns to the question of the challenges faced by political parties in the UK today, arguing that parties and the party system face a range of challenges, some of which are specific to the UK’s parties, but many of which are also common to political parties elsewhere.

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INDEX

References to tables and figures are in bold type. Abbott, D. 86 Adams, G. 163, 164 age voting behaviour, and 229 all-women shortlists (AWS) 30, 85, 107, 123 Ashcroft, Lord 241, 242, 245 Ashdown, P. assessment of leadership 100–101 Attlee, C. 69, 91 assessment of leadership 87–8 AWS 30, 85, 107, 123 Axelrod, D. 236 Bale, T. 50, 53, 65 Berlusconi, S. 263 Beveridge, W. 94 ‘Big Society’ 46, 47 Blair, T. 71, 91, 186, 189, 190, 206, 240 assessment of leadership 78–9 Brack, D. 100, 101, 102, 209 British National Party (BNP) 144–6, 148, 149, 150 electoral performance 145, 146 electoral support 145 ideology and policy 145 income 154 British party system (1945–1970) 8–9 (1974–2017) 11–17 changes in 254–5 constitutional and institutional change 253–4 decrease in class-based voting 250 fragmentation of the vote 250–51 structure of party competition 251–3 classifying change in 17–19 origins of 7 permutations of party competition 7–8 two-party system 11, 249, 250 see also party systems

Brown, G. 38, 78, 82, 90 assessment of leadership 79 Butler, R. 8 ‘Butskellism’ 8 Cable, V. 96, 103, 109–10 assessment of leadership 104 Callaghan, J. assessment of leadership 75–6 Cameron, D. 1, 2, 3, 46, 47, 57, 58, 204, 205, 241 assessment of leadership 53, 54 EU and Scottish Independence referendums 64 campaigning see election campaigning Campbell, A. 189, 191, 192, 200 Campbell, Sir M. assessment of leadership 102–3 candidate selection 57 Conservative Party 57, 58, 59 Labour Party 83–4 Liberal Democrats 106 Scottish National Party 122–3 cartel party model 146, 251 ‘cash for honours’ 222 ‘catch-all parties’ 32, 131, 230 CCO 203 centre-periphery cleavage 5, 8–9, 15 Childs, S. 58, 59 church-state cleavage 5 Churchill, Sir W. 61 class cleavage decrease in class-based voting 250 owner-worker class cleavage 5, 9, 15, 18 classical liberalism 92–3 cleavage structures centre-periphery cleavage 5, 8–9, 15 church-state cleavage 5 class cleavage decrease in class-based voting 250 owner-worker class cleavage 5, 9, 15, 18

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Copyrighted material – 9781137577092 INDEX public-private sector cleavage 15 urban-rural cleavage 5, 8–9 Clegg, N. 1, 110, 193, 259 assessment of leadership 103–4 coalition governments 36–7, 264 see also Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition ‘confidence and supply’ arrangement 3, 13, 36, 162 Conservative Central Office (CCO) 203 Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 1, 36, 37, 63, 108–10 coalition negotiations 108–9 Conservative Party 42, 65–6 candidate selection 57, 58, 59 ideology and policy 43–8, 65, 66 ‘Big Society’ 46, 47 hierarchy, leadership and authority 43 ideological division 46 liberal conservatism 44, 46 limits of human ability 43 national interest 43 ‘one nation’ conservatism 43, 44, 45 organic view of society 43 prosperous economy 43 rule of law 43 strong but limited state 43 Thatcherism 44, 45 tradition 43 leadership 48–57, 65 assessment of leaders 49–55 leaders (1940–2017) 49 leadership results (2005) 54 procedures for electing a leader 55–6 selection of leaders 55 organisational structure 203–5 1922 Committee 203, 205 organisational reform 204 performance in office 61–5 representativeness 57, 58, 59, 59, 60, 60, 61 constituency campaigning 242–7 centralisation of 245 contact with voters 246, 247 members’ activities 244 Corbyn, J. 29, 73, 83, 91, 187, 190, 194, 195, 207, 208, 242, 252, 253, 261 assessment of leadership 80. 81 elected as Labour Party leader 2 Coulson, A. 189, 190, 191, 200 Crosby, L. 236 Crosland, A. 70

Davidson, R. 170 Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 3, 36, 160–62 ‘confidence and supply’ arrangement 3, 13, 36, 162 electoral performance 161, 162 ideology and policy 160–61, 162 performance in office 161–2 devolution 17, 89, 108, 122, 158, 253, 259 digital campaigning 238, 248 Disraeli, B. 43 Downsian model of party competition 33 Duncan Smith, I. 52 DUP see Democratic Unionist Party Eastwood, C. 167 EDL 259 effective number of electoral parties (ENEP) 14, 14, 168, 169 effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) 14, 14, 168, 169 election campaigning 233, 248 Ashcroft targeting programme 245 campaign strategy 239–42, 248 constituency campaigning 242–7 centralisation of 245 contact with voters 246, 247 members’ activities 244 development of party campaigns 233, 247–8 modern campaigns 233–4 post-modern campaigns 234 pre-modern campaigns 233 digital campaigning 238, 248 expenditure 236, 237, 238 permanent, voter-oriented campaign activity 235–6 planning 238–9 professionalization of 234–5, 236 Electoral Commission 146, 221, 222, 224 electoral performance British National Party 145, 146 Democratic Unionist Party 161, 162 Green Party 142, 142, 143 Plaid Cymru 157, 158 Sinn Fein 163–4 Social Democratic and Labour Party 167 UK Independence Party 137, 137, 138

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Copyrighted material – 9781137577092 INDEX electoral support British National Party 145 Green Party 143–4 UK Independence Party 138 electoral volatility 13–14, 14 Elliott, T. 166 Empey, R. 165 ENEP 14, 14, 168, 169 English Defence League (EDL) 259 ENPP 14, 14, 168, 169 European Parliament elections 175–6, 176, 177 European Union (EU) referendum 2–3, 64, 135, 140 Evans, E. 107

globalisation 16 Gould, P. 235, 259 Gove, M. 55 governments and majorities (1945–2017) 34, 35, 35 ‘governments of all the talents’ 38 Greater London Authority (GLA) 172, 174 Green Party 141–4, 147, 148, 149, 150 challenges for 144 electoral performance 142, 142, 143 electoral support 143–4 ideology and policy 142 income 154 organisational structure 211 Griffin, N. 150

Fabian Society 68, 205 Facebook 196, 197, 198 Farage, N. 134, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 149, 211 Farron, T. assessment of leadership 104 financial crisis impact of 264–5 Foot, M. assessment of leadership 76 Foster, A. 160, 161–2 funding of political parties 225–6 concerns over 222, 223 income and expenditure levels 219, 219, 220 regulatory framework 220–22 PPEA 224 PPERA 221–2 review of 223, 224, 225 sources of funding 217, 218, 218–19

Hague, W. 52, 53, 56, 240 organisational reform 204 Heath, E. 15 assessment of leadership 49, 61–2 Heseltine, M. 51 Hilton, S. 190–91 Hobhouse, L. 93 Howard, M. 52, 53 Hume, J. 163 hung parliament 13, 18, 19, 36, 173, 232, 236, 251, 264

Gaitskell, H. 8, 69 Galloway, G. 140, 141, 148, 149, 150 Gamble, A. 45 Game, C. 173, 175 gender voting behaviour, and 229 General Elections 1974 (February) 11 2015 2 results (1945–2017) 10 ‘general incentives’ theory 216 geography voting behaviour, and 15–16, 229 Gibb, R. 191 GLA 172, 174

identity politics 259, 260 ideology and policy British National Party 145 Conservative Party 43–8, 65, 66 Democratic Unionist Party 160–61, 162 Green Party 142 Labour Party 67–74, 90–91 Liberal Democrats 92–9 Plaid Cymru 157 Scottish National Party 112–13, 115–17 Sinn Fein 162–3 Social Democratic and Labour Party 166 UK Independence Party 134–6 Ingham, B. 192 internet Facebook 196, 197, 198 parties’ websites 195, 196, 197 political impact of 195–9 Twitter 196, 197, 198 voters’ use of the internet 197, 198, 198 YouTube 196, 197 Italy collapse of Italian party system 263–4

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Copyrighted material – 9781137577092 INDEX Jackson, B. 117 Johnson, B. 55, 173 Kennedy, C. 209 assessment of leadership 101–2 Keynes, J. M. 93 Khan, S. 86, 173 Kilroy-Silk, R. 138 Kinnock, N. 206 assessment of leadership 76–7 Kuhn, R. 179–80, 181, 192 Labour Party 67 candidate selection 83–4 ideology and policy 67–74, 90–91 Alternative Economic Strategy 70 Blue Labour 73 Christian and ethical roots of the party’s socialism 68 common ownership of industry 69 equality 68, 70 Meet the Challenge, Make the Change 70 organised labour 68 parliamentary democracy 69 Purple Book 73 redistribution 68–9 scientific socialism 68 ‘Third Way’ 71, 72 leadership 74–83, 91 leaders (1935–2017) 74 leadership election results (2015, 2016) 80 leadership election rules 81–3 organisational structure 205–8 origins of 67, 68 performance in office 87–90, 91 representativeness 83, 84–5, 85, 86. 87 land-industry cleavage 5, 8–9 LaPalombara, J. 22 leadership Conservative Party 48–57, 65 Labour Party 74–83, 91 Liberal Democrats 99, 100–105 Scottish National Party 118–22 Sinn Fein 164–5 Social Democratic and Labour Party 167 UK Independence Party 138, 139 see also organisational structure Leadsom, A. 55 Lib-Lab pact 36

liberal conservatism 44, 46 Liberal Democrats 92 candidate selection 106 ‘community politics’ 99, 208, 209, 247 distinctiveness 110–11 electoral credibility 111 ideology and policy 92–9 classical liberalism 92–3 ‘fairness’ 98 five ‘E’s 95 Make It Happen 97–8 ‘maximalist’ social liberals 97, 98 ‘minimalist’ social liberals 97 Orange Book 96 Reinventing the State 97 social liberalism 93, 94, 95 leadership 99, 100–105 leaders (1945–2017) 100 selection of leaders 104–5 organisational structure 208–9 origins of 99 performance in office 107–10 representativeness 105, 106, 107 Liberal Unionists 7 Lilley, P. 240 Lipset, S. 5 Livingstone, K. 173 local government party systems 173, 175, 175 Lucas, C. 143, 144, 149 Mair, P. 256 Major, J. assessment of leadership 51–2, 62–3 Mandelson, P. 235 material - post-material divide 146, 147 Mattinson, D. 235 May, T. 3, 48, 57, 190, 194, 242 assessment of leadership 54–5, 64–5 calling general election in 2017 3, 55, 64 mayoral elections 172–3 McDonald, M. L. 164–5 McGuinness, M. 164 McKenzie, R. 4 media broadcast media 188, 189 obligation of impartiality 187–8 ‘soundbites’ 189 functions of 179–80 illegal phone hacking 187, 189, 200 impact on party behaviour 200, 201

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Copyrighted material – 9781137577092 INDEX media – (Continued ) impact on voting behaviour 199–200, 201 internet Facebook 196, 197, 198 parties’ websites 195, 196, 197 political impact of 195–9 Twitter 196, 197, 198 voters’ use of the internet 197, 198, 198 YouTube 196, 197 parties’ professionalisation of political communication 179, 189–93 news management practices 192 press secretaries’ briefings 191 proactive and reactive communications strategies 190 Special Advisers 191 ‘spin doctors’ 179, 189 partisanship 182, 183, 184–5, 186–7 ‘political information cycle’ 194, 199 televised leaders’ debates 193–5, 239 theories of political communication 179–82 direct, top-down model 180 interactionist position 180 pluralist model 180 membership see organisational structure Miliband, D. 79 Miliband, E. 187, 207 assessment of leadership 79–80 minority government 3, 18, 36, 76, 87, 119, 124–5, 162, 170, 232 Momentum 80, 83, 84, 207, 208, 245–6 Morrison, H. 69 multi-level party systems 156, 177–8 coalition potential of parties 167–8 effective number of electoral parties 168, 169 effective number of parliamentary parties 168, 169 European Parliament elections 175–6, 176, 177 Greater London Authority 172, 174 ideological distance and direction of party competition 168, 169, 170 local government 173, 175, 175 mayoral elections 172–3 party systems, types of 170 Northern Ireland 159, 160, 171–2 Scotland 170 Wales 171

National Assembly for Wales election results 158 National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations 203 Nesbitt, M. 166 non-mainstream parties see small parties Norris, P. 200–201, 233 Northern Ireland Democratic Unionist Party 160–62 ‘confidence and supply’ arrangement 3, 13, 36, 162 electoral performance 161, 162 ideology and policy 160–61, 162 performance in office 161–2 Northern Ireland Assembly election results (1998–2017) 160 party system 159, 160, 171–2 Sinn Fein 162–5 electoral performance 163–4 ideology and policy 162–3 leadership 164–5 origins of 162 performance in office 164 Social Democratic and Labour Party 166–7 electoral performance 167 ideology and policy 166 leadership 167 Ulster Unionist Party 165–6 Oliver, C. 191 ‘one nation’ conservatism 43, 44, 45 O’Neill, M. 164 Orange Order 165 organisational structure 225 Conservative Party 203–5 1922 Committee 203, 205 organisational reform 204 elements of party organisation 202 grassroots organisation 211, 213 Green Party 211 Labour Party 205–8 leadership dominance 202–3 Liberal Democrats 208–9 membership activities 28, 213–14, 214, 215 membership size 28, 29, 29, 211, 212, 212, 213, 213, 217 motivation to join political parties 215–16 reasons for members leaving parties 216–17 Scottish National Party 210–11

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Copyrighted material – 9781137577092 INDEX ‘stratarchical’ nature of parties 203 ‘supporters’ 215 UK Independence Party 211 owner–worker class cleavage 5, 9, 15, 18 Paisley, Rev. I. 160 Panebianco, A. 22 partisanship media 182, 183, 184–5, 186–7 party identification 8, 27, 27, 28, 40–41 party systems 5 classification of party systems 5–6 core 6 degrees of change in party systems 6–7 extreme / polarized pluralism 6 major cleavages 5 moderate pluralist systems 6, 17 predominant party systems 6 shocks to 1, 2, 3, 4 sources of party system change 6 stability of party systems 250 two-party systems 6 see also British party system Pedersen index 13 performance in office 15 Conservative Party 61–5 Democratic Unionist Party 161–2 Labour Party 87–90, 91 Liberal Democrats 107–10 Plaid Cymru 158–9 Scottish National Party 36, 124–8 Sinn Fein 164 Phillips, Sir H. 223, 224 phone hacking 187, 189, 200 Plaid Cymru 156–9 electoral performance 157, 158 ideology and policy 157 origins of 156–7 performance in office 158–9 Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) 160, 161, 164 political communication see media political parties adaptation to changing circumstances 256 challenges to 257–61, 265 identity politics 259, 260 links to society 257 managing the consequences of the referendums 260–61 need to explain policy decisions 258 policy failures 258 public trust 258–9

special interest groups, influence of 257 comparative perspectives coalition governments and hung parliaments 264 collapse of Italian party system 263–4 decline in party membership 263 financial crisis, impact of 264–5 party legitimacy 263, 265 ‘political earthquakes’ in Ireland and France 264 populist anti-politics parties 262–3 social movement organisations, rise of 262 constraints on 22–3 decline of 21, 40, 255 definitions of 21–2, 40 electoral function 24, 25–9 educating citizens 26 mobilising people to participate 28, 29 symbols of political identification and loyalty 27, 28 functions of 23–4, 25, 40, 41 electoral function 24, 25–9 integrative function 24 parties as organizations 30–34 parties in government 34–9 legitimacy 41, 256–7, 266 organising dissent and opposition 39–40 parties as organisations 30–34 aggregating political interests 32, 33, 34 articulating political interests 31–2, 34 recruiting political leadership 30, 31 seeking governmental office 30 training political elites 31 parties in government 34–9 controlling government administration 37–8 creating majorities 34, 35 ensuring responsibility for government actions 38, 39 fostering stability 35, 36, 37 implementing policy objectives 38 organising the government 37 reform proposals electoral reform 261–2 increased transparency 262 state funding 261 voter action 262

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Copyrighted material – 9781137577092 INDEX Political Parties and Elections Act (PPEA) (2009) 224 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act (PPERA) (2000) 221–2 political socialisation within the family 8 poll tax 40, 51 populist anti-politics parties 148, 262–3 PPEA (2009) 224 PPERA (2000) 221–2 Prescott, J. 239 press secretaries briefings 191 primaries 58, 59 Provisional IRA 162, 165 PSNI 160, 161, 164 public -private sector cleavage 15 public trust 258–9 ‘rational choice’ voting 39, 230–31, 231, 232–3 representativeness Conservative Party 57, 58, 59, 59, 60, 60, 61 Labour Party 83, 84–5, 85, 86. 87 Liberal Democrats 105, 106, 107 Scottish National Party 122, 123, 124 Respect 140–41, 147, 148, 149, 150 Robinson, P. 160, 161 Rohrschneider, R. 239 Rokkan, S. 5 Saatchi & Saatchi 234, 235 Salmond, A. 210 assessment of leadership 118, 119–20 Sartori, G. 5–6, 21–2, 167, 168, 170, 171, 176 SCA 235 Scammell, M. 189 Scotland independence referendums 1–2, 64, 128–30 party system 170 Scottish National Party (SNP) 1, 2, 112, 130–31 candidate selection 122–3 ideology and policy 112–13, 115–17 citizenship 116–17 independence 116, 117 pro-European 117 independence referendums 128 -30 leadership 118–22 election of leaders 122

SNP leaders (1990–2017) 118 organisational structure 210–11 performance in office 36, 124–8 representativeness 122, 123, 124 Scottish Parliament election results (1999–2016) 114 SDLP see Social Democratic and Labour Party Shadow Communications Agency (SCA) 235 Sinn Fein (SF) 162–5 electoral performance 163–4 ideology and policy 162–3 leadership 164–5 origins of 162 performance in office 164 small parties 132, 133, 134 challenges faced by 150–54, 155 competing among themselves 151–2 ‘poaching’ of policies by mainstream parties 150–51 resources 152, 153, 154, 154 defining 133–4 factors in the success of 146–50, 154–5 leadership 149 populism 148 ‘second-order’ elections 149 membership 152, 152, 153 see also British National Party; Green Party; Respect; UK Independence Party Smith, G. 6, 7 Smith, J. assessment of leadership 77–8 Smith, O. 83 SNP see Scottish National Party Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 166–7 electoral performance 167 ideology and policy 166 leadership 167 social-economic structure voting behaviour, and 227–8, 228, 229, 230 social liberalism 93, 94, 95 social movement organisations rise of 262 Special Advisers (Spads) 191 special interest groups influence of 257 ‘spin doctors’ 179, 189 Steel, D. 99 ‘stratarchical’ nature of parties 203

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Copyrighted material – 9781137577092 INDEX Sturgeon, N. 117, 119, 120, 129, 130, 194, 210 assessment of leadership 121 ‘supporters’ of political parties 215 Swann, R. 166 Swinney, J. assessment of leadership 120 televised leaders’ debates 193–5, 239 Thatcher, M. 12, 40, 61, 94, 190 assessment of leadership 49–51, 61, 62 Thatcherism 44, 45 ‘Third Way’ 71, 72 Tories 7 Toynbee, P. 183 trade unions 32, 70, 76, 79, 80, 83, 84, 205, 207, 217, 225, 240 Trimble, D. 165 Twitter 196, 197, 198 UK Independence Party (UKIP) 134–40, 147, 148, 149, 150 electoral performance 136, 136, 137, 137, 138 electoral support 138 EU referendum 135, 140 ideology and policy 134–6 immigration 135–6 populist anti-politics approach 136 income 153 internal conflict 138, 139 leadership 138, 139 limited representation outside England 139–40 organisational structure 211 origins of 134

Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 165–6 urban-rural cleavage 5, 8–9 ‘valence’ politics 39, 232–3 voter turnout 12, 13, 28, 41 voting behaviour 227, 247 age 229 gender 229 geography 15–16, 229 impact of the media 199–200, 201 political socialisation within the family 8 ‘rational choice’ voting 39, 230–31, 231, 232–3 social-economic structure 227–8, 228, 229, 230 Wales National Assembly for Wales election results 158 party system 171 Plaid Cymru 156–9 Ware, A. 22 Watts, D. 180 Webb, P. 263 Webb, S. 68 Weiner, M. 22 Welsh Assembly see National Assembly for Wales Whigs 7 Williams, K. 107 Wilson, D. 173, 175 Wilson, H. assessment of leadership 75 ‘Winter of Discontent’ 75, 89 YouTube 196, 197